














# THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW



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## SUPERNATURAL RELIGION.

(FIRST ARTICLE.)

*Supernatural Religion: An Inquiry into the Reality of  
Divine Revelation. Two vols. Second Edition. London  
Longmans. & Co.*

**I**F the author of "Supernatural Religion" designed, by withholding his name, to stimulate public curiosity and thus to extend the circulation of his work, he has certainly not been disappointed in his hope. When the rumour once got abroad, that it proceeded from the pen of a learned and venerable prelate, the success of the book was secured. For this rumour indeed there was no foundation in fact. It was promptly and emphatically denied, when accidentally it reached the ears of the supposed author. But meanwhile the report had been efficacious. The reviewers had taken the work in hand and (with one exception) lavished their praises on the critical portions of it. The first edition was exhausted in a few months.

No words can be too strong to condemn the heartless cruelty of this imputation. The venerable prelate, on whom the authorship of this anonymous work was thrust, deserved least of all men to be exposed to such an insult. As an academic teacher and as an ecclesiastical ruler alike, he had distinguished himself by a courageous avowal of his opinions at all costs. For more than a quarter of a century he had lived in the full blaze of publicity, and on his fearless integrity no breath of suspicion had ever rested. Yet now, when increasing



infirmities obliged him to lay down his office, he was told that his life for years past had been one gigantic lie. The insinuation involved nothing less than this. Throughout those many years, during which the anonymous author, as he himself tells us, had been preparing for the publication of an elaborate and systematic attack upon Christianity, the bishop was preaching Christian doctrine, confirming Christian children, ordaining Christian ministers, without breathing a hint to the world that he felt any misgiving of the truths which he thus avowed and taught. Yet men talked as if, somehow or other, the cause of "freethinking" had gained great moral support from the conversion of a bishop, though, if the rumour had been true, their new convert had for years past been guilty of the basest fraud of which a man is capable.

And all the while there was absolutely nothing to recommend this identification of the unknown author. The intellectual characteristics of the work present a trenchant contrast to the refined scholarship and cautious logic of this accomplished prelate. Only one point of resemblance could be named. The author shows an acquaintance with the theological critics of the modern Dutch school; and a knowledge of Dutch writers was known, or believed, to have a place among the acquisitions of this omniscient scholar. Truly no reputation is safe, when such a reputation is traduced on these grounds.

I have been assuming however that the work entitled "Supernatural Religion," which lies before me, is the same work which the reviewers have applauded under this name. But, when I remember that the St. Mark of Papias cannot possibly be our St. Mark, I feel bound to throw upon this assumption the full light of modern critical principles; and, so tested, it proves to be not only hasty and unwarrantable, but altogether absurd. It is only necessary to compare the statements of highly intellectual reviewers with the work itself; and every unprejudiced mind must be convinced that "the evidence is fatal to the claims" involved in this identification. Out of five reviews or notices of the work which I have read, only one seems to refer to our "Supernatural Religion." The other four are plainly dealing with some apocryphal work, bearing the same name and often using the same language, but in its main characteristics quite different from and much more authentic than the volumes before me.

1. It must be observed in the first place, that the reviewers agree in attributing to the work scholarship and criticism of the highest order. "The author," writes one, "is a scientifically trained critic. He has learned to argue and to weigh evidence." "The book," adds a second, "proceeds from a man of ability, a scholar and a reasoner." "His scholarship," says this same reviewer again, "is apparent throughout." "Along with a wide and minute scholarship," he

writes in yet another place, "the unknown writer shows great acuteness." Again a third reviewer, of whose general tone, as well as of his criticisms on the first part of the work, I should wish to speak with the highest respect, praises the writer's "searching and scholarly criticism." Lastly, a fourth reviewer attributes to the author "careful and acute scholarship." This testimony is explicit, and it comes from four different quarters. It is moreover confirmed by the rumour already mentioned, which assigned the work to a bishop who has few rivals among his contemporaries as a scholar and a critic.

Now, since the documents which our author has undertaken to discuss, are written almost wholly in the Greek and Latin languages, it may safely be assumed that under the term "scholarship" the reviewers included an adequate knowledge of these languages. Starting from this as an axiom which will not be disputed, I proceed to enquire what we find in the work itself, which will throw any light on this point.

The example, which I shall take first, relates to a highly important passage of Irenæus,\* containing a reference in some earlier authority, whom this father quotes, to a saying of our Lord recorded only in St. John's Gospel. The passage begins thus :—

"As the elders say, then also shall those deemed worthy of the abode in heaven depart thither; and others shall enjoy the delights of paradise; and others shall possess the splendour of the city; for everywhere the Saviour shall be seen according as they that see Him shall be worthy."

Then follows the important paragraph which is translated differently by our author† and by Dr. Westcott.‡ For reasons which will appear immediately, I place the two renderings side by side :—

WESTCOTT.

"This distinction of dwelling, they taught, exists between those who brought forth a hundred-fold, and those who brought forth sixty-fold, and those who brought forth twenty-fold (Matt. xiii. 8). . . .

And it was for this reason the Lord said that *in His Father's house* (ἐν τοῖς τοῦ πατρὸς) *are many mansions* (John xiv. 2)." §

SUPERNATURAL RELIGION.

"But there is to be this distinction of dwelling (εἶναι δὲ τὴν διαστολὴν ταύτην τῆς οἰκῆσεως) of those bearing fruit the hundred-fold, and of the (bearers of) the sixty-fold, and of the (bearers of) the thirty-fold: of whom some indeed shall be taken up into the heavens, some shall live in Paradise, and some shall inhabit the city, and for that reason (διὰ τοῦτο—προpter hoc) the Lord declared many mansions to be in the (heavens) of my Father (ἐν τοῖς τοῦ πατρὸς μου μόνις εἶναι πολλὰς)," &c.

\* Iren. v. 36. 1, 2.

† S. R. II. p. 328 sq.

‡ Canon, p. 63, note 2.

§ The Greek is εἶναι δὲ τὴν διαστολὴν ταύτην τῆς οἰκῆσεως . . . καὶ διὰ τὸ το εἰρηκέναι τὸν κύριον ἐν τοῖς τοῦ πατρὸς μου μόνις εἶναι πολλὰς κ. τ. λ.

On this extract our author remarks that "it is impossible for any one who attentively considers the whole of this passage and who makes himself acquainted with the manner in which Irenæus conducts his argument, and interweaves it with texts of Scripture, to doubt that the phrase we are considering is introduced by Irenæus himself, and is in no case a quotation from the work of Papias." As regards the relation of this quotation from the Fourth Gospel to Papias any remarks, which I have to make, must be deferred for the present; but on the other point I venture to say that any fairly trained school-boy will feel himself constrained by the rules of Greek grammar to deny what our author considers it "impossible" even "to doubt." He himself is quite unconscious of the difference between the infinitive and the indicative, or in other words between the oblique and the direct narrative; and so he boldly translates *εἶναι τὴν διαστολήν* as though it were *ἔσται* (or *μέλλει εἶναι*) ἡ διαστολή, and *εἰρήκεναι τὸν κύριον* as though it were *εἶρηκεν ὁ κύριος*. This is just as if a translator from a German original were to persist in ignoring the difference between "es sey" and "es ist" and between "der Herr sage" and "der Herr sagt." Yet so unconscious is our author of the real point at issue, that he proceeds to support his view by several other passages in which Irenæus "interweaves" his own remarks, because they happen to contain the words *διὰ τοῦτο*, though in every instance the indicative and *not the infinitive* is used. To complete this feat of scholarship he proceeds to charge Dr. Westcott with what "amounts to a falsification of the text," because this scholarly writer has inserted the words "they taught" to show that in the original the sentence containing the reference to St. John is in the oblique narrative and therefore reports the words of others.\* I shall not retort this charge of "falsification," because I do not think that the cause of truth is served by imputing immoral motives to those from whom we differ; and indeed the context shows that our author is altogether blind to the grammatical necessity. But I would venture to ask whether it would not have been more prudent, as well as more seemly, if he had paused before venturing, under the shelter of an anonymous publication, to throw out this imputation of dishonesty against a writer of

\* Our author has already (p. 326) accused Tischendorf of 'deliberately falsifying the text by inserting, "say they."' Tischendorf's words are, 'Und deshalb sagen sie habe der Herr den Ausspruch gethan.' He might have spared the 'sagen sic,' because the German idiom 'habe' enables him to express the main fact that the words are not Irenæus' own, without this addition. But he has not altered any idea which the original contains; whereas our author himself has suppressed this all-important fact in his own translation.

The reader may compare S. R. II. p. 100, 'The lightness and inaccuracy with which the "Great African" proceeds, is all the better illustrated by the fact, that not only does he accuse Marcion falsely, but he actually defines the motives for which he expunged the passage which never existed, &c. . . he actually repeats the same charge on two other occasions.'

singular candour and moderation, who has at least given to the world the hostage and the credential of an honoured name. It is necessary to add that our author persists in riveting this grammatical error on himself. He returns to the charge again in two later footnotes \* and declares himself to have *shown* "that it [the reference to the Fourth Gospel] must be referred to Irenæus himself, and that there is no ground for attributing it to the Presbyters at all." "Most critics," he continues, "admit the uncertainty." As it will be my misfortune hereafter to dispute not a few propositions which "most critics" are agreed in maintaining, it is somewhat reassuring to find that they are quite indifferent to the most elementary demands of grammar.

The passage just discussed has a vital bearing on the main question at issue, the date of the Fourth Gospel. The second example which I shall take, though less important, is not without its value. As in the former instance our author showed his indifference to moods, so here he is equally regardless of tenses. He is discussing the heathen Celsus, who shows an acquaintance with the Evangelical narratives, and whose date therefore it is not a matter of indifference to ascertain. Origen, in the preface to his refutation of Celsus, distinctly states that this person had been long dead (*ἤδη καὶ πάλοι νεκρον*). In his first book again he confesses his ignorance who this Celsus was, but is disposed to identify him with a person of the name known to have flourished about a century before his own time.† But at the close of the last book,‡ addressing his friend Ambrosius who had sent him the work, and at whose instance he had undertaken the refutation, he writes (or rather, he is represented by our author as writing) as follows:—

"Know, however, that Celsus has promised to write another treatise after this one. . . . If, therefore, he has not fulfilled his promise to write a second book, we may well be satisfied with the eight books in reply to his 'Discourse.' If, however, he has commenced and finished this work also, seek it, and send it in order that we may answer it also, and confute the false teaching in it, &c."§

On the strength of the passage so translated, our author supposes that Origen's impression concerning the date of Celsus had meanwhile been "considerably modified," and remarks that he now "treats him as a contemporary." Unfortunately however, the tenses, on which everything depends, are freely handled in this translation. \* Origen does not say, "Celsus *has* promised," but "Celsus *promises*" (*ἐπαγγελλόμενον*), i.e. in the treatise before him, for Origen's knowledge was plainly derived from the book itself. And again, he does not say "If he *has* not fulfilled his promise to write," but "If he *did* not

\* S. R. II. p. 334.

† C. Cels., viii. 76.

‡ C. Cels., i. 8.

§ S. R. II. p. 231, sq.

· write as he undertook to do" (ἐγράψεν ὑποσχόμενος); nor "if he has commenced and finished," but "if he commenced and finished" (ἀρξάμενος συνετέλεσε).<sup>\*</sup> Thus Origen's language itself here points to a past epoch, and is in strict accordance with the earlier passages in his work.

These two examples have been chosen, not because they are by any means the worst specimens of our author's Greek, but because in both cases an elaborate argument is wrecked on this rock of grammar. If any reader is curious to see how he can drive his ploughshare through a Greek sentence, he may refer for instance to the translations of Basilides (II. p. 46), or of Valentinus (p. 63), or of Philo (p. 265 sq.) Or he may draw his inferences from such renderings as ὁ λόγος ἐδήλου, "Scripture declares," † or κατὰ κόβρης προπηλακίζει, ‡ "to inflict a blow on one side;" or from such perversions of meaning as "did no wrong," twice repeated § as a translation of οὐδὲν ἤμαρτε in an important passage of Papias relating to St. Mark, where this Father really means that the Evangelist, though his narrative was not complete, yet "made no mistake" in what he did record.

Nor does our author's Latin fare any better than his Greek, as may be inferred from the fact that he can translate "nihil tamen differt credentium fidei," "nothing nevertheless differs in the faith of believers," || instead of "it makes no difference to the faith of believers," thus sacrificing sense and grammar alike. Or it is still better illustrated by the following example:—

"Nam ex iis commentatoribus quos habemus, Lucam videtur Marcion elegisse quem caderet." Tertull. *adv. Marc.* iv. 2.

"For of the Commentators whom we possess, Marcion seems (*videtur*) to have selected Luko, which he mutilates." *S. R.* II. p. 99.

Here again tenses and moods are quite indifferent, an imperfective subjunctive being treated as a present indicative; while at the same time our author fails to perceive that the "Commentatores" are the Evangelists themselves. His mind seems to be running on the Commentaries of De Wette and Alford, and he has forgotten the Commentaries of Cæsar.

Having shown that the author does not possess the elementary knowledge which is indispensable in a critical scholar, I shall not stop to inquire how far he exhibits those higher qualifications of a critic, which are far more rare—whether for instance he has the discriminating tact and nice balance of judgment necessary for such a work, or whether again he realizes how men in actual life do speak and write now, and might be expected to speak and write sixteen or seventeen centuries ago—without which qualifications the most painful study

\* There is also another aorist in the part of the sentence, which our author has not quoted, ἕλλο σύνταγμα . . . ἐν ᾧ διδάξεν ἐπηγγελματο.

† II. p. 296 sq.

§ I. p. 448, comp. p. 455.

‡ II. p. 192.

|| II. p. 384.

and reproduction of German and Dutch criticism is valueless. These qualifications cannot be weighed or measured, and I must trust to my subsequent investigations to put the reader in possession of data for forming a judgment on these points. At present it will be sufficient to remark that a scholarly writer might at least be expected not to contradict himself on a highly important question of Biblical criticism. Yet this is what our author does. Speaking of the descent of the angel at the pool of Bethesda (John v. 3, 4) in his first part, he writes: "The passage is not found in the older MSS. of the Fourth Gospel, and it was probably a later interpolation."\* But, having occasion towards the end of his work to refer again to this same passage, he entirely forgets his previously expressed opinion, and is very positive on the other side. "We must believe," he writes, "that this passage did originally belong to the text, and has from an early period been omitted from the MSS. on account of the difficulty it presents."† And, to make the contradiction more flagrant, he proceeds to give a reason why the disputed words must have formed part of the original text.

It must be evident by this time to any "impartial mind," that the "Supernatural Religion" of the reviewers cannot be our "Supernatural Religion." The higher criticism has taught me that poor foolish Papias, an extreme specimen of "the most deplorable carelessness and want of critical judgment" displayed by the Fathers on all occasions, cannot possibly have had our St. Mark's Gospel before him, because he says that his St. Mark recorded only "some" of our Lord's sayings and doings, and did not record them in order (though by the way no one maintains that everything said and done by Christ is recorded in our Second Gospel, or that the events follow in strict chronological sequence); and how then is it possible to resist the conclusion, which is forced upon the mind by the concurrent testimony of so many able reviewers, the leaders of intellectual thought in this critical nineteenth century, to the consummate scholarship of the writer, that they must be referring to a different recension, probably more authentic and certainly far more satisfactory than the book which lies before me?

2. And the difficulty of the popular identification will be found to increase as the investigation proceeds. There is a second point, also, on which our critics are unanimous. Our first reviewer describes the author as "scrupulously exact in stating the arguments of adversaries." Our fourth reviewer uses still stronger language: "The author with excellent candour places before us the materials on which a judgment must rest, with great fulness and perfect impartiality." The testimony

\* I. p. 113. The last words ran 'certainly a late interpolation' in the first edition (I. p. 103). Thus the passage has undergone revision, and yet the author has not discovered the contradiction.

† II. p. 421.

of the other two, though not quite so explicit, tends in the same direction. "An earnest seeker after truth," says the second reviewer, "looking around at all particulars pertaining to his inquiries." "The account given in the volume we are noticing," writes the third, "is a perfect mine of information on this subject, alloyed indeed with no small prejudice, yet so wonderfully faithful and comprehensive that an error may be detected by the light of the writer's own searching and scholarly criticism."

Now this is not the characteristic of the book before me. The author does indeed single out from time to time the weaker arguments of "apologetic" writers, and on these he dwells at great length; but their weightier facts and lines of reasoning are altogether ignored by him, though they often occur in the same books and even in the same contexts which he quotes. This charge will, I believe, be abundantly substantiated as I proceed. At present I shall do no more than give a few samples.

Our author charges the Epistle ascribed to Polycarp with an anachronism,\* because, though in an earlier passage St. Ignatius is assumed to be dead, "in chap. xiii. he is spoken of as living, and information is requested regarding him 'and those who are with him.'" Why then does he not notice the answer which he might have found in any common source of information, that when the Latin version (the Greek is wanting here) "*de his qui cum eo sunt*" is retranslated into the original language, *τοῖς σὺν αὐτῷ*, the "anachronism" altogether disappears? Again, when he devotes more than forty pages to the discussion of Papias,† why does he not even mention the view maintained by Dr. Westcott and others (and certainly suggested by a strict interpretation of Papias' own words), that this father's object in his "Exposition" was not to construct a new evangelical narrative, but to interpret and illustrate by oral tradition one already lying before him in written documents? This view, if correct, entirely alters the relation of Papias to the written Gospels; and its discussion was a matter of essential importance to the main question at issue. Again, when he reproduces the Tübingen fallacy respecting "the strong prejudice" of Hegesippus against St. Paul,‡ and quotes the often-quoted passage from Stephanus Gobarus, in which this writer refers to the language of Hegesippus condemning the use of the words, "Eye hath not seen, etc.," why does he not state that these words were employed by heretical teachers to justify their rites of initiation, and consequently "apologetic" writers contend that Hegesippus refers to the words, not as used by St. Paul, but as misapplied by these heretics? Since, according to the Tübingen interpretation, this single notice contradicts everything else which we know of the opinions of Hegesippus, the view

\* S. R. I. p. 276.

† I. p. 444-485.

‡ I. p. 441.

of "apologists" might perhaps have been worth a moment's consideration. And again, in the elaborate examination of Justin Martyr's evangelical quotations, in which he had Credner's careful analysis to guide him, and which therefore is quite the most favourable specimen of his critical work, our author frequently refers to Dr. Westcott's book to censure it, and many comparatively insignificant points are discussed at great length. Why then does he not once mention Dr. Westcott's argument founded on the looseness of Justin Martyr's quotations from the Old Testament, as throwing some light on the degree of accuracy which he might be expected to show in quoting the Gospels? \* The former Justin supposed to be (as one of the reviewers expresses it) "almost automatically inspired," whereas he took a much larger view of the inspiration of the evangelical narratives. A reader fresh from the perusal of "Supernatural Religion" will have his eyes opened as to the character of Justin's mind, when he turns to Dr. Westcott's book, and finds how Justin interweaves, mis-names, and mis-quotes passages from the Old Testament. It cannot be said that these are unimportant points. In every instance which I have selected, these omitted considerations vitally affect the main question at issue.

Our fourth reviewer however uses the words which I have already quoted, "excellent candour," "great fulness," "perfect impartiality," with special reference to the part of the work relating to the authorship and character of the Fourth Gospel, which he describes as "a piece of keen and solid reasoning." This is quite decisive. Our author might have had his own grounds for ignoring the arguments of "apologetic" writers, or he may have been ignorant of them. For reasons which will appear presently, the latter alternative ought probably to be adopted as explaining some omissions. But however this may be, the language of the reviewer is quite inapplicable to the work lying before me. It may be candid in the sense of being honestly meant, but it is not candid in any other sense; and it is the very reverse of full and impartial. The arguments of "apologetic" writers are systematically ignored in this part of the work. Once or twice indeed he fastens on passages from such writers, that he may make capital of them; but their main arguments remain wholly unnoticed. Why, for instance, when he says of the Fourth Gospel "that instead of the fierce and intolerant temper of the Son of Thunder; we find a spirit breathing forth nothing but gentleness and

\* In I. p. 260, there is a foot-note, 'For the arguments of apologetic criticism the reader may be referred to Canon Westcott's work "On the Canon," p. 112-139. Dr. Westcott does not attempt to deny the fact that Justin's quotations are different from the text of our Gospels; but he accounts for his variations on grounds which are purely imaginary.' I can hardly suppose that our author had read the passage to which he refers. Otherwise the last sentence would doubtless have run thus, 'but he accounts for his variations by arguments which it would give me some trouble to answer.'



love,"\* does he forget to add that "apologists" have pointed to such passages as "Ye are of your father the devil," as a refutation of this statement—passages far more "intolerant" than anything recorded in the Synoptic Gospels?† Why again, when he asserts that "allusion is undoubtedly made to" St. Paul in the words of the Apocalypse, "them that hold the teaching of Balaam, who taught Balak to cast a stumblingblock before the children of Israel, to eat things sacrificed to idols,"‡ does he forget to mention that St. Paul himself uses this same chapter in Jewish history as a warning to those free-thinkers and free-livers, who eat things sacrificed to idols, regardless of the scandal which their conduct might create, and thus, so far from a direct antagonism, there is a substantial agreement between the two Apostles on this point?§ Why, when he is endeavouring to minimize, if not to deny, the Hebraic character of the Fourth Gospel, does he wholly ignore the investigations of Luthardt and others, which (as "apologists" venture to think) show that the whole texture of the language in the Fourth Gospel is Hebraic? Why again, when he alludes to "the minuteness of details"|| in this Gospel as alleged in defence of its authenticity, is he satisfied with this mere caricature of the "apologetic" argument? Having set up a man of straw, he has no difficulty in knocking him down. He has only to declare that "the identification of an eye-witness by details is absurd." It would have been more to the purpose if he had boldly grappled with such arguments as he might have found in Mr. Sanday's book for instance; arguments founded not on the minuteness of details, but on the thorough naturalness with which the incidents develop themselves,

\* II. p. 411.

† Our author himself refers to this saying for a wholly different purpose later on (p. 416).

‡ II. p. 408. Our author says, 'It is clear that Paul is referred to in the address to the Church of Ephesus: "And thou didst try them which say that they are Apostles and are not, and didst find them false."' He seems to forget what he himself has said (p. 395), 'No result of criticism rests upon a more secure basis . . . than the fact that the Apocalypse was written in A.D. 68, 69,' i.e., after St. Paul's death. This theory moreover is directly at variance with the one definite fact which we know respecting the personal relations between the two Apostles; namely, that they gave to each other the right hands of fellowship (Gal. ii. 9). It is surprising therefore that this extravagant paradox should have been recently reproduced in an English review of high character.

§ 1 Cor. x. 7, 8, 14, 21. When the season of persecution arrived, and the constancy of Christians was tested in this very way, St. Paul's own principles would require a correspondingly rigid abstinence from even apparent complicity in idolatrous rites. There is every reason therefore to believe that, if St. Paul had been living when the Apocalypse was written, he would have expressed himself not less strongly on the same side. On the other hand these early Gnostics who are denounced in the Apocalypse seem, like their successors in the next generation, to have held that a Christian might conform to Gentile practices in these matters to escape persecution. St. Paul combats this spirit of license, then in its infancy, in the First Epistle to the Corinthians.

|| II. p. 415.

on the subtle and inobtrusive traits of character which appear in the speakers, on the local colouring which is inseparably interwoven with the narrative, on the presence of strictly Jewish (as distinguished from Christian) ideas, more especially Messianic ideas, which saturate the speeches, and the like. And, if he could have brought forward any parallel to all this in the literature of the time, or could even have shown a reasonable probability that such a fiction might have been produced in an age which (as we are constantly reminded) was singularly inappreciative and uncritical in such matters, and which certainly has not left any evidence of a genius for realism, for its highest conception of romance-writing does not rise above the stiffness of the Clementines or the extravagance of the Protevangelium—if he could have done this, he would at least have advanced his argument a step.\* Why again, when he is emphasizing the differences between the Apocalypse and the Fourth Gospel, does he content himself with stating “that some apologetic writers” are “satisfied by the analogies which could scarcely fail to exist between two works dealing with a similar (!) theme,”† without mentioning for the benefit of the reader some of these analogies, as for instance, that our Lord is styled the Word of God in these two writings, and these alone, of the New Testament? He recurs more than once to the doctrine of the Logos, as exhibited in the Gospel, but again he is silent about the presence of this nomenclature in the Apocalypse. Why, when he contrasts the Christology of the Synoptic Gospels with the Christology of St. John,‡ does he not mention that “apologists” quote in reply our Lord’s words in Matt. xi. 27, sq., “All things are delivered unto me of my Father; and no man knoweth the Son but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to whom soever the Son will reveal him. Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest”? This one passage, they assert, covers the characteristic teaching of the Fourth Gospel, and hitherto they have not been answered. Again, our author says very positively that “the Synoptics clearly represent the ministry of Jesus as having been limited to a single year, and his preaching is confined to Galilee and Jerusalem, where his career culminates at the fatal Passover;” thus contrasting with the Fourth Gospel, which “distributes the teaching of Jesus between Galilee, Samaria, and Jerusalem, makes it extend at least over three years, and refers to three Passovers spent by Jesus at Jerusalem.”§ Why then does he not add that “apologetic” writers refer to such passages as Matt. xiii. 37 (comp. Luke xiii. 34),

\* Our author (p. 444) speaks of ‘the works of imagination of which the world is full, and the singular realism of many of which is recognized by all.’ Is this a true description of the world in the early Christian ages? If not, it is nothing to the purpose.

† II. p. 389. “Apologists” lay stress on the difference of theme.

‡ II. p. 468, and elsewhere.

§ II. p. 451

"O, Jerusalem, Jerusalem, . . . *how often* would I have gathered thy children together"? Here the expression "*how often*," it is contended, obliges us to postulate other visits, probably several visits, to Jerusalem, which are not recorded in the Synoptic Gospels themselves. And it may be suggested also that the twice-repeated notice of time in the context of St. Luke, "I do cures *to-day and to-morrow, and the third day* I shall be perfected," "I must walk *to-day and to-morrow and the day following*," points to the very duration of our Lord's ministry, as indicated by the Fourth Gospel. If so, the coincidence is the more remarkable, because it does not appear that St. Luke himself, while recording these prophetic words, was aware of their full historical import. But whatever may be thought of this last point, the contention of "apologetic" writers is that here, as elsewhere, the Fourth Gospel supplies the key to historical difficulties in the Synoptic narratives, which are not unlocked in the course of those narratives themselves, and this fact increases their confidence in its value as an authentic record.

Again : he refers several times to the Paschal controversy of the second century as bearing on the authorship of the Fourth Gospel. On one occasion he devotes two whole pages to it.\* Why then does he not mention that "apologetic" writers altogether deny what he states to be absolutely certain ; maintaining on the contrary that the Christian Passover, celebrated by the Asiatic Churches on the 14th Nisan, commemorated not the Institution of the Lord's Supper, but, as it naturally would, the Sacrifice on the Cross, and asserting that the main dispute between the Asiatic and Roman Churches had reference to the question whether the commemoration should take place always on the 14th Nisan (irrespective of the day of the week) or always on a Friday ? Thus, they claim the Paschal controversy as a witness on their own side. This view may be right or wrong ; but inasmuch as any person might read the unusually full account of the controversy in Eusebius from beginning to end, without a suspicion that the alternative of the 14th or 15th Nisan, as the day of the Crucifixion, entered into the dispute at all, the *onus probandi* rests with our author, and his stout assertions were certainly needed to supply the place of arguments.

The same reticence or ignorance respecting the arguments of "apologetic" writers is noticeable also when he deals with the historical and geographical allusions in the Fourth Gospel. If by any chance he condescends to discuss a question, he takes care to fasten on the least likely solution of "apologists" (*e.g.* the identification of Sychar and Shechem),† omitting altogether to notice others. But as a rule,

\* II. p. 472 sq. ; comp. pp. 186 sq., 271.

† II. p. 421. Travellers and 'apologists' alike now more commonly identify Sychar with the village bearing the Arabic name Askar. This fact is not mentioned by our author. He says moreover 'It is admitted that there was no such

he betrays no knowledge whatever of his adversaries' arguments. One instance will suffice to illustrate his mode of procedur . Referring to the interpretation of Siloam as "sent," in John ix. 7, he stigmatizes this as "a distinct error," because the word signifies "a spring, a fountain, a flow of water;" and he adds that "a foreigner with a slight knowledge of the language is misled by the superficial analogy of sound." \* Does he not know (his Gesenius will teach him this) that Siloam signifies a fountain, or rather, an aqueduct, a conduit, like the Latin *emissarium*, because it is derived from the Hebrew *shalach* "to send"? and if he does know it, why has he left his readers entirely in the dark on this subject? As the word is much disguised in its Greek dress (*Siloam* for *Shiloach*), the knowledge of its derivation is not unimportant, and "apologists" claim to have this item of evidence transferred to their side of the account. Any one disposed to retaliate upon our author for his habitual reticence would find in these volumes, ready made for his purpose, a large assortment of convenient phrases ranging from "discreet reserve" to "wilful and deliberate evasion." I do not intend to yield to this temptation. But the reader will have drawn his own conclusions from this recklessness of assault in one whose own armour is gaping at every joint.

But indeed, when he does stoop to notice the arguments of "apologetic" writers, he is not always successful in apprehending their meaning.

Thus he writes of the unnamed disciple, the assumed author of the Fourth Gospel :—

"The assumption that the disciple thus indicated is John, rests principally on the fact that whilst the author mentions the other apostles, he seems studiously to avoid directly naming John, and also that he only once distinguishes John the Baptist by the appellation *ὁ βαπτιστής*, whilst he carefully distinguishes the two disciples of the name of Judas, and always speaks of the Apostle Peter as 'Simon Peter,' or 'Peter,' or but rarely as 'Simon' only. Without pausing to consider the slightness of this evidence, &c."†

Now the fact is, that the Fourth Evangelist *never once* distinguishes this John as "the Baptist," though such is his common designation in the other Gospels; and the only person, in whom the omission would be natural, is his namesake, John the son of Zebedee. Hence "apologists" lay great stress on this fact, as an evidence all the more valuable, because it lies below the surface, and they urge with force, that this subtle indication of authorship is inconceivable

place [as Sychar, Συχαρ], and apologetic ingenuity is severely taxed to explain the difficulty.' This is altogether untrue. Others besides 'apologists' point to passages in the Talmud which speak of 'the well of Suchar (or Sochar, or Sichar);' see Neubauer, "La G ographie du Talmud," p. 169, sq. Our author refers in his note to an article by Delitzsch, "Zeitschr. f. Luth. Theol." 1856, p. 240, sq. He cannot have read the article, for these Talmudic references are its main purport.

\* II. p. 419.

† II. p. 423, sq.

as the literary device of a forger in the second century. We cannot wonder, however, if our author considers this evidence so slight that he will not even pause upon it, when he has altogether distorted it by a mis-statement of fact. But it is instructive to trace his error to its source. Turning to Credner, to whom the author gives a reference in a footnote, I find this writer stating that the Fourth Evangelist

"Has not found it necessary to distinguish John the Baptist from the Apostle John his namesake *even so much as once* (auch nur ein einziges Mal) by the addition *ὁ βαπτιστής*."\*

So then our author has stumbled over that little word "nur," and his German has gone the way of his Greek and his Latin. But the error is instructive from another point of view. This argument happens to be a *commonplace* of "apologists." How comes it then, that he was not set right by one or other of these many writers, even if he could not construe Credner's German? Clearly this cannot be the work which the reviewers credit with an "exhaustive" knowledge of the literature of the subject. I may be asked indeed to explain how, on this theory of mistaken identity which I here put forward, the work reviewed by the critics came to be displaced by the work before me, so that no traces of the original remain. But this I altogether decline to do, and I plead authority for refusing. "The mere negative evidence that our actual [Supernatural Religion] is not the work described by [the Reviewers] is sufficient for our purpose."†

3. But the argument is strengthened when we come to consider a third point. "The author's discussions," writes our first reviewer, "are conducted in a judicial method." "He has the critical faculty in union with a calm spirit." "Calm and judicial in tone," is the verdict of our second reviewer. The opinion of our third and fourth reviewers on this part may be gathered not so much from what they say as from what they leave unsaid. A fifth reviewer however, who seems certainly to have had our "Supernatural Religion" before him, holds different language. He rebukes the author—with wonderful gentleness, considering the gravity of the offence—for "now and then losing patience."

Now whether calmness of tone can be said to distinguish a work which bristles with such epithets as "monstrous," "impossible," "audacious," "preposterous," "absurd;" whether the habit of reiterating as axiomatic truths what at the very best are highly precarious hypotheses—as, for instance, that Papias did not refer to our St. Mark's

\* Credner, Einl. I. p. 210 ' . . . hat er es nicht für nöthig gefunden, den Täufer Johannes von dem gleichnamigen Apostel auch nur ein einziges Mal durch den Zusatz *ὁ βαπτιστής* zu unterscheiden (i. 6, 15, 19, 26, 28, 29, 32, 33, 41; iii. 23, 24, 25, 26, 27; iv. 1; v. 33, 36; x. 40, 41).'

† S. R. I. p. 459.

Gospel—does not savour more of the vehemence of the advocate than of the impartiality of the judge, I must ask the reader to decide for himself. But of the highly discreditable practice of imputing corrupt motives to those who differ from us, there cannot be two opinions. We have already seen how a righteous nemesis has overtaken our author, and he has covered himself with confusion, while recklessly flinging a charge of "falsification" at another. Unfortunately however that passage does not stand alone. I will not take up the reader's time with illustrations of a practice, of which we have seen more than enough already. But there is one example which is sufficiently instructive to deserve quoting. Dr. Westcott writes of Basilides as follows:—

The inverted commas are given here as they appear in Dr. Westcott's book. It need hardly be said that Dr. Westcott is simply illustrating the statement of Basilides that Glaucias was an interpreter of St. Peter by the similar statement of Papias and others that St. Mark was an interpreter of the same apostle—a very innocent piece of information, one would suppose. On this passage however our author remarks :—

Dr. Westcott's honour may safely be left to take care of itself. It stands far too high to be touched by insinuations like these. I only call attention to the fact that our author has removed Dr. Westcott's inverted commas, and then founded on the passage so manipulated a charge of unfair dealing, which could only be sustained in their absence, and which even then no one but himself would have thought of. I will not retort upon our author the charge of "deliberate

† S. R. II. p. 44, sq. The words which I have enclosed in brackets were inserted in the 2nd edition. A frank withdrawal would have been worth something; but this insertion only aggravates the offence.

falsification," which he so freely levels at others, for I do not believe that he had any such intention. The lesson suggested by this highly characteristic passage is of another kind. It exemplifies the elaborate looseness which pervades the critical portion of this book. It illustrates the author's inability to look at things in a straightforward way. It emphasizes more especially the suspicious temper of the work, which makes it, as even a favourable reviewer has said, "painfully sceptical"—a temper which must necessarily vitiate all the processes of criticism, and which, if freely humoured elsewhere, would render life intolerable and history impossible.

It is difficult to see what end the author proposed to attain by all this literary browbeating. In the course of my examination I shall be constrained to adopt many a view which has been denounced beforehand as impossible and absurd; and I shall give my reasons for doing so. If by an "apologist" is meant one who knows that he owes everything which is best and truest in himself to the teaching of Christianity—not the Christless Christianity which alone our author would spare, the works with the mainspring broken, but the Christianity of the Apostles and Evangelists—who believes that its doctrines, its sanctions, and its hopes, are truths of the highest moment to the wellbeing of mankind, and who, knowing and believing all this, is ready to use in its defence such abilities as he has, then a man may be proud to take even the lowest place among the ranks of "apologists," and to brave any insinuations of dishonesty which an anonymous critic may fling at him.

There is however another more subtle mode of intimidation which plays an important part in these volumes. Long lists of references are given in the notes, to modern critics who (as the reader would infer from the mode of reference) support the views mentioned or adopted by the author in the text. I have verified these references in one or two cases, and have found that several writers, at all events, do not hold the opinions to which their names are attached. But, under any circumstances, these lists will not fetter the judgment of any thoughtful mind. It is strange indeed, that a writer who denounces so strongly the influence of authority as represented by tradition, should be anxious to impose on his readers another less honourable yoke. There is at least a presumption (though in individual cases it may prove false on examination) that the historical sense of seventeen or eighteen centuries is larger and truer than the critical insight of a section of men in one late half century. The idols of our cave never present themselves in a more alluring form than when they appear as the "spirit of the age." It is comparatively easy to resist the fallacies of past times, but it is most difficult to escape the infection of the intellectual atmosphere in which we live. I ask myself, for instance, whether one who lived in the age of the rabbis would have been altogether right in resigning himself to the immediate current

of intellectual thought, because he saw, or seemed to see, that it was setting strongly in one direction.

This comparison is not without its use. Here were men eminently learned, painstaking, minute; eminently ingenious also, and in a certain sense, eminently critical. In accumulating and assorting facts—such facts as lay within their reach—and in the general thoroughness of their work, the rabbis of Jewish exegesis might well bear comparison with the rabbis of neologian criticism. They reigned supreme in their own circles for a time; their work has not been without its fruits; many useful suggestions have gone to swell the intellectual and moral inheritance of later ages; but their characteristic teaching, which they themselves would have regarded as their chief claim to immortality, has long since been consigned to oblivion. It might be minute and searching, but it was conceived in a false vein; it was essentially unhistorical, and therefore it could not live. The modern negative school of criticism seems to me to be equally perverse and unreal, though in a different way; and therefore I anticipate for it the same fate.

Mr. Matthew Arnold, alluding to an eccentric work of rationalizing tendencies written by an English scholar, and using M. Renan as his mouthpiece, expresses the opinion that "an extravagance of this sort could never have come from Germany where there is a great force of critical opinion controlling a learned man's vagaries, and keeping him straight."\* I confess that my experiences of the critical literature of Germany have not been so fortunate. It would be difficult, I think, to find among English scholars any parallel to the mass of absurdities, which several intelligent and very learned German critics have conspired to heap upon two simple names in the Philippian Epistle, Euodia and Syntyche; first, Baur suggesting that the pivot of the Epistle, which has a conciliatory tendency, is the mention of Clement, a mythical or almost mythical person, who represents the union of the Petrine and Pauline parties in the Church;† then Schwegler, carrying the theory a step further, and declaring that the two names, Euodia and Syntyche, actually represent these two parties, while the true yoke-fellow is St. Peter himself;‡ then Volkmar, improving the occasion, and showing that this fact is indicated in their very names, Euodia or "Rightway," and Syntyche or "Consort," denoting respectively the orthodoxy of the one party and the incorporation of the other;§ lastly, Hitzig lamenting that interpreters of the New Testament are not more thoroughly imbued with the language and spirit of the Old, and maintaining that these two names are reproductions of the patriarchs Asher and Gad—their sex having been changed in the transition from one language to another—and represent

\* "Essays in Criticism," p. 57.

† "Paulus," p. 469, sq. (1st ed.).

‡ "Nachapost. Zeitalter," II. p. 135.

§ "Theolog. Jahrb." XV. p. 311, sq., XVI. p. 147, sq.



the Greek and Roman elements in the Church, while the Epistle to the Philippians itself is a plagiarism from the Agricola of Tacitus.\* When therefore I find our author supporting some of his more important judgments by the authority of "Hitzig, Volkmar and others," or of "Volkmar and others,"† I have my own opinion of the weight which such names should carry with them.

It is not however against the eccentricities of individuals, except so far as these can be charged to a vicious atmosphere and training, that I would rest the chief stress of my complaint. The whole tone and spirit of the school in its excess of scepticism must, I venture to think, be fatal to the ends of true criticism. A reviewer of "Supernatural Religion" compares the author's handling of the reconstructive efforts of certain conservative critics regarding the Fourth Gospel to Sir G. C. Lewis's objections to Niebuhr's "equally arbitrary reconstruction of early Roman history." From one point of view this comparison is instructive. We have no means of testing the value of that eminent writer's negative criticisms of early Roman history. But where additional knowledge has enabled us to apply a test to his opinions, as, for instance, respecting the interpretation of the Egyptian hieroglyphic language, we find that his scepticism led him signally astray. It seems to be assumed that, because the sceptical spirit has its proper function in scientific inquiry (though even here its excesses will often impede progress), therefore its exercise is equally useful and equally free from danger in the domain of criticism. A moment's reflection however will show that the cases are wholly different. In whatever relates to morals and history—in short, to human life in all its developments—where mathematical or scientific demonstration is impossible, and where consequently everything depends on the even balance of the judicial faculties, scepticism must be at least as fatal to the truth as credulity.

The author of "Supernatural Religion" proposes to himself the task of demonstrating that the miraculous element in Christianity is a delusion. The work is divided into three parts. The first part undertakes to prove that miracles are not only highly improbable, but antecedently incredible, so that no amount of testimony can

\* "Zur Kritik Paulinischer Briefe." Leipzig. 1870. The author's conclusions are supported by an appeal to the Hebrew, Arabic, Syriac, and Armenian languages. The learning of this curious pamphlet keeps pace with its absurdity. If the reader is disposed to think that this writer must be laughing in his sleeve at the methods of the modern school to which he belongs, he is checked by the obviously serious tone of the whole discussion. Indeed it is altogether in keeping with Hitzig's critical discoveries elsewhere. To this same critic we owe the suggestion, that the name of the fabulist Æsop is derived from Solomon's "*ayssop* that springeth out of the wall," Kings iv. 33: "Die Sprüche Salomo's," p. xvi., sq.

† E.g. respecting the date of the book of Judith, on which depends the authenticity of Clement's Epistle (I. p. 222), the date of Celsus (II. p. 228), etc.

overcome the objections to them. As a subsidiary aim, he endeavours to show that the sort of evidence, which, under the most favourable circumstances we should be likely to obtain in the early Christian ages, ought not to inspire confidence. The second and third parts are occupied in examining the actual witnesses themselves, that is, the four Gospels; the second being devoted to the Synoptists, and the third to St. John. The main contention is that the four Gospels are entirely devoid of evidence sufficient to satisfy us of their date and authorship, considering the momentous import of their contents. These portions of the work therefore are chiefly occupied in examining the external testimonies to the authenticity and genuineness of the Gospels. In the case of St. John the internal character of the document is likewise subjected to examination.

Obviously, if the author has established his conclusions in the first part, the second and third are altogether superfluous. It is somewhat strange therefore, that more than three-fourths of the whole work should be devoted to this needless task. Impressed, as it would seem, by the elaboration of these portions, reviewers have singled them out for special praise, even when they have condemned the first as unsatisfactory. With this estimate of their value I find myself altogether unable to agree; and in the articles which will follow I hope to give my reasons for dissenting. Regarded as a handbook of the critical fallacies of the modern destructive school, "Supernatural Religion" well deserves examination.

For this reason I shall hereafter occupy myself solely with the two latter portions of the work, and more especially with the external evidences of the Gospels; but there is one point, affecting the main question at issue, which it is impossible to pass over in silence. Any one who, with the arguments of the first part fresh in his memory, will turn to the final chapter, in which the author gives a confession of faith, must be struck with the startling dislocation between the principles from which the work starts and the manifesto with which it concludes. Our author has eliminated, as he believes, the miraculous or supernatural element from the Gospel. He will have nothing to say to "Ecclesiastical Christianity," by which strange phrase is meant the Christianity of the Apostles and Evangelists. He will not even hear of a future life with its hopes and fears.\* He will purge the Gospel of all "dogmas," and will present it as an ethical system alone. The extreme beauty, I might almost say the absolute perfection, of Christ's moral teaching,† he not only allows, but insists upon. "Morality," he adds, "was the essence of his system; theology was an after-thought."‡ And yet almost in the same breath he adopts as his "two fundamental principles, Love to God and love to man." He commends a "morality based upon the earnest and intelligent acceptance of Divine Law, and perfect recog-

\* II. p. 484.

† P. 487, sq.

‡ P. 486.

nition of the brotherhood of man," as "the highest conceivable by humanity."\* He speaks of the "purity of heart which alone 'sees God.'"† He enforces the necessity of "rising to higher conceptions of an infinitely wise and beneficent Being . . . whose laws of wondrous comprehensiveness and perfection we ever perceive in operation around us."‡ All this is well said, but is it consistent? This universal "brotherhood of man," what is it but a "dogma" of the most comprehensive application? This "Love to God" springing from the apprehension of a "wondrous perfection," and the recognition of an "infinitely wise and beneficent Being,"—in short, this belief in a Heavenly Father, which on any showing was the fundamental axiom of our Lord's teaching, and which our author thus accepts as a cardinal article in his own creed,—what is it but a theological proposition of the most overwhelming import, before which all other "dogmas" sink into insignificance?

And what room, we are forced to ask, has he left for such a dogma? In the first portion of the work our author has been careful not to define his position. He has studiously avoided committing himself to a belief in a universal Father or a moral Governor, or even in a Personal God. If he had done so, he would have tied his hands at once. Very much of the reasoning which he brings forward against the miraculous element in Christianity in answer to Dr. Mozley and Dean Mansel, falls to the ground when this proposition is assumed. His arguments prove nothing, because they prove too much: for they are equally efficacious, or equally inefficacious, against the doctrine of a Divine providence or of human responsibility, as they are against the resurrection of Christ. The truth is, that when our author closes his work, he cannot face the conclusions to which his premisses would inevitably lead him. They are too startling for himself, as well as for his readers, in their naked deformity; and with a noble inconsistency he clutches at these "dogmas" to save himself from sinking into the abyss of moral scepticism.

Mr. J. S. Mill's inexorable logic may not be without its use, as holding up the mirror to such inconsistency. On his own narrow premisses this eminent logician builds up his own narrow conclusions with remorseless rigour. Our author in his first part adopts this same narrow basis, and truly enough finds no resting-place for Christianity upon it, as indeed there is none for any theory of a providential government. But at the conclusion he tacitly and (as it would seem) quite unconsciously assumes a much wider standing-ground. If he had not done so, he himself would have been edged off his footing, and hurled down the precipice. A whole pack of "pursuing wolves" § is upon him, far more ravenous than any which

\* P. 487, sq.

† P. 489.

‡ P. 490.

§ S. R. I. p. xiv.

beset the path of the believers in revelation ; and he has left himself no shelter. If he had commenced by defining what he meant by "Nature" and "Supernatural," he might have avoided this inconsistency, though he must have sacrificed much of his argument to save his creed. As it is, he has unconsciously juggled with two senses of Nature. Nature in the first part, where he is arguing against miracles, is the aggregate of external phenomena—the same Nature against which Mr. Mill prefers his terrible indictment for its cruelty and injustice. But Nature in the concluding chapter involves the idea of a moral Governor and a beneficent Father ; and this idea can only be introduced by opening flood-gates of thought which refuse to be closed just at the moment when it is necessary to bar the admission of the miraculous. Our author has ranged himself unconsciously with the "intuitive philosophers," of whom Mr. Mill speaks so scornfully. He has appealed, though he does not seem to be aware of it, to the inner consciousness of man, to the instincts and cravings of humanity, to interpret and supplement the teachings of external Nature ; and he is altogether unaware how large a concession he has made to believers in revelation by so doing.

Even though we should close our eyes to all other considerations, it is vain to ignore the inevitable moral consequences which flow from this mode of reasoning ; for they are becoming every day more apparent. The demand is made that we should abandon our Christianity on grounds which logically involve the abandonment of any belief in the providential government of the world and in the moral responsibility of man. Young men are apt to be far more logical than their elders. Older persons are taught by long experience to distrust the adequacy of their premisses : consciously or unconsciously, they supplement the narrow conclusions of their logic by larger lessons learnt from human life or from their own heart. But generally speaking, the young man has no such distrust. His teacher has appealed to Nature, and to Nature he shall go. The teacher becomes frightened, struggles to retrace his steps, and speaks of "an infinitely wise and beneficent Being ;" but the pupil insolently points out how

Nature, red in tooth and claw,  
With ravin, shrieks against his creed.

The teacher urges, "All that is consistent with wise and omnipotent Law is prospered and brought to perfection : " \* and the pupil replies : "You have limited my horizon to this life, and in this life the facts do not verify your statement." The teacher says, Believe that you—you personally—"are eternally cared for and governed by an omnipresent immutable power for which nothing is too great, nothing too insignificant." † The pupil says : "My Christianity did show me how this was possible ; but with my Christianity I have cast it away as a delusion. I could not stop short at this point consistently with

\* II. p. 492.

† *Id.*

the principles you have laid down for my guidance. I have done as you told me to do; I have 'ratified the fiat which maintains the order of Nature,'\* and I find Nature wholly

*Careless of the single life.*

I will therefore please myself henceforth." The teacher speaks of "the purity which alone sees God"; and to him the expression has a real meaning, for his mind is unconsciously saturated with ideas which he has certainly not learnt from his adopted philosophy: but to the pupil it has lost its articulate utterance, and is no better than sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. Hence the pupil, having thrown off his Christianity, too often follows out the principles of his teacher to their logical conclusions, and divests himself also of moral restraints, except so far as it may be convenient or necessary for him to submit to them. Happily this has not been the case hitherto in the large majority of instances. The permanence of habits formed in a nobler school of teaching, the abiding presence of a loftier ideal not derived from this new philosophy, and (we may add also) the voice of an inward witness whose authority is denied, but whose warnings nevertheless compel a hearing, all tend to raise the level of men's conduct above their principles. The full moral consequences of the teaching would only then be seen, if ever a generation should grow up, moulded altogether under its influences.

\* II. p. 492.

J. B. LIGHTFOOT.



## SAXON STUDIES.

### II.—OF GAMBRINUS.

#### I.

LIFE is a tissue of mysteries. One is, that if the feelings be touched the palate never complains. An egg, hard-boiled over the fire of the affections, outdoes an omelette by Savarin. A half-pint of schnapps poured into an earthen mug by the hand of the affections, has a finer aroma than old wine in crystal goblets, less finely presented. Or what rude bench, cushioned by the emotions, is not softer than satin and eider-down? The spiritual not only commands the sensual—it may be said to create it. The banquets of the gods are divine only in so far as they harmonize the two. This is the whole secret of nectar and ambrosia.

The theme so expands beneath the pen, that we were best bring it to a head at once. Suffice it introduces us to the modest establishment of Frau Schmidt, just beyond the outer droschky limits: a favourite resort of mine, though better beer, easier chairs, and more accessible sites be discoverable elsewhere. I cannot baffle the reader's insight—the outweighing attraction is Frau Schmidt herself. Yet she is not a widow,—nay, she is fonder of her husband than is the case with most Saxon women: and he is really quite a fine fellow. Moreover, her personal charms are not bewildering. She appears before us a grey-clad little woman, with plain, pleasant, patient visage and low, respectful voice: she puts down our schoppen

of beer on our accustomed table near the window, smiles a neutral-tinted little smile of welcome; and we pass the compliments of the day. Twice or thrice during our stay she returns to chat with us; and her big, grave, reticent husband stands beside her, and puts in a rumbling word or two. Anon they are off to serve their other customers—mostly common workmen out of the street, thirsty, rough fellows, with marvellous garments and manners. Evidently, the spell that draws us hither is one which works beneath the surface. Well, we are not going to draw aside the veil just yet. Let us first discuss our meditative beer: in the dregs of the last glass, perhaps, we shall find the secret revealed.

From our window is a view of the river and the town. A tree rustles in the little front-yard: beyond curves a dusty stretch of road. It is about four in the afternoon, and we have the room almost to ourselves. Till sunset we will sip, and muse, and moralize, and hold converse with the spirit of the great Gambrinus. Mighty, indeed, is he! Kings and emperors may talk, but to Gambrinus belongs the true fealty of Germans. We have only eulogy for him—his is a spell to disarm ill-nature's self. He is author of the most genial liquor in the world; his wholesome soul bubbles in every foaming glass of it. We could have forgiven Esau, had he yielded his birthright for a glass of German beer; nor would himself have regretted the exchange.

Try we a mouthful or two; how fresh, how wholesomely bitter—the texture how fine and frothy: mark the delicate film it leaves upon the glass. Lighter than English ale, of a less pronounced but more lastingly agreeable flavour: we tire of it no more than of bread. We may drink it by the gallon; and yet a little will go a long way. It seems not a foreign substance, but makes itself immediately at home. In colour it ranges from brightest amber to deepest Vandyke brown, and in strength from potent Nuremberg to airy Bohemian. It is both food and drink to many a poor devil, whose stomach it can flatter into hypotheccating a meal. To be sure, an unwelcome flabbiness and flatulence will, in the long run, reveal the deception. Rightly used, however, it makes thirst a luxury.

This liquor can be neither brewed nor exported beyond the Fatherland; nay, a journey of but a few miles from its birthplace impairs its integrity. Why—is a romantic and poetical enigma. In America the brewing is more elaborate and careful, but the result is nervous and heady. The broad Gambrinian smile becomes a wiry grin, or even a sour dyspeptic grimace. If exported, no matter with what care of cork and tinfoil, ere it can reach its destination some subtle magic has conjured away the better part of it. *Et cælum et animam mutat.* Gambrinus has laid a charm upon it; it is the life-blood of the country, and shall not flow or rise in alien veins.

A profound political truth is symbolized here, if we would but see

it ; it elucidates the subject of emigration and the effect of locality, on temperament. The varieties of German beer are innumerable ; each tastes best on the spot where it was brewed ; and each has its supporters as against all others. Now, the Berlin Government seems desirous of proving (what we Americans have already proved to the world's satisfaction, if not to our own), that people living, no matter how far apart and under what different circumstances, may be united in mind, sentiment, and disposition as one man. To this end, what method more effective than to ordain a universal beer, and forbid the brewing or drinking of any other ? Condense into one the many inconsiderable principalities of *Gambrinus*. True, though men can apparently be induced by the proper arguments to accommodate themselves to whatever political or moral exigencies, beer is of a more intractable temper, and persists in being different in different places. But surely Prince Bismarck, who can do so much, will not be beaten by a beverage : the difficulty will be ultimately overcome, if military discipline and legislation be worth anything. Two alternatives suggest themselves at once. The first, to create a uniform climate, soil, and water throughout the Fatherland—not an impossibility to German science, I should suppose :—the second, to brew the beer nowhere save in Berlin, to be drunk on the premises. Berlin would thus be secure of becoming the centre of attraction of the empire ; and if, as is believed, Germans are Germans by virtue of the beer they drink, if all drank the same beer, of course they all would become the same Germans.

Moreover, if this may be done with the nation, why not apply the principle to the individual ? A nation is but a larger, completer man ; and if a nation may be concentrated at a single point, as Berlin ; why not concentrate the persons composing it into a single individual, as Bismarck ? Having swallowed his countrymen, the Prince could thereafter legislate to please himself : and might ultimately proceed to swallow himself into a universal atom.

Pending these improvements, we are consoled with the reflection that there are advantages connected with the undigested form impressed upon men and states by their original creator ; for example, there is much entertainment in the discussions between various beer-cliques as to the merit of their respective beverages. Saxons, like other people, most enjoy disputes the least important and adjustable. A perverse instinct, no doubt, but universal, is that of asserting the worth of our own opinion and individuality against all comers. It remains to hope, that Saxony, and Germany with her—leading the world in other departments of civilization—may before long, resolve themselves into a homogeneous mass—according to modern lights, the only true form of union.



## II.

Another pull at our schoppen : we must avoid over-heating ourselves with transcendental controversy. The genius of beer is peaceful ; and there is a mild unobtrusive efficacy about it which is a marvel in its way. The flavour, although highly agreeable, does not take the palate captive, but introduces itself like a friend of old-standing ; the liquor glides softly through the portals of the gullet, and grows ever more good-humoured on the way down. We swallow a mouthful or two, and then put down the glass to pause and meditate. The effect upon thoughts is peculiar and grateful. It gently anoints them, so that they move more noiselessly and sleekly, getting over much ground with little jar. It draws a transparent screen between us and our mental processes—as a window shuts out the noise of the street without obstructing our view of what is going on. Upon this screen are projected luxurious fancies, coming and going we know not whence or whither, and we become lost in following them. Slight matters acquire large interest ; with what profound speculation do we mark the course of yonder leaf earthwards floating from its twig, overweighted by the consideration we have bestowed on it. The striking of a church clock, a mile away, echoes through vast halls of arched phantasy. The babble of those good people at a neighbouring table foregoes distinctive utterance, and is resolved into a dreamy refrain. Our own voices seem to come from far away ; our prosaic thoughts take on the hues of poetry and romance. We seem to chant rather than speak our sentences, and perceive a subtle melody in them. We feel comfortable, peaceful, yet heroic and strong ; surely there is somewhat superb and grand about us, which, till now, has been but half appreciated. We sit full-orbed and complete, and regard our fellow-men with a sweet-tempered contempt of superiority.

That peculiar kind of friendliness and sociability which distinguishes Saxons would soon languish if deprived of its inspiring beer. As sun to earth is their beer to them—the source of their vitality. Colourless and bloodless enough were they without it. If Gambrinus may not be said (such an assertion would indeed be treasonable) to be Germany's immediate sovereign, he at least renders her worth being sovereign over. It is well to make slaves and puppets of men, but he also deserves credit who gives the puppet a soul to be enslaved with.

Happy Saxons ! have they themselves an adequate conception of the part beer plays in their economy—of the degree to which their ideas and acts are steeped in it ? Only Germans can properly be said to possess a national drink ; beer takes with them the place of all other beverages ; an American bar, with its myriad eye-openers and stone-walls, would be absurdly out of place here. The Saxon's

palate is not tickled with variety ; one thing suffices him, which he loves as he loves himself—because it has become a part of him. 'It fascinates him, not as aught new and strange, which might be potent for a time, but eventually palls. But it is as dear to him as are the ruddy drops which visit his sad heart—a steady, perennial, exclusive affection, constant as his very selfishness.' Who calls the Saxon cold ? is there any devotion, he asks, warmer than mine to me ?

I like to hear him call for his beer—as though he had been wrongfully separated from it, and claimed it as his Saxon birthright. There is a certain half-concealed complacency in his tone, too ; arising partly from pleasurable anticipation, partly from pride that there is so good a thing to call for. Having got it, he never shows to such advantage as with it in his hand—never so like an apple of gold in a picture of silver. It seems a pity, then, that he should ever strive to be aught sublimer than a beer-drinker. For nothing else is he so fit ; nothing else, perhaps, renders him so genial and happy ; and surely there are many things which do him more harm. Gambrinus, the mightiest of Germans, not only did nothing else—he owes his greatness to that fact. Methinks there is deep significance in the story how, when Satan called to claim his bargain, the German Bacchus trusted to no other weapon than this single beer-drinking faculty of his, and therewith got the better of his enemy. He played a manly part : a smaller man would have fallen to evasion, forsaking his true stronghold for another with which he was unacquainted. Gambrinus succeeded, as do all men who know their power and rely upon it. Doubtless, he might have wasted his time in making himself a fair philosopher, politician, soldier, or what not ; but all would not have saved him from the devil. Saxons—here is food for reflection.

I am bound to admit, however, that this luxury, like all others, may be indulged in to imprudent lengths, and thereby lead to consequences anything but peaceful or meditative. A legend is current of a certain evil demon, Katzenjammer by name, who is as hateful as Gambrinus is genial ; and it is whispered that between the two there is a mysterious and awful connection. When the jovial monarch's symposium is at its maddest height, when the guests are merriest and the liquor most delicious—then is it that this hideous presence lurks most nigh. The lights may blaze upon the festive board ; but out of the shadow below, and in gloomy alcoves here and there, the boon companions shudder at the glimpse of his ghastly features. Those who have met him face to face (and such men live) describe him as sallow, cadaverous, blear-eyed, and unwholesome : his countenance overspread with a grey despair, as of a creature born from joy to misery, and retaining, in his wretchedness, the memory of all that makes life sweet, and the yearning for it. Moreover—and this is perhaps the grisliest feature of the legend—

lie is said to bear a villainous and most unaccountable resemblance to Gambrinus himself; insomuch, that when encountered the morning after a carousal, the beholder can scarce free himself from the delusion that it is Gambrinus's self he sees—fearfully changed, indeed, yet essentially the same. I fear there is some disagreeable secret at the bottom of all this, and that poor old Gambrinus did not quite escape the devil's claws, after all. However, if we can be resolute not to commit ourselves too far with the god, we may be tolerably secured against falling into the clutches of the hobgoblin. Meanwhile, excellent Frau Schmidt, another pint of beer!

### III.

What may be the subtle principle according to which liquors depend for their flavour upon the form and fashion of the vessel from which they are quaffed, I know not; but certainly German beer should be drunk only from the schoppen. For a long time I put my faith in an Oxford mug of pewter with a plate-glass bottom; but, in the end, I reverted to the national tankard, with its massive base, its scoloped glass sides, and its lid enamelled with pictures and mottoes. The rest of the world might produce port glasses, hock glasses, sherry glasses, absinthe glasses; it was reserved for Germany to evolve the schoppen. Whether Gambrinus was the first to invent it, I am not precisely informed, but am inclined to consider it a supreme product of our modern civilization.

I once visited the Antiken Sammlung in the Museum of the Zwinger; and judging by the wild experiments in the way of drinking-vessels on exhibition there, I should have thought the ancients must half the time have been in doubt what they were swallowing. There were elephants, fishes, Chinese pagodas, legless human figures which, unlike their living prototypes, would never stand upright unless they were empty; huge silver-mounted horns; ingenious arrangements to rap the drinker's pate if he spared to drink all at a draught, or to prick his tongue if he drank not fast enough. Some goblets there were of the capacity of seven quarts—so the guide assured me; and he added, in a quiet tone, that the mighty ones of yore thought nothing of emptying one without drawing breath. He was a tall, thin, courteous, amenable fellow—that guide—yellow-eyed, curly-bearded, with hands gloveless, unclean, and very cold. Near at hand stood a marble bust of Washington, placid, respectable, and rather dirty. How often had he heard that lie reiterated, without once being able to knit his marble brow at the liar, or wink a pupil-less eye at the visitor, not to be taken in. But I doubt not that the fact of the bust's being there deepened the guide's crime.

Of a less barbarous age are the ivory tankards, elaborately carved, to be found in the windows of curiosity shops throughout

Dresden. There, moreover, stand tall green glasses of Bohemian manufacture, jewelled and painted with arabesques and figures. But all are but approximations to the excellence of the clear glass schoppen of to-day, which, if it hold but a pint, may be replenished a hundred times a-day, and is vastly more manageable than the seven-quart affair. They are usually some seven or eight inches high, and twice as much in girth—just the proportion of a respectable toper; but this model is varied within certain limits: and some of gothic design, with peaked lids, are as beautiful as heart could wish; and a pewter mannikin an inch and a half high, staggering under the weight of a barrel of liquor, is perched above the handle. The lids are a distinguishing feature, necessary to retard the too rapid evaporation of the foam. They must be kept down, like a maiden's; should we neglect this precaution, not only is our beer liable to stale, but any impertinent fellow sitting near may, by beer-law, snatch a draught of it without saying, *By your leave!*

We may, of course, hurl the mug at him; there are few better missiles than a good schoppen, and every Saxon knows how to use it in this way also. The schoppen-throwing spirit is latent in the most seeming-inoffensive of the race, and will crop out on occasion. We do not know our friend until we have seen him at such a moment. He has no tendency to individual action; he loves a majority, though not ignorant of how to turn the contrary position into a virtue. With a crowd to back him, he will sling his mug at anybody; and it is instructive to observe, when once his victory is secure, how voluble, excited, and indignant he becomes—how implacable and over-bearing towards his foe; the same Saxon in his beer-saloon as at Sedan!

In reflecting upon the amount of beer consumed by the average Saxon during the day, I am inclined to believe with Rabelais that drinking preceded thirst in the order of creation, since the want postulates the habit: and that he drinks, not because his throat is parched, but in order that it may not be. It is no paradox that the thirstiest men are the smallest drinkers: therefore Saxons can never be thirsty, but drink either out of mere bravado, or else from a belief that to drink steadily the first half of their lives, will secure them from thirst during the second. If this creed be not a popular fallacy, it is a most important truth. Nevertheless, it would perhaps be safer to continue the remedy throughout the decline of existence, and so float comfortably into the other life.

#### IV.

From our present point of view, Dresden might be described as a beer-lake, of which the breweries are the head-waters. The liquid, however, is divided up into reservoirs of all sizes, from thousand-

gallon tuns to pint bottles. The fishes are the ~~Dresdeners~~ <sup>Dresdeners</sup> themselves, who, instead of swimming in the lake, allow it to swim in them—a more pleasant and economic arrangement. This lake resembles the ocean in having hours of flood and ebb; but the tide never runs out so far as to leave the fishes high and dry. The periods of high beer, or full fishes, are, roughly speaking, from twelve to two at noon and from six to ten in the evening.

It is really not easy to exaggerate the importance of beer-saloons to the city economy. Beer, like other valuable things, has a tendency to lodge humbly: is fond of antique, not to say plebeian, surroundings; and is so thorough a demagogue that it not only flatters the multitude, but harbours in their midst! Now, so uninviting are some Dresden neighbourhoods, we must believe that, except for the beer-saloons in them, they would speedily be left without inhabitants. Thus beer equalizes the distribution of population. What is of more moment, it provides employment either directly or indirectly for a vast proportion of the people. Not to speak of the architects, coopers, glass-workers, and numberless others to whose support it largely contributes, it actually creates the landlords, waiters, and waitresses. We may go further, and point out that it is the vital principle, if not the cause, of the popular concerts, as well as of summer excursions into rural suburbs, whose healthful beauties would else remain unexplored. The student "Kneipes" owe what life they have more to their beer than to either their traditions or the *Schläger*. In short, society, among the mass of the people, is clustered round the beer-glass: and the liquor of Gambrinus is not more the national beverage than it is the builder-up of the nation.

The beer-saloon is the Saxon's club, parlour, and drawing-room, and is free alike to rich and poor, noble and simple. The family-man as well as the bachelor, the old with the young man, is regular and uniform in his attendance. For Saxons have no homes, nor the refinement which leads most creatures, human or other, to reserve for themselves a retreat apart from the world's common path and gaze. It must not be inferred that the husband objects to taking his wife and children along with him: the broad Saxon tolerance never dreams of ostracising woman from the scene of her lord's conviviality. Though seldom present in large numbers, there is generally a sprinkling of them in every room-full of drinkers. I have not observed that they exercise any restraint upon the tone of conversation: considering the light in which woman is regarded, it is not to be expected that they should; and as for children, they are not regarded at all. The wives watch the conversation of their masters much as a dog might do, seldom thinking of contributing to it; or if they do, it is not in womanly fashion, but so far as possible in imitation of the men's manner. They drink their fair share of

beer, often from the men's glass ; but I cannot say that the geniality thus induced improves them. Until pretty far up in the social scale, there is little essential difference between the lower orders of women and those above them, especially after Gambrinus has laid his wand upon them. In the German language are no equivalents for the best sense of our Lady and Gentleman ; and perhaps the reason is not entirely a linguistic one.

Female Saxony is very industrious ; carries its sewing or embroidery about with it everywhere, and knits to admiration. When in its own company, it chatters like magpies, and we watch it with an appropriately amused interest. But our interest is of another sort when, as sometimes happens, a man enters with his newly-married wife, or sweetheart. The untutored stranger observes with curiosity the indifference of the couple to the public eye. Towards the close of the second glass, her head droops upon his shoulder, their hands and eyes meet, they murmur in each other's ear, and fatuously smile. It is nothing to them that the table and the room are crowded with strange faces. The untutored stranger, if he imagine these persons to be other than of perfect social respectability, commits a profound mistake. They are Saxons of the better class, and are utterly unconscious of anything coarse or ungainly in thus giving publicity to their mutual endearments. The untutored stranger had perhaps believed that publicity of love, to be sublime, must be manifested under very exceptional circumstances. He had read with pleasure how the beautiful woman threw herself upon her lover's bosom, so to intercept the fatal bullet : or his heart had throbbed at the passionate last embrace of wife and husband upon the scaffold steps. But he is extravagant and prejudiced : not instant death, but a quart or so of beer, is pretext all-sufficient. Nay, may it not be that our Saxon sweethearts would find death put their affection out of joint, and therefore do wisely to be satisfied with the easy godfatherhood of Gambrinus ? At all events, our criticisms are as gratuitous as untutored. The mixed assembly in which the exhibition takes place considers it so little extraordinary, as scarcely to be at the trouble of looking at it or away from it. Nevertheless there seems to be a spiritual nudity about it, which, if not divine, indicates a phase of civilization elsewhere unknown.

I have introduced this scene because it typifies a universal trait. Saxons cannot be happy except in public and under one another's noses. The edge of pain is dulled for them if only they may undergo their torture in the market-place ; and no piece of good luck is worth having which has not been dragged through the common gutter. Each man's family is too small for him,—he must take his neighbour's likewise into his bosom. Is this the result of a lofty spirit of human brotherhood ? or is it diseased vanity, which

finds its only comfort in stripping the wretched fig-leaves alike from its virtue and its vice? Nevertheless, most Saxons, if charged to their faces with being the first of nations, admit the impeachment: which proves how little true greatness has in common with the minor proprieties.

It would be pleasant to study this trait in its effect upon gossip and scandal. If a man denudes himself in presence of my crony and me, does he not deprive our epigrams of their sting, and make our innuendoes ridiculous? Backbiters, thus rudely treated, must miss that delicate flavour which renders a dish of French scandal the delight of the world. But the guild dies hard, and even in the face of a persecution which should go the length not only of confessing discredibilities, but of taking a pride in them, will still find some husks to fatten upon.

## V.

It is high time for us to make some pleasant acquaintances; and if we will let our imagination wander citywards, I know a spot where we may meet some. Turning aside from the venerable Schloss Strasse, we traverse a narrower side-thoroughfare, and soon arrive at a low and dark-mouthed archway. We vanish beneath it, and, feeling our way along the wall, come presently to a door which, opening almost of itself, admits us into an apartment remarkable alike for its smokiness, its narrowness, and its length. The opposite wall seems to press against us, and we instinctively adopt a sideways motion in walking down the room. Full five out of the seven or eight feet of narrowness are taken up with the square brown chairs and tables, of which there must be enough in Saxony to cover a third of the country's area. The walls are panelled breast high; the ends of the room are indistinct in the smoky haze. All the world is sitting down except ourselves and buxom Ida, who comes tripping along behind us, with both her plump hands full of beer. Let us too hasten to be seated.

The Saxon habit of sitting down to everything is, by the way, one which Americans would do well to imitate, especially when they eat or drink. Man is the only animal that can sit squarely down upon a chair—it is as much his prerogative as laughing or cooking. The moral effect of sitting down is to induce deliberation, and we Republicans should have too much self-respect as well as prudence to stand up to a luncheon or liquor-bar like so many sparrows: while our Saxon brother finds his knees giving way at no more than the sight of a toothpick. That foolish relic of barbarism, the practice of rising to toasts, does, it is true, obtain in Saxony no less than elsewhere; but internal evidence justifies the prediction that Saxons will lead the world in refining it away.

Having got us comfortably seated, buxom little Ida caresses the

back of our chair while she lends her ear and ear-ring to our order. Ida is always on the best of terms with her company, while maintaining a feminine ascendancy over them. She responds cordially if we summon her by name, but is deaf to the unceremonious rattling of the schoppen-lid, which is the usual way of calling for attendance. She sustains the many personal compliments wherewith she is plied with a rare, complacent equanimity, repaying them with a softened cadence of tone and an approving smile. She has her favourites of course, but so manages matters 'as not to obtrude the fact unpleasantly upon the less fortunate. When, at parting, we take occasion to slip into her palm an eleemosynary coin, she allows her short fingers to close for a moment over ours in mute friendly acknowledgment. She is a brisk, round, smooth, little body, with no feature or expression worth mentioning, and a figure consisting mainly of rounded protuberances. She knows her duties well, and deftly remembers the idiosyncrasies of her guest, after the first few visits have made him familiar. I have never seen in her face any record or passage of thought: she even adds up her accounts without thinking, and this is possibly one reason why so many small perquisites make their way to her plump pockets. When she finds herself at leisure—usually for an hour or so during the morning and afternoon—she has a well-conditioned little nap in a corner, never bothering her small brain-pan with life-problems past or to come. It is a mystery how a body and soul combined in such very unequal proportions, should produce so pleasant and cheerful an effect. Is Ida ever naughty? I should as soon think of applying moral standards to a jelly-fish as to her; meanwhile, the worst wickedness I have detected in her is a funny fat slyness in that matter of perquisites. Her conscience—which probably is less fat and more gristle than any other part of her body—is, I am sure, untroubled.

Ida can scarcely be taken as a representative of her class—a fact which is probably less to their credit than to hers. German beer-girls are harder worked than English bar-maids, since, in addition to late hours, they are obliged to walk from ten to fifteen miles a day, carrying to and fro heavy loads of beer-glasses. Though they may equal their English sisters in education, they are far behind them in intelligence and the appearance of refinement. They are often pretty, however, and withal healthy and substantial-looking: and I dare say their labours, arduous as they appear, are luxury compared to those of the peasantry, from which class most of them spring. More deleterious than the physical work is doubtless the moral wear and tear consequent upon receiving day by day the jokes, caresses, compliments, or insults of a rabble of men of all ranks and tempers. They generally acquit themselves with some tact and more good humour; and they are subjected to a freedom of speech and beha-



viour from the sterner sex which, in any other country, would be met by a thoroughly deserved box on the ear. It appears to be understood that the right of embracing the beer-girl is included in the price of the beer. In one respect these young women compare pleasantly with the men-waiters ;—that whereas we may bind the latter body and soul to our service by a judicious administration of fees, in the minds of the former we can at best only create a conflict between their interest and their affections. We may see a Kellnerin to the limit of her desires, yet, if that be our best charm, all will not prevent her enjoying her whisper in the corner with her poor soldier, who never gave her anything more valuable than a kiss ; while our beer-glass stands empty. This is more agreeable than anything in the male character. Women were never so necessary to the world's welfare as now, if only they will be women. Let them steep their brains in their hearts, or else dispense with the former altogether. What becomes of these waitresses later in life, I know not. Let us hope they are happy with their soldiers.

The little clique which makes Ida's beer-saloon its nightly resort is of a character complementary to Ida's own. They are elderly men, and represent the most thoughtful and enlightened class in Dresden. They are patriots of '48, who, having been banished by their government, owe their recall to the progress of those opinions for which they suffered exile. Most of them are now members of the Council, and amuse themselves by occasionally voting against an increase of the king's income. They are among the few Saxons whose patriotism does not consist in being selfish, conceited, and intolerant of criticism. They desire not to defend their country for what she is, but to help her to what she might be : if they do not sympathize with their unenlightened countrymen, they would like to render them worthy of sympathy. In the face of so stiff a job, I cannot but admire their uniformly jovial and well-conditioned aspect. There is nothing of the melancholy, wild-eyed, long-haired, collarless enthusiast about them. Probably they have the wisdom to use those qualities in their opponents which can be made to serve their own ends, and thus have become prosperous.

We may hold agreeable converse with these men, for their draught of the outer world has permanently improved their mental digestions, and allows us to talk discursively without fear of giving offence. When the beer has loosened in them the reins of those faculties which their experience has developed, they become very good company. Yet, when all has been said, there remains a secret sense of dissatisfaction. We have coincided upon many points, but on what one have we melted together ? The objection may seem fantastic, but it is true and of significance. Many a hard head and intractable judgment do we meet, who yet in the dispute lets fall a word or tone which makes the eyes fill, we know not why ; revealing

a deeper agreement between us than any of opinions. We fight such men more lovingly than we ally ourselves with others, whose creeds perhaps fit ours like the lines of a dissecting map.

## VI.

Besides the politicians, there is a sprinkling of the learned class, who are often shabbier in external aspect than men of far less consideration. In addition to their undeniable beer-drinking powers, they quaffed deep of the Pierian spring, and are no less interesting than the books which they compile. There is little human glow in them, however, and their erudite talk reminds of conversations printed on a page: it lacks the unexpectedness and piquancy of original or spontaneous thought. They are wood of a straight, close grain,—displaying none of the knots and eccentric veins which make a polished surface attractive: nor do they possess the rich, pervading colour which might compensate for plainness of structure. Their faculties are useful to the world in the same way that printing-types are,—they may be arranged to form valuable combinations, but are not therefore intrinsically captivating: have none of that fascination which attaches to a black-letter MS. Geniuses not only never repeat themselves, but never use the same material twice. Each fresh work is done in a new way, with new tools; and retains an unhackneyed aroma, be it ever so irregular or imperfect.

But the talents of these Saxon sages are limited in number and overworked: and the very fact of their limitation and want of idiosyncrasy seems to be the cause of their application to all sorts and amounts of labour. But a man who can get anything out of himself, all on the same rule and scale, should perhaps be especially careful to confine himself to only one thing. Original men change colour, tone, and key with every new idea; and as no two ideas can ever be quite alike, so is their manner of entertaining them never twice identical. Otherwise they are machines; and we think the Saxon sages often have a tendency to be mechanical.

Nevertheless there are some originals among them. One gentleman I remember, who was by profession a lawyer, but had dabbled in literature, was the author of some poetry, I believe, and ranked himself among the Klopstocks and Heines. He had fine features and a high, bald forehead, which he seemed always trying to heighten by passing his hand up it, and tossing back the thin locks of grey hair which hung down to his shoulders. He was dressed with small care, and less cleanliness; his shirt, in particular, was enough to make the heart ache. Reverses, perhaps, or disappointed ambition, had enrolled this personage among the sworn disciples of Gambrinus, and it was his daily custom to pledge that monarch so deeply that by evening his heart was full and ready to overflow on small encouragement. One night he entered late, and proceeded without

warning to be ardently enamoured of an unobtrusive young man who happened to be of our party, and whom he had never seen before. "Sir, you are dear to me! I love you, sir! my heart is yours!" In proof of his regard, he presently began to declaim a great deal of poetry; and never have I heard those pieces more finely and eloquently interpreted. The scene perhaps took its rise in the whim of a half-tipsy brain, but, as the actor wrought upon himself, it assumed a hue of grotesque pathos. The man himself became stirred to his depths; now tears ran down his cheeks, now his eyes flashed, and he manned himself heroically;—and now again he paused to empty his beer-glass and sign to Ida for more. But the liquor he drank, instead of disguising him, dissolved the mask of his inner nature. Heaven knows what confused memories of joy and grief were at work within him; but it was evident that, through the miserable absurdity of circumstance, he gave us distorted glimpses of what had been best and highest in his character—that he was laying bare to us the deepest heart he had. And it is on this account—not for purposes of ridicule—that I have brought forward the episode. His sincerity no one could have doubted, least of all himself: yet it revealed nothing genuine; the man's very soul was artificial, and in the heat of his self-abandonment, he could not be natural. His sentiment and passion could only have moved unconscious hypocrites like himself. He had been very eminent in his profession, and all he did was marked by exceptional talent: he must once have been an exceeding handsome man; and, above all, he was a thorough German, in accord with the genius of his countrymen. But for those who are not Germans, the heart is the gunpowder whose explosion gives the bullet of thought its effect, and they cannot be pierced with the subtlest intellectual missile which lacks this projecting power.

After Ida's, my favourite resort was a mediæval-looking apartment in the Neustadt, near the head of the venerable, historic bridge which connects the main thoroughfares of the old and new towns. Werthmann, the proprietor, is a man of taste and feeling, and has adorned his saloon with intent to realize, so far as 'he may, the ideal of a Gambrinian temple. We enter a square room of moderate size, wainscoted to a height of five feet from the floor with dark carved wood. Above the wainscot the wall is divided lengthwise into two compartments, the upper one exhibiting designs of highly-coloured groups of figures in fourteenth-century costumes, relieved against a dark-blue background; while the other is devoted to scraps of convivial poetry, appropriate to the paintings, and executed in the black-letter character; which poetry, if not always unexceptionable, either from a moral or poetical point of view, matches well enough the tone of the surroundings. Over the doorway is inscribed the legend "*Kommt Herein, Hier ist gut sein!*" which is certainly an

improvement upon some of those religious perpetrations which I have noticed further back. In other places we spell out such agreeable truisms as "*Gerste mit Hopfen giebt gute Tropfen*;" and here, again, is Doctor Martin Luther's famous couplet. The windows are sunk nearly three feet into the walls, with black oak sills and panels, and command a view of the ugly old market-place, with its rough cobble pavement and its tanned market-women, presided over by the ungainly equestrian statue of Augustus the Strong, his gelding sadly tarnished by the weather. There is an inner room, much in the fashion of the first, save that the background of the frescoes is golden instead of blue; and still beyond is the billiard-room, whence issues a buzz of voices and click of balls. At certain hours of the day Werthmann comes in,—a portly, imposing, but thoroughly amiable figure, bowing with serious courtesy to each of his assembled guests. This done, he seats himself at a table with his favourite gossips and a glass of his particular beer. Among the frescoes on the walls there is more than one portrait figure of Herr Werthmann in the character of Gambrinus himself—and he supports the rôle well. But he is not for show only. One morning I caught him on a chair, amidst half-a-dozen workmen, clad in an enormous pinafore, and bespattered with the whitewash which he was vigorously applying to the ceiling. He is a good type of Saxon landlords, who, as a rule, are among the pleasantest and most conversable men in town. Much of the success of their business depends on their geniality, and practice makes it their second nature.

The attendants here are both male and female, though the former perhaps predominate, in their regulation black swallow-tails. I have often noticed a singular effect which uniforms have upon the analysis of character; it is nearly impossible to form an unbiassed judgment of a man whose coat and hat mark his profession. Inevitably we regard him, not as a simple human being, but through the coloured medium of his official insignia. Thus, if the Kellners wore ordinary clothes, it would be much easier to pronounce upon their peculiarities of disposition and behaviour. As it is, their sable dress-coats,—which seem to have been born with them and to have grown like their skins—their staccato manner, their fallacious briskness, their elaborate way of not accomplishing anything, and their fundamental rascality, appear to be the chief impressions of them left upon my mind. They do not contrast well with the English waiters; there is seldom any approach to neatness in their condition, and they never attain the cultured, high-bred repose which we see on the other side of the Channel. In their swindling operations they manifest neither art nor delicacy; moral suasion is unknown to them, nor do they ever attempt to undermine us on the side of abstract justice and respectability. They simply and brutally retain the change, and meet any remonstrance on our part, first with denial, secondly with abuse, and finally with an appeal to the police.

Some few of these men have grown old in the service, but the majority are between eighteen and thirty. Often they are the sons of hotel-keepers, serving' an apprenticeship at their trade. Their wages are very moderate, but I fancy few of them retire from the profession without having accumulated a tolerable fortune. Unless treated with a politic mixture of sternness and liberality, they are apt to be either brusque or pre-occupied, if not altogether oblivious. Possibly their darker traits may be the effect of continually wearing black tailed-coats, and when they put them off, they may also lay aside their tendency to theft and falsehood. But my researches have not gone so deep as to warrant me in more than offering the suggestion.

## VII.

In summer, however, we have no business to sit between four walls; Dresden is full of beer-gardens, where, if the beer is sometimes inferior, its flavour is compensated by the soft pure air and the music. Our difficulty will be, not to find a pleasant spot, but to fix upon the pleasantest. Sauntering beneath a mile-long avenue of chestnut-trees, we might climb to the Waldschloesschen Brewery, resting on the hillside like a great yellow giant, whose hundred eyes look out over a lovely picture of curving river and hazy-towered town. Here, sitting on the broad stone terrace, beneath trees so dense of foliage that rain cannot penetrate them, we are on a level with the tops of trees below, which have the appearance of a green bank suspended in mid-air. Far off on the river the white steam-boats crawl and palpitate, and the huge canal-boats spread their brown wings to help along as best they may their unwieldy bulk. Here, too, the beer is of the best, and we may drink it to the tune of Mozart and Strauss.

Somewhat similar are the attractions of the Bruelsche Terrasse, which is also more accessible and more exclusive. It is fine in the evening, when it sparkles thick with coloured lamps and throbs with music; and the river, above whose brink it stands, is a black, mysterious abyss, revealed only by the reflected lights which wander here and there across its surface, or range themselves along the length of the distant bridge, and cast long wheeling shadows of unseen people passing to and fro across it. But even here we find imperfections; the beer glasses are scandalously small, and the waiters, who wear not only dress-coats but silver buttons, are more rapacious and remorseless than harpies.

After all, however, the best place is the Grosser Wirthschaft, in the Royal Park. There we are in the midst of a small forest; but a vista, opening through the trees and broadening over a wide green meadow, yields us a glimpse, at a mile's distance, of a grey dome and two or three tapering spires. The square open court, some

sixty yards in width and closely planted with trees and street-lamps is partly closed in on two sides by low buildings; the orchestra occupies a third, while on the fourth stands sentinel a gigantic tree. During the pauses of the music, a few steps will bring us to sweet secluded walks, where we might almost forget that such things as houses and Saxons existed in the world. During the heat of the season concerts are given here at five in the morning, and are attended by crowds of tradespeople, who thus secure their half-holiday before the day has fairly begun. If we can manage to get up early enough to go to one, the effect of the spectacle upon the imagination is very peculiar. Reason tells us that it is long before breakfast time; but the broad sunshine, the crowd of people drinking their beer, the music and the wide-awakeness of everything, proclaim four o'clock in the afternoon. The fact that the sun is in the wrong quarter of the heavens only increases our bewilderment, and we are almost persuaded either that the whole scene is a wonderful mirage, or that we are phantoms, accidentally strayed into the material world.

Surely, only hypercriticism could find anything to complain of in all this. We do not, I suppose, expect Saxon beer-gardens to be like the land of the lotus-eaters, where dreamy souls recline on flowery couches, and know not whether the music in their enchanted ears comes from without or within. Moreover, cane-bottomed chairs are in many ways better than flowery couches, and to sit at a table with three or four other people, even if we do not happen to know them, is preferable to having no table at all. Lovers of music should not object to receiving in exchange for five groschen, a piece of paper with the musical programme on one side, and a bill of fare on the other; nor should they allow themselves to be disturbed by the continual repassing, during the performance, of unsympathetic waiters, who never allow a beer-glass to become empty through any lack of solicitation on their part to have it refilled. If the ground beneath their feet is reddish-brown gravel instead of turf, it is all the safer for delicate constitutions; and if trees, tables, and lamp-posts are rigidly aligned, it is all the better for order and convenience. As for the music, it surely could not be finer; and the fact that every individual of the orchestra may be seen sawing or puffing himself red in the face over his horn or violin, ought only to make the pleasure more real and tangible.

Who can deny all this? Nevertheless, all the world knows that to possess good things is only to foster the notion that they might be improved. Any strictures against Saxon beer-gardens would certainly apply with equal force anywhere else, and perhaps it is chiefly because they are good enough to suggest dreams of something better, that such dreams venture to assert themselves. Were I inclined to pick flaws, the first would be that the gardens disappoint from being

half gardens and half something with which the spirit of gardens is quite irreconcilable. Music, whispering leaves, summer skies,—what combination could be more charming? but if we descend—as we must—beneath the leaves, the disenchantment is all the harsher. Nature is put in a strait-jacket, her tresses are shorn, and she is preposterously decked out with artificial ornament. These gardens are aptly symbolised by the Sirens, who made fascinating music and had lovely hair, and who, seen from a proper distance, seemed all delightful. But they turned out to be less attractive below. Thus if we walk in the secluded paths near the *Grosser Wirthschaft*, catching snatches of the melody, and glimpses of the gay crowd shadowed by the cool foliage, the effect is captivating; but the stern utilitarian features which a nearer view discovers, are the Siren's claws.

But my quarrel strikes a deeper root than this, and will not, I fear, gain me much sympathy. I question whether music can be heard as well in company as in solitude, save when the company is in very exceptional accord. Certainly, any strange or unwelcome presence jars like a false note continually repeated. Lovers, I should imagine, might listen to sweet music with a multiplied pleasure and appreciation: or a great assembly, ablaze with some all-inspiring sentiment, doubtless take additional fire from the sound of an appropriate strain. But to lavish the mighty symphonies of great musicians upon an ill-assorted crowd, brought together, ticketed and arranged of malice aforethought, is to pawn pearls at less than their value: isolation—harmonious seclusion—are the only terms upon which a perception of subtle musical jewels can be obtained, and even these are often insufficient.

The Bible tells us that the Divine Presence can be better invoked by two or three than by one; but music, like nature, not being an infinite divinity, seldom reveals her more exquisite charms save to the solitary worshipper. Human beings are terribly potent things: we admire the shrewd scent of wild animals, but what is it compared with the keenness of man's spiritual scent for his fellow?

Furthermore, musicians, unlike little boys, should be heard but not seen. Perhaps a beautiful singer may be an exception, because, in her, facial expression may aid the interpretation and give it richer colouring; and possibly the cultured grace of a master-violinist may give form and vividness to his rendering. But the grace and beauty, not to be offensive, must, at least, equal that of the theme. A visible orchestra is like a dissected Venus: to lay bare the springs and methods of the sweet mystery of harmonious life, is to sin alike against art and nature.

#### VIII.

I should not have been tempted to go so far, had it not been my purpose to go one step further, and announce the remarkable dis-

covery that the Saxons have a less correct ear for music than any people with which I am acquainted. I am sure they think quite differently, and no doubt, after the first surprise is over, they will be grateful for having had their error pointed out. Undeniably, the greatest musical composers have been of German blood: just as in ancient times, by a sort of revenge of nature, giants and pygmies were made to live together. Moreover, there is nowhere more good music than in Saxony: nor anywhere better soldiers: the reason being, not that Saxons have any especial aptitude for war or music, but that they are exhaustively and indefatigably trained. Bismarck and Wagner are at the bottom of it.

The average Saxon orchestra learns its music by rote, and its perception of harmony is not intuitive but mechanical. They regard a false note as a mistake—never as a sin; and it is only rigid drilling which enables them to do so much as that. Listen to a party of young students singing together, as is the custom of young students all over the world: they sing loudly and in perfect good faith, conscious that they are Saxons, and therefore fancying that they are infallible. But there will be more discords to a staff, than an equal number of young men of any other country could produce. There may be something pathetic about this, but there is certainly much that is disagreeable. Again, the audiences of the garden concerts are affected by tunes and slight airs, and are invariably enthusiastic in their applause of a solo, however imperfectly rendered; because, having actually beheld a man stand up before them and produce, with more or less physical exertion, a variety of musical sounds, they are convinced that they have heard what is, or ought to be, music. But they pass by the great, sublime compositions with significant silence. Now, animals are moved by tunes, and parrots and magpies can be taught to whistle them. When the tunes are what is called national—enhanced, that is, by some glorious or inspiring tradition, the consideration of whatever musical worth they may have is as nothing: such tunes influence mobs, and Saxon mobs no less than others. A tune is to music what an automaton, with its little round of recurring movements, is to a living man with his infinite variety of manifestation, which yet observes a distinctive form and purpose.

Music in Saxony, like the army, is a forced product, having no root in the nature of the people, and destined to wither away when the artificial inspiration is removed. There is surely something sacred about music: those who are born to it will seek it out through all obstacles; but to obtrude it upon persons who have no vital understanding of it, is to do injury both to the music and to them. The commonness of concerts in Saxony, and elsewhere in Germany, is everywhere admired: they are too common, perhaps, and may be lowered by low appreciation. Nothing beautiful can be driven into



a man from without : the only result will be to disfigure him and desecrate the thing of beauty.—But we are getting heated again. Another glass of beer?—No, we must bid Gambrinus farewell, for it is late. We have found more than we bargained for in our schoppen.

## IX.

Good little Frau Schmidt comes up, with her pleasant but not quite cheerful smile, to see us to the door, and bid us not forget to return. We had made a little mystery about her, at the beginning of our session, with the understanding that it should be cleared up before we went away. The mystery does not amount to much, after all, but its elucidation may serve also to explain why Frau Schmidt is more a favourite of ours than any Saxon woman we have known.


The fact is (for we have not skill further to prolong the suspense, even were there any longer reason for doing so), Frau Schmidt is an Englishwoman, born, she tells us, within hearing of Bow bells. She met in London the big, silent Saxon, with the fine massive head and serious bearing, who was destined to win her love and marry her. He, perhaps, was at that time a political refugee. Certainly he was more a man than the average : there was a force and largeness in him rare among Saxons ; and individual excellence is an uncomfortable possession in a land governed as is this.

But when a good many years had passed, and an altered administration could pardon Herr Schmidt's political virtues, the memory of his birthplace continually haunted him : his health began to fail, and he fancied that only a breath of his native air could restore him. *His wife doubtless shrank at first from the thought of leaving England, and settling among strange faces and barbarous tongues, in an unknown land.* Yet her heart would not let her hold him back, and without her he could not go. They came, therefore, and Herr Schmidt, having purchased a small beer-saloon on the banks of the river he had known in boyhood, looked forward to health and quiet happiness.

But all was somehow not right—not as he had expected. Was Dresden changed, or had his memory played him false ? There stood Dresden, with her domes and steeples ; there flowed the well-known Elbe beneath the old historic bridge. Around him were Saxon tongues and faces ; yet the city—the people of his remembrance were not there. Perchance, save in memory, they had never been at all. Ah, Herr Schmidt, in leaving England, I fear you were not wise. Had you remained, two good countries would have been yours : England ; good enough in all conscience for those who have never known a better,—and the Saxony of your remembrance, without doubt superior to England, to Saxony itself, or to any other place whatever. But you were not wise, Herr Schmidt, and therefore both countries are lost to you.

And how of Frau Schmidt, the little grey-clad Englishwoman? She loves her Saxon husband, and would rather be with him than anywhere; yet perhaps, amidst her many cares and few amusements, she finds now and then a moment wherein to be decently wretched. When, on my first chance visit to her little saloon, I happened to let fall an English word, I shall not soon forget with what a thirsty eagerness she caught up the old familiar tongue; with what an almost tremulous pleasure she stood and talked—talked for the mere pleasure of once more talking English; delighting in it as does a child over a long-lost toy; yet saddened by that very delight, because it made her recognize how rare the luxury was and must ever be. Well, she does her best to be a good wife, to make her guests welcome, and worthily to serve King Gambrinus, hoping secretly that in time he will reward her from his treasury, and enable her at least to die in England. That time will never come, patient little Frau Schmidt; but meanwhile may evil befall me if ever I neglect to send you that occasional English newspaper for which you once with hesitating earnestness besought me.

JULIAN HAWTHORNE.



## NECESSARY TRUTH.

THE following article requires a few words of introduction. Dr. Ward and I are members of a private society for the discussion of philosophical questions. In this society I read a paper entitled "Some Thoughts on Necessary Truth," forming a criticism upon a theory maintained in a series of papers, contributed by Dr. Ward to the "Dublin Review," several of which he had been good enough to distribute amongst the members of the society. Dr. Ward read a paper in reply, and there I supposed the matter ended. Dr. Ward, however, published, in the "Dublin Review," his reply to my paper. This, of course, he had a perfect right to do, but by doing so he challenged the publication of the paper referred to. It accordingly forms the first part of the present article. I follow Dr. Ward's example in publishing the paper just as it was written, subject only to a few alterations and omissions, most of which are rendered natural by the change in the manner of publication, though some are meant to remove obscurities or other defects in expression of my views, which Dr. Ward's criticisms have suggested to me.

I have appended to the article some remarks which Dr. Ward's reply has suggested. The reply convinces me that we look at the subject from such different points of view, that I have failed to make him understand the point of my argument. My additional observations may accordingly appear to be to some extent to a re-statement, in a more explicit form, of the contents of the original

paper. Those who interest themselves in these subjects will perhaps forgive this defect in the form of the article if it contributes anything to the clear apprehension of an obscure matter. The paper then was substantially as follows.

In a paper lately published in the "Dublin Review," Dr. Ward states one of his principal doctrines as follows:—

"Whatever the existent cognitive faculties of mankind testify is instinctively known by mankind as certainly true.

"But the existent cognitive faculties of mankind testify that any given mathematical axiom is self-evidently necessary.

"*Ergo*, it is instinctively known by mankind as certainly true that any given mathematical axiom is self-evidently necessary."

To say that I deny the major and the minor and the conclusion of this syllogism is an imperfect way of expressing my dissent from it. I feel that its author speaks a language different from mine, and lives, so to speak, in a different intellectual world. The words "know," "true," "necessary," and many others, must, I suppose, mean to him something which they do not mean to me. Apart, however, from this, the syllogism appears to me to exemplify in a striking manner the defect which Mr. Mill attributed, as I think justly, to all syllogistic reasoning. The major and minor premisses could never be affirmed unless the truth of the conclusion was independently known. Indeed, they are simply the conclusion stated in terms of increasing generality. Dr. Ward gets a conclusion to start with, by supposing that there is something special in mathematical knowledge. He gets a minor by supposing that the special characteristic of mathematical knowledge is, that it is obtained by a direct act of some special faculty of the mind, and the major is obtained by generalising the minor.

This appears more clearly upon examining the terms of the syllogism. The major proposition appears to me simply to repeat six times over (without explaining them) the words "We know." Each of the six expressions "existent cognitive faculties," "testify," "instinctively," "known," "certainly," "true," asserts or implies the same thing, and the whole syllogism amounts to this:—"We know something. We know Euclid. Therefore, we know Euclid." This appears to me a cumbrous way of saying "We know Euclid."

Again, I dissent from a theory about faculties implied in the use of this language. A man, according to this syllogism, has existent cognitive faculties, and he has also other faculties by which he instinctively knows. Besides these two sets of faculties, he is acquainted, I suppose, otherwise, with the meaning of the word "certainly true." The first set of faculties "testify." Thereupon the second set of faculties inform the common owner of the two sets

that what the first set of faculties say is "certainly true." It occurs to me that the faculties which "instinctively know" require a voucher, as well as the "cognitive faculties" which "testify." After all, what are a man's faculties except the man himself when engaged in a certain act? and what meaning is there in the assertion that one set of his faculties corroborates another through a third? When all is said, what does it mean, except that people have certain ways of gaining knowledge which, from the nature of the case, they are obliged to trust. And did any one ever deny it? The whole apparatus of cognitive faculties, instinctive knowledge, and certain truth is only, as it seems to me, an expansion of the words "we know," and carries us no further.

The substance and purport of the syllogism, however, appears to be this:—There are two kinds of knowledge, or perhaps I should say we know two kinds of truths, contingent truths and necessary truths. The first class, namely, the class of contingent truths, includes all common facts, such as that so many persons, dressed in such a way, are sitting round a table at a given time and place. The other class, namely, the class of necessary truths, consists of general propositions. Those which relate to time, space, and number are specimens of them. We can distinguish between contingent and necessary truths by an unfailing test. A contingent truth might be imagined to be, and might be, other than it is, but a necessary truth cannot; or to put the same thing in a different way, Omnipotence could alter the one, and cannot alter the other. Dr. Ward, I have no doubt, would accept the following illustration, though I do not give it as an exact quotation. Omnipotence could make white gold or cold fire, but could not make a quadrangular figure contained by three straight sides. I deny the existence of this distinction, and if I am right, Dr. Ward's syllogism is either wrong or unmeaning. If no truths are necessary, the minor is disproved. If all truths are necessary, the conclusion is unmeaning.

The expression "necessary truth" may have one of two different meanings. It may mean a fact which could not have been otherwise than it is, or it may mean a truth affirmed by the very use of certain words. The expression "could not have been otherwise," is not in itself clear, as I shall show further on. If, as many people suppose, it is merely a way of describing facts, which might have been predicted by any one who had sufficient knowledge to make such a prediction, I am by no means sure that all truths whatever are not necessary, and I am much disposed to think they are. It is a truth that these lines were written on blue paper with a quill pen, in such a room, on such an hour, of such a day. I can easily imagine any one of these circumstances having been different, but the assertion of their existence is as true as that two and two make four, and I was when they occurred equally unable

to doubt of any one of them. Being past, they are unalterable (I suppose) even by Omnipotence, and in order that they might have happened otherwise, it might, for aught I can tell, have been necessary for the whole constitution of the universe to have been slightly altered from all eternity. What, then, is the meaning of the assertion that any fact whatever is contingent? Not surely that I can prevent it from existing. If this were so, no fact would be contingent. Every fact whatever is. It would not be a fact, if it did not exist; and if it exists, and comes under my "existent cognitive faculties," it is not contingent to me. How can any power of imagining its absence, and the substitution for it of a similar but slightly different state of things, afford any sort of evidence as to the possibility of its not having happened? When a man says, "This ink might just as well have been blue as black," all that he really means is, that he can easily imagine the absence of the black ink and the presence of the blue ink in its place; but for aught I know to the contrary, the presence of the black ink was determined by causes reaching far beyond Adam.

If, on the other hand, you mean by necessary truths, truths which are implied by the very use of certain words, then I say that facts come first, and that words ought to be made to fit them; and that when you describe the properties of space, time, and number as necessary truths, all that you ought to mean, all that you can prove, is that certain propositions about them (*e.g.*, that two straight lines cannot enclose a space,) describe in perfectly clear and adequate language facts which we learn by experience. I could understand the meaning of calling these facts necessary, though I see no good in doing so; but the so-called truths are merely descriptions of the facts, and carry us no further than our perceptions of them.

An illustration will show how very much the difference between contingent and necessary truth (using the word "necessary" in the second sense) is a difference as to the use of words. It is, we are told, a contingent truth that gold is yellow, and the reason is because God could make white gold. It seems to me that the truth of the assertion that God could make white gold entirely depends on the meaning which men choose to attach to the word "gold." If by the word "gold" we mean a metal of a certain specific gravity, malleable, not liable to rust, and of a yellow colour, then God can no more make white gold than he can make a square triangle. If by the word "gold" we mean a metal of a certain specific gravity, malleable, and not liable to rust, whatever may be its colour, then God can (we may suppose) make gold of any colour, but why should we not annex the meaning "yellow" to the word "gold," as well as the meaning "metal?" Dr. Ward somewhere observes that it would be easy for Omnipotence

tence to make cold fire.\*. All that I can say to that is, that if Omnipotence made something which sparkled, and crackled, and smoked, but did not burn, I should not call it fire.

The difference, and the only difference which I can perceive between the class of truths which relate to the properties of time, space, and number, and propositions as to common objects and occurrences, is this: The words which relate to time, space, and number are perfectly simple and adequate to that which they describe, whereas the words which relate to common objects are in nearly every case complex, often to the highest degree. The words "straight," "line," "plane," "surface," "angle," "circle," "triangle," have no complexity at all. A line means a line. Add the idea of breadth, or thickness, or specific colour, or weight, and the word becomes inappropriate; but the words "paper," "stick," "book," "man," "fire," "gold," and so on, mean a collection of many qualities which may be varied by imagination, without destroying the general resemblance between the image raised by the word used and the thing signified. If we hear of red gold, for instance, we understand a metal having all the other properties of gold as commonly known, except the quality of yellowness, for which redness is substituted. When we are told of a black swan, we understand a bird like a white swan, but of a different colour. But when we hear of straight lines two of which would enclose a space, or of a figure contained by three straight lines making four angles with each other, we know that if the words employed are employed in their usual senses, the propositions into which they are introduced cannot be true; because the propositions deny the only quality which the words employed denote, and are thus contradictions in terms or mere nonsense. To talk of two straight lines which enclose a space is as much nonsense as to talk of two straight lines of which either one or both are crooked.

I will consider immediately the manner in which we get our knowledge of the qualities of space, but before doing so I will make an observation on the character of the words in which we embody that knowledge, and of the thing to which they apply. Space has, as far as we know, no qualities or properties at all, except qualities and properties which the words used by us express with perfect clearness and adequacy; and this seems to be the reason why the propositions which we make about space do not admit of being varied, and cannot

\* "Let us take as an instance of a geometrical axiom the proposition that two parallel straight lines will never meet, and let us take as an instance of an obvious physical fact the warmth-giving property of fire. No one who reflects will doubt that an English child's experience of the latter truth is (to say the least) every whit as constant and uniform as his experience of the former. Yet when he comes to the age of reason, he pronounces that the former is a necessary truth; whereas he would be simply amazed at the allegation that an Omnipotent Creator could not on any given occasion deprive fire of its warmth-giving property." *Dublin Review*, Jan., 1874.

even be imagined to be false. When we speak of a straight line, we mean an imaginary line resembling the thin parallelograms popularly called straight lines, but distinguished from them by having no breadth, no thickness, no specific colour, and no deviation whatever from the apparent general direction. We can imagine a substance like gold in all respects except its colour, or its specific gravity, or its malleability, or its exchangeable value; and we can think of gold with exclusive reference to any one or more of these qualities. We thus find no difficulty in applying the word "gold" to numerous imaginary substances, differing from each other in many respects, but resembling each other in the particular matters of which we think when we use the word. Moreover, all the words which describe the qualities of gold admit of degrees. There are numerous shades of colour, for instance, to which the word "yellow" applies. Space, on the other hand, has no qualities at all, except the qualities of figure, and these qualities are described in words which have one meaning, and no more. Hence we cannot vary either our mental image of space itself, or the meaning of the words in which we describe it. If we tried to do so, we should speak without a meaning, and reduce the subject of our speech to the condition to which that eminent logician, Crambe, reduced his abstract Lord Mayor. When Martinus Scriblerus said that he could not conceive of a Lord Mayor without his gold chain or his turtle, Crambe replied that he could conceive of a Lord Mayor without gold chain, turtle, fur gown, sword-bearer, chaplain, coach, office, body, soul, or spirit, which, he submitted, was the abstract idea of a Lord Mayor. Martinus, I am sorry to say, called Crambe an impudent liar, which, though rude, was not, I think, wholly unnatural; but seriously speaking, I think that to try to conceive of space as being other than it is, is like trying to conceive of red as being blue. You can substitute one colour for another, but the sole property of any given colour is to be itself. Alter it, and you destroy it. It is the same of space. We cannot modify it in imagination, because there is nothing in it to modify, and because we have no experience of anything else, not quite the same, but very like it, which we can substitute for it.

I now come to the question by what means is our knowledge of the characteristics of Space acquired, and to this I reply, it is acquired in precisely the same way as our knowledge of any common fact,—the fact, for instance, that a particular sheet of paper is blue and not white,—namely, by the use of our senses. Now if this is the case, either all truths are necessary, or mathematical truths depend upon experience, like others, and may thus be called contingent.

The question,—What is the nature of time, space, and number? is quite independent of the question,—How do we become aware of their properties? I am not myself able to attach any meaning to



the words "Space" and "Number" apart from distinct objects existing in space, and faculties capable of perceiving them as so existing, nor can I attach any meaning to the word "Time" apart from the faculty of memory. But whether space, time, and number are objective or subjective, whether they are the colour, so to speak, of the things we look at, or of glasses through which we are obliged to look, it is undeniable that our knowledge of them is entirely dependent upon our senses and our memory. A person who passed his life in dreamless sleep, so that he had no external perceptions at all, and whose mind was conscious of no succession of thoughts or impressions, would know nothing of space, number, or time. On the other hand, the instant a person begins to use his senses or his memory he becomes aware of space, time, and number, and he continues to be made aware of them at every instant at which he uses his faculties through the whole of his life. His early ideas on the subject are exceedingly confused, but by experience, especially if it is guided by instruction, they become perfectly clear and systematic; and when they have once reached a clear and systematic condition subsequent experience adds nothing to them. He knows them as well as they admit of being known, just as a lad of 14 knows his multiplication-table and his alphabet as well as he will ever know them, if he lives to be a hundred. The experience by which we learn to understand the words "before" and "after" is so early and simple that no one remembers its acquisition, but I should suppose most people remember learning the multiplication-table and the first elements of geometry. If I were to generalise from my own experience, I should say that we begin with exceedingly confused notions upon the matter, and that after a time, longer or shorter, as it may be, we see that the matter really is as we are told that it is,—that is to say, we see that our impressions of external objects really are summed up by the multiplication-table and geometrical axioms.

I distinctly remember the first day when I really understood the first proposition of the first book of Euclid, and how I demonstrated it to myself over and over again many times with great satisfaction. It was exactly the same sort of feeling as one which I have often experienced in later life,—the feeling of discovering one's way about a place. If a man takes up his abode in a new neighbourhood, and proceeds to explore it, he will find (at least I have often found) that at first he is very much astray, even if he has maps to help him. By degrees he begins to find his way, he mentally connects one road with another, and sees what are the relative positions of such and such woods, hills, houses, and other objects. The whole at last takes its place in his mind, sometimes by a kind of crisis which enables him, with striking distinctness and rapidity, to say, "Now I know where I am." When this happens he knows the country, and if he

lives in it fifty years his knowledge will not alter, though, of course, it may become more detailed and minute.

Our acquaintance with the relations of space in general is, if I am not mistaken, of precisely the same nature as our acquaintance with particular portions of space. We learn the general meaning of the words "line," "surface," "solid," "point," "round," "square," and the like, as we learn the meaning of other common words. A nurse or a mother tells a child that the marks which she makes on a piece of paper are lines, just as she tells it that the creature which lies on the rug is a dog. I suppose no one ever yet studied Euclid who did not know perfectly well before he read a word of it what a straight and a crooked line, a round thing and a square thing, look like, nor can any one have seen a board, or a table, or a sheet of paper, without having received the impression of parallel lines. I should further suppose that no one ever learnt to walk without learning what is meant by a short cut from place to place. Experience teaches every human being who is not an idiot, and indeed every animal, that it saves time to cut a corner, and the difference between this homely proposition and the proposition that two sides of a triangle are greater than the third is only a difference of expression.

If it is denied that matters of this sort are learnt by experience, it appears to me that it ought, in consistency, to be denied that anything whatever is learnt by experience. It appears to me just as clear that experience teaches us to compare together the length of lines in general, and, in particular, to compare the length of a straight and crooked line terminating at the same points, as that it teaches us to compare together the lengths of any two specific lines. I see no difference whatever between the process by which we learn that the word "straight" means a line of a peculiar kind, like that which is apparently formed by a string tightly stretched, and that such lines are the shortest way from point to point; and the process by which we learn that the Oxford Road is proximately straight, and that that road forms a shorter connection between Victoria Gate and the Marble Arch than the road which goes all round Hyde Park. The difference between the two propositions is simply that one of them refers to one particular corner of the contents of space, and the other to space, or, which is the same thing, to the contents of space in general.

It is sometimes asked how you are enabled by any number of observations on particular parts of space to make general observations on it? I think Dr. Ward asks in one place what right Mr. Mill had to suppose that the conditions of space in Sirius were the same as they are here. The answer appears to me to be, that by the word "space" we mean that enormous apparent blue vault which appears to our senses to contain the earth, the solar system, and innumerable other systems, nebulae, and fixed stars. All these things we see with

our eyes, and we picture space to ourselves as an enormous expanse or cavity in which they are all contained. No one, I suppose, will deny that experience enables us to draw an imaginary line between two trees or two book-cases, between which, if we pleased, we could draw a real line; or that it informs us that if we represent these lines on paper, we can reason about the relations of the objects to each other as well as we could if we confined our attention to the things themselves, and indeed, in many instances, much better. If the possibility of making and using maps is not a fact taught by experience, then experience teaches nothing at all.\* If it is, then when we draw imaginary lines from star to star, and argue about their distances, upon data which we have gathered from our local experience of space, we are proceeding upon experience, the experience upon which we proceed being that of our own eyesight, which assures us that fixed stars do exist in space, and that that which we call space is a vast homogeneous vault for them to exist in. I do not see how this can be denied by any one who does not confine the word "experience" to experience by touch. At this moment, I see a sparrow sitting on a tree, perhaps ten yards off. Behind the sparrow and through the fog, I see the sun, and I have identically the same reason for believing that the sun and the sparrow both exist in space.

I maintain, on the whole, that we learn the characteristics of Space by looking at things in it and by moving about in it, just as we learn the shape of a room and the position of the articles of furniture in it by the very same process; and I say that both or neither of the matters thus learnt are learnt by experience.

I have already attempted to explain the reason why it is practically impossible for us to imagine or conceive (I think the only difference between the two operations is in the greater distinctness of imagination, and its application to matters of which we are informed by the eye or ear) any alteration in space, time, or number, their properties and relations, the reason being that our ideas of them are simple ideas, and therefore cannot be altered without being destroyed. But I will pursue the matter a little further, with the view of showing,—first, that no inference whatever can be drawn from the extent of our

\* On this passage Dr. Ward observes that the only inferences which we can draw from maps more readily than from the things themselves, are "those which have for their premisses (in addition to the data of the map) mathematical truths." Surely this is not so. We can tell from a map much more readily than from actual observation, that Italy resembles a boot, or that the Alps and Apennines run in certain directions, or that Great Britain and Ireland are contiguous islands; but how are these mathematical truths? Is the resemblance of a portrait to a face a mathematical truth? and what is a map but a picture of a particular sort? I do not quite understand what the 'data of the map' are. The fundamental datum of every map is the fact that the apparent figure of an object can be represented to the eye by lines drawn on paper or similar materials. This is not a mathematical truth, but a fact shown to exist by experience. This fact is the basis of geometry.

power of imagining or conceiving; and secondly, that though we cannot imagine or conceive of an alteration of the qualities of space, time, or number, we can readily imagine facts which, if they existed, would prevent us from forming our present ideas of space, time, and number, and would show that those ideas, if formed, were incorrect.

The first point may, I think, be established very shortly. The processes of imagining and conceiving consist, as far as we know, in representing to our minds, things which we have perceived by the combined operation of our senses and our intelligence. Now time, space, and number enter into nearly every imagination of our minds. There may be some thoughts which have no relation to them, but these I need not at present consider. Now there is but one space, one series of numbers, and one course or stream of time, and our idea of each of the three is a perfectly simple idea, independent of everything else, and continually present to our minds. How, then, can we modify it in imagination? It is as impossible to do so as to imagine a new colour, or to think out the common expression, "If I were you." Thus our incapacity to imagine or conceive certain things proves simply that we have no experience which enables us to do so. It neither proves, nor to my mind does it tend to prove, that what we cannot imagine or conceive cannot be conceived or imagined by any other intelligent being, even if he is omnipotent. To me the expression "space of four dimensions" conveys no meaning whatever, but I am far from denying that it might convey a meaning to a being with faculties differently constituted, and I believe mathematicians would be able to give grounds for supposing that it would.

As to the second point, I say, that though we cannot picture to ourselves a state of things in which the conditions of time, space, and number differ from those with which we are acquainted, in the sense of forming a complete and coherent mental picture of it, we can easily imagine facts which would prevent us from forming our present ideas about time, space, and number, or would show that if formed, those ideas were false. If, then, such facts existed, our present ideas as to time, space, and number would not exist, or if they did, would be regarded as false. Hence their truth depends upon the continued non-existence of facts readily imaginable, and hence we must conclude either that they might be otherwise, or that no one fact which we observe could be otherwise, and in either case they have no such special character as is denoted by the expression "necessary truths."

Not to trouble you longer, I will conclude with a single illustration of this. Dr. Ward says: "Let there be sixteen rows of pebbles, each containing eighteen. It is a necessary truth that the whole number is two hundred and eighty-eight. Omnipotence could divide one pebble into two or create new pebbles, but it is beyond the sphere of

Omnipotence to effect that, so long as there remain sixteen rows of eighteen pebbles each, the whole number of pebbles should be either more or less than two hundreds, eight tens, and eight units." There is, I believe, a superstition in Wiltshire that no one can count the stones at Stonehenge, but that if you pass your life in counting you will always bring out a different result. Now suppose this were the fact, and suppose it were a fact commonly observed, that if you counted Dr. Ward's pebbles over and over again, arranging them each time in a different order, you always brought out a different result, would it not follow that the multiplication table was not true? That table assumes, and so implicitly asserts, that there are things which retain their identity for a certain time, and that they do not lose it by the alteration of their position. I do not see why this truth should not be otherwise, why there should not be a world in which the act of putting two pairs of things together should reduce the number to three, just as the juxtaposition of two drops of water produces one drop.\* It is true that the one drop contains as much water as the two contained, but this is very far from being immediately obvious, or from being incapable of being disproved by experience. Every proposition in the multiplication table is indeed either merely arbitrary, or else it is a statement of the fact that by varying the arrangement of groups of objects you do not vary their number, which is a property of matter learnt by experience. When you say three times three are nine, you either give a name to three groups of threes which name might just as well be eleven or seven as nine, or else you affirm that the juxtaposition or rearrangement of three groups of three things does not affect their number, which is perfectly true, but is necessary only in the general sense already-referred to.

Upon the whole, it appears to me that the one type of truth and knowledge is the proposition—"This sheet of paper which I hold in

\* Dr. Ward observes: "On such a supposition, if the inhabitants possessed reason, they would know with absolute certainty that two and two make neither more nor less than four, and they would know that some power was constantly at work destroying material objects which had existed, or uniting material objects which had been distinct. As Mr. Stephen has not assigned any reasons for his opinions on this head, I need not assign any reasons for mine." I think I have assigned a reason. My argument is that the multiplication table assumes, that by changing the position of things, their number is unaffected. This is a fact which might be imagined to be otherwise. Suppose it were otherwise, where, I ask, would you get your multiplication table? How would it ever occur to the mind? Dr. Ward simply asserts that it would do so. I should be curious to see his reasons for this opinion. Till he gives them, the matter stands thus. We agree that the multiplication table represents and assumes a fact proved by continual experience. I affirm, and he denies, that its truth is dependent on the continuance of the experience. In reference to illustrations similar to this published by me years ago, Professor Clifford observed in a paper published in the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW for October, that in such a world the word "number" would have quite a different meaning from the one which it bears with us. No doubt it would. The very point which I wish to prove is that propositions about space and number, and the very meaning of those words, are as much dependent upon experience as any others, and in this Professor Clifford would (I suppose) agree.

my hand is blue, and that other is white," and that all other assertions are reducible to this type. Truth thus means the correspondence between the thoughts or images raised by words, and the thoughts or images raised by the joint action of the senses and the mind directed to the things to which the words refer. Whether such truth is called "necessary" or not is to me matter of indifference. The essential point is that when we say that statements are true, we mean only that they correspond either with present perception, or with a present recollection of past perception checked and corrected as far as possible. When we say that they are certain, we mean only that we do not, in fact, doubt them at the time when we make them. Truth and certainty are words of degree. They never can be freed from any errors which may be inherent in our faculties or our memory, and every assertion which we make is, or ought to be, made subject to a tacit reservation in respect of such errors. You cannot have anything truer than truth or more certain than certainty, in the senses of truth and certainty just stated.

This was the paper to which Dr. Ward replied by a paper published as an article in the *Dublin Review* for July, 1874. The article contains much matter which I am content to leave without further remark to the judgment of those who read the two papers, but it is summed up by Dr. Ward himself in two theses, each of which he supports by two arguments. Before I proceed to the explanations which these arguments show to be necessary, I will state, in Dr. Ward's own words, each of the theses and each of the arguments by which it is supported, together with my answer to each argument. Dr. Ward states his theses and the arguments in favour of them very shortly, and I will imitate his brevity in my answers. The italics in every case, indeed all the italics in this article without exception, are Dr. Ward's.

#### FIRST THESIS.

"The phenomenist admits that we can know with absolute certainty the triangularity of all trilaterals; but he adds, that our mode of obtaining that knowledge is experience and observation. My first thesis has been merely negative, viz., that these assuredly are *not* the ways in which such knowledge is *gained*."

FIRST ARGUMENT.—Not one man in a million has observed the fact that trilaterals are triangular.

ANSWER.—If so, not one man in a million knows that trilaterals are triangular. Every man who does know it has either observed it as a fact for himself, or has had the fact pointed out to him by others, and knows it for that reason.

SECOND ARGUMENT.—In the enormous majority of instances when, the axiom [*i.e.*, that all trilaterals are triangular] is first known by us,

it is accepted as an entirely new proposition, and yet as being, notwithstanding its novelty, self-evidently true.

ANSWER.—The same may be said of every truth which is proved by experiment. The proposition that the words now under the reader's eye are printed on the page before him, is accepted by every reader who sees them for the first time as an entirely new proposition, and yet as being, notwithstanding its novelty, self-evidently true. Yet that proposition is proved by experience and observation only.

#### SECOND THESIS.

"This axiom [*i.e.*, the axiom that trilaterals are triangular] is known by us as necessarily true."

FIRST ARGUMENT.—I do not see how any one can deny—certainly Mr. Mill expressly admits—that the triangularity of all trilaterals can be known by purely mental experimentation, by the mere process of imagining a trilateral. The axiom, then, is self-evident, or, in other words, is known to be true by the mere process of being duly pondered [not pondered, but imagined, which is a different thing.]

ANSWER.—This also is true (subject to the qualification in brackets); but it is not inconsistent with the theory that belief in the doctrine in question is based upon experience. Having seen various lines and triangles we can imagine others, and argue about them as well as if they were represented by actual figures drawn on paper. Dr. Ward's argument requires some one who could imagine triangles without ever having learnt, by sight or touch, what a straight line is, without knowing by experience what is meant by space. Imagination is based on sensation, and sensation is one of the constituent elements of experience. Mr. Mill's point is, that in this particular case imagination is a kind of experience.

SECOND ARGUMENT.—"This second reason for my second thesis is based on that conviction of necessity which inevitably arises in our mind when we contemplate this or any other geometrical axiom. We pronounce at once, on the question being placed before us, that the triangularity of trilaterals is not simply a phenomenon which prevails within the region of our experience, but a truth which could not be otherwise, of which Omnipotence could not effect the contradictory. I allege this as a fact of which every one must be cognisant who carefully and fairly examines his own mind."

Dr. Ward proceeds to say, that this "conviction of necessity cannot possibly be due to the mere frequent experience and observation of" (any mathematical) "axiom." In proof of this, he returns to the illustration about fire. Every one experiences the heating power of fire as often at least as he perceives that a trilateral is triangular, and probably his attention is much more frequently directed to it, yet "we see no repugnance whatever in the notion that in some other planet a

substance may be found which in every other respect resembles fire, but yet which does *not* possess this particular property of imparting warmth."

ANSWERS.—(1.) It is not shown that a necessary truth (whatever that may be) cannot be known by observation and experience only; therefore, admitting, for the sake of argument, that what we are alleged to "pronounce at once" is pronounced at once, and is true, it does not follow that the truths so pronounced are not learnt by experience.

(2.) No such "conviction of necessity" as is alleged to rise in "our minds" arises in my mind on contemplating such axioms. The only convictions which do arise in my mind with respect to them are that they appear at present to sum up the facts of external nature which are continually under my observation; that I have no ground to expect such an alteration in those facts as would falsify the axioms in question; and that I cannot form any consistent inherent picture of such a state of facts, though I can readily imagine isolated results, which if they existed would throw doubt upon such axioms. Hence, whenever I have occasion to think of time, space, or number, I imagine them as being what to my present experience they seem to be, and, if my memory is correct, always have been.

(3.) I have never tried to account for the "conviction of necessity" which is said to attend our knowledge of mathematical axioms by the frequency with which we experience their truth. Our certainty of their truth (I avoid the phrase "conviction of necessity") arises from their simplicity and the directness with which we observe the facts which mathematical axioms describe. The experience by which we learn the meaning of the words "straight line" and "crooked line," is the experience by which we perceive the truth of the proposition two straight lines cannot inclose a space. The experience by which we learn the meaning of the words, "a blue sheet of paper," is the experience by which we perceive the truth of the proposition, "this sheet of paper is blue;" but the mere frequency with which we look at the sheet of paper, has nothing to do with our certainty of the truth of the proposition. One steady look is as good for the purpose of producing that certainty as ten thousand looks; but one is absolutely indispensable. So of the lines.

This shortly sums up what I have to say by way of rejoinder to Dr. Ward's reply. I now proceed to the further explanations which from his article appear to be required. I think that his theory is pervaded by two errors more or less connected together, which vitiate all his speculations. These errors are an obscure and imperfect conception of what is meant by experience, and a confusion of thought about necessity and possibility, which, as I shall try to show, leads him into strange inconsistencies. First, I will consider the subject of experience; and next, the subject of necessity and possibility.



Dr. Ward's reasoning seems to assume throughout that the acquisition of knowledge by experience must in all cases be a gradual process. He seems, for instance, to be under the impression that a man who speaks of learning from experience that two sides of a triangle are greater than the third, means that the assertion is generalized from the observation of a vast number of individual triangles. If this is not Dr. Ward's impression, I do not understand such a passage as the following: "Imagine grave philosophers, telescope in hand, endeavouring to discern some trilateral in distant space in order that they may carefully count the number of its angles." This, of course, is meant to suggest that those who think as I do,\* ought in consistency to perpetrate the absurdity in question. The best way of answering this will be to show, by an example, what I mean by learning from experience the proposition to which Dr. Ward continually recurs about triangles having three sides.

First. What is the proposition? Dr. Ward says:—"The axiom which throughout my articles I have chosen for the purpose of illustrating this question has been the axiom that "all trilateral figures are triangular." I certainly never heard that this proposition was "an axiom" at all, but this is of little importance. It is more important to remark that as stated the proposition is not even true. For instance, a capital Z or N is a trilateral figure, but it has two and not three angles. If the three sides were zigzags the figures might still be called trilateral, but they would have many more than three angles. To make the so-called axiom true, it must be worded in the following or in equivalent terms:—"If a portion of a plane superficies is enclosed by three straight lines they will form three angles with each other, and no more." Now I assert that this proposition is learnt from experience and nothing else; and I further assert that experience, and experience alone, enables us to assert that this proposition is true of every part of space,—that it is as true in Sirius as it is in London.

Any one who wished to teach a person the proposition just stated could do so by drawing a triangle and pointing out that it had three angles, and no more. He might then proceed to show in various obvious ways that if the three sides were arranged in any other way, they would not enclose space. One obvious mode of doing this would be to tell the student to imagine any one of the three sides turned round on either of its extremities as a centre. So long as it continued to enclose any portion of space it would cut the other two lines at two points, and as soon as it ceased to do so the three lines would cease to enclose space. This surely is experience in the strictest sense of the word, and the result is to show the student

\* In Dr. Ward's language "phenomenists," Dr. Ward being a "necessist." I may in passing disclaim these nicknames. I dislike Dr. Ward's habit of coining words. Surely the common English of every day life is quite capable of expressing any proposition which has a distinct meaning.

that the only way in which those particular three lines could be made to enclose space is by cutting each other at three points. If further proof were wanting, he might be challenged to do it in any other way. I cannot conceive in what other manner the proposition could be established, and I think Dr. Ward himself would own that this was not merely experience, but experience in the form of a crucial experiment.

I suppose Dr. Ward would say that such a proof would apply to only one triangle, or set of triangles, and that the difficulty is to show how experience could establish it with reference to all possible triangles in every part of space.

The experiment in question might readily be so managed as to apply to all possible triangles. By making each of the three lines revolve on its extremity, each of them is made to point in every direction to which any straight line in the plane of the paper can point. By making the paper revolve on its axis, each triangle is made to occupy successively all the planes into which space can be divided. Thus, with a single triangle and a single sheet of paper, we can perform experiments which show that the proposition in question is not affected either by the direction of the lines or by the plane in which they are placed. Equally simple experiments would show that it is unaffected by the length of the lines.

If a man was so unimaginative as to require such illustrations, it would be easy to show him that the result was the same whether the sides of the triangle were an inch long, or were drawn by the imagination between three fixed stars situated in remote parts of the sky. It can hardly be said that this is not an appeal to experience, and it appears to me equally idle to deny that the proper inference from the experience in question is that the proposition applies to every part of space where there are or may be straight lines. We believe triangles in Sirius to be like triangles in London, because our eyes tell us that Sirius is included in the vast vault which we call space, and because the acquaintance with the three dimensions of space which we gain by looking at it and moving about in it assures us that a straight line is a straight line, whatever way it points, and whatever its length may be.

Indeed the very terms of the proposition, when correctly stated, are such as to show its truth when they are compared with the things which they denote. This may be easily shown. The proposition is as follows when correctly stated:—"If a portion of a plane superficies is enclosed by three straight lines they will form three angles with one another, and no more." What is a plane superficies? Anything flat—this sheet of paper, for instance. What do you mean by the words "enclose a portion of a plane superficies?" Drawing lines in different directions, but in the same plane, so arranged as to return to the point from which you begin. What is

an angle? The figure made by the meeting of two straight lines going in different directions, or a bent line each of the parts of which is straight. Draw three straight lines in different directions in such a manner that the third line ends where the first line began.

Here they are



or thus



or thus



In either of these cases the three lines enclose space, and meet each other in three points. Thus the proposition described as "a necessary truth" comes, when properly stated and explained, to this plain statement of two matters of fact—first: figures enclosing space can be drawn with three sides and three angles, and they are commonly called triangles. Secondly, no one ever yet has been able to imagine or to suggest a way in which three straight lines can be made to cut each other in more than three places. This is really all that the proposition that all trilaterals are triangular means. If any one thinks that it means more, I would recommend to his notice the article by Professor Clifford already referred to. At the conclusion of that article, the author states his conviction that we do not know that mathematical axioms are universally true. Whether he is right or wrong in this I do not pretend to say. It is enough for my argument that a man of the highest scientific attainments deliberately makes such an assertion. How Dr. Ward can reconcile the fact that Professor Clifford has expressed such an opinion with his own theory of necessary truth I cannot imagine. The article in question directly contradicts, by its very existence, Dr. Ward's assertion that a "conviction of necessity inevitably arises in our minds when we contemplate any geometrical axiom." Unless Professor Clifford deceives himself on a matter of which no one else can judge, no such conviction arises in the mind of at least one very eminent mathematician.\*

I am almost ashamed to labour a point which to my mind is so clear that to enforce it is like burning daylight, but experience, the universal teacher, shows that it is not equally clear to every one. Perhaps this question may throw some light on the subject. Is there one single proposition about time, space, or number, of which we can affirm that its truth would be known to a being who had no sensations whatever? If not, sensation—and so experience—is essential to knowledge, and Dr. Ward's fundamental thesis, that

\* The following is an extract from the article referred to:—"I am driven to conclude in regard to every apparently universal statement either that it is not really universal, but a particular statement about my nervous system, about my apparatus of thought, or that I do not know that it is true, and to this conclusion . . . I shall endeavour to lead you."

certain truths "are cognizable by us quite independently of experience," is disproved.

So much for the question of experience. I pass to the confusion of thought about necessity, to which I have already referred. It appears to me that Dr. Ward's views on this matter may be shown to expose him to the following dilemma. Either he must give up the whole doctrine of necessary truth, which, as he would himself admit, forms an essential point of the philosophical foundation upon which he wishes to place Roman Catholic theology, or he must accept it in a form which would reduce all mysteries to nonsense, and render all miracles impossible. He is aware of the danger, and makes an effort to avoid it, which I will examine in its place, but I must first show what his opinion is. In his last paper he gives the following explanation of the expression "necessary truth"—"a truth which could not be otherwise, of which Omnipotence could not effect the contradictory."

The second part of this definition is the really important member of it. If it were left out the first part would fall of itself. What is the meaning of "could not" or "cannot?" Power, so far as we know, can be exerted only by voluntary agents. The statement that a man cannot enclose a space with two straight lines is both intelligible and true. The statement that two straight lines "cannot" enclose a space taken strictly is as unmeaning as the statement that they cannot paint a picture. Three straight lines "cannot" in this sense enclose a space any more than two, though any man can do it with three straight lines. I think therefore that Dr. Ward was perfectly right in adding the second to the first branch of his definition, "A necessary truth is a truth which could not be otherwise," is a definition which tells us nothing unless the words "could not be" are connected with some voluntary agent. This is the reason why my paper assumes that a "truth which could not be otherwise" means a truth which we cannot imagine to be otherwise; and I have already given reasons which I need not repeat for thinking that the mere fact that men are unable to imagine the falsehood of geometrical axioms, proves nothing more than the fact that they are unable to alter any one fact which they perceive. Hence the really important part of Dr. Ward's definition of necessary truth is that they are truths of which Omnipotence cannot effect the contradictory. The result of it is, that in order to know whether or not a truth is necessary, we must know what God can and what he cannot do.

As I have already shown, there is a sense in which the power of God is limited by the language of man. Define gold as a metal of a yellow colour, and God cannot make red gold. Define a straight line as a line which is not bent, and God cannot make a straight line which is bent. This, however, is mere quibbling. The substantial question is whether we can learn anything from asking ourselves

whether God can or cannot bring about particular results capable of being more or less intelligibly described by human language. To me such an inquiry appears wholly absurd and monstrous. If a bookworm had somehow or other arrived at the conclusion that a Bible was probably produced by a being who possessed whatever the bookworm meant by intelligence, and if having arrived at that conclusion it were to go on to inquire what this being could and could not do, in order to get a measure of the comparative value of different propositions which its fellow bookworms had laid down about eating the leaves of books, it would act very like a man who affects to know what can and what cannot be done by a Being capable of doing everything which displays marks of design, of arranging the stars, making men and women, animals, and insects discoverable only by the microscope.

Dr. Ward can hardly take this view. It is essential to his whole system that he should measure the power of God, and when examined it will distinctly appear that he does, in fact, measure it by the powers of his own mind. He does, as a matter of fact, argue upon the supposition that God cannot do certain things because the human imagination stands in the way of it, and that God can do everything which the human imagination can conceive or depict.

Of course Dr. Ward does not, and could not, hold this theory consciously. Of course he repudiates it when it is ascribed to him. In his last paper upon the subject, he says:—"Imagine a *Catholic* of all men committing himself to such an argument! Imagine a Catholic implying that what is inconceivable is necessarily false! Did any one, *e.g.*, ever dream of imagining that human beings on earth can conceive in its integrity the dogma of the Blessed Trinity? Of course I heartily agree with my critic that things utterly inconceivable by the human intellect may to beings of a higher nature be the simplest of truths."

That a Catholic or any other man should be led by the necessities of his argument to contradict himself, and that he should be prevented from seeing this by his own verbal subtlety, is nothing at all surprising, and any one who has read Dr. Ward's articles must, I think, perceive that no man is more likely to be led into such a position; for no writer of our day is so fond of coining new words and devising verbal distinctions. I think that in the present case it can be shown that he has found himself compelled by the necessities of his argument to take the human faculties as being the measure of God's omnipotence in some cases, whilst in other cases which depend upon the same principle he arbitrarily refuses to do so.

The first part of this proposition is proved by passages already quoted for another purpose.

His first argument in support of the thesis that mathematical

axioms are necessarily true is this: "The triangularity of all trilaterals can be known by purely mental experimentation, by the mere process of *imagining* a trilateral. By this act of *imagination* we know infallibly that" [any] "trilateral is triangular, or, in other words, that it is outside the sphere of Omnipotence to make a trilateral which shall not be triangular." Thus by a mere act of imagination we learn what God cannot do. The second argument in support of the same thesis is very much to the same effect. It "is based on that conviction of necessity which inevitably arises in our mind when we contemplate this" (the triangularity of trilaterals) "or any other geometrical axiom. We pronounce at once that the triangularity of trilaterals is not simply a phenomenon which prevails within the region of our own experience, but a truth which could not be otherwise, of which Omnipotence could not effect the contradictory." In fewer words God cannot alter mathematical axioms, because we have a conviction that God cannot alter them. A feeling of ours, the "conviction of necessity arising in our minds," is the negative limit of God's power. He cannot do what we feel that he cannot do.

In other places, Dr. Ward uses the human imagination to show positively what God can do. For instance, he says that "an Omnipotent Creator could, on any given occasion, deprive fire of its warmth-giving property," "support stones in the water," "alter the taste of beetroot," "divide one pebble into two, or create new pebbles," and so forth. In a passage referred to above, he says in effect that there may be a substance like fire in all other respects in some other planet, because "we see no repugnance whatever" in the notion. That is, the existence of such a body is possible because we can imagine it as existing. Thus, the power of causing innumerable events is ascribed to God, simply, as far as I can see, because *man* can imagine their occurrence. We thus find that Dr. Ward believes God to be able to bring about any result which man can distinctly imagine, and that he also believes on the strength of acts of his imagination and feelings in his own mind that there are other things which God cannot do. It would be natural to conclude from this that Dr. Ward makes the powers of his own mind, his power of conceiving or imagining, the measure of God's Omnipotence; and I believe that this inference is just, though, as the paragraph above quoted shows, he repudiates it, and regards it with something approaching to horror.

I now proceed to consider the means by which he tries to avoid it. His opinions on the subject are to be found in an article published in the *Dublin Review* for July, 1871, called "The Rule and Motive of Certitude." The point of that article, as far as it affects the present question, may be stated very briefly in the following propositions, which are almost in Dr. Ward's own words.\*

\* The passage is so important that I give Dr. Ward's very words, though they are not very conveniently arranged, and are encumbered with matter immaterial to

1. A proposition is necessarily false which contradicts what is known by the very conception of its subject.

2. If the subject is apprehended as infinitely transcending the conception thereof, various propositions are not known by its very conception which otherwise would be [so known].

3. Therefore proposition (1) is consistent with the assertion that many propositions are indubitably true, though "they may most fitly be called inconceivable and unthinkable."

I do not understand what is meant by, "knowing by the very conception of a subject." A man knows that the leaf under his eyes is green, not by his conception of it, but by looking at it; nor do I understand how the fact, that a leaf or anything else has many other qualities besides those denoted by the word leaf, prevents us from understanding those which are so denoted, or entitles us to talk nonsense about them. A man may know that a leaf is green, that it has a particular shape, and occupies a particular portion of space. He may also know that it has an internal structure, a set of organs which "infinitely transcend" his knowledge of them; but he would not therefore believe the most learned botanist in the world if he were to assert things "inconceivable and unthinkable" about the leaf affecting its shape and colour: if, for instance, he were to say that it was both green and also bright scarlet, and that it was often in two places at once; the reply would be, "I can judge of that as well as you." Leaving these dark sayings as they stand, let us see how they apply to particular cases.

Dr. Ward repeats again and again in a variety of forms of words that God cannot make two straight lines enclose a space.

The catechism put forward by all the Roman Catholic bishops in England as a simple statement of their creed contains these questions and answers:—*Q.* What is the Holy Eucharist?—*A.* It is the true body and blood of Christ under the appearances of bread and wine. *Q.* How are the bread and wine changed into the body and blood of Christ?—*A.* By the power of God, to whom nothing is impossible or difficult. *Q.* When is the change made?—*A.* When the words of consecration ordained by Jesus Christ are pronounced by the priest in the Mass.

When Mass is performed a quantity of wafers are consecrated at once, each of which is declared to be the true body of Christ,

the present argument. They are these: P. 57, "But we think there *are* propositions which may most fitly be called inconceivable and unthinkable, yet which all theists regard as indubitably true. We refer to religious *mysteries*." P. 59, "We implied a few pages back that a proposition is necessarily false which contradicts what is known by the very conception of its 'subject.' We should here explain that this does not at all conflict with what we have just been saying about mysteries. The reason is this. When the archetype is apprehended by me as indefinitely transcending my conception thereof various propositions are *not* 'known by its very conception,' which otherwise would be."

and Masses are being performed all over the world at the same moment.

Hence if the statement in the catechism is true, the true body of Christ is in many places at one and the same moment of time. Hence God can cause a body to be in two or more places at once. Yet says Dr. Ward he cannot cause two straight lines to enclose a space. The one operation is a mystery, "utterly inconceivable by the human intellect," no doubt, but indubitably true. The other contradicts that which is "cognized" as a "necessary truth," and God himself cannot do that. How can distinctions about "knowing by the very conception of a subject," and any other kind of knowing, meet a case like this? What intelligible distinction is it possible to draw between the state of our minds as to the proposition, "two straight lines cannot enclose a space," and the proposition, "a body cannot be in two places at once?" Dr. Ward says that by the mere act of imagining a trilateral, we know infallibly that every trilateral must be triangular, and that God himself could not make a four-cornered one. What answer can he give to a person who says that by the act of imagining a "true body" he is satisfied that God himself cannot put it in two places at once, because he "knows infallibly by this act of imagination" that every body fills at every time one determinate part of space, or, in other words, that "it is outside the sphere of Omnipotence to cause it to be in more portions of space than one" at any time?

The more this result is considered the more amazing it will appear to be. That all trilaterals are triangular is a necessary truth, which God himself cannot alter. It is known "by the very conception of the subject." That a body cannot be in two places at once, is not known by the very conception of the subject, probably because body is apprehended by us as infinitely transcending our conception of it, therefore God can cause a body to be in two places at once, or even in three or more. If so, surely he can make a four-cornered figure of three sides—for the true body may as well be straight as of any other figure—and if it can be in two places at once it can make a trilateral with four corners. Two ordinary straight lines would form one of the angles, and the transcendent body being in two places at once would form three others with them and with itself. We, therefore, thus get a three-sided figure with four angles, which contradicts the necessary truth cognized by Dr. Ward. Thus the necessary and contingent truth may be brought into collision; and what is to happen then?

Upon the whole, it would seem that we are not much aided in our search after necessary truth, by being told to ask ourselves what God cannot do, and the difficulty is, if possible, increased by the information given in a very cautious and elaborate way, that he can accomplish some apparent impossibilities but not others; and



that the test by which the two classes of apparent impossibilities may be distinguished, is that those which cannot be accomplished are and that the others are not known to be impossible "by the very conception of the subject."

Do we then learn more as to the nature of necessary truths by approaching the test proposed from the other side, that is to say, by considering the question, What God can do? Dr. Ward does not explicitly answer this question, but the illustrations already referred to show that he considers that God can bring about any result which man can distinctly imagine. It is almost as difficult to reconcile the doctrine of necessary truths with this assumption as to reconcile it with the belief in mysteries. I do not understand what is meant by knowing by the very conception of a subject, but be this as it may, we all know somehow or other that iron is hard and solid, and that it occupies space. Does Dr. Ward affirm, and if so on what grounds, that God can separate two links of an iron chain without breaking either of them? A being like a man, only much stronger and more dexterous, might probably be able to open one of the links, take out the other, and solder up the opening so quickly, that the human eye could not follow the operation; but this is another matter. My question is, whether God could make the one piece of iron pass through the other without dividing it? Whether, in other words, he could cause two pieces of metal to occupy the same space, at the same time, let the time be as short, and the space as small as you please? If the answer is yes, then God can "effect the contradictory" of a truth which to me at least appears (to use Dr. Ward's phrase) as necessary as any geometrical axiom whatever. To speak of two iron rods as occupying let us say the same cubic inch of space at the same moment of time, is to talk nonsense; just as much as to talk of two straight lines enclosing a space. I can attach no more meaning to the one statement than to the other. If the answer is no, then God's powers are only an exaggeration of human powers. God, like man, must command nature by obeying it. His operations, like ours, must be limited by the properties of matter. Such a conception is of course inconsistent with the whole of Dr. Ward's theology. In particular it would make creation impossible. To make something out of nothing is a feat which no imaginable extension of human skill and power would even tend to effect. Once admit the doctrine of necessary truth, and it will inevitably follow that unless it can be shown how a given result might be brought about by a man sufficiently strong and skilful, it can never be positively affirmed that God can bring it about, for a necessary truth may stand in the way.

Dr. Ward's utterances about fire are a good illustration of this. In the paper printed above I said that Dr. Ward would probably admit that God "could make cold fire." In his reply Dr. Ward says, "We are constantly experiencing and observing the warmth-givingness of fire.

Yet there is no kind of conviction existing in our mind as to the necessity of this fact; we see no repugnance whatever in the notion that in some other planet a substance may be found which in every other respect resembles fire . . . but yet which does not possess this particular property of imparting warmth." In the *Dublin Review* for January, 1874, he says in substance (in the passage quoted above) that it is clear that "an Omnipotent Creator could on any occasion deprive fire of its warmth-giving property." These passages throw a light on Dr. Ward's theories, of which it is impossible to overrate the importance. He will not go so far as to say in terms that God can make cold fire. He probably feels that to make such an assertion is very like saying that God can make a crooked straight line. He thinks, however, that God can go very near making cold fire. He can make something exactly like fire in every other respect except that of giving warmth. Moreover, he can deprive fire of its "warmth-givingness" on any particular occasion.

Each of these assertions is very strange, and more particularly the last. If God can deprive fire of its "warmth-givingness" on any particular occasion, why might he not go on doing so continually, and thus make cold fire? Apart from this, however, what right has Dr. Ward to say that the "warmth-givingness of fire" is not a necessary truth? which he must say before he can assert that God can "effect its contradictory." The only ground on which he can say so is that he can imagine the other qualities of fire combined in one substance, this one being left out. No doubt he can, but what does that prove? How can any man undertake to assert that everything which he can imagine may exist? Nothing is more easy than to imagine a man enjoying perpetual youth, and living for millions of ages, floating about in the air, crossing the sea on a cloak, or walking about with his head in his hand; but before we can undertake to say that these things are possible, we must show how they can be effected consistently with what we know of the properties of matter. It is one thing to admit, as I should, that we cannot deny that they might be done by a being of immeasurable power and skill, but it is quite another to affirm, as Dr. Ward impliedly does, that they certainly can be done.

If we could analyse all the facts which are referred to by the proposition "fire heats the human body" as distinctly as we can analyse the facts referred to by the proposition "the square of the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle is equal to the sum of the squares of the sides enclosing the right angle," we might probably discover that to speak of depriving fire on any given occasion of its "warmth-givingness," or to speak of constructing a substance resembling fire in every other particular than its capacity of giving warmth, is exactly like speaking of causing the squares of the

hypotheses of a few right-angled triangles to be not quite so large as the sum of the squares of the sides for a few days, or of constructing a triangle similar to a right-angled triangle in every other property except this. The progress of physical science seems to me to make it probable in the highest degree that this actually is the case. Every fresh discovery seems to point to the general conclusion that the qualities of space which we can grasp with perfect distinctness, are only particular cases of a principle which extends to matter in all its forms, that nothing but our ignorance prevents us from exhibiting all the phenomena of animal life for instance, in the form of conclusions connected by demonstrations as strict as Euclid, with definitions, axioms, and postulates having as good a claim as his to the title of necessary truths. No one can positively affirm this, however probable it may appear; but until any one can affirm the contrary, until it can be shown that no assertion about the qualities of matter is a necessary truth, Dr. Ward cannot on his own principles justify his implied assertion that God can do whatever man can imagine. The utmost that he can properly assert is that God can probably do whatever man could do if he were much stronger and more skilful than he is.

For these reasons I say that the doctrine of necessary truth cannot be stated in any coherent or intelligible form except a form which turns all mysteries into nonsense, and reduces all miracles to the type of such a discovery as the electric telegraph.

Upon the whole, it appears to me that the word necessary as applied to truth is unmeaning. "Necessary truth," in short, is nothing but truth disfigured by an unnecessary adjective which obscures the real question at issue between Dr. Ward and his opponents. This question is, "What is truth?" When we affirm that a proposition is true, can we affirm more than that the words of which it consists raise in our minds, thoughts, images, conceptions, ideas, or whatever else you please to call them, corresponding more or less distinctly and completely to those which are now, or which, as we now think, formerly were or hereafter will be raised in our minds by the direction of our bodily senses to external objects, or by our own internal feelings? Can we, in short, leap off our own shadows? Can we make any affirmation at all which is not at bottom an affirmation about ourselves? Is not the whole of our knowledge subject to all the limitations, and liable to all the imperfections which beset language, sense, memory, anticipation, the process of drawing inferences, and, in a word, every human operation whatever? In one word, is not truth relative to man?

That this is so is an assertion hardly to be distinguished from the doctrine, that all our knowledge is founded upon experience, and that all our opinions on matters external to ourselves, which we can neither see, hear, touch, nor otherwise perceive by the exercise of our senses,

are of the nature of more or less probable inferences founded upon what we can see, hear, touch, or otherwise perceive.

It is not, and indeed it cannot be denied by any one, that this is so with respect to almost all departments of knowledge. But it is vehemently contended by a school of which Dr. Ward is perhaps the most prominent Roman Catholic representative in England, that the principal doctrines of religion and morals rest upon a different basis.

And it is almost conceded by them that this opinion cannot be maintained unless mathematical and especially geometrical truths can be shown to be based on the foundation on which, as they say, moral and religious truths are founded. They feel that it would be almost absurd to ask a man to "intue" (to use their strange dialect) the truth of the proposition "there is a God," unless they can make out that he is accustomed to "intue" the proposition, two straight lines cannot enclose a space, and others of the same sort. This is the reason why the doctrine of necessary truth is asserted under all sorts of different names with such persistency and such an expenditure of needless ingenuity.

For my own part, I can only regret, as a waste of power, the passionate efforts which are continually being made to get at some superior kind of truth, by poring over the operations of the mind. As Coleridge in the last generation made the distinction between reason and understanding the foundation of a great part of his philosophy, so Dr. Ward attempts to leap off his own shadow by all manner of strange phrases about necessary truth and contingent truth, "cognizing," "intuing," "ontologism," "phenomenism," "objectivism," the imaginable and the unimaginable, the conceivable and the inconceivable, the thinkable and the unthinkable, knowing pure and simple, and "knowing by the very conception of the subject." To me all such speculations are simply an attempt to coin ignorance into a superior sort of knowledge by shaking up hard words in a bag.

I am very far indeed from asserting that the human body, as we see and know it, is the whole of the human being; that we are nothing more than the aggregates of the various organs and powers which can be seen, touched, weighed and measured. I think it highly probable that a being with appropriate faculties for that purpose would perceive in us much that we cannot perceive in ourselves. A man who could not see his own eyes or those of other people, would learn very little about them from pondering on the sensation of winking; but he would be guilty of equal and opposite errors, if he either concluded that he had no organ by which he was able to see, or devised elaborate theories about its nature and properties from the very trifling indications of its character afforded to him by its use. This is an exact parallel to metaphysics, and seems to me to explain their barrenness. As regards the operations of our own minds, we resemble persons who, being precluded by

circumstances from the study of human and comparative anatomy, speculate on the internal organs of their own bodies. If persons so situated were to attempt to construct a system of anatomical knowledge out of the obscure feelings of their own hearts, brains, lungs, and stomachs, and if this system turned out, on examination, to be composed of slight metaphors derived from their observation of their hands, feet, eyes, ears, and mouths, they would, as it seems to me, occupy precisely the same position as Dr. Ward and many others, who follow methods dependent on the same principle. It is by no means improbable that they would, more or less unconsciously, struggle to conceal even from themselves the true character of their undertaking by inventing new and unfamiliar words at every turn, and by so disguising real ignorance under an appearance of unusual profundity.

If we consider the words by which the different operations of the mind are described we shall find that they supply proof that we know nothing about our minds; that our conjectures about them and their operations are, to the last degree, vague and unsatisfactory; and that our language on the subject is no more than a set of metaphors obviously incomplete, and in many respects incorrect.

Look, first of all, at the names which we give to the mind and its principal faculties, if they are to be regarded as something different from the mind. "I," "mind," "spirit," "soul," "reason," "understanding," &c. We cannot give the derivation of all these words. Some of them, like ancient coins, have passed from hand to hand so often, that the original stamp is worn out. This, however, is not the case with all. "Spirit" is breath. Whatever "soul" may mean, "âme" its equivalent, is "anima," and that again is breath. "Reason" and "understanding" are really no more than two metaphors which express the same thing in different ways. "That which counts or reckons," "that which stands under," as a table stands under the things laid upon it, and so if it were conscious would "understand" their relative position. "Verstand" is a similar metaphor, but rather less distinct. The French "entendement" is equally instructive, though the metaphor is different. The sense of hearing is given as a name to the faculty which understands when the ear hears. "Intelligo is 'intus,' or 'inter' 'lego.'"

Look next at the names of the different mental operations. "Imagine," "conceive," "think," "attend," "intend," "apprehend," "comprehend." The last four are obvious metaphors—"stretch to," "stretch towards," "lay hold of," "grasp." If this were doubtful, it might be proved by reference to a passage in Cicero's "Academics," in which the author illustrates the stoical doctrine as to the different degrees of knowledge—"visum," which may perhaps be called perception; "assensus," which comes very near to apprehension, "comprehensio," and "scientia."

"Hoc quidem Zeno gestu conficiebat. Nam quum extensa digittis adversam manum ostenderat, 'Visum inquebat hujusmodi est.' Deinde quum paulum digitos constrinxerat, 'Assensus hujusmodi.' Tum quum plane compresserat pugnumque fecerat comprehensionem illam esse dicebat. Qua ex similitudine etiam nomen ei rei, quod ante non fuerat, *comprehensio* imposuit. Quum autem laevam manum admovebat et illum pugnum arcte vehementerque compresserat, scientiam talem esse dicebat, cuius compotem nisi sapientem esse neminem."—Academ. I. ii. 47.

The other three words, "think," "imagine," "conceive," are equally metaphorical. Dr. Ward is very particular in drawing distinctions between imagination and conception, but surely they mean the same thing, though the meaning is denoted by different metaphors. If "think" (as Horne Tooke supposed) is connected with "thing," it is difficult to distinguish it from "imagine." The difference between imagination and conception is the difference between drawing a picture and taking,—or, as we should rather say—putting together, the parts of a whole. The one metaphor is clearer and more lively; the other more general and better suited to words which do not denote objects of sight. The words, "A white horse, sixteen hands high, with brown spots, a long tail, and no shoe on his off fore foot," raise a set of images. The words, "although I had known him for some years, I was not aware that he was married," might more properly be said to be conceived or understood.

The difference between the two sentences is simply, that one relates wholly to objects which can be seen, the other to periods of time ("some years"), legal relations ("married"), mental operations ("know," "known"), persons indicated but not described ("he," "I"); and forms of speech like "although," which by a mental shorthand refers to a great number of other things. (This man was my acquaintance. I did not know he was married. I do know of most of my acquaintances whether they are married or not. It is singular that I did not know it in respect of him.) It is more natural, certainly, to speak of putting together such thoughts in one's mind than to speak of drawing a picture of them; but each separate thought might be the subject of mental images, and the act of putting or taking several things together is itself an image, and a very expressive one. An illustration of the fact that language about the mind and its operations is metaphorical, is given by Dr. Ward himself, and is all the more instructive and interesting on account of the unconsciousness with which it is given. He quotes with approbation the following passage from Mr. James Martineau:—

"You may deny the idea of the infinite as not clear; and clear it is not, if nothing but the mental picture of an outline deserve that word. But if a thought is clear when it sits apart without danger of being confounded with another, when it can exactly keep its own in speech and reasoning without forfeit and without encroachment— if, in short, logical clearness consists not in the idea of a limit but in

the limit of the idea,—then no sharpest image of any finite quantity is clearer than the thought of the infinite."

Here a protest against taking imagination as a test of clearness is made by means of a series of images much more lively than appropriate. A thought is something which can sit, and it can sit either in company or alone; it can be in danger, it can forfeit its own territory, and encroach on the territory of other thoughts. It is "clear"—i.e., bright; or "obscure," that is dark: and its brightness stands together in the line drawn round the image (consists in the limit of the idea). It would not be easy to crowd a greater number of metaphors into a given number of words. The passage also shows how easily able men are run away with by their metaphors. The "idea of a limit" is contrasted with "the limit of an idea," as if there was a difference in the sense because there is a difference in the sound of the two expressions. Retranslate the metaphors into pictures, and it is obvious that the two phrases mean the same thing. The "idea of a limit" is the picture of a boundary. "The limit of an idea" is the boundary of a picture. Now, as the boundary of the picture must be part of the picture, and must be itself depicted, it is obvious that these expressions mean one and the same thing.

Upon the whole it seems to me that the difference between imagination, conception, thinking, reasoning, understanding, and all other words by which mental operations are described is simply that some of the metaphors which these words embody are more appropriate to thoughts upon some subjects, and some to thoughts upon other subjects, but that it is idle to attempt to distinguish, with any approach to accuracy, either between the processes indicated by these words or between the subjects to which those processes are applied. To return to the illustration given above, imagine the hopeless nonsense into which a man would fall who attempted, simply by studying his own sensations, to investigate the subject of digestion, and to say precisely what his heart and stomach were like, and how their operations affected each other. A man may describe his own bodily feelings accurately enough without possessing any anatomical or physiological knowledge at all, but he ought not to think of founding anything further on such a description. Surely upon the same principle a wise man ought to be content to describe his own thoughts as they arise within him without attempting to get beyond them by means of them. To think about thinking is to try to escape from metaphor by changing your metaphor; to try to avoid the imperfections of language by translating English into French, French into German, German into Spanish, and Spanish back into English. Some friends once discussed a question into which was introduced the phrase of 'The Personality of the Absolute.' One of the party excused himself from joining in the discussion on the ground that he saw no use

in inquiring whether or not the Untied wears a Mask. Heap up upon the word "truth" such phrases as "absolute," "necessary," "eternal," "instinctively known," and the like for ever if you please. They do not affect in the slightest degree the following reflections:—

1. All our knowledge comes to us through faculties each and all of which are constantly liable to error which we cannot in all cases detect.

2. All our knowledge is expressed in language which, when closely examined, may be resolved into metaphors more or less inappropriate to the matter in hand, and capable of being misunderstood and perverted by any one who looks at it from a point of view a little different from our own.

3. All our knowledge includes an element of memory or anticipation, each of which is in the highest degree fallible.

4. All our anticipations involve an assumption utterly incapable of proof, that the future will resemble our present conception of the past.


5. Many of our anticipations involve an assumption which is probably false, that no new forces with which we are at present unacquainted will come into play and affect the results which we anticipate.

I cannot understand how any one of these assertions can be denied, or upon what grounds anyone who admits them can refuse to draw from them the conclusion that every assertion which we make should be coupled either expressly or tacitly with some such qualification as this:—"As at present advised, subject to further and better instructions, and upon the assumptions hereinbefore stated, I am of opinion——." The opinion should further be dated, both in time and place, so as to show that a variation on these matters might affect its truth.

If we suppose (and surely it is at least probable enough to influence the conduct of reasonable men), that this life is only a stage in existence, and that death is as much the gate into a new life as birth was—should this be true, it is surely possible that death may resemble waking from sleep, and that many things which now appear to all of us truths, and to some of us necessary truths, may turn out after all to have been necessary fictions, which fuller experience will enable us to lay aside. Dreams are often founded upon realities, but when we wake the reality is seen to be altogether unlike what in our dreams we were compelled to believe it to be.

J. F. STEPHEN.





## THE PAST AND FUTURE OF OUR EARTH.\*

*' Ut his exordia primis  
Omnia, et ipse tener Mundi concreverit orbis.  
Tum durare solum, et discludere Nerea ponto  
Cuperit, et rerum paulatim sumere formas."*

VIRGIL

THE subject with which I am about to deal is associated by many with questions of religion. Let me premise, however, that I do not thus view it myself. It seems to me impossible to obtain from science any clear ideas respecting the ways or nature of the Deity, or even respecting the reality of an Almighty personal God. Science deals with the finite though it may carry our thoughts to the infinite. Infinity of space and of matter occupying space, of time and of the processes with which time is occupied, and infinity of energy as necessarily implied by the infinities of matter and of the operations affecting matter,—these infinities science brings clearly before us. For science directs our thoughts to the finites to which these infinities correspond. It shows us that there can be no conceivable limits to space or time, and though finiteness of matter or of opera-

\* This essay presents the substance of a lecture delivered in New York on April 3, of the present year, being the first of a subsidiary series in which, of set purpose (and in accordance with the request of several esteemed friends), I dealt less with the direct teachings of astronomy which had occupied me in a former series than with ideas suggested by astronomical facts and more particularly by the discoveries made during the last quarter of a century.—R. A. P.

tion may be conceivable, there is manifest incongruity in assuming an infinite disproportion between unoccupied and occupied space, or between void time and time occupied with the occurrence of events of what sort soever. So that the teachings of science bring us into the presence of the unquestionable infinities of time and of space, and the presumable infinities of matter and of operation,—hence, therefore, into the presence of infinity of energy. But science teaches us nothing about these infinities, as such. They remain none the less inconceivable, however clearly we may be taught to recognise their reality. Moreover, these infinities, including the infinity of energy, are material infinities. Science tells us nothing of the infinite attributes of an Almighty Being, it presents to us no personal infinities, whether of Power, Beneficence, or Wisdom. Science may suggest some ideas on these points; though we perceive daily more and more clearly that it is unsafe to accept as her teaching ideas which commonly derive their colouring from our own prepossessions. And assuredly, as respects actual facts, Science in so far as she presents personal infinity to us at all, presents it as an inconceivable, like those other inconceivable infinities, with the finites corresponding to which her operations are alone directly concerned. To speak in plain terms—so far as Science is concerned, the idea of a personal God is inconceivable,\* as are all the attributes which religion recognizes in such a Being. On the other hand, it should be admitted as distinctly, that Science no more disproves the existence of infinite personal power or wisdom than she disproves the existence of infinite material energy (which on the contrary must be regarded as probable) or the existence of infinite space or time (which must be regarded as certain).

So much premised, we may proceed to inquire into the probable past and future of our earth, as calmly as we should inquire into the probable past and future of a pebble, a weed, or an insect, of a rock, a tree, or an animal, of a continent, or of a type—whether of vegetable or of animal life. The beginning of all things is not to be reached, not appreciably to be even approached, by a few steps backward in imagination, nor the end of all things by a few steps forward. Such a thought is as unfounded as was the fear of men in old times

\* I mean these words to be understood literally. To the man of science, observing the operation of second causes in every process with which his researches deal, and finding no limit to the operation of such causes however far back he may trace the chain of causation, the idea of a first cause is as inconceivable in its relation to observed scientific facts as is the idea of infinite space in its relation to the finite space to which the observations of science extend. Yet infinite space must be admitted; nor do I see how even that man of science who would limit his thoughts most rigidly to facts, can admit that all things are of which he thinks, without having impressed upon him the feeling that in some way he cannot understand these things represent the operation of Infinite Purpose. Assuredly we do not avoid the inconceivable by assuming as at least possible that matter exists only as it affects our perceptions.

that by travelling too far in any direction they might pass over the earth's edge and be plunged into the abyss beyond, as unreasonable as was the hope that by increase of telescopic range astronomers could approach the imagined "heavens above the crystalline."

In considering the probable past history of the earth, we are necessarily led to inquire into the origin of the solar system. I have already sketched two theories of the system, and described the general facts on which both theories are based. The various planets circle in one direction around the sun, the sun rotating in the same direction, the satellite families (with one noteworthy but by no means inexplicable exception) travelling round their primaries in the same direction, and all the planets whose rotation has been determined still preserving the same direction of circulation (so to speak). These relations seem to point, in a manner there is no mistaking, to a process of evolution by which those various parts of the solar system which now form discrete masses were developed from a former condition characterized by a certain unity as respects the manner of its circulation. One theory of this process of evolution, Laplace's, implies the contraction of the solar system from a great rotating nebulous mass; according to the other theory, the solar system instead of contracting to its present condition, was formed by a process of accretion, due to the indrawing of great flights of meteoric and cometic matter.

I need not here enter at length, for I have already done so elsewhere, into the astronomical evidence in favour of either theory; but it will be well to present briefly some of the more striking facts.

Among the various forms of *nebulæ* (or star-cloudlets) revealed by the telescope, we find many which seem to accord with our ideas as to some of the stages through which our solar system must have passed in changing from the nebulous condition to its present form. The irregular *nebulæ*,—such, for instance, as that wonderful nebula in the Sword of Orion,—shew by their enormous extension the existence of sufficient quantities of gaseous matter to form systems as large and as massive as our own, or even far vaster. We know from the teachings of the spectroscope that these irregular *nebulæ* really consist of glowing gas (as Sir W. Herschel long since surmised), hydrogen and nitrogen being presumably present, though the spectrum of neither gas appears in its complete form (one line only of each spectrum being shewn, instead of the sets of lines usually given by these gases). An American physicist has suggested that hydrogen and nitrogen exist in the gaseous *nebulæ* in an elementary condition, these gases really being compound, and he suggests further that all our so-called elements may have been derived from those elementary forms of hydrogen and nitrogen. In the absence of any evidence from observation or experiment, these ideas must be regarded as merely speculative; and I think that we arrive here at a

point where speculation helps us as little as it does in attempting to trace the evolution of living creatures across the gap which separates the earliest forms of life from the beginning itself of life upon the earth. Since we cannot hope to determine the real beginning of this earth's history, we need not at present attempt to pass back beyond the earliest stage of which we have any clear information.

Passing from the irregular nebula, in which we see chaotic masses of gaseous matter occupying millions of millions of cubic miles and scattered as wildly through space as clouds are scattered in a storm-swept air, we come to various orders of nebulae in which we seem to find clear evidence of a process of evolution. We see first the traces of a central aggregation. This aggregation becomes more and more clearly defined, until there is no possibility of mistaking its nature as a centre having power (by virtue of the quantity of matter contained in it) to influence the motions of the matter belonging to the rest of the nebula. Then, still passing be it remembered from nebula to nebula, and only inferring, not actually witnessing, the changes described,—we see a subordinate aggregation, wherein, after a while, the greater portion of the mass of the nebula outside the central aggregation becomes gathered, even as Jupiter contains the greater portion of the mass of the solar system outside the central sun.\* Next we see a second subordinate aggregation, inferior to the first, but comprising, if we judge from its appearance, by far the greater portion of what remained after the first aggregation had been formed, even as Saturn's mass far exceeds the combined mass of all the planets less than himself, and so comprises far the greater portion of the solar system after account has been taken of Jupiter and the sun.† And we may infer that the other parts of nebulae contain smaller aggregations not perceptible to us, out of which the smaller planets of the developing system are hereafter to be formed.

Side views of some of these nebulae indicate a flatness of figure agreeing well with the general tendency of the members of the solar system towards the medial plane of that system. For the solar system may be described as flat, and if the nebulae I have been dealing with (the spiral nebulae with aggregations) were globular we could not recognise in them the true analogues of our solar system in the earlier stages of its history. But the telescope reveals nebulae manifestly corresponding in appearance to the great whirlpool nebula of Lord Rosse, as it would appear if it is a somewhat flattened spiral and could be viewed nearly edgewise.

And here I may pause to note that although, in thus inferring progressive changes where in reality we have but various forms of

\* The mass of Jupiter exceeds, in the proportion of five to two, the combined mass of all the remaining planets.

† The mass of Saturn exceeds, in the proportion of nearly three to one, the combined mass of all the planets smaller than himself.

nebulae, I have been adopting an assumption and one which no one can hope either to verify or to disprove, yet it must be remembered that these nebulae by their very figure indicate that they are not at rest. If they consist of matter possessing the attribute of gravitation,—and it would be infinitely more daring to assert that they do not than that they do,—then they must be undergoing processes of change. Nor can we conceive that discrete gaseous masses in whorls spirally arranged around a great central aggregation (taking one of the earlier stages) could otherwise change than by aggregating towards their centre, unless we admit motions of revolution (in orbits more or less eccentric) the continuance of which would necessarily lead, through collisions, to the rapid growth of the central aggregation, and to the formation and slower growth of subordinate gatherings.

I have shown elsewhere how the formation of our solar system, in the manner supposed, would explain what Laplace admitted that he could not explain by his theory,—the peculiar arrangement of the masses forming the solar system. The laws of dynamics tell us, that no matter what the original configuration or motion of the masses, probably gaseous, forming the nebula, the motions of these masses would have greater and greater velocity the nearer the masses were to the central aggregation, each distance indicating certain limits between which the velocities must inevitably lie. For example, in our solar system, supposing the central sun had already attained very nearly his full growth as respects quantity of matter, then the velocity of any mass whatever belonging to the system, would at Jupiter's distance be less than twelve miles per second, whereas at the distance of the earth, the largest planet travelling inside the orbit of Jupiter, the limit of the velocity would be more than twice as great. Hence we can see with what comparative difficulty an aggregation would form close to the central one, and how the first subordinate aggregation would lie at a distance where the quantity of matter was still great but the average velocity of motion not too great. Such an aggregation once formed, the next important aggregation would necessarily lie far outside, for within the first there would now be two disturbing influences preventing the rapid growth of these aggregations. The third and fourth would be outside the second. Between the first aggregation and the sun only small planets, like the Earth and Venus, Mars, Mercury, and the asteroids, could form; and we should expect to find that the largest of the four small planets would be in the middle of the space belonging to the family, as Venus and the Earth are actually placed, while the much smaller planets Mercury and Mars travel next on either side, one close to the Sun and the other next to Jupiter, the asteroids indicating the region where the combined disturbing influences of Jupiter and the Sun prevented any single planet from being developed.

But I should require much more time than is now at my command to present adequately the reasoning on which the theory of accretion is based. And we are not concerned here to inquire whether this theory, or Laplace's theory of contraction, or (which I hold to be altogether more probable than either) a theory involving combined processes of accretion and contraction, be the true hypothesis of the evolution of the solar system. Let it suffice that we recognise as one of the earliest stages of our earth's history, her condition as a rotating mass of glowing vapour, capturing then as now, but far more actively than now, masses of matter which approached near enough, and *growing* by these continual indraughts from without. From the very beginning, as it would seem, the earth grew in this way. This firm earth on which we live represents an aggregation of matter not from one portion of space; but from all space. All that is upon and within the earth, all vegetable forms and all animal forms, our bodies, our brains, are formed of materials which have been drawn in from those depths of space surrounding us on all sides. This hand that I am now raising contains particles which have travelled hither from regions far away amid the northern and southern constellations, particles drawn in towards the earth by processes continuing millions of millions of ages, until after multitudinous changes the chapter of accidents has combined them, and so distributed them in plants and animals that after coming to form portions of my food they are here present before you. Passing from the mere illustration of the thought, is not the thought itself striking and suggestive, that not only the earth on which we move, but everything we see or touch, and every particle in body and brain, has sped during countless ages through the immensity of space?

The great mass of glowing gas which formed our earth in the earliest stage of its history was undergoing two noteworthy processes,—first, the process of cooling by which the mass was eventually to become at least partially solid, and secondly a process of growth due to the gathering in of meteoric and cometic matter. As respects the latter process, which will not hereafter occupy our attention, I must remark that many astronomers appear to me to give far less consideration to the inferences certainly deducible from recent discoveries than the importance of these discoveries would fairly warrant. It is now absolutely certain that hour by hour, day by day, and year by year, the earth is gathering in matter from without. On the most moderate assumption as to the average weight of meteors and shooting stars, the earth must increase each year in mass by many thousands of tons. And when we consider the enormous, one may almost say the awful time-intervals which have elapsed since the earth was in a gaseous condition, we cannot but perceive that the process of accretion now going on indicates the existence of only the merest residue of matter (ungathered) compared with that which at the beginning of those time-intervals was freely moving around the

central aggregation.\* The process of accretion which now does not sensibly increase the earth's mass was then a process of actual growth. Jupiter and Saturn might then no longer be gathering in matter appreciably increasing their mass, although the quantity of matter gathered in by them must have been far larger than all that the then forming earth could gather in equal times. For those planets were then as now so massive that any possible increment from without was as nothing compared with the mass they had already attained. We have to throw back into yet more awful time-depths the birth and growth of those giant orbs. And even those depths of time are as nothing compared with the intervals which have elapsed since the sun himself began to be. Yet it is with time-intervals measurable by hundreds of millions of years that we have to deal in considering only our earth's history,—nay, two or three hundred millions of years only carry us back to a period when the earth was in a stage of development long sequent to the gaseous condition we are now considering. That the supply of meteoric and cometic matter not gathered in was then enormously greater than that which still exists within the solar domain, appears to me not a mere fanciful speculation, nor even a theoretical consideration, but as nearly a certainty as anything not admitting of mathematical demonstration can possibly be. That the rate of in-gathering at that time enormously exceeded the present rate, may be regarded as certain. That the increase resulting from such in-gathering during the hundreds of millions of years that it has been in operation since the period when the earth first existed as a gaseous mass, must have resulted in adding a quantity of matter forming no inconsiderable aliquot part of the earth's present mass, seems to me a reasonable inference, although it is certain that the present rate of growth continued even for hundreds of millions of years would not appreciably affect the earth's mass.\* And it is a thought worthy\* of consideration, in selecting between Laplace's theory of contraction and the theory of accretion, that accretion being a process necessarily exhaustive, we are able to trace it back through stages of gradually increasing activity without limit until we reach that stage when the whole of the matter now forming our solar system was as yet unformed. Contraction may alternate with expansion, according to the changing condition of a forming system; but accretion is a process which can only act in one direction; and as accretion is certainly going on now, however slowly, we have but to trace back the process to be led inevitably, in my judgment, to regard our system as having its origin in processes of accretion,—though it seems

\* It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to explain that I refer here not to absolute but to relative increase. The absolute increase of mass would amount to many millions of tons, but the earth would not be increased by the billionth part of her present mass.

equally clear that each individual orb of the system, if not each subordinate scheme within it, has also undergone a process of contraction from a former nebulous condition.

In this early gaseous stage our earth was preparing as it were to become a *sun*. As yet her gaseous globe probably extended beyond the smaller aggregation out of which the moon was one day to be formed. This may be inferred, I think, from the law of the moon's rotation. It is true that a moon independently created, and started on the moon's present course, with a rotation-period nearly equalling its period of revolution, would gradually have acquired a rotation-period exactly equalling the mean period of revolution. But there is no reason in nature why there should have been any such near approach; whereas, if we suppose the moon's gaseous globe to have been originally entangled within the outskirts of the earth's, we see that the peculiar relation in question would have prevailed from the beginning of the moon's existence as a separate body. The laws of dynamics show us, moreover, that although the conditions under which the moon moved and rotated must have undergone considerable changes since her first formation, yet that since those changes took place very slowly, the rotation of the moon would be gradually modified, *pari passu*, so that the peculiar relation between the moon's rotation and revolution would continue unimpaired.\*

In her next stage, our earth is presented to us as a *sun*. It may be that at that time the moon was the abode of life, our earth affording the supplies of light and heat necessary for the wants of creatures living on the moon. But whether this were so or not, it may be safely assumed that when the earth's contracting gaseous globe first began to have liquid or solid matter in its constitution, the earth must have been a *sun* so far as the emission of heat and light were concerned. I must warn you, however, against an undue regard for analogy which has led some astronomers to say that all the members of the solar system have passed or will pass through exactly similar stages. That our earth once gave out light and heat, as the sun does now, may be admitted as probable; and we may believe that later the earth presented the characteristics which we now recognize in Jupiter; while hereafter it may pass through a stage comparable with that through which our moon is now passing. But we must remember that the original quantity of matter in any orb passing through such stages must very importantly modify the actual condition of the orb in each of those stages, as well, of course, as the duration of each stage; and it may even be that no two orbs in the universe were ever in the same, or very nearly the same condition,

\* On the theory of evolution some such view of the origin of the moon's rotation must be adopted, unless the matter be regarded as the result of a strange chance. If we believe, on the contrary, that the arrangement was specially ordained by the Creator, we are left to wonder what useful purpose a relation so peculiar and so artificial can have been intended to subserve.



and that no change undergone by one has corresponded closely with any change undergone by another.

We know so little respecting the sun's actual condition, that even if we could be assured that in any past stages of her history the earth was nearly in the same state, we should nevertheless remain in almost complete ignorance as to the processes to which the earth's orb was at that time subject. In particular we have no means of forming an opinion as to the manner in which the elementary constituents of the earth's globe were situated when she was in the sun-like stage. We may adopt some general theory of the sun's present condition; for example, we may accept the ingenious reasoning by which Professor Young, of Dartmouth, N.H., has supported his theory that the sun is a gigantic bubble;\* but we should be far from having any exact idea of the processes actually taking place within the solar globe, even if we were absolutely certain that that or some other general theory were the true one.

Assuming that our earth, when in the sun-like stage, was a gaseous mass within a liquid non-permanent shell, we can see that as the process of cooling went on the showers forming the shell would attain a greater and greater depth, the shell thus becoming thicker, the space within the shell becoming less, the whole earth contracting until it became entirely liquid; or rather these changes would progress until no considerable portion of the earth would be gaseous, for doubtless long before this stage was reached large portions of the earth would have become solid. As to the position which the solid parts of the earth's globe would assume when the first processes of solidification took place, we must not fall into the mistake of judging from the formation of a crust of ice on freezing water that these solid parts would form a crust upon the earth. Water presents

\* "The eruptions which are all the time" (*Anglice*, 'always') "occurring on the sun's surface," says Professor Young, "almost compel the supposition that there is a crust of some kind which restrains the imprisoned gases, and through which they force their way with great violence. This crust may consist of a more or less continuous sheet of rain,—not of water, of course, but of materials whose vapours are shown by means of the spectroscope to exist in the solar atmosphere, and whose condensations and combinations are supposed to furnish the solar heat. The continuous outflow of the solar heat is equivalent to the supply that would be developed by the condensation from steam to vapour of a layer about five feet thick over the whole surface of the sun per minute. As this tremendous rain descends, the velocity of the falling drops would be increased by the resistance of the dense gases underneath, the drops would increase until continuous sheets would be formed, and the sheets would unite and form a sort of bottomless ocean, resting upon the compressed vapours beneath and pierced by innumerable ascending jets and bubbles. It would have nearly a constant depth in thickness, because it would re-evaporate at the bottom nearly as fast as it would grow by the descending rains above, though probably the thickness of this sheet would continually increase at some slow rate, and its whole diameter diminish. In other words, the sun, according to this view, is a gigantic bubble, whose walls are gradually thickening and its diameter diminishing at a rate determined by its loss of heat. It differs, however, from ordinary bubbles in the fact that its skin is constantly penetrated by blasts and jets from within."

an exception to other substances, in being denser in the liquid form than as a solid. Some metals and alloys are like water in this respect; but with most earthy substances, "and notably," says Dr. Sterry Hunt, "the various minerals and earthy compounds like those which may be supposed to have made up the mass of the molten globe, the case is entirely different. The numerous and detailed experiments of St. Clair Deville, and those of Delesse, besides the earlier ones of Bischof, unite in showing that the density of fused rocks is much less than that of the crystalline products resulting from their slow cooling, these being, according to Deville, from one-seventh to one-sixteenth heavier than the fused mass, so that if formed at the surface they would, in obedience to the laws of gravity, tend to sink as soon as formed." \*

Nevertheless, inasmuch as solidification would occur at the surface, where the radiation of heat would take place most rapidly, and as the descending solid matter would be gradually liquified, it seems certain that for a long time the solid portions of the earth, though not forming a solid crust, would occupy the exterior parts of the earth's globe. After a time, the whole globe would have so far cooled that a process of aggregation of solid matter around the centre of the earth would take place. The matter so aggregated consisted probably of metallic and metalloidal compounds denser than the material forming the crust of the earth. Between the solid centre and the solidifying crust, there would be a shell of uncongealed matter, gradually diminishing in amount, but a portion probably retaining its liquid condition even to the present time, whether existing in isolated reservoirs or whether, as Scrope opines, it forms still a continuous sheet surrounding the solid nucleus. One strange fact of terrestrial magnetism may be mentioned in partial confirmation of the theory that the interior of the earth is of this nature,—a great solid mass, separated from the solid crust by a viscous plastic ocean: the magnetic poles of the earth are changing in position in a manner which seems only explicable on the supposition that there is an interior solid globe rotating under the outer shell, but at a slightly different rate, gaining or losing one complete rotation in the course of about 650 years.

Be this as it may, we find in this theory an explanation of the irregularities of the earth's surface. The solid crust, contracting at first more rapidly than the partially liquid mass within, portions of this liquid matter would force their way through and form glowing oceans outside the crust. Geology tells us of regions which, unless so formed, must have been produced in the much more startling manner conceived by Meyer, who attributed them to great meteoric

\* It is as yet doubtful, how far the recent experiments of Mallet affect this reasoning.

downfalls.\* At a later stage, when the crust, having hitherto cooled more rapidly than the interior, began to have a slower rate of cooling, the retreating nucleus left the crust to contract upon it, corrugating in the process, and so forming the first mountain ranges upon the spheroidal earth, which preceding processes had left partially deformed and therefore ready to become in due time divided into oceans and continents.

At this stage the earth must have been surrounded by an atmosphere much denser than that now existing, and more complex in constitution. We may probably form the most trustworthy opinion of the nature of the earth's atmosphere and the probable condition of the earth's surface at this early epoch by following the method of reasoning employed by Dr. Sterry Hunt. It will be remembered that he conceives an intense heat applied to the earth as at present existing, and infers the chemical results. It is evident that such a process would result in the oxidation of every form of carbonaceous matter; all carbonates, chlorides, and sulphates would be converted into silicates,—carbon, chlorine, and sulphur, being separated in the form of acid gases. These gases, with nitrogen, an excess of oxygen, and enormous quantities of aqueous vapour, would form an atmosphere of great density. In such an atmosphere condensation would only take place at a temperature far above the present boiling point; and the lower level of the slowly cooling crust would be drenched with a heated solution of hydrochloric acid, whose decomposing action, aided by its high temperature, would be exceedingly rapid. The primitive igneous rock on which these heavy showers fell,

\* There is very little new under the sun. In dealing with the multitudinous lunar craters, which were certainly formed in ages when unattached meteors were enormously greater in number and size than at present, I mentioned as a consideration not to be overlooked the probability that some of the meteoric matter falling on the moon when she was plastic with intensity of heat might be expected to leave traces which we could discern; and although none of the larger lunar craters could be so formed, yet some of the smaller craters in these lunar regions where craters overlap like the rings left by raindrops which have fallen on a plastic surface, might be due to meteoric downfall. I find that Meyer had far earlier advanced a similar idea in explanation of those extensive regions of our earth which present signs of having been in a state of igneous fluidity. Again, two or three years ago, Sir W. Thomson startled us all by suggesting the possibility that vegetable life might have been introduced upon our earth by the downfall of fragments of old worlds. Now, several years before, Dr. Sterry Hunt had pointed to evidence which tends to show that large meteoric globes had fallen on the earth, and he shewed further that some meteors contain hydrocarbons and certain metallic compounds indicating processes of vegetation. Dr. Hunt tells me that, in his opinion, some of the meteors whose fragments have fallen on the earth in historic times were once covered with vegetation, since otherwise, according to our present chemical experience, the actual condition of these meteoric fragments would be inexplicable. He does not regard them as fragments of a considerable orb comparable even with the least of the planets, but still, whatever their dimensions may have been, he considers that vegetable life must have formerly existed upon them.

probably resembled in composition certain furnace-slugs or basic volcanic glasses. Chlorides of the various bases would be formed, and silica would be separated under the decomposing action of the heated showers until the affinities of the hydrochloric acid were satisfied. Later, sulphuric acid would be formed in large quantities by the combinations of oxygen with the sulphurous acid of the primeval atmosphere. After the compounds of sulphur and chlorine had been separated from the air, carbonic acid would still continue to be an important constituent of the atmosphere. This constituent would gradually be diminished in quantity, during the conversion of the complex aluminous silicates into hydrated silicate of alumina, or clay, while the separated lime, magnesia, and alkalis would be changed into bicarbonates, and carried down to the sea in a state of solution.

Thus far the earth was without life, at least no forms of life, vegetable or animal, with which we are familiar, could have existed while the processes hitherto described were taking place. The earth during the long series of ages required for these changes, was in a condition comparable with the condition through which Jupiter and Saturn are apparently at present passing. A dense atmosphere concealed the surface of the earth, even as the true surface of Jupiter is now concealed. Enormous cloud masses were continually forming and continually pouring heavy showers on the intensely heated surface of the planet, throughout the whole of the enormous period which elapsed between the time when first the earth had a surface and the time when the atmosphere began to resemble in constitution the air we breathe. Even when vegetable life, such as we are familiar with, was first possible, the earth was still intensely heated, and the quantity of aqueous vapour and cloud always present in the air must have been far greater than at present.

It has been in vain, thus far, that men have attempted to lift the veil which conceals the beginning of life upon the earth. It would not befit me to express an opinion on the controversy whether the possibility of spontaneous generation has, or has not, been experimentally verified. That is a question on which experts alone can give an opinion worth listening to; and all that can here be noted is that experts are not agreed upon the subject. As a mere speculation it may be suggested that, somewhat as the elements when freshly released from chemical combination show for a short time an unusual readiness to enter into new combinations, so it may be possible that, when the earth was fresh from the baptism of liquid fire to which her primeval surface had for ages been exposed, certain of the substances existing on her surface were for the time in a condition fitting them to pass to a higher order of existence, and that then the lower forms of life sprang spontaneously

into existence on the earth's still throbbing bosom. In any case, we need not feel hampered by religious scruples in considering the possibility of the spontaneous generation of life upon the earth. It would be straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel, if we found a difficulty of that sort, *here*, after admitting, as we are compelled by clearest evidence to admit, the evolution of the earth itself and of the system to which the earth belongs, by purely natural processes. The student of science should view these matters apart from their supposed association with religious questions, apart in particular from interpretations which have been placed upon the Bible records. We may be perfectly satisfied that the works of God will teach us aright if rightly studied. Repeatedly it has been shown that ideas respecting creation which had come to be regarded as sacred because they were ancient, were altogether erroneous, and it may well be so in this matter of the creation of life.\*

Whatever opinion we form on these points, it seems probable that vegetable life existed on the earth before animal life, and also that primeval vegetation was far more luxuriant than the vegetation of our own time. Vast forests were formed, of which our coal-fields, enormous as is their extent, represent merely a small portion preserved in their present form through a fortuitous combination of exceptional conditions. By far the greater portion of those forest masses underwent processes of vegetable decay effectually removing all traces of their existence. What escaped, however, suffices to show the amazing luxuriance with which vegetation formerly thrived over the whole earth.

In assuming the probability that vegetable life predated animal life, I may appear to be opposing myself to an accepted palæontological doctrine, according to which animal and vegetable life began together upon the earth. But I would remind you that the actual teaching of the ablest, and therefore the most cautious, palæontologists on this point, amounts merely to this, that if the geological record as at present known be assumed to be coeval with the commencement of life upon the globe, then animals and plants began their existence together. In a similar way the teachings of geology and palæontology as to the nature of the earliest known forms of life and as to the succession of faunæ and floræ, depend on an admittedly imperfect record. Apart, however, from this

\* It is not for me to undertake to reconcile the Bible account of creation with the results which science is bringing gradually more clearly before us. It seems to me unfortunate, in fact, that such reconciliation should be thought necessary. But it must be conceded, I suppose, by all, that it is not more difficult to reconcile modern biological theories of evolution with the Bible record, than it is to reconcile with that record the theory of the evolution of the solar system. Yet strangely enough many oppose the biological theories (not without anger), who readily admit that some form or other of the nebular hypothesis of the solar system must be adopted in order to explain the peculiarities of structure presented by that system.

consideration, I do not think it would serve any useful purpose if I were to attempt, I will not say to discuss, for that is out of the question, but to speak of the geological evidence respecting that portion of the past history of our earth which belongs to the interval between the introduction of life upon the surface and the present time. In particular, my opinion on the interesting question whether *all* the forms of life upon the earth, including the various races of man, came into being by processes of evolution, could have no weight whatever. I may remark that, even apart from the evidence which the most eminent biologists have brought to bear on this question, it seems to me illogical to accept evolution as sufficient to explain the history of our earth during millions of years prior to the existence of life, and to deny its sufficiency to explain the development of life (if one may so speak), upon the earth. It seems even more illogical to admit its operation up to any given stage in the development of life, and there to draw a hard and fast line beyond which its action cannot be supposed to have extended.\* Nor can I understand why it should be considered a comforting thought, that at this or that epoch in the history of the complex machine of life, some imperfection in the machinery compelled the intervention of God,—thus presented to our contemplation as Almighty, but very far from being All-wise.

There is, however, one aspect in which the existence of life has to be considered as intimately associated with the future history of our earth. We perceive that the abundance of primeval vegetation during long ages, aided by other processes tending gradually to reduce the amount of carbonic acid gas in the air, must have led to a gradual change in the constitution of the atmosphere. At a later epoch, when animal life and vegetable life were more equally proportioned, a state of things existed which, so far as can be judged, might have lasted many times as long as it has already lasted had not man appeared upon the scene. But it seems to me impossible to consider what is actually taking place on the earth at present, without perceiving that within periods short indeed by comparison with geological eras, and still shorter compared with the intervals to which the astronomical history of our earth has introduced us, the condition of the earth as an abode of life will be seriously modified by the ways and works of man. It is only in the savage state that man is content to live upon the produce of the earth, taking his

\* Since I thus spoke, a new and as it seems to me an even more illogical limit has been suggested for the operation of the process of evolution as affecting the development of life, and this by an advocate of the general doctrine of evolution. I refer to the opinion advanced by Mr. J. Fiske, of Harvard College (U.S.), "that no race of organisms can in future be produced through the agency of natural selection and direct adaptation, which shall be zoologically distinct from, and superior to, the human race."

share, as it were, of what the earth (under the fruitful heat of the sun, which is her life) brings forth,—day by day, month by month, year by year, and century by century. But civilized man is not content to take his share of the earth's *income*, he uses the garnered wealth which is the earth's *capital*—and this at a rate which is not only ever increasing, but is increasing at an increasing rate. The rapid consumption of coal is but a single instance of his wasteful expenditure of the stores which during countless ages have been gathered together, seemingly for the use of man. In this country (America), I need not dwell upon the fact that, in many other ways, man is consuming, if not wasting, supplies of earth-wealth which cannot be replaced. It is not merely what is found within the earth, but the store of wealth which clothes the earth's surface, which is thus being exhausted. Your mighty forests seem capable of supplying all the timber that the whole race of man could need for ages; yet a very moderate computation of the rate at which they are being cut down, and will presumably continue to be, by a population increasing rapidly in numbers and in the destructive capabilities which characterize modern civilization, would show that this country will be denuded of its forest-wealth in about the same period which we in England have calculated as probably limiting the effective duration of our stores of coal. That period—a thousand or twelve hundred years—may seem long compared with the life of individual men, long even compared with the duration of any nation in the height of power; but though men and nations pass away the human race continues, and a thousand years are as less than a day in the history of that race. Looking forward to that future day, seemingly so remote, but (on the scale upon which we are at present tracing our earth's history) in reality the *to-morrow* of our earth, we see that either a change in their mode of civilization will be forced on the human race, or else it will then have become possible, as your Ericsson has already suggested, to make the sun's daily heat the mainspring of the machinery of civilization.

But turning from those portions of the past and future of our earth which, by comparison with the astronomical eras of her history, may be regarded as present, let us consider, so far as known facts permit, the probable future of the earth after astronomical eras comparable with those which were presented to us when we considered her past history.

One of the chief points in the progression of the earth towards her present condition was the gradual passing away of the heat with which formerly her whole globe was instinct. We have now to consider whether this process of cooling is still going on, and how far it is likely to extend. In this inquiry we must not be misled by the probable fact, for such it seems, that during hundreds of thousands

of years the general warmth of the surface of the earth has not appreciably diminished. In the first place, hundreds of thousands of years are the seconds of the time-measures we have now to deal with ; and next, it is known that the loss of temperature which our earth is at present undergoing chiefly affects the interior parts of her globe. The inquiries of Mallet and others show that the present vulcanian energies of the earth are due in the main to the gradual withdrawal of the earth's nuclear parts from the surface crust, because of the relatively more rapid loss of heat by the former. The surface crust is thus left to contract under the action of gravity, and vulcanian phenomena—that is, volcanoes and earthquakes,—represent the mechanical equivalent of this contraction. Here is a process which cannot continue for ever, simply because it is in its very nature exhaustive of the energy to which it is due. It shows us that the earth's nuclear regions are parting with their heat, and as they cannot part with their heat without warming the surface-crust, which nevertheless grows no warmer, we perceive that the surface-heat is maintained from a source which is being gradually exhausted. The fitness of the earth to be the abode of life will not only be affected directly in this way, but will be indirectly affected by the loss of that vulcanian energy which appears to be one of its necessary conditions. At present, the surface of the earth is like the flesh clothing the living body ; it does not wear out because (through the life which is within it) it undergoes continual change. But even as the body itself is consumed by natural processes so soon as life has passed from it, so, when the internal heat of the earth, which is its life, shall have passed away, her surface will “grow old as doth a garment ;” and with this inherent terrestrial vitality will pass away by slow degrees the life which is upon the earth.

In dealing with the past history of our earth, we recognized a time when she was a sun, rejoicing as a giant in the strength of youth ; and later we considered a time when her condition resembled that of the planets Jupiter and Saturn, whose dense atmospheres seem to be still loaded with the waters which are to form the future oceans of those noble orbs. In considering our earth's future, we may recognize in the moon's actual condition a stage through which the earth will hereafter have to pass. When the earth's inherent heat has passed away and long ages have elapsed since she had been the abode of life, we may believe that her desert continents and frost-bound oceans will in some degree resemble the arid wastes which the astronomer recognizes in the lunar surface. And yet it is not to be supposed that the appearance of the earth will ever be closely similar to that presented by the moon. The earth may part, as completely as the moon has, with her internal heat ; the rotation of the earth may in hundreds of millions of years be slowed down by tidal action into agreement with the period in which the moon completes her monthly



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orbit; and every form of animal and vegetable life may perish from off the face of the earth: yet ineffaceable traces of the long ages during which her surface was clothed with life, and instinct with inherent vitality, will distinguish her from the moon, where the era of life was incomparably shorter. Even if the speculations of Stanislas Meunier be just, according to which the oceans will gradually be withdrawn beneath the surface crust and even the atmosphere almost wholly disappear, there would for ever remain the signs of changes brought about by rainfall and snowfall, by wind and storm, by river and glacier, by ocean waves and ocean currents, by the presence of vegetable life and of animal life during hundreds of millions of years, and even more potently by the fiery deluge poured continually on the primeval surface of our globe. By all these causes the surface of the earth has been so wrought upon as no longer to resemble the primary igneous rock which we seem to recognize in the scarred surface of our satellite.

Dare we look onwards to yet later stages in the history of our earth? Truly it is like looking beyond death; for now imagination presents our earth to us as an inert mass, not only lifeless as at the beginning, but no longer possessing that potentiality of life which existed in her substance before life appeared upon her surface. We trace her circling year after year around the sun, serving no useful purpose according to our conceptions. The energy represented by her motions of rotation and revolution seems to be as completely wasted as are those parts (the whole save only one 230,000,000th portion) of the sun's light and heat, which, falling on no planet, seem to be poured uselessly into desert space. Long as has been, and doubtless will be, the duration of life upon the earth, it seems less than a second of time compared with those two awful time-intervals—one past, when as yet life had not begun, the other still to come, when all life shall have passed away.

But we are thus led to contemplate time-intervals of a yet higher order—to consider the eras belonging to the life-time of the solar-system itself. Long after the earth shall have ceased to be the abode of life, other and nobler orbs will become in their time fit to support millions of forms as well of animal as of vegetable existence; and the later each planet is in thus “putting on life,” the longer will be the duration of the life-supporting era of its own existence. Even those time-intervals will pass, however, until every orb in turn has been the scene of busy life, and has then, each after its due life-season, become inert and dead. One orb alone will then remain, on which life will be possible,—the sun, the source whence life had been sustained in all those worlds. And then, after the lapse, perchance, of a lifeless interval compared with which all the past eras of the solar system were utterly insignificant, the time will arrive when the sun will be a fit abode for living creatures. There-


after, during ages infinite to our conceptions, the great central orb will be (as now, though in another sense) the life of the solar system. We may even look onwards to still more distant changes, seeing that the solar system is itself moving on an orbit, though the centre round which it travels is so distant that as yet it remains unknown. We see in imagination change after change, cycle after cycle, till

Drawn on paths of never-ending duty,  
The worlds—eternity begun—  
Rest, absorbed in ever glorious beauty,  
On the Heart of the All-Central Sun.

But in reality it is only because our conceptions are finite that we thus look forward to an end even as we seek to trace events back to a beginning. The notion is inconceivable to us that absolutely endless series of changes may take place in the future and have taken place in the past; equally inconceivable is the notion that series on series of material combinations, passing onwards to ever higher orders,—from planets to suns, from suns to sun-systems, from sun-systems to galaxies, from galaxies to systems of galaxies, from these to higher and higher orders, absolutely without end,—may surround us on every hand. And yet, as I set out by saying, these things are not more inconceivable than infinity of time and infinity of space, while the idea that time and space are finite is not merely inconceivable but opposed directly to what the mind conceives of space and time. It has been said that progression necessarily implies a beginning and an end; but this is not so where the progression relates to absolute space or time. No one can indeed doubt that progression in space is of its very nature limitless. But this is equally true, though not less inconceivable, of time. Progression implies only relative beginning and relative ending; but that there should be an absolute beginning or an absolute end is not merely inconceivable, like absolute eternity, but is inconsistent with the necessary conditions of the progression of time as presented to us by our conceptions. Those who can may find relief in believing in absolutely void space and absolutely unoccupied time before some very remote but not infinitely remote epoch, which may in such belief be called the beginning of all things; but the void time before *that* beginning can have had no beginning, unless it were preceded by time not unoccupied by events, which is inconsistent with the supposition. We find no absolute beginning if we look backwards; and looking forwards we not only find an absolute end inconceivable by reason, but revealed religion—as ordinarily interpreted—teaches that on *that* side lies an eternity not of void but of occupied time. The time-intervals, then, which have presented themselves to our contemplation in dealing with the past and future of our earth, being in their nature finite, however vast, are

less than the shortest instant in comparison with absolute time, which—endless itself—is measured by endless cycles of change. And in like manner, the space seemingly infinite from which our solar system has drawn its materials—in other words, the universe as partially revealed to us in the study of the star-depths—is but the merest point by comparison with absolute space. The end, seemingly so remote, to which our earth is tending, the end infinitely more remote to which the solar system is tending, the end of our galaxy, the end of systems of such galaxies as ours—all these endings (each one of which presents itself in turn to our conceptions as the end of the universe itself) are but the beginnings of eras comparable with themselves, even as the beginnings to which we severally trace back the history of our planet, of the planetary system, and of galaxies of such systems, are but the endings of prior conditions which have followed each other in infinite succession. The wave of life which is now passing over our earth is but a ripple in the sea of life within the solar system; this sea of life is itself but as a wavelet on the ocean of eternal life throughout the universe. Inconceivable, doubtless, are these infinities of time and space, of matter, of motion, and of life. Inconceivable that the whole universe can be for all time the scene of the operation of infinite personal power, omnipresent, all-knowing. Utterly incomprehensible how Infinite Purpose can be associated with endless material evolution. But it is no new thought, no modern discovery, that we are thus utterly powerless to conceive or comprehend the idea of an Infinite Being, Almighty, All-knowing, Omnipresent, and Eternal, of whose inscrutable purpose the material universe is the unexplained manifestation. Science is in presence of the old, old mystery; the old, old questions are asked of her,—“Canst thou by searching find out God? canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection? It is as high as heaven; what canst thou do? deeper than hell; what canst thou know?” And science answers these questions, as they were answered of old,—“As touching the Almighty, we cannot find Him out.”

R. A. PROCTOR.



## PROFESSOR TYNDALL AND THE RELIGIOUS EMOTIONS.

“**T**O find a legitimate satisfaction for the religious Emotions is the problem of problems of our day.” These are the words of a man who stands as one of the best exponents of scientific knowledge, and as a fair representative of the feelings of scientific men. They are distinctly free from any trace of antagonism to Theology, considered in itself; and in so far as they express dissent from any existing theological views, imply it in the most modest form; simply affirming that the solutions reached hitherto, upon a line of enquiry that has his intensest sympathy, seem to him not to satisfy all the conditions of the problem.\*

By a “legitimate” satisfaction it is evident is meant a satisfaction that, while contenting the religious aspirations, does not come into conflict with the operations of the intellect, as expressed in the results of Science; a claim which no one now would wish to controvert. The feeling expressed, then, being so absolutely innocent and so worthy of a man, it is perhaps worth while to cease for a moment from controversial assaults upon the speaker (even though they might be in other respects deserved) and to see whether or not anything may be accomplished in the direction in which his face is turned, and on a method which would command his sympathy.

\* It might be remarked here, that, inasmuch as some of those conditions—our knowledge of physical phenomena, namely—were not present when these solutions were formulated, it is not surprising that the forms given to them failed adequately to recognize these conditions; from which, however, it by no means follows that the solutions themselves are not fundamentally correct.

It is possible that at least one step may be taken. Let us look at the task that is suggested for us. We are bidden to seek some thought respecting the Universe and our relation to it that shall do two things: in the first place, shall satisfy the religious Emotions, and, in the second, shall not contradict the results of the exploration of the universe by our senses and our intellect.

Let us put these two conditions into definite terms; and take the second first: our thought must not contradict Science. Now of all the results of Science none is more universal or emphatic than this: that there is no arbitrariness in the series of events which constitute our experience; but that a perfect order prevails through them all, an order which our intellect can apprehend under the form of cause and effect, or, better, of constant persistency of amount both of matter and of force; or, perhaps better still, under the form of a perfect "connection in reason" between all events. Against this result of Science our solution must not offend: it must not ascribe arbitrariness to that which it may recognize as the agent, or existence, or power, operative in the Universe. And on the other hand, the solution must, in like manner, not offend against the demands of the Emotions (which evidently have demands as clear and as incapable of being merely set aside as those of the Intellect itself). Now one demand of the Emotions, absolute and most emphatic, is that this agent, or existence, or power is not to be regarded as mechanical. If it be so regarded—as a mere mechanical necessity—then the intensest and deepest interests of our life are subject to mere blind forces; the very Life of moral Beings, their moral life as well as physical, liable to be marred or ruined by that which is nothing more than the mere impulse of a falling stone. This does not satisfy the Emotions, but stifles them.

We have thus, at once, apart from theory, two characters that must (on Professor Tyndall's principles) be embodied in our thought of the Universe: one that the power or existence exhibited in it is not arbitrary; the other that it is not mechanical. There is a boundary on either hand, one erected by the Intellect, and one by the Emotions, marking out the path that we must walk in.

Is there any difficulty in fulfilling these two conditions? What is that which is at once not arbitrary and not mechanical? What at once free and necessary; unbound and yet perfect in order?

The real simplicity of the problem becomes more evident as we advance. There has been a tendency to regard the demands of the Intellect and of the Emotions as opposed or mutually limiting each other; but in reality they are mutually confirmatory; and only seem opposed so long as each is but partially apprehended. The Emotions as much demand the exclusion of arbitrariness as Science does: disorder and unreason—absence of necessity—are, truly, at least as repugnant to them as to the intellect: the moral aspirations as utterly

refuse arbitrariness as does the severest science. And on the other hand, Science to the full as absolutely refuses mechanicalness in Nature as do the religious aspirations.

For it is long now since Science discarded the idea that it could include within its formulas the true power by which the order of natural events is determined. While retaining the names of *matter* and *force*, it is express in affirming that these names are not used as the names of absolute existences, or as denoting the presence of special qualities in that which is the true subject of our research; but that they are simply used as terms for something the true properties of which are unknown, but which (as it is presented to us) is best investigated by aid of the ideas which these terms convey. This view has even frequently led to the expression that matter and force are merely used as  $x$  and  $y$  are used by the mathematician; as symbols for the study of things in themselves unknown. Matter and force so far answer to our sensations and our conceptions that our thoughts can best trace the relations of things by laying hold of them under these terms; but they do not represent to us the things themselves.

But if this be so, then Science does not affirm, but expressly repudiates, mechanicalness in Nature. For to affirm that, would be to affirm that the ideas of matter and force do truly represent existence. To Science the world is no more mechanical than it is coloured, or warm: as colour is an idea derived from a mode of our Sensation, so also, fully as much, is force; or mechanical necessity. The one is derived from the passive sense of sight; the other from the active sense of touch: but, for reasons easy to see, the latter sense [of touch] presents characters better adapted for the general expression of the phenomena than any other.

In this respect, then, there is no antagonism between the demands of Emotion and of Intellect: alike each repudiates mechanicalness, repudiates arbitrariness: affirming therefore, both unitedly, a necessity not mechanical.

But farther, that a contradiction should exist between the religious Emotions and Science in its present attitude is impossible. For the conceptions furnished by Science are universally agreed to be but phenomenal; that is, Science presents to us but an appearance. Now, to estimate aright our real position here, we may turn to the appearances presented by the sense of sight in relation to their objects as known by touch. It is evident that the appearance to the eye of an object, under circumstances of light, distance, position, &c., may differ in an extreme degree from that object. Our experience indeed would lead us to believe that there may exist scarcely any traceable resemblance between them. In tracing the relation of an appearance to the reality, therefore, there is no reason, in experience, for our expecting to find likeness between the two: the only result that we

can expect to gain is, that we should be able to trace a reasonable connection between them; that is, that we should discover how the object should, in accordance with reason, present such an appearance to us.

Granted therefore that the "phenomenon" or appearance of the Universe, as presented to us, is best apprehended as matter and force, and its characters best expressed in material terms, there is no presumption that the fact resembles this phenomenon. There is one result, however, which experience justifies us in hoping to gain: namely, to become able to trace, rationally, how the truly existing Universe should present to us the appearance that it does. That is, to learn why an existence that is not a material world should impress us as if it were one.

Even now does this task appear impossible? Surely not absolutely so. For even in Professor Tyndall's own words, a parallel is suggested to us which may furnish guidance to our thoughts.

We can interpret mere appearances to the eyes into solid things because we can bring into use the sense of touch;\* and, on a larger scale, when we have most completely gathered together all the perceptions we can gain by sense, we can interpret the appearance that is so presented to us, by bringing into use the intellect.† Thus we rise from appearances to the truer facts by bringing in the aid of other powers: we add touch to sight, we add to the aggregate of the senses intellect. Now there is (as Professor Tyndall points out) yet another element of our being besides reason; namely, the Emotions. So, to interpret into a truer fact the appearances presented to intellect—that is, the "phenomenon" which Science attains—what should we do but bring in the aid of the Emotions? The very same process which enables us to pass beyond appearances, is open to us again. We have not availed ourselves yet of all our means; we are midway in a course which calls us to continuance, and in which the experience of the past gives us assurance of success. The "problem of problems of our day," then, is this: So to use the Senses, the Intellect, and the Emotions *together*, as to learn from the appearance which is presented to us in Science,‡ some truer fact, in respect to which we shall be able to understand why it should present to us this appearance.

Now the turning point of the question, and that also which makes it difficult, is this introduction of the Emotions as part of the means whereby we are to gain a knowledge of Nature. But preparation has been made for it in the steps we have already taken. When we

\* So we find that there is no merely *superficial* thing, although we can never see more than surface.

† Thus, the multitude of apparent 'forces' which the senses present to us are interpreted, by aid of the intellect, into one unceasing 'force.'

‡ This is sometimes termed "the phenomenal."

exclude from the fact which gives us our experience—that is, when we exclude from that which we call Nature—on the one hand arbitrariness, and on the other hand mechanicalness, and so recognize in it at once necessity and freedom, we perceive that we have placed before ourselves a problem which we need the aid of our Emotional powers to solve. The terms are without meaning to the intellect, but they are not so to the moral feelings. To them nothing is more familiar than an action at once free and necessary. It is as solidity, inapprehensible in the strict sense to the eye, is familiar to the touch. In either case we transfer, as it were, a problem from one of our powers to another, to receive its answer. Here the moral Emotions give plain reply: an action at once free and necessary is an act that we know as one of love, or rightness. The Existence, therefore, that presents to us the phenomena of Nature is one in which such powers inhere as enable necessity to be present, and yet not mean passiveness: such powers as can let action in its fullest sense exist, and yet not put aside necessity. They are the powers therefore which we apprehend by our moral Emotions; which, in an imperfect way, express themselves in these.

Let this then be, for the argument's sake, supposed. Now can we or can we not rationally discover how an existence with characters thus of a moral or spiritual order, should present to us the appearance of an Universe of matter and force? The mere unlikeness need present no difficulty; but many questions arise which cannot be included here. Yet one suggestion may be made. One characteristic of the "material" may be questioned as it were, in this light, respecting its real significance. "Cause and effect" is an universal condition of the phenomenal. Now cause and effect is a name we give to the ceasing of one thing coincidently with the occurrence of another: it has been described sometimes, even in the language of scientific men, as "one thing *merging itself* in another;" as if it were—even when looked at from without and in mere appearance—the visible image of the giving up of one life for another's being. Now if the order of Nature truly were mechanical this would of course be a merely inaccurate expression, as implying spontaneous action where there can be none. But if material Nature be but the appearance of an existence not mechanical, but acting in ways to be truly grasped only with the aid of the Emotions, then the expression is more than justified. So far, at least, the appearance may be rationally referred to the fact; for what appearance could more truly represent an act of everlasting "merging self into another," than this perpetual flux of cause and effect which Science presents to us?

Thus one character of the material world gives us aid in recognizing the material as the appearance of a spiritual existence. Through being bound in a seeming chain of cause and effect, Nature challenges us (as soon as we recognize that her processes are not



truly mechanical) to acknowledge in her a Life that appeals to the heart. Mere passiveness being put aside, a different energy, which we best know as a passion of the soul, takes its place: for Science forbids us to suppose caprice or accident. This constant order—when a passive or mechanical necessity is refused as its explanation—comes to us with a new significance. Leave out the *Action* from self-sacrifice, and does not “cause and effect” remain?

And it is to be observed that this character of the phenomenal (or material) world which is thus found to be spiritual in its meaning, is the one which most of all has seemed the contrary. So long as men took their own sensuous impressions to guide them, and assumed that all they had to do was to carry their own sensation of *force* everywhere, as if it contained the key to all things, then this unvarying cause and effect was the fact which above all banished spirituality from Nature; but when we have risen above this bondage, and gained liberty for our other faculties also to take their part in determining our thought, then this absolute rule of reason amid all change, this constant giving up of being to find it in new forms, this meeting of every fresh demand with ready sacrifice, have a voice not heard before. That which seemed darkness has become light.

And if this fact that most seemed hostile to the Emotions thus becomes their guide, it is reasonable to expect that other characters of the phenomenal world also would be found to have a similar significance. When the idea of a dead mechanicalness is fairly banished from our study of Nature, and the thought is kept fairly before the mind that the material Universe is but the appearance to us of some existence not yet recognized, a freer pathway is opened for thought. There is a road yet to be trodden with a guidance no less sure than that on which Science has hitherto relied.

But into farther illustrations we cannot enter now; in the meantime, it would appear that the claim put forth in the name of Science for a satisfaction to the religious Emotions which shall not conflict with its teaching, gives to those Emotions not a limitation, but an enlargement of their field. It affirms for them a right to share in the interpretation of Nature itself; and puts aside the very possibility of conflict by uniting them with Science in a common work.


And the mode in which this result is effected is full of interest. For in truth the efforts made to maintain the claims of the Emotions have been the very causes of their loss, and the seeming defeat of their cause is its real victory. For it is through the recognition of the law of cause and effect as universal that it is made to be recognized as the appearance of a spiritual act. If it were not universal, then it might have been left still mechanical in our thoughts, and the religious Emotions might have been cheated indefinitely with a partial and precarious satisfaction, such as they still endeavour to find in claiming a sphere of exceptions to the law, or a Will *beyond*

it. But through at once insisting on the universality of the law of cause and effect, and at the same time on a satisfaction (not conflicting with this) for the religious Emotions, they are given this better and fuller satisfaction still: that the law itself becomes the domain of these Emotions, and is to be interpreted by them.

They chiefly therefore owe thanks to Science, who thus through it receive the fulfilment of their own desires, made better than they desired.

Perhaps it may be found that, in lines somewhat such as these, a positive investigation, not fated to barrenness, may be carried on. The points I have tried to suggest are chiefly two. One, that this problem is rationally presented to us by the present state of science: namely, to try if we can learn how a world not having the properties we call material should present the appearance of a material world to us. And the other, that in this inquiry the emotional part of our nature has a legitimate place. To these two points, under other aspects, I hope to return.

JAMES HINTON.



## THE POEMS OF MR. MORRIS.

*"The Defence of Guenevere and other poems."* 1858.

*"The Life and Death of Jason"* 1867.

*"The Earthly Paradise."* Parts I. to IV. 1868—1871.

*"Love is Enough, or the Freeing of Pharamond; a Morality."* 1873.

IF we seek to explain the attraction which the ballad-epics of ancient Greece, the romances and tales of the middle ages, possess for modern readers, we can be at no loss to ascribe it to the charm of contrast. Not only does the state of society therein depicted present the most striking unlikeness to our own, but the delightful unconsciousness of the narrators breathes a spirit to which we have long been strangers. They describe just what they see, with the winning frankness of children. They have no facts to conceal, nor theories to propound; and it is of their theme, not of themselves, that they are evidently thinking. That this is the main secret of their attraction for us may be felt rather than proved. The proof, at all events, must be comparative rather than positive. In reading "Lara" and "The Corsair," for example, one is continually haunted by the suspicion that, if not actually masking behind the hero, Byron is drawing the character and painting the passion from experience of his own. The Iliad and the Odyssey, on the other hand, bear so little witness to the personality of Homer that his very existence is still a moot point; and the "Canterbury Tales" afford barely hints enough to clothe the antiquarian skeleton which passes for Chaucer's biography with the semblance of flesh and blood. When the glamour that fascinated our youthful fancy in the personality of Byron has died out, how seldom we care to recur to the lurid creations in which he embodied it! Whereas to the epics which betray no likeness of their author, to the tales which pourtray

every contemporary type but that of the poet himself, do not young men and old return again and again to find at each reading their original freshness revived? In no age, perhaps, have Homer and Chaucer been studied with so much eagerness as in this, when the development of self-consciousness has been carried in poetry, as in every other field of intellectual action, to a pitch of almost morbid intensity. The advent of a new poet characterized by an unconsciousness like that of the ancient rhapsodists, and avowedly the disciple of the first English poet who most nearly resembled them, yet able to adapt his themes and his language to the demands of modern taste, was sure therefore of a hearty welcome, if only on the score of novelty. On the appearance of Mr. Morris's "Jason," he was hailed in almost every quarter as a poet who fulfilled these conditions; and the poem has deservedly taken rank among the purest of modern classics.

To a few readers his name was already known by the publication of an earlier volume. "The Defence of Guenevere" and the other poems in this collection are a series of mediæval studies, akin to the productions of the Pre-Raphaelite school of painters, to a leading member of which the writer dedicated them. Like those productions, they might be fairly condemned for weakness of drawing and crudity of colour. Quaint archaisms of diction, forced and bald rhymes, wilful obscurity, harshness, not to say ugliness of metaphor, disfigure nearly every page, and it would be easy to raise a laugh at their absurdity. But a just and careful critic could not fail to discern that the singer was worthier than his song. He had so saturated his imagination with the glow of chivalric romance and Catholic mythology as to be incapable for the moment of anything beyond reproduction. But the receptive and assimilative power which enabled him to apprehend thus intimately the spirit of so remote an age, and imitate thus faithfully the relics of its living literature, required only time and training to mature into one of the richest of poetic faculties. No sign of this power is more marked in the volume than the tone of *naïf* unconsciousness which the writer has caught from his models. His personality is never visible; he never preaches; dispenses praise and blame but rarely, and then in accordance with a standard not of his own raising. With calm impartiality he sets forth in successive pictures the double aspect in which the love of Guenevere for Lancelot seems to have presented itself to mediæval imagination,—the view adopted by Chivalry, and the view sanctioned by the Church. In "The Defence of Guenevere" she is a Phryne, voluptuous, imperial, irresistible; in "King Arthur's Tomb," a Magdalen, tortured by remorse and tempted by passion, but sustained by penitence and faith unto the end. In "Sir Galahad" the portrait of the saint-knight is painted with a truthfulness that atones for whatever clumsiness of handling may at first repel us.

He is represented as setting out in his quest of the San-Greal with sharp misgivings of spirit as to the career of chastity to which he must vow himself. He witnesses the tender leave-taking of a lady and her knight, and thinks sorrowfully that for him no maiden will mourn if he falls. He recalls the loves of Lancelot and Guenevere, of Tristram and Iscalt, and is tempted to envy their happiness and forget their sin. But in the chapel where he passes his first vigil, he has a vision of

"One sitting on the altar as a throne,  
Whose face no man could say he did not know,  
And though the bell still rang, He sat alone,  
With raiment half blood-red, half white as snow."

Overpowered with shame, he sinks nerveless on the floor.

"But mightily a gentle voice came down,  
'Rise up and look and listen, Galahad,  
Good Knight of God, for you will see no frown  
Upon my face; I come to make you glad.

'For that you say that you are all alone,  
I will be with you always, and fear not  
You are uncared for, though no maiden moan  
Above your empty tomb. For Lancelot,

'He in good time shall be my servant too:  
Meantime, take note whose sword first made him knight,  
And who hath loved him alway, yea, and who  
Still trusts him alway, though in all men's sight

'He is just what you know, O Galahad;  
This love is happy, even as you say,  
But would you for a little time be glad  
To make Me sorry long day after day?

'Her warm arms round his neck half throttle Me,  
The hot love-tears burn deep like spots of lead;  
Yea, and the years pass quick; right dismally  
Will Lancelot at one time hang his head:

'Yea, old and shrivelled he shall win my love!'"

The struggle in the youth's soul ceases ere the voice dies into silence, and the Vision of the San-Greal is ther revealed to eyes fitted to perceive it.

The minor poems, of which the greater number are ballads, bear the same marks of the writer's thorough sympathy with a particular era of history and type of literature, a sympathy which he doubtless thought to express most worthily by the closest imitation. His attempts seem to us as successful as any that have since been made. "The Sailing of the Sword," which is the least imitative, and therefore the freest from affectations, approaches, perhaps, as nearly as a modern ballad can hope to do, the genuine simplicity of the antique.

The pledge of artistic capacity given in Mr. Morris's early volume was more than redeemed nine years later by the publication of "The

Life and Death of Jason," which attested how wisely he had spent the interval in enlarging his culture and ripening his taste. The sympathy it displays with the genius of Greece in the mythopoeic stage of its development is as living as that which he heretofore shewed with Anglo-Saxon England in her age of chivalric romance. The reverent apostrophe to his master Chaucer suffices to prove that the old love has not been killed by the new, but the form which this takes is no longer that of servile imitation. "Jason" is the work of an artist who has studied the epoch which he desires to depict, through the medium of its literature, with the aim not of reproducing the letter but of imbibing the spirit. The conception of the subject is that which a modern English poet would most naturally shape and modern English readers most readily apprehend. No choice could have been happier, for the story has received no adequate treatment from an earlier pen, and is too full of incident to be easily degraded by the ingenuity of Professor Max Müller and his followers from the picturesque interest of an heroic legend to the pale monotony of a solar myth. So fresh is the narrative, so pictorial the detail, that the familiar adventures of the Argonauts,—the harpy-haunted feast of Phineus, the nymphs' abduction of Hylas, Argo's passage of the "clashing rocks" in the wake of the pilot-dove, the threefold horrors which guarded the Fleece of Gold, the love-prompted wiles by which Medea overcame them, the voyagers' long wintering in Scythia, their return homeward past Circe's bower, the Sirens' isle and the Hesperides' garden, the miracle of craft whereby Medea procured the death of Pelias and her lover's accession to his throne, the faithlessness with which Jason requited her love and the terrible vengeance she exacted for it—all live again before our eyes with the charm of actual novelty. The characters of the hero and heroine are consistently conceived throughout, and the subordination of the rest is skilfully contrived to throw them into relief without depriving any of their due importance.

The writer's sustained power is remarkable, the length of the poem considered. There is scarcely a weak passage of description anywhere, and in critical situations his voice rises to their height. Besides the pathos so indispensable to a narrative poet, he exhibits a power of restraining and concentrating emotion which usually characterizes the dramatist. The lyrics which diversify the story are as musical and graceful as could be desired. The language is simple without baldness, idiomatic without meanness. By the occasional introduction of words that have undeservedly become obsolete, Mr. Morris has given it a tone appropriately archaic, while avoiding the excess into which Spencer was led by immoderate admiration of their common master. The "heroic metre" employed is rescued from monotony by a frequent division of the couplet over two sentences, after the fashion set by Keats. Such faults as there are in the poem may be noticed in this

connection, for they reach no deeper than the exterior of literary art. Occasional diffuseness of expression, and a wilful or careless disregard of prosody, as shown in the scansion of words like *mire*, *fire*, and *desire* as dissyllables, and the accentuation of words like *bushes*, *heeding*, *lacking*, &c., on the last syllable, constitute the whole indictment with which we think "Jason" is chargeable.\*

To illustrate by a few extracts the salient beauties to which attention has been called:—The perfection of pure narrative poetry—vivid clearness of description, choice simplicity of diction, ordered tunefulness of measure—seems to us almost attained in such a passage as the following. Medea, moved by love of Jason, goes to conjure Hecate for spells, whereby to overcome the guardians of the Fleece:—

"But when all hushed and still the palace grew,  
She put her gold robes off, and on her drew  
A dusky gown, and with a wallet small  
And cutting wood-knife girt herself withal,  
And from her dainty chamber softly passed  
Through stairs and corridors, until at last  
She came down to a gilded watergate,  
Which with a golden key she opened straight;  
And swiftly stept into a little boat,  
And, pushing off from shore, began to float  
Adown the stream, and with her tender hands  
And half-bared arms, the wonder of all lands,  
Rowed strongly through the starlit gusty night  
As though she knew the watery way aright.  
So, from the city being gone apace,  
Turning the boat's head, did she near a space  
Where, by the water's edge, a thick yew wood  
Made a black blot on the dim-gleaming flood;  
But when she reached it, dropping either oar  
Upon the grassy bank, she leapt ashore  
And to a yew-bough made the boat's head fast.  
Then here and there quick glances did she cast  
And listened, lest some wanderers should be nigh.  
Then by the river's side she tremblingly  
Undid the bands that bound her yellow hair  
And let it float about her, and made bare  
Her shoulder and right arm, and, kneeling down,  
Drew off her shoes, and girded up her gown,  
And in the river washed her silver feet  
And trembling hands, and then turned round to meet  
The yew-wood's darkness, gross and palpable,  
As though she made for some place known full well."

The intimate sympathy which enables the poet to seize upon and condense into a vignette the life of a time so foreign to his own as

\* A blemish of taste, if it be not a coincidence of idea, may deserve a note in passing. Mr. Morris has drawn so little inspiration from contemporary sources that he may be excused for an ignorance which would be inconceivable in the case of another. He can hardly have been acquainted with the idyll in Mr. Tennyson's "Princess," when he penned such a line as

"Hummed over by innumerable bees."

the mythic age of Greece, will be apparent in the speech of *Æson* to his young son *Jason*, whose adventurous career has not yet been foretold :—

“ O child, I pray the Gods to spare thine head  
The burden of a crown ; were it not good  
That thou shouldst live and die within this wood  
That clothes the feet of *Pelion*, knowing nought  
Of all the things by foolish men so sought ;  
For there, no doubt, is everything man needs, —  
The quiver with the iron-pointed reeds,  
The cornel bow, the wood-knife at the side,  
The garments of the spotted leopard's hide,  
The bed of bear-skin in the hollow hill,  
The bath within the pool of some green rill ;  
There shall the quick-eyed centaurs be thy friends,  
Unto whose hearts such wisdom great *Jove* sends  
They know the past and future, and fear nought  
That by the fates upon them may be brought.  
And when the Spring brings love, then mayst thou find,  
In some fair grassy place, the wood nymphs kind,  
And choose thy mate, and with her, hand in hand,  
Go wandering through the blossoming sweet land ;  
And nought of evil there shall come to thee,  
But like the golden age shall all things be.”

A relic of the very “ Golden Age,” to which the speaker points as past, is presented to our view in the elaborate picture of the “ Garden of the *Hesperides* ;” but the passage is too long for quotation. An afternoon landscape and a night-scene may serve to illustrate the picturesque quality which the poem so largely possesses :—

“ But when he reached the well-remembered keel,  
The sun was far upon his downward way,  
At afternoon of a bright summer day.  
Hot was it, and still o'er the long rank grass,  
Beneath the hull, a widening shade did pass ;  
And further off, the sunny daisied sward  
The raised oars with their creeping shadows barred ;  
And grey shade from the hills of *Cenchreæ*  
Began to move toward the heaving sea.  
So *Jason*, lying in the shadow dark  
Cast by the stem, the warble of the lark,  
The chirrup of the cricket, well could hear ;  
And now and then the sound would come anear  
Of some hind shouting o'er his laden wain ;  
But looking o'er the blue and heaving plain,  
Sailless it was, and beaten by no oar,  
And on the yellow edges of the shore  
The ripple fell in murmur soft and low,  
As with wide sweeping wings the gulls did go  
About the breakers crying plaintively.”

“ And so, unchallenged, did they draw anear  
The long white quays, and at the street's end now  
Beheld the ship's masts standing row by row



Stark black against the stars ; then cautiously  
 Peered Jason forth, ere they took heart to try  
 The open starlit place ; but nought he saw  
 Except the night-wind twitching the loose straw  
 From half-unloaded keels, and nought he heard  
 But the strange twittering of a caged green bird  
 Within an Indian ship, and from the hill  
 A distant baying."

No trace of the influence of Chaucer is more pleasantly marked than Mr. Morris's habit of resorting to natural imagery for the most ordinary purposes of illustration. The description of the skeins with which the daughters of Pelias were spinning when Medea entered their chamber is an example in point:—

"The many-coloured bundles newly dyed,  
 Blood-red and heavenly blue and grassy green,  
 Yea, and more colours than man yet has seen  
 In flowery meadows midmost of the May."

Sketches from nature so detailed and truthful as the following, however, are seldom to be found in any but a writer of our own century:—

"So still she stood, that the quick water-hen  
 Noted her not, as through the blue mouse-ear  
 He made his way ; the conies drew a-near,  
 Nibbling the grass, and from an oak-twig nigh  
 A thrush poured forth his song unceasingly."

"O the sweet valley of deep grass,  
 Where through the summer stream doth pass,  
 In chain of shallow, and still pool,  
 From misty morn to evening cool ;  
 Where the black ivy creeps and twines  
 O'er the dark-armed, red-trunked pines  
 Whence clattering the pigeon flits,  
 Or, brooding o'er her thin eggs, sits,  
 And every hollow of the hills  
 With echoing song the mavis fills."

Other signs of indebtedness to his master will be apparent in Mr. Morris's careful elaboration of homely detail, as of furniture and costume, and his habitual employment of a few favourite idioms.

To Homer his obligations will be readily discerned in the general structure and supernatural machinery of his story, of which the *Odyssey* is the legitimate prototype, the constant repetition of characteristic epithets (among which that of "wan" for water is specially felicitous), and the effective use of proper names. The catalogue of the heroes who muster at Iolchos for the quest is a notable instance of the last peculiarity:—

"Meanwhile came many heroes to the town ;—  
 Asterion, dweller on the windy down  
 Below Philæus, far up in the north ;  
 Slow-footed Polyphemus, late borne forth  
 In chariot from Larissa, that beholds  
 Green-winding Peneus cleaving fertile wolds ;  
 Erginus, son of Neptune, nigh the sea  
 His father set him, where the laden bee  
 Flies low across Maander, and falls down  
 Against the white walls of a merchant town  
 Men call Miletus."

Of the dramatic force with which the expression of emotion is concentrated when the occasion demands it, no better example could be given than from the soliloquy in which Medea steels herself to take vengeance on Jason by the murder of their children :—

"What ! when I kneel in temples of the Gods,  
 Must I bethink me of the upturned sods,  
 And hear a voice say : ' Mother, wilt thou come  
 And see us resting in our new-made home,  
 Since thou wert used to make us lie full soft,  
 Smoothing our pillows many a time and oft ?  
 O ! mother, now no dainty food we need,  
 Whereof of old thou usedst to have such heed.  
 O mother, now we need no gowns of gold,  
 Nor in the winter time do we grow cold ;  
 Thy hands would bathe us when we were thine own,  
 Now doth the rain wash every shining bone.' . . .

"But when in some dim land we meet again  
 Will ye remember all the loss and pain ?  
 Will ye the form of children keep for aye  
 With thoughts of men ? and ' Mother,' will ye say,  
 ' Why didst thou slay us ere we came to know  
 That men die ? hadst thou waited until now,  
 An easy thing it had been then to die,  
 For in the thought of immortality  
 Do children play about the flowery meads,  
 And win their heaven with a crown of weeds.'"

"O children ! that I would have died to save,  
 How fair a life of pleasure might ye have,  
 But for your mother ;—nay, for thee, for thee,  
 For thee, O traitor ! who didst bring them here  
 Into this cruel world, this lovely bier  
 Of youth and love, and joy and happiness,  
 That unforseeing happy fools still bless."

In such situations as have sexual passion for their motive Mr. Morris's treatment is very skilful, preserving fidelity to the frankness of Greek manners without offending the delicacy of English taste. Sensuous it must be to be truthful, but immodesty is avoided, and impurity not approached. In more than one passage wherein the limits of propriety are stretched to the full, it is evident that there was the strongest temptation to exceed them. Remembering in whose company his name has since been associated, one is bound

not to pass without notice these signs of his restraint. He shows true insight in portraying the daimseles who are the instruments of Circe's sensual enchantments as "weary images of sin." The unintelligent mechanism of mere lust, with which, when divorced from love, mind and soul are alike unsatisfied, is graphically depicted in their mien.

"Heavy-eyed they seemed,  
And each at other gazed as though she dreamed,  
Not noting aught of all the glorious show  
She joined herself, nor seeming more to know  
What words she spake, nor what her fellows sung,  
Nor feeling arms that haply round her clung."

The charm of unconsciousness which was so marked in the earlier volume has lost none of its freshness in "Jason." With the exception of the passage in which his discipleship to Chaucer is avowed, there is scarcely an indication of the writer's individuality. The occurrence of a reflection or comment upon the narrative is extremely rare, and readers unacquainted with his later writings would be able to form no impression of the poet's spiritual calibre. Interpreted by the light of these later writings, however, there are scattered passages (especially the lines at the close of Book V., "So set 'twixt pleasure," &c., and the song of Orpheus, commencing "O death that maketh life so sweet") which indicate that he was already travelling with a burden of sorrowful thought, although the time was not yet ripe for its deliverance as an expression of personal conviction.

The appearance of "The Earthly Paradise" at once dispelled the hope that the school in which Homer and Chaucer are masters had found a permanent representative in Mr. Morris. It was but too plain that "the strange disease of modern thought" had infected him like his fellows, that his unconscious serenity had been displaced by the brooding pain of self-consciousness. Instead of the healthy cheerfulness, the manly decisive tone of thought which the ancient masters might communicate to a faithful disciple, we find here the morbid melancholy sentiment, the fluctuating chaos of ideas that belong to the modern sceptic. The poem might take for its motto the well-known saying of Johnson that "the whole of life is but keeping away the thought of death." The purpose of a band of panic-stricken Norwegians to escape from a land where death seems imminent, into an ideal Paradise,

"Where at the worst Death is so far away  
No man need think of him from day to day,"

constitutes the thread upon which the several tales are strung. After enduring countless vicissitudes in the pursuit of their chimæra, and by which they are slowly disillusionized, the voyagers arrive as aged men upon a southern shore, where they are hospitably wel-

comed by the inhabitants. In recounting their adventures to sympathetic hearers and the interchange of legendary lore they find comparative repose, and while away the time until death.

Though Mr. Morris would possibly resent the imputation of intending "to point a moral," his poem has one too obvious to be missed. The Voyage of the Wanderers is a parable of life, where in straining after the too-much we do but lose the enough. Its lesson could not be better enforced than in the words of their own spokesman to the citizens with whom they at last take refuge :—

"We are as men who cast aside a feast  
Amidst their lowly fellows, that they may  
Eat with the king, and who at end of day  
Bearing sore stripes, with great humility  
Must pray the bedesmen of those men to be  
They scorned that day while yet the sun was high."

Strange that one who apprehends this wisdom so clearly should fail so signally to apply it! The certainty of death, as Mr. Morris never wearies of telling us, is the great bugbear of life. To keep the thought away by every device of his art is the poet's only aim. He announces this in the prologue, reiterates it in the interludes, and clenches the avowal in his *l'envoi*. He deprecates the supposition of his possessing any gift that will not serve to this end :—

"Of Heaven and Hell I have no power to sing,  
I cannot ease the burden of your fears,  
Or make quick-coming death a little thing,  
Or bring again the pleasure of past years,  
Ner for my words shall ye forget your tears  
Or hope again for aught that I can say,  
The idle singer of an empty day."

All that can be done is to extract the perfume of life while it lasts, and distract our memories from the thorn that surrounds the rose. The attempt of the Wanderers to escape from the sense of their doom was worthy of a poet's imitation :—

"Death have we hated, knowing not what it meant,  
Life have we loved through green leaf and through sere,  
Though still the less we knew of its intent :  
The Earth and Heaven through countless year on year  
Slow-changing, were to us but curtains fair  
Hung round about a little room, where play  
Weeping and laughter of man's empty day."

It is in the hope of whiling away the time until the inevitable end comes that he has thus "in some old garden wrought," and if he has successfully helped to make

"Fresh flowers spring up from hoarded soil,  
And fragrance of old days and deeds have brought  
Back to folks' memory, all was not for nought :  
No little part it was for me to play,  
The idle singer of an empty day."

With the aim of forgetting death who would imitate the Egyptians by setting up a skeleton at every banquet? Yet this is just what Mr. Morris has done. In season and out of season the remembrance he is so anxious to dispel is persistently thrust upon us. In the prelude "March" he enounces the creed, which was the burden of Orpheus' song in "Jason," that the very certainty of death is the source of life's best enjoyment.\*

"Ah! what begetteth all this storm of bliss  
But Death himself, who crying solemnly  
E'en from the heart of sweet Forgetfulness,  
Bids us 'Rejoice, lest pleasureless ye lie,  
Within a little time ye must go by.'"

In the epilogue this creed is somewhat deprecated indeed, but with a faintness that only strengthens the sense of its reluctant acceptance. If it be true that the consciousness of death "makes love itself with all its bliss," the reason is that we are stimulated into anxiety to forget the doom, our yearning desire being that "we might never die." But however anxious we may be to forget, Mr. Morris will not suffer us. In the prelude "May" he beholds a vision of Love as the Lord of life passing with a bright procession "of maids and youths and minstrelsy." The pageant is suddenly shadowed by the intrusion of "Eld and Death," but it is only the poet who observes their presence:—

"None noted aught their noiseless passing by,  
The world had quite forgotten it must die."

The song chaunted by unseen voices to Psyche in the House of Love vindicates the truth that the affections may attain to a conviction of immortality:—

"If ye could forget  
Amidst your outpoured love that you must die,  
Then ye, my servants, were death's conquerors yet,  
And love to you should be eternity,  
How quick soever might the days go by;  
Yea, ye are made immortal on the day  
Ye cease the dusty grains of time to weigh."

But in another page we are taught how vain is this illusion. Even in the midst of her new-found life of love, Andromeda must turn to Perseus with the wail,

"O love! to think that love can pass away,  
That soon or late, to us shall come a day  
When this shall be forgotten;"

\* The doctrine that this certainty heightens instead of impairing the value of life is preached with much force in George Eliot's "Jubal," and refuted with a noble scorn in "In Memoriam" (xxxv.) A practical test of its soundness may be obtained by observing to what school the apostles of "Euthanasia" belong, and comparing the solicitude with which the incurably sick and dying have been tended by those who believe most firmly that life does not end with the body.

Nor has Perseus any better consolation to offer her than that

"If thou needs must think of that dull night,  
Yet for that thought hold closer to thy bliss."

If Mr. Morris were not so "painfully in earnest," there would be something ludicrous about the resolution which he shews, like Dickens' Mrs. Gummidge or Lord Dufferin's Wilson, to be dismal under all circumstances. In the midst of describing the bliss of the newly-wedded pair he thrusts in this doleful reflection:—

"Love while ye may ; if twain grow into one,  
'Tis for a little while ; the time goes by ;  
No hatred 'twixt the pair of friends doth lie,  
No troubles break their hearts—and yet, and yet,  
How could it be ?—we strove not to forget. . . .  
Let pass—at latest when we come to die  
Then shall the fashion of the world go by."

What again can be more ghastly than the obtrusion of the grave into a dainty erotic sung in alternate verses by a maiden and youth ?

"In the white-flowered hawthorn-brake  
Love, be merry for my sake !  
Twine the blossoms in my hair,  
Kiss me where I am most fair,—  
Kiss me, love ! for who knoweth  
What thing cometh after death ?"

In this wise the presence of "quick-coming death" haunts the poet and his readers from first to last. If he has, as he admits, no power to "set the crooked straight," it is surprising how much ability he displays of making the straight crooked. Job's comforters could not more cruelly have abused their office and opportunity than has this self-elected apostle of "sweet Forgetfulness." The truth is that, like his own Wanderers, in straining after the too-much he has missed the enough. Death is not to be forgotten by any frantic effort, but is the more likely to be thereby remembered. It may be that Mr. Morris has been misled upon this point by his intimate study of mediæval art. The familiarity therein displayed with the idea of death may be thought to have bred a wholesome contempt for it in the minds of the spectators addressed, and certainly does not appear to have exercised a morbidly depressing influence. But if this be his view, it is strange he should have omitted to note what lay at the root of this contempt. The men of the middle ages could afford to despise death, because they had a profound faith in immortality. Their artists did not paint "The Dance of Death" upon the bridge-roof or market-wall without also painting the "Resurrection" in the Duomo or the Campo Santo. Mr. Morris is unable to give his readers an equivalent consolation. With him Death is "the End. . . . that all perfection mocks." Beyond a passing reference,

where the occasion imperatively requires it, to the belief which the Pagan and Christian races from whose legendary stores his tales are drawn, alike entertained in a life beyond the grave, we can discover no hint in "The Earthly Paradise" that implies even respect for the idea. On the contrary, the certainty of cessation is preached with a persistence that can hardly consist with a suspense of judgment as to the possibility of life's continued existence. A view of human destiny which has commended itself to the highest intellects in every age, a hope cherished by the most loving hearts as the one consolation that makes life tolerable, is steadily ignored and in effect set aside as worthless. We are here concerned not with Mr. Morris's unbelief, but with the expression of it. It is at least surprising that a writer who acknowledges

"How good is hope to man at need,  
Yea, even the least ray thereof,"

and professes such zeal for the alleviation of human misery, should show so little reverence for the sanctity of a faith which has contributed most largely to that end, and for which he has no better substitute to offer.

The aspiration from which the hope of immortality derives its main strength Mr. Morris does not wholly lack. Several of the lyrical preludes to these tales (headed with the names and suggested by the associations of the months) are charged with emotional tenderness that is unmistakably personal. In "October," after indulging a vein of morbid sentiment as to death's affording a "rest from love which ne'er the end can gain," he yields to the healthy reaction with which his heart responds,

"How can I have enough of life and love?"

It is this feeling which in more happily constituted natures blossoms into faith. That it is of the essence of love to believe itself eternal Mr. Morris shews more than once an intellectual conviction. One proof of it has already been given. Another offers in the scene where at a crisis of great peril Bellerophon and Philonoë meet to take farewell, and he describes them as feeling

"Wonder at the death they knew so nigh,  
And disbelief in parting should they die."

But so perverse is the scepticism by which this conviction is controlled—that, by a strange inconsistency, the lover whose feelings are thus truthfully portrayed is represented at this very time as an agnostic to whom the existence of heaven and hell was a question of indifferent concern. ("Bellerophon in Lycia," Part IV., pp. 309–10).

The impression of melancholy which the whole poem leaves, a melancholy reflected from the self-conscious gloom of one who is

haunted by a spectre that he cannot lay, and tantalized with aspirations that he will not trust, is deepened by other evidences of the writer's moral fluctuation. His conception of love, for example, seems to be strangely shifting and indiscriminate. The preference given to the carnal over the spiritual element in it is very marked, especially in the earlier tales. In "The Doom of King Acrisius," "Cupid and Psyche," "The Watching of the Falcon," and "The Lady of the Land," there is scarcely an effort made to rise above the lower view. A myth such as "Cupid and Psyche" manifestly admitted of an essentially different treatment, and the song in the House of Love suggests that this had occurred to his mind, but the hint has not been worked out. That it is not the Hellenic idea of love which is defective in this respect, Mr. Morris clearly recognizes by the selection of at least two subjects wherein the higher elements are supremely dominant. In the first of these, "The Love of Alcestis," if he has failed to draw out so impressively as Mr. Browning has since done, the deeper significance of the story, he does justice to the nobility of the sacrifice which an exalted affection is capable of making for a dear albeit ignoble object. In the antithetical legend of "The Death of Paris," he has painted with rare skill the emotional conflict that rages in the breast of *Ænone* when her sometime lover implores her to heal him of his deadly wound, the agonized resolution with which, when convinced of his faithlessness, she nerves her heart to refuse the boon, rather than see him again enslaved by the unworthy passion which has brought ruin on himself and his country. No finer type of womanhood, again, can be conceived than Mr. Morris has drawn in *Philonoë*, the purely passionate, gentle, devoted heroine of "Bellerophon in Lycia;" and he has confronted her with the sensual, hard, selfish type of her sister *Sthenobœa* with evident appreciation of the contrast. But he has lavished greater art upon the portrait of the cold, calculating, ambitious *Rhodope* in the story that bears her name, than upon the tender, generous, lowly-minded heroine of "The Man born to be King," without betraying an indication that one type is less deserving of admiration than the other. It may be urged in defence of this indiscrimination, perhaps, that the several narrators of the tales are supposed to be chargeable with their treatment, and that the writer is no more responsible than a dramatist for the action of his characters. But the plea is set aside by the fact that the narrators, unlike Chaucer's, are merely lay figures, the only pronounced individuality being that of the poet himself. Having been at such pains to impress upon us how completely he has exchanged the unconsciousness of the rhapsodist for the self-consciousness of the preacher, he cannot divest himself of the obligations incident to the part. The same fluctuation is apparent in the tone of the reflections with which the narrative is plentifully interspersed. One of the most



fatal symptoms of moral sickness is betrayed in the passage commencing "O many-peopled Earth" (Part IV. p. 367), where the reluctance of men, who otherwise interchange confidences frankly, to disclose their suffering from unrequited affection, is attributed to their secret conviction that the value of love is really illusory, seeing

"What a pain it is,  
How little balanced by the sullied bliss  
They win for some few minutes of their lives."

In another page, however, we have an exhortation which dispels the fear that this mistrust is an abiding sentiment:—

"O thou who clingest still to life and love,  
Though nought of good, no God thou may'st discern,  
Though nought that is thine utmost woe can move,  
Though no soul knows wherewith thine heart doth yearn,  
Yet since thy weary lips no curse can learn,  
Cast no least thing thou lovedst once away,  
Since yet perchance thine eyes shall see the day."

The strain of kindly sympathy and sorrowful resignation which runs through the prelude, epilogue, and *l'envoi*, is disagreeably jarred by such a discordant note of cynicism as this:—

"For ever must the rich man hate the poor ;"

and an outburst of rebellious pessimism like the following:—

"The Gods both happy and forlorn  
Have set in one world, each to each to be  
A vain rebuke, a bitter mockery."

The tone of this last passage bears pretty plain marks of its origin, but it would be rash to infer from the repetition of a catch-word or two that the writer had any real sympathy with the school of which Mr. Swinburne is the English representative. An occasional expression of discontent, however bitter, differs widely from the persistent and violent negation of the "Songs before Sunrise," and the yearning pathos of Mr. Morris's despondency is unlike, not in degree but in kind, to the ghastly recklessness of despair which was a dominant note of the "Poems and Ballads." Nor can we endorse the censure in which Mr. Buchanan has involved him as sharing the "fleshly" tendencies characteristic of the same school.\* His uncertain handling of the subject of love has been admitted, but even when the preference given to the sensuous conception of it is most marked, there is no such indelicacy in the treatment as may be fairly charged against Mr. Rossetti's; still less is there a trace of that depraved sympathy with the developments of lust in disease which so revolts us in the author of "Anactoria" and "Erotion." Mr. Morris's subtle delineation in "The Hill of Venus" of the successive phases of carnal slavery and emancipation—the spiritual chaos that precedes the sudden lapse, the gradual disenchantment in spite of every

\* CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, Oct., 1871, p. 334 et seq.

effort to defer "the dreadful dawn," the long-drawn weariness of satiety, and the self-loathing sense of degradation that attends the awakening recoil—opposes as powerful a protest as any in modern poetry against the teaching of the school with which his name has been undeservedly associated.

The only other exception we shall take as respects the moral drift of his collective tales is to the partiality displayed for a type of lover, whose querulous craving and nerveless questing for satisfaction accord ill with the masculine virtues of courage, self-control, and determination. When, like *Accontius*, and *John* (in "*The Land East of the Sun*") these lovers succeed in their aim, they do so rather by help of Heaven's grace or Fortune's caprice than of their own energy. Miracles are wrought for them; it is not they who vanquish their difficulties. When they fail, like "the man who never laughed again" and his fellow-victims, they die of grief for their frustrated hope almost without a struggle. A poet who can delineate the heroic type so skilfully as in the figures of *Bellerophon* and *Kiartan*, tries the patience of his readers by expending greater space upon less worthy conceptions.

With these qualifications we have only grateful admiration to express for the high artistic qualities displayed in "*The Earthly Paradise*," the Oriental prodigality of invention, the graceful scholarship, the delicate apprehension of natural beauty, the tenderness of sentiment, the mastery of musical diction discernible in almost every tale, and the rarer but striking evidences of moral insight and dramatic power. Though his subjects have been selected from Greek, Norse, and Persian sources which have been already well ransacked, there is none that greets us as a familiar story, none in which the pictorial tracery is not newly designed and freshly coloured. In some cases the outline may be assumed original. How much, if any, of "*The Land East of the Sun and West of the Moon*," for instance, is legendary we know not. The tale, at all events, is eminently characteristic of the Norse imagination, and if not founded upon one of its native products, attests how thoroughly Mr. Morris has become imbued with its genius. The incidents of the narrative, especially the hero's first vision of his Fairy-love, as she dances and sings at dawn on the meadow with her sisters, holding in her hand the doffed swan-skin, which is her earthly disguise, are exquisite in their simplicity and grace. "*The Man born to be King*" is a scarcely less admirable example of pure narrative. In the homeliness of the detail the essential life-likeness of the description consists, but the principle of selection adopted avoids the errors into which Dutch art fell by over-realism. In both these poems skilful management of the eight-syllable couplet lends an added charm to the diction. We may take, as a typical specimen, a passage from the latter, which combines these features in a single picture:—

"So long he rode he drew anigh  
 A mill upon the river's brim,  
 That seemed a goodly place to him,  
 For o'er the oily smooth mill-head  
 There hung the apples growing red,  
 And many an ancient apple-tree  
 Within the orchard could he see,  
 While the smooth millwalls white and black  
 Shook to the great wheels' measured clack,  
 And grumble of the gear within ;  
 While o'er the roof that dulled that din  
 The doves sat crooning half the day,  
 And round the half-cut stack of hay  
 The sparrows fluttered twittering."

A different picture from "The Doom of King Acrisius" illustrates the same mode of treatment applied to strict landscape :—

"Now underneath the scarped cliffs of the bay  
 From horn to horn a belt of sand there lay,  
 Fast lessening as the flood-tide swallowed it ;  
 There all about did the sea-swallows flit,  
 And from the black rocks yellow hawks flew down,  
 And cormorants fished amidst the sea-weed brown,  
 Or on the low rocks nigh unto the sea,  
 While over all the fresh wind merrily  
 Blew from the sea, and o'er the pale blue sky  
 Thin clouds were stretched the way the wind went by."

The treatment of classical subjects approaches the mediæval rather than the modern point of view, in keeping with the period at which the narrators are supposed to live. Throughout the work, indeed, the writer shews that thorough familiarity with mediæval thought and feeling of which his early studies were the first-fruit. An excellent instance of this is the reason which the sub-prior Adrian (in "The Man born to be King") assigns for ringing the lost-bell when travelling through an unpeopled district to administer absolution to a dying communicant :—

"I took between mine hands the Lord,  
 And bade the boy bear forth the bell,  
 For though few folk were there to tell  
 Who passed that way, natheless I trow  
 The beasts were glad that news to know."

The realization in the following passage of a scene in England during the palmy days of monastic rule is very life-like :—

- "Above the green and unburnt fen  
 The little houses of an English town,  
 Cross-timbered, thatched with fen-reeds coarse and brown,  
 And high o'er these, three gables, great and fair,  
 That slender rods of columns do upbear  
 Over the minster doors, and imagery  
 Of kings, and flowers no summer field doth see,  
 Wrought on those gables. Yea, I heard withal,  
 In the fresh morning air, the trowels fall

Upon the stone, a thin noise far away ;  
 For high up wrought the masons off that day,  
 Since to the monks that house seemed scarcely well  
 Till they had set a spire or pinnacle  
 Each side the great porch."

The extracts made from "Jason" have so well attested Mr. Morris's skill in reproducing the life of ancient Greece, that we need not add much to them. We may instance the description of Sthenobœa and her maidens spinning in the fountained court of the palace as specially pictorial, but it is too long for citation. ("Bellerophon in Argos," Part IV., pp. 110-111). In the "Ring given to Venus," there is a night-procession of the Pagan deities which would furnish an impressive theme to such a painter as Mr. Leighton. The figure of the disguised Apollo at the court of Admetus might in the same manner be commended to such a sculptor as Mr. Story :—

For morns there were when he the man would meet,  
 His hair wreathed round with bay and blossoms sweet,  
 Gazing distraught into the brightening east,  
 Nor taking heed of either man or beast,  
 Or any thing that was upon the earth ;  
 Or sometimes midst the hottest of the mirth,  
 Within the King's hall, would he seem to wake  
 As from a dream, and his stringed tortoise take,  
 And strike the chords unbidden, till the hall  
 Filled with the glorious sound from wall to wall,  
 Trembled and seemed as it would melt away,  
 And sunken down the faces weeping lay,  
 That erewhile laughed the loudest ; only he  
 Stood upright, looking forward steadily  
 With sparkling eyes as one who cannot weep,  
 Until the storm of music sank to sleep."

(*"The Love of Alcestis."*)

The feeling for landscape evinced in the extracts already given may be shown to better advantage in this home-sketch :—

"Across the gap made by our English hinds,  
 Amidst the Romans' handiwork, behold  
 Far off the long-roofed church ; the shepherd binds  
 The withy round the hurdles of his fold ;  
 Down in the foss the river fed of old,  
 That through long lapse of time has grown to be  
 The little grassy valley that you see.  
 Rest here awhile, not yet the eve is still,  
 The bees are wandering yet, and you may hear  
 The barley mowers on the trenched hill,  
 The sheep-bells, and the restless changing weir,  
 All little sounds made musical and clear  
 Beneath the sky that burning August gives,  
 While yet the thought of glorious Summer lives."

The tender melancholy which, in spite of its morbid excess, constitutes one of the most fascinating of Mr. Morris's gifts, makes itself felt in the following passages :—

"Two gates unto the road of life there are,  
 And to the happy youth both seem afar,  
 Both seem afar, so far the past one seems,  
 The gate of birth, made dim with many dreams,  
 Bright with remembered hopes, beset with flowers;  
 So far it seems he cannot count the hours  
 That to this midway path have led him on,  
 Where every joy of life now seemeth won—  
 So far, he thinks not of the other gate,  
 Within whose shade the ghosts of dead hopes wait  
 To call upon him as he draws anear,  
 Despoiled, alone, and dull with many a fear,  
 Where is thy work ? how little thou hast done,  
 Where are thy friends, why art thou so alone ?"

The declining years of the Wanderers form the subject of this simile :—

"Therefore their latter journey to the grave  
 Was like those days of later autumn-tide,  
 When he who in some town may chance to bide  
 Opens the window for the balmy air,  
 And seeing the golden hazy sky so fair  
 And from some city-garden hearing still  
 The wheeling rooks the air with music fill,  
 Sweet hopeful music, thinketh,—Is this spring,  
 Surely the year can scarce be perishing ?  
 But then he leaves the clamour of the town,  
 And sees the withered scanty leaves fall down ;  
 The half-ploughed field, the flowerless garden-plot,  
 The dark full stream by summer long forgot,  
 The tangled hedges where, relaxed and dead,  
 The twining plants their withered berries shed,  
 And feels therewith the treachery of the sun,  
 And knows the pleasant time is well-nigh done."

Of the many examples of pathos in which the poem abounds, we should select, if space permitted, the soliloquy of Medusa in "The Doom of King Acrisius," and the farewell speech of Alcestis as the finest. There is a touching tenderness in the words of Andromeda to Perseus, when in the midst of their loving colloquy she sees the monster approaching :—

"Look seaward and behold ! my death draws nigh ;  
 Not thine—not thine ; but kiss me ere I die ;  
 Alas ! how many things I had to tell,  
 For certainly I should have loved thee well."

The mastery of musical language which Mr. Morris shews will scarcely need further proof. The adroit use of archaisms is not carried beyond the legitimate limits observed in "Jason." Though for the most part his diction keeps a uniform sobriety of colour, and lacks the jewelled phrases with which Keats and Mr. Tennyson enrich their narrative, it abounds in characteristic epithets, such as "the brown bird," for the nightingale, "the pink-foot dove," &c., which, like Homer, he repeats continually without fear that his

hearers will be tired. The variety of metres employed in the course of the work, however, greatly assists our enjoyment. An adaptation of *settima rima*, which is a favourite with him, is new, we think, to English verse, and forms a welcome addition to its resources.

Of the rarer and higher merits to which we have referred, the writer's moral insight may best appear in the reflections severally ascribed to the unscrupulous, sensual Sthenobœa and the honourable, chaste Bellerophon, after the scene wherein he has resisted her allurements. The temptress perceives that she must change her tactics :—

"I know not good and ill, but yet through all  
Know that the gods a just man him would call ;  
Nay, and I knew it when I saw him first,  
And in my heart sprang up that glorious thirst ;  
And should he, not being base, yield suddenly,  
And as the basest man, not loving me,  
Take all I gave him, and cast all his life  
Into a tangled and dishonoured strife ?  
Nay, it could never be ; but now indeed  
Somewhat with pity of me his heart may bleed,  
Since he is good, and he shall think of me . . . .  
Nor shall my next speech to him be so vain."

Bellerophon, on his part, leaves her with the sense that to have been even tempted constitutes an injury to his master, her husband :—

"Shamed he felt,  
E'en as a just man who in sleep hath dealt  
Unjustly."

The dramatic power visible in the contrast of these two characters is exhibited throughout the work in the only form admissible to narrative poetry, that of incisive and vigorous portraiture. "The Lovers of Gudrun," a rendering of one of the finest Icelandic legends, is a marked example of this ; but the poem must be read as a whole in order to apprehend its force. We can only select one scene, wherein Thorgerd, the aged mother of the murdered Kiartan, rouses her surviving sons to avenge his death. The period is just subsequent to the introduction of Christianity into the island, where, though welcomed by the young, it has obtained the bare assent of the elder generation. The family are assembled at the board, and the memory of the dead has been pledged in silence, when the eyes of all present meet

"Grey Thorgerd's smile  
Scornful and fierce, who therewithal rose up  
And laid her hand upon a silver cup,  
And drew from out her cloak a jewelled sword,  
And cast it ringing on the oaken board,  
And o'er the hall's noise high her clear voice shrilled ;  
'If the old gods by Christ and mass are killed

Or driven away, yet am I left behind,  
 Daughter of Egil, and with such a mind  
 As Egil had ; wherefore if Asa Thor  
 Has never lived, and there are men no more  
 Within the land, yet by this king's gift here,  
 And by this cup Thor owned once, do I swear  
 That the false foster-brother shall be slain  
 Before three summers have come round again,  
 If but my hand must bring him to his end ! ”

It would be difficult to condense into a smaller compass the lineaments of that stern type of womanhood which was fashioned by the cult of Odín, and supplied fit wives and mothers to the ruthless Sea-kings.

Of all dramatic passages in the work, however, we are most impressed by the last interview between Paris and Ænone, already mentioned. In the scorn of his cowardice and treachery, which uplifts her to the dignity of a Nemesis, and the revulsion of feeling by which, ere the penalty is inflicted, she is melted again into womanly tenderness, there are the elements of high tragedy:—

“ ‘ Hearken ! ’ she said,  
 ‘ Death is anear thee ; is then death so ill  
 With me anigh thee—since Troy is as dead,  
 Ere many tides the Xanthus’ mouth shall fill,  
 And thou art reft of her that harmed me still,  
 Whatso may change—shall I heal thee for this,  
 That thou may’st die more mad for her last kiss ? . . .  
 . . . Trembling he stretched out his hand to her,  
 Although self-loathing and strange hate did tear  
 His heart that Death made cold e’en as he said,  
 ‘ Whatso thou wilt shall be remembered ;  
 Whatso thou wilt, O love, shall be forgot,—  
 It may be I shall love thee as of old ! ’  
 As thunder laughs she laughed—‘ Nay touch me not !  
 Touch me not, fool ! ’ she cried, ‘ Thou grow’st a-cold,  
 And I am Death, Death, Death !—the tale is told  
 Of all thy days ! of all those joyous days  
 When thinking nought of me thou garneredst praise. . .  
 Nay, speak not ; think not of me ! think of her  
 Who made me this ; and back unto her wend,  
 Lest her lot, too, should be yet heavier !  
 I will depart for fear thou diest here,  
 Lest I should see thy woeful ghost forlorn  
 Here wandering ever ’twixt the night and morn.  
 —O heart grown wise, wilt thou not let me go ?  
 Will ye be never satisfied, O eyes,  
 With gazing on my misery and my woe ?  
 O foolish, quivering heart, now grown so wise,  
 What folly is it that from out thee cries  
 To be all close to him once more, once more  
 Ere yet the dark stream cleaveth shore from shore.’ . . .  
 A little while she stood, and spake no word,  
 But hung above him, with white heaving breast,  
 And moaning still, as moans the grey-winged bird  
 In autumn-tide o’er his forgotten nest ;  
 And then her hands about her throat she pressed,

As though to keep a cry back, then stooped down  
 And set her face to his, while spake her moan ;  
 ' O love, O cherished more than I can tell,  
 Through years of woe, O love, my life and bane,  
 My joy and grief, farewell, farewell, farewell !  
 Forgetfulness of grief I yet may gain ;  
 In some wise may come ending to my pain ;  
 It may be yet the gods will have me glad !  
 Yet, love, I would that thee and pain I had.  
 Alas, it may not be, it may not be. . . . .  
 Yet would, O love, with thee I might abide.  
 Now, now that restful death is drawing nigh—  
 Farewell, farewell, how good it is to die ! ”

These artistic merits are undoubtedly balanced by corresponding defects, which it is to be hoped Mr. Morris will hereafter see reason to remedy. The one most easily remediable is his diffuseness of style. This was perceptible in “Jason,” but the habit has since grown upon him, and in a work of greater length is proportionately worse. In such a description as the following it is exaggerated to the verge of tautology :—

“ A seemly man and fair,  
 No more a youth, but bearing not the load  
 Of many years ; he might have seen the wear  
 Of thirty summers.”

Elsewhere it takes the form of irrelevant suggestion, and answers to what in painting would be called scattering of light. A pretty comparison of the mingled voices of an applauding audience to the noisy twittering of a bird's nest at dawn is thus spoilt by the introduction of a superfluous idea :—

“ And with a sweet sound was the hall fulfilled,  
 E'en like the noise that from the thin woods' side  
 Swims through the dawning day at April-tide,  
 Across the speckled eggs, when from the brown  
 Soft feathers glittering eyes are looking down  
 Over the dewy meads, *too fresh and fair,*  
*For aught but lovely feet to wander there.* ”

It is probably owing to deficient concentration that Mr. Morris, usually so lucid, now and then becomes obscure ; unlike most poets, who generally err in this respect from excess of terseness. His facility of expression is so great, and his fancy so active in suggestion, that he strays at times into a maze of thought where the thread is lost. It is not worth while to give instances, but they will be readily found.

Other faults equally remediable are his habitual inaccuracy of accentuation, an occasional tendency to overload his epithets, as in the line,—

“ But the sad, dying, autumn field flowers fair,”

and to exaggerate what has before been noted as a Chaucerian



reminiscence, the repetition of favourite idioms, such as "twixt kiss and kiss," "this and that," &c.; a mannerism agreeable enough in a new writer, but apt to grow tiresome when it becomes inveterate.

The only other defect we shall notice constitutes an essential difference between him and his master, Chaucer, the conspicuous absence of humour. If congenital, we need not waste words in deploring it, but if, like Mr. Matthew Arnold, Mr. Morris possesses the gift and designedly withholds the exhibition of it, the error of judgment seems to us lamentable. Oppressed by the poet's overshadowing gloom, and never suffered by the most cheerful of his narrators to transcend the bounds of a gentle satisfaction, how greatly would the reader be relieved to hear once and again the genial voice and jolly laugh of "Oure Hoste," or "The Nonnes Preste!" It is strange enough that a disciple so observant of his master's least peculiarities (such, *e.g.*, as the preference for grey-eyed heroines) should neglect to follow his lead in a matter of capital importance.

Notwithstanding all its faults of commission and omission, however, "The Earthly Paradise" is a work of which our generation may well be proud. Whatever else may be thought of its drift, it is dignified by seriousness of purpose; amid copious variety it preserves a unity of structure, and bears throughout the honourable stamp of artistic craftsmanship.

"Love is Enough," Mr. Morris's latest poem, will not rank, we think, among his highest efforts. The adaptation to modern taste of a mediæval "Morality" has been an experiment of which the result does not tempt us to desire a repetition. The dramatic form lacks its *raison d'être* when there is no action to support, and an abstract personage such as Love is apt to talk too metaphysically to be readily intelligible to a concrete audience. The sing-song monotony of the dactylic measure, and the cloying alliteration of the language combine to produce an effect of weakness which is increased rather than diminished by the prevailing tone of the poem. The motive is similar to that of Shelley's "Alastor," and elaborates an idea which runs through several tales in "The Earthly Paradise." Pharamond, the hero, is indeed represented to us as having been in former years a pattern-king, undaunted in adversity, unspoilt by prosperity,—a gallant soldier in the field, a wise judge on the throne. But we only see him as the slave of phantasy, haunted by dreams of an ideal love which benumb his energies and destroy his peace. Faint with the sickness of hope deferred, he deserts his people without explanation or misgiving, and attended by one faithful follower, wanders over land and sea, enduring grievous perils, until he realizes in a lowly maiden the fair enchantress of his visions. He returns home to find his throne occupied and his people's affections estranged. After some unreasonable surprise at their ingratitude, and a few cynical reflections upon the usurper, he abdicates without a pang, and

cheerfully retires to love and obscurity. A hero of this calibre may excite sympathy, but scarcely admiration. Azalais, his love, is a dimly-defined conception. She appears but once, to fall instantly in love with the sleeping stranger, and accept without scruple or inquiry the recognition with which he greets her on waking. The only natural character in the "Morality" is the henchman Oliver, whose unquestioning devotion to his master is truthfully, if not very originally, portrayed. "Love," who between each scene appears before the curtain in an emblematic disguise, and whose ministers are supposed to chaunt the lyrical interludes that follow, partakes too much of that emasculated, sickly type with which Mr. Simeon Solomon's designs have made us familiar, to inspire reverence. The vein of symbolic sentiment which pervades the lyrics is presented at its best in the following stanza :—

"Love is enough : ho, ye who seek saving,  
Go no further ; come hither, there have been who have found it,  
And these know the House of Fulfilment of Craving,  
These know the Cup with the roses around it ;  
These know the World's Wound, and the balm that hath bound it ;  
Cry out, the World heedeth not, ' Love, lead us home ! ' "

Though the mode of its presentment is open to these objections, the drift of the *Morality* is quite unexceptionable. That Love is the law of life, the only worthy end of existence, a certain solace for this world, and even, as one passage seems to hint, a ground of hope for another, we are left in no doubt is the poet's genuine conviction. The universality of love's dominion is gracefully typified by exhibiting its influence over three couples of unequal rank, a newly wedded Emperor and Empress, in whose honour the *Morality* is played, the actor and actress who fill the leading parts, and a rustic pair, selected from the throng of spectators. The simple, tender converse of the latter is full of charm, and one of the few finished pictures of the poem is the description which the young wife gives of the peaceful home, to which after the play is over she is longing to return :—

"E'en now meseems the cows are come  
Unto the grey gates of our home,  
And low to hear the milking-pail ;  
The peacock spreads abroad his tail.  
Against the sun, as down the lane  
The milkmaids pass the moveless wain,  
And stable door where the roan team  
An hour ago began to dream  
Over the dusty oats."

Nothing that Mr. Morris writes is lacking in grace, and here and there will be found an exquisitely musical line, such as

"Till her hallowed eyes drew me a space into heaven,"

which makes amends for many a harsh one; and a vignette such as this,

“Lo ! here comes the sun o’er the tops of the mountains,  
And she with his light in her hair comes before him,  
As solemn and fair as the dawn of the May-tide  
On some isle of mid-ocean when all winds are sleeping ;”


which redeems many pages of monotonous sentiment. The weakness and strength of the poem, in brief, are well summed up in the closing words with which “Love” preludes the entrance of the human actors :—

“Rather caught up at hazard is the pipe,  
That mixed with scent of roses over-ripe,  
And murmur of the summer afternoon,  
May charm you somewhat with its wavering tune  
’Twixt joy and sadness : whatsoe’er it saith,  
I know at least there breathes through it my breath.”

Mr. Morris, we may hope, has a long career before him. Though he cannot take rank as an original force, he has shown a capacity of growth as an artist which entitles his generation to form larger expectations of him. One expectation his latest poem gives us reason to think he may ere long fulfil, by attaining to something like spiritual confidence. Return to his early stand-point of unconscious serenity is plainly impossible, but, like the poet whose mental progress we recently endeavoured to delineate,\* he may, by the very agency of self-consciousness, rough-hew a path from scepticism to conviction which, though falling far short of orthodoxy, may possess all the security of faith.

● HENRY G. HEWLETT.

\* CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, Sept., 1874.



MAN TRANS-CORPOREAL,  
THE SUBSTANCE RATHER THAN THE SHADOW OF THE  
MERE MATERIAL MAN.

*"It is no part of my philosophy to turn away from  
serious thoughts when they lie before me."*

SOUTHEY : *The Doctor*

IS man what he seems to be at first sight, body and little if anything else, or is he more, much more, than this? Has he to be regarded from an Aristotelian or from a Platonic point of view? In the present matter-of-fact days, when Aristotelianism is so much in the ascendant, little heed, I fear, is likely to be paid to Plato, and less still to S. Paul and others whose claim to reverent attention is even greater than that of Plato; and it grieves me that it should be so, for, in truth, it is *not* with those who are content to look at man through the eyes of Aristotle that I find myself in company.

To Aristotle the things of sense are in every way real. Any such thing, his own body for instance, he regards as a compound made up of *ύλη*, matter, and *εἶδος*, *form*, the latter being the true substance, the constituent element, the formative principle, the energy by which the thing is produced and constituted and actualized. With the exception of mind, *vous*, which is regarded as a

\* "Every man is born an Aristotelian or a Platonist." So wrote Samuel Taylor Coleridge, and so also wrote Frederick von Schlegel, the one, it may be, repeating unwittingly the remark of the other. Moreover, Mr. Erskine, of Linlathen, said something to the same effect in a conversation I had with him not long before his death—a conversation to which I shall always look back with satisfaction as a memorable passage in my own life.

manifestation of pure εἶδος peculiar to man, all the varied phases of life belonging to man in common with plants and animals are held to have, in great part at least, a material basis, to be bodily functions. Let the body of man die, and all the life belonging to it dies also, except mind, νους, which is supposed to join the body sometime before birth, and to take leave of the body at death, and which, as pure εἶδος, is indestructible. Aristotle, however, does not concern himself so much with the life belonging to pure εἶδος, whether manifested in human mind, or in the First Cause, as with the life which has to do with the body made up partly of ψαη and partly of εἶδος—with that life, in short, of which, as being more or less connected with ψαη, it is right to say that, in part at least, it has a material basis. He supposes the First Cause to be purest εἶδος, and therefore life in a pre-eminent sense; but he shuts out man from this source of life by making the First Cause, for all practical purposes, extra-mundane: and he is content to trace the life of man to the joint workings of the human mind and body. Nay, it is scarcely unfair to say that he is more content to refer this life to the ψαη entering into the constitution of the body than to the εἶδος, and that he now and then seems to confound these two elements, by speaking of ψαη as if it were all but actually εἶδος, and of εἶδος as if it might be so far materialized as to come within the reach of the senses. In a word, man, from an Aristotelian point of view, is to be regarded as a being with whom the First Cause has nothing to do, and who owes obedience only to the laws of nature—a being who at most is not much more than mere body, and whose body is of the earth earthy, in that it may be the product of a law of development by which inorganic matter has been gradually made to shape itself, through various lower forms of being, perhaps even through woman, into man.

The views of Plato are in every way opposed to these. Aristotle regards the things of sense as being really what they seem to be: Plato, on the other hand, considers them as mere phantoms, except in so far as they derive reality from things transcending sense, to which he gives the name of ἰδέαι, *ideas*, the things of sense being, in fact, only copies or adumbrations of these ideas—a view according to which the world of appearances, the material world, holds from the ideal world that shines through it “its entire existence in fee.” Everywhere, moreover, Plato is bent on recognizing a principle of unity in multiety and of multiety in unity, by which all things are bound together so as to be really and actually one, not only with each other, but also with a Divine Being who is at once the true centre of unity and the only source of being—who is also not merely that which is divine, but divinity personified, not merely τὸ θεῖον, but ὁ θεός. “When,” says Maurice, “we use personal language to describe the God of whom Plato speaks, we feel that we are using that

which suits best with his feelings and principles, even though, through reverence or ignorance, he forbears to use it himself. When we use personal language to describe the deity of Aristotle, we feel that it is improper and unsuitable, even if, through deference to ordinary natures, or the difficulty of inventing any other, he resorts to it himself. Theology can have no connexion with the system of Aristotle." On the other hand, Platonism has its very basis in theology. Indeed, Plato may be described as a devout transcendentalist who could very well believe that the gods might appear among men as men, and again disappear, and that men, without any miracle, might undergo corresponding changes, because he believed in the material world as something which was capable of being idealized or spiritualized so as to be rapt away from the senses, and in the ideal and spiritual world as something not unsusceptible of that material change by which it could come within the reach of the senses. Without being inconsistent with his principles as a philosopher, Plato could not be other than religious in one way or another. In all sincerity, he may have fulfilled the last wish of Socrates by offering in person a cock to Aisklepios. But not so Aristotle, who actually would have been put to death for atheism, if he had not escaped from Athens to Chalcis, and remained there ever after, even until his death in 322 B.C. At all events, believing as he did in the subordination of the material body to the ideal body—of the *εἶδωλον* to the *ἰδέα*, and in the doctrine of unity, Plato could not by any possibility refer life in any of its many aspects to a material basis, or believe that man was less than a being whose nature, in very deed, was congenerous with that of the Divine Being.

Nor is a different lesson to be found in the pages which contain what are for me sacred utterances. For what is this? It is that God is all in all, and that man is the "image of God." In God "we live, and move, and have our being." "By Him all things consist." The idea of unity is thus, without confusion, associated with that of diversity, and the idea of diversity with that of unity; the association holding good, even as regards divinity itself. Enough is said, moreover, to make it necessary to believe that there is in man that which is beyond the reach of the senses, a man trans-corporeal, as well as a man corporeal, a body celestial and immortal as well as a body terrestrial and mortal, the one in every way real, the other only apparent, the one "an house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens," and "present with the Lord"; the other an earthy tabernacle, burdensome in every sense, *naked*, and "absent from the Lord," the body terrestrial being something which is to be, not put off, as by a process of un-clothing, but *clothed-upon*, mortality being swallowed up in life, death in victory. "For we know that if our earthly house of this tabernacle be dissolved, we have a building of God, an house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. For in this we groan, earnestly desiring to be *clothed-upon* with our

house which is from heaven, τὸ οἰκητήριον ἡμῶν τὸ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ ἐπε-  
 δύσασθαι ἐπιποθοῦντες: if so be that being clothed we shall not be  
 found naked, εἰ γε καὶ ἐνδυσάμενοι, οὐ γυμνοὶ εὗρεθῇσόμεθα. For we  
 that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened: not for that we  
 would be *un clothed*, but *clothed-upon*, that mortality might be swal-  
 lowed up of life, ἐπειδὴ οὐ θέλομεν ἐκδύσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπενδύσασθαι, ἵνα  
 καταποθῇ τὸ θνητὸν ὑπὸ τῆς ζωῆς. . . . Therefore we are always  
 confident, knowing that whilst we are at home in the body we are  
 absent from the Lord (for we walk by faith, and not by sight): we  
 are confident, I say, and willing rather to be absent from the body,  
 and to be present with the Lord."

What then? Is there a way out of these difficulties which may be  
 made in some measure passable? No, I say to those who require a  
 road along every stage of which they may ride or drive luxuriously,  
 and no, more emphatically still, to those who want the speed  
 and ease of a railway for their journeying: yes, I say to all who are  
 content with a foot-path, always ill-made and often not made at all,  
 and who have pleasure in the active use of their limbs. And what I  
 have now to do is to try and make good this latter statement as best  
 I may in the space at my disposal.

In setting about this task I shall occupy myself chiefly with the  
 consideration of matters relating to *mind*; but I have also some-  
 thing to say about *body*, of which a part may perhaps be said with  
 advantage before proceeding further.

In attempting to analyze the phenomena of body, it is difficult  
 to keep in the background the phenomena which are supposed to  
 belong more exclusively to mind. There is in them evidently more than  
 what is seen. The visible body is certainly transitory. The matter  
 of which it is made is in a state of endless flux. Matter is continually  
 passing from the inorganic world into the organic, and from the  
 organic back again into the inorganic. No creature is for long built  
 up of the same material, and, in fact, the same material serves  
 successively for the building up of countless creatures. And yet  
 underlying this ceaseless flux is something abiding, archetypal,  
 spiritual,—something by which these ever-floating atoms are for the  
 time compelled to take upon themselves the bodily form in which  
 they are manifested to the senses,—something which holds the same  
 relation to the ordinary body as that which is held by the Platonic *ἰδέα*  
 to the Platonic *εἶδωλον*, or by the body celestial to the body terrestrial.  
 Without such something the ordinary body is simply nothing. Ordinary  
 body, in short, must hold its very existence in fee from spirit, and  
 there is no escape from this conclusion. Moreover, the traces of  
 archetypal unity which are everywhere perceptible in the organic  
 world may be looked upon as supplying evidence to the same effect;  
 for may not these show that the bodies of different living creatures  
 are not things apart, as they would seem to be at first sight, but

parts of a connected whole which has its real foundation in the unity of the Divine Being? In a word, it is impossible to rest satisfied with the conclusion that the body of which the senses take cognizance is all in all; and, the more the matter is looked into in this way, the more it becomes evident that this body is no more than the copy or adumbration of the real body. Indeed it is not impossible that the body terrestrial may undergo a change like that of which Fra Angelico and Raphael had a vision when they were inspired to paint the transfiguration of Christ in the immortal works which are yet to be seen in scarcely diminished lustre, the one in fresco on the cell-wall of the convent of S. Marco at Florence, the other on the canvas now in the Vatican,—or like that which was exemplified more or less fully in Moses when he had to veil his countenance, or in Elijah at the moment of his translation, or in Ananias, Azarias, and Misael in the midst of the fiery furnace, or in the disciples at the day of Pentecost (when, perhaps, it was not upon the heads merely that the tongues of fire rested), or in Stephen, when his countenance shone like that of an angel, or in the evangelist Philip, when he was caught away from the side of the eunuch and found again at Azotus—a change which is evidently akin to that which passed over the body of Christ, not only at the transfiguration, but also when He walked upon the sea of Galilee, or vanished from the angry crowd at Nazareth, or went about, now visible, now invisible, after the resurrection,—a body which might be realized in flesh at one moment and rapt away from the senses at the next, and which has the same relation to the body terrestrial that the body celestial may be supposed to have. And to my mind it is more easy to entertain this belief than to reject it.

Passing on to the consideration of mental phenomena, it is difficult to proceed far without perceiving that every path of inquiry leads in the same direction as that which has just been indicated when speaking of the phenomena belonging to body, and that the only perplexity lies in the choice of the path along which it may be wise to plod in the first instance. Whether the path chosen be this or that, whether it lie through the memory, or the imagination, or the intellect, or the will, or the sympathies, or the religious instincts, or the conviction of personal identity which asserts itself as *ego*, it invariably leads away from body to spirit, and from spirit to the conception of unity in the Divine Being; and what I would now do is to try and in some measure make good this statement by wandering along each of these paths in turn, without any more settled plan than that which arises out of the order in which I have chanced to name it.

As I reflect upon the phenomena of *memory*, I find myself less and less disposed to regard them as having their foundation in mere brain—as being solely due to cerebration.



Coleridge, in his "*Biographia Literaria*," relates the case of a girl in which is to be found a very cogent proof that there is something *imperishable* in memory. "This case," he writes, "occurred in a Catholic town in Germany a year or two before my arrival in Göttingen, and had not then ceased to be a frequent subject of conversation. A young woman of four or five and twenty, who could neither read nor write, was seized with a nervous fever, during which, according to the asseverations of all the priests and monks of the neighbourhood, she became possessed with a very learned devil. She continued incessantly talking Latin, Greek, and Hebrew, in very pompous tones, and with most distinct enunciation. This possession was rendered more probable by the known fact that she was a heretic. Voltaire humorously advises the devil to decline all acquaintance with medical men, and it would have been more to his reputation if he had taken this advice in the present instance. The case had attracted the particular attention of a young physician, and by his statements many eminent physiologists and psychologists visited the town and made cross-examination on the spot. Sheets full of her ravings were taken down from her mouth, and were found to consist of sentences coherent and intelligible each for itself, but with little or no connection with each other. Of these a small portion only could be traced to the Bible; the remainder seemed to be in the Rabbinical dialect. All trick or conspiracy was out of the question. Not only had this young woman ever been a harmless, simple creature, but she was labouring under a nervous fever. In the town in which she had been resident for many years as a servant in different families, no solution presented itself. The young physician, however, determined to trace her past life step by step, for the patient herself was incapable of returning a rational answer. He at length discovered the place where her parents had lived, travelled thither, found them dead, but an uncle surviving, and from him learnt that the patient had been charitably taken by an old Protestant pastor at nine years old, and had remained with him for some years, even until the old man's death. Of this pastor the uncle knew nothing but that he was a very good man. With great difficulty, and after much trouble, our young medical philosopher discovered a niece of the pastor's, who had lived with him as a housekeeper, and had inherited his effects. She remembered the girl; related that her venerable uncle had been much too indulgent, and could not bear to hear her scolded; that she was willing to have kept her, but that after her patron's death the girl herself refused to stay. Anxious inquiries were then, of course, made concerning the pastor's habits, and the solution of the problem was soon obtained; for it appeared that it had been the old man's custom for years to walk up and down a passage in his house into which the kitchen door opened, and to read to himself with a loud voice out of his favourite books. A considerable number of these were still in the

niece's possession. She added that he was a very learned man, and a great Hebraist. Among the books were found a collection of Rabbinical writings, together with several of the Greek and Latin fathers; and the physician succeeded in identifying so many passages with those taken down at the young woman's bedside, that no doubt could remain in any rational mind concerning the true origin of the impressions made upon her nervous system."

"This authenticated case," continues Coleridge, "furnishes both proof and instance that reliques of sensation may exist for an indefinite time in a latent state, in the very same order in which they were originally impressed, and contributes to make it even probable that all thoughts are in themselves imperishable; and that if the intellectual faculty should be rendered more comprehensive, it will require only a sufficient and apportioned organization—the body *celestial*, instead of the body *terrestrial*—to bring before every human soul the collective experience of its whole past existence. And this—this, perchance, is the dread book of judgment in whose mysterious hieroglyphics every idle word is recorded! Yea, in the very nature of a living spirit, it may be more probable for heaven and earth to pass away than that a single act—a single thought—shall be loosened or lost from that living chain of causes, to all whose links, conscious or unconscious, the free-will, our only absolute *self*, is co-extensive and co-present."

As bearing directly upon these remarks, De Quincey also writes:—"I was once told by a near relative of mine (a woman of masculine understanding and unimpeachable veracity) that, having in her childhood fallen into a river, and being on the very verge of death but for the assistance which reached her at the last critical moment, she then saw her whole past life, clothed in its forgotten incidents, arrayed before her as in a mirror, not successively, but simultaneously; and that she had at the same time a faculty developed as suddenly for comprehending the whole and every part. This, from some opium experiences, I can believe. . . . And of this I feel assured, that there is no such thing as ultimate *forgetting*; traces once impressed upon the memory are indestructible. A thousand accidents may, and will, interpose a veil between our present consciousness and the secret inscriptions in the mind. Accidents of the same sort will also rend away this veil. But alike, whether veiled or unveiled, the inscriptions remain for ever; just as the stars seem to withdraw before the common light of day, whereas, in fact, we all know that it is the light which is drawn over them as a veil, and that they are waiting to be revealed whenever the obscuring daylight itself shall have been withdrawn."

To the same effect, also, is the story told in a letter to the celebrated Dr. Wollaston by the late hydrographer to the navy, Admiral Beaufort, of his own experience in drowning—a letter which has,

I believe, found its way into print before, but which I transcribe, as far as is necessary to my present purpose, from a manuscript copy in the possession of my friend Sir Thomas Watson, who, in fact, called my attention to it.

"Many years ago," writes the Admiral, "when a youngster of the 'Aquilon' frigate, after sculling a boat about Portsmouth harbour, I was endeavouring to make her fast alongside the ship, but, the tide being strong, and the boat sheering off, I foolishly stepped on the gunwale in order to reach the ring of one of the scuttles. The boat of course upset, I tumbled into the water, and, not knowing how to swim, all my efforts to lay hold either of the boat or of the floating sculls were fruitless. The transaction had not been observed by the sentinel on the gangway, and it was not until the tide had carried me some distance from the ship, that a man on the fore-top saw the splashing in the water and gave the alarm. The first lieutenant (the present Rear-Admiral Oliver) instantly jumped overboard, the carpenter followed his example, and the gunner hastened into a boat and pulled after us. With the violent attempts to make myself heard I had swallowed a good deal of water, my struggles to keep myself afloat had exhausted me, and before any of my gallant preservers overtook me I had sunk below the surface. All exertions having ceased, all hope having fled, I *felt* that I was drowning.

"So far the facts were either partially remembered, or else supplied to me by those who had witnessed the scene, for during an interval of such agitation, the mind is too much absorbed by alternate hope and despair to mark the succession of ordinary events very accurately: not so, however, as regards the circumstances which immediately followed. From the moment exertion had ceased, which I imagine was immediately consequent upon complete suffocation, a feeling of the most perfect tranquillity superseded the previous tumultuous sensations. It might be called apathy. It was certainly not resignation; for dying no longer appeared to be an evil, and all thought of rescue was at an end. Nor was I in any bodily pain. On the contrary, my feelings were rather of a pleasurable cast, comparable, perhaps, to those of that dull, but satisfactory, state which precedes the sleep produced by fatigue. Though the senses were thus deadened, the activity of the mind seemed invigorated and excited in a ratio which defies expression, and thought succeeded thought with a rapidity which is not only indescribable, but probably inconceivable, by any one who has not himself been in a similar situation.

"The course of these thoughts I can now in a great measure retrace. The event that had just taken place, the awkwardness that had produced it, the bustle it had caused on board (for I had observed the two persons leap out of the chains), the effect it would have on my most affectionate father, the manner in which he would disclose

it to the rest of the family, and a thousand other circumstances associated with home—these were the first ideas which occupied me. But my thoughts now took a wider range; and the events of the last cruise, a preceding voyage, a former shipwreck, the school where I had been educated, my boyish adventures and earliest exploits, every past incident in my life, glanced across my mind in retrograde succession, not in mere outline, as here stated, but with the picture filled up with every collateral detail. In short, my whole life seemed placed before me in a sort of panoramic review, and each act of it was accompanied by a consciousness of right and wrong, or by a reflection on its causes and its consequences; indeed, many trifling affairs which had long been forgotten then crowded into my mind with a sort of recent familiarity.

"It is remarkable that the innumerable ideas which thus crowded into my mind—with one exception at the outset about the feelings of my family—were all retrospective. Yet I had been religiously brought up; my hopes or fears of the next world had lost nothing of their early strength, and at any other period the most intense interest, or the most awful anticipation, would have been excited by the mere probability that I was standing on the threshold of eternity. Yet in that inexplicable moment, when I had a full conviction that I had crossed the threshold, not a single thought wandered into the future. I was wrapped entirely in the past. . . .

"Whilst life was returning my feelings were painfully the reverse of those which immediately preceded the loss of consciousness. A single, miserable, confused belief that I was still drowning dwelt upon my mind—a hopeless and doubting anxiety, a kind of horrid nightmare, pressed heavily on every faculty and prevented the formation of a single distinct thought, and it was with extreme difficulty that I could at length convince myself that I was really alive. Again: instead of being free from bodily suffering, I was tortured by dull, but deep pains; and though I have since been seriously wounded in all parts of my body, and subjected to severe surgical discipline, I consider my suffering to have been far greater at that time, if not in intensity, at least in general distress."

With such experience, it is no wonder that, in the course of this letter, Admiral Beaufort should put the question: "May we not infer that in the 'prolonged instant' in which the past was so marvellously opened out there is no faint indication of the almost infinite power of memory with which we are to awaken hereafter, and thus be enabled, or compelled, to contemplate our past life? Or, might it not almost warrant the startling idea that death is only a change or modification in our existence, in which there is no real pause or interruption?"

In a note accompanying the copy of this letter, Sir Thomas Watson writes: "Many years ago a Mr. Impey, whom I met at

dinner, told me that James Boswell (son of Dr. Johnson's Jemmy Boswell), who was a contemporary of his at Brazenose, Oxford, and was once nearly drowned, had afterwards declared to him (Impey) that he then felt a drowsy, sleepy, undulating sensation, and that in a very short space of time the minutest circumstances of all his former life appeared before his mind in rapid succession. The present Lord Romilly, and his deceased brother Edward, also knew of similar cases; the former of a gentleman rendered insensible by immersion in the Lake of Geneva; the latter of an acquaintance of his, a Mr. Ashmore(?), who was near being drowned in this country."

And thus, at the very onset of the inquiry, there appears to be a necessity to believe that there is something *imperishable* in memory which is inexplicable on the supposition that this mental faculty is a mere function of any perishable organ like brain—something which almost appears to necessitate the conclusion that the mind, of which memory is a faculty, has its foundation deep down in *spirit*, of which *imperishability* may be an attribute, perhaps in Divine Spirit.

Moreover, it is no easy matter to rest content with the notion that all the records of the memory are written down in the brain. The knowledge of identity, by which an object once seen is recognized as having been seen, would seem to be a sufficient reason for believing that this object retains in itself some mark by which it can be recognized. Without such mark any knowledge of identity, any act of recognition, must, as it would seem, be mixed with a doubt whether the eye and mind are not, after all, dealing with a new and different object. To me, indeed, the knowledge of identity, which is involved in the act of recognition, is in itself, and by itself, a conclusive proof that the records of memory are not all kept in the ganglionic brain-cells—that some of them are to be found elsewhere; nay, it even suggests the idea that these latter may be the originals of which the former are only copies at most—copies, too, which may perhaps be dispensed with. For, after all, if mind be a spirit, what is *within* and what is *without* in relation to it? If, in the petition "Thy kingdom come," I must remember, "Neither shall they say, lo, here! or, lo, there!—for, behold, the kingdom of God is *within* you;" it surely follows that my being is not less comprehensive as regards the present world. I cannot explain the conceptions of within and without, of here and there, of locality generally; but I can see that they may have to do with a present imperfect state of being. Nay, even now, I perceive dimly that in forming these conceptions I cannot altogether exclude their opposites, and that I have something to do with a state in which there is neither within nor without, neither here nor there, in which I am in very deed in some mysterious way superior to space. Even now, indeed, I can dimly perceive that

there is something in me which is not content to be cooped up in "the clay cottage in which I am tenant for life"—that I have a *spirit* of which *ubiquitousness* is an attribute—a spirit which is, in this respect, akin to the Divine Spirit. And thus, instead of there being any need that the records of memory should be copied in certain ganglionic brain-cells, all that is wanted is this—that they should remain wherever they were written down originally, no matter where; for, by virtue of its faculty of ubiquitousness, it is as easy for the mind to find them in one place as in another. Nay, it must be more easy for the mind to find the originals than the copies. In sober truth the brain is, in the main, made up, not only of water, but of water in an ever-flowing stream, and it is almost idle to suppose it possible that the memory can keep her indelible records in it. Upon such a damp tablet any writing must be, at best, but faintly legible among the blurs and blots. Or, rather, the only idea attaching to such writing is that of utter illegibility, even that idea which was in the mind of the poet, who had inscribed on his tomb in the cemetery overshadowed by the pyramid of Caius Cestius at Rome, the words, "whose name was writ in water." Moreover, to suppose that the records of memory are inscribed in these ganglionic brain-cells, is to attribute to the very simplest and crudest of organic forms, the cell, the most exalted of functions—to make a demand upon credulity almost as great as that which is required to see, potentially, man himself, body and mind, in a marine ascidian, which creature is, substantially, little more than a huge simple cell. No doubt these ganglionic brain-cells have some all-important function to fulfil in relation to memory and every other mental faculty; but it does not follow that this function is that which it is assumed to be. \* It may be, indeed, that they have to help in keeping up that electrical state of the brain, and of the nervous system generally, without which the manifestation of mental action by bodily action would be impossible—that the brain and the rest of the nervous system is a wonderful telegraphic apparatus, by which the mind communicates with its own body, and with other bodies. It may even be that this apparatus is so set that certain parts of the grey matter of the convolutions have to do specially with particular movements, one part concerning itself with speaking, another with handling, and so on. Or it may be that they have some other function which has yet to be discovered. But, do what I will, I cannot bring myself to suppose that it is a function of the grey matter of the cerebral convolutions to serve as a record-office for memory, and that the act of remembering is really carried on *within* a ganglionic corpuscle: and, in fact, the more I reflect upon this matter the more the conviction is forced upon me—that memory has its records, not in the brain simply, but anywhere and every-

where, wherever the mind has chanced to roam,—that the mind never leaves the place where these records are written,—and that it is by the mind being awake in these places, and by the places reacting upon the mind, as in the first instance, that the memory acts. Nor is it more easy to associate the idea of time with the workings of memory. What the eye has once seen the mind sees ever; what has once caught the ear the mind never ceases to listen to; and so also with every other impression upon the memory. What is remembered has in it something which is in reality as superior to time as it is to space—something which has to do with imperishable and ubiquitous spirit rather than with time-bound and space-bound body; and so far from thinking that memory can have its seat in the body, it seems more rational to suppose that this body can only be a clog to the free movement of memory, and that all that is wanted to allow of this free movement is the removal of this clog. At all events, the fact that a thing outside the body, once seen, is recognized as having been seen, is to me a reason for believing that the memory relating to it is, in part at least, lodged in it; and thus it is that I am left free to conclude that the mind, of which memory is a faculty, may range beyond body as a spirit may be supposed to range—that the mind, indeed, may be a spirit akin to the Divine Spirit, in having absolute superiority to time and space among its attributes.

This view of mind, as gathered from the history of memory, would also seem to derive no small degree of support from the light it throws upon more than one recondite mental phenomenon.

If mind be spirit, and if memory testify to the *immanence* of this spirit in the things remembered, wherever these may be, no matter whether without or within, then once to know anything is always to know it, and the act of *recognition* ceases to be separable from the act of *cognition*. Upon this view a thing once apprehended by the mind from that time forth becomes part and parcel of the being of him who apprehends it, and it must be recognized, if again brought under notice in any way, without any question being raised as to its identity. Once held it is never let go; and by ever holding it the mind is satisfied as to its identity.

Again: the view here taken of memory is not a little supported by the light it sheds upon the association of ideas. For if the mind remain where it roams, never vacating ground once occupied, does it not follow that the subjects or objects appropriated must ever remain in that particular relation to each other which they occupied in the first instance, so that for the memory to go back along any one chain of thought to any one link in that chain is of necessity to bring to the mind's eye the overlappings of the adjoining links?

Again: in this view of memory there is what would seem to be a

sort of explanation of the strange backward way in which memory fails as old age advances, or under the ravages of certain brain diseases. In this failure recent events are forgotten first, then those which are less and less recent in turn, until at last all that is remembered has to do only with early life. Some years ago, for example, I saw a French lady whose case supplies a memorable instance of the way in which these results are brought about by disease, the case being one of relapsing mania, with epileptiform symptoms, rapidly passing into dementia. Until she reached her sixteenth year this lady lived in France, and spoke only French; after this time she came to live in England, and began to speak English. When about twenty she married an American, and from this time, for about twenty years, she lived sometimes in America, sometimes in England, speaking English habitually, and French scarcely ever. When I saw her first, her mind was feeble, and that was all; when, after an interval of about two years, I saw her last, she had forgotten everything connected with her married life, her English not excepted; and if asked who she was, and where she was, she gave her maiden name, and mentioned the street where she had lived in Paris when a girl. So completely had she forgotten her English, and gone back to her French at this time, that it had become necessary to change an English for a French maid. What happened in this case, and happens to a greater or less extent in all cases of the kind, as well as in old age, is the very reverse of what might be expected to happen. It might be expected that the memory of early events would be the first to fade, and that of recent events the last; but in reality this is no necessary inference from the facts. If mind be spirit, indeed, it is possible that it may, as it were, go on widening through a series of concentric circles until it reaches its maturity, and that, so long as it retains its full vigour, it may keep hold upon all the memories in each of these circles, inner and outer; and that afterwards, when a contrary movement to that of development is taking place, the mind may fall asleep, as it were, in circle after circle, until at last it only remains awake in the innermost circles of all; for if it be so it will follow that the memories of recent events, which are in the outer circles, will be the first to fade, and those of early events, which are in the inner circles, the last. That would happen, in fact, which is really found to happen, so that what seemed to be exceptional at first may after all prove to be exactly in order when the law of mind is better known.

And thus memory may show, and that too in no equivocal manner, that the mind of which it is a manifestation is something more than a function of certain brain-cells, something more than a mere mode of cerebration, by showing that mind can have no less substantial a foundation than that which can only be supplied by spirit which is at once imperishable and ubiquitous in its essence.



Nor is a different conclusion to be drawn from the stories told of mind by other mental faculties.

The *imagination* is a faculty about which it is difficult to think at all without becoming bewildered. It intermeddles with all things, past, present, and to come, spurning the bounds of time and space with divine audacity. It creates for itself its own past, present, and future, and influences in a thousand ways for good or ill, not only him who imagines, but others also. In no mere figurative sense it lives and works in a world of its own. Indeed, so real is this power that the most sober and unimaginative thinker, if he think at all, cannot choose but bow before it, and confess it to be, like memory, a manifestation of a spirit which is divine in being, not only superior to time and space, but *creative* in the true, if not in the full, sense of the word. As it seems to me, it is simply idle to speak of imagination as the result of cerebration, as being anything earth-born; for as I read it the story told by this mental power is the same as that told by memory, with additions that give it greater emphasis and wider scope.

Nor is this conclusion to be set aside by saying that the imagination has to do with a dreaming rather than with a waking state of mind. Dreaming? What is it? May it not be a partial escape from the world of appearances, the world of the senses, which is emphatically the world of the waking state? May it not be a glimpse of the wider *presence*, the *trans-ego* belonging to the spiritual world—a presence, a *trans-ego*, in which that which is partial is almost lost in that which is general. Or, rather, may it not show that man is *a part of* the universe in which he is placed, and not *apart from* it in the sense in which he appears to himself in the waking state, the revelation being not altogether unlike that by which the true relations of the earth to the universe are made evident at night, when "the withdrawal of the veil of light" allows the stars to be seen? May it not be that in sleep, as in death, the portal of a fuller life is opened, and that Jacob's dream of a "ladder reaching from earth to mysterious altitudes above the earth" is to show that the way to escape from the earth is in the dreaming rather than in the waking state? It was in a dream that Solomon prayed for wisdom, and became wise. Life is renewed in sleep: the incubus of the body is forgotten in sleep: and this forgetfulness, it may be, brings with it this renewal by letting the wearied sleeper—wearied because while waking he had only made use of a life which was self-contained, and, therefore, soon spent—fall into the ocean of cosmoal life, or rather into the life of Him, "in whom we live and move and have our being." And, if so, then there is nothing in dreams, nothing in sleep, to invalidate the conclusion respecting mind to which the history of the imagination, no less than that of the memory, would seem to point.

As in the memory so also in the imagination there would seem to

be something which is not to be hemmed in by bodily bounds, something which points to the man beyond the reach of the senses, the *man trans-corporeal*.

I once knew a bright little English girl about five and a half years of age who could speak English or French or German with equal readiness, but who was unable to choose the language in which she had to speak. If spoken to in English she answered in English, and so also for French or German. She had a nursery governess, a German, who spoke French and English as well as her native language, and she it was who directed my attention to the curious fact in question and gave me more than one opportunity of verifying it. Again and again I heard the child addressed in each of the three languages named, and pressed to reply in one or other of the remaining two, and invariably without success. If pressed beyond a certain point she would cry, and that was all. On the part of the child there was no unwillingness to obey, and no inability to obey in any other case. Indeed, what puzzled the nursery governess, and caused her to speak to me on the subject, was that the child should be, as it seemed to her, perfectly good and obedient except in this one matter. Nor was the result different when the conversation was carried on by others. More than once I myself tried to prevail, and all I could do by coaxing, and by bribing as well, I did, but I failed as completely as the nurse. Whether the result would have been different if the child had been spoken to by another child I do not know. There were no other children in the house, and no polyglot children within reach; and, honestly, it did not occur to me to try this experiment while there was the chance. Nor do I know whether the peculiarity in question passed off as age advanced. Indeed, all that I know more is that this child was never strong, and that she died about eleven from some head-affection, which was supposed to have been brought on by pressing her education injudiciously; and this, also, is all that I would say upon the subject now, except that I have heard of more than one case in which, as in it, the imagination of the child in speaking would seem to have been over-ridden by that of an adult speaker, or of other children—to be so over-ridden, in short, as to give no little confirmation to the notion that the child was not altogether shut in within the bounds of its visible body,—that there might be actual commingling of the *trans-ego* belonging to different persons so far as the imagination is concerned.

What holds good of imagination and memory would also seem to hold good of *will*. How is it that I am free to say *yes* or *no*, and to act accordingly, if there be not in me a spirit which is more or less akin to the Spirit which has omnipotence for one of its attributes? How, indeed! And surely it is more easy to entertain this explanation than to accept that which regards will as mere brain-power.

Lord Bacon has also said something (*Sylva Sylvarum*, Century X., 945 and 946) which may be quoted here as supplying a reason for believing that the sphere of the will is not limited to any one brain or body, but co-extensive with that of the memory and imagination "The problem is," so runs the text, "Whether a man constantly and strongly beleaving that such a thing shall be (as that such an one will love him, or that such an one will grant him his request, or that such an one shall recover a sicknesse, or the like) it doth help anything to the effecting of the thing itselfe. And here againe we must warily distinguish, for it is not meant (as hath been partly said before) that it should help by making a man more stout, or more industrious (in which kind a constant beleafe doth much), but mearely by a secret operation, or binding, or changing the spirit of another. And in this it is hard (as we began to say) to make any new experiments, for I cannot command myselfe to beleave what I will, and so no triall can be made. Nay, it is worse, for whatsoever a man imagineth doubtingly, or with feare, must needs do hurt; if imagination have any power at all. For a man representeth that oftener that hee feareth, than the contrarie.

"The helpe therefore is, for a man to work by another, in whom he may create beleafe, and not by himselfe, untill himselfe have found by experience that imagination doth prevaile, for then experience worketh in himselfe beleafe, if the beleafe that such a thing shall be, be joyned with a beleafe that his imagination may proceede it.

"For example, I related one time to a man that was curious and vaine enough in these things, that I saw a kinde of juggler that had a paire of cards, and would tell a man what card he thought. This pretended learned man told mee, it was a mistaking in mee, for (said hee) it was not the knowledge of the man's thought (for that is proper to God), but it was the *inforcing* of a thought upon him, and binding his imagination by a stronger, that hee could thinke no other card. And thereupon he asked me a question or two, which I thought he did but cunningly, knowing before what used to be the feats of the juggler. Sir (said hee), doe you remember whether hee told the card the man thought himselfe, or bade another to tell it? I answered (as was true) that he bade another tell it. Whereunto, he said, so I thought, for (said hee) himselfe could not have put on so strong an imagination; but by telling the other the card (who beleaved that the juggler was some strange man and could doe strange things) that other man caught a strong imagination. I hearkened unto him, thinking for a vanitie hee spoke prettily. Then he asked me another question: saithe hee, doe you remember whether he bade the man thinke the card first, and afterwards told the other man in his eare what he should thinke, or else that he did whisper first in the man's eare that should tell the card, telling that such a man should thinke such a card, and after bade the man thinke a card? I told him, as

was true, that he did first whisper the man in the eare, that such a man should thinke such a card. Upon this, the learned man did much exult, and please himselfe, saying, loe you may see that my opinion is right: for if the man had thought first, his thought had been fixed; but the other imagining first, bound his thoughts. Which, though it did somewhat sinke with me, yet I made it lighter than I thought, and said, I thought it was a confederacie between the juggler and the two servants, though (indeed) I had no reason so to thinke, for they were both my father's servants, and hee had never plaied in the house before. The juggler also did cause a garter to be held up, and tooke upon him to know that such an one should point in such a place of the garter, as it shoulde be neare so many inches to the longer end, and so many to the shorter. And still he did it, by first telling the imaginer, and after bidding the actour thinke."

And so likewise with the *intellect*. What power other than that of a spirit possessed in some measure of omniscience by participating in the omniscience of the Divine Spirit could venture to exercise itself, not only upon the world of sensible phenomena, but upon such abstract ideas as infinity, eternity, absolute goodness, absolute truth, absolute justice, unity in diversity, cosmical law, even God himself, bringing object and subject, law and law-giver, alike to the bar of reason, and not hesitating to pass judgment! Surely, that mental power which will be ever asking *why*, with a full conviction that it is entitled to an answer, must show that the mind, of which it is a manifestation, is a spirit of which intelligence little short of God-like must be an attribute!

It is also easy to find reason for believing that there is an outer-sphere of intelligence as well as an outer-sphere of memory and imagination and volition. I remember, for example, a circumstance in connection with the death of my grandmother which supplies me with such a reason. My grandmother, a lady considerably over seventy years of age, resided with my parents, and I was then staying at a place about four miles away from home. Everybody at home was, to all appearance, in good health, and had been so for a long time, and on that particular night I went to bed and fell asleep, without at all divining what was so soon to happen. I have no remembrance of having dreamt, and all that I know is, that after having been asleep for a couple of hours, I woke with the full conviction that my grandmother had been taken suddenly ill, that a messenger was on his way to fetch me, and that I should not reach home before all was over. A moment or two later I got up, lit a candle, looked at my watch, dressed, and waited at the window, in the full belief that my grandmother was then dead, and that I should have to go presently; and as I expected, so it was, the messenger arriving just as I was ready to return with him, and the death happening, as it proved afterwards, at the very moment I had looked

at my watch. • I had not any impression at the time that there was anything supernatural in the way in which intelligence was thus conveyed to my mind. I remember nothing like a feeling of fear at the time, and I did not (I was a lad of not more than sixteen years of age) perplex myself with reasoning on the subject. It was only in after years that the fact slowly acquired significance, and I began to see it in the light in which I now see it, that is, as showing that I could know what was passing at home, not only by the promptings of the senses when there, but also, perhaps, by remaining there when seemingly elsewhere, and that in this way my intelligence might be made to tell a similar story to that already told by my memory and imagination and will.

It would also be easy to find evidence to the same effect in the strange way in which, without any help from the senses, one person will often divine the thoughts of another person, or in which the same thought will often occur to two or more persons simultaneously ; but I resist the temptation to dwell upon these topics, in order that I may allude to an argument which, to my mind, tells conclusively against the notion that intelligence is hemmed in within the bounds of body, or subjected to any kind of limitation—an argument which is based upon the simple conception of any abstract thought. I cannot conceive it possible, for example, that there should be any cerebral or bodily way of accounting for the idea of eternity. I might, *perhaps*, allow that impressions of a certain sort upon the brain might, by their repetition, “by myriad blows,” give rise to a notion of time ; but that any multiplication of these impressions should cause the idea of time to change into that of eternity is altogether beyond my powers of comprehension. These two ideas have nothing in common ; and to think that the idea of eternity should arise in this way, would seem to be almost as absurd as to suppose that a clock, by dint of continual clicking, should, instead of wearing out, come to be, not only a better timekeeper, but also a tell-tale of what happens when time ends in the timeless eternal Now. In order to the conception of the idea of eternity, as it seems to me, there must be an intelligence which is in itself eternal,—a something which may belong to an eternal *trans-ego*, but which cannot by any probability belong to mere temporal brain or body ; and deal with it as I may, I cannot think otherwise than that this conception of eternity is in itself an argument for supposing that in intellect, no less than in memory and imagination and will, there is something which points to *trans-corporeity* as a paramount reality in man. And as with the idea of eternity, so also with the idea of infinity and all other abstract ideas, I cannot find room for that which is universal in that which at best is only partial ; and thus it is, that in order to accommodate these abstract ideas, it is necessary to get outside the brain and outside the body,

and to believe that the true sphere of the intelligence is co-extensive with that of the Divine Spirit. Indeed, to do otherwise, and suppose that an idea like that of God or eternity or infinity can be lodged in a brain-cell, requires, as it seems to me, a greater stretch of fancy than that which would be needed in order to believe it possible that all the waters of the ocean might find their bed in a thimble.

Nor does the consideration of the mental phenomena which are of a sympathetic and religious character lead to a different conclusion respecting mind.

Men are bound together by ties which cannot be untied. The husband and wife are "one flesh" in more than a figurative sense, and it is impossible to break the links of the many chains which hold parent to child, friend to friend, and all men to home and country. Man cannot, if he would, altogether shut himself up in self. If he does not yield to the impulse to sacrifice himself for others, he feels that he ought to do it. He is often carried away by this impulse to his own destruction, as when he leaps into the water to save the life of a drowning person. He cannot entertain the mere idea of an execution, of a woman more especially, without a painful shudder: he cannot look upon death, even in its most peaceful aspect, with indifference. It is impossible to undervalue the *sympathies* which are manifest in these and a thousand other ways. It is impossible to rest content with a merely selfish interpretation of them. They must have a wider basis than that which can be supplied by the brain of any one individual man, and it is scarcely possible to escape the conclusion that there are actual, even organic bonds, between man and man, and between man and nature as a whole, and that these bonds make themselves felt through the sympathies. After what has been said, indeed, I cannot escape from the conclusion that mind must be regarded as something common to all men, perhaps as something cosmical, rather than as anything peculiar to any individual man; and, taking this view, I can in some measure see why the philosophy of Plato should lead, step by step, from the individual man to the idea of a republic of men under the superintendence of a Divine Being, and why a higher philosophy than that of Plato should bring men together in a church, with Christ for its head. After what has been said, indeed, this idea of a republic or church is the natural outcome of the argument. Nor is this conclusion invalidated when the thoughts are turned from the mind to the body, of which the senses take cognizance. For what is the actual case? It is that this very body is not so individual as it would seem to be when the evidence of the senses is not brought to the bar of reason. It is that it is inseparably bound to other bodies, and to the universe, by the force of gravity. It is,—as will be one day better known, I trust—that it is not less firmly held in the same position by "the electric chain wherewith we are darkly

bound." It is that it cannot claim more than a momentary tenure even in the matter of which it is made, for, in fact, this matter is the common property of all organic beings. And thus even the body may be generalized until it ceases to be a serious obstacle to the adoption of that generalization of mind which seems to arise naturally out of the premises—a view according to which mind is to be looked upon, not as the result of cerebration, or of any other action in man individually, but as something which is common to all mankind and to creation generally,—as something for which the limits of the material cosmos are too narrow,—as something which is not limited in any way,—as something, it may be, which is as illimitable as the Divine Spirit which underlies all things. And if mind have this foundation, then it surely follows that mind must comprehend all things, and that the reality of its grasp may be attested by the sympathies in the way which has been indicated.

A continuation of the same story is also to be found in a consideration of the mental phenomena which come under the head of *religious instincts*. In what has just been said upon the sympathetic phenomena of mind it has been seen that mind is something without rather than something within the body—something comprehending in itself all mankind and all things. In what may be said upon the *religious instincts* the sum is this—that these instincts may point to a connection of the very closest kind between humanity and Divinity. Do what I may, indeed, I cannot explain away these religious instincts, or regard them in any other light than that in which they would be regarded by Plato and in Holy Writ. Indeed, after what has been said, I feel myself at liberty to see in these instincts another proof that the mind has its foundation, not in man individually, not in man collectively, not even in nature generally, but in the Divine Being "in whom all things consist." And, going so far, I am constrained to go further still, and see in conscience, which may be regarded as one of the religious instincts, a reason for believing that the Divine Being, who is the foundation of mind, is just and true and holy as He is revealed in the Scriptures, conscience being in very deed that word of which Isaiah speaks when he says, "and thine ears shall hear a word behind thee saying, this is the way, walk ye in it, when ye turn to the right hand and to the left," and which at the same time enforces the conviction that the way thus indicated is the way of justice and truth and holiness. After what has been said, indeed, the story of mind as told by the religious instincts is only another chapter in the story already told of mind by memory, and imagination, and intellect, and will, and sympathy,—that mind must have its foundation in Divine Spirit, and that, so far from being hemmed in within the bounds of man's visible body, its sphere must be co-extensive with that of the Divine Spirit itself, as illimitable, as incomprehensible.

And most assuredly a consideration of the *ego* in man leads to no different conclusion respecting mind. I cannot doubt that I am. I seem compelled to believe that in this *I am* there is that which will never cease to be. And how is this? Is it that I cannot disconnect myself from Him who is Life of Life? Do I say *I am* because I have been made in the image of Him whose name is I AM? I have the warranty of Holy Scripture for putting these questions, and for answering them affirmatively; and most assuredly I am not driven to a different conclusion by my own reason. Indeed, if, as I am compelled to believe, mind be a spirit akin in its nature to Divine Spirit, it follows as a necessary consequence that the *ego* in man must find its explanation in this way, and in this way only, the *ego*, in fact, being only one among many other proofs that the mind, of which it is a manifestation, is in reality a spirit akin in its nature to the Divine Spirit—that I say *I am* by nothing less than by a “divine right” to say so.

Whither then do these arguments tend to take me? Am I really to believe that I have been made, as the Scriptures declare, in the image of God, even of Him who, according to the same records is self-existent, eternal, omnipresent, omniscient, almighty Spirit, who is perfectly just and true and holy, the very I AM in whom all things are, without whom is nothing? Am I to believe this? Much, no doubt, remains to be done before I may be fully at liberty to give a rational assent to such belief; but even now, for anything that appears to the contrary, I may do so without being altogether irrational. For what is the conclusion respecting mind and body which would seem to be inevitable? It is that mind has its foundation in spirit possessing attributes which may, nay must, belong to a spirit created in the image of the Divine Spirit. It is that body presents no obstacle to this conclusion, body, when inquired into, becoming *one* with spirit—not by degrading spirit into flesh, not by materializing spirit, but by taking the flesh into spirit, by spiritualizing matter. In other words, spirit has to be regarded, not as an uncertain out-come from matter, having intimate connections with electricity, and heat, and other physical agencies, but as something so absolutely superior to everything material as to make it possible for man to be not wholly unbelieving when he hears the words of Christ; “Verily, I say unto you, if ye have faith as a grain of mustard-seed, ye shall say unto this mountain, remove hence to yonder place, and it shall remove, and nothing shall be impossible unto you.” In short, the common conception of matter is altogether excluded by that of spirit: and the only conclusion to which I can come, is that spirit is a divine reality, which may at one time be manifested to the senses, either as matter, or as the more etherial substance belonging to the “body celestial,” and at another be rapt away from the senses, and that no definition can apply to man’s spirit in its fulness, except that which is equally



applicable to the Divine Spirit, the "divinity that doth hedge a king" belonging in sober fact to man as man.

And if this be so, then it ceases to be a ground of wonder that man should be so richly endowed with mental and all other power. If he be in any true sense the image of God, he must be so endowed, and the wonder is, not that man is crowned with wisdom and understanding, but that he is so imbecile and foolish; not that he is able to will and do, but that he is so irresolute and incapable; not that he has a conscience, but that his sense of right and wrong is so seared and drowsy; not that he remembers, but that he forgets; not that his imagination ranges hither and thither without let or hindrance, but that it is so "lapsed in time and passion;" not that he is so full of life, but that death has any dominion over him. The explanation wanted is, not of *plus*, but of *minus*; and this is not difficult to find. Nothing more is required indeed than to take the whole story told of man in Scripture, and apply it. For what is there yet to tell of this story? It is that man is not now what he was at first,—what he may again become. It is that man's present state is a fallen state—a state of death, whatever this may mean. It is that Adam died on the very day on which he fell, and that thenceforth his state and that of his descendants has been a state of death,—which state of death, for anything that appears to the contrary, may mean obscurity to any degree of the divine image in man, even to the extent at present met with. And thus, after all, instead of opposing a difficulty in the way of accepting the scriptural history of man, the very imperfections at present met with in man may, when properly inquired into, only supply additional evidence in support of this history.

In a word, I find it less easy to accept the doctrine of evolution which has found such favour in the present day than to believe that each creature was created as a necessary part of a great whole, perfect in itself, and perfect in its relations to all other creatures, and to the universe in which it is placed—so perfect as to deserve to be described at the beginning as "very good,"—and that man originally was no brute-descended savage, living in a wilderness, and fighting his way upwards, step by step, to a higher level, but a demi-god, walking and talking, as a child with his parent, with the God in whose image he was made, until, for some fault of his own, he was driven out into the wilderness "wretched, and miserable, and poor, and blind, and naked," and so far oblivious of everything relating to his high original as to look upon God as a dark deity—a very Moloch.

Without question the same archetypal plan is perceptible in the bodies of man, and of all animals below man in the scale of being. Without question it is possible to consider man bodily as standing on the topmost round of this scale, and to believe that he may have gained this position by mounting round after round from the bottom

through sub-ordinate forms of being, and also that this process of mounting would be not a little facilitated by the existence of archetypal unity in all creatures. But there is no necessary connection between the doctrine of evolution and the doctrine of archetypal unity; and, in fact, the latter doctrine is equally consistent with the belief that each round of the scale of being is always occupied by the creature belonging to it, that each creature has its own office to fulfil in its own place no less than man in his, and that it is a necessary part of a great whole. Without question, also, there are facts which show that there is a law of unity for mind as well as for body, and that there are in the creatures below man rudiments of mind, varying infinitely in degree, which may, perhaps, give some support to the notion that the mind of man may have been developed out of them by a process of evolution. But here again the same objections arise which were hinted at when speaking of body, and it may be urged that each creature mentally may be a necessary part of a great whole to which the plan of archetypal unity bears witness, that the balance of existence might be seriously disturbed if it were wanting, and that equally whether all creatures were formed upon the same plan or not. I cannot allow, however, that the question of evolution is an open question. As it seems to me, indeed, the evidence of *fact* is, to say the least, against the believers in this doctrine rather than in their favour. At all events, there is a fact belonging to mind which I can only read as showing conclusively that man is in some mysterious way cut off from the brute creation by an impassable gulf, and this is the *regularity of mental movement, which, in some of its aspects, is spoken of as instinctive*. The mental movements of man are not regular in the sense in which those of the brutes are regular. And how is this? Is it that the mind of man acts irregularly, because man's present state is one, not of true order, but of disorder? Is it that the mental movements of brutes are regular because the state of these creatures is one, not of disorder, but of order. There can be no doubt as to the answer, which is in accordance with the premises. The "whole creation groaneth in bondage," but there is no reason to believe that the brute has fallen in the sense in which man has fallen, and, therefore, it may be supposed that the mental movements of the brute, be they small or great, *must* be perfectly adapted to the circumstances in which they happen, must have the character of *instincts*, in short, because it may fairly be conceded that the *unimpeded* workings of mind, and of law generally, are always "for the best." Indeed, when fully read, I feel convinced that nothing will remain in the history of the lower forms of life to invalidate the conclusions already drawn respecting man, and that the final result will be, not to bridge-over, but to widen everywhere, the gulf which separates man from the brute creation.

C. B. RADCLIFFE.



## ON THE ATMOSPHERE IN RELATION TO FOG-SIGNALLING.

### PART II.

#### *Action of Hail and Rain.*

IN the first part of this article it was demonstrated that the optic transparency and acoustic transparency of our atmosphere were by no means necessarily coincident; that on days of marvellous optical clearness the atmosphere may be filled with impervious acoustic clouds, while days optically turbid may be acoustically clear. We have now to consider, in detail, the influence of various agents which have hitherto been considered potent in reference to the transmission of sound through the atmosphere.

Derham, and after him all other writers, considered that falling rain tended powerfully to obstruct sound. An observation on June 3 has been already referred to as tending to throw doubt on this conclusion. Two other crucial instances will suffice to show its untenability. On the morning of October 8 at 7.45 A.M., a thunderstorm accompanied by heavy rain broke over Dover. But the clouds subsequently cleared away, and the sun shone strongly on the sea. For a time the optical clearness of the atmosphere was extraordinary, but it was acoustically opaque. At 2.30 P.M., a densely black scowl again overspread the heavens to the W.S.W. The distance being 6 miles, and all hushed on board, the horn was heard very feebly, the siren more distinctly, while the howitzer was better than either, though not much superior to the siren.

A squall approached us from the west. In the Alps or elsewhere I have rarely seen the heavens blacker. Vast cumuli floated to the N.E. and S.E.; vast streamers of rain descended in the W.N.W.;

huge scrolls of cloud hung in the N. ; but spaces of blue were to be seen to the N.N.E.

At 7 miles distance the siren and horn were both feeble, while the guns sent us a very faint report. A dense shower now enveloped the Foreland.

The rain at length reached us ; falling heavily all the way between us and the Foreland. But the sound, instead of being deadened, rose perceptibly in power. Hail was now added to the rain, and the shower reached a tropical violence, the hailstones floating thickly on the flooded deck. In the midst of this furious squall both the horns and the siren were distinctly heard ; and as the shower lightened, thus lessening the local pattering, the sounds so rose in power that we heard them at a distance of  $7\frac{1}{2}$  miles distinctly louder than they had been heard through the rainless atmosphere at 5 miles.

At 4 P.M. the rain had ceased and the sun shone clearly through the calm air. At 9 miles distance the horn was heard feebly, the siren clearly, while the howitzer sent us a loud report. All the sounds were better heard at this distance than they had previously been at  $5\frac{1}{2}$  miles ; from which, by the law of inverse squares, it follows that the intensity of the sound at  $5\frac{1}{2}$  miles distance must have been augmented at least threefold by the descent of the rain.

On the 23rd of October, our steamer had forsaken us for shelter, and I sought to turn the weather to account by making other observations on both sides of the fog-signal station. Mr. Douglas, the Chief Engineer of the Trinity House, was good enough to undertake the observations N.E. of the Foreland ; while Mr. Ayres, the Assistant Engineer, walked in the other direction. At 12.50 P.M. the wind blew a gale and broke into a thunderstorm with violent rain. Inside and outside the Cornhill Coastguard Station, a mile from the instruments in the direction of Dover, Mr. Ayres heard the sound of the siren through the storm ; and after the rain had ceased, all sounds were heard distinctly louder than before. Mr. Douglas had sent a fly before him to Kingsdown, and the driver had been waiting for fifteen minutes before he arrived. During this time no sound had been heard, though 40 blasts had been blown in the interval ; nor had the coastguard man on duty, a practised observer, heard any of them throughout the day. During the thunderstorm and while the rain was actually falling with a violence which Mr. Douglas describes as perfectly torrential, the sounds became audible and were heard by all.

To rain, in short, I have never been able to trace the slightest deadening influence upon sound. The reputed barrier offered by "thick weather" to the passage of sound was one of the causes which tended to produce hesitation in establishing sound-signals on our coasts. It is to be hoped that the removal of this error may redound to the advantage of coming generations of seafaring men.

• *Action of Snow.*

Falling snow, according to Derham, is the most serious obstacle of all to the transmission of sound. We did not extend our observations at the South Foreland into snowy weather; but a previous observation of my own bears directly upon this point. On Christmas night, 1859, I arrived at Chamouni, through snow so deep as to obliterate the road-fences, and to render the labour of reaching the village arduous in the extreme. On the 26th and 27th it fell heavily. On the 27th, during a lull in the storm, I reached the Montanvert, sometimes breast-deep in snow. On the 28th, with great difficulty, two lines of stakes were set out across the glacier, with the view of determining its winter motion. On the 29th the entry in my journal, written in the morning, is, "Snow, heavy snow; it must have descended through the entire night, the quantity freshly fallen is so great."


Under these circumstances I planted my theodolite beside the Mer de Glace, having waded to my position through snow which, being dry, reached nearly to my breast. Assistants were sent across the glacier with instructions to measure the displacement of a transverse line of stakes planted previously in the snow. A storm drifted up the valley, darkening the air as it approached. It reached us, the snow falling more heavily than I had ever seen it elsewhere. It soon formed a heap on the theodolite, and thickly covered my own clothes. Here, then, was a combination of snow in the air and of soft fresh snow on the ground, such as Derham could hardly have enjoyed; still through such an atmosphere I was able to make my instructions audible quite across the glacier, the distance being half a mile, while the experiment was rendered reciprocal by one of my assistants making his voice audible to me.

The flakes here were so thick that it was only at intervals that I was able to pick up the retreating forms of the men. Still the air through which the flakes fell was continuous. Did the flakes merely yield passively to the sonorous waves, swinging like the particles of air themselves to and fro as the sound waves passed them? Or did the waves bend by diffraction round the flakes, and emerge from them without sensible loss? Experiment will aid us here by showing the astonishing facility with which sound makes its way among obstacles, and passes through tissues, so long as the continuity of the air in their interstices is preserved.

A piece of millboard or of glass, a plank of wood, or the hand, placed across the open end  $t'$  of the tunnel  $a b c d$  fig. 1 (next page) intercepts the sound of the bell, placed in the padded box  $P$ , and stills the sensitive flame  $k$  (described in the last article).

An ordinary cambric pocket-handkerchief, on the other hand,

stretched across the tunnel end produced hardly an appreciable effect upon the sound. Through two layers of the handkerchief the flame



was strongly agitated ; through four layers it was still agitated ; while through six layers, though nearly stilled, it was not entirely so.

Dipping the same handkerchief into water, and stretching a single wetted layer across the tunnel-end, it stilled the flame as effectually as the millboard or the wood. Hence the conclusion, that the sound-

waves in the first instance passed through the interstices of the cambric.

Through a single layer of thin silk the sound passed without sensible interruption ; through six layers the flame was strongly agitated ; while through twelve layers the agitation was quite perceptible.

A single layer of this silk, when wetted, stilled the flame.

A layer of soft lint produced but little effect upon the sound ; a layer of thick flannel was almost equally ineffectual. Through four layers of flannel the flame was perceptibly agitated. Through a single layer of green baize the sound passed almost as freely as through air ; through four layers of the baize the action was still sensible. Through a layer of close hard felt, half an inch thick, the sound waves passed with sufficient energy to sensibly agitate the flame. I did not witness these effects without astonishment.

A single layer of thin oiled silk stopped the sound and stilled the flame. A single layer of goldbeater's skin did the same. A leaf of common note-paper, or even of foreign post, stopped the sound.

The sensitive flame is not absolutely necessary to these experiments. Let a ticking watch be hung six inches from the ear, a cambric handkerchief dropped between it and the ear scarcely sensibly affects the ticking, a sheet of oil-skin or an intensely heated gas column cuts it almost wholly off.

But though oiled silk, foreign post, and even goldbeater's skin can stop the sound, a film sufficiently thin to yield freely to the aerial pulses transmits it. A thick soap film produces an obvious effect upon the sensitive flame, a very thin one does not. The augmentation of the transmitted sound may be observed simultaneously with the generation and brightening of the colours which indicate the increasing thinness of the film. A very thin collodion-film acts in the same way.

Acquainted with the foregoing facts regarding the passage of sound through cambric, silk, lint, flannel, baize, and felt, the reader is prepared for the statement that the sound-waves pass without sensible impediment through heavy artificial showers of rain, hail, and snow. Water-drops, seeds, sand, bran, and flocculi of various kinds, have been employed to form such showers : through all of these, as through the actual rain and hail already described, and through the snow on the Mer de Glace, the sound passes without sensible obstruction.

#### *Action of Fog. Observations in London.*

But the mariner's greatest enemy, fog, is still to be dealt with ; and here for a long time the proper conditions of experiment were absent. Up to the end of November we had had frequent days of haze, sufficiently thick to obscure the white cliffs of the Foreland, but no real fog. Still those cases furnished demonstrative evidence that the

notions entertained regarding the reflection of sound by suspended particles were wrong ; for on many days of the thickest haze the sound covered twice the range attained on other days of perfect optical transparency. Such instances dissolved the association hitherto assumed to exist between acoustic transparency and optic transparency, but they left the action of dense fogs undetermined.

On December 9 a memorable fog settled down on London. I addressed a telegram to the Trinity House suggesting some gun observations. With characteristic promptness came the reply that they would be made in the afternoon at Blackwall. I went to Greenwich in the hope of hearing the guns across the river ; but the delay of the train by the fog rendered my arrival too late. Over the river the fog was very dense, and through it came various sounds with great distinctness. The signal bell of an unseen barge rang clearly out at intervals, and I could plainly hear the hammering at Cubitt's Town, half a mile away, on the opposite side of the river. No deadening of the sound by the fog was apparent.

Through this fog and various local noises, Captain Atkins and Mr. Edwards heard the report of a 12-pounder cannonade with a 1-lb. charge distinctly better than the 18-pounder with a 3-lb. charge, an optically clear atmosphere, and all noise absent, on July 3.

Anxious to turn to the best account a phenomenon for which we had waited so long, I tried to grapple with the problem by experiments on a small scale. On the 10th I stationed my assistant with a whistle and organ pipe on the walk below the south-west end of the bridge dividing Hyde Park from Kensington Gardens. From the eastern end of the Serpentine I heard distinctly both the whistle and the pipe, which produced 380 waves a second. On changing places with my assistant, I heard for a time the distinct blast of the whistle only. The deeper note of the organ-pipe at length reached me, rising sometimes to great distinctness, and sometimes falling to inaudibility. The whistle showed the same intermittence as to period, but in an opposite sense ; for when the whistle was faint the pipe was strong, and *vice versa*. To obtain the fundamental note of the pipe it had to be blown gently, and on the whole the whistle proved the most efficient in piercing the fog.

An extraordinary amount of sound filled the air during these experiments. The resonant roar of the Bayswater and Knightsbridge roads ; the clangour of the great bell of Westminster ; the railway whistles, which were frequently blown, and the fog-signals exploded at the various metropolitan stations, were all heard with extraordinary intensity. This could by no means be reconciled with the statements so categorically made regarding the acoustic impenetrability of a London fog.

On the 11th of December, the fog being denser than before, I heard every blast of the whistle, and occasional blasts of the pipe, over the



distance between the bridge and the eastern end of the *Serpentine*. On joining my assistant at the bridge the loud concussion of a gun was heard by both of us. A police-inspector affirmed that it came from Woolwich, and that he had heard several shots about two P.M. and previously. The fact, if a fact, was of the highest importance; so I immediately telegraphed to Woolwich for information. Professor Abel kindly furnished me with the following particulars:—

“The firing took place at 1.40 P.M. The guns proved were of comparatively small size—64-pounders, with 10-lb. charges of powder.

“The concussion experienced at my house and office, about three-quarters of a mile from the butt, was decidedly more severe than that experienced when the heaviest guns are proved with charges of 110 to 120 lbs. of powder. There was a dense fog here at the time of firing.”

These were the reports heard by the police-inspector; on subsequent inquiry it was ascertained that two guns were fired at about three P.M. These were the guns heard by myself.

Professor Abel also communicated to me the following fact:—“Our workman’s bell at the Arsenal gate, which is of moderate size and anything but clear in tone, is pretty distinctly heard by Professor Bloxam *only* when the wind is *north-east*. During the whole of last week the bell was heard with great distinctness, the wind being *south-westerly* [opposed to the sound]. The distance of the bell from Bloxam’s house is about three-quarters of a mile as the crow flies.”

Assuredly no question of science ever stood so much in need of revision as this of the transmission of sound through the atmosphere. Slowly but surely we mastered the question; and the further we advanced the more plainly it appeared that our reputed knowledge regarding it was erroneous from beginning to end.

On the morning of the 12th the fog attained its maximum density. It was not possible to read at my window, which fronted the open western sky. At 10.30 I sent an assistant to the bridge, and listened for his whistle and pipe at the eastern end of the *Serpentine*. The whistle rose to a shrillness far surpassing anything previously heard, but it sank sometimes almost to inaudibility; proving that though the air was on the whole highly homogeneous, acoustic clouds still drifted through the fog. A second pipe, which was quite inaudible yesterday, was plainly heard this morning. We were able to discourse across the *Serpentine* to-day with much greater ease than yesterday.

During our summer observations I had once or twice been able to fix the position of the Foreland in thick haze by the direction of the sound. To-day my assistant, hidden by the fog, walked up to the Watermen’s Boat-House sounding his whistle; and I walked along the opposite side of the *Serpentine*, clearly appreciating for a time that the line joining us was oblique to the axis of the river. Coming

to a point which seemed to be exactly abreast of him I marked it, and on the following day, when the fog had cleared away, the marked position was found to be perfectly exact. When undisturbed by echoes, the ear, with a little practice, becomes capable of fixing with great precision the direction of a sound.

On reaching the Serpentine this morning a peal of bells, which then began to ring, seemed so close at hand that it required some reflection to convince me that they were ringing to the north of Hyde Park. The sounds fluctuated wonderfully in power. Prior to the striking of eleven by the great bell of Westminster, a nearer bell struck with loud clangour. The first five strokes of the Westminster bell were afterwards heard, one of them being extremely loud; but the six last strokes were inaudible. An assistant was stationed to attend to the twelve o'clock bells. The clock which had struck so loudly at eleven was unheard at twelve, while of the Westminster bell eight strokes out of twelve were inaudible. To such astonishing changes is the atmosphere liable.

At seven P.M. the Westminster bell striking seven was not at all heard from the Serpentine, while the nearer bell already alluded to was heard distinctly. The fog had cleared away, and the lamps on the bridge could be seen from the eastern end of the Serpentine burning brightly; but instead of the sound sharing the improvement of the light, what might be properly called an acoustic fog took the place of its optical predecessor. Several series of the whistle and organ-pipe were sounded in succession; one series only of the whistle-sounds was heard, all the others being quite inaudible. Three series of the organ-pipe were heard, but exceedingly faintly. On reversing the positions and sounding as before, nothing whatever was heard.

At eight o'clock the chimes and hour-bell of the Westminster clock were both very loud. The "acoustic fog" had shifted its position or temporarily melted away.

Extraordinary fluctuations were also observed in the case of the church bells heard in the morning; in a few seconds they would sink from a loudly ringing peal into utter silence, from which they would rapidly return to loud-tongued audibility. The intermittent drifting of fog over the sun's disk, by which his light is at times obscured, at times revealed, is the optical analogue of these effects. As regards such changes, the acoustic deportment of the atmosphere is a true transcript of its optical deportment.

At nine P.M. three strokes only of the Westminster clock were heard; the others were inaudible. The air had relapsed in part into its condition at seven P.M., when all the strokes were unheard.

The quiet of the park this evening, as contrasted with the resonant roar which filled the air on the two preceding days, was very remarkable. The sound, in fact, was stifled in the optically clear but acoustically flocculent atmosphere.

On the 13th, the fog being displaced by thin haze, I went again to the Serpentine. The carriage-sounds were damped to an extraordinary degree. The roar of the Knightsbridge and Bayswater roads had subsided, the tread of troops which passed us a little way off was unheard, while at eleven A.M. both the chimes and the hour-bell of the Westminster clock were stifled. Subjectively considered, all was favourable to auditory impressions; but the very cause that damped the local noises extinguished our experimental sounds. The voice across the Serpentine to-day, with my assistant plainly visible in front of me, was distinctly feebler than it had been when each of us was hidden from the other in the densest fog.

Placing the source of sound at the eastern end of the Serpentine, I walked along its edge from the bridge towards the end. The distance between these two points is about 1000 paces. After five hundred of them had been stepped, the sound was not so distinct as it had been at the bridge on the day of densest fog; hence, by the law of inverse squares, the optical cleansing of the air through the melting away of the fog had so darkened it acoustically, that a sound generated at the eastern end of the Serpentine was lowered to one-fourth of its intensity at a point midway between the end and the bridge.

To these demonstrative observations one or two subsequent ones may be added. On several of the moist and warm days at the beginning of this year I stood at noon beside the railing of St. James's Park, near Buckingham Palace, three-quarters of a mile from the clock tower, which was clearly visible. Not a single stroke of "Big Ben" was heard. On January 19 fog and drizzling rain obscured the tower; still from the same position I not only heard the strokes of the great bell but also the chimes of the quarter bells.

During the exceedingly dense and "dripping" fog of January 22, from the same railings, I heard every stroke of the bell. At the end of the Serpentine, when the fog was densest, the Westminster bell was heard striking loudly eleven. Towards evening this fog began to melt away, and at six o'clock I went to the end of the Serpentine to observe the effect of the optical clearing upon the sound. Not one of the strokes reached me. At nine o'clock and at ten o'clock my assistant was in the same position, and on both occasions he failed to hear a single stroke of the bell. It was a case precisely similar to that of December 13, when the dissolution of the fog was accompanied by a decided acoustic thickening of the air.\*

#### *Observations at the South Foreland.*

Satisfactory and indeed conclusive as these results seemed, I desired exceedingly to confirm them by experiments with the instruments

\* A friend informs me that he has followed a pack of hounds on a clear calm day without hearing a single yelp from the dogs; while on calm foggy days from the same distance the musical roar of the pack was loudly audible.

actually employed at the South Foreland. On the 10th of February I had the gratification of receiving the following note and enclosure from the Deputy Master of Trinity House :—

“MY DEAR TYNDALL,—The enclosed will show how accurately your views have been verified, and I send them on at once without waiting for the details. I think you will be glad to have them, and as soon as I get the report it shall be sent to you. I made up my mind ten days ago that there would be a chance in the light foggy-disposed weather at home, and therefore sent the *Argus* off at an hour's notice, and requested the Fog Committee to keep one member on board. On Friday I was so satisfied that the fog would occur that I sent Edwards down to record the observations. . . .

“Very truly yours,

“FRED. ARROW.”

The enclosure referred to was notes from Captain Atkins and Mr. Edwards. Captain Atkins writes thus :—

“As arranged, I came down here by the mail express, meeting Mr. Edwards at Cannon Street. We put up at the Dover Castle, and next morning at 7 I was awake by the sounds of the siren. On jumping up I discovered that the long-looked-for fog had arrived, and that the *Argus* had left her moorings.

“However, had I been on board, the instructions I left with Troughton (the master of the *Argus*) could not have been better carried out. About noon the fog cleared up and the *Argus* returned to her moorings, when I learned that they had taken both siren and horn sounds to a distance of 11 miles from the station, where they dropped a buoy. This I know to be correct, as I have this morning recovered the buoy, and the distances both in and out agree with Troughton's statement. I have also been to the Varne light-ship, (12½ miles from the Foreland), and ascertained that during the fog of Saturday forenoon they ‘distinctly’ heard the sounds.”

Mr. Edwards, who was constantly at my side during our summer and autumn observations, and who is thoroughly competent to form a comparative estimate of the strength of the sounds, states that the sounds were “extraordinarily loud,” both Captain Atkins and himself being awake by them. He does not remember ever before hearing the sounds so loud in Dover; it seemed as though the observers were close to the instruments.

Other days of fog preceded this one, and they were all days of acoustic transparency, the day of densest fog being acoustically the clearest of all.

The results here recorded are of the highest importance, for they bring us face to face with a dense fog and an actual fog-signal, and confirm in the most conclusive manner the previous observations.

The fact of Captain Atkins and Mr. Edwards being awakened by the siren proves, beyond all our previous experience, its power during the fog on the 7th of February.

It is exceedingly interesting to compare the transmission of sound on February 7 with its transmission on October 14. The wind on both days had the same strength and direction. My notes of the observations show the latter to have been throughout a day of extreme optical clearness. The range was 10 miles. During the fog of February 7, the *Argus* heard the sound at 11 miles; and it was also heard at the Varne light-vessel, which is  $12\frac{1}{2}$  miles from the Foreland.

It is also worthy of note that through the same fog the sounds were well heard at the South Sand Head light-vessel, which is in the opposite direction from the South Foreland, and actually behind the siren. For this important circumstance is to be borne in mind: on February 7 the siren happened to be pointed, not towards the *Argus*, but towards Dover. Had the yacht been in the axis of the instrument, it is highly probable that the sound would have been heard all the way across to the coast of France.

It is hardly necessary for me to say a word to guard myself against the misconception that I consider sound to be assisted by the fog itself. The fog particles have no more influence upon the waves of sound than the suspended particles stirred up over the banks of Newfoundland have upon the waves of the Atlantic. A homogeneous air is the usual associate of fog, and hence the acoustic clearness of foggy weather.

### *Experiments on Artificial Fogs.*

These observations are clinched and finished by being brought within the range of laboratory experiment. Here we shall learn incidentally a lesson as to the caution required from an experimenter.

The smoke from smouldering brown paper was allowed to stream upwards into the tunnel *a b c d* (fig. 1); the action upon the sound-waves was strong, rendering the short and agitated sensitive flame *k* tall and quiescent. Here the action of the smoke seemed clearly demonstrated.

Air first passed through ammonia, then through hydrochloric acid, and thus loaded with thick fumes, was sent into the tunnel; the agitated flame was rendered immediately quiescent, indicating a very decided action on the part of the artificial fog.

Air passed through perchloride of tin and sent into the tunnel produced exceedingly dense fumes. The action of the fog upon the sound-waves was very strong.

The dense smoke of resin, burnt before the open end of the tunnel and blown into it with a pair of bellows, had also the effect of stopping the sound-waves, so as to still the agitated flame.

The result seems clear; and it perfectly harmonizes with the prevalent *à priori* notions as to the action of fog upon sound. But caution is here necessary; for the smoke of the brown paper was *hot*; the flask containing the hydrochloric acid was *hot*; that containing the perchloride of tin was *hot*; while the resin-fumes produced by a red-hot poker were also obviously hot. Were the results, then, due to the fumes or to the differences of temperature? The observations might well have proved a trap to an incautious reasoner.

Instead of the smoke and heated air, the heated air alone from four red-hot pokers was permitted to stream upwards into the tunnel; the action on the sound-waves was very decided, though the tunnel was optically empty. The flame of a candle was placed at the tunnel end, and the hot air just above its tip was blown into the tunnel; the action on the sensitive flame was decided. A similar effect was produced when the air, ascending from a red-hot iron, was blown into the tunnel.

In these latter cases the tunnel remained optically clear, while the same effect as that produced by the resin—smoke and fumes was observed. Clearly, then, we are not entitled to ascribe, without further investigation, to the artificial fog an effect which may have been due to the air which accompanied it.

Having eliminated the fog and proved the nonhomogeneous air effective, our reasoning will be completed by eliminating the heat, and proving the fog ineffective.

Instead of the tunnel *a b c d*, fig. 1, a cupboard with glass sides, three feet long, two feet wide, and about five feet high, was filled with fumes of various kinds. Here it was thought the fumes might remain long enough for differences of temperature to disappear. Two apertures were made in two opposite panes of glass three feet asunder; in front of one aperture was placed the bell in its padded box and behind the other aperture, and at some distance from it, the sensitive flame.

Phosphorus placed in a cup floating on water was ignited within the closed cupboard. The fumes were so dense that considerably less than the three feet traversed by the sound extinguished totally a bright candle-flame. At first there was a slight action upon the sound; but this rapidly vanished, the flame being affected exactly as if the sound passed through pure air. The first action was manifestly due to differences of temperature, and disappeared when the temperature was equalized.

The cupboard was next filled with the dense fumes of gunpowder. At first there was a slight action; but this disappeared even more rapidly than in the case of the phosphorus, the sound passing as if no fumes were there. It required less than half a minute to abolish the action in the case of the phosphorus, but a few seconds sufficed

in the case of the gunpowder. The fumes were far more than sufficient to quench the candle-flame.

The dense smoke of resin, when the temperature had become equable, exerted no action on the sound.

The fumes of gum mastic were equally ineffectual.

The fumes of the perchloride of tin, though of extraordinary density, exerted no sensible effect upon the sound.

Exceedingly dense fumes of chloride of ammonium next filled the cupboard. A fraction of the length of the 3-foot tube sufficed to quench the candle-flame. Soon after the cupboard was filled, the sound passed without the least sensible deterioration. An aperture at the top of the cupboard was opened; but though a dense smoke-column ascended through it, many minutes elapsed before the candle-flame could be seen through the attenuated fog.

Steam from a copper boiler was so copiously admitted into the cupboard as to fill it with a dense cloud. No real cloud was ever so dense; still the sound passed through it without the least sensible diminution. This being the case, cloud-echoes are not a likely phenomenon.

In all of these cases, when a couple of Bunsen's burners were ignited within the cupboard containing the fumes, less than a minute's action rendered the air so heterogeneous that the sensitive flame was completely stilled.

These acoustically inactive fogs were subsequently proved competent to cut off the electric light.

Experiment and observation go therefore, hand in hand in demonstrating that fogs have no sensible action upon sound; the notion of their impenetrability which so powerfully retarded the introduction of phonic coast signals being thus abolished, we have solid ground for the hope that disasters due to fogs and thick weather will in the future be materially mitigated.

#### *Action of Wind.*

In stormy weather we were frequently forsaken by our steamer, which had to seek shelter in the Downs or Margate Roads, and on such occasions the opportunity was turned to account to determine the effect of the wind. On October 11th, accompanied by Mr. Douglass and Mr. Edwards, I walked along the cliffs to Dover Castle towards the Foreland, the wind blowing strongly against the sound. On the Dover side, and at about a mile and half from the Foreland, we first heard the faint but distinct sound of the siren. The horn-sound was inaudible. A gun fired during our halt was also unheard.

As we approached the Foreland we saw the smoke of the gun. Mr. Edwards heard a faint crack, but neither Mr. Douglass nor I heard anything. The sound of the siren was at the same time of piercing intensity. We waited for ten minutes, when another gun

was fired. The smoke was at hand, and I thought I heard a faint thud, but could not be certain. My companions heard nothing. On pacing the distance afterwards we were found to be only 550 yards from the gun. We were shaded at the time by a slight eminence from both the siren and the gun, but this could not account for the utter extinction of the gun-sound at so short a distance, and at a time when the siren sent to us a note of great power.

Mr. Ayres at my request walked to windward along the cliff, while Mr. Douglass proceeded to St. Margaret's Bay. During their absence I had three guns fired. Mr. Ayres heard only one of them. Favoured by the wind, Mr. Douglass at twice the distance, and far more deeply immersed in the sound-shadow, heard all three reports with the utmost distinctness.

Joining Mr. Douglass, we continued our walk to a distance of three-quarters of a mile beyond St. Margaret's Bay. Here, being dead to leeward, though the wind blew with unabated violence, the sound of the siren was borne to us with extraordinary power.\* In this position we also heard the gun loudly, and two other loud reports at the proper interval of ten minutes, as we returned to the Foreland.

It is within the mark to say that the gun to-day was heard five times, and might have been heard fifteen times as far to leeward as to windward.

In windy weather the shortness of its sound is a serious drawback to the use of a gun as a signal. In the case of the horn and siren, time is given for the attention to be fixed upon the sound; and a single puff, while cutting out a portion of the blast, does not obliterate it wholly. Such a puff, however, may be fatal to the momentary gun-sound.

On the leeward side of the Foreland, on the 23rd, the sounds were heard at least four times as far as on the windward side, while in both directions the siren possessed the greatest penetrative power.

On the 24th the wind shifted to E.S.E., and the sounds, which when the wind was W.S.W. failed to reach Dover, were now heard in the streets through thick rain. On the 27th the wind was E.N.E. In our writing-room in the Lord Warden Hotel, in the bed-rooms, and on the staircase the sound of the siren reached us with surprising power, piercing through the whistling and moaning of the wind, which blew through Dover towards Folkestone. The sounds were heard at 6 miles from the Foreland on the Folkestone road, and had the instruments not then ceased sounding, they might have been heard much further. At the South Sand Head light-vessel,  $3\frac{1}{4}$  miles on the opposite side, no sound had been heard throughout the day. On the 28th, the wind being N. by E., the sounds were heard in the middle of

\* The horn here was temporarily suspended, but doubtless would have been well heard.



Folkestone, 8 miles off, while in the opposite direction they failed to reach  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles. On the 29th the limits of range were Eastware Bay on the one side and Kingsdown on the other; on the 30th the limits were Kingsdown on the one hand and Folkestone Pier on the other. With a wind having a force of 4 or 5 it was a very common observation to hear the sound in one direction three times as far as in the other.

This well-known effect of the wind is exceedingly difficult to explain. Indeed, the only explanation worthy of the name is one offered by Professor Stokes, and suggested by some remarkable observations by De la Roche. In vol. i. of the "Annales de Chemie" for 1816, p. 176, Arago introduces De la Roche's memoir in these words:—"L'auteur arrive à des conclusions, qui d'abord pourront paraître paradoxales, mais ceux qui savent combien il mettait de soins et d'exactitude dans toutes ses recherches se garderont sans doute d'opposer une opinion populaire à des expériences positives." The strangeness of De la Roche's results consisted in his establishing, by quantitative measurements, not only that sound has a greater range in the direction of the wind than in the opposite direction, but that the range at right angles to the wind is the maximum.

In a short but exceedingly able communication presented to the British Association in 1857, the eminent physicist above-mentioned points out a cause which, *if sufficient*, would account for the results referred to. The lower atmospheric strata are retarded by friction against the earth, and the upper ones by those immediately below them; the velocity of translation, therefore, in the case of wind increases from the ground upwards. This difference of velocity tilts the sound-wave upwards in a direction opposed to, and downwards in a direction co-incident with the wind. In this latter case the direct wave is reinforced by the wave reflected from the earth. Now the reinforcement is greatest in the direction in which the direct and reflected waves enclose the smallest angle, and this is at right angles to the direction of the wind. Hence the greater range in this direction. It is not, therefore, according to Professor Stokes, a stifling of the sound to windward, but a tilting of the sound-wave over the heads of the observers that defeats the propagation in that direction.

This explanation calls for verification, and I wished much to test it by means of a captive balloon rising high enough to catch the deflected wave; but on communicating with Mr. Coxwell, who has earned for himself so high a reputation as an aeronaut, and who has always shown himself so willing to promote a scientific object, I learned with regret that the experiment was too dangerous to be carried out.\*

\* Experiments so important as those of De la Roche ought not be left without verification. I have made arrangements with a view to this object.

*Atmospheric Selection.*

It has been stated that the atmosphere on different days shows preferences to different sounds. This point is worthy of further illustration.

After the violent shower which passed over us on October 18th, the sounds of all the instruments, as already stated, rose in power ; but it was noticed that the horn sound, which was of lower pitch than that of the siren, improved most, at times not only equalling, but surpassing the sound of its rival. From this it might be inferred that the atmospheric change produced by the rain favoured more especially the transmission of the longer sonorous waves.

But our programme enabled us to go further than mere inference. It had been arranged on the day mentioned, that up to 3.30 P.M. the siren should perform 2400 revolutions a minute, generating 480 waves a second. As long as this rate continued the horn, after the shower, had the advantage. The rate of rotation was then changed to 2000 a minute, or 400 waves a second, when the siren-sound immediately surpassed that of the horn. A clear connection was thus established between aerial reflection and the length of the sonorous waves.

The 10-inch Canadian whistle being capable of adjustment so as to produce sounds of different pitch, on the 10th of October I ran through a series of its sounds. The shrillest appeared to possess great intensity and penetrative power. The belief is common that a note of this character (which affects so powerfully, and even painfully, an observer close at hand) has also the greatest range. Mr. A. Gordon, in his examination before the Committee on Lighthouses, in 1845, expressed himself thus : " When you get a shrill sound, high in the scale, that sound is carried much further than a lower note in the scale." I have heard the same opinion expressed by other scientific men.

On the 14th of October the point was submitted to an experimental test. It had been arranged that up to 11.30 A.M. the Canadian whistle, which had been heard with such piercing intensity on the 10th, should sound its shrill note. At the hour just mentioned we were beside the Varne buoy,  $7\frac{1}{4}$  miles from the Foreland. The siren, as we approached the buoy, was heard through the paddle noises ; the horns were also heard, but more feebly than the siren. We paused at the buoy and listened for the 11.30 gun. Its boom was heard by all. Neither before nor during the pause was the shrill-sounding Canadian whistle once heard. It was now adjusted to produce its ordinary low-pitched note, which was immediately heard. Still further out the low boom of the cannon continued audible after all the other sounds had ceased.

But it was only during the early part of the day that this pre-

ference for the longer waves was manifested. At 3 P.M. the case was completely altered, for then the high-pitched siren was heard when all the other sounds were inaudible. On many other days we had illustrations of the varying comparative power of the siren and the gun. On the 9th of October sometimes the one, sometimes the other was predominant. On the morning of the 13th the siren was clearly heard on Shakespeare's Cliff, while two guns, with their puffs perfectly visible, were unheard. On October 16th, two miles from the signal-station, the gun at 11 o'clock was inferior to the siren, but both were heard. At 12.30, the distance being six miles, the gun was quite unheard, while the siren continued faintly audible. Later on in the day the experiment was twice repeated. The puff of the gun was in each case seen, but nothing was heard; in the last experiment, when the gun was quenched, the siren sent forth a sound so strong as to maintain itself through the paddle-noises. The day was clearly hostile to the passage of the longer sonorous waves.

October 17th began with a preference for the shorter waves. At 11.30 A.M. the mastery of the siren over the gun was pronounced; at 12.30 the gun slightly surpassed the siren; at 1, 2, and 2.30 P.M. the gun also asserted its mastery. This preference for the longer waves was continued on October 18th. On October 20th the day began in favour of the gun, then both became equal, and finally the siren gained the mastery; but the day had become stormy, and a storm is always unfavourable to the momentary gun sound. The same remark applies to the experiments of October 21st. At 11 A.M., distance  $6\frac{1}{2}$  miles, when the siren made itself heard through the noises of wind, sea, and paddles, the gun was fired; but, though listened for with all attention, no sound was heard. Half an hour later the result was the same. On October 24th five observers saw the flash of the gun at a distance of 5 miles, but heard nothing; all of them at this distance heard the siren distinctly; a second experiment on the same day yielded the same result. On the 27th also the siren was triumphant; and on three several occasions on the 29th, its mastery over the gun was very pronounced.

Such experiments yield new conceptions as to the scattering of sound in the atmosphere. No sound here employed is a simple sound; in every case the fundamental note is accompanied by others, and the action of the atmosphere on these different groups of waves, has its optical analogue in that scattering of the waves of the luminiferous ether which produces the various shades and colours of the sky.

#### *Concluding Remarks.*

A few additional remarks and suggestions will fitly wind up this paper. It has been proved that in some states of the weather the

howitzer firing a 3 lb. charge commands a larger range than the whistles, trumpets, or siren. This was the case, for example, on the particular day, October 17, when the ranges of all the sounds reached their maximum.

On many other days, however, the inferiority of the gun to the siren was demonstrated in the clearest manner. The gun-puffs were seen with the utmost distinctness at the Foreland, but no sound was heard, the note of the siren at the same time reaching us with distinct and considerable power.

The disadvantages of the gun are these :—

a. The duration of the sound is so short that, unless the observer is prepared beforehand, the sound, through lack of attention rather than through its own powerlessness, is liable to be unheard.

b. Its liability to be quenched by a local sound is so great, that it is sometimes obliterated by a puff of wind taking possession of the ears at the time of its arrival. This point was alluded to by Arago, in his report on the celebrated experiments of 1822. By such a puff a momentary gap is produced in the case of a continuous sound, but not entire extinction.

c. Its liability to be quenched or deflected by an opposing wind, so as to be practically useless at a very short distance to windward, is very remarkable. A case has been cited in which the gun failed to be heard against a violent wind at a distance of 550 yards from the place of firing, the sound of the siren at the same time reaching us with great intensity.

Still, notwithstanding these drawbacks, I think the gun is entitled to rank as a first-class signal. I have had occasion myself to observe its extreme utility at Holyhead and the Kish light-vessel near Kingstown. The commanders of the Holyhead boats, moreover, are unanimous in their commendation of the gun. An important addition in its favour is the fact that in fog the flash or glare often comes to the aid of the sound ; on this point the evidence is quite conclusive.

There may be cases in which the combination of the gun with one of the other signals may be desirable. Where it is wished to confer an unmistakable individuality on a fog-signal station, such a combination might with advantage be resorted to.

If the gun be retained as one form of fog-signal (and I should be sorry at present to recommend its total abolition), it ought to be of the most suitable description. Our experiments prove the sound of the gun to be dependent on its shape ; but we do not know that we have employed the best shape. This suggests the desirability of constructing a gun with special reference to the production of sound.\*

\* The Elder Brethren have already had plans of a new signal-gun laid before them by the constructors of the War Department.

An absolutely uniform superiority on all days cannot be conceded to any one of the instruments subjected to examination ; still, our observations have been so numerous and long-continued as to enable us to come to the sure conclusion that, on the whole, the steam-siren is the most powerful fog-signal which has hitherto been tried in England. It is specially powerful when local noises, such as those of wind, rigging, breaking waves, shore surf, and the rattle of pebbles, have to be overcome. Its density, quality, pitch, and penetration, render it dominant over such noises after all other signal sounds have succumbed.

I have not, therefore, hesitated to recommend the introduction of the siren as a coast signal.

It will be desirable in each case to confer upon the instrument a power of rotation, so as to enable the person in charge of it to point its trumpet against the wind or in any other required direction. This arrangement was made at the South Foreland, and it presents no mechanical difficulty. It is also desirable to mount the siren so as to permit of the depression of its trumpet fifteen or twenty degrees below the horizon.

In selecting the position at which a fog-signal is to be mounted, the possible influence of a sound-shadow, and the possible extinction of the sound by the interference of the direct waves with waves reflected from the shore, must form the subject of the gravest consideration. Preliminary trials may, in most cases, be necessary before fixing on the precise point at which the instrument is to be placed.

The siren, it will be remembered, has been hitherto worked with steam of 70 lbs. pressure or thereabouts ; the trumpets have been worked with compressed air ; and our experiments have proved that a pressure of 20 lbs. yielded sensibly as loud a sound as higher pressures. The possibility of obtaining a serviceable sound with this low air-pressure may render available the employment of caloric engines with trumpets ; if so, the establishment of trumpets on board light-vessels would be greatly facilitated. The signals at present existing on board such vessels are exceedingly defective, and may be immeasurably improved upon. There are, I am told, practical difficulties as to the introduction of steam on board light-ships ; otherwise I should be strongly inclined to recommend the introduction among them of the Canadian whistle. The siren would probably be found too large and cumbrous for light-vessels.

The siren which has been long known to scientific men is worked with air, and it would be worth while to try how the fog siren would behave supposing compressed air to be substituted for steam. Compressed air might also be tried with the whistles.

No fog-signal hitherto tried is able to fulfil the condition laid down in a very able letter already referred to, namely, "*that all fog-signals should be distinctly audible for at least 4 miles, under every circum-*

stance.' Circumstances may exist to prevent the most powerful sound from being heard at half this distance. What may with certainty be affirmed is, that in almost all cases the siren may certainly be relied on at a distance of 2 miles; in the great majority of cases it may be relied upon at a distance of 3 miles, and in the majority of cases to a distance greater than 3 miles.

Happily the experiments thus far made are perfectly concurrent in indicating that at the particular time when fog-signals are needed, the air, holding the fog in suspension, is in a highly homogeneous condition; hence it is in the highest degree probable that in the case of fog we may rely upon the signals being effective at far greater distances than those just mentioned.

I am cautious not to inspire the mariner with a confidence which may prove delusive. When he hears a fog-signal he ought, as a general rule, (at all events until extended experience justifies the contrary), to assume the source of sound to be not more than 2 or 3 miles distant, and to heave his lead or take other necessary precautions. If he errs at all in his estimate of distance, it ought to be on the side of safety.

With the instruments now at our disposal wisely established along coasts, I venture to think that the saving of property in ten years will be an exceedingly large multiple of the outlay necessary for the establishment of such signals. The saving of life appeals to the higher motives of humanity.

In a report written for the Trinity House on the subject of fog-signals, my excellent predecessor, Professor Faraday, expresses the opinion that a false promise to the mariner would be worse than no promise at all. Casting our eyes back upon the observations here recorded, we find the sound-range on clear, calm days varying from  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles to  $16\frac{1}{2}$  miles. It must be evident that an instruction founded on the latter observation would be fraught with peril in weather corresponding to the former. Not the maximum but the minimum sound-range should be impressed upon the mariner. Want of attention to this point may be followed by disastrous consequences.

This remark is not made without cause. I have before me a "Notice to Mariners" issued by the Board of Trade regarding a fog-whistle recently mounted at Cape Race, and which is reputed to have a range of 20 miles in calm weather, 30 miles with the wind; and in stormy weather or against the wind 7 to 10 miles. Now, considering the distance reached by sound in our observations, I should be willing to concede the possibility, in a more homogeneous atmosphere than ours, of a sound-range on *some* calm days of 20 miles, and on *some* light windy days of 30 miles, to a powerful whistle; but I entertain a strong belief that the stating of these distances, or of the distance 7


to 10 miles against a storm, without any qualification, is calculated to inspire the mariner with false confidence. I would venture to affirm that at Cape Race calm days might be found in which the range of the sound will be less than one-fourth of what this notice states it to be. Such publications ought to be without a trace of exaggeration, and furnish only data on which the mariner may with perfect confidence rely. My object in extending these observations over so long a period was to make evident to all how fallacious it would be, and how mischievous it might be, to draw general conclusions from observations made in weather of great acoustic transparency.

Thus ends, for the present at all events, an inquiry which I trust will prove of some importance, scientific as well as practical. In conducting it I have had to congratulate myself on the unfailing aid and co-operation of the Elder Brethren of the Trinity House. Captain Drew, Captain Close, Captain Were, Captain Atkins, and the Deputy Master have all from time to time taken part in the inquiry. To the eminent Arctic navigator, Admiral Collinson, who showed throughout unflagging, and, I would add, philosophic interest in the investigation, I am indebted for most important practical aid; he was almost always at my side, comparing opinions with me, placing the steamer in the required positions, and making with consummate skill and promptness the necessary sextant observations. I am also deeply sensible of the important services rendered by Mr. Douglass, the able and indefatigable Engineer, of Mr. Ayres, the Assistant Engineer, and of Mr. Price Edwards, the Private Secretary of the Deputy Master of the Trinity House.

The officers and gunners at the South Foreland also merit my best thanks, as also Mr. Holmes and Mr. Laidlaw, who had charge of the trumpets, whistles, and siren.

In the subsequent experimental treatment of the subject I have been most ably aided by my excellent assistant, Mr. John Cottrell.

JOHN TYNDALL.



## THE PLACE OF HOMER IN HISTORY AND IN EGYPTIAN CHRONOLOGY.

### III.—THE THEBAN LINK.

**E**VEN without reference to Egyptian discovery, the references in the Homeric poems to Egyptian Thebes are remarkable. They seemed, however, rather to be brought into question than illustrated by the fact that we also heard of a Thebè in Boiotia, connected with the Cadmeian family and with Phœnicia, and of a Thebè of King Eëtion, the city of those Kilikes who dwelt near Troas. There was no tie between the three, until we come to know something of the great Egyptian empire, and of its close relations with the Phoinikes,\* which must have gone far to identify in contemporary Greek reports what was Egyptian and what was Phœnician.

But these passages have acquired a new importance in relation to my present design, from our having learned that the fame and greatness of Egyptian Thebes belong to a particular, though a lengthened, period of the history of the country.† The old monarchy, before the great invasion of the Shepherd kings, had Memphis for its seat. Thebes is known to have existed under its later dynasties, and also under the Shepherds. But it became the capital of the country only after their expulsion by Ahmes, the first sovereign of the Eighteenth dynasty. At this date the principal monuments of the city begin.‡ This is indeed the Theban monarchy, a phrase synchronous with

\* See also the conjectures explained in Smith's *Anc. Hist. of the East*, p. 81.

† Smith's *Anc. Hist. of the East*, chap. iv.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 63.



the splendour of Egypt. It lasts through this Dynasty of Triumph, and through the Nineteenth Dynasty of Struggle. In the Twentieth, the Dynasty of Decline, the supremacy passes away from Thebes,\* which is etymologically the city of the head, or capital.† According to Mr. P. Smith's chronology, this supremacy of Thebes embraces the period (approximately) between B.C. 1530 and B.C. 1100. He adopts in substance the computations of Mr. Poole, and I believe of Sir G. Wilkinson. Mr. Poole thinks the Eighteenth Dynasty began not later than 1525 B.C., and the Nineteenth not later than 1322. The computations followed by Lenormant carry us nearly a century further back, for the commencement of the period, but with no great difference towards the close; and it is on these that my figures have been based. But the substantial proposition which I submit is this: that the references in the Poems to Egyptian Thebes prove that they belong to the period when that city was supreme in Egypt, and was in effect the first city of the world. The first of them is in Il. ix., where Achilles declares that no amount of gift or treasure which Agamemnon can offer or obtain for him will induce him to compliance: "Not if he gave ten times, twenty times what he offers; not if all he has, or all he might have." Then he proceeds:—

οὐδ' ὅσ' ἔς Ὀρχόμενον προτινίσσεται, οὐδ' ὅσα Θήβας  
 Αἰγυπτίας, ὅθι πλείστα δόμοις ἐν κτήματα κείται,  
 αἱ θ' ἐκατόμυλοι εἰσι, δυκόσιοι δ' ἄν' ἐκάστην  
 ἄνεραι ἐξοιχνεύσι σὺν ἵπποισιν καὶ δχεσφιν.‡

The whole passage, as to the gifts of Agamemnon, is in the nature of a climax; passing from the actual offers to the entire property of the King, the speaker illustrates this transition by referring to Orchomenos, then a wealthy city of the Boiotoi, and from hence, to crown his argument, he moves onwards and upwards to Thebes of Egypt, as the city which contained the greatest treasures in the world. This is wholly inapplicable and unintelligible, except with regard to the period of the actual supremacy of that Egyptian capital.

Next, the Egyptian Thebes is Thebes of the hundred gates. This is not a statistical epithet, more than are those which describe Crete as the land of an hundred,§ or of † ninety, cities. Nor does the word Hecatombè in Homer literally signify an hundred oxen: in truth, it seems to have become a mere phrase designating a solemn and splendid Sacrifice. But there is little doubt that in the other cases, where Homer was not using a customary phrase, but a poetical expression of his own, he intended to signify a very large or indefinite number. A much smaller number, as I have elsewhere endeavoured to show,¶ is indefinitely larger for Homer, than for us. There is, then,

\* F. Lenormant, *Premières Civilisations*, vol. i. p. 224.

† Ib. p. 23.

§ Il. ii. 649.

† Il. ix. 381-4.

|| Od. xix. 174.

¶ *Studies on Homer*, vol. iii. Aoidos, sect. iii.

something singular, and requiring explanation, in this account of a city with a multitude of gates. If we take even the largest walled cities, like Rome, which may have some ten or twelve, it is difficult to conceive how the epithet could be applicable to gates in the ordinary sense. This difficulty seems to have been felt of old, and Diodorus\* explained it as referring to the *propylaia* of the temples. I have understood that the structural forms within the city to this day exhibit what, existing in large numbers, might very well have passed in rumour as gates of the city, and might have been so represented to and by the Poet.

But, besides the primacy of wealth and the number of gates, Homer characterises Thebes of Egypt by a reference to the horse, and what is more, to the horse not as an animal of draught or burden, nor as an animal used for riding, but as driven in the chariots used for war, of which he represents that there were an enormous number, literally twenty thousand, in use at Thebes. That is to say, as to the mode of using the animal, he represents a stage of development in Egypt corresponding with what we know prevailed in the Greece of his day, where the main and characteristic purpose for which horses were used was the traction of the chariot of war; another great purpose, that of riding, being altogether secondary and rare.

In the text of Homer generally, the horse stands in special relation with the East and with Poseidon. But it also stands in connection with the name of the Phoinikes. As to this name, we must remember that it includes all those foreigners who had intercourse with Greece through ships, and since the Phœnician mariners were the medium of this intercourse as carriers, their name comes to cover what is Eastern generally. This, again, means in a great degree what was Egyptian, in common with what was properly Phœnician. If, then, we ask whether the horse of Homer was chiefly related, as far as the text informs us, to Phœnicia or to Egypt, there is one strong reason in favour of the last-named country. It is this, that the Phœniakes of Scheria are evidently intended, from their great wealth and maritime habits, to present to us a picture of Phœnicians proper; and that among them there is not the smallest reference to the horse.

Now, on turning to the Egyptian records, we find that the horse was not indigenous to Egypt, and was unknown there during the Old Pre-Theban Monarchy. It seems to have been introduced by the Shepherd Kings. But, under the warlike Theban kings of the Eighteenth Dynasty, the value of these animals was appreciated, and they were obtained from Asia in immense numbers in payment of tribute,† as well as doubtless by commerce: so that Egypt became a great horse-market,‡ and the horse a characteristic of Egypt. Accordingly, as it was an object of the Mosaic legislation (delivered about the time of Merephthah) to check intercourse with that country, we

\* Diod. Sic. i. 45.

† Chabas, *Études*, p. 441.

‡ Chabas p 443.

find it written :—"But he (the king) shall not multiply horses to himself, nor cause the people to return to Egypt, to the intent that he should multiply horses."\*

And Solomon, who first in Israel had large numbers of horses, obtained them from Egypt.† Enormous ranges of stabling, we learn from Diodorus,‡ subsisted in Thebes. Thus the reference of Homer to the chariots of Egypt is peculiarly appropriate to Thebes, and to the Theban period. But the non-mention of riding concurs with the mention of enormous chariot driving, to give yet more of character to the passage. For the monuments of the Theban kings, which abound in pictures of the horsed chariot, but seldom represent equitation.§ The use of the animal for agricultural draught also made a beginning at this period. It is called by the name of kava, and it is supposed to be derived from the root represented in the Sanscrit *acva*.||

Since, then, very personal and characteristic description, when found to be also most accurate, is a strong indication of contemporary standing, the passage of the Iliad which we have been considering affords evidence of the composition of the Poems during the period of the great Theban Dynasties.

There remains the passage from the Odyssey :

Φύλω δ' ἀργύρεον τάλαρον φέρε, τὸν οἱ ἔδωκεν  
'Αλκάνδρη, Πολύβοιο δάμαρ· ὅς ἐναι' ἐνὶ Θήβῃς  
Λίγυπτις, ὅθι πλεῖστα δόμοις ἐν κτήματι κείμεται.¶

It then proceeds to relate how, while presenting this silver work-basket to Helen, Polubos gave to Menelaos two baths of silver, two cauldrons or tripods, and ten talents of gold ; while the wife of Polubos made a set of separate presents to his Queen ; namely, the aforesaid basket of silver mounted on wheels, and a golden distaff.

This passage both corroborates and enlarges the evidence drawn from that on which we were last engaged. The statement that Thebes contained in its dwellings the largest amount of stored wealth, which might have passed for a mere figure in the fervid oratory of Achilles, reappears here in the calm narrative of this Poet as the simple statement of a fact, and pretty clearly exhibits him as contemporary with the greatness of Thebes.

But again, Polubos dwelt in Thebes ; it was in Thebes itself that these presents were given. But Thebes is not on the Egyptian coast ; it is removed from it by a distance of above three hundred miles. Why did Menelaos, a traveller by sea, penetrate so far inwards ? or, rather, why is he represented as having visited Thebes, and as having

\* Deut. xvii. 16. The ass, not the horse, was the animal of personal use from Moses to David.

† 1 Kings x. 28.

‡ i. 45.

§ Chabas, *Études*, p. 430 ; F. Lenormant, *Prem. Civilisations*, i. 307, *seq.*

|| F. Lenormant, *Ibid.* p. 322.

¶ Od. iv. 125-7.

there received the trophies of Egyptian hospitality? Surely because it was the actual capital of the country. The visit of Menelaos must then be referred to a period not later than the close of the Twentieth Dynasty, for after this period "Tanite and Bubastite Pharaohs," as Mr. Donne\* remarks, were lords of the Nile valley; and the policy and wars of Egypt probably made it expedient to move the seat of government to a point nearer the Syrian frontier. But even the Twentieth Dynasty, after the Third Rameses, witnessed, amidst much vicissitude, times of confusion and rapid decay, which warrant the belief that the Homeric allusions to Thebes must belong to a period, if not before, yet at latest scarcely after the reign of that sovereign. In effect, we should refer the passages (always in relation with the Egyptian Chronology) at least to the early part of the thirteenth century B.C., even though the sovereigns did not fall into insignificance, nor the Empire lose at least its titular sovereignty in Asia, until the latter part of the twelfth. It was this decadence of Egypt which gave scope even to the small kingdom of the Hebrews, under Kings David and Solomon, for rising during a brief space into considerable power.

When we have been thus enabled to connect the references in Homer to Egyptian Thebes with a given historic period, the passages which touch other cities of the same name acquire a fresh interest. We may reasonably suppose that this name, discovered in Asia Minor or in Greece, indicates a foundation effected by settlers belonging to the great Egyptian Empire, and emigrating at some time during the Theban period.

The Thebes of Eëtion is mentioned or referred to in the *Iliad* several times. In *Il. I. 466*, it is the sacred city of Eëtion (ἱερὴ πόλις). It is connected, as we have already seen, with special excellence of horses; and lastly, it has lofty gates (ὕψιλος, *Il. IV. 416*). It is surely remarkable that we find all these three characteristics reproduced in the Cadmeian Thebes of Bœotia. It is sacred (ἱερὰ πρὸς τείχῃα Θήβης, *Il. IV. 378*). It is most closely associated with the horse; for to the Kadmeici alone, besides the Trojans, does Homer give the designation of κέντορες ἵππων, *Il. IV. 391*. It is also remarkable for its gates, being the seven-gated Thebes, *Il. IV. 406*, *Od. XI. 263*. Both cities, too, were rich: Thebes of Eëtion is εὐναιέδουσα, or flourishing (*Il. VI. 415*), as to its territory, and εὐκτίμενον πολίεθρον, a well-built city, in itself (*Il. II. 505*); while Kadmeian Thebes is εὐρύχορος (*Od. XI. 265*). The three pointed characteristics, as well as the fourth, all belonged to the great mother city in Egypt. She had the hundred gates; she horsed twenty thousand chariots; and she was eminently a sacred city, for she was the centre of the Ammon-worship.

Of the period of the foundation of Hupoplakian Thebes, we know

\* Thebes Ægypti, in Smith's Dict. of Geography; F. Lenormant, i. 450.

nothing. Nor can the Cadmeian genealogy be made out from Homer, who tells us that Amphion and Zethos first settled and fortified, not the actual, existing city, but the site (*ἔδος*, *Od.* XI. 263); and that Eurualos, who contended in the Funeral Games of the Iliad, had also beaten all the Kadmeians at Thebes on the occasion of the obsequies of Oidipous. All that the text does here is to throw back the advent of Kadmos, or of the settlers indicated by his name \* (which we are told means immigrant or stranger), for several generations. So that it shows the Theban name had remained in vogue for a long period before the war; and as to this indication it is evidently in accord with the facts of history.

#### IV.—THE SIDONIAN LINK.

The names of Phoinikè and Phoinikes are, it will be remembered, names affixed by Greek foreigners, and having no root in the country to which they refer. Of Canaan, the true indigenous name of Phœnicia, we have no trace in the Poems. But we have in eight passages of the Iliad and Odyssey the name of Sidon and Sidonié, or that of its inhabitants, called Sidones and Sidonioi. This name is given us in the tenth chapter of Genesis,—which is, I believe, acknowledged by the best authorities to be the most valuable document of ancient Ethnography in the world,—as the name of the first-born son of Canaan, who is himself named fourth among the sons of Ham (*Gen.* x. 6, 15); and there is no doubt of its local character, and its great antiquity. Twice named in the tenth chapter of Genesis, Sidon appears again in the nineteenth chapter of Joshua, which, with the eighteenth, gives us the delimitation of the tribes of Israel on their settlement, as “great Sidon” (v. 28). So in Joshua xi. 8, the children of Israel chased their enemies unto “great Sidon.” In the later Scriptural notices of the name, this epithet disappears. The two persons of Canaan and Sidon in the earliest notices may probably be regarded as the eponymists, or typical fathers of races.†

Tyre, on the other hand, is not mentioned in Scripture, except twice, before the epoch of Solomon. First in the nineteenth chapter of Joshua, already mentioned (v. 29), as a fortified city; and again in 2 Samuel, xxiv. 7, when we have reached the reign of David, or the eleventh century B.C.

If the Exodus from Egypt took place under Merepthah in the fourteenth century B.C., are we to treat the reference to Tyre as proving that it had been built and fortified before that period? In Mr. Espin's Preface to the Book of Joshua,‡ there are remarks on the geographical lists as exhibiting much and now incurable

\* Renan, *Langues Sémitiques*, p. 44.

† Movers, *Phönizische Alterthum*, i. 9.

‡ Speaker's Bible, vol. ii. p. 8.

imperfection : and of names, like numbers, it is exceedingly difficult to rely upon a perfectly faithful transmission in ancient records, because the figures are not, like words, generally interwoven with the grammatical sense of the context. It would be hazardous, then, to assert the existence of Tyre as a fortified city in the fourteenth century B.C., on the sole ground of this passage. Nor can any strong reliance be placed on the report given by the Priests\* of the temple of Heracles to Herodotus in the fifth century B.C., who then claimed for it an existence of 2300 years. There is no trace in Homer of the City of Tyre, except a single and slight one. Turo was the grandmother of Nestor, and a descendant of Poseidon. Her extraction, therefore, links her with the East : and it is probably connected with the existence, at least, of Tyre at the time.

But plainly the text of the Poems implies that Sidon was the great and leading city of Canaan or Phoinikè. And in this respect they are in entire accordance with the books of the Old Testament.

The Sidonians of Homer do not appear before us as a purely maritime people. In the Fourth Odyssey, we have a list of the countries and peoples visited by Menelaos, where the Sidonioi stand apart from Phoinikè. When Homer mentions navigators from that quarter, they are commonly Phoinikes ; but the Sidonians appear, when there is any special mark, in connection with works of art. At the Games, Achilles produces, as the prize of the footrace, a six-metre wrought silver bowl (*τετυγμένον*), which exceeded in beauty all others known : for it was worked by the Sidones, who are called *πολυδάδαλοι*, workers in a highly ornamental style. But Phœnician navigators brought it over sea, and gave it to King Thoas.† Another like bowl was presented by Phaidimos, King of the Sidonians (whose name is another indication of their wealth and fame), to Menelaos.‡ Sidon is described as abounding in copper,§ and Sidoniè as flourishing (*εὐναιομένη*). Also, in the Sixth Iliad Hecabè repairs to her store of embroidered robes, the works of the women of Sidon, which Paris had brought to Troy.|| The Sidonians represent a distinct part of that material, as distinct from moral, civilization, which appears the oldest in the history of man,¶ and marks what may properly be called the Hamitic or in part the Poseidonian races.

We have, then, two facts historically certain, that Sidon was very great and wealthy in the primitive period of the history of Canaan, and that it was completely overshadowed by Tyre at a subsequent, though still early, date. And the evidence of the Homeric text is that the Poems belong to the period of the predominance of Sidon, not to that when Tyre was paramount.

\* Herod. ii. 43, 4.

† Il. xxiii. 740-5.

‡ Od. iv. 615-9, and xv. 115-9.

§ Od. xv. 424.

|| Il. vi. 288-91.

¶ Renan, *Langues Sémitiques*, p. 502.

Tradition supplies us with a date, as that at which the change from the one to the other period occurred. Justin states that Sidon was the city first founded by the Phœnicians, and that after a long time its inhabitants were expelled by the King of Ascalon, and built (that may mean resettled and extended) Tyre in the year before the capture of Troy.\* Josephus placed this settlement of Tyre at 240 years before the dedication of Solomon's Temple. The exact date of that event is disputed; if we take the latest year given for it, or 969 B.C., the overthrow of the power of Sidon took place in 1209 B.C., which may be the year intended by Justin: though according to the Poems the greatness of Sidon survived, if only for a short period, the fall of Troy.† Movers treats the Sidonian period as having begun not later than 1600 B.C., and as having ended with the transference of power to Tyre. For this he does not fix a date, but refers to the foundation of Gades and Utica as colonies sent out from Tyre, after the depression of Sidon, in the end of the twelfth century.‡ This supposes that Tyre had come into possession of considerable power some time before.

Again, it may be observed that Sidon was overthrown from Ascalon, a city of the Philistines. It is held by Le Normant that the Philistines were the same people with the "Pelesta of the mid-sea," who entered Syria in the reign of Rameses III., and whose fleet was defeated by a Phœnician navy, acting under and for the Egyptian monarch; and that this defeat of the warriors was avenged a century after by the destruction of Sidon.§ In any case, if we rightly assume the identity of name between Pelesta and Philistia, it follows that the fall of Sidon was subsequent to the War of Rameses III.

Upon the whole, it may be stated that, while the references to Sidon and the Sidonians very closely associate the Poems with the Sidonian Period, there is nothing unreasonable in the traditional opinion that that period closed by the virtual overthrow of Sidon late in the thirteenth century B.C.

#### V.—THE LEGEND OF MEMNON, AND THE KETEIANS OF THE ELEVENTH ODYSSEY.

Nothing can be more improbable than the common tradition respecting Memnon, that he came from Egypt to take part in the war against Troy. It was only at the height of its power that the Egyptian dominion or influence could have reached so far as to the Dardanelles, or indeed, according to our information, into Asia

\* Justin xviii. 3.

† Kenrick's *Phœnicia*, p. 343. Smith's Dict., Art. *Phœnicia*.

‡ Mover's *Phœn. alt. B. i. ch. 8.* (Theil. ii. p. 257.)

§ F. Le Normant in *The Academy* of March 28, 1874.

Minor. Again, the relation of subordination, which had probably once subsisted, laid the foundations not of alliance but of hostility, as we see from the participation of the Dardanians in the Asiatic combination against *Rameses II.* Further, if the interference of the Egyptian empire in the Trojan War was improbable, still less was it likely that an empire of that magnitude should, if taking any part at all, take one so insignificant as by sending a single chief, with a mere contingent, to aid the side which had all along been the losing one: and this, again, only towards the close of the contest. The local tradition, connecting Memnon with Egypt through his supposed statue, is exploded by the knowledge now obtained that this was known historically in the country as the statue of Amenophis III.,\* the son of Thothmes III., who lived before the close, as it seems, of the sixteenth century B.C. To suppose, with others, that Memnon came from the Cushite kingdom, lying to the south of Egypt, would be yet more extravagant; for it was not from the ends of the known earth that contingents were supplied for Troy. Next, we have no reason to presume hostility between Egypt and the Greeks at the period of the *Troica*, for we find Menelaos visiting Egypt as a friend, and so received there, while he pays no visits at all, according to the Homeric record, along the coast, so much less remote, which had supplied military aid to Priam. Nor are we aware of any maritime means by which Memnon could have had access to Troas, as the Phœnicians appear to have maintained neutrality, and there was no power in the North Ægean to cope with the Greeks by sea. Improbable on general grounds, the connection of Memnon with Egypt itself is at direct variance with Homer. He calls Memnon *Ῥοῦς φαεινῆς ἀγλαὸς υἱός* (Od. IV. 188). But Homer nowhere associates Egypt directly with the East; the dwelling of *Kirkè* and the *ἄντρολαὶ Ῥελίοιο* are evidently in the Euxine.

Professor Rawlinson† has enumerated some of the countries which set up in after times a claim to be associated with Memnon. These were Egypt, Ethiopia on the Nile, and Assyria at Susa. Again, his tomb was shown on the Aisepos, at Ptolemais, and at Palton in Syria; and his sword at Nicomedeia in Bithynia.‡

The meaning of all this appears to be, that, from the great and permanent fame of the Trojan War, there arose a natural tendency, in various countries, to claim a share in it, where tradition afforded any sort of handle for the purpose. Memnon was associated by Homer with the East, and the East with dark skin: and he did what no properly Trojan chief is ever related to have done; he killed a leading Greek warrior, seemingly in fair fight.§ Hence connection with him was honourable, and was liable to be very freely claimed. But, as

\* Rawlinson's *Empire*, i. 48. P. Smith, *Hist. of the East*, p. 94.

† *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. i. p. 48, ed. 1871.

‡ *Paus.* iii. 3-6.

§ *Od.* iv. 186-8.



regards Assyria and Susa, his making the long land journey from thence to Troy is, perhaps, as improbable as a similar journey from Egypt, which indeed had much more to do, than had Assyria, with the intervening countries of Syria and Palestine. In the endeavour to examine the case of Memnon, it should all along be borne in mind that the Egyptian monuments and inscriptions now open to us, are entirely without any trace of him.\*

There are but two passages in which Homer refers to Memnon. In the fourth *Odyssey*, he is described as the slayer of Antilochos, and as the famous son of the bright East. In the eleventh *Odyssey*, he is named for his personal beauty, in the following lines, where Odysseus describes to the Shade of Achilles the warlike exploits of his son:—

‘Αλλ’ οἷον τὸν Τηλεφίδην κατενήρατο χαλκῶ,  
 “Ἡρῶ’ Εὐρύπυλον· πολλοὶ δ’ ἄμφ’ αὐτὸν ἑταῖροι  
 Κήτειοι κτείνοντο, γυναιῶν εἵνεκα δόρων.  
 Κεῖνον δὲ κάλλιστον ἴδον μετὰ Μέμνονα διῶν.†

First, let us consider the tribute thus paid to Memnon for his personal beauty.

When Homer compares men on this ground, it is always within the limits of some race. He does not compare the beauty of a Greek with that of a Trojan, but with that of other Greeks. In the second *Iliad*, Nireus is the most beautiful among all the Danaoi, who went to Troy, after the glorious Achilles.‡ After him, the prince and paragon of men, the Telamonian Ajax, was the noblest in form again among all the Danaoi, as well as the greatest in martial achievements.§ This last quoted declaration comes within less than thirty lines after the passage in which it is stated that Eurupulos was the most beautiful warrior after Memnon. When, therefore, the Poet says that Eurupulos, who led the Keteians, was the most beautiful person he had seen except the surpassing Memnon, analogy clearly leads us to suppose that Eurupulos and Memnon were of the same race, and that they both were Asiatics of the same region and associations; probably, then, both were Keteians.

In the Hippodamion at Olympia there was, as Pausanias informs us, a tablet which|| represented Memnon as standing \* over against or fighting with Achilles, and which thus supported the tradition of his great fame in war: suggesting that, like so many more, he went down before the sword and spear of that unrivalled warrior. We have no direct testimony on this subject from Homer; but we may observe, from the passage under consideration, that Odysseus does not give any information about Eurupulos and Memnon to Achilles, but speaks of both as if they were well known already to his interlocutor, only calling Eurupulos τὸν Τηλεφίδην, “I mean him the son of Telephos,”

\* Lauch, *Homer und Ægypten*, p. 31.

‡ *Od.* xi. 519–22.

† *Il.* ii. 674.

§ *Od.* xi. 550.

|| *Paus.* v. 22, p. 435.

as if to distinguish him from the Greek Eurupulos, who commanded the contingent from Ormenion,\* so that the passage reads as if Memnon had been the original commander of the Keteians, and on his death Eurupulos had succeeded him.

Who, then, were these Keteians? and can we, through the traditions respecting Eurupulos or his father Telephos, obtain any light in regard to them, or to Memnon, whether as connected with them or otherwise?

With regard to Memnon, son of the Morning, we know that he must have come from some country to the east of Troas, in order to obtain that appellation. But, are we to look for the Keteioi in the same direction?

We may, in the first place, observe, it is probable that they came from a distance. First, because we find that, as was natural, Priam had already obtained, at the beginning of the war, or, at least, before the period of the action of the Iliad, assistance from all his nearer neighbours, in geographical order, associated together in a great international struggle. The only distinct notice we have of a new arrival of allies during the war is in the case of the Thracians, under their king, Rhesos.† Now, the Thracians of the Trojan Catalogue were those only who bordered upon the current, *i.e.*, the straits of the Hellespont.‡ It cannot, then, be doubted that the Thracians of Rhesos were those who came from the inland country towards Mount Haimos, and who were thus drawn in as the struggle, being prolonged, and growing more arduous, led to greater efforts on the part of the losing side. But we have another sign that the Keteioi came from a distance. It is, that they entered into the war only for a consideration: receiving the gifts of Priam (*γυναιῶν εἴνεκα δώρων*), which, probably, may have been presented to the Queen, or some chief woman of their nation.§ As we find Kinures of Cyprus,|| at the farthest point to which Agamemnon's political influence could be stretched, sending him a valuable gift, in order, apparently, to be excused from serving, yet to maintain friendship, so we can well understand how, when service was obtained under great necessity from a distance, where community of interest would be less strongly felt, gifts should pass to those who rendered it.

The next observation to be made is, that Strabo witnesses to the existence of a river in the Eleatis, called Keteios, which falls into the Kaikos, in Mysia,¶ but, as a mere mountain stream; which, besides that the formation would not be regular, was hardly likely to give its name to a race, if it might receive one from some members of a race. Who the Keteioi were, he frankly avows himself quite ignorant; and he treats as fables the current explanations of the learned. The

\* IL ii. 734.

† IL x. 434.

‡ IL ii. 815.

§ In Egypt, as we find from the records, women in some very remarkable instances administered the government.

|| IL xi. 20.

¶ Strabo, b. 13, p. 616.

lengthened commentary of Eustathius\* on the passage, in which he inclines to derive the word from κῆρος, adds nothing to our knowledge, though he has got hold of the idea that these Keteioi were mercenaries.

If we look at the name in itself, it admits, by the aid of recent Egyptian discoveries, of a perfectly simple and natural identification. In the Book of Genesis, we hear of the children of Heth, the second born son of Canaan, who are afterwards called the Hittites.† Of this race, one, and that the smaller, portion was in immediate contact with the Jews. The great body of the nation occupied northern Syria, and the lower valley of the Orontes: a branch, apparently, of the great Hamitic family, which supplied, in the earliest times, the bulk of the Syrian population.

This warlike and powerful race formed both the great barrier in the north against the extension of Egyptian power, and the centre of military confederations, created for the purpose of repressing it. The name Heth, in Scripture, is represented by Kheta of the Egyptian monuments, and by the Khatti, of the Assyrian inscriptions;‡ and it is principally from the former of these that an accurate idea of their position is to be derived. The Kheta of the Egyptians may well be, as far as the name is concerned, the Keteioi of Homer: indeed, it is not easy to suggest any other rendering, so simple and so obvious, of their name in the Greek tongue.

In the reign of the great Rameses II., when the Egyptian Monarchy was beginning to assume a defensive attitude, the Kheta, or Hethites, made war upon that monarch,§ with a wide support, both from East and West; although of the Phœnicians, they were joined by the town of Arados alone. But, from Asia Minor, they counted as allies, among others, the people of Mysia, and the Dardanians of Troas; indeed, as the inscription is read, of Ilios and Pedasos. This alliance shows that relations existed between the Kheta and the North-west corner of the Fore-Asia (Vorder-Asiens) as it is conveniently called by the Germans.

But there are other signs which tend to show an ethnical, as well as a political, connection between these two quarters. The immediate neighbours of the Kheta on the West, were the Cilicians. According to the mythical genealogy of Apollodorus,|| and others, Kilix was the brother of Phoinix, and the grandson of Poseidon, the great Hamitic deity. When the Kilikes are called Semitic, it is, perhaps, in a sense in which the term is also applied to the Phœnicians; that is to say, their language, so far as it is known by inscriptions, belonged to a family which appears to have been used in common by the Semites and the Asiatic Hamites of the great migration from the head of the

\* P. 1697.

† Gen. x. 15.

‡ Smith's Ancient Hist. of the East, p. 6.

§ Lenormant's Manual de l'Histoire de l'Orient, b. iii. 5, 4.

|| Apollod. ii. 1, 4.

Persian Gulf.\* Next, what appears to be most clearly established is their immediate relationship to the Phœnicians, with whose equipment in the navy of Xerxes theirs nearly agreed.† This similarity would, without doubt, be promoted by their maritime habits. On the other hand, the access by land into their country, from the East and South, was round the Gulf of Issus, through the pass of Mount Amanus; and if not identical in composition with the Kheta, the Kilikes must have been in the closest relations with that nation.

But if we turn to the Troad, we find that it had in its immediate neighbourhood its own race of Kilikes, reckoned, probably, among the neighbouring Mysians. Eetion, father of Andromachè, dwelt under Plakos,

Κιλίκεσσ' ἀνδρῶσιν ἀνάσσων,‡

and Achilles, destroying the city, is thus described:—

ἐκ δὲ πόλιν πέρσεν Κιλίκων εὐναιετάωσαν.§

Strabo, moreover, records the traditions, which, as well as etymology, connect the Kilikes of Mysia with the Kilikes of Cilicia.||

Again, there are reasons why we should look for the presence of non-Aryan races other than the Kares in the Trojan circle of allies. In the Catalogue, Homer calls the Kares *Βαρβαρόφωνοι*,¶ the speakers of a strange tongue. And they are the only race so named. But in the fourth Book, after describing the bleating, so to call it, of the Trojan Army, a broken and various noise, as when each sheep answers its lamb, he gives, as a reason,—

οὐ γὰρ πάντων ἦεν ἡμῶς θρόος οὐδ' ἴα γῆρυς  
ἀλλὰ γλῶσσ' ἐμέμικτο, πολύκλητοι δ' ἔσαν ἄνδρες.\*\*

We may, therefore, well look for some others besides the Kares to justify, by their foreign speech, this general description. It may be that the contingent from Lycia, which was clearly under commanders of Phœnician extraction, likewise used the Phœnician tongue. But, knowing as we do, that there were Kilikes in the neighbourhood of Troy, apparently dwelling among the people of Mysia, we seem justified in pointing to these also, since they were of the Hamitic stock if they were of the Cilician race; and the sense of the passage we are considering therefore tends to support this presumption of identity between the two sets of Kilikes.

The Khita would certainly have been, to Homer, barbarians in speech. It appears probable, to say the least, that these Kilikes were the same. There are several marks which connect Eetion, their sovereign, with Poseidon, and, therefore, with the Poseidon-worship-

\* Lenormant, b. i. 5, 3.

† Herod. vii. 89, 91; Smith, *Anc. Hist. of East*, p. 430.

‡ Il. vi. 397; Strabo, xiv. p. 667.

§ Il. vi. 415.

¶ Il. ii. 867.

|| Strabo, pp. 6, 7.

\*\* Il. iv. 437.

ping races. One is the name of his city, Thebè \*; and another, the excellence of his horses.† We are not, however, called upon to reject the common explanation of the passage in *Od.* xi. 519-22, which is probably true, but not the whole truth. There might be Keteioi in Mysia and on the Orontes, as there were Kilikes in Mysia and in Cilicia, and as there were Lukioi in Troas and in Lycia; and as we know that another branch of the Hethite or Hittite race dwelt among the seven nations of Canaan, at a distance from the parent stock; and as we also find a town founded by this same race in Cyprus, namely the Citium of the Romans.

In the traditional report of the swarthiness of Memnon, there is nothing to raise a presumption that he was not one of the Khita. They were Canaanites and Hamites, worshippers of Poseidon; and it is easy to show, from Homer, through the hair, how remarkably he associated darkness of skin with all that was Eastern.

Now, if Memnon were leader of the Keteioi, it may be observed, in the first place, that his country lay in the same parallel of latitude as Southern Greece, and he might, therefore, with ample consistency, be called by the Poet, son of the Morning. And, most certainly, the Homeric statement, that Memnon was the famous son of the Morning, would be in thorough accordance both with the Poet's geographical idea of the East and sunrise, which the *Odyssey* by no means carries far towards the South, and with the fame to which the Khita, as the resolute and somewhat successful opponents of the vast Egyptian power, had attained.

Of the two questions I have been considering in conjunction, the legend of Memnon and the true interpretation of the Keteian name in the Eleventh *Odyssey*, the latter is of the greater importance in relation to the date of Homer, as it connects him with the period of that nation's prosperity and power. But if we can do anything to identify the position of Memnon, it adds a stone to the fabric. And an old Greek monument enables us to take a further step in this direction. The Lycians under Sarpedon are the most remote towards the south and east of Priam's Allies at the period of the Catalogue. Next to them lie the Kilikes, who, as I contend, are associated with the Kheta. If, then, I am right about Memnon, he and Sarpedon were territorial neighbours. Now Pausanias ‡ gives us a description in detail of the paintings of Polugnotos in the Leschè, or place of resort for conversation, at Delphi. In one portion of these paintings, § the figure of Sarpedon is introduced in a pensive position, his head leaning upon his hands. Next to Sarpedon is placed Memnon, with one of his hands placed on the shoulder of Sarpedon; which must mark, if not consolation, at least friendly relation of some sort.

\* The son of a Thebaïos fights on the Trojan side, *Il.* viii. 120.

† *Il.* viii. 136; xvi. 153.

‡ *x.* 25, seqq.

§ *Paus.* x. 31, p. 875.

And what can this be? Sarpedon is slain during the action of the Iliad, before Memnon has come to Troas. The picture then does not relate to a personal friendship and intercourse in Troas. Is it not a reasonable explanation that the position indicates the friendly territorial neighbourhood of nations, which it is pretty certain had been united in resistance to a foreign supremacy?

There is yet another presumption bearing on the subject of the Keteioi, which arises from the text of Homer. In the Fourth Odyssey, Menelaos describes to Telemachos and his friend his own experiences since quitting Troas:—

ἦ γὰρ παλλὰ παθὼν καὶ πόλλ' ἐπαληθείς  
 Ἦγαγόμεν ἐν νηυσὶ καὶ ὄγδοαίῳ ἔτει ἦλθον·  
 Κύπρον Φοινίκην τε καὶ Αἰγυπτίους ἐπαληθείς  
 Αἰθιοπίας θ' ἰκόμεν καὶ Σιδονίου καὶ Ἑρεμβούς  
 Καὶ Λιβύην ἵνα τ' ἄρνες ἄφαρ κερασοὶ τελέθουσιν.\*

Did we but know in a Menelaid the details of this eight years' tour! Evidently it approached to, though it might not equal, the tour of Odysseus. It differs in this among other respects, that it does not lie so completely beyond the limits of Hellenic navigation and experience, for Egypt and Phœnicia were in some sense known countries, inasmuch as, to say the least, the Greeks were assured of the existence and character of such cities as Thebes and Sidon; while Kupros or Cyprus was, as we see from the Eleventh Iliad, partially within the Hellenic circle of political influence.

Still, the very same expression which Menelaos uses to describe his wanderings, is employed by the seer Theoklumenos in the Fifteenth Odyssey, and again by Eumaios, to describe those of Odysseus: 'he is one who underwent much, and travelled much.' †

Now, bearing in mind that the navigation of the ancients was as far as possible coast navigation, the question arises, How was it that Menelaos is represented as not having touched land anywhere along the great distance between Troas and Phoinikè, except at Kupros, which we know to have been a friendly country? As to Phoinikè, it appears plain, from the Poems, that the Phœnicians took no side in the war; and the visit of Menelaos to Egypt proves it to have been at the time either neutral or friendly. Evidently he avoids the western and southern coast of Asia Minor as far as Lycia, because we know it from the Trojan Catalogue to have been hostile. But, after what we have seen of the presence of Kilikes in Mysia, and of Musoi in Cilicia, we at once account for his avoiding the Cilician coast on the same ground, namely, that it was held by a hostile population. There is still an intervening link, the coast of Northern Syria beyond Troas, which was in the country of the Hethites or Kheta. Is it not a fair presumption that this coast was avoided on the same ground?

\* Od. iv. 81—5.

† Od. xv. 176, 400.

and therefore that the Kheta were also the Keteioi of the Eleventh Odyssey?

That the Phœnicians did not take part in the war is readily accounted for, not only by their distance, but by their position as the chief traders of the Mediterranean, whose business it was, with a due allowance for the liberty of kidnapping, to be at peace with both sides. Hence probably it was that they chose to remain all along in a modified subordination to the great Egyptian empire, rather than to avail themselves of their considerable natural advantages for resistance. That Paris had visited Sidon\* before the war proves nothing adverse to this supposition, as he was then on the most friendly terms also with Greece itself.

To sum up what has been said: we thus find Homer, with respect to the Memnonian tradition, in contact and full consistency, upon a reasonable and probable interpretation of his text, with the facts of real history. Memnon, with whose personality we need not be troubled, was for him the son of the East. Therefore he could not well be Egyptian: yet Egypt might afterwards claim him, in fond connection with the traditions of a period when she had proudly possessed the Empire of the East. He could hardly come from Susiana or Assyria, with which there is no trace of social or political relations. Yet he probably came from outside the circle of the earlier Trojan alliances, and therefore from beyond Lycia, and the countries of the Musoi and Kilikes. There lie the Kheta; and the Poet supplies us with their name, Keteioi. These warriors were separated from the Phœnicians generally, and therefore from relations with Greece, by their hostility to Egypt: and with this historic fact their supplying aid to Troy is in complete harmony.

#### VI.—THE LEGEND OF THE PSEUDODYSSEUS.—THE VOYAGE OF THE SHIP ARGO.

It is not the object of this inquiry to draw out from the Poems all the traces of connection between Greece of the heroic age and the great Egyptian Empire; but only such of them as tend towards defining the chronological limits within which, so far as we are enabled to judge from the Egyptian records or other positive testimony, the War of Troy historically falls.

Having now set forth the principal points of contact between the Homeric text and the Egyptian and Phœnician history, I proceed to mention one or two others of minor moment, which are, however, distinctly subsidiary to those already named.

(I.) In the Fourteenth Odyssey, Odysseus has availed himself on his return to Ithaca, of the hospitality of Eumaios, to whom [he

\* II. vi.

remains unknown. Eumaios desires to learn who he is, and how and why he came to Ithaca. This demand Odysseus meets by a fictitious narrative, which I have termed the Legend of the Pseudo-*Odysseus*.

He describes himself as a Cretan of high extraction, not given to industrious habits, but to war and buccaneering. By this, as a sea-rover, he had greatly prospered; but had afterwards been obliged to take part as a Cretan leader in the Achaian war with Troy. On his return, after only a month of rest at home, he prepared an expedition against Egypt. It consisted of nine ships, and the people readily took service in it.\*

A fair wind brought them in five days to Egypt; and he proceeds in the following terms:—

"I moored in the River Aiguptos. I bid my gallant men stay where they were, and haul the vessel ashore, while I sent out scouts for a survey of the land. But they, unable to restrain their eagerness and wantonness, at once fell to making havock of the well-tilled fields of the men of Egypt, slaying the full-grown males, and carrying off the women and young children. But the din soon reached the city. And the inhabitants hearing it, came down at the following dawn. The whole plain was filled with chariots and with foot-soldiery, and with the blaze of armour. And Zeus, lover of the thunderbolt, struck my comrades with a miserable panic, nor did a man of them stand firm, for mischief gathered on all sides. There they slew many of us with the sharp edge of weapons; and some they took alive to become their bondsmen. . . . †

"As for me, I went straight to meet the king in his chariot, and held and kissed his knees. He raised me and pitied me, and placing me in the chariot, carried me weeping to his home. Many, indeed, rushed at me with spears, for in truth they were vehemently exasperated; but he kept them off, for he had regard to the displeasure of Zeus Xeínios, the great avenger of ill-deeds."

Then he relates how he abode for years in Egypt, receiving kind gifts, and acquiring wealth, until a Phœnician rogue induced him to abscond; when he went to Phoinikè, and from thence, after a year, embarked for Libya, when they fell into ill weather which destroyed their vessel, and new adventures followed which are not to the present purpose.‡

Is it possible to read this narrative in the light of the Egyptian discoveries, and not to receive the impression that it was by no means a pure and arbitrary invention, but one adapted to the law of likelihood, and related to some known facts? The first, because *Odysseus* was not merely entertaining the itching ears of a simpleton, but putting a very shrewd and intelligent man in possession of what he was to take for a real biography. The second, because of the

\* *Od.* xiv. 199-248.

† *Od.* xiv. 258-72.

‡ *Od.* xiv. 278-309.



remarkable points of resemblance with what we now know from the Egyptian records. Let us observe :—

(1) How eminently Egypt is, in this tale, the land of horses, and of horses in chariots, when they are specifically mentioned as having come out in the tumultuary muster of the population against a small band of freebooters.

(2) How the general course of the narrative agrees with that of the Libyan coalition ; an aggressive invasion, success in the first instance, severe suffering inflicted, the ruin of the expedition through a decisive battle, great slaughter and a residue of prisoners. Even the mercy shown to Odysseus agrees with what we are told happened in the same case, when a number of the invaders were allowed to remain as subjects.

(3) There is something strange, and not agreeable to Achaian habits, in the remarkable clemency of the Egyptian king to his suppliant prisoner. But Sir G. Wilkinson, commenting on Herod. ii. 102\*, speaks of the comparative clemency of the Egyptians, and of the honour paid by Sesostris to those who gallantly withstood him.

(4) Still more remarkable is the case of the escape. A Phœnician induced him to escape from Egypt, and in escaping to go with him to Phoinikè, which was the nearest place of refuge. This is perfectly explicable. But next, he persuades the supposed Cretan to go on to Libya, when we should have expected him to seek his own country, Crete. The explanation is supplied by the Egyptian records, though we have no sign from the Poems of anything like ordinary commerce or other intercourse between Greece and the coast of Africa ; the resort of a Greek to that country ceases to be inexplicable, when we find that its people had recently been engaged in a common enterprise with the Achaians against Egypt.

It is evidently the expedition against Merepthah to which this Legend thus in many important points corresponds ; and it supports the view, which the use of the word Achaians suggests, that that expedition took place at a time shortly before the War of Troy.

It may indeed be said that the Legend represents a buccannering raid, whereas the invasion was conducted by a coalition of nations. The answer is tolerably plain ; the Egyptian records are unhappily wanting at the place where they should give the numbers of the Achaian contingents ; but they show with sufficient clearness that the numerical force of the invading army was mainly African. The Libyans (or Lebu) recorded as killed were 6359. Of another nation whose name is blank, there were 6111, and of a third, also blank, 2370.† As the record gives 9111 daggers or knives taken from the Maxyes, the larger of these two numbers, it would seem, belongs to them, and

\* In Rawlinson's Herodotus, vol. ii. p. 162.

† Chabas, pp. 199, 200.

the third may be that of the Kahakas. The Maxyes were much more nearly united with the Libyans than the Achaians were (though all were probably Aryan races); and were comprehended with them in the general designation of Tahennu, which included all the neighbours of Egypt on the West.\* But when we come to the transmarine contingents, we find the Achaian name given, with the numbers blank: the Sikels, who have but 222 killed, and the Tursha, or supposed Etruscans, whose slain are 542. From this it appears probable, though not certain, that the Achaian force in the war against Merepthah was on a scale not widely different from that which we find in the very curious legend of the Pseudodyseus.

(II.) Though it cannot be said that the Records of Egypt throw any direct light upon the voyage of the ship *Argo*, yet indirectly they suggest a sense and meaning for a legend which it has been heretofore so difficult to supply with a probable basis of fact.

We have long, indeed, been in possession of most curious information respecting the Colchians. Pindar† calls them the dark-faced (*κεκάλωπες*). Herodotus states that a colony detached from the Army of Sesostris settled on the Phasis. He has no doubt that the Colchians are an Egyptian race. He found that tradition subsisting among them. He relies partly on their having black skin and woolly hair, but very much more on their practising circumcision. The Egyptians and the Colchians use a manner of weaving unknown elsewhere.‡ I do not refer to the less weighty authorities of Diodorus and other late witnesses. But I may mention that the language of old Colchis, now Mingrelia, is Turanian.§

There were but two great events, antecedent to the *Troica*, and known to us by the general tradition of the country, in which Greece had an interest truly national. Homer, who gives us so largely the adventures of Phoenix, and the local war of Nestor, alludes to the events I speak of in a manner bearing no proportion to their historical moment. He was too great an artist to bring upon the stage any figure which could vie with the subject of his song; and it is probable that the Legends of the War of Thebes and of the ship *Argo* were competing legends with the War of Troy. Of the War of Thebes he gives us only glances, and those incidentally to the character and position of Diomed.|| The ship *Argo* is named but once in the Poems.¶

We have recently, I think, begun to perceive that the expedition against Thebes was a national expedition; an expedition, as Homer phrases it, of Achaians against Cadmeians. Mitford had noticed it as "the first instance of a league among Grecian Princes."\*\*\* The

\* De Rougé's Memoire, pp. 14, 15.

† Pyth. iv. 377.

‡ Herod. ii. 103-5.

§ Max Müller, *Languages of the Seat of War*, pp. 112-4.

|| Il. iv. 370-400; Il. v. 800-8.

¶ Od. xii. 70.

\*\*\* Mitford, chap. i. sect. 3. Notwithstanding his prejudices, Mitford is an author whom no one need even at this day be ashamed to consult or quote. Fifty years ago

Theban country was the grand seat of foreign immigration and influence in Middle and Southern Greece. Elsewhere there had been individuals or families settling in the country, rather than communities. Here there appears to have been a real colony, and a colony which perhaps displaced or supplanted a prior settlement by Amphion and Zethos.\* The War against Thebes has notes which indicate that it was probably an early effort of the nation, just awaking, under its Achaian name, to self-consciousness and independence, in which the domestic dissensions of the ruling families of Thebes were used as the occasion for putting down an element of power in the country, which was or had been formidable by reason of its derivation from the great though declining Egyptian Empire. The tenacious vitality of the motives from which it sprang would seem to show that it was far more than a personal quarrel. The expedition of the *Epigonoî* took place after Poluneikes, the person by whom the movement was originally prompted, was already dead. It is mentioned but slightly in Homer.† Yet the completeness of its success seems to be attested by the decentralized condition in which the Boiotians mustered for the Trojan war, not as a monarchy, but under five apparently equal leaders.‡

Now I would suggest that the voyage of the ship *Argo* was probably a manifestation, and an effort, at a very slightly earlier date, of the same feeling. As it stands in the framework of ordinary Greek legend, it has been found by the ablest critics extremely difficult either to accept as history, or to etherialize and translate as myth.§ Mitford || refers it to the ambition of Jason to obtain distinction by a freebooting expedition to a more remote quarter than any theretofore molested. Bishop Thirlwall laments that when the marvellous is stripped off, and only a dry husk left, the story appears only more meagre and not more intelligible.¶ Mr. Grote treats the inquiry as hopeless whether there be in the Legend any basis of fact or not. But it is plain that when once we are able to show an historic link between Egypt and Greece, importing supremacy at a given period on one side, and dependence on the other, there is nothing forced or improbable in the hypothesis that the Greeks, when the yoke had ceased to press them, might have been attracted by the love of booty and the hope of revenge to any point where Egyptian authority was represented feebly enough to invite attack.

he enjoyed a monopoly of authority; he is now perhaps unduly depressed. He surely marks one of the advancing stages of Greek historiography. I do not find the subject noticed in the work of Bishop Thirlwall. Mr. Grote's view of the legendary period, which as coming from him carries great authority, was not favourable to the admission of the too realistic idea of nationality as among the motives which prompted mythical ornamentation. It is set forth in his *Sixteenth Chapter*.

\* Od. xi. 260-5.

† Il. iv. 406.

‡ Il. ii. 494.

§ Thirlwall's *Greece*, chap. v. vol. i. pp. 132-9, 12mo edition.

|| Chap. v. p. 143.

¶ Part i. chap. xiii. pp. 332-4.

Sir G. Wilkinson\* considers that the object of the Argonautic expedition may have been to obtain a share of the lucrative trade with the East which flourished on the eastern coast of the Black Sea. But that expedition preceded the Homeric Poems, and it is surely evident that even at their date the Greeks had not attained to any such development of their commercial conceptions. Indeed, the whole tale, unlike that of the War against Thebes, presents circumstances of improbability which, in the absence of any specific answer, are most startling. In the whole of the Poems we never hear of a merchantship of the Greeks. The *Argo*, if it existed, must have been a pure sea-rover's vessel fitted for booty. As a single vessel, she could not be meant for war in the sense of the Trojan expedition. But if she was meant for booty only, why did she seek it at so great a distance, in a sea as yet untraversed by the Greeks? And why, above all, if she were but a pirate, was she an object of intense national feeling to the people of her own time, or why did she take so high and lasting a place in the recollections of the race? If, as we know from the records, Egypt was now no longer a maritime power in the Mediterranean, and the Achaian people were disposed to retaliate; and if as tradition, together with many signs, assures us, there was in the Black Sea a weak Egyptian outpost, showing probably, in Greek eyes, some of the wealth but little of the force of the old Empire; then I think, and perhaps then only, do we attain to a rational hypothesis as to the motive and character of the Argonautic expedition.

Now, slight as is the notice in the *Odyssey*, it gives us assistance on at least two points. While declaring that *Argo*, and she only, had passed through the dangerous *Strophades*, or the *Bosphorus*, on her voyage, it calls her *παιμύλουσα*—an object of universal, *i.e.*, national interest; and it states that she never would have effected the passage, except by means of the love of *Herè* for Jason.†

Why did *Herè* thus love Jason, not with a passionate or mortal, but with a divine and protecting love? Among the surest indications in Homer, are those afforded by the introduction of a deity in connection with some special person or purpose. Now, *Herè* is by a peculiar and exclusive excellence, the great Achaian goddess. Not like *Zeus* and *Apollo*, who are wholly liberated from merely national affections; or *Poseidon*, who everywhere holds fast by those of his own race or longitude; or *Athenè*, whose sympathies in the war are given to individuals rather than to a race or country: the basis of her national action seeming to lie exclusively in that offence of *Paris*, which she had suffered together with *Herè*.‡ It is *Herè*, and *Herè* only, on whose inner heart is written in deep characters the Achaian name; whose energy on behalf of the army never ceases, who beguiles *Zeus*,

\* In Rawlinson's *Herodotus*, vol. ii. p. 169.

† *Od.* xii. 69-72.

‡ *Il.* xxiv. 27

who compels the Sun to set when he wishes to continue shining, who gives her sympathy to all that is Greek, and nothing that is not Greek, and whose central worship through the historic ages was in Argos, a district of Achaian settlement, and the centre of Achaian power. When Homer says that *Argo* passed the Straits in safety because Herè guided her, out of her care for Jason (ἐπεὶ φίλος ἦεν Ἰήσων), I read him as meaning that Jason was engaged in a true national enterprise, so the goddess proper to the nation kept him scatheless.—

Much more might be said on the connection between the Greece of Homer and Egypt. Who is the Homeric Minos? Who is the Aiguptios of Ithaca? What share has Egypt in all the notices of the Phœnician name, and the numberless and interesting associations connected with it? Why is it that, while the later and uncertified Greek tradition testifies to Egyptian influence and settlement over heroic Greece in forms so numerous that we cannot refer them all to a casual origin, the direct traces of the connection are so faintly marked in the Poems? Why is Minos Judge in the Underworld of the *Odyssey*? Was he the Egyptian Menes, and are the imagery and personages of that underworld borrowed from what Homer might have gathered respecting the religion of Egypt? Lauch, in his "*Homer und Ægypten*," has pursued in much curious and interesting detail the search in the Egyptian records for names which we find in the Poems. I will only here say, in relation to the questions I have raised, that if, when Homer sang, there was the memory of a time still recent, during which the young nation, now grown so strong in self-consciousness, energy, and hope, had been in political subordination to Egypt, that of itself was reason enough for a Poet with the intense Hellenism of Homer to suppress or reduce as much as possible the direct tokens of the connection.—

I have been thus far more or less upon the ground of history; I conclude with offering what is certainly pure conjecture; and yet, I think, conjecture not unreasonable.

Of the great Egyptian empire of Rameses II. and the Nineteenth Dynasty, Homer, or at least Hellas, must, humanly speaking, have known something, on account of their relation to continental and yet more certainly to insular Greece. But, considering the military greatness of that empire, its numerous expeditions to Syria, and the concern of the Phœnicians, in all such things the sole or main informants to the Greeks, in its affairs, some *tennis aura*, some breath, at least, of the renown of the Egyptian kings and warriors, must have passed into the atmosphere of Greece. With respect to Thebes, we have seen that the single allusion of the kind is one apparently founded not on vague rumour, but upon real tidings truly characteristic of their subject. There was probably some corresponding knowledge of other things and persons. Rameses II., as we are told, enjoyed what other great men before Agamemnon wanted—namely, the advantageous

chance for fame which the muse confers.\* The contemporary epic of Pentaour has recorded, and doubtless enlarged, his deeds. It was probably due to this poem, either alone or with other causes, that in tradition he outgrew predecessors whose real achievements, or at least whose real power was greater, and that he not only outgrew, but even absorbed them; for with the world outside of Egypt, down even to our time, Sesostris was the hero of that country, and Sesostris was Rameses II. And this great but shadowy name was the sole but much questioned testimony to the fact that the supremacy over humankind had once belonged to a great Egyptian empire. According to the Pentaour, this monarch personally performed in the war with the Kheta such prodigies of valour as may fairly be deemed without example, and considered to approximate to the superhuman. Was it the echo of these deeds, or of this resounding celebration of them, that suggested to Homer the colossal scale of his Achilles? a warrior against whom, while heroic strength and prowess secured but an *impar congressus*, mere numbers, however accumulated, were but as dust in the balance; and the very apparition of his form discomfited an army.† The Poet is notably in correspondence with the account of Rameses, who is represented as surrounded when alone by 2,500 chariots of the enemy, as making his appeal to Ammon, and as cutting his way through the hostile army, with great glory to the horses who drew his chariot; all singularly in sympathy and accordance with the spirit of the Homeric picture and its preter-human element.‡

But Rameses was also, and this according to the inscriptions, a portentous sensualist.§ In a long life, we are told, he had 166 children, of whom fifty-nine were sons. It was perhaps this extraordinary form of human excess—and if not it was almost certainly some similar exorbitancy—that may have suggested to the Poet a picture so intensely foreign, and so repulsive to the Greek manners, as that of Priam; who had fifty sons, with a number of daughters, nowhere mentioned; but twelve were married inmates of his palace.|| And his vast progeny proceeded from a number of mothers about which we are in the dark, three only being expressly named; and nineteen of the sons being credited to Hecabè.¶

The argument for these conjectures may be summed up thus:—Contemporary Hellas was subject, after the manner of an eastern empire, to the Egyptian Sovereigns of the Eighteenth Dynasty, and, titularly at least, perhaps also to the Nineteenth. On this account it must have had some information as to extraordinary characters and events connected with the great empire whose yoke—probably a light one from the remoteness of the seat of power—it bore.

\* Lenormant, i. 411, and *Premières Civilisations*, vol. i. p. 287.

† Hom., II. xviii. 215–29.

‡ Lenormant, *Prem. Civ.* i. pp. 289–294. § Lenormant, *Hist.* i. 423.

|| II. 24, 493, b. 248. See *Studies on Homer*, vol. iii. p. 210, \* 7.

¶ II. xxiv. 196.

The force of this consideration is heightened, when we recollect that the tribes or nation who constituted the maritime arm of this great Empire were also the race who, described in Homer and by the Greeks as Phoinikes, were their principal and perhaps almost sole informants concerning occurrences which took place at a distance from their own coasts.

Now this Rameses the Second was evidently reputed to be a person of the most marked individuality; a man so extraordinary—at least in the verse of his Bard—that though he does not represent the climax of Egyptian power, which in his reign was beginning to decline, yet he cast both his successors and his more potent predecessors into the shade through his heroic force and prominence; and he passed into the general tradition of the world with a name which reached the historic times as that of a great conqueror, while they were forgotten beyond the bounds of Egypt itself.

In the Poems of Homer, while we have much that is remarkable indeed, but still within the limits of human experience, two pictures only are presented to us, which surpassed them: the character of Achilles, in its colossal dimensions both of sentiment and action; and the ménage of Priam, in its Asiatic multiformity so strangely contrasted with the modesty of early Greek life. And the hint or suggestion of both these representations is found in the character of Rameses the Second.—

I will now bring together the figures which are yielded by the three wars against Egypt under Rameses II., his son Merephthah, and Rameses III. The dates of the attacks are taken in the two first, approximately at 1406 and 1345 B.C.; for the third exactly, as M. Le Normant informs us, at 1306 B.C.

The characteristic names of the three expeditions, which supply the links with Greek history, are respectively Dardanians, Achaians, and Danaans. The first expedition was certainly, and the second probably, before the War of Troy; the third must in all likelihood have been later than the War. The ranges of time which I have computed from the facts of the attacks, would give us the following limits within which the Siege of Troy must, according to the Egyptian records, have fallen—

	Earliest.	Latest.
From the expedition against Rameses II.	1316 B.C.	1226 B.C.
„ „ „ „ Merephthah	1345 „	1285 „
„ „ „ „ Rameses III.	1387 „	1307 „

The years between 1316 B.C. and 1307 B.C. would satisfy the conditions of all these computations. And the latest year which any of them will allow, it will be observed, is 1226 B.C., a date earlier than the important catastrophe which deposed the city of Sidon from its primacy in Canaan.

The names used in Homer, which bear directly on the argument, are five—

- |                   |                  |
|-------------------|------------------|
| 1. The Dardanian. | 4. The Sidonian. |
| 2. The Achaian.   | 5. The Keteian.  |
| 3. The Danaan.    | 6. The Theban.   |

And the evidence which the text yields in connection with each and all of them converges, positively or negatively, upon the same point. The general effect is, to throw back the Fall of Troy somewhat, but not greatly, further than according to the common computation. Some, however, as we have seen, bring the 18th, 19th, and 20th Dynasties slightly lower down than the writers whose figures I have provisionally adopted. Mr. Poole's or Mr. P. Smith's figures would not greatly affect any date to be assigned on the strength of an argument such as this to the War or Fall of Troy. There is no method of handling the evidence in detail, as far as I can see, which will not throw the *Troica* back at least as far as the middle of the Thirteenth Century B.C. But the whole, it must be remembered, depends on the substantial acceptance of the Egyptian computations.

The opinions which were current on this subject before it was capable of illustration by Egyptology, were learnedly discussed and summed up by Clinton.\* Düntzer† observes, that Herodotus in his history adopts the date of 1270 B.C., and by some the event was carried as high as 1353 B.C., while others placed it as low as 1120 B.C.—

One word, before closing, on the extraordinary interest which, if my presentation of this early history be generally correct, attaches to the warlike incidents of the infancy of Greece. *Sic fortis Etruria crevit*. We have examples in modern times, and in the most recent experience, of great States which owe all their greatness to successful war. The spectacle offered to a calm review by this process is a mixed, sometimes a painful one. So, too, it seems, that the early life of the most wonderful people whom the world has ever seen, was greatly spent in the use of the strong hand against the foreigner. That people was nursed, and its hardy character was formed, in the continuing stress of danger and difficulty. But the voyage of Argo, the Seven against Cadmeian Thebes, the triumphant attack of the Epigonoï, the enormous and prolonged effort of the War of Troy, the Achaian and so-called Danaan attempts against Egypt, were not wars of conquest. They were not waged in order to impose the yoke upon the necks of others. And yet, though varied in time, in magnitude, in local destination, they seem, with some likelihood at least, to present to us a common character. They speak with one voice of one great theme: a dedication of nascent force, upon the

\* *Fasti Hellenici*, Introduction, sect. vi. p. 123.

† *Homerische Fragen*, p. 122.




whole noble in its aim, as well as determined and masculine in its execution. For the end it had in view, during a course of effort sustained through so many generations, was the worthy, nay, the paramount end of establishing, on a firm and lasting basis, the national life, cohesion, and independence.

1874.

W. E. GLADSTONE.

NOTE.—I have to withdraw a statement too hastily made in the first part of this paper that Homer does not call Troy large or broad-wayed. This is incorrect ; see *Il.* ii. 141, 332, and elsewhere. But in the substance of my statement, with regard to the population of Troy, I have nothing to qualify.—June 12.



## LATENT THOUGHT."

IT has struck me that a loose and somewhat obscure mode of speaking of "latent thought," and, indeed, of the intellect generally as an automatic machine independent of consciousness, has grown up of late,—a mode of speaking which is but an hypothesis, and, I believe, an unwarranted one, for accounting for a few mental phenomena, no doubt of the first importance, but quite inadequate for the purpose of establishing the very startling conclusion that you can reach some of the highest and best results of thought without thinking. My object, in the present paper, is briefly to classify the phenomena referred to, and maintain that they do not imply what they are supposed to imply, and what I do not think they could be supposed to imply if we realized fully the meaning of our words,—namely, that the brain, as distinct from the mind, is a sort of intellectual weaving-machine, from which, if you supply it with the raw materials of a mental problem, you may hope to take out the finished article without the exercise of any intellectual judgment or reflection. I don't think you can get the results of thinking without thought, of judging without judgment, of creative effort without the conscious adaptation of means to ends. And I don't think that the phenomena—the real existence of which, of course, I fully accept—alleged as proving that this is possible, prove, or even legitimately suggest, so strange a conclusion.

(1.) One of the most remarkable evidences of what is called "latent thought" is furnished by the laws of perception. It is quite certain that there is for every person a *minimum visibile* or *audibile*, or generally a *minimum sensible* (to use somewhat bad Latin), anything

less than which does not affect his perceptive faculties at all, but less than which yet is, of course, an essential part of that minimum itself. If the line I am writing on could be cut up into such a number of distinct spots that each of them was a trifle less than my *minimum visibile*, and if these spots were then removed to some distance from each other, I should not perceive their existence at all. But if any two of them were brought together, I should then become aware of the existence of a spot. It is clear, therefore, that there are such things as physical constituents of an object of perception which, taken alone, are not perceived, and yet which are essential elements of something that is perceived. If this is "latent perception," on the ground that one of these spots taken alone must affect me in some degree, though not in a degree sufficient to excite perception without combining with another of them,—then latent perception only means "a latent physical condition of perception;" and that there are innumerable such latent physical conditions,—conditions which only become patent in conjunction with other conditions,—I suppose every observant man would admit. The colour of the spot, for instance, may be such a latent physical condition of perception, since a much smaller spot of bright colour can be seen on a dark ground, or a much smaller spot of dark colour on a bright ground, than could be perceived if the colour of the spot were more similar to that of the background. Hence the redness of the two halves of the *minimum visibile* may be a latent physical condition of their being perceived when they coalesce into one, just as much as their size. The latent physical conditions not only of perception, but of feeling and thought,—the conditions of the nervous system essential to feeling and thought,—are probably innumerable. But no one will say that unobserved—*i.e.*, latent—physical conditions of feelings and thoughts, are feelings and thoughts, or we should be using language quite without that definiteness and appropriateness which are the main uses of language. The case I am now discussing is not one of latent perception, but of a latent physical condition of future perception. It constitutes no proof that you perceive without perception, though it may constitute a proof, to use Sir William Hamilton's language, that "what we are conscious of is constructed out of what we are not conscious of,"—a very different thing, though even that seems to me a little inaccurately stated, for it would be better to say, that what we are conscious of is constructed out of what we could not be conscious of without the occurrence of other conditions. Surely we are conscious of the whole *minimum visibile*;—though not of each half, yet of both halves. In the doctrine, then, of latent physical conditions of perception, I see no justification for the phrase, latent perception. There is either perception or no perception. What is unperceived is not perceived, though it may be quite essential to something that is to be perceived. That something

may be happening in my brain, to my optic nerve, for example, even when only half the *minimum visibile* is opposite to my eye, and that this something is quite essential to what happens as soon as the whole is there, I am willing to admit. But the half does not cause a latent perception, though it is a latent physical condition of perception.

(2.) Dr. Carpenter, in his learned and instructive book on “Mental Physiology,” speaks of the phenomena of recollection as proving a kind of activity of the brain or mind,—he guards himself against applying the term “thought” to anything of which we are not conscious, but I am not quite sure how far he thinks the distinction to be more than a question of words,—which is often even stimulated by our giving up the effort to recollect, and passing to other subjects. And he gives us many striking instances of phenomena of which we have all, probably, seen less striking instances, in which the effort to recollect being futile, the missing memory flashes back upon us soon after we have relinquished the search. Farther, he expresses his belief that when phenomenon A is connected with C, but only, *as far as our consciousness is concerned*, through B, A frequently suggests C directly, without any even momentary flash of B upon the memory, the substitute for B being the cerebral or nervous state formerly connected with B, though not, in this instance, serving to bring B back into consciousness. I have no doubt at all that that is often a perfectly true account of the missing links in a chain of memory. There can be no doubt that the restoration of a former state of consciousness may be accomplished by any avenue whatever which leads back to it? and that if phenomenon A be a flash of light causing a particular nerve to vibrate, which nerve, again, is in the same sheath with two others, one closely connected with phenomenon B, and the other with phenomenon C, it might well happen that the second nerve might set the third in motion, without itself suggesting phenomenon B, before the attention had been rivetted by phenomenon C? The sight of a certain species of chocolate always suggests to me the jaundice, but I have no doubt that originally the missing link between these two conceptions was a particular sensation in the mouth or stomach, which, as far as I know, I have never consciously recalled, but which the chocolate caused at a time when an attack of jaundice was coming on. It is quite possible that some very faint recurrence of that sensation—so faint as never to challenge conscious attention—was the missing link between the two impressions in my mind. But here, again, I see nothing like latent or unthought thought, but only unthought physical conditions of thought. Clearly Dr. Carpenter is right in saying that to leave off attempting to recollect and to rely on the trains of suggestions set going in the first effort, after the (probably misleading) control of the will has been withdrawn, is frequently the best chance we have for recovering a missing impression. But Miss Cobbe’s and Mr. Wendell Holmes’s

suggestion, to which Dr. Carpenter will be, I believe, *misunderstood* by many, as lending in this book a certain amount of countenance, that this recovery is due to some mysterious so-to-say subterranean intelligence working beneath our consciousness, as a Secretary hunts up a quotation for his superior, seems to me baseless. Any man who observes his own mind, will notice that if he stirs up thoroughly any subject whatever, by ransacking its intellectual neighbourhood, so to speak, he will for days afterwards have all sorts of cross-associations with it flashing up at times in his mind,—and this whether he is in search of a missing impression or not. When you take down an old shelf of College books, you have, for days after, waifs and strays of College memories haunting your mind, some of them coming by direct, some by quite inscrutably indirect and subtle paths of association. Of course it is not remarkable that when one of these impressions happens to be missing, it will come back to you on some such line of association. But all that this seems to me to signify, is that memory depends on a number of latent and involuntary physical conditions, as well as a number of conscious and equally involuntary mental conditions, and that when you have exhausted the latter unsuccessfully, you had better fall back on the chance of help from the former. Man being made up of body and mind, there is nothing astonishing in the fact that there are bodily links, of which he may often be unconscious, between states of mind not otherwise associated. But this is not latent or unthought *thought*, it is a latent or unthought physical condition of suggestion. And that such conditions exist, I think every psychologist will admit. It does not the least follow from thus admitting that the conditions of memory are rooted in involuntary physical as well as mental laws, that the process of inference or judgment, of analysis or synthesis, or even of recollection itself, could be unconsciously performed. Yet, as I shall show, the theory appears to be held, even by a very distinguished man, that you may recollect without recollecting—*i.e.*, recollect elaborately with your muscles what has not yet emerged into recognition by your mind.

Again, (3) there are such things as automatic habits, which, once formed, require exceedingly little thought or attention, so that you may read aloud, or play on the piano, or walk through a crowded street, absorbed all the time in a train of intense thought or feeling, as widely removed as the Poles asunder from your immediate action. Such habits seem to be in some sense mental analogies of the first law of motion,—seem to show, that is, that even a law of change, once established in our minds, tends to persevere, in the absence of any resisting force. But are these cases of unconscious thought, of latent intellectual effort? I think not. They show with how little conscious effort you can do that which it took you a great conscious effort to begin to do, but\* *not that an under-mind* is working without

\* "Not an *under-mind*, but an *under-party*," says Dr. Carpenter.—EDITOR C. R.

your knowing it, while the upper-mind works at something else. If an under-mind were working at reading aloud, for instance, while the upper-mind were dwelling on a totally different train of ideas, then it would follow that the drift of what you had been reading might be recovered by you in some future mental state. Now it is true, I think, that this sort of unconscious reading does sometimes impress the *sound* on your memory; the ear will retain what the ear hears, and sometimes a sentence comes afterwards back on you *verbally*, and then for the first time, if you take in the words, you apprehend what it means, and just as freshly as if you were then hearing it for the first time; but what one has read thus automatically is never apprehended by the mind, and consequently never recollected, unless it be indirectly by the lingering of the sounds in the memory, which sounds are not translated into their import till some future time. It seems to me that these automatic habits imply no more than this,—that what takes but little effort and attention may be done simultaneously with what takes much. But this is no case of ‘latent thought.’ It is a case of giving exceedingly little thought to a thing which now requires little, and a great deal to another thing which requires much; the power of recalling afterwards, being generally proportional to the amount of attention given. That you cannot do even these semi-automatic acts without some attention is shown by the fact that if in such automatic reading you get to a new and difficult word, you have to break your chain of thought to read it, or else you break down,—and that if in your walk in a crowded street you get to a barricade, you must recall your mind to circumvent it. These seem to me phenomena not of latent thought, but of a minimum of thought. Dr. Carpenter holds that the power some remarkable calculators have of adding up a long column of figures almost at a glance, shows that the brain operates without the consciousness, inasmuch as there is not time to receive a distinct conscious impression of every figure. But that view surely explains a great deal too much. If any one figure were changed, unquestionably the result would be differently given, if it were rightly given. Either, then, the mind takes account of every figure, though so rapidly as not to be able to recall it afterwards, or it does not take account of any, and the whole operation is unconscious,—which seems to me a much wilder supposition than the former. To say that a man *cerebrates* a sum more quickly than he could calculate it, seems like saying that an intellectual habit which, by practice and faculty, has become astonishingly easy and sure, has ceased to be intellectual by reason of its economy of effort. But surely to require less effort and attention to a given achievement is not less, but more of a triumph of intellect, than to require more. What is called ‘cerebration’ is, I think, only a mental operation marked by great economy of intellect and effort. But why is such an operation more a case of ‘cerebra-

tion' than the same operation slowly carried through all its stages? Where is the evidence that the less the amount of intellectual effort, the greater is the amount of brain activity? As far as I can see, the 'cerebrational' assumption assumes that there can be no real economy of brain-effort at all, that as soon as we have less mental trouble over an operation, there must be some compensation for the saving, in the shape of a great relegation of activity to brain-processes of which we are not conscious. I should have expected just the reverse,—that the greatest amount of 'cerebration' goes with the greatest amount of conscious attention and effort, and the least 'cerebration' with the least. Dr. Carpenter teaches us (see p. 475 of the work referred to) that semi-automatic habits are due to the mechanism of a different set of nerves from those which are called into play when we first painfully learn our lesson:—

"Now, since," he says, "in those cases in which man *acquires* powers that are *original* or *intuitive* in the lower animals, there is the strongest reason for believing that a mechanism forms itself in *him* which is equivalent to that congenitally possessed by *them*, we seem fully justified in the belief that in those more special forms of activity which are the result of prolonged 'training,' the Sensorimotor apparatus *grows-to* the mode in which it is habitually exercised, so as to become fit for the immediate execution of the mandate it receives (§ 194): it being often found to act not only without intelligent direction, but without any consciousness of exertion, in immediate response to some particular kind of stimulus,—just as an Automaton that executes one motion when a certain spring is touched, will execute a very different one when set going in some other way."

But admit that animal movements follow each other without any consciousness when a certain spring in the nervous system has been once touched, and that those animal movements are as well adapted as a locomotive with steam on to move a train, for the purpose which you had in view in starting them,—still this does not prove in the least that the results of thought can be obtained without thought, except in the sense in which it is always true of a mechanism properly prepared,—the said locomotive, for instance,—that after you have ceased to think, it will, when properly set in motion by human purpose, do what it had been adapted to do. But *have* we a logical or calculating machine, like Professor Jevons's and the late Mr. Babbage's, in our brains, which will, when properly manipulated, draw inferences, and calculate arithmetical problems, without intelligence? I see no sign of it at all. I have no means of drawing an inference without understanding the premisses; I have no means of telling what the sin. 30°, is without knowing what a sine means, and what 30° mean. That machines may be devised to *imitate* to some extent the methods of human thought, does not in the least prove that we possess such machines in our own brains, in addition to the original intelligence which suggested them. And I don't think we do. My only quarrel is with the notion that you can get all the

results of calculation out of your brain without discriminating 2 from 5; that you can have all the fruits of recollection while your memory is a blank; that you can infer without a conscious act of attention; that you can judge without a trace of any weighing of the pros and cons. And this is the view which a small part of Dr. Carpenter's doctrine seems to me at least to countenance.

For instance, (4) Dr. Carpenter gives as a tenable explanation of certain supposed facts adduced by spiritualists, that a person present at a séance, having some time ago known certain facts reported by the movements of the table, but having quite forgotten them, had yet involuntarily and unconsciously caused the table to move so as to assert them, they being at the moment, in this person's own belief, not only false, but completely imaginary:—

"Another instance, supplied by Mr. Dibdin (*op. cit.*), affords yet more remarkable evidence to the same effect; especially as being related by a firm believer in the 'diabolical' origin of Table-talking:—A gentleman, who was at the time a believer in the 'spiritual' agency of his table, assured Mr. Dibdin that he had raised a *good* spirit instead of *evil* ones—that, namely, of Edward Young, the poet. The 'spirit' having been desired to prove his identity by citing a line of his poetry, the table spelled out, 'Man was not made to question, but adore.' 'Is that in your "Night Thoughts?"' was then asked. 'No.' 'Where is it, then?' The reply was 'J o n.' Not being familiar with Young's poems, the questioner did not know what this meant; but the next day he bought a copy of them; and at the end of the 'Night Thoughts' he found a paraphrase of the Book of Job, the last line of which is, 'Man was not made to question, but adore.' Of course he was very much astonished; but not long afterwards he came to Mr. Dibdin, and assured him that he had satisfied himself that the whole thing was a delusion—numerous answers he had obtained being obviously the results of an influence unconsciously exerted on the table by those who had their hands upon it; and when asked by Mr. Dibdin how he accounted for the dictation of the line by the spirit of Young, he very honestly confessed, 'Well, the fact is, I must tell you, that I had the book in my house all the time, although I bought another copy; and I found that I had read it before. My opinion is that it was a *latent idea*, and that the table brought it out.'"

Now, Dr. Carpenter does not vouch for this fact, and of course it is not the fact itself which I am either accepting or questioning, but only the validity of the explanation suggested, if the fact itself be assumed. That explanation seems to me even less credible than the so-called spiritualist explanation. It is, at least, *possible* that invisible intelligences may correct our blunders of memory. But to ask us to believe that one and the same person can have, at one and the same moment, nervous arrangements for recalling accurately by the mediation of his muscles, *yet without any act of memory*, how a thing really happened, while he is making, by an act of recollection, an erroneous statement on the same subject through his consciousness and his voice, is, I think, to ask us to believe a much more improbable explanation in order to avoid a less improbable one. And this is why I think the



former improbability the less. If the fact were as related, we should clearly have evidence that the table's movements were due to some agency which understood the structure of language and its meaning. Now, if that agency were that of the person who, after having once read Young's 'Job,' had forgotten completely both the existence of the book and the line in question, it would follow that at the same moment of time, within the limits of the same organization, there existed two distinct agencies, both able to use language as a means of conveying rational meaning, one of them, however,—the one apparently in command of the speech and the brain,—without any memory of Dr. Young's 'Job,' and of the particular line quoted from it, and the other of them,—which must have had a certain control over the spinal cord and the system of reflex action,—retaining that memory perfectly. Now, while we have ample experience of *successive* phenomena of this kind within the limits of the same individual's experience, surely not only have we no experience whatever of simultaneous phenomena of the kind, but if we had, our ideas of moral responsibility would be extraordinarily confused. Which of these two intellectual agencies is to be identified with the person of the individual who was the source of both? The one which remembered correctly and telegraphed the accurate memory through the table, or the one with a defective memory which asserted its inaccurate memory by the voice? If my spinal cord holds one view, and my cerebrum another, as to the events of my past life, the one might turn Queen's evidence against the other; but how one of them could be hanged, while the other received a free pardon, would be an embarrassing problem. Speaking seriously, it seems to me that this doctrine of a 'latent' memory capable of articulate telegraphy, in direct contradiction to the conscious memory,—which denies simultaneously all knowledge of the matter so telegraphed,—passes infinitely beyond any hypothesis warranted by the class of facts I have hitherto dealt with, and could hardly be true without our constantly coming across ample evidence of its truth. That men forget a thing one moment and remember it the next, is certain; but while they forget, they forget, and have, as far as we know, no oracle to consult in that part of their system to which the reflex actions are due, by the help of which the forgotten facts can be recalled. If some part of my body can not only recover its hold of a story I have forgotten, but *put it into human speech*, while I continue quite sincerely to disown it, it seems to me perfectly clear that there are two intellectual agents under cover of my organization, and not one. But that is far more surprising than the spiritualist hypothesis itself. It is conceivable at least, that an invisible intelligence might use my hands to transmit ideas of which I am not the originator, just as any one strong enough to do so may guide my hand when I am blindfolded, so as to write a letter, of the contents of which I am

ignorant. But it is hardly conceivable that I myself can do so, without sharing the knowledge communicated by the means in question. If that could be, then "latent thought" must mean thought which can be communicated and made intelligible to others without anyone to think it; for I don't think it, I deny thinking it; and the automatic apparatus which communicates it does not *think* it, for, by the hypothesis, it is not attended by consciousness at all, and on appeal being made to consciousness, it is promptly disowned. Now, what is there in the facts which are universally admitted as to the latent physical conditions of perception and memory, and as to the half automatic character of habitual actions, to justify so astounding a challenge to all experience as this? Observe that what seems so incredible in this theory is the use of language implying *conscious* thought without any consciousness behind it. I should not deny of course that a *physical* habit, say a nervous twitch in the fingers, might testify, even *against* a man's own conscious memory, to the truth of a story in which was to be found the explanation of the origin of that twitch, a story, that is, which the man himself had quite forgotten. Just so a scar is often a physical record of a blow of which the conscious memory holds no trace. But if letters were selected, one by one, to spell out the word "Job," and the line quoted from it, "Man was not made to question but adore," there would be far *more* evidence of consciousness somewhere than there would be even, if the line had been merely spoken. It is possible enough that in the case, for instance, of anyone who repeats a given cry thousands of times in the same day, like a newspaper boy or an old clothesman in the London streets, the muscles of speech may take so fixed a habit as to pronounce significant words without any corresponding thought to put them in motion. But suppose the mode of communication suddenly changed to a *new* one, like the individual selection of the letters, one by one, which go to make up the words,—and surely the hypothesis which denies consciousness to the agency selecting these letters, becomes utterly untenable. It is quite conceivable, of course, that in some abnormal sleep, under the influence of a different set of physical or mental suggestions, I might recall and correctly repeat a line I had completely forgotten, and refer it to its right author, while in my waking state I fail to recall it. But if I am at the very same moment to be *both* in an abnormal trance *and* awake, with a distinct mechanism for communicating my dreams and my recollections, with an inconsistent set of statements to communicate, and with only one consciousness,—which lends its imprimatur to the wrong set of the two, even while I am carefully comparing them,—then I conceive that no beam of light doubly refracted by Iceland spar could be in a worse condition for tracing its historical identity than I.

(5.) I do not even attempt in this paper to explain the curious


facts on which the doctrine of 'unconscious cerebration' is chiefly rested,—for a very good reason, because I can't. But a good many of them surely indicate a very different explanation,—namely, discontinuous states of active thought, in which both brain and consciousness must have in every sense fully co-operated, but the link between which has for some reason, connected more with physical than mental causes, been temporarily lost. Dr. Carpenter has collected in his very valuable book many most curious illustrations of the way in which a great shock to the nervous system will utterly annihilate memory for a time, so that the sufferer has to begin to learn even the rudiments of knowledge anew, and often makes great progress, when another physical change in his or her brain suddenly restores all the former knowledge, but obliterates completely the memory of the painfully reacquired knowledge of the intermediate period. No one even suggests that the intellectual processes of the intermediate period were not consciously performed, though they are separated by a film of complete oblivion from the normal consciousness. Again, Dr. Carpenter gives us some very curious illustrations of the successful solution during sleep of problems unsuccessfully attempted during waking. Take this, for example, among many of the same kind :—

"The first case is given by Dr. Abercrombie, on the authority of the family of a distinguished Scottish lawyer of the last age :—'This eminent person had been consulted respecting a case of great importance and much difficulty ; and he had been studying it with intense anxiety and attention. After several days had been occupied in this manner, he was observed by his wife to rise from his bed in the night, and go to a writing-desk which stood in the bed-room. He then sat down, and wrote a long paper which he carefully put by in his desk, and returned to bed. The following morning he told his wife that he had had a most interesting dream ; that he had dreamt of delivering a clear and luminous opinion respecting a case which had exceedingly perplexed him ; and that he would give anything to recover the train of thought which had passed before him in his dream. She then directed him to the writing-desk, where he found the opinion clearly and fully written out ; and this was afterwards found to be perfectly correct.' (*Intellectual Powers*, 5th Edit., p. 306.)"

It cannot reasonably be asserted that thoughts which were so completely in possession of this person's mind, as to have partially survived sleep, were not real and vivid exercises of the thinking power. Clearly here is a case of genuine and concentrated thought almost completely forgotten, in consequence of the cessation of the physical state in which the train of ideas was elaborated. In various other instances given by Dr. Carpenter the oblivion is more complete, but there is not less evidence of real *thought* (as distinguished from the mere train of suggestions which can alone be plausibly referred to 'cerebration'). If now in these cases it is quite certain that, be the cerebral process what you please, there was as real and as conscious thought as any thinking man can ever boast of, and yet that very

often the forgetfulness was nearly or quite complete, is it not fair to conclude that in a great many of the cases on which Dr. Carpenter appears to insist so much,—those in which, after a long apparent mental rest, we return to a subject to find it taking quite new and very much clearer shape in our minds,—the progress is probably due not to 'unconscious cerebration,' but to forgotten intervals of conscious intellectual work? For my own part, I am persuaded that this very often *is* the case. The side-glances one gives to a subject which is not exactly *before* the mind, but which is resting in it in comparative abeyance, are, I am sure, though seldom remembered, extremely fruitful. It is these which tell you where you have been pressing a favourite crotchet too hard, which set the balance of the judgment right, and which open up new and important tracks of consideration that had been well-nigh neglected under the pressure of too much eagerness. When one remembers that such side-glances may, for many men, take place in sleep no less than in waking hours, and would, without being individually recalled, alter completely the aspect in which a subject presents itself, I confess I see in facts of this kind no excuse for the startling hypothesis that you ever attain to a distinct conclusion without any conscious consideration of the conditions, that you ever 'cerebrate' a sum without mathematical process, or that you ever attest articulately a fact which at that very moment you have quite forgotten.

R. H. HUTTON.



## CO-OPERATIVE PRODUCTION.

IT is scarcely necessary to insist on the vast development of our co-operative organization. The tabular return, recently presented to Parliament on the motion of Mr. Morrison, one of the most earnest and judicious friends of co-operation, sets forth the statistical result in a most remarkable enumeration. The number of Co-operative Societies in England and Wales is 746: the number of members, 300,587; of whom 60,000 were admitted, and 32,000 withdrew in 1872. The share capital amounted at the end of 1872 to £2,784,000, and the sums of £10,176,000 were paid, and £11,379,000 received during the year in cash for goods. The disposable net profit realized from all sources amounted to £807,748.

These enormous sums give proof that the principle of Co-operation, in its application to the Distribution of Commodities among consumers, is convenient and practicable, and effects a considerable saving of expense.

It cannot, therefore, be doubted that the co-operative system tends to diminish the business of that large class who earn their livelihood in the retail trade of the country. As the co-operative system is more and more generally adopted, many who might have earned an income as shopkeepers must seek out another career. In the transition stage some suffering may be experienced by individuals. We trust, however, that changes will proceed gradually; and that there may be ample time for the absorption into other channels of the labour and capital displaced by co-operation.

Further, it is to be observed that the retailers may, by a better system of trading, find themselves able to afford their customers the same advantages which they now receive at the co-operative stores. Retail prices have been enhanced by the unwholesome system of long credits. The business of the individual retailer has generally been so small that a decent livelihood could be earned only by making a high profit on a limited number of transactions. If the retailers' business were concentrated in fewer hands, and the credit system were abolished; if the sound commercial principle were adopted of looking for a large aggregate gain by means of small profits but quick returns, and by making a small percentage on a large turnover; the public might find that the exceptional advantages it now offers need not be confined to the co-operative system.

The management of a Co-operative Store is a task not without difficulties. The members who withdrew from these societies in 1872—the returns for 1873 are not completed—were half as many in number as those who joined. The retailers may, therefore, reasonably infer that they are competing with rivals who have serious problems to solve; and instead of idly complaining, they must meet the competition of the Co-operative Stores by an improved organization of their own trade.

Let us now pass from co-operative distribution to that more interesting branch of the movement—Co-operative Production. The equitable distribution of profits between labour, capital, and the inventive faculty which creates, and the commercial and organizing faculty which conducts a business, is the most important, as it is undoubtedly one of the most difficult of the social problems of our age.

Among the working class there must be many who think that, in the actual organization of productive industry, there is a disproportionate assignment of profits to capital. As instances of individual success are multiplied, so this conviction of the injustice of the existing order of things in the commercial world will be strengthened and confirmed. Whatever political economy may teach, however easy it may be to explain the operations of trade, between wealth and necessity there still exists a contrast, which mingles with the possession of riches a dark alloy, and cannot but make the burden of the poor man harder and heavier to bear. We may be able to prove that the capital of the large capitalist ordinarily receives but a moderate return, and indeed is freely employed on easier terms than a needy man would exact; but it is not less true that, measured by the strict necessities of life, an accumulation of wealth must, under all circumstances, be a superfluity.

Socialism is the protest of labour against the unequal distribution of the profits of production; but the system of absolute equality is against the law of nature. Whatever poets, sentimentalists, and

agitators may say, there cannot be equality in a society composed of individuals unequally endowed in knowledge, natural aptitude, and in physical and mental power. But while there cannot be equality, there must be justice.

Viewing the subject in the light indicated in these observations, we earnestly wish success to the experiment of adapting the co-operative principle to productive industry. In a co-operative mill, or workshop, or farm, the producers unite the double functions of capital and labour. The handicraftsman sits in judgment on the claims of the capital provided by his own thrift and past labours ; and while he is not likely to appropriate an inadequate rate of interest to a fund obtained from such a source, he cannot, at the same time, apportion too much to capital without doing an injustice to himself in another capacity.

If it be practically developed on an extensive scale, co-operative production ought to save many disputes concerning the rates of wages. In the co-operative establishments there cannot, in the nature of things, be any contention between a body of workmen and an individual whom they regard with unfriendly eyes as a selfish monopolist. Nor will the benefits be confined to co-operative establishments alone. They will ameliorate the relations between employers and employed in cases where, as it commonly happens, the conflicting interests of capital and labour are represented by different individuals. But the difference between those interests will be more easily adjusted, when the capitalist is enabled to refer the labourer to the rates of wages prevailing in co-operative establishments, where they have been determined, not by a single individual, suspected of being without sympathy for the labourer, but by those very men who, in the capacity of workmen, become the earners of wages fixed and paid by themselves.

The desideratum in all labour disputes is a standard, set up by an impartial tribunal, by which it may readily be decided what constitutes a fair rate of wages. When co-operative production has been introduced into all branches of industry successfully and on a sufficiently extensive scale, we shall then have the universal gauge or measure of the workman's rightful claims. From the day when the workman will take his part in the deliberations which accord to capital its fair rate of interest, and to the wage-earner his due, from the day when the workman may count with certainty on a just and equal participation in the profits of every enterprise in which he is engaged, in proportion to his merits, strikes, it is to be hoped, will cease, and workmen will be devoted to the successful prosecution of the industry in which they find their employment. If it should appear an exaggeration of the powers of human nature to adopt the principles on which Fourier insisted, and to regard all labour as a pleasure ; it is possible to conceive conditions, in which labour would

appear neither irksome nor distasteful. The labourer might have more satisfaction in working under the direction of persons selected by himself, than he now experiences under the authority of an employer upon whom he is entirely dependent as the distributor of wages.

It has been asserted by prominent advocates of the labour interest that among capitalists there is a universal desire to acquire wealth, and but little disposition to pay due regard to the rights of others. There may be cases in which these allegations are true ; but they do not correctly represent the general tone and temper of the employers of this country, among whom a higher spirit prevails than some ill-natured critics are ready to allow.

In France and Germany similar representations have gained many credulous converts. In those countries, and especially in the former, there is much hostility between masters and men. Even when kind and considerate acts are done, they are regarded with suspicion, and are not accepted as the fruits of a generous impulse, or as meriting grateful recognition.

Happily there is no such hostility of class and class in this country.

One thing may be unhesitatingly affirmed—that the disposition to be liberal towards workmen is developed, as a general rule, in proportion to the extent of the business and the capital of the employer; that there is the most intense love of gain among certain smaller employers; and that some of the least generous members of the class are those who have most recently been transposed from the capacity of workmen to that of employers. This is only as it ought to be. Those, who have been nursed in ease and security from care, may well afford to deal in a more generous mood with their dependents.

It would not be well that capital should be favoured at the expense of labour, nor yet would it be for the advantage of the working class to diminish the motives to accumulate that fund, which in truth is the only source whereby enterprise can be encouraged, and employment created. The ordinary interest upon capital in England is lower than in any other civilized country. The temptations to English holders of capital to invest elsewhere are already sufficiently great. All the countries of Europe, and, to a yet greater extent, the United States, are constantly bidding for the use of our resources. Capital employed in agriculture and railway enterprise in the United States yields a return at least one-third higher than the like investments in England ; and we should accordingly view with considerable anxiety any serious depreciation of the current rate of interest.

It has been alleged that in England the class of persons is gradually being diminished, who without large means enjoy the advantage of holding a position of independence. Theirs is an order essential in a happily-constituted society, as the connecting link



between the rich and poor. They are defenders of the rights of property, while in their modest and frugal households there is nothing which obtrudes itself in painful contrast to the condition of the less independent wage-earners among whom they live. It is said that the monopoly of capital is gradually leading to the extinction of the small farmers and the small shopkeepers, and that there is a gloomy prospect of a society, in which a painful gulf will separate the privileged few from the mass of the community. What does the recent census teach on this subject? It is true that the number of large farms is increasing, and the acreage of farms under one hundred acres diminishing; but the process of change is slow. The number of farms of 200 acres and upwards, in 1851 and 1871, is within a fraction the same; and it is a most remarkable circumstance that, while the average size of the farms in seventeen representative counties of England was ascertained to be 152 acres, the average size of the farms of the United States, according to the census of 1870, was 154 acres.

There is in the United States a boundless territory available for agricultural occupations, and the laws offer every facility for the purchase and transfer of land. We may therefore safely infer that, as there is a coincidence in point of size between the farms of England and the United States, the acreage has in each case been determined by considerations of convenience. If smaller holdings had been found to offer equal advantages, no obstacle would have been raised on the part of the landowners to a more minute subdivision.

The average size of farms has been determined by long experience, and has been settled as between landlord and tenant by a countless number of independent negotiations, each party to the bargain looking mainly to the protection of his own interest. Hence, so far at least as agriculture is concerned, there appear no sufficient grounds for the assertion that there are greater impediments in England than in other countries to the existence of a class of farmers able to cultivate small holdings with success, but not furnished with capital enough to do justice to a large extent of land. †

Undoubtedly it might be a benefit to society that capital should be distributed among a greater number of individuals; and it is because co-operative production would tend to promote that result, that we sincerely desire to see it extended.

Let us not, however, be misunderstood. There is a power for good in large accumulations of capital in the hands of a single individual, if he be steadfastly determined to make a right use of his resources. It is by such men that some of the most judicious operations have been carried out in this country for developing the mineral resources of an untried district, for the advancement of agriculture by costly drainage, for the comfort of the poor by the

erection of convenient dwelling-houses, for the improvement of our towns and cities by the destruction of unwholesome habitations and the erection of others, furnished with all the contrivances of modern sanitary science, or for the extension of the boon of railway communication into thickly-peopled districts. Works such as these, however profitable they may become in the course of time, generally involve a protracted lock-up of capital; and the ordinary investor, who cannot afford to lose for a long period the interest upon a comparatively slender capital, is slow to undertake them.

Apart, however, from such exceptional cases, the argument in favour of a more equal participation in profits may be admitted as theoretically incontrovertible; and the co-operative system of production is a means to the end we have in view. At the same time while highly commending the system in principle, it cannot be denied that in its practical application there are grave difficulties.

In deliberation the opinions of many councillors serve to establish sound conclusions in the mind; but when you proceed to carry out a decision thus arrived at, when you have to govern and administer, all experience proves the infinite superiority of individual over corporate management. "There be three points of business," says Lord Bacon,—"the preparation, the debate or examination, and the perfection. Whereof, if you look for dispatch, let the middle only be the work of many, and the first and last the work of few."

The following remarks by Mr. Erastus Bigelow, of Massachusetts, quoted by Mr. Harris Gastrell, may be cited in support of the view we have ventured to express:—

"The Corporation system has been a serious hindrance to the proper diversification of our manufactures. \* \* \* \* I will point out briefly some of the disadvantages. When men who are occupied with other pursuits decide to invest capital in manufacturing corporations, it is usually done on grounds of general confidence. They invest because others are investing. They believe, without exactly knowing why, that such investments are safe, and will be profitable; or they follow the lead of some friend, in whose knowledge and judgment they confide. They do not act on their own acquaintance with the nature and requirements of the business; for such an acquaintance can be made only by careful investigation or actual experience. The natural consequence of all this is that capital for the extension of old or the projection of new manufacturing enterprises can seldom be obtained at those times when it is most needed and might most profitably be employed. This single feature of the system is fatal to any true and healthy progress under it.

"The capital thus raised must be expended. An agent is employed, and enters on his work. Those capitalists who have invested under the stimulus of high profits are impatient for results, and urge him to hasty action on ill-considered plans. A sudden and unnatural demand

for operatives is thus created, raising the rate of wages and greatly enhancing the cost of goods. Lastly, unity of purpose and action, without which no business can be successfully prosecuted, can hardly be expected under the divided responsibilities of a large corporate organization."

It is because there has been in co-operative establishments a reluctance to pay what is necessary to enlist first-rate ability in the management of the business, that their operations have hitherto been attended with very partial success. Only personal experience of the difficulties of the task would induce a body of workmen to reserve from their earnings a sum sufficient to secure the services of competent leaders.

We would, therefore, earnestly advise those interested in co-operative production to discourage attempts to commence on a large scale a business difficult to manage. A moderate capital is easily obtained. Large funds are not rapidly procured. Where only a few hands are engaged, the government may be conducted on a purely democratic basis. Where the energies of a multitude are to be combined, there must be an enlightened despotism.

In the case of a co-operative establishment, the persons entrusted with plenary powers must, as a matter of course, be subject to the control of the contributors of the capital; but their control should be exercised only at stated, though sufficiently frequent intervals. It was rightly pointed out by Mr. Morrison, in the debates at the last conference of Co-operative Societies, that, without the concentration of management among a limited number of persons, it would be impossible to preserve the unity of tradition and administration, which are essential to establish the reputation of a factory or workshop, and to secure for the articles, therein produced, the high prices consumers are always ready to pay for goods of undoubted quality.

The appointment of the manager by popular election,—the electors being the hand-workers, who are to serve under the chief, selected by themselves,—is quite compatible with continuity of management. In a trading concern, the acting partner or manager, who has personal control, is rarely obtained by hereditary succession. It is seldom that a man of commercial genius has a worthy successor in his son; hence it may be anticipated that the elective principle will be at least as well calculated as the hereditary to protect the workmen from the disasters which must inevitably be caused by incapacity in the management.

These considerations would have led to the more rapid establishment of Co-operative Societies of production, unless there had been some formidable difficulties in the way. The most recent report shows that the number of these Societies may almost be counted on the fingers. Though some of the experiments actually tried have been successful, the failures have been more numerous than the suc-

cesses. The Paisley Manufacturing Society, the Hebden Bridge Fustian Society, the Eccles Quilt Manufacturing Society, the Lurgan Damask Manufacturing Society, are examples of co-operative production successfully conducted; but they are on a small scale, and probably their success is partly attributable to the wisdom of the promoters in not attempting their operations on a too ambitious footing. The Printing Society of Manchester is a greater effort, and it is highly flourishing. It is possible that the business is of a kind which depends less on the administrative ability of the manager than on the individual exertions of the workmen. I fear, however, that the Co-operative Printing Society recently established in London has failed to command a business sufficient to produce a return upon the capital expended.

The most important experiment in co-operative production hitherto attempted in this country is that of the Ouseburn Engine Works. But this Company has sustained a severe loss; and, strange to say, there has been a strike for higher wages on the part of the workmen employed in one department of the concern. The occurrence of a strike in a co-operative establishment proves the difficulty, we by no means imply the impossibility, of conducting an undertaking on a democratic system, when you have to deal with many classes of workmen, possessing different and unequal qualifications.

The adjustment of the rates of wages in a case in which some members of the co-operative body must be paid at considerably higher rates than others, requires on the part of the latter no common measure of self-denial. It is sometimes hard to recognize the superior merits of others, even when we have the means of forming an independent opinion on their claims; but when workmen, brought up in one trade, are required to assign much higher wages to artisans practising another trade, of the exact nature and difficulty of which they have no experience, they are naturally prone to doubt whether a sufficient reason exists to justify a distinction inevitably involving a personal loss to themselves.

Thus, the inequality in the earnings of different trades, and of the same trades in different countries, is a common cause of dissatisfaction among those who receive the least liberal rates of pay.

To return, however, to the Ouseburn Company, the causes of the early losses have been frankly and ably explained by the managing director, Dr. Rutherford. Orders had been booked at too low a price. The manager, by whom the directors were advised, was much at fault. The head of the undertaking should have been, as Dr. Rutherford so justly urged, a practical engineer, as well as a philanthropist. To secure the services of a competent manager the remuneration required should have been measured, not by a few hundred, but by a few thousand pounds. The history of the Ouseburn works is an illustration of the principles already laid down. The early failure

is attributable to the want of that experience and technical and practical knowledge, which can only be supplied by the appointment of a highly-qualified engineer. When such a man has been found, all will go well with the Ouseburn Company.

There has been a Quixotic idea among co-operators that a percentage on the price charged to customers should be returned. The policy of competing for business by underbidding rivals, placed in exactly the same relative position, in regard to the cost of materials and labour, should be followed with the greatest caution. Keen competition in every department of our trade has already brought down profits to the lowest point. The aim of the co-operators should be to follow the example of those sagacious and experienced men of business, who always insist on full prices for their work, and endeavour to protect themselves against competition by superior excellence in the quality of their productions.

The valuable reports of Her Majesty's Secretaries of Legation describe many successful applications of the co-operative principle.

It is stated by Mr. Ford that the Executive Committee of the 'Tailors' Union in New York, on notifying the cessation of a strike, in which the trade had been engaged in 1869, declared that their policy would thenceforward be to abandon the system of strikes, and to fight with a stronger weapon of co-operation.

The co-operative principle has been adopted by those strange religious sects, the Mormons, Shakers, Economists, and Perfectionists; and, however we may differ from their creed, it must be admitted that they have attained to great success in the organization of labour. The Mormons at Salt Lake City have transformed "a wilderness into a garden," and we can testify from personal knowledge that the Shakers are excellent farmers.

Co-operative foundries have been established in New York and Massachusetts. There is an iron foundry at Troy, in New York, which was started in May, 1866, with a capital of £2,700 paid-up. The shares were fixed at £20, and limited in number to 2,000. In the first year thirty-two men, in the second seventy-five, in 1869 eighty-five men were employed in the works. A dividend of 10 per cent. was made in the first year, and 30 per cent. more was paid on labour. The second year the dividends on stock and labour amounted to 89 per cent., and in 1869 they reached 100 per cent. The most skilled trades earn, owing to their steady employment, 35 per cent. more than the same classes of workmen would earn at similar wages in any private foundry. Great economy has been effected in the use of materials, and the strictest discipline is enforced. Up to the date of Mr. Ford's report, all the profits due to individuals had been paid to them in shares, with the view of applying the additional capital to the enlargement of the works.

The co-operative movement, thus happily begun, has been since

followed up with energy and spirit. Mr. Archibald, our Consul-General in New York, writing in 1872, says :—" During the past year, co-operative concerns have been organized in several departments of business, but with far greater success in industrial than in commercial matters. The Working Men's Manufacturing Company, with a capital of £25,000, has been formed at Emmaus. It is to be conducted on the co-operative principle, and will erect extensive works, including a foundry, forge, and two machine shops, employing at the commencement about 200 hands."

In Austria, the majority of the printers, though in theory advocates of the views of Lassalle in favour of Government workshops, in practice have adopted the sound doctrine inculcated by Schultse Delitsch, the eminent German economist, that every man should trust to self-help, rather than place his dependence on the Government. The printers of Vienna have established a co-operative press ; and Lord Lytton states in his report that 1,500 printers were, in 1869, negotiating for the purchase of another office.

Mr. Jocelyn, in his report of 1869, refers to the progress of co-operative production in Sweden, and says that this most difficult form of labour organization has been particularly successful in that country. He attributes this fortunate result to a spirit of independence highly honourable to the Swedish workman. They will willingly risk their savings for the sake of seizing an opportunity of rising from a dependent position to the freedom of co-operative industry. It has been found in Sweden that the smaller undertakings of this nature are the most prosperous. Where, on the other hand, many are associated upon an equal footing for the promotion of manufactures requiring unusual skill, there is great danger of the whole becoming *de facto* the property of a few of the original founders, while the rest sink back into the condition of simple workmen under their command.

While the efforts to establish co-operative production in this country have not thus far been attended with a large measure of success, the importance of the principle at stake is so great, that we should deprecate most earnestly the abandonment of further attempts in the same direction. The wiser course will be to avoid, as it has been already suggested, commencing undertakings on a large scale. When the business is of a kind that cannot be carried out advantageously on a moderate footing, the co-operative principle should be applied to the execution of sub-contracts for portions of the work, to the supply of a part of a large order, or to the execution of a single process in a complicated manufacture.

When a railway contract has been taken, the principal contractor usually subdivides the works, and lets them out to sub-contractors. On a long line of railway every cutting, bridge, tunnel, embankment, and station, is executed by one or more separate contractors ; and

thus the co-operative system may readily be applied to the construction of every section of the largest undertaking, after it has been sufficiently subdivided. The same remarks apply to shipbuilding and many other branches of industry where the subdivision of the work will give ample scope for the application of the co-operative system, when, from the nature of the case, superior administrative skill and large resources at the fountain head are indispensable.

Some details of the methods adopted by the English contractors, who have been engaged in the execution of great railway contracts both at home and abroad may be studied with interest, as calculated to throw light upon the organization of industry on the co-operative principle. In the conduct of these works the main object in view has been to give to the workmen a personal interest in the performance of an adequate quantity of work in return for the wages received. In the case of the contractor it was especially important to attain this object by making it the interest of the labourer to do his fair share of work, rather than by placing reliance on a close personal inspection of his conduct. With the development of railway enterprise, the practice was adopted of inviting English contractors with competent resources to undertake railway and other works, not only in their own country, but in every quarter of the globe. The difficulties of supervision of necessity increased with the enlarged area of their operations; and it was essential to devise some plan by which it should, if possible, be made an advantage to every individual concerned to perform his share of the common task to the best of his ability.

Thus the system of sub-contract and piecework, originally adopted by the pioneers of railway construction, was extended to every operation where it was possible to apply it. The general character of the arrangements may perhaps be best explained by the selection of an example taken from actual practice. On the contract for part of the London and South Western Railway, between Basingstoke and Winchester, there was an unusual proportion of excavation to make, amounting to some  $3\frac{1}{4}$  millions of cubic yards on a length of eighteen miles. Not only were the works of a heavy and costly nature, but the time allowed for the completion was so short as to render the utmost diligence and energy necessary. The operations were carried on night and day, and 1,100 workmen were employed.

There was one particular cutting near Winchester, which, in the deepest part, was from 90 to 100 feet in depth. Here, in spite of severe and unfavourable weather, the works were pushed on with the utmost diligence and determination. This was done even at a considerable pecuniary sacrifice; because the contractor was anxious, above all things, to maintain and increase the good reputation he had already begun to establish, and of which he was wisely jealous as the surest guarantee for his future success. At Micheldever there was

one immense embankment, about 85 feet in height ; and at Popham Beacons there was a short cutting, not more than 10 chains in length, intervening between two tunnels, of such a depth that 100,000 cubic yards were excavated in order to make the cutting.

The whole of these works were executed by sub-contract. The amount of work let to a particular sub-contractor was determined by the appreciation formed by the principal contractor or his agent of the ability of the individual to carry out the work. A man of superior qualifications was allowed to take a sub-contract for an amount of work increasing in magnitude, in proportion to the confidence entertained in his ability. Some of the sub-contractors would take contracts for work costing in the total £15,000 to £20,000, and employing from 150 to 200 men.

Frequently the sub-contractor would again let his work to the navvies at so much a yard. They worked in what were called *butty gangs*, or parties of from six to twelve men. The navvies would take a contract under a sub-contractor for excavating so many yards of earth at so much per yard ; and they would divide the earnings equally amongst each other. Disputes would frequently arise between the *butty gangs* and the sub-contractors upon the question of measurement, and in such cases the resident agent or representative of the principal contractor was required to arbitrate.

When the work was organized in the manner described, the function of the principal contractor was rather that of a practical engineer, superintending the execution of the works by a number of smaller contractors. The principal contractor, being responsible to the engineer for the faithful performance of the contract, had to watch very closely the work done by the sub-contractors, and to see that it was executed in such a manner as to satisfy the requirements of the engineer ; but he was not directly the employer of the workmen or the navvies.

The policy was to avoid, as far as possible, engaging a large number of workmen by the day, and to pay every man concerned in proportion to results.

The following observations, coming from one of the most eminent shipbuilders of the United Kingdom, fully substantiate the conclusions drawn from a large experience in railway construction. The observations shall be quoted verbatim :—

“The businesses in which I am directly or indirectly engaged are shipbuilding, engineering, forging and founding—in fact, everything to complete steamships from the rough cast or malleable iron. I have seen no reason to regret keeping these several departments under separate heads and management.

“I purpose, however, now taking up iron shipbuilding only, as being much the largest department, and to compare two distinct periods of years—1868 and 1873. In 1868 we had no piecework. Between then and 1873 we introduced it, with some little difficulty,



into the iron department and blacksmith work. We have not yet succeeded in bringing it into play in the ship-carpenter and joiner, and some minor branches, but we bide our time. Fully half our pays go to piecework, leaving the balance for time payment. It is because we only build high-class passenger steamships, that we continue to pay so large a number of men by the day rather than by the piece. I may observe that the wood department runs much higher in proportion to iron than in yards mostly devoted to sailing ships or cargo steamers. The steamships we built in 1868 and 1873 were almost identical in style of finish though differing in tonnage. We had much trouble about 1868 with our iron hands. It was difficult to get men, the demand exceeding the supply. The introduction of the piece system, that is to say the payment by results, led to hard, or at least fairly hard work, on the part of the skilled men, and to ingenuity on their part and ours to save unskilled labour by the introduction of machinery. The result has been that skilled and unskilled men make 50 per cent. to 75 per cent. more earnings. We get the work per ton of iron in the ships about 20 per cent. cheaper; and from a much smaller number of men being required, the supply is approximately equal to the demand. Since we introduced piecework we can estimate to within a fraction what the iron and blacksmith work will cost, and we could never do so before. Here I would observe that all this has been accomplished with working time in 1873 reduced to 54 hours per week, whereas in 1868 the men worked 60 hours a week. As to the skilled hands—and they are all highly skilled men—in the wood departments, we had to pay higher wages in 1873 for 54 hours' work than in 1868 with 60 hours'. We have, however, met this by the introduction of machinery. Our joinery and cabinet department is now like an engineer's shop, with tools for *every description of work*. I may say in every part of our work, during the past three or four years, we have been introducing 'steam' and other appliances where we could; and there has been generally sharper supervision and attention on the part of those in charge, and our manager over them.

"I may now come to results. In 1868 we launched nine steamships, in round numbers aggregating 13,000 tons. I take gross new measurement in each case for the purpose of comparison. The wages bill was £78,963; average number of men and boys employed, 1,776. In 1873 we launched seven steamships, in round numbers aggregating 18,500 tons; wages bill, £91,838; average number of men and boys employed, 1,550. In 1868 the average wage earned per week of 60 hours was about 17s. 1d. In 1873, per week of 54 hours, about 22s. 9d. In 1873 the cost per ton, gross new measurement, in wages only, was fully 20s. cheaper than in 1868, but this reduction is due to the piecework departments. We consider it something to have met the increase in wages and diminution in hours of the 'time-workers' by the means already mentioned.

"I am not clear that these time-workers work harder whilst they are at it than they did before the advance in wages and the decrease in hours, but we may have gained something from sharper overlooking. As I have said, we have effected considerable economies by the introduction of steam machinery and other labour-saving appliances.

"The piecework system keeps us clearer of disputes and trouble with our men than we were under the old method; and men and employers alike make a better result. I look to 'payment by results' as a system calculated to put an end to many trade disturbances, but Trades' Unions are opposed to it. As ours is practically a non-union-yard, we hope in time to overcome the obstacles in our way, and to make the one system universal. Piecework in the iron department of shipbuilding is now general in the Clyde district.

"As this year will complete my thirtieth in the employment of labour you will see that my experience of it is somewhat large."

On theoretical grounds, we would advocate strongly the adoption of the co-operative principle pure and simple; but we would also commend to those interested in the cordial alliance of labour and capital the methods of payment so successfully applied by Messrs. Briggs, and Fox, Head and Co., as worthy of attentive examination, and as affording, if only a partial, still a much easier, solution of the labour problem than that proposed by the advocates of a purely co-operative system.

The principles of the scheme of Messrs. Fox, Head and Co. are as follows:—

"That every person employed shall have a pecuniary interest in the success of the business, and the profits to be made; that interest being as far as possible in proportion to the services rendered.

"That the labour employed, whether of workmen, clerks, foremen, managers, or partners, shall be remunerated by wages or salaries at the rates customary in the district.

"That the capital employed shall be remunerated by a specified rate of interest.

"That the works and plant upon which the capital has been expended shall be kept up in a perfect state of repair, and that to cover renewals and depreciation a reasonable allowance shall be made out of the profits of manufacture.

"That a fund shall be created and maintained as a provision against loss by bad debts.

"That these provisions being satisfied, any surplus profit shall, at the end of each year, be ascertained and certified, and the amount thereof divided into two equal parts—the one to be paid to the capitalist, and the other to be divided among all those engaged in the manufacture, in proportion to the amount earned by them during such year in wages and salaries."

In these establishments, so well known to all who take an interest in co-operative production, the employers have endeavoured to give to the workmen a direct personal advantage from the success of the business, while retaining in their own hands the absolute power of directing the general policy and management. Keenly alive to all the evils arising from divided responsibility, and the admission of workmen inexperienced in commercial affairs to an equal authority with their employers, they have sought to protect themselves from the ill effects of corporate management, and yet to give to the workmen a full share of the profits, in proportion to their skill and diligence.

It is some eight years since Messrs. Fox, Head and Co., brought out their scheme. In that interval, amid the many fluctuations to which their trade is always subjected, they have paid between £6,000 and £7,000 to their workmen by way of bonus; and the result has been eminently satisfactory to the employers. They think they have a superior class of workmen, and that they stay longer at the works. They obtain the best prices for their manufactures. They have no disputes, and pay no contributions to standing committees or courts of conciliation. Thus, the employers are well content with the arrangements they have made; and the conduct of the workmen shows that a feeling of mutual satisfaction prevails.

It is unnecessary to describe in detail the system adopted by Messrs. Briggs. In August of last year (1873), they distributed among 1,754 workmen, employed by their Company, upwards of £14,250, as their share of profits for the previous year. It is stated by Mr. H. C. Briggs that several miners received £30 each; and that, since the distribution, they have had applications from their workmen for about 700 additional shares in the Company; though they were asking £10 premium on the shares, on which only £12 10s. have been paid. About half the sum paid as bonus has thus been returned to the Company by the workmen, in premiums on the shares applied for. For several years a workman director has sat on the board, who is qualified by holding one share in the Company, and by the receipt of weekly wages. This representative of labour is annually elected by the votes of shareholders actually in receipt of weekly wages. He was formerly one of their most bitter opponents; but the Messrs. Briggs believe that the insight he has lately gained into the difficulties of conducting large industrial undertakings, will effectually deter him from renewing the strife of former days.

Monsieur Godin, of Guise, has adopted the following scheme of paying his workmen, with a view to giving them an interest in the success of the business in which they are employed. Capital, invention, and labour, being alike essential to the production of wealth, the equitable apportionment of the profits among the several interests concerned is the problem to be solved. In determining the interest

due to capital, the workmen, in the opinion of M. Godin, should be previously consulted; and the rate should be fixed with due regard to the risks of the trade, and other circumstances. In the scheme adopted in the establishment of M. Godin, capital receives a clear 15 per cent. interest, the workman is paid his ordinary wages, and provision is made to cover the charges for administration and mechanical inventions. These necessary expenses having been provided for, the balance over, if any, is regarded as the net profit; and it is apportioned, one-third to the reserve fund, and the remaining two-thirds to capital and labour, in proportion to the fixed amounts, payable to each from the earnings, before the net profits were ascertained. The practical operation of the system may be illustrated by an example. Assume that the sums payable had been :—

Wages . . . . .	£9,000
Interest on £40,000 at 15 per cent.	6,000
General charges . . . . .	1,000
	£16,000

Then if £2,400 be the net profit, one-third, or £800, equal to 5 per cent. on the fixed expenditure, is set aside to reserve; and the balance of £1,600 is appropriated to capital and labour, in proportion to their respective shares in the fixed earnings. Thus, the sum of £900 is added to the earnings of the wage-receivers, the sum of £600 is payable as bonus to the capitalist, and £100 to the management. Under the system usually adopted, capital would have claimed the whole of the £1,600.

The evils of a general pay day are well understood by persons at the head of great industrial establishments. The drunkenness and disorder, the wasted earnings, the subsequent irregularity of attendance, are the familiar yet regrettable incidents of a general distribution of wages to a numerous body of workmen. M. Godin pays his workmen every fortnight, but he has divided them into sections, and each section is paid separately. The pays take place three times a week, and one section only of the workmen is paid on the same pay day. By this arrangement, the irregularities, inevitable when a general distribution of wages takes place, are avoided. The small proportion of men receiving their pay on any one pay day, are kept in order by the example of steadiness afforded by their fellow workmen, who are not disturbed by a recent payment of money.

With these encouraging examples before them, many employers may be glad to follow the same course. Any plan by which workmen may be made to realize that they row in the same boat with their employers, should not be lightly set aside. It is good policy to forego a portion of the profits of a prosperous year, in order to

avert the calamity of a strike, with all its attendant evils of loss of profit, and bitterness and strife between masters and men.

Capital and labour are essentially necessary and interdependent elements of production ; and the man of business, not less than the philanthropist, must desire to see the representatives of those two interests closely allied.

It is well that workmen should watch these and other efforts to combine the principle of co-operation with the undoubted advantages of undivided responsibility in the administration of a large undertaking ; because the corporate system is not always applicable.

Where no special personal influence is needed, for the purpose of securing clients and customers, and where the internal economy of an establishment can be conducted by a regular routine, there will be no practical disadvantage in the management of a board or council. But when no transaction can be completed without long and difficult negotiations ; when an undertaking is of a kind that cannot be conducted in accordance with fixed rules, and the emergencies, which must from the nature of the case arise, are always unforeseen, and must be met on the spot by an administrator, upon whose skill and conduct all will depend ; in such a case, the co-operative system, pure and simple, becomes impossible ; and the attention of masters and workmen, wishing to work together in friendly alliance, should rather be employed to devise schemes, whereby the equitable distribution of profits among the workmen may be combined with the necessary concentration of authority in their employer.

For complicated undertakings co-operative organization will often prove ineffectual. A council of war never fights ; and no difficult task in the field of peaceful labour can be brought to completion without a trusted leader.

One more suggestion, and we close our remarks on this aspect of the case. In many descriptions of enterprise the commercial result cannot be ascertained until after an interval of time has elapsed, too long to be tolerable to a body of workmen dependent on their weekly wages. We again choose an illustration from the experiences of the railway contractor. Take the case of a concession for a long line of railway on the Continent. The first conception of the project will probably come from some local engineer. He makes a rude preliminary survey of the country to be traversed. He comes to England with his rough studies to seek the financial aid and larger professional experience of one of our eminent engineers or contractors. The negotiations proceed, and the English promoters make a second and more careful examination of the scheme, involving a repetition of the original survey. Plans and an estimate are prepared at considerable expense, and negotiations are thereupon commenced with the Government within whose territories the proposed railway

will pass. Weary months, and sometimes years, elapse before a decision is obtained. We will assume the decision to have been favourable, and that a concession has been granted. Then follows the execution of the works which, if the length of the railway is considerable, may probably occupy a period of three years. While the construction is progressing, financial arrangements must be made, in order to form a company, to take over the concession from the contractors, and to raise the capital for the line by public subscription. The subscription may possibly be only partly successful. In that event, the contractor must meet a large proportion of the expenditure from his private resources. Before he has succeeded in disposing of his proportion of the shares or bonds allotted to him, a European war may have broken out. In that case, an indefinite period must elapse before the securities are realized.

We have here sketched no imaginary picture. In the business, with which the present writer is identified, the history of every transaction is a repetition of the story I have narrated. It is no exaggeration to say that an interval of ten years ordinarily elapsed, between the opening of communications with the original promoters and the final payment for the construction of the works. The hazards and uncertainties of an enterprise of this nature are such, that no true friend of the working classes would recommend them to risk their hard earnings in such adventures.

The general business of the country, however, is of a more stable and methodical character. Here, the co-operative principle is more easily applied.

It may not be necessary to dwell on this occasion on the many powerful but familiar arguments in favour of the co-operative principle. It is certain that the system must be more congenial to ordinary human nature than the more usual organization of labour, under which the workman has no voice in the management of the business, by which he earns his livelihood. The love of liberty and independence is universal in civilized society, and it is as keen in the factory and workshop as in the senate.

The rapid increase in the rate of wages has been one of the most remarkable phenomena of our day. The consequent rise in prices presses with a heavy burden on every individual; and unless there were a concurrent rise of prices abroad, we should have a gloomy prospect in view for the future of England. No other country is so dependent on the superiority of its workmen, both for excellence and economy of production. In no other population is the proportion of those who live by the fertility of the soil so small, by comparison with the classes who live by the application of skilled labour to the manufacture of goods for foreign markets. In the anxiety and inconvenience experienced from the advance in wages, people are disposed to attribute the concessions, made most reluctantly to the demands

of workmen, to some arbitrary cause, such as the superior organization of trades-unionism.' They mistake a manifestation of power for the actual sources of power and strength.

There has been much outcry at the recent increase in prices and in wages. There is nothing new to economic science in our recent experience. All the oscillations in the labour market can be fully explained by the long-recognized law of political economy—that the rates of wages, like the price of commodities, are regulated by demand and supply. We will illustrate the operation of this rule in one department of trade, that of shipbuilding. The tonnage of the new vessels built in the United Kingdom in 1862 was 310,900 tons; in 1865, 607,000 tons; in 1871, 391,000 tons; and in 1872, 475,000 tons. In the latter year, therefore, there was a great increase upon the tonnage of the first year included in the period under review; while in the inflation of the shipbuilding trade, which reached its climax in 1865, the amount of tonnage built was doubled in three years.

It is clear from these considerations that there has been a permanent increase, and occasionally an enormous increase, in the demand by shipbuilders for the supply of the highly-skilled labour required for their trade. In the meanwhile the total number of artificers employed exhibits no corresponding augmentation. In the period embraced in the recent census, 1861-71, the number of shipwrights and shipbuilders has been slowly increased from 39,053 to 40,605 men.

Arguing from the reports published by the *Economist* of the state of the shipbuilding trade on the Clyde and the Mersey, we may reasonably assume that in 1873 there was no diminution of activity. The aggregate tonnage of ships built on the Clyde was in 1870, 189,800 tons: in 1871, 196,200 tons; in 1872, 224,000 tons; in 1873, 261,500 tons. Of this tonnage, six steamers, of 18,200 tons and 3,300 horse power, were built for the North German Lloyd's; five steamers, of 13,325 tons and 2,100 horse power, for the Peninsular and Oriental Company; three steamers, of 11,250 tons and 1,500 horse power, for the Anchor line, three steamers, of 10,500 tons and 1,800 horse power, for the German Transatlantic Company of Hamburg.

The demand for the supply of labour has been more urgent, not only through the activity in building new ships, but also through the numerous alterations of old vessels. It has been ascertained that there is much economy in point of horse power and fuel from an increase in the length of the ships and the adoption of compound engines. It should be observed, further, that the repairs constantly required for our vast fleet of merchant ships must necessarily be very extensive; and in many ports more workmen by far are employed in repairs than in building additional tonnage.

In this marvellous activity ample explanation is given for the rates of

wages prevailing in Liverpool, in London, and the Clyde, where ship carpenters are sometimes earning eight shillings a day, and other trades in proportion. Many masters are competing against each other for the services of but few men. The case would be rapidly changed, if there were more men and less employment. Capitalists should consider whether they themselves are not to blame, ere they impute to the labourers the responsibility for an augmentation in the cost of production. Our workmen, too, should pause before they proceed to make further demands. It is a question for them to consider how far the advance of prices has neutralized the benefits they derive from higher wages.

The recent history of one of our largest lines of steamships affords a striking instance of the need for the admonition we have ventured to address to incautious capitalists.

Within a short space of time the Company in question has doubled the tonnage of its vessels, which are all powerful ocean-going steamers of the first-class, in dimensions, speed, equipment, and, as a necessary consequence, in price. In 1873 the Company were supplied with nine steamers from the Clyde alone—one was a vessel of 4,820 tons and 650 horse power—and the total tonnage and horse power constructed for them amounted to 28,895 tons and 4,500 horse power. This was the largest amount ever supplied to a single Company in one year. For the same Company three steamers of the largest class were built last year by Messrs. Laird Brothers, at Birkenhead.

The construction of this great fleet for one concern alone must have exercised a most appreciable influence on the rates of wages in the shipbuilding yards on the Clyde, and made it sometimes difficult to obtain the labour required for other similar contracts. But the shareholders of this Company now learn that the policy of increasing their fleet has been, in a commercial point of view, injudicious. Their trade has not increased with the increase of their fleet, and they would have fared better, had they been content to keep their undertaking within its former limit and scope. Here, therefore, two consequences have followed from the errors of certain capitalists. The course they have pursued has tended to keep up, if not actually to raise, the price of labour; while they have also sustained a considerable loss from the depreciation in the value of their shares. In the case here quoted, as a warning and illustration of the consequences to be apprehended from errors of commercial judgment the price of labour cannot be assigned as the direct or indirect cause of misfortune; and similar instances might be indefinitely multiplied to prove that the many great reverses which chequer the history of our commerce, must be traced not to the rapacity of the workman, but to rash speculations.

While anxious to do equal justice between labour and capital, and to vindicate the conduct of workmen, when unfairly accused, it is our



duty to remind the working classes in England that their employers are engaged in the closest competition with all the manufacturing countries of the world. The markets of the United States, almost monopolised in former times by British productions, are now principally supplied with American goods. The tariff established since the war presents a formidable barrier to importations from England. If those duties were removed, the difference in the cost of labour would, doubtless, at the present time, secure for England her former position. But it must also be remembered that, assuming the cost of labour in the United States to be 25 per cent. in excess of the cost in this country, the addition to the value of the product does not exceed 5 or 6 per cent.; and if the duties imposed in the United States on all raw materials should be repealed, and if, as we may reasonably anticipate, the cost of living should be materially lessened, the cost of production, under those more favourable conditions, would be so much reduced that the present advantages of the British manufacturer would cease, and there would no longer be a sufficient margin to cover the cost of exportation from this country to America.

We cannot conclude these observations on the condition of the labouring classes, without reference to the important influence that must eventually, and it may be very rapidly, follow from the increasing facilities of communication between distant centres of industry. Foreign travel, in former times, was the exclusive privilege of the wealthy; but when the working men begin to circulate more freely from country to country, the class interests, which they have in common, will inevitably tend to bring them together, and make them regard with stronger aversion those national struggles in which, from motives of personal ambition, their rulers in past ages have been too ready to engage. Already we see in Germany a party being formed whose sympathies are for France. The originators of the movement are the artisans in the two countries; and, as their numbers will probably increase, they may exercise a valuable influence in promoting the blessed work of reconciliation.

So, too, between England and the United States, the solidarity of the two peoples is a surer guarantee for a close and permanent alliance than the most elaborate contrivances of diplomacy.

Our eminent writers appeal with equal success to Anglo-Saxon readers in both hemispheres; and when they visit the United States they are welcomed as men of whom the American people are proud, because they have conferred distinction on the whole English-speaking race. Our early history, our language, our literature, are common to both nations, and they are links which should unite us together as no other people can be united.

As union is most earnestly to be desired between the same classes in different countries, so it is not less desirable between different


classes in the same country. If it is hard for the privileged few to appreciate the difficulties of the masses around them, who are struggling forward in the battle of life, it is still harder, we may rest assured, for the poor to appreciate the peculiar trials of the rich. We may plead for princes their isolation, and for the nobly-born the absence of many powerful motives which fire the ambition of men of modest station and lead them forward to a career of usefulness and distinction. We may urge on behalf of the rich that they are a tempting prey to designing men, and can seldom earn the gratitude reserved for those who are believed to practise the virtue of self-denial; but we may rest assured that the mass below them, contending for bare existence, have little sympathy to spare from the constant troubles of their own lives, for trials that to them must appear artificial and self-imposed.

Whatever the poor may feel towards the rich, the duty of the rich towards the poor is too plain to admit of misconception. Whether moved by considerations of policy, or by the nobler impulses of humanity, it must be the object of our universal solicitude that no class in society should be exposed to the fatal influences of despair.

Multitudes there must be in every city contending amid waves that threaten destruction; and when, with anxious glances they seek a refuge from the storm, can they descry the happy isles in which they may repose? The land, if seen, is far away, their bark is sinking, and their only hope the aid of those who have already gained the shore.

An idea prevails in certain quarters abroad that there is no sympathy between the affluent classes in England and the masses of their less fortunate fellow-countrymen. Much more truly may it be affirmed that in no other country is the same deep interest felt in the welfare of the poor. It is because this sympathy exists, that in England we have as yet been spared the miseries of social disunion; and from this the most dire calamity which can befall a nation Heaven grant we may remain for ever free!

THOMAS BRASSEY.



## STRAUSS AS A THEOLOGIAN.

**T**HERE are many reasons which make it probable that the nineteenth century may be named by future historians of theology after Strauss as the sixteenth century is named after Luther. And this not because he has been remarkably fertile in original ideas; for the only part of his doctrine which can be claimed as peculiarly his own is the so-called mythical explanation of the primitive Christian history, and this view has been in some measure surrendered by subsequent criticism. Nor, again, would the charm and lucidity of his style alone suffice to give him a more permanent place in the history of thought than the author of *Ecce Homo*. Nor would the fact that, for the last forty years he has been the most solitary and unpopular man in Europe, give him a claim to mark the epoch. But—and here lies the reason—he has been the most unpopular man in Europe, for the same reason as the conscience is the least amiable and esteemed of all the human faculties. He has been the “evil conscience,” “the candid friend” of a time of transition; he has spoken when men would willingly have kept silence; he has divided what successive schools have laboured to unite; he has ripped up every compromise, he has probed remorselessly every wound; and has exhibited all the nakedness and deformity of the Christian spirit during a period of decay. And this peculiar relation to the age seems to be one reason, though, as I shall show hereafter, not the only reason why Dr. Strauss, when writing of theological matters, always moves in an atmosphere of chagrin. His pages—especially the pages

of his more recent works—are full of explosions of displeasure. What, then, has the age done to make appropriate so irritable a critic? Apart from a good deal of personal soreness, it is the “soothing equivocation,” the inevitable disingenuousness with which men compose their minds to rest, in order to proceed to the daily work of life without the disturbing intrusion of disquieting thoughts; it is the spirit of conciliation which makes of two things one, which is obtuse in descrying differences between things, and quick to note and exaggerate resemblances, which halts on the journey, and endeavours to perpetuate a state of transition in opinion.

Whether in the performance of this ungrateful task, Dr. Strauss has used the *suaviter in modo* as much as he might have done consistently with a due adherence to the *fortiter in re*; whether he has treated in a manner sufficiently tender the embarrassments which religious dissolution entails in persons of refined sensibility who have to deal practically with the prejudices of the public mind, need not be decided here. Neither do I propose to dwell upon the details of the uneventful, though in some respects, tragic career of a German literary man, excepting so far as they appear to fill up lacunæ in the transition through which the mind of Strauss passed at different periods of his life—a transition, as he would have us believe, identical with that through which the European mind has passed also. Whether this identity be a fact, we shall inquire before we have done; but, even if it be only in part a fact, it supplies a sufficient reason for the assertion with which we began, that the nineteenth century will be reckoned hereafter as the age on which Strauss pre-eminently has set his mark.

From the year 1835, when he published the *Life of Jesus*, down to the time of his decease in the beginning of the present year, Dr. Strauss has appeared before the world three times in the character of theologian: each time advocating a different tenet, each time starting from a different point of view, and each time addressing a different audience. In the first period, 1835-1840, the period of the first *Leben Jesu*, and of *Christliche Glaubenslehre*, his stand-point is that of Hegel's *Philosophy of Religion*, i.e., a distinctly Christian position, involving the maintenance in their integrity of the great Christian doctrines of the Incarnation and the Atonement; and in insisting upon these he addresses himself as a critical theologian to critical theologians. In 1864, after a silence of a quarter of a century, so far as theology is concerned, he published a revised edition of the *Life of Jesus*, in which no longer addressing the learned, but “the people,” he relapses into the rationalistic deism of the English school of the last century, which, in the *Leben Jesu*, he had condemned as insufficient (*unzulänglich*), empty (*leer*), and unworthy of the nineteenth century—(*Leben Jesu*, §§ 147-8). And finally, in 1872, in his *Confession*, he writes for a class of readers who are

neither critical theologians nor "the people," but a group of restricted dimensions, which he calls *wir*, "we," *i.e.*, people who agree with me in the holding the positions to which at the end of my life I have at length attained. Those positions are neither Christian nor deistic, but may be roughly though not inaccurately denominated the positions of modern physical science or methodized common sense.

Now these transformations of opinion taking place within the area of a single life would be in themselves sufficiently remarkable, and the explanation of them would present a psychological problem of no ordinary difficulty. But what is still more remarkable is, that these stadia, which the mind of Strauss passes through during his lifetime, are the same as those which the theological movement of Europe had traversed during the two preceding centuries, only in *precisely the reverse order*.

Let us see what that movement has been, and how it arose from the previous development of Christian doctrine. If we examine the structure of religious dogma we shall find that it consists of two elements—a particular element, and a general or ideal element; and that the tendency of the general element is, in the course of the development of the religious consciousness, to become more general, and to absorb into itself the particular element. Thus, if we compare the ancient religion of the Jews with that of any other nation, we find that their idea of God contained within it these two mutually contradictory factors. On the one hand, Jehovah was the national deity of the Hebrew race, in the same sense as the heathen gods were national gods; and yet, on the other hand, unlike the gods of the heathen religions, Jehovah is the God of the whole of mankind. That is,—the idea of Deity was to the Jews on the one side a particular, and on the other side a general conception. The element of generality, though latent from the first, even when Jehovah is spoken of as pre-eminently "our," "thy," and "their" God, in distinction from "other" and "strange" gods, only grew up with time. The comparison of "ours" and "strange" does not necessarily go beyond the particular. Even the command, "Thou shalt have no other gods *before me*," does not explicitly do so. But so soon as the Jew came to ask, "Who is there among the gods that can be compared with Jehovah?" he requires to go only one step further in the same direction to say, "The idols of the heathen are but silver and gold, the work of men's hands: they have mouths, but they speak not; eyes have they, but they see not: they have ears and hear not; neither is there any breath in their mouths." By this negation the generality in the Jewish idea of God becomes complete.

Similarly when we read of the ordinance of sacrifices to be offered at specified times and places, and consisting of specified victims, we feel that we are still moving in the region of the particular; but when the prophet says, "Sacrifice and burnt offering for sin thou

wouldest not, but mine ears hast thou pierced," i.e., taken me permanently as thy servant; the generality involved in the idea of a permanent state of sacrifice in the moral and religious life, has absorbed into itself the multitudinous and recurring ordinances of the sacrificial cultus.

So Christianity in its primary aspect appears as a further generalization of the old religion, and as giving a meaning to it. The Jehovah of the Jew as we have seen, had become, from being the God of a nation, the God of the whole of mankind; but he was not conceived as having definite relations with any nation outside the covenant; his relations to the rest of mankind were either non-existent or vague and indeterminate. To the Christian consciousness on the other hand this particular relation becomes generalized in a two-fold manner: it becomes not merely a relation to every nation and to every human being composing it, but it becomes a paternal and permanent, and no longer a merely covenanted and so precarious, relation dependent upon conditions and upon the observance of the Mosaic law. So again with regard to the old sacrificial cultus, the Christian idea of one continual and all-sufficing sacrifice is the permanent generality which, while it gives a meaning to the particular ordinances, supersedes them by summing them up in itself.

An objection may here be made to this view of the development of religious dogma by successive expansion of its generality, that Christianity itself introduced into the religious consciousness a series of new particulars, in the shape of the historical events occurring at a particular place, under particular circumstances and in a particular year, which the paternal relation of God to the world and the supersession of the ancient ritual, is conditioned by, and made to depend upon. It is undeniable that the original Christian faith is immersed in the element of historical particularity; and that it was this element of historical particularity which, so soon as the Christian religion began to be preached, was found to be a stumbling block to the Jews and to the Greeks foolishness. But it is none the less true that within the Christian community itself, before even the first generation of believers has passed away, the same process of generalization is applied to this very historical element, which we have already noted as expanding and ultimately bursting through the national and ceremonial constituents of Judaism. And the reason of this is, that an historical event *as such* is not a possible object for the religious consciousness at all. It may excite the emotions, but not the religious emotions. The specifically religious emotions are not excited until the minds of the community of believers have travelled away from the actual occurrences far enough to be in a position to reflect upon them. After the particular event is passed away, the *meaning* of it, the generality in it, appears above the horizon and "dawns," as it is said, upon the mind. It is then this *meaning*, this general, or

ideal aspect of the event which is dwelt upon, and which excites the emotions and becomes the dominant factor in the religious consciousness. It is this *meaning* as distinguished from a mere recollection of it, which by its generality serves to perpetuate the event to which it belongs, to bring it into definite relations with the permanent order of the world, and more especially to bring it home to the soul, to give it inwardness, and to make it authoritative over the conscience. Lastly, it is this *meaning* which, as so assimilated, constitutes the side upon which religious experience is ultimately brought into contact with science and with the other general ideas of mankind.

To take an instance. So long as the religious consciousness rests in the mere historical events, it cannot see in Jesus Christ more than a teacher, or in his crucifixion, more than a martyrdom; but it was not as a teacher or a martyrdom that the person and death of Christ were assimilated by the religious consciousness of even the earliest Christians; it was as the Incarnation and the Atonement, conceptions of a greater generality and complexity, than those which had marked the development of the Jewish religion, or its transition to the Christian. The person of Jesus Christ ceases to be that of a particular individual,\* but stands for that of the whole human race, and his death ceases to be a particular event and becomes "the slaying of the lamb before the *foundation of the world*."

It was this abstraction of the religious consciousness from the historical and particular, this immersion in the idea, in the generality, which produced at once the primitive heresies and the early definitions of the Christian faith. The points at issue in the early Church are not questions about the actual occurrence of the recorded events as amongst ourselves, but questions as to their meaning, and about the nature and qualities of the Deity, or to use the terms of the schools, they were not Biblical but Christological.

The same tendency was if not developed, at least maintained in the Catholic Church of the middle ages; and while making it no sin to withhold the Bible from the congregation, it vindicated to the Church the right of developing doctrine, and placed the Mass at the centre of the religious life. The Catholic Mass is not like the Protestant Lord's Supper, mainly and pre-eminently a memorial of a particular past event, but before all things itself a sacrifice which is eternal, *i.e.*, of the "lamb slain before the foundation of the world." Indeed, the whole distinctive quality of Catholicism is conditioned by the keen and unwavering appreciation of the cardinal facts of the spiritual world, as permanently present and energizing here and now as truly as any history has recorded them to have operated in the past. And it can scarcely be denied that this generality in the Catholic conception has produced the most consummate flowers of the religious life.

\* Compare Ephrem Syrus ap. Photium Cod. 229. οὐ τὸν τινὰ ἑθρωπον ἀλλὰ τὸν δαϊκόν.

It is of course easy to exaggerate this generality of form in the Catholic religion and to shut one's eyes to the elements of historical particularity which still clung to it. The historical lurked in the *legenda* of public worship though in a tongue "not understood" of the congregation; it stirred up the warlike passions of Europe in the Crusades; it found a permanent expression in not a little of mediæval art. But it was not until the Protestant Reformation and the translation of the Bible into the modern languages of Europe that the written record of the *origines* of Christianity came definitely to the front as the authoritative standard whereby the highly articulated structure of the traditional faith was to be judged. The Reformation, whatever else it was, was certainly an appeal from the spirit to the letter, from the inward to the outward, from the present to the past, from the ideal to the historical, in a word, from generality to particularity.

For those who embraced the Reformation, therefore, the centre of gravity, so to speak, of the religious consciousness, became displaced. With the appeal to the written record, emerged also the private intellect, the "common sense" of the individual, as the sole guide to its interpretation, and as a consequence, an endless *morcellement* both of feeling and opinion. Unity and centrality in development were lost; and with them much of the beauty and sweetness of the Christian life. We cannot stop to follow out the manifold results of this displacement in detail; but so far as our especial purpose is concerned, the appeal from religion as it had come to be after fifteen centuries of growth to the records of its foundation, gave rise—so soon as the immediate effects of the crisis itself had disappeared—to three very remarkable phases of thought, a brief explanation of which in their order, will bring us down to the proper subject of the present paper, the original position taken by Dr. Strauss.

1. The new specific reference of the contents of religion to the historical circumstances of a distant age and the erection of "common sense" as the criterion by which those circumstances and the records of them were to be judged, landed and could not but land the Protestant mind in a negation. "Common Sense," the intellectual phase of the eighteenth century, could not accept a miraculous history as miraculous. Missing with characteristic coarseness and absence of tact, all the finer points, all the sentiment, not to speak of the speculative ideas involved in primitive Christianity, it invented the hypothesis of imposture to account for the miracles; and left the philosopher at liberty "to regard with a smile or a sigh" the obscurity of the founders of superstition and the ignorance or credulity of its votaries. This attitude, the characteristic standing point of English Deism, and of the Continental *éclaircissement*, carries with it, as will easily be seen, the surrender of a great deal more than the historical element in religion. It involves, as was proved by the event, the erasure of



all the distinctive traits of the Christian consciousness itself ; it involved an aversion from the whole Christian ethical view of life, and an establishment of the maxims and sentiments of prudential morality, in its place. But it did not necessarily involve, as we may see in the case of Voltaire or Gibbon, a demolition of the more primitive and abstract elements of the religious consciousness, as—e.g., the belief in the existence of God. The belief in an extramundane mind, remote, inscrutable, clothed, so far as it was clothed at all, with the attributes of its worshippers, a kind of Supreme Common Sense, became fused with a more or less emotional and imaginative conception of the maxims of prudential morality under the name of Natural Religion. It is out of this abstract residuum that Bishop Butler attempts to reconstruct again the belief in Christianity upon the basis of the prudential motive, that it is conceivably true, and if true, the penalties for disbelieving it are severe. But no ingenuity can construe the idea of the Christian God out of the abstract Deity of Natural Religion ; and for this reason. To the conception of the Divine Nature, as embraced by and constituting the Christian consciousness, the operations of Revelation, Incarnation, and Redemption, are not accidental incidents, which can be let drop or set aside, leaving the idea of God in its integrity. They constitute it. God is nothing to the Christian, except as revealing himself in consciousness, as incarnate in the world, and as redeeming it. As it is somewhere happily phrased, I think by Mr. Pictor, "a new race was born in Christ ; the divine humanity to which God is not Object only but Subject."

The God of Natural Religion, on the contrary, is not this spiritual process in and towards mankind, but a motionless point, which is the mere negation of the series of finite things. The idea is, as Feuerbach has conclusively shown, nothing more nor less than the apotheosis of the human understanding, i.e., of the abstract logical centre of the reasoning faculties. The deduction of a sanction for prudential morality, then, from this abstraction, which is the God of Deism, although it may have been a necessity from a psychological point of view, was ethically superfluous as well as impossible. For prudential morality has a sufficient ground in its *fit*, and is not advantaged by deriving its sanction from a transcendental entity ; while on the other hand a vanishing point, which is the mere negation of the finite, such as we have found the God of Natural Religion to be, is incompetent to supply a sanction to prudential morality or to anything else.

2. The impotence and superfluity of Deism as the guide and sanction of life, or as a resting place for the emotions, produced a reaction towards Christianity ; and in Kant's *Religion within the limits of pure Reason*, as in Butler's *Analogy*, we may discern an attempt to recover some of its ideal elements. But in Kant, there is no attempted return, as there is in Butler, to the historical factor

which Deism had demolished. Rather, he strives to make out a compromise between the phraseology of those theological ideas which are compatible with his system, or which the emotions require as a supplement to it, and the phraseology of isolated parts of current religion. With Kant, as with Fichte, "*nur das Metaphysische nicht das Historische macht selig; das letztere macht bloss verständig.*" But the reaction towards the Christian consciousness did not stop here; and in Schleiermacher's philosophical reconstruction of it, we discern a partial recrudescence of the tendency towards the historical, though confined to the single case of the resurrection of Christ as a means of helping out the psychological method. This, which is of the nature of a *purpureus pannus* in Schleiermacher, reopened the whole question of the historical factor in religion, and brought about that curious phase of conflict between a faith in bondage to the letter and a philosophy which had grown up in conscious estrangement from any form of Christian sentiment. This conflict has assumed a place in history under the name of Rationalism.

3. The point at issue between the Rationalists and Supernaturalists was no longer, indeed, that which had been raised by the English Deists, viz., whether or no the Christian religion was a tissue of imposture, unworthy of the consideration of reasonable men, the position confronted by Bishop Butler; and the line of defence no longer consisted in proving by forensic methods the good faith of the Biblical writers. The hypothesis of imposture had worn itself out, without being exactly refuted, and with Voltaire seems to have fallen into disrepute through its own intrinsic improbability. But the rejection of the miraculous element in the records which had been the latent motive of Deism remained the latent motive of Rationalism. The Rationalists were thus enabled to take common ground with the Supernaturalists in accepting the Gospel narratives as history; while contending for the readjustment of their outlines, so as to read them as the history of natural events, as against the traditional mode of regarding them as a true history of supernatural intervention. It is not difficult to see that both the contending parties alike based their position upon the dualistic conception of God which, in common with Deism, banished Him to an indefinite distance from the world; while in the conception of the Supernaturalists, the mechanical character of the supposed relation of God to the world was not materially modified by the theory of occasional interposition. Further than this, the long continued conflict between the two views had the effect of hatching a numerous brood of minute, specialized, and intermediate points of view, some bearing a closer resemblance to one parent, others to the other, until at length, as Schwartz says, "nobody knew any longer to which class he himself belonged, and still less in which class he should place others."\*

\* Geschichte der neueren Theologie, p. 5.

At this crisis, just forty years ago, Dr. Strauss, at that time a young lecturer of twenty-eight years of age, in the Theological College at Tübingen, and saturated with Schleiermacher and with Hegel, came forward with the sinister question: "You are disputing what sort of history the Gospels are; *are they history at all?*" Can you withdraw the miraculous element from a history claiming to narrate miraculous events, and leave behind any such residuum of natural history as the Rationalist proposes to do? If you deny the possibility or the demonstrability of the miraculous, the question which remains to be answered is not "how do you reconstruct the narrative *without* the miracles, but how do you account for the origination of the narrative *with* the miracles?" This question was posed by Strauss with an entirely unmistakeable directness, and ran like an electric shock through all the various schools of "soothing equivocation" with which Germany teemed. And the answer is equally unmistakeable: given the Jewish expectation of a Messiah, and given the appearance on the scene of an exceptionally impressive personality, the application of the former to the latter will account for the gradual evolution of the mythus which forms the ground-work of the Gospel narratives. The working out of this answer in relation to all the main groups of evangelical narrative, occupies nearly the whole of the original *Leben Jesu* of 1835, which was translated into English by no less a person than Miss Marian Evans.

This, then, was the negative side of Strauss at that time; and it was epoch-making in the sense that it closed the episode of conflict between faith and common sense, which the appeal to the historical record, as the criterion of the contents of the religious consciousness, had initiated at the time of the Protestant reformation.

But this negation was not the whole of Strauss, although it is the side of his doctrine which has attracted most attention in this country, while in Germany it has formed the starting point of the important modern school of evangelical criticism, and the subject of continual modification in accordance with the growth of knowledge. Neither was the ground idea of the myth originated by Strauss. It was an application of Hegel's profound diagnosis of the elements which go to constitute the religious consciousness. The ideas involved in religion are according to Hegel the same ideas as those which form the content of Philosophy; but that which is specific to the religious consciousness is the imaginative conception of them, and the concretion of them into individual forms. The imaginative concretion of the idea of God, or of His operations in the world (what Strauss calls mythus), is thus not merely an hypothesis to which he is driven experimentally by the study of a particular record; it is a necessary quality of religion as such, which, being taken away, religion would cease to be what it is.\*

\* *Leben Jesu*: *Einleitung*, § 14. That the Hebrew and Christian religions have

What, then, is Strauss's position in reference to the religious as distinguished from the historical elements in Christianity? Does he renounce Christianity in surrendering the latter? Assuredly not: and it is this which distinguishes his stand-point from the Deism in which the Protestant episode culminated. Here I will let him speak first for himself. In the concluding dissertation of the *Leben Jesu*, he says: \*

"The critic is intrinsically a believer. In proportion as he is distinguished from the rationalistic theologian and the freethinker, in proportion as his criticism is conceived in the spirit of the nineteenth century, he is filled with veneration for every religion, and especially for the substance of the sublimest of all religions, the Christian, which he perceives to be identical with the profoundest philosophical truth."

The object which the modern critic must set before himself is twofold, "to keep the faith unmutated, and at the same time to keep science unoffended:"† and it is because it only attempted to perform the latter of these two functions that Strauss condemns Rationalism.

"The insufficiency of Rationalism consists in its not doing what every theory of religion (Glaubenslehre) should do. That is, taking the complex of belief with which it has to deal, it should—first, give it adequate expression; and secondly, bring it into some relation, whether positive or negative, to science. Now, in the effort to make the faith agree with science, Rationalism has defaced the proportions of the faith. Thus to regard Christ as nothing more than a remarkable human being presents no difficulty to science; but this is not that Christ in whom the Church believes."‡

And in speaking of Schleiermacher he praises him for having "sought to retain what Rationalism had lost, the essential part of positive Christianity, whereby he has saved many in these days from the narrowness of Supernaturalism and the emptiness of Rationalism."§

What, then, is this positive element to which Strauss attaches so much importance? It is the general or ideal factor in religion, the growth and expansion of which to ever greater generality and ever profounder meaning we have already noted in the Jewish and Christian religions, until in the latter the process was interrupted by the appeal of the Reformation to the letter and the records, followed by what we have ventured to call the Protestant episode. The

their myths like all other religions "wird bestätigt" says Strauss, "wenn man vom Begriffe der Religion ausgeht, und fragt was zu deren Wesen gehört und also Bestandtheil aller Religionen sein muss, und worin hingegen die einzelnen Religionen sich noch unterscheiden können. Wenn man Religion im Verhältniss zur Philosophie bestimmt als das Bewusstsein desselben absoluten Inhalts aber nicht in Form des Begriffs sondern der Vorstellung; so ist leicht zu sehen dass nur unter und über dem eigentlichen Standpunkte der Religion das Mythische fehlen kann; innerhalb der eigentlichen religiösen Sphäre aber dasselbe wesentlich und nothwendig vorhanden ist."

\* Schlussabhandlung, § 144. "On the Dogmatic Import of the Life of Jesus."

† Schlussabh., § 148.

‡ Schlussabh., § 147.

§ Ibid. § 148.

greatness of Strauss, then, does not so much consist in his negation of the letter, and in dealing thereby the death-blow to the controversy between the Rationalists and Supernaturalists which was eating away the vitals of religion, as in taking up the threads of the old development of doctrine, re-establishing centrality in the movement of ideas, and carrying on that development several degrees further.

I have already called attention to the way in which the idea of the person of Christ became generalized in the early Church, from the time when St. Paul said,\* "Though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet from henceforth know we him no more," till we get in Ephrem Syrus the more technical conception of ὁ ὀλίκος ἄνθρωπος—and how his work and sacrifice were conceived as an external fact beginning "before the foundation of the world," and, as set forth in the Catholic doctrine of the Mass, going to the end of time. Now hear Strauss in a classical passage :†—

"Spiritual existence in its truth and reality is found neither in God by himself nor in man by himself, but in the union of God and man (der Gott-mensch); neither in the infinity of the one nor in the finitude of the other, taken by themselves, but in that process of self-surrender and recovery taking place between the two factors, which, from the Divine side is revelation, and from the human, religion."

This new generality, like the ground-work of the Mythical Theory, is all to be found in Hegel; but Hegel's exposition of the speculative notion of the Incarnation and Atonement, was sufficiently obscure and vacillating to lead the so-called "right wing" of the Hegelian school to attempt, and to suppose Hegel himself to have attempted, by means of this notion, a rehabilitation of the historical particularities of the Gospel record. That such was not Hegel's real meaning may be inferred from numberless passages in his works; and the necessity of proving that such a reconstruction of the historical was incompatible with his whole system of thought, gave rise to the so-called "left wing" of the Hegelian school, and to the *Halle Yearbooks*, to the early numbers of which Strauss contributed.

The question at issue between the two contending parties was this: Does the conception of the Incarnation and Atonement as an eternal process constituting the essential nature of spiritual existence, lead of necessity to, is it compatible with, the summation of this process in a single individual? Hegel had said, the important point for us is not that the summation did or did not take place in a single individual, but that it was part and parcel of the earliest consciousness of the Christian community to which we can penetrate, to believe that it did, to believe that is, that the infinite and the finite spirits had actually confronted each other in their entirety

\* 2 Cor. v. 16.

† *Leben Jesu* : Schlussabhandlung, § 150.

within the area of a single mind. This is not a real answer to the question, although it cannot be denied that for the religious consciousness as it exists imperfectly in the ordinary Christian, it is important to be convinced, that the consciousness of God, which in us is a dim and partial glimmering, attained only in rare moments of exaltation, cannot be explained away; because it has existed in an historical person with complete and uninterrupted lucidity, during a whole life time. For this practical purpose of edification and encouragement, it may be said, the belief is everything, and the truth of the conviction of secondary importance. But, on the other hand, a firm emotional grasp of the generality, that the whole universe is framed upon the basis of the continual and uninterrupted intercourse of the Infinite with the Finite, supplies the same need, without being liable, as everything historical must be, to be called in question on the ground of insufficient external evidence.

However this may be, the question to be decided by the theologian is not whether the doctrine of the summation of the spiritual process in an individual is edifying, but whether it follows from the idea of that process itself. And here the dry and ruthless Swabian intellect of Strauss comes in, as always, with an unmistakable answer:—

“According to the conception of science the infinite has its existence in the alternate production and absorption of the finite; and the *idea* is realized only in the entire series of its manifestations.”\*

This generalization of the doctrines of Incarnation and Atonement is the upshot of the instructive chapter on the “Dogmatic import of the Life of Jesus,” which forms the concluding dissertation of Strauss’ original *Leben Jesu*, and of the *Christliche Glaubenslehre*, in which the previous stadia traversed by the development of Christian doctrine, are subjected to the same searching criticism as the historical element had been in the previous work. During the whole of this negative sifting of dogma the new generalization, which we have endeavoured to explain, forms the dominant conception, the background; and it is a noteworthy fact that the *Glaubenslehre*, though it appeared after the *Leben Jesu*, was planned before it, thus showing that it was the attainment of this new conception which motived the elimination of the historical, and not the elimination of the historical which precipitated the new generalization as its residuum.

Whatever, therefore, we may think of Strauss’ speculative Christology, as a doctrine capable of assimilation by the religious community, enough has been said to show that it represents the normal development of the Christian consciousness; that it is of a piece with the tendency to generalization which made of the old

\* *Leben Jesu*: Schlussabhandlung, § 149. Cf. *Christliche Glaubenslehre*, § 66 p. 220.

Mosaic religion a spiritual instead of a merely national or heathen religion; which made the doctrine of the Divinity of Christ the centre of European thought, and the Mass the hearth and home of Catholic worship.\*

But the importance of the speculative Christology of Strauss does not consist solely in its normality as the latest term of a continuous development. Its special value, at the present crisis, is that it provides a basis for the religious and specifically Christian emotions, outside and independent of the dissolution produced by historical criticism. No one who is acquainted with the progress which historical science has made within the last half century, with the exactness of its method, and with the increasing internal agreement of its results, can sincerely propose to do otherwise than resign to it unreservedly the primitive records of religion. But it is impossible, in the long run, for the religious emotions to remain attached to the imagination of events which have been called in question, even though their historical truth may be ultimately established. What religious emotion demands is the eternal and indisputable, and no historical event resting upon external evidence which may become the subject of discussion, can have this character of eternity and indisputableness. Whether we will or no, emotion must disengage itself from the mutable and uncertain, and take refuge in that inner sanctuary of general doctrine which is the organic growth of the collective reason of mankind, and which, in the progress of the individual life, may be brought to the test of religious and moral experience.

But it is time that we proceed to examine the second phase through which the mind of Strauss passed, and which was exhibited after the lapse of nearly thirty years in the popular revision of the *Life of Jesus*, published in 1864.

2. The principal thing that strikes us in this revision of Strauss's great work is the alteration of tone apparent in the author as he approaches his subject.

His aim is no longer to construe a portion of past history into forms capable of assimilation by the modern mind (*eine vergangene*

\* That the generalization of the doctrine of the Incarnation in its most complete form, as it appears in Strauss as distinguished from Hegel, was not foreign to the thinkers of the middle ages, might be shown by plenty of quotations. I will content myself with one from St. Thomas Aquinas, which is as follows:—

"Cum Deo competat summa perfectio tanto magis est Deo simile aliquid quanto est magis perfectum. Sed totum universum est magis perfectum quam partes ejus, inter quas est natura humana; ergo totum universum est magis assumptibile quam natura humana." Summa iii. 4, 1. Compare with this the almost identical import of Spinoza, *Epist. xxi.* "Dico ad salutem non esse omnino necesse, Christum secundum carnem noscere; sed de aeterno illo filio Dei, h.e. Dei aeterna sapientia, quae sese in omnibus rebus, et maxime in mente humana et omnium maxime in Christo Jesu manifestavit, longe aliter sentiendum. Nam nemo absque hac ad statum beatitudinis potest pervenire, utpote quae sola docet, quid verum at falsum, bonum et malum sit."

Geschichte zu ermitteln), "but to lend a hand in the eventual emancipation of the human mind from the galling yoke of belief."\*

"The criticism of the Gospel history has (he complains) during the last twenty years undeniably run to seed (ins Kraut geschossen), new hypotheses especially relative to the Synoptic Gospels, their sources, composition, and mutual relations, spring up fast and free; are set up with zeal to be knocked down with zeal; *als ob es um Nichts weiter handelte*, as if these were not a further question in the background. And the controversy is becoming so extensive in its scope that one may well begin to be anxious whether we shall ever get clear on the main question, if its solution is to be postponed until the critical problem is settled."†

What, then, is this "main question" which agitates Strauss to such impatience? On this point his characteristic plainness of speech does not desert him. In the dedication of the book to his brother he congratulates him on having given his life to commercial pursuits, and thus avoided all the vexations and persecutions which beset the career of the theologian; and on having the insight to perceive "that *political progress*, at least in Germany, can never be secured until means have been taken to emancipate the popular mind from the religious illusion (von dem religiösen Wahn), and substitute a purely humanistic culture."

It will be seen at once that the ground of aggression against popular religion which is taken here is an entirely different position from that which Strauss had occupied thirty years before. Not less trenchant than now, he was content then to say, "We leave the believer his belief, let him leave us our philosophy." And his main endeavour was, as we have seen, to draw a line of demarcation between the ideal and permanent element and the historical creed with which it had become interwoven. In the revised and popular "*Life*," on the other hand, this permanent element, although not overtly abandoned, is let drop by the author, with the unsatisfactory explanation that he will not trouble the popular reader with conceptions which it may be difficult for him to grasp; and, with the exception of a few isolated passages which recall the earlier work, but have no pretension to be called in any sense a Christology,‡ the revised "*Life*" is largely occupied with modifications of the negative results arrived at previously.

\* Vorrede, xiv.

† Ibid. xv.

‡ As a typical passage in Strauss' second manner, I may give the following from the Preface to the *Leben Jesu*, of 1864 (Vorrede, xvii):—"We live in a crisis like that of the reformation, the difficulty of which consists in the fact that a portion of the dominant Christianity has become as intolerable as another part is indispensable. To the Reformers the intolerable element was the ecclesiastical, to us it is the biblical. . . . The indispensable and indeed imperishable element which remains to us of Christianity is that by which it rescued mankind from the *sensuous religion* of Greece on the one hand, and from the Mosiac law on the other; the belief, namely, that there is a spiritual and moral power governing the world, and that the service we have to render to this power is like itself, spiritual and moral," &c.



One thing, however, is very remarkable, as indicative of the new stand-point taken by the author, namely this, that Strauss now attempts what he had not attempted before—a positive reconstruction of the historical Christ, from the residue of record which remains after the miraculous events in the Gospel history have been eliminated. This, it will be remembered, is precisely the attempt which Rationalism had made, and which Strauss had in his first work condemned, in the strongest terms, as “unzulänglich” and “leer,” and as unworthy of the state of knowledge in the nineteenth century.\*

What, then, it may be asked, were the intermediate steps by which Strauss travelled from the speculative Christology of the first *Leben Jesu* back to the point of view of the old Rationalism. Are there any logical elements inherent in the first position, the development of which necessitates the second? As he gives no explanation of the mental procedure himself, I have most carefully considered, with a view of doing, so far as in me lies, complete justice to Strauss—what dialectical movement of ideas is conceivable from the speculative Christology to Rationalism; and I have found none. I have found no mediation of the two stand-points, but a biographical one; a “mediation” made up of the circumstances of Strauss’ life during those thirty years which intervened between the publication of the two *Lives*. And although, until a complete biography of Strauss is published, my explanation may be called in question; I offer it to the consideration of the reader for what it is worth. The first effect of the publication of the first *Life*, even before the appearance of the second volume, was the dismissal of Strauss from his tutorship in Tübingen. The whole theological world of Germany was up in arms against him. His teachers disclaimed the *Life* as in any sense a deduction from their principles; many of his friends renounced his acquaintance; those who stood by him became at once suspect, were passed over in promotion, or dismissed. He retired to a mastership in the Lyceum of his native town of Ludwigsburg, and lived with his parents. But here again a fresh trouble was in store for him in the displeasure of his father, and the uneasiness of his mother at the continual bickerings which took place between the two men.† After a year, in the autumn of 1836, he took refuge in Stuttgart and occupied himself with the preparation of the second, third, and fourth editions of the *Life* which were speedily demanded. For the book had made a prodigious success, and had become the centre of a vigorous and embittered controversy, which raged from one end to the other of Germany. Into this controversy Strauss plunged with ardour: his

\* Cf. p. 235.

† Zeller: David Friedrich Strauss in seinem Leben und seinen Schriften geschildert. Bonn, 1874, p. 44.

opponents obtained small mercy at his hands, and he asked none from theirs. But the speedy result upon his own mind and temper was the beginning of an aversion to the subject with which he had been dealing. In December, 1837, he wrote to his friend Eduard Zeller, that so soon as he should have finished the third edition of the *Life*, "he would wipe his hands of theology altogether."\* And for the next two years he wrote nothing but literary reviews for the newspapers. The profound exasperation at the treatment he had received on all sides seems during this interval to have partly subsided, and he again returned to his old studies. Two little works, *Selbstgespräche über Vergängliches und Bleibendes im Christenthum*, and an article on Kerner, which he subsequently (1839) united under the title *Zwei friedliche Blätter*, were the product of this altered mood, and represent the nearest approach that Strauss ever condescended to make to the point of view of the ordinary believing Christian. This sympathetic overture he afterwards, when other causes of exasperation supervened, condemned as a morbid outcome of the "horror of feeling himself alone in the world, which penetrated into every limb."† In the same year he received a call to a Theological Chair at Zürich, but before he could enter upon it, a popular *émeute* excited by the appointment had removed the ministry which made it, and left Strauss without further hope of getting a Professorship. Fortunately he does not appear to have ever suffered from that cruellest penalty which attends the expression of unpopular opinions, pecuniary embarrassment. But his life-long exclusion from an Academical career, for which he was adapted by temperament, and which by its regular succession of duties would probably have subdued a certain restlessness of character observable in him,—this life-long exclusion, Professor Zeller tells us,‡ weighed very heavily upon him. In the parallel case of Arthur Schopenhauer, there can be little doubt that the exclusion from a congenial sphere of duty conditioned to some extent the more extravagant Pessimism of his writings: and I am disposed to attribute the altered tone in Strauss towards religion, in default of any other explanation, to these external circumstances of his career. In 1839 his mother died after a prolonged illness, increased by worry; in 1841 his father followed. Strauss plunged with energy into his old studies again, and brought out the two volumes of the *Christliche Glaubenslehre*, which he had planned before the *Leben Jesu*, and anticipated to some extent in the "concluding dissertation" of that work. The *Glaubenslehre* was not a success: it appeared, at least the second volume of it, simultaneously with the Feuerbach's *Wesen des Christenthums*, which took possession of the public mind, as Strauss' *Leben Jesu* had

\* Wolle er sobald keine theologische Feder mehr anrühren. Zeller, D. F. Strauss in *Seinem Leben*, u.s.w., p. 48.

† Zeller, *op. cit.* p. 51.

‡ *Op. cit.* p. 53.

formerly done, but left little chance of popularity for a continuation of a less startling kind. And now, at length, Strauss seemed determined to keep his resolution to write no more theology. His interest had cooled; and as a theologian he was silent for the next twenty years. "I can only write when I am in a rage," he said to a friend: and his rage had fallen, with the decay of opposition. But these years were not destined to be more fortunate. In 1842 he married an actress of remarkable personal attractions and culture, but after a brief period of happiness, spent in the neighbourhood of Heilbronn, a growing alienation of sympathy between man and wife culminated at the end of five years in a voluntary separation. This was a terrible blow to his sensitive nature; and, in speaking afterwards of his mother's death, Strauss "rejoices that she did not live to see his life wrecked by a convulsion far more fatal than any of those theological persecutions whose virulence used to be such an affliction to her."\* The lady retired to her friends in Stuttgart, where she remained till her death in 1870; and Strauss began a vagrant life, unable to settle in any place for more than a few years. He read with diligence, as he always had done; but he found it impossible to write. No one subject could chain his attention; but was dropped for another. He turned himself to politics, and at length to the editing of the letters of the Swabian poet Schubart which had been committed to him.

In 1848 came the Democratic movement and the Frankfort parliament: and Strauss, at the urgent request of his friends, though much against the grain, allowed himself to become a candidate for his native township of Ludwigsburg. But his ill-luck continued to attend him: his election failed in consequence of the country votes. However, he was soon elected to represent the same town in the Würtemberg Chamber, the country electors having in this case no vote for the town member. In the Chamber he became sensible of his entire want of sympathy with the movement which was rife in Germany: he set his face steadily against the stream, and voted consistently with the small nobles and the clerical party. The radicals were exasperated, even his own friends deserted him; and a requisition was conveyed to him to give up his seat. He refused, but a few weeks sufficed to convince him that his position was untenable. One day, on the urgent demand of the radical members, he suffered the indignity of being called to order in the Chamber,† and he at once wrote to his constituents and resigned his seat.

It was at this time, apparently, that he first came to entertain the opinion which he afterwards expressed in the dedication of the popular *Life of Jesus*, which we have already quoted; that political

\* The Old and the New Faith. Translated by Mathilde Blind. Memoir of Strauss, xli. London: Asher, 1874.

† This was according to Zeller undeserved. *Op. cit.* p. 72.

progress in Germany was impossible until "the religious illusion" was dissipated.

"Nothing can possibly be worse," he writes, "than the condition of Germany at the present time. My position is clear. If I have to choose between an aristocratic and a democratic despotism, I say, without hesitation, I prefer the former."

One can see that in this sweeping condemnation there is not a little of personal chafing under unmerited injuries. And the experience of every one will bear witness that nothing is more easy than to construct a generality of this sort out of the circumstances of one's own private sphere. A man quarrels with his architect, and relieves his feelings by writing a paper to prove that the extinction of the whole class of architects is an indispensable condition of modern progress. My grocer serves me with some adulterated commodity, and in my righteous indignation I feel that I am at one with all that is sound in European thought in inveighing publicly against the powerful and predatory class of licensed victuallers. Many a man who has groaned under the tyranny of the clerical majority at our English universities has been permanently alienated, not only from the Church but from all religion.

In this respect, Strauss is not very unlike those idolaters who were accustomed to chastise their deities on an access of misfortune. But it remains to ask, why Strauss should have selected the distinctive tenet of eighteenth century Rationalism, as the speculative accompaniment of his chagrin. That his mind had been tending in that direction is shown by the character of the biographies which occupied his pen during the latter part of the interval between the two *Lives of Jesus*. In Ulrich von Hutten, he had found the hero of theological conflict. The contentious irreconcilable character of his subject was congenial to him. At the time of the concordats with Rome he asks himself what would Hutten have done.

"Damals rief ich : ist denn kein Hutten da?" "And because I found none among the living, I undertook to renew the image of the dead Hutten and present him before the eyes of the German people."

Later again, the feeling of his own isolated position leads him to seek intercourse with kindred souls in the past. In this mood he turns to the unpublished papers of Reimarus in the Wolfenbüttel library, from which Lessing had already drawn; and Reimarus becomes a hero as Hutten had been—the hero of negative evangelical criticism. So Strauss by following his varying moods is brought back again to Theology, but he returns to it no longer as a speculative Theologian of the School of Hegel, but as a Rationalist. The metaphysic "welche selig macht" has evaporated along with the Christian temperament; Strauss is himself scarcely conscious that it has done so; it does not occur to him to explain how it went. He

even talks still in the *Life* of 1864 about the "ächten Heilswahrheiten," the genuine saving truths, as if these were still a part of his mind: but when we look for them, we come only upon the jejune traces of Deism. The place of the *Schlussabhandlung* of the earlier *Life* is occupied by a new positive factor, in the shape of a reconstruction of the evangelical history with the miraculous threads of narrative drawn out of it; precisely the feat which thirty years before he had pronounced impossible from a critical point of view, and inasmuch as the result is "not the Christ in whom the Church believes," but merely an "ausgezeichneter mensch" whose lineaments shall give no offence to Science, we must quote Strauss against himself and say, that this is the criticism not of the nineteenth but of the eighteenth century.

Upon Strauss's last publication, *The Old and the New Faith*, it will not be necessary to dwell at any great length. Its contents are known in this country, and are fresh in the memory of all who care for these things. Unlike the second *Life* it is not a *provocatio ad populum*; but an esoteric "confession" addressed to the unknown "we," who have arrived at the same opinions. The opinions are not new or strange; they exist sporadically wherever philosophy is in decay or has not yet formed a part of education, as amongst the present generation of men engaged in physical science. They have no especial interest in themselves; but their combination, and the fact that Strauss, who had once attained the commanding heights of philosophical speculation, should, at the end of his career, have relapsed into them, present a curious problem, but *distinctly a problem in individual biography, not a stage in the march of ideas in the world*. Here again the immediately preceding condition to this latest phase seems to have been the study of Voltaire, as the immediately preceding condition of the mood represented by the *Life* of 1864, was the study of Reimarus.\*

In *The Old and New Faith*, the last vestige of the original Strauss, who made an epoch and will live in the history of thought, is swept away. In the *Life* of 1864, the Christological element is allowed to drop, but the critical remains. In *The Old and New Faith* the critical falls to the ground also. What, for instance, can be conceived more entirely at variance with the nicety of the true critical touch, than to take the crudest and most materialistic forms of early popular belief and bluntly ask, Do we believe them? Of course we do not; but what has become of the long march of doctrinal development, by which we have arrived at the religious consciousness of to-day? Is that to count for nothing? Are we to be judged by the most primitive conceptions? What was the object of the *Christliche Glaubenslehre*, if not to show that the development of the Christian consciousness is a reality, capable of specific description?

\* Zeller, *op. cit.* 98.

All this is, however, let drop without a word; and we are confronted with the *schroffer Gegensatz* of the modern and the primitive mind.


It would seem a remarkable inconsistency that Dr. Strauss, after having thought himself out of every belief in development as applied to ideas and to the religious consciousness at large, should find so much repose in the contemplation of the evolutionary doctrines at which modern physical science has arrived. If there is continuous development in the inorganic and organic worlds, why not, as Hegel insisted that there was, in the world of thought? The diremption of the two kinds of development may be possible to the individual, but in the long run, as a diremption in the consciousness of mankind, it must ultimately eliminate itself.

It is on this subjective and individual point of view that Strauss, hunted, *destitué*, systematically tarred and feathered by fortune and the theologians, came during the latter half of his life more and more to stand. And as marking the relapse, the speculative decay, if I may use the expression, I will quote in conclusion a passage from the *Glaubenslehre*, which cuts away any objective and philosophical value from the Second and Third phases of Strauss, and leaves his original position, the position taken by the first "Life of Jesus," as the only historical one that he ever took, and the only one by which he will probably hereafter be known:—

"The subjective criticism of the individual is like a hose which every child can handle for a time; but the criticism which consummates itself in the course of centuries, rushes down like a mountain torrent, and against it every barrier is powerless. The true criticism of Dogma is its history."\*

C. E. APPLETON.

\* *Glaubenslehre*, I., x. 71, quoted by Zeller.



## ULTRAMONTANISM AND THE FREE KIRK OF SCOTLAND.

IN REPLY TO ARCHBISHOP MANNING.

ON the shores of Scotland and America we may observe a company of men who stand and look out with much interest, but, at the same time, with scarcely concealed complacency, over the troubled sea of Europe. The shock of those mighty opposites, Ultramontanism and Cæsarism, which perplexes and saddens so many, has filled them with satisfaction. That hopeless but most instructive conflict is exactly what they had anticipated, nay, what in some milder form they had desired. For the Scotch Churches and their far more numerous American allies are the representatives in the present day of the only sharply defined theory I know, which is fundamentally distinct from both the colossal extremes. Cavour's "Free Church in a Free State" was more a practical plan of action than a doctrine; but long before the phrase was uttered, a theory corresponding to it had been reduced to logical form by Puritanism in England and Scotland—a massive and noble theory, disfigured though it then was by the intolerance of the age, and of the law, and of the men who believed it. In England it has passed out of sight: yielding to a confusion of thought and feeling on the whole subject so helpless as quite to appal one, when it is dragged to the surface by a question like this of Germany. In Scotland, on the other hand, the theory was in the last generation taken up, and magnificently illustrated by a knot of the hardest headed and strongest hearted Scotchmen of modern times. And in America, it seems to have attained, what I cannot say it has yet done at home, a recognized position as the legal theory of the country—that upon

which the Supreme Court of the United States (a tribunal looked up to by lawyers all over the world), as well as the other independent but more limited judicatories, now proceed."

To this doctrine in all its details we need not commit ourselves. But that something very like it—perhaps substantially the same—is the only possible middle-ground for the future, the only safeguard from absolutism in the civil and religious sphere, every few years seem to show more clearly. Above all, the progress of Prince Bismarck's contest with Pius IX. is producing, week by week, such an effect upon English opinion, that multitudes are at this moment groping outside the *Scoto-American* theory of mutual independence, unwilling to enter by that door, and yet unable to move away. In such circumstances, its advocates may well run a waiting race. Time is on their side. Every development in the great North German story will bring out more and more the impossibility of submerging or subordinating either the secular power or the spiritual, and so will suggest the expediency of frankly recognizing both. And while history is unrolling so great a picture under so intense an illumination, may we not wisely keep silence?

I should do so, but for one reason. Archbishop Manning, in his now well-known address on *Cesarism and Ultramontanism*,\* after stating boldly and clearly the central pretensions of the latter system, indicated that, in his view, all Christians have made the same claims for the Church as against the State. That might pass as a too vague or rash statement. But in the *CONTEMPORARY REVIEW* for April last he returns to the subject; and repeating his thesis, that "Jesus Christ established a Church," (postponing, in the meantime the question, What body answers the description? but, at all events, "a Church") "with the constitution and powers which I claim for my Church," he adduces as witnesses to it: 1. The Established Church of England; 2. The Church of Scotland; 3. The Free Church of Scotland; 4. The free Churches of England. On the case of the Church of England I say nothing, because of its ecclesiastical law I know nothing; and because the case of a Church where the sovereign still claims authority in all causes ecclesiastical must differ from that of a country whose whole constitution was founded, as that of Scotland was at the Revolution, on a legislative repudiation and rescinding of any such authority. At the same time, I cannot doubt that Leslie and the other writers referred to by Dr. Manning, will be found entitled to the benefit of some of the distinctions to be hereafter pointed out. But, with regard to the three other bodies whose witness the Ultramontanist champion claims, I must express unbounded astonishment at the assertion, that his position is maintained by them. The case of the English Nonconformists is really stronger than that of Scotland, although they have no authoritative documents

\* "*Cesarism and Ultramontanism*." Second Edition. Burns and Oates. 1874.



to refer to. But, with regard to the Church of Scotland, and "still more decisively" the Free Church, I shall venture to state and hope to prove that it would be just as reasonable to accuse either of them of Cæsarism as of Ultramontaniam.

Cæsarism, let us say, means, speaking generally, the supremacy of the State over the Church. Ultramontaniam, again speaking generally and provisionally, means the supremacy of the Church over the State. Now, whatever its actings may have been, the notorious theory of the Church of Scotland has been always that there is no supremacy of the one power over the other, and no subordination of the one under the other; that each has its own separate sphere: that in that sphere each is independent and supreme; and that each has thus its own jurisdiction, not derived from the other, or held of the other, but, as the Free Church came habitually to term it, a "co-ordinate" jurisdiction. That this theory was originally conceded to the Church by the Scotch lawyers, or unequivocally recorded in the Statute-Book of the realm, I have never been able to see, though our Churchmen have weightily urged that it was so. But, on the other hand, that it was claimed by the Reformed Church itself, and that from the first, I have no doubt at all. Dr. Manning quotes from the Second Book of Discipline. It is proper that he should know that this manifesto, though a document of great authority, is not strictly a standard of the Church of Scotland, and that its binding obligation has been questioned by lawyers. But take it without remark. There is not a sentence quoted by Dr. Manning, nor is there a sentence in the document omitted by him, which does not agree with this theory of mutual independence, which does not, indeed, flow from it. It is carefully poised and balanced throughout by a regard to this very theory; and it would be as easy to prove that it leaned to Erastianism as to the Roman Catholic theory of the Church and State. Dr. Manning shows that it asserts Church independence; but he shows no more. Indeed, if we take up the more authoritative documents of the Kirk, viz., Knox's Confession of 1560, which was in force long after the Second Book of Discipline was passed, and the Westminster Confession of 1647, the present Scotch creed, it might with regard to both of them be plausibly argued that they lean away from the side of Church independence, still more from Church supremacy. They seem, at first sight, to concede more to the civil magistrate—to Cæsar—than the theory of equal and mutual relations calls for. But this, too, is a mistake; and the whole statements are really deductions from the twin propositions which we find heading different chapters in the Confession of Westminster:—

"God, the supreme Lord and King of all the world, hath ordained civil magistrates to be under Him over the people."

"The Lord Jesus, as King and Head of His Church, hath therein appointed a government in the hand of Church officers, distinct from the civil magistrate."

And on this theory of co-ordination the *Second Book of Discipline* is a commentary in the 17th century, like the *Theoremata*, or 119 Propositions prepared by Gillespie, and sent down in the 18th by the General Assembly to the Universities. They all make the State as independent of the Church as they make the Church independent of the State.

We are already almost in a position to judge of the paragraph which Dr. Manning, quoting it from himself, says, "reads like a quotation from the *Second Book of Discipline*, and there is not a syllable in it which does not fall within the limits of the Free Kirk of Scotland." Let us try its very first words. "All freedom of soul and conscience in men, in families, and in states, comes from the limitation of the *civil power*." But the Book of Discipline, in every sentence, (or rather every alternate sentence,) implies or asserts that one half of human freedom comes from limitation of the spiritual power; which it again and again restricts, sometimes by pointing out the sphere and rights of the civil magistrate, and sometimes by declaring that "it is proper to Christ only to be called lord and master in the spiritual government of the Kirk, and all others that bear office therein should be called only ministers, disciples, and servants." And the more authoritative Westminster creed, in the magnificent and classical passage "Of Christian liberty, and liberty of conscience," turns its hostile declaration not partially but wholly against the demand of any Church on earth (Dr. Manning's assuredly not excepted) to be the guide of conscience and dispenser of truth. "God alone is lord of the conscience, and hath left it free from the doctrines and commandments of men which are in anything contrary to His word, or beside it, in matters of faith or worship. So that to believe such doctrines, or to obey such commandments out of conscience, is to betray true liberty of conscience; and the requiring of an implicit faith, and an absolute and blind obedience, is to destroy liberty of conscience, and reason also." After this it is scarcely necessary to go through the rest of Dr. Manning's paragraph, in which he describes the Church as a "superior authority" limiting the State, and the law of God as "represented, expounded, applied on earth by an authority of His own creation, and by judicial powers of His own delegation." The Kirk of Scotland has (as we have seen above) always solemnly rejected the idea of being an "authority" over men, even as individuals; and much more that of being a "superior authority," judicially or otherwise, over the State, whose independence it has, in words at least, guarded equally with its own.

But Archbishop Manning holds that the witness of the Free Church of Scotland is "still more decisive" of his assertion that every Christian Church claims both independence and supremacy, in the Ultramontane sense. And it is quite true that this body, both when representing the Church of Scotland for ten years before

1843, and after its disruption from the State, revived the old principles with a "precision and intensity" which make us look there, if anywhere, for a critical utterance. We shall not be disappointed.

In his later papers Dr. Manning generally speaks of the Church as "separate and *supreme*." But his use of the last word is vague or ambiguous. Sometimes he says, the Church is "supreme in its own sphere," which in one sense every Christian Church should be or is, and which in another every king, every clerk, and every costermonger is. But again he speaks of the Church being "supreme in its own sphere *over the State*," by being a "superior authority" over it. And this again baffles us and brings us back to the question, What is meant by "supreme" in the Ultramontane sense? Does it mean no more than "independent" in the Scotch Church sense, at least, as that Church's claim was made "precise and intense" in the Free Church controversy? On p. 36 of the pamphlet, Dr. Manning answers this question :

"Let us, then, ascertain somewhat farther what is the meaning of supreme. Any power which is independent and can alone fix the limits of its own jurisdiction, *and can thereby fix the limits of all other jurisdictions*, is, *ipso facto*, supreme" . . . . "The Church is the Supreme Power among men; that is to say, . . . it alone can fix the limits of the faith and law intrusted to it, and therefore the sphere of its own jurisdiction; it alone can decide in questions where its power is in contact with the civil power—that is, in mixed questions."

It is admirably well put. This is the test of supremacy, as distinguished from independence—the test, therefore, of Ultramontanism—that when a mixed question arises between Church and State, the Church shall not claim simply to regulate its own religious matters by its own laws, but shall claim, as of right, that the State yield to its authority in the disputed matter. The State, of course, may refuse; but wrongfully, for the Church claims authority over its conscience. And the question is, has this ever been the claim of the Church of Scotland, especially in its modern conflict with the State? Now, it is unfortunate that an eminent prelate, in a crisis of his Church's fortunes, should make an appeal to Scotland which may be met by a crushingly conclusive answer. For the specialty—the notorious and characteristic thing—in the Scotch Church position from 1838 to 1843 was that it took the form of rejecting this Ultramontane claim. It was not only by implication. It was not merely by general statements of mutual independence, as in the old standards, leaving the limitation of Church powers to be inferred. It was by express statement of the particular formula, carried out too in practice. The very first step, when the "mixed question," the Auchterarder case, was decided against the Church by the supreme civil tribunal, was that Dr. Chalmers, supported by

young Mr. Candlish, moved that "the General Assembly, being satisfied that by the said judgment all questions of civil right are substantially decided, do now in conformity with the uniform practice of this Church, ever to give and inculcate implicit obedience to the decisions of civil courts, in regard to the civil rights and emoluments secured by law to the Church, instruct the Presbytery to offer no further resistance to the claims of Mr. Young or of the patron to the emoluments," while at the same time it formally declined to take any ecclesiastical steps in their favour. And this distinction, whether right or wrong in detail, was taken by the Scotch Church expressly on the ground of the twofold independence, and the separate spheres, and the abjuration of supremacy in the sense of Dr. Manning. In the "Engagement" entered into at this time by the party which afterwards became the Free Church, it is said that, as to civil consequences of Church judgments, "as in regard to all temporal matters, we fully acknowledge the civil magistrate to be the sole and supreme judge—bound, indeed, to have respect to the word of God and the *liberties* of Christ's Church, yet always entitled to act independently, on his own convictions of what is right." The idea, indeed, of calling upon the magistrate or judge to be regulated in these mixed matters by Church authority, or to accept from the Church the limits of his jurisdiction, was never even hinted by the Church, and as often as it was imputed by the other side was promptly and publicly condemned. It was the other question—the counter-claim—which they had to deal with. For the Church having decided that the admission of pastors was a Church matter, within its duties and jurisdiction, the Court held that it must, in present circumstances, be taken as civil. And thereupon it demanded that the Church should on this question of what fell within its powers, yield not to persuasion or negotiation, but to the ruling of civil authority as *supreme*. No one in Scotland has any doubt that this is the exact statement of fact on what Dr. Manning has unwarily made challenge\*; and hear how he speaks on it (p. 47):—

"The essence of modern Cæsarism is not only that the State has supreme power over the Church in all persons and causes, but supreme right to determine the limits of the rights of the Church, its liberties, offices, and duties; or, in other words, that the State can determine, and the Church cannot determine, what is the authority and commission intrusted to it by its Divine Founder. This is the vital point in the contention."

So far Dr. Manning and the Scotch Church agree, for the refusal of the latter body to accept the ruling of the civil powers on the limits of its jurisdiction, as regulating, not only all civil results and

\* The protest of the Moderate minority in the Assembly (29 May, 1841), was that the Church was bound "to be subject to the civil power in all matters declared by the supreme civil authorities of the country to affect temporal rights."

relations, but its Church acting, was the precise point by which the split was caused. But in Dr. Manning's next sentences there is a divergence:—

"The Church claims to be the sole, because the divinely appointed, judge of the sphere of its own spiritual office, authority, and jurisdiction. The modern Caesarism claims this ultimate power of determination for the State. Between these conflicting claims there can be no *modus vivendi*."

The Scotch Church, very questionably, I think, asserted that there could be a *modus vivendi* even in establishment. It was rather a hard one, for it proposed in every particular case of conflict to submit to the ruling of the State as to all emoluments—i.e., to be disestablished *pro tanto*. And when it came to the question of the whole Church, and not of particular parishes, it took the same course. But it did so, not on Dr. Manning's ground of the Church being the sole judge of the limits of the two jurisdictions, or on Dr. Cook's ground of the courts being the sole judge, but expressly on the ground that both were judges—that both ought to be judges—that the judgment of each ought to rule its own province, and that if they could not agree they must separate. So the "Free Church Catechism" instructs the logical youth of the north. "When it becomes a question whether the terms of alliance between Church and State have been kept by one of the parties, who is to decide?—*Ans.* Neither party can decide for the other without destroying its independence. Each must decide for itself. The civil court, from its very nature, cannot be a third party in such a case. It is merely the organ and instrument of the State. And the only thing competent for the State to do, if it is of opinion, or if its tribunals decide, that the Church has broken the terms of alliance, is (after trying to convince the Church of its error) to put an end to the alliance, and withdraw the civil benefits it has conferred." \* And so the only thing competent to the Church to do, is, instead of attempting, by fixing the limits of its own jurisdiction, "thereby to fix the limits of all other jurisdictions," to separate from the State, submitting to the State ruling<sup>1</sup> as being within the State's own sphere absolutely authoritative. So the chief theologian on the side of the Scotch Church put it: "We have uniformly not admitted merely, but contended, that the civil magistrate is entitled and bound to judge for himself, on his own responsibility, of the meaning of the Word of God, and of the scriptural warrant for the decisions and proceedings of Church Courts, with a view to the discharge of his own duty, whatever that may be, and the regulation of his own conduct in the exercise of his lawful jurisdiction in civil or temporal matters." † And so, more recently, Dr. Rainy, in his powerful answer to Dean Stanley. "As to Hilde-

\* Catechism on the Principles and Constitution of the Free Church of Scotland, issued by authority of the General Assembly. Edinburgh: James Nichol.

† Dr. Cunningham's Discussions on Church Principles, p. 281.

brandism, it is enough to say that we recognize the duty of the State to regulate its action in its own sphere according to its own sense of duty, and to accept no authoritative dictation from the Church. The State is to have its own conscience; and the Church is to affect the State's action only as it can, upon the merits of each question, influence the common convictions and intelligence of those who form the State." But what is of more consequence than the views of representative theologians—when the actual Disruption admirably described by Dr. Manning arrived, the same theory was built into its documents. The "Claim of Right" of 1842, claims, as of right, and as inalienable, the spiritual freedom of the Church, but "fully recognizes the absolute jurisdiction of the civil courts in relation to all matters whatsoever of a civil nature, and especially in relation to all the temporalities conferred by the State upon the Church, and the civil consequences attached by law to the decisions, in matters spiritual, of the Church courts." And the final "Protest" of 1843 proceeds on an acknowledgement of the now declared "mind and will of the State" as to the future conditions of Establishment in Scotland—a matter as to which the Church had already acknowledged the "exclusive and ultimate" authority of the civil power, and claimed none itself. Throughout, the Church contention was that neither power had the right to fix *for the other* the limits of its jurisdiction or the rule of its actings—*i.e.*, that neither was supreme in the Ultramontane sense, but both were independent.

Now all this Scotch theory may be absurd. It may be impracticable. It may be inconsistent with the principles of civil government on the one hand, or of Church authority on the other, or with both; all this it is quite open to Dr. Manning at any time to argue. But that is not the question. The question is whether at a moment when the European powers of Cæsarism and Ultramontaniam are proclaimed to be locked once more in conflict, the venerable representative of the latter system in Great Britain can be permitted, publicly and repeatedly, to claim moral support from a system which is not opposed merely, but is broadly and notoriously opposed, to his own. For the Mutual Independence theory of the Scotch Church was not a thing hidden or capable of being misunderstood. It, and its corollary, that neither was "supreme" (that is, as Dr. Manning most accurately puts it, that neither could authoritatively prescribe limits to the other), was made hard dogma. It was reduced to formula. It became food for babes and catechumens. It was brandished about, by Free Church controversialists, challenging and urging reply, till all Scotland grew weary of it. And now when attention is directed to it from without, by the seeming impossibility of otherwise extricating the dead-lock visible in Prussia and impending all over the world, it is a little unfortunate that so eminent a controversialist should claim it as "directly and explicitly" in favour of the Ultramontane theory. Ultramon-

tanism, I fancy, came into existence as the name opposed to Gallicanism. And that most learned and accurate theologian whom I have already quoted, gives it as the result of his reading that "almost all the great men who have defended the Gallican Liberties, whether theologians or jurists, have maintained the independence of the Church *as well as of the State*, and have held views as to the proper rule of limitation, concerning things civil and ecclesiastical, and the rights and duties of the civil power *circa sacra*, substantially the same as those which have generally been put forth by Scottish Presbyterians."\* But on an historical matter like this I say nothing, though it be technically conclusive. Neither do I press the general view, which is substantially and satisfactorily conclusive, that all Protestant Churches, but most particularly the Scotch Church, are founded upon a repudiation of the characteristic tenet of Roman Catholicism, whether Ultramontane or not—the tenet, namely, that, in the Archbishop's words, the Church on earth "holds in custody the faith and the law of Jesus Christ, and is the sole interpreter of that faith and the sole expositor of that law," and so has power "to legislate with authority," and to "bind consciences." But I select the characteristic of Ultramontanism given by Dr. Manning himself—supremacy; and of that not very ambiguous term I take his own careful definition; and I admit that the history of the Kirk, especially in the modern conflict which he challenges as the critical one, turned exactly upon the test which that definition supplies. And I must be permitted to say that the result of this sifting process is, that it would be quite as reasonable for Dr. Falck to claim that the documents and history of the Kirk of Scotland and Free Kirk are "directly and explicitly" in favour of Caesarism, as for Dr. Manning to claim them in favour of his own system.

This then professes to be a *via media*. Now the present is not the time when we can afford to fling aside any middle theory which has even an appearance of logic or consistency. It may perhaps not extricate us, after all. But we are in bitter need of something that will do so. Dr. Manning's view is clear and consistent. Mr. Fitzjames Stephen's is at least equally so. But most Englishmen abhor both. Yet when we apply our minds to such a gigantic problem as the German one, and still more when we look to the future all over the world, we feel the most humiliating need of something better than our present uneasy shuffle between Erastianism and reaction. Will this *Scoto-American* theory suffice?

As I have already indicated, I do not commit myself wholly to it. The great difficulty it leaves is the middle region common to State and Church. Both powers, we say, are independent; that is, neither supreme over the other, but each supreme in its own sphere. But how can we separate the spheres? I mean, how can we separate

\* Principal Cunningham's Discussions, 151.

them even in theory? How are we to draw a line across the objects and interests of human life, and say This is religious, and this is secular? There is no such distinction in nature—in things as they lie around us; and if it be said (no doubt rightly) that the difference is only superinduced by the deliberate actings of men in civil or sacred association, that still leaves great difficulties. Shall the Church be entitled to say to the State, "It is Corban, by whatsoever thou mightest have been profited by me?" Or the State to the Church, "This filthy lucre has been put into God's treasury, but my necessity is greater than thine?" And what of the whole activities of human life, for example, Education? To which sphere does it belong? The utterances on these subjects have sometimes been alarmingly reckless, and that not only on the side of Churchmen; for probably the most eminent instance of it is the principle on which Lord Brougham in the House of Lords decided the great Scotch Church case in 1838: "The Church courts are barred and shut out from any cognizance of civil patrimonial rights, and not only of civil patrimonial rights directly, but of those things which indirectly affect civil patrimonial rights." That is, they are barred and shut out from every conceivable case which can come before them; for there never was and never will be a Church case which does not indirectly affect civil and pecuniary rights. The truth is, it is capable of something like demonstration,\* that almost the whole of human life may belong at the same time or alternately to both spheres. And the chief reasons why I do not regard this as fatal to the Mutual Independence theory, are that in the first place the supporters of that theory do not seem to hesitate to acknowledge and face the fact;† and secondly, that, practically, there appears to be no serious difficulty on either side of the Atlantic, in Courts of Law or elsewhere, in working it to all good and fair results. It must be worked "with brains, Sir," and with something like good faith; but so wrought it seems soon to regulate itself, even when the Courts know nothing of theology and dislike the region. One remark, indeed, must be made on the practical side. To work well, it requires Voluntaryism. The Mutual Independence theory, indeed, was not elaborated by Voluntaries. Knox, Melville, Chalmers, demanded the union of the two independent powers, and for three hundred years they almost attained it—a memorable experiment. But in the future, establishment will not be conceded—will probably never be proposed—in connection

\* I may venture to refer to a paper on "The Universal Relations of Church and State," read before the Social Science Congress, at Newcastle. *Law Magazine and Law Review*, vol. xxv. p. 227.

† "There is no act so purely ecclesiastical but that in some of its aspects and consequences it may come legitimately under the cognizance of the civil power; and no act so civil that it may not, provided it be done by a member of the Church, come legitimately under the cognizance of the ecclesiastical authorities."—"Cunningham's Discussions," p. 209; see also p. 249.



with this theory. So if it were applied in Germany, the first step would be the breaking of all those links of establishment and endowment by which the Protestant as well as the Roman Catholic bodies are bound to the State. And the second would be the refusal of the State to concern itself with the internal affairs of any of them, except in so far as questions of civil right and vested interests in property were brought before the tribunals by members of the Church itself. In such a case the Scotch theory not only permits but demands the magistrate's adjudication and the submission of the Church. His jurisdiction is unquestioned; but he may sometimes have extreme difficulty in exercising it. To whom, for example, is the German State to adjudge the property of the Catholic Church, where it is alleged on the one hand that the Old Catholics alone hold to the original contract and doctrines of the body, and that for these the property was gifted; but, on the other, that the property was gifted to a Church, which notoriously claimed the right of from time to time defining and even developing its faith? It is a hard question, but on the theory we are dealing with it is wholly for the civil law. That law, on the Scotch and American theory, may strip the Church of its temporalities, or at least of the temporalities it claims; but cannot advance an inch into its internal domain of Church action. It is so it cuts the knot that is strangling Europe.\*

\* I have hitherto gone on the supposition that the Mutual Independence theory would concede full freedom to Archbishop Manning's Church, while refusing his "supremacy," *i.e.*, would take his side as against Bismarck at present. But it is only fair to say that many of the supporters of that system in Scotland and America would have some difficulty in conceding the benefit of it to Ultramontane Romanism. And that not because of religious prejudice. There are systems to which they have still greater objections—*e.g.* Socinianism—which are unquestionably entitled to the rights of conscience. The specialty is that Ultramontane Romanism has necessarily an aggressive and encroaching aspect towards the civil power which few other systems can have—is itself almost a foreign civil institute. The Roman Catholic Church is a sort of corporation, defined not by inward and spiritual graces, but (as the Pope recently pointed out) by the fact of baptism; it claims not only authority but now infallible authority located in one foreign prince; it demands, as we have seen, supremacy *over* all civil powers, and prescribes for them the limits of their duties; and it exempts the persons of its ecclesiastics, and withdraws the possessions of the Church, from civil jurisdiction. These are very peculiar circumstances, and no doubt account for the hesitation expressed by some well-known Scotch ecclesiastics—*e.g.*, Sir Henry Moncreiff and Dr. Cairns. But since this paper was written, I have read with much admiration the concluding address of the Moderator of the Free General Assembly of 1874, the Rev. Dr. Stewart, of Leghorn (son-in-law of that Scotch judge who has recently risen from the dead to bear his testimony on the same subject). In Dr. Stewart's address, delivered in Edinburgh on the 2nd of June last, he fearlessly applies the ancient principles and modern definitions of the Scottish Kirk to the present problems of every country in Europe, and in Germany in particular cuts sheer through the recent legislation for the Churches with a sabre-like simplicity and directness. But he does it on the principle that the Roman Catholic Church, in so far as it is a church, is entitled to independence as much as any other, and to be absolutely free in its internal or spiritual relations: while in so far as it is not a "religious system," but a "hostile secular policy," a civil government may meet it with exceptional defensive legislation, provided that legislation does not trench (as the Falck Laws certainly do) on the internal working of the ecclesiastical body.

But the great objection to the independence of Churches, even when the independence is not complicated by a claim of supremacy over the State, is not one of detail. It is one which goes to the root of the whole theory; one which has always been urged against it, and always will be; one which has in the past occurred to the minds of nine out of ten Englishmen as at once fatal; and which yet, on deliberate examination, is found 'not only to be inconclusive as a practical objection,—America alone may prove that,—but, as I believe, to be the pledge of the vitality and victory of the doctrine in the future. I mean of course the objection which the words *imperium in imperio* at once call up, but which is founded on the principle, now more broadly proclaimed than ever, that *there must be somewhere in human life a supreme and universal authority*. This is Dr. Manning's view. You must have one supreme power on earth to decide doubtful questions; "and, therefore," he adds, "it must be infallible." But on exactly the same ground the Claim of Right of the Church of Scotland was rejected in 1843 from the other side. "There must be a tribunal somewhere to overrule all others, for there is no wrong without a remedy."

Even in a technical and legal shape this principle was always a doubtful one. Lord Ivory, one of the Scotch judges in the Church question I have referred to, was scarcely met when he pointed out that "the constitutional law of our country has adopted the existence of several co-ordinate tribunals as the very root and basis of its legal establishment;" while in his masterly demonstration of the proper results if you once admit that two spheres are independent, or that two courts or powers are supreme, he was both unanswered and unanswerable.\* But this old and formal way of stating the objection is not thoroughgoing enough for the present age, and was perhaps at all times rather appropriate to the case of an Established Church claiming independence—the only clear Cismontane example of which was the Kirk of Scotland. But in England we are all now looking to the future, and our theories are built to bear the changes which the future may bring. When we argue now that there can be only one rule of human life; that the

\* "What must necessarily be the issue of a conflict of jurisdictions, upon the assumption that the jurisdictions so coming into conflict are each of them sovereign jurisdictions, and so co-ordinate and independent of each other? Neither the one nor the other tribunal can enforce its own construction as to the limit of jurisdiction against its competitor. For this would be to destroy that character of sovereignty which *ex hypothesi* belongs to each. . . . The only practical and the only conceivable result is that each tribunal shall within its own province adopt and enforce its own construction."—5 Dunlop's Reports, p. 970. I quote this, because in the case where it was uttered, the long debate had at last run itself down to its deepest roots. But any unprofessional student of this question will at present be overpoweringly attracted to the graphic "Journal" of Lord Cockburn, just published. And he will do well to remember that the judge's "logic on fire" is ignited by patriotism, not by Church feeling or Church principle.

State must be all; that liberty of conscience is either nonsense simply, or doubly and pernicious nonsense, we contemplate a state of things in which Church existence shall no longer be acknowledged. We contemplate it, and we do more. The theories of the present day aim not merely at ignoring the Church, but at so subordinating and assimilating it into the general civil system of things that it shall feel itself from the first to have no separate standing ground—at least no tolerated standing ground—in conscience or the divine, and shall day by day be more obliterated. These tendencies have just one good thing about them. They have destroyed the old false importance which used to be given—for political and practical reasons chiefly—to the question of Voluntaryism or Establishment. Exceedingly interesting as such a question may be at an election time, it is now a very subordinate matter in theory. When a recent writer, taking up and exaggerating what is supposed to be the aggressive side of Bismarckism, proposes that we should salary all forms of Christianity, he does it with the undisguised view that this is the true means of gradually deleting Christianity as a belief in a supernatural and divine element breaking in from the outside into human life. But the salaried Christianity, on condition of our not acknowledging its independence or the rights of conscience, was consistent in the last century for revolutionary France, as it has been in the present for Switzerland, with the most savage intolerance against all faith that refused the bargain. So in these days of free thinking and plain speaking, we have very fair warning that the question of the future is not one that the Church can escape from either by establishment or by throwing up its emoluments. The theory which we have now to meet, that there is universal power in the State, only limited in exercise by its own pleasure or discretion, and that there are no proper rights of conscience,—none especially in the direction of a Church, or divinely commanded consociation of men—this modern Hobbism (and Mr. Fitzjames Stephen is surely more remorseless in setting up arbitrary power than Hobbes) is chasing out the old Erastianism; which, for the rest, never had any legs of its own to stand upon. And the change is not reassuring for the future. The undertone of menace in it reminds us of the formidable past. The doctrine of the *Pall Mall Gazette* against toleration has for years been that which Cardinal Wiseman and the *Westminster Gazette* propagated before, though from the other side; it is the very Ultramontaniam of State supremacy. And therefore it is not so much opposed to Ultramontaniam in practical effect as it desires to be.

Now all this is an old story in Scotland. Dr. Manning says “the Kirk vindicated the great laws of liberty of conscience by noble histories of suffering unto bonds and death.” But when did it do so? It was in the days of that Charles “who was crowned in his youth with the Covenant in his hand, but died with the Host sticking in his

throat, after a life spent in dawdling suspense between *Hobbism and Popery*.\* But what was dawdling suspense to him, as perhaps to most critics of the recent duel between the same powers in this REVIEW, resulted in immediate and miserable oppression to his ancestral kingdom. And why was this the result to us? Because the one thing common to Popery and Hobbism is intolerance and the suppression of individualism; and during the whole period of the Restoration the two principles, opposed to each other in other matters, united to crush out liberty of conscience. We have already had occasion to illustrate in these pages† how the leading men of that hateful reaction in Scotland were made despots by precisely these two principles—a churchiness which bore down private judgment, and a slavish readiness to “make the laws of my country my creed.” During the whole reign of Charles, and still more during that of James, these two tendencies wrought together; as indeed why should they not? It was from the class who read the “Leviathan” and believed in Royal *jus divinum* and despotism, that some gradually began to attend the Queen’s Chapel and go to confession in England. And it was men of the class who in Scotland went in for conformity on the ground of latitudinarianism (the “religious stoics”), who at first arbitrarily restored the ancient order of bishops, and at last made preaching in the open fields death, with confiscation of goods. The heroism of Scotland in confronting these opposite influences in that century and this has now passed into history, and is the subject of lavish praise. But may not the principle which underlay and produced the heroism be at least as worthy of attention, now that the old influences again darken the world with converging shadows, converging, although from extremes?

For in our day the theories are more extreme. The Catholicism of 1680 is tame compared to the centralized infallibility of the Church of Dr. Manning. And the cynicism of Hobbes is Christian compared to the steel-like secularism by which the infallible theory has been confronted. In truth they are so extreme that nine-tenths of readers have been haunted by a feeling, injurious to men of such honesty and power, as if the fight were a mere sword-play, and the controversialists had been working into each other’s hands. What could Dr. Manning have more desired than an opponent of Ultramontanism who should attack the bases of all religious belief? What could Mr. Stephen, when denying the existence or value of a spiritual sphere, have hoped for more than an antagonist who should claim that the spiritual sphere is defined and ruled by an infallible Italian priest? Again, as a thousand times before in history, these opposing theories have *practically* worked for each other in the minds of readers predisposed to either, and have together tended to corrode all faith in


\* Macaulay.

† “The Bloody Mackenzie.” CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, September, 1871.

God which was not faith in a mediator Church. But I do not think it has been always remarked how much this practical working together is due to the fact that to a large extent the theories are the same. The craving for absolutism in both (for I cannot dissociate Mr. Stephen's papers from that extraordinarily able book, so much easier to dissent from than to answer), is closely connected with the general reaction in modern time towards external authority in religious matters. And is this reaction, fundamentally, anything else than a shrinking from the too oppressive burden of individual responsibility—that "burden of an honour" accepted by Europe with austere joy, when in the sixteenth century God alone became Lord of the conscience?

But it is in these circumstances that we have to maintain, and to lose no opportunity of doing it, that human life has not been all given up to the State, or to the Church; that there is a separate and guarded region in man's soul sacred from the foot of man; that unlimited and arbitrary authority belongs to no power on earth, whether it call itself secular or sacred,—has been given to none by God, and can be given to none by man, so long as he respects that inalienable freedom of conscience, which is the chastity of the soul. And in fighting this battle in the future it will be well to remember, that there are many English-speaking Churches throughout the world which deny the authority of Christ's Church over the faith and the practice even of individuals, and still more over the proper functions of secular Powers; which desire no establishment for themselves, and abjure coercion of others, but which yet maintain the independence of the Church along with the independence of the State, as a great and fruitful principle.

ALEX. TAYLOR INNES.



## PETRARCH.

**I**T has happened more than once in the history of literature that a nation joins together as of almost equal eminence two writers, who, to outside critics, are not merely unequal in power, but occupy distinct grades in the hierarchy of letters. It is thus that an Englishman speaks of Shakespere and Milton, a German of Goethe and Schiller, an Italian of Dante and Petrarch. And in each case the national instinct is in one point of view right. To a German Shakespere and Milton are two poets, the one the greatest the world has seen, the other not merely inferior, but occupying an altogether lower rank. To an Englishman Shakespere is indeed his representative poet, the highest extreme of the national genius, but he cannot judge Milton only as a poet. In an age of degradation and dishonour, when abroad England had sunk to be a vassal of France and at home to be the slave of a profligate Court, when it seemed that

All had turned degenerate, all depraved ;  
Justice and temperance, truth and faith forgot :  
One man except, the only son of light  
In a dark age, against example good,  
Against allurements, custom, and a world  
Offended ;

Milton, in poverty, old age, and blindness, remained faithful to the great principles for which he had laboured and suffered ; and, because his writings are instinct with his own noble spirit, his own unswerving devotion to liberty and truth, we refuse to judge him merely by the rules of criticism, and place him side by side with the highest name

in our literature. In the same way Schiller, true poet as he is, falls far short of the marvellous flexibility and universality which make Goethe's genius stand alone. But, to a German, Schiller is more than a poet. When the national unity was broken up into fragments and the national life had almost died out; when life itself seemed mean and petty, with no high aim to ennoble it; when even Goethe stooped to fawn upon the blood-stained usurper at Erfurt; the nation's deepest need was a stirring appeal to their higher selves, and this they found in Schiller: through all his writings rings the perpetual refrain, not less audible because it is not on the surface, "Be true," "Be noble," and so the Germans regard him with a feeling that a foreigner can hardly enter into, and speak of Goethe and Schiller as the highest of the great names in the splendid muster-roll of their literature.

It is thus that an Italian links together the names of Dante and Petrarch. To those who know Petrarch only by his sonnets, this may seem a strange assertion. Indeed Petrarch's is a strange fate; one of the few writers who can be said to have a European reputation, his fame rests not on his real titles to honour, but on poems which except among his countrymen are but seldom read; and the popular conception of him remains as an effeminate sonnetteer who passed all his life stringing together far-fetched conceits for a cold and disdainful mistress. How far this conception is from the true Petrarch, the high-souled patriot, the devoted apostle and martyr of literature, it is one of the objects of this paper to show.

Towards the end of the 13th century the long-standing quarrel of Guelphs and Ghibellines had become complicated in Florence by a family feud imported from Pistoia. The opposing factions into which the city became divided were known by the names of the Neri and Bianchi, the former as a rule espousing the Guelph side, and the latter inclined towards the Ghibelline. It was while this quarrel was at its height that Boniface VIII. despatched Charles of Valois, brother of Philip IV., to settle the disturbed state of Florence. Unarmed, save with the lance of the Archtraitor, his thrust rent open the breast of Florence.

Senza arme n'esce, e solo con la lancia  
Con la qual giostrò Guida; e quella ponta  
Sì che a Firenze fa scoppiar la pancia.

Purg. xx. 73.

Sentence of exile was passed against nearly the whole of the Bianca party, including among other well-known names Dante and a certain notary, by name Petracco, the father of the poet. The exiles took up their station at Arezzo, and joining the Ghibellines in the year 1304 attempted to re-enter Florence by force. The enterprise, which promised at first to be successful, miscarried; and it was on the night of the 19th—20th July, 1304, while his father was

flying hurriedly along the road to Arezzo, that the young Petrarch first saw the light. The boy was called Francesco; and in after days Francesco di Petracco, Francis the son of Petracco, became altered into Francesco Petrarca, the name by which he was always known. The first seven years of his life were passed at Incisa, 14 miles from Florence, on a small property belonging to his father. His mother had obtained permission to reside there, and Petracco himself might have obtained a remission of his exile on condition of doing public penance in the Church of San Giovanni. But like Dante he scorned a favour coupled with such conditions; like Dante he too looked forward to the regeneration of Italy by the noblest of the Emperors, Henry of Luxembourg, and when these hopes were cut short by the Emperor's sudden death, after lingering some time at Pisa, he snapped the ties which bound him to an ungrateful country, and, with his wife and family, in the year 1313, settled at Avignon, where Clement V. had just established the Papal Court. In the crowd of strangers which filled the city to overflowing, Petracco could find no room for his wife and children, and they were sent to lodge at Carpentras, the capital of the old county Venaissin. Long afterwards Petrarch speaks of the happiness of that time, its liberty and quiet repose,—strange feeling for a boy of eleven or twelve. It was here he attended the school of an old Italian, Conventuale, and received his first lessons in grammar, rhetoric, and logic. Already the winning charm of his character was making itself felt, and his old master declared that he never had a pupil whom he loved more. In 1319 his father, anxious that he should follow the study of law, and, above all, canon law, then the surest road to advancement, sent him to Montpellier, where he remained four years, and from thence to Bologna, the most renowned school of law in Europe. Here he passed three years, but his heart was already vowed to literature, and those seven years spent in irksome half-hearted study, Petrarch looked back upon in after days as wasted. Not, as he says in his Letter to Posterity, that he did not reverence the authority of law, or that he found law an unpleasant study, bound up as it was with Roman antiquity; but the chicanery of its practical working deterred him. This remark gives an interesting insight into Petrarch's character, the affection which would bind him to a distasteful career rather than disappoint a father's wishes, the unintentional disclosure that when life was just opening before him, the grandeur of the past had laid a spell on his imagination, and made him turn in disgust from the disenchanting present. His favourite Latin authors whom he studied in secret, were one day discovered by his angry father and committed to the flames, and only rescued half burned when he saw the boy's despairing grief. It was at Bologna that Petrarch formed a friendship with Cino da Pistoia, professor of law, the gentle minstrel of Selvaggia, whose name his young pupil was



destined to eclipse. In 1326 Petrarch's father died, and he at once returned to Avignon to begin life with his young brother Gherardo. The dishonesty of their guardians had left them almost entirely without means, and forced both of them to become ecclesiastics; a profession which in those days was often treated as giving licence for a wilder career of vice. The state of the Papal Court was at that time too foul for description. Making all allowances for Petrarch's patriotic indignation at the transfer of the Pontifical throne from its rightful seat to a foreign land, his account of the unbridled wickedness of the Court in his letters, and especially the *Epistolæ sine Titulo* reveals an unsurpassed depth of corruption; in his 14th, 15th, and 16th Sonnets, Part IV., in burning words worthy of Dante, he calls down fire from heaven upon "that nest of treachery where is hatched all the evil that spreads over the world, the slave of wine and gluttony, with Beelzebub in her midst, the false and guilty Babylon where good dies and evil is born and nourished,—a hell upon earth."

Fiamma dal ciel su le tue trecce piova

Malvagia,—

Nido di tradimenti in cui si cova

Quanto mal per lo mondo oggi si spande ;

Di vin serva, di letti et di vivande,

In cui lussuria fa l'ultima prova.

. . . e Beelzebub in mezzo.

Sonnet xiv.

. . . Babilonia falsa et ria,

Ove'l ben more et 'l mal si nutre e cria ;

Di vivi inferno.

Part iv., Sonnet xvi.

In the flush of youth, of slender and graceful person, with features which though not handsome possessed a singular charm, with a poet's imagination just beginning to stir in him, Petrarch at first flung himself into all the pleasures of that fashionable and frivolous world. At Bologna he had formed a friendship with the young Giacomo Colonna, son of the famous Stefano Colonna, who had followed the Papal Court to Avignon; and to the friend of a Colonna no door would be closed. Petrarch in after years, when his brother had become a monk, recalls to him (*Fam. x. 3*) the memory of those days; their anxious care that their linen should be of the most spotless white, the constant dressing and undressing, the fear lest even a gentle breeze should disarrange their ringlets, the anxiety to avoid splashes from passing vehicles, the torture that Petrarch suffered from fashionable boots, the agonies they endured beneath the tongs of the hairdresser. Pure and noble as Petrarch's nature was, it could not be expected that he should pass through such an atmosphere unstained. He became the father of a son and daughter by a lady of Avignon.

How far Petrarch might have fallen, it is impossible to say; but he was rescued by the passion which has immortalized his name. On the 6th April, 1327, he saw, in the Church of the Nuns of St. Clare, Laura, the wife of Hugh de Sade, then in the fresh bloom of youth and beauty; a day equally memorable with that on which Dante met Beatrice walking between two ladies, when he first received her modest salutation. (*Vita Nuova*, sec. 3.) That day made Petrarch a poet. The relationship between Petrarch and Laura, throws much light on the manners and modes of thought of that age. That a young man should fall in love at first sight with a lady is scarcely remarkable, but that the most prominent man of his time, courted by the greatest, should for twenty-one years nourish a pure and sincere passion for a married woman, even when her beauty faded and she became the mother of numerous children, (she left nine surviving her,) that he should admit the whole world to witness the inmost workings of his passion,—this seems so strange to modern feelings that some critics have even denied Laura's existence, and classed her with the numerous Celias and Delias to whom so many poets have sung feigned homage. That this view receives some countenance from some of the sonnets addressed to Laura can hardly be denied. The eternal puns on Laura and *Laurus* (the laurel), and *l'aura*, the breeze, are almost enough to disenchant the firmest believer in the reality of Petrarch's passion. To give one or two instances out of very many. In Sonnet XXI. in "*Vita di M. L.*" the poet prays Apollo (the sun) if he still retains his love for Daphne (the laurel) to defend her sacred leaves from frost and storm, so that they both may see their lady, (*i.e.*, the laurel representing both Daphne and Laura,) with her own arms forming a shade for herself. So in Sonnet XXXVIII., he says the gentle tree which he has loved so long, nourished his genius under her shade while her fair boughs did not disclaim him, but now that from sweet she has become pitiless wood (*Fece di dolce sè spietato legno*) how shall she be punished for letting the poet's verses encourage other lovers? Let no poet gather her, or Jove guard her from lightning, and let the sun in his anger wither her green leaves! That any man, mediæval or otherwise, could write thus under the influence of strong feeling is no doubt impossible, and if Petrarch had never written in a higher strain, his name would scarcely now hold a prominent position.

To form, however, at all a fair estimate of the *Canzoniere*, we must try to throw ourselves into the feelings of the age. The old modes of thought and feeling had passed away, and a new world was springing young and vigorous from its grave. A new passion had been born—Love. Assuredly before this, husbands had loved their wives, witness only the parting scene of Hector and Andromache; and lovers had sung enough, and more than enough, of the pangs of love. But the feeling was a much less complex one than the new

passion. It was scarcely more than overmastering physical emotion. There was no mystic awe, no self-abasement, no idealizing power in the old passion. Many influences contributed to the change. Christianity had altered the world's ideal, had raised into pre-eminence many of the gentler, more feminine virtues, humility, unselfishness, purity. The theological controversies of centuries had seemed to remove Christ from the warm life of humanity into the awful distance of the Godhead. In his place, the highest ideal of humanity was found in the Virgin Mother. Mingling with this profound change in men's whole view of life and character, and reacted upon by it, was the old Gothic reverence for women. Thus love became a kind of religion, it called out man's noblest impulses, by bidding him protect the weak, and yet he was to worship the weak as higher and better than himself. Thus the Crusader's motto was, "*Dieu et ma Dame*"—worship of God and worship of his lady, as God's living representative, the earthly embodiment of purity and goodness. Warmer hues, caught perhaps from the more voluptuous Arabic imagination, prevented this emotion from becoming too spiritualized and ethereal for ordinary humanity.

This new passion found utterance in a new literature. As ever, new feelings clothed themselves in a new form, and rhyme instead of quantity was the note of the new poetry. How widely it was cultivated, all know; monarchs and nobles became minstrels of love, and no knight could aspire to perfection if he were not vowed to the worship of a lady. The centre of this movement was Provence, and for a century and a half the "*Gai Saber*" flourished till the Provençal literature was crushed by the fierce Albigensian persecutions.

Brought up at Avignon, where the old poetic traditions still lingered, Petrarch became the admirer and pupil of the Provençal poets, of Arnaud Daniel, "great Master of Love," of the two Pierres, "on whom the grasp of love so easily closed," of "the less famous Arnaud de Marveil," of Raimbaud, the lover of Beatrix of Montferrat, of Rudel, "who plied oar and sail to meet his death" in the arms of the Countess of Tripoli. ("*Trion d'Am.*" Cap. IV.) Partly owing to the higher culture of the age, and partly to the advantage of language, the Italian singers have eclipsed their masters, and to modern readers, Petrarch has taken the place of the representative poet of love. His Italian poems on this subject consist of 207 sonnets and 17 odes or canzoni on the life of his Lady Laura, and 90 sonnets and 8 canzoni on her death, with a few short poems in a slightly different shape, sestine, madrigals, and ballate. Perhaps there are few modern readers of the *Canzoniere* who do not soon find themselves yawning; one is inclined to feel that if two-thirds of the poems had perished they would gain greatly in force. Except within somewhat narrow limits, there is but little variety. We gather no distinct image of what Laura was, except that she was virtuous, beautiful, and cold. The greater

number of the sonnets are occupied with descriptions of Petrarch's own emotions; there is none of the interaction of thought and emotion, none of the subtle influence of one character upon another, which constitute the interest of a modern tale of love. The *Canzoniere* is not the varied harmony of two instruments uttering the same music, with blended cadences melting into each other, it is the simpler, more monotonous "melody of the small lute" which "gave ease to Petrarch's wound." Assuredly, therefore, a modern reader, who comes to the *Canzoniere* expecting what it has not to give, will be disappointed. The truth is, our conception of love is different: to us, it is the union of two hearts and minds in affectionate sympathy; to the best minds of that age, it was devotion to a higher being; their love seems to us to lack variety and interest, ours would have seemed to them to lack reverence.

Consequently, the poets of that time sung less of their mistress than of their worship of her, of their lord Love, and his mastery over all their thoughts and emotions. So real was this mastery that Love took shape and form under their exalted feelings. Pierre Vidal met him, a young Cavalier fair as the day, with sweet gentle eyes, fresh and smiling mouth, lithe and graceful in shape, his robe inwrought with flowers, his palfrey white as the snow. To Dante too he appeared, now as a Lord of terrible aspect, shrouded in cloud the colour of fire, now as a pilgrim lightly clad in vile raiment. (V.N. ss. 3 and 9.) The most perfect representation of this passion sublimated to the highest point is preserved for us in the *Vita Nuova*. Many circumstances contributed to this result. Dante had seen Beatrice in early boyhood, for years he had worshipped her, and then she was removed by an early death—there was, therefore, no hard contact with reality to check his imagination, and, as her figure receded into the background of years, his fancy idealized her more and more, till all taint of earth seemed to have passed from her, and she was to him

*una cosa venuta*

*Di Cielo in terra a miracol mostrare;*

so clothed and crowned with humility that many when she had passed said, "This is not a woman, rather one of the fairest of heaven's angels." (V. N., sec. 26. A.)

The history of Petrarch's love was different. He was destitute of Dante's imagination, and Laura had not been taken early from him. For twenty-one years he had watched her passing from girlhood into ripe age, amid the cares of married life and many children, and that under a Southern sun, where female beauty is always short-lived. Under these circumstances it would have been little less than a miracle if Petrarch had reached the "fine air, the pure severity of perfect light" of the *Vita Nuova*. It is this which causes an essential element of prose in the *Canzoniere*. His love was neither

a genuine human passion nor a genuine worship. Laura's severe virtue forbade the first, and it was only by intervals he rose to the second. Perforce, therefore, he fell back on the faculty which is fatal to all true poetry, ingenuity. Gifted with an almost fatal facility of language, he could clothe the most commonplace thoughts in words always ingenious, and often beautiful, and he has his reward—while the *Vita Nuova* has an audience fit and few, the admirers of the *Canzoniere* in the poet's own country are legion; for one who can rise to the exquisite purity and freshness of the *Vita Nuova*, there are hundreds attracted by Petrarch's more earthy lyrics, "dedicated to sentiment, not devoid of languor and not without a touch of sin."\*

That at first Petrarch's was a simple human passion may be gathered from several passages in the *Canzoniere*, if it were not proved by his express avowal in many of his writings.

Looking back on it in later years he deprecates the wasted days and nights spent in dallying with the fierce desire that burnt his heart.

Padre del ciel, dopo i perduti giorni,  
Dopo le notti vaneggiando spese  
Con quel fero desio ch' al cor s'accese  
Mirando gli atti per mio mal sì adorni :  
Piacciati omai col tuo lume ch' io torni  
Ad altra Vita ed a più belle imprese.

Sonnet xl.

The same feeling shows itself in the 44th Sonnet, where he recalls the icy chill which shot through his heart as a voice seemed to call him to higher things than an earthly love. So also in the 69th; again in the 86th Sonnet on the death of Laura he tells us that it was her sweet sternness, her soft repulses, that checked his fierce desires; her gentle speech in which shone forth the highest modesty and courtesy, that rooted out all base thoughts from his heart and saved him in spite of himself. It was this that drove him to leave Avignon again and again, and seek forgetfulness in travel; it was this that made him love the wild solitude of Vaucluse, the Vallis Clausa, shut in by grey red-veined walls of rock, the sky line broken into the fantastic semblance of Gothic towers and battlements, while from a cave in the precipice which bounded the valley sprang the limpid stream of the Sorgue. Attended here by a peasant and his wife, whose sunburnt face it was a penance to look upon (*Fam.* xiii. 8), Petrarch manfully strove to forget his passion in solitude and work; and yet, unable to cut himself loose from Provençal traditions and the feelings of his age, looking upon love now as the source of all that was highest and best in him, and now as of the earth earthy, he let his fancy play round a passion which he tried to persuade himself he was anxious altogether to forget.

\* Introduction to Study of Dante. J. Symonds, p. 270, A book to which I must here express my grateful obligations.

Earthly passion, refined and pure it is true, is the guiding thought of a Sonnet like the 61st, where he dwells upon Laura's golden hair floating in the breeze, the lovely light of her eyes, her sweet look of pity; of the 146th Sonnet where he tells the strange emotions the sight of her eyes and hair produced in his heart, and of a hundred others like these. Perhaps the most favourable specimen of Petrarch's powers in this way are the 6th, 7th, and 8th Canzoni, known as the Three Sisters. Of these the two first are in every way superior, and reach a higher strain than is usual with his lyre. Love has been purged of earthly stain and rises at intervals to a worship; almost in the words of Dante \* he speaks of love as separating him from all low thoughts, (*parte d'ogni pensier vile*), of the sweet light of Laura's eyes which shows him the way to heaven: it is the sight of them which leads him to live nobly and guides him to a glorious end.

Gentil mia Donna, i' veggio  
Nel mover de' vostri occhi un dolce lume  
Che mi mostra la via ch' al Ciel conduce:  
Quest' è la vista ch' a ben fare m'induce,  
E che mi scorge al glorioso fine;  
Questa sola dal vulgo m' allontana.

It is the hope of rendering himself worthy of Laura's love that makes him strive to be

Al ben veloce, e al contrario tardo,  
Dispregiator di quanto 'l mondo brama.

At other times the two feelings lie side by side in strange juxtaposition. The archetype of her beauty is in Heaven, whoever has not seen her eyes searches in vain for divine beauty, her heart is the home of all the virtues, and yet with a kind of wistful pang the poet half wishes that the chief virtue had been absent,—

Quand' un cor tante in se virtuti accolse?  
Benchè la somma è di mia morte rea.

Sonnet cviii.

though in his better moments he feels that he is longing for two incompatible things:

Ch' ogni altra sua voglia  
Era a me inorte ed a lei fama rea.

"Hymn to Virgin."

More commonly, however, his sonnets are exquisitely polished verses on some simple incident connected with Laura. Now it is an excuse that he has so long delayed to visit her (Sonnet 25); now his finding her glove, which, however, he has to restore (Sonnets 147, 148, 149). Now her paleness at his departure (Sonnet 84), or a kinder reception than usual (Sonnet 200), or more often a description of his own feelings—how he became mute and timid in her presence

\* Compare Vita Nuova, 18.

Irae lo intendimento da tutte le vili cose.

(Sonnets 32, 33, and 34), or how he tries in vain to flee from love (Canz. 10).

It is easy to understand how, with only incidents so slight to build upon, imagination gave place to ingenuity, and the poet strove to make his verses interesting by far-fetched conceits or extravagant hyperboles. Unfortunately it is only too easy to supply examples: when the tree which Phœbus loves (the laurel, *i.e.*, Laura) is removed from its place, Vulcan toils over his work, sharpening the bolts of Jove, who thunders, or snows, or rains, regardless of Cæsar as of Janus (*i.e.*, of the month of July called after Julius Cæsar as of January), and the sun stands far off when he sees his loved one (Daphne, *i.e.* the Laurel, *i.e.* Laura) gone, and so on (Sonnet 26).

The 27th and 28th Sonnets harp on exactly the same idea, that while Laura is present the sky is bright, when she is absent it is dark and cloudy. When Laura salutes him the sun hides his head in jealousy (Sonnet 79); when the sun rises the stars disappear; when Laura rises the sun disappears (Sonnet 164). In another place (Sonnet 4) he does not shrink from comparing Laura's birth at a small village with that of our Saviour at Bethlehem.

Conceits which have scarcely the merit of ingenuity are equally numerous. Two sonnets, the 30th and 31st, are devoted to reproaches of her looking-glass, for she is so occupied in gazing on her own beauty that she wastes no looks on her admirers. In Sonnet 24 he complains that no obstacle in the world, river or lake, wall or hill, is so grievous to him as the veil which hides Laura's eyes, or the hand which guards them from his gaze. Beside these, his constant assertions that death only can relieve his misery, *e.g.*, Sonnets 17 and 23, though there is a thoroughly unreal ring about them, seem sober expressions of feeling. But there is even a lower depth in the eternal puns on the laurel. No unkindness can remove Laura from his heart where love engrafts many branches from the laurel, though that gentle plant is scarce fitted for so barren a soil.

Uscir già mai  
Del petto, ove dal primo lauro innesta  
Amor più rami.  
Chè gentil pianta in arido terreno  
Par che si disconvenga.

Sonnet xli.

On the left bank of the Tyrrhene Sea he suddenly espies a laurel, and the sight recalling Laura's tresses so dazed his mind that he fell into a stream: but he would be glad, he says, that his eyes and feet should thus exchange (*i.e.*, being wet) if only a more courteous April would dry the former.

Piacemi almen d'aver cangiato stile  
Dagli occhi a' piè; se del lor esser molli  
Gli altri asciugasse un più cortese aprile.  
Sonnet xliii.

An otherwise graceful sonnet (the 77th) is spoiled by a wretched pun on *Laura* and *l'aura* the breeze. He is expressing true feelings of pleasure at the sight of his loved Valley of *Vaucluse*; the fire of love is again kindled in his heart, when coming to the realm of love he sees the place—

Onde nacque *Laura* (*l'aura*) dolce e pura  
Ch' acqueta l'aere e mette i tuoni in bando.

Of course a literal translation can do no justice to the grace of language which constitutes the real charm of all Petrarch's poems; but making every allowance for this, the sonnets above referred to can never be ranked higher than trinkets—they are not solid gold.

We have seen that an unrequited passion lasting over so many years can scarcely be poetical unless it be idealized, and idealization of an object brought into contact with everyday life is scarcely possible. Absence is necessary to give imagination scope. Thus some of the best of Petrarch's sonnets were written when he was far away from *Laura*. Another circumstance contributed to this. Petrarch was almost modern in his love of nature. This feeling shows itself in his account of the Ascent of Mount *Ventorix* (*Fam. iv. 1*), with its view of the *Rhone* Valley down to the sea, the snow-clad line of the 'Alps in the background, and beyond, seen only with the eye of imagination, the poet's loved Italy. It is this love of nature which has inspired the sweetest poems in the *Canzoniere*. The thought of *Laura* seems to blend in a rich mellow glow, with his keen sense of the beauty of nature. Such is the graceful picture of his Lady contained in the 11th *Canzone*. In memory he recalls her fair form seated by a stream rich and clear and sweet; she leans against a gentle bough, and from the happy branches descends a rain of flowers over her breast as she sits lowly in her glory; the flowers falling now on the hem of her robe, now on her fair tresses, which looked like burnished gold and pearls; the blossoms resting now on the earth, now on the streamlet, while others as they float in the air seem to say: Here is the realm of Love.'

Da bei rami scendea  
(Dolce nella memoria)  
Una pioggia di fior sopra 'l suo grembo ;  
Ed ella si sedea  
Umile in tanta gloria,  
Coverta già del amoroso nembo.  
Qual fior cadea sul lembo,  
Qual su le treccioie bionde,  
Ch' oro forbito e perle  
Eran quel dì a vederle ;  
Qual si posava in terra, qual su l'onde ;  
Qual con un Vago errore  
Girando, pareva dir : qui regna Amore.

In others, such as the 12th and 13th *Canzoni*, a softer strain



breathes. All sights and sounds of Nature remind him of his absent Lady—the snow on the mountains beneath the glint of the Sun, reminds him of her beauty; the meteors gleaming in the clear midnight sky after rain, as they flame amid the dew and frost, recall her beauteous eyes, and white and red roses in a golden vase, picked by some maiden hand, her flushing cheeks and auburn tresses. Or, again (Canzone 13), he wanders over trackless mountains, in shady valleys, or by lonely streams seeking rest, but at every step rises a new thought of Laura. The breeze rustling in the leaves, the warbling of the birds, the tinkling of the rivulet amid the green herbage in the lonely Ardennes cause him to sing of his Lady (Sonnet 124). The very spirit of solitude seems to breathe in the 22nd Sonnet, as he tells us how he wanders alone and in thought, attended only by his lord, Love. To all others the sweet evening hour brings rest; the wearied pilgrim hastens to forget toil in short repose; the labourer gathers his tools and hies home with his comrades to the simple evening meal; the shepherd drives homeward his flock; the sailor in some sheltered nook stretches his limbs on the hard deck; the oxen quit the yoke; all nature has a respite from toil; he only cannot escape the pangs of love (Canzone 4).

It is a confirmation of this view that when the last long absence of death had come, when no hard reality could jar against the softening, idealizing power of memory, Petrarch's verses gain in sincerity and power. Somewhat of earth may have mingled with his love through life, but in the solemn presence of death it rises purified and ennobled. Unreal compliments and tawdry conceits seem profane to a real grief: and if the sonnets on the death of Laura lose in brilliancy of fancy, they gain far more than they lose in simplicity and truth. He recalls her smile, her mirth, her modest bearing, and courteous speech, her words, which, if heard, would have made a sordid soul gentle:—

Il pensar e' l tacer, il riso e' l gioco,  
L'abito onesto e' l ragionar cortese,  
Le parole che 'ntese  
Avrian fatto gentil d'alma villana;  
L'angelica sembianzi simile e piana.

Part ii. Canz. 2.

Again, he seems to hear her in the plaintive cry of the birds, or the summer breeze rustling sweetly on the leaves (Part II., Sonnet 11). His loved Vacluse is the same, but all the brightness has fled from his own life (Part II., Sonnet 33). Spring returns, with its joyous sights and sounds, but all is to him desolate and wild (Part II., Sonnet 42). Now and again he sees her purified and radiant image in heaven (Part II., Sonnets 34, 61). . . . The Hymn to the Virgin forms a fitting and noble close to the Canzoniere. The vain stir and tumult of passion has passed; he looks back on his days, flown more swiftly than an arrow, spent in misery and sin: death fills the

horizon of the future, and he calls on the Maiden Mother for mercy and guidance. Perhaps no other hymn in the world expresses with equal beauty a devotion made up of so many complex feelings—devotion to her, who is now the Queen of Heaven, once a mortal woman, with all a woman's weakness and loveliness, a woman's compassion for human frailty and suffering. It is worthy to stand beside the prayer of St. Bernard to the Virgin, with which opens the closing scene of the Paradiso.

We have dwelt so long on the work by which Petrarch is best known to posterity, that but scant space is left to consider the real character of the man. Coming, as he did, to Avignon at the age of 22, poor and friendless, nothing is more striking than the singular charm which seemed to win the friendship of all those with whom he was brought into contact. "Many great personages began to show themselves desirous of my friendship," he says with simplicity in his Letter to Posterity; "if I reflect on it at the moment, I confess I understand not why." From the first, the great family of the Colonnas were his devoted friends. This winning personal charm remained with him through life. In those young days of reviving literature a poet was looked upon as almost sacred, and Petrarch's name as a poet began to be noised abroad through the Peninsula. In 1340 the laurel crown of poetry was offered to him both by the University of Paris and the Senate of Rome. After some hesitation between the great University, then in the zenith of its fame, and the Eternal City, great only in her past, Petrarch yielded to the spell of the *Romani nominis umbra*, and received the noblest prize ever bestowed on a human being, a Crown of Victory in the Warfare of intellect against ignorance: but a crown which he sadly confesses brought him no knowledge, but only gloomy envy.

During the remainder of his life Petrarch occupied an almost unique position. He was revered as an intellectual monarch. Pilgrimages were made to Vaucluse to visit him,—as he passed through the streets of Milan all heads were uncovered; contending armies vied with each other in marks of respect. The greatest families of Italy eagerly courted him, and held his sojourn as the highest honour he could pay them. Robert King of Naples was anxious to crown him with the garland of poetry at Naples, the Correggi of Parma, the Carrara family of Padua, the Visconti of Milan used all efforts to retain him at their Courts. The haughty aristocracy of Venice assigned him a place on the right hand of the Doge. Two Kings of France and four Popes sought to attach him to themselves. With her own hand, an Empress, the wife of Charles IV., wrote to inform him of the birth of a daughter; and Charles IV. on several occasions offered him a home in Germany. But through all this Petrarch was faithful to the two guiding impulses of his life, love of his country and love of literature. I have called them two impulses,

and yet in truth they were mingled so together as to be only one. His love of Italy was that of an ideal, not the Italy of his own day, torn by party faction and foul with intestine hatred and bloodshed, but the Italy of the past, the mistress of the world, the parent of literature, and law, and Art. In Dante's continual biting invectives against Florence we can trace a love which injury has turned to gall; but when his fellow-citizens offered to Petrarch a chair in the New University of Florence, at the same time restoring to him his confiscated patrimony, he coldly refused the offer. Like Dante, he saw that the only hope of Italy was in union, and one of his noblest odes, the *Marseillaise* of Italy, as it has been called, was addressed to the nobles, calling upon them to lay aside intestine quarrels in the presence of the foreigner. "My Italy, tho' words be vain for the deadly wounds which I see in such fearful number on thy fair body, let my sighs be such as the Tiber and the Arno hope for." Why has nature reared up the barrier of the Alps against the German fury, if their blind passion strikes leprosy even to a sound body: the degradation of foreign oppression is more terrible, in that it is inflicted by that lawless people whom Marius struck down, so that the river ran red with their blood.

Italia mia, ben che'l il parlar sia indarno  
 A le piaghe mortali  
 Che nel bel corpo tuo si spesse veggio,  
 Piacemi almen ch' e' miei sospiri sien quali  
 Spera 'l Tevero e l'Arno  
 E'l Po dove doglioso e grave or seggio.

\* \* \* \* \*

Ben provide Natura al nostro stato  
 Quando de l' Alpi schermo  
 Pose fra noi e la tedesca rabbia :  
 Ma 'l desir cieco e' ncontra 'l suo ben fermo  
 S'è poi tanto ingegnato,  
 Ch' al corpo sano à procurato scabbia.

\* \* \* \* \*

Ed è questo del seme,  
 Per più dolor, del popol senza legge,  
 Al qual, come si legge,  
 Mario aperse sì 'l fianco  
 Che memoria de l'opra anco non langue,  
 Quando assetato e stanco,  
 Non più bevve del fiume acquà che sangue.

Part iv. Canz. 4.

That the Italy of the past was the object of his love is strikingly shown in the enthusiasm with which he supported the wild dream of Rienzi. To him the Roman people had an indefeasible right to rule the world, and, blinded by the shadow of a name, the motley multitude gathered from all the quarters of heaven, from which sprang the population of Mediæval Rome, were for him the descendants of the old Roman stock that ruled the world. In the well known words of Madame de Stael, "He mistook memories for hopes." To the

Colonnas he was bound by every tie of gratitude and friendship, but the only hope for the democracy at Rome was to crush the nobles, and the Colonnas must be sacrificed. He loved them but he loved the State more, Rome more, Italy more—

“*Carior res publica, carior Roma, carior Italia*”—

*Ad Fam. xi. 16.*

To Rienzi he addressed the celebrated canzone beginning “*Spirto gentil*.” The change of manner from his poems to Laura is very striking. To quote the vigorous language of Macaulay, “The effeminate lisp of the sonneteer is exchanged for a cry wild and solemn and piercing as that which cried ‘sleep no more’ to the bloody house of Cawdor.” “Italy seems not to feel her sufferings, decrepit, sluggish, and languid, will she sleep for ever, will there be no one to wake her? O that I had my hands twisted in her hair!”

*Italia, che suoi guai non par che senta  
Vecchia, oziosa et lenta  
Domirà sempre, e non fia che la svegli?  
Le man l'avess' io avvolte entro capegli!*

‘The old walls which the world still fears and loves, the stones which cover the limbs of men whose fame will live till the universe is dissolved, the ruined relics of Roman greatness hope only in Rienzi. The shades of the mighty dead, the Scipios, Brutus, Fabricius, would joy if the tidings could reach them. A more glorious career is open to Rienzi than the world has ever seen, to reinstate the noblest monarchy on earth. Others have helped Rome when she was young and vigorous—Rienzi, in her decrepitude, has saved her from death.’ An equal glow of patriotism burns in the ode addressed to Giacomo Colonna—*O aspettata in ciel*; and equally does he turn for examples to the great days of old. The whole world is flocking to the crusade, all that dwell between the Garonne and the Alps, Aragon and Spain, England and the isles of the Northern Ocean. Even Germany amid her ice and snow is girding on the sword, and shall not Italy be roused to grasp the lance for Christ? From the rule of the son of Mars to the great Augustus, Rome has poured out her blood to avenge others’ wrongs, and shall she not avenge the Son of Mary? He bids them remember the exploits of the Greeks, the reckless daring of Xerxes, the Persian women mourning for their lords, the Sea of Salamis red with blood; Marathon and “the deadly pass where the Lion of Lacedæmon turned to bay.”

*Pon mente al temerario ardir di Serse,  
Che fece, per calcar i nostri liti,  
Di novi ponti oltraggio a la marina:  
E vedrai ne la morte de’ mariti  
Tutte vestite a brun le donne Perse,  
E tinto in rosso il mar di Salamina.*

E non pur questa misera ruina  
 Del popol infelice d'oriente  
 Vittoria ten promette,  
 Ma Maratona, e le mortali strette  
 Che difese il Leon con poca gente.

Like Dante, Petrarch's hopes for Italy rested on the Emperor. To the wisest and best men of that age the Roman Empire was not a dead idea, it was a living reality. There was one Pope and one Emperor, the one the successor of St. Peter, the other of the Cæsars, each holding his power of God; the one, ruler in things temporal, the other in things spiritual, the natural seat of each being Rome, the Eternal City. Thus Dante's invitation to the Emperors to descend into Italy was not invoking a foreign Master, it was a passionate appeal by a deserted people to their rightful lord—

Vieni a veder la tua Roma che piagne,  
 Vedova, sola, e di' e notte chiama  
 Cesare mio, perchè non mi accompagni ?  
 Purg. vi. 112.

and as Dante had centered his hopes on the noblest of the Emperors, Henry of Luxemburg, so Petrarch burst into transports of joy at hearing that Charles IV., unfortunately one of the most worthless, had crossed the Alps. Hence came his bitter invectives against the Popes of Avignon: they had deserted their lawful wife and left her to wander in unknown valleys, while her place was usurped by a foul courtesan.

Uxor iam pridem ignotis in vallibus errat ;  
 Et patrium limen thalamumque egressa pudicum  
 Illa sequetur ovans meretrix famosa.

Ecl. vi.

His letter to Urban V., urging him to return to Rome, is instinct with manly eloquence: "When we shall stand at the judgment seat of Christ, where thou wilt no longer be lord and we servants, but where there will be one lord and we all fellow servants, what wilt thou say? I raised thee from beggary and humil'ty and set thee not only with princes but above them. I entrusted to thee my Church, where hast thou left her? I have given thee pre-eminent gifts, what pre-eminent return has thou made to me, except that thou sittest on the rock of Avignon, and hast forgotten the Tarpeian rock?"

Petrarch occupied the same independent position towards all his great friends. When Charles IV. asked a place in his work on illustrious men, he answered, "I promise it if you have merit, and I life." He refused the invitation of Philip of Valois to visit his Court, because he cared not for letters. How unique this position was is proved by the number of important missions which he was selected to fulfil. He was chosen by the Roman people as one of their eighteen

deputies who went to Avignon to implore the newly elected Pope, Clement VI., to restore the seat of the Papacy to Rome. He was chosen by Clement VI., to represent the Papal rights at Naples after the death of Robert. A letter of his to the Magistracy at Florence led to the putting down the brigands who infested the Apennines. He was the chief of the Embassy sent by the Visconti to Venice, in the vain endeavour to bring about a peace between Venice and Genoa. He was Ambassador to the Emperor at Bale, when the storm of war seemed hanging over Italy; to King John of France after his return from captivity in England. All these embassies were to attain no personal object, to curry favour with no powerful friend; they were one and all undertaken in the service of Italy.


Of his services to the cause of letters it is difficult to speak too highly. It was patriotism taking another shape, devotion to the Great Past, which was to him as real as the present. His utmost influence was used to recover MSS. and memorials of antiquity. He was the first to make a collection of medals and coins with a view to elucidate history. He never travelled without visiting convents and religious houses to search for MSS.; he entreated all the learned strangers whom he met at Avignon, to make similar searches in France, Spain, England, Germany, and even the East. At Liège, where he could scarcely find ink, he lighted upon two of Cicero's Speeches—up to that time unknown—and copied one with his own hand, entreating a friend to copy the other. His copy of Cicero's Letters, *ad familiares*, in his own handwriting still exists in the Biblioteca Laurenziana at Florence. In those days it was difficult to find copyists learned enough to read and understand Latin, and Petrarch was often obliged to be his own copyist. One collection of Cicero's Speeches took him four years to copy. He planned a History of Rome from Romulus to Titus. When near the age of sixty he undertook the study of Greek, then an unknown tongue in Italy, the only teachers he could obtain being natives of Calabria, where a debased dialect of the old tongue still lingered, and in his zeal for learning, endured the filthy habits and national contempt for everything Latin of Leontius Pilatus. A new spirit was breathed into the past; the great writers of antiquity were to Petrarch not storehouses of dead matter, useful only for the barren discussions of the Schools, they were a living School of Art; he had caught something of their harmony, their perfect beauty of form, and, in the light of this new revelation, dared fiercely to assail the superstitions of alchemy, of medicine—as medicine was practised then—and the scarcely less superstitious worship of the syllogism. As his end drew near, his love of study seemed to increase; he used to devote sixteen hours out of the twenty-four to work. "Reading and writing," he said, "are a light toil, rather a sweet rest, which makes me forget heavier toils." To his loved friend Boccaccio he wrote, a few days before his death,

"Just as there is no pleasure more honourable than letters, so there is none more durable, more sweet or faithful; a companion ready to be at your side in all the mischances of life, and a companion of which you never weary." Shortly afterwards his servants found him in his library, his head bent over a book: he had breathed his last.

As we look back over his pure and noble life, we can forgive the enthusiasm which would place him by the side of Dante. It was his devotion to letters which prepared the ground for the Renaissance of the next century; it was his patriotism that helped to keep alive through centuries of division and oppression the idea of Italian Unity. And if this unity has come at last in a somewhat different form and way from that which Dante and he expected, none the less may the Italians look upon them as two of the authors of their national life; two of those who have caught most clearly the music of a great purpose and a noble ideal, never to be perfectly realized in facts, but in harmony with which the great of all ages have worked.

For an ye heard a music, like enow  
They are building still, seeing the City is built  
To music, therefore never built at all,  
And therefore built for ever.

A. H. SIMPSON. ' 1



## CHURCH PARTIES.

" Now let us sit in conclave. That these weed  
Be rooted from the vineyard of the Church,  
That these foul tares be severed from the wheat,  
We are, I trust, agreed.—Yet how to do this,  
Nor hurt the wholesome crop and tender vine-plants,  
Craves good advisement."

SIR WALTER SCOTT. *Monastery.*

THE present attitude of the various schools within the Church of England towards each other is one of considerable interest to careful thinkers. It matters not, so far as this fact is concerned, what the religious standpoint of observers may be, whether friendly or hostile to the Anglican Communion; whether on the side of Theism or of the Agnostics. In any case the problems which it offers are not mere surface questions, but go down to the very foundation of spiritual consciousness, and cannot be neglected by any inquirer who retains an interest in psychology or in social statics, even if he have ceased to give attention to theological questions.

It seems to me that the only way in which adequate materials can be procured for inquiry is by such members of the several schools as have some practical knowledge of and sympathy with other shades of opinion than their own, recording their impressions frankly, and putting forward the grounds on which they base their own preference. The attitude of a person claiming to adjudicate impartially is such as to deprive his remarks of trustworthiness and value; because in a matter of such vital interest as religion, to assume the function of unbiassed criticism is in truth to assert that religious truth is undiscovered, if not undiscoverable, and thus to range one's self at once with Agnostics, precisely the one section of thinkers whose opinion on the rival merits of Church parties can have no possible weight.



The following observations, therefore, are intended as a mere contribution to the fair discussion of the points debated just now within the Established Church, and they need to be supplemented by similar statements from the pens of members of other schools. I myself write from the "Ritualistic" standpoint; but, as I believe, with perfect willingness to see and allow the merits of other forms of opinion and practice, and with a degree of personal and literary familiarity with those other forms within the Anglican field which enables me to make an estimate of them which may be very imperfect, but which is at least neither guess-work, prejudice, nor bigotry.

Bigotry, as it seems to me, differs from enthusiasm or fanaticism by its qualities of injustice and rancour, and secret unbelief in its own cause. A bigot is not merely eager in maintaining his own views, but pursues with personal hatred those who differ from him; he will not allow that any element of truth is mixed with their errors, or at least not in a palliating degree; and he has so little confidence that Heaven is on his side, that he is fain to prohibit all open discussion, and to use against his opponents any weapon of falsehood or calumny which may lie conveniently near his hand.

This attitude is as impossible to the intelligent "Ritualist" of to-day as it was to the intelligent Christian of the first or second century, and for precisely the same reason: that the rapid spread of his opinions amidst all classes of society teaches him to look upon the violent enemy of to-day as the possible, nay, the probable convert of to-morrow, and therefore as one to be viewed in a friendly spirit, while the experience of public discussion makes in the same direction. I can state, as a matter falling within my own personal knowledge, that every large Anti-Confessional meeting held for the last sixteen years—and there have been a good many of them—has invariably been followed by a considerable increase of first confessions, made by persons whose attention would perhaps have never been drawn to the subject through any other agency; and therefore the only objection which I and those who think with me have to such meetings is the injurious effect they exercise on the spirit and temper of the speakers at them, who have, unless I gravely mistake, in no instance personal acquaintance with the working of the system they assail.

There is a further reason, going even deeper, which insures a tolerant attitude on the part of the Ritualistic school. It is that the fundamental principle of the Oxford movement throughout all its phases is the conception of Christianity as a historical creed and polity, a view which has never been accepted by Low or Broad Churchmen, and has been abandoned in our own day by its once foremost champions, the Roman Catholic clergy. A necessary result of this principle is the careful study of ecclesiastical history, as one of the most important sources of information as to social and religious

progress, and this study discloses two facts: first, that there never has been a time when there have not been distinct and even rival schools of opinion within the Christian Church; and next, that every one of those schools has in one way or another done useful service; sometimes, it is true, briefly and on a very small scale, but always with appreciable results. This being so, two conclusions are inevitable: that uniformity is practically unattainable, and that diversity is important for the equable development of truth on all its sides. It is impossible for any genius, however transcendent, for any creed, however comprehensive, for any Church system, however august, symmetric, philosophical, to exhaust the possibilities of theology, to plumb the abysmal depths of the Divine mind. Man's intellect inexorably demands answers to fresh problems; new statements and expansions of earlier statements are required either in consequence of subtle evasions and misconstructions of those earlier ones, or because the tentative solutions proposed for intricate questions have failed to satisfy the conscience of Christendom. Of these two processes examples may be found in the formation of the Niceno-Constantinopolitan symbol, and in the rejection, one after another, of various hypotheses on the nature of the Atonement, such as those of Origen and St. Anselm, each of which held its ground for several centuries. But the unvarying tendency of any one school which has obtained a monopoly, no matter how broad, wise, and sympathetic it may be, is to crystallize, and impede the flow of Church life, to refuse answers to new questions, and to resist the introduction of the most obvious improvements which involve any change in the settled posture of affairs. The most palmary instance of this in all Church history is the long delay of Rome in answering the question which Luther put as the spokesman of Germany, "What is Justification?" Rome was silent until 1547, the year after Luther's death, when the schism had been consummated, and her reply was too late to prevent or to heal it. It is of no practical avail now that the explanation which Luther himself gave, though very widely accepted at first, is all but unanimously rejected by modern Protestant theologians, albeit prevalent still amongst the more unlettered members of the Wesleyan body and a dwindling minority of the Anglican clergy, nor is it of much more importance that the Tridentine decrees on the subject are seen to harmonize better with Scripture and morality. No event in European history more fatally interfered with civilization and progress than the Thirty Years' War, and it is at least highly probable that if the decrees and reforms of Trent had come as a prompt reply to the remonstrances of those who were justly dissatisfied with the state of unreformed Latin Christianity, instead of being a mere effort at salvage after the conflagration, there would have been a peaceable adjustment of the matters in dispute, without that unhappy arbitrament of brute

force. It was not from lack of highly-placed and highly-gifted men who were fully conscious of the need of reform—the names of Sadolet, Contarini, and Pole are decisive on that head—but for lack of a constitutional Opposition to prevent official authority from using its powers to suppress complaints rather than to satisfy them, that the day of amendment was put off too late; since the co-ordinate rights of different schools was no more accepted as an axiom in the ecclesiastical world of that day than it is in French secular politics even now, where each Government in turn regards all its opponents as little better than rebels, to be kept down with all the power of the State, and harassed by incessant supervision and interference.

Such a theory is, I repeat, impossible to an instructed student of the wonderful career of the Christian Church, who declines to believe on the bare assertion of a single partisan, that “the appeal to history is heresy and treason.” It is even more impossible to a loyal member of the Church of England, who is aware, if he know aught of her annals, not merely that each of the three great schools of which she is made up has a strict legal right to toleration within her pale, but also that each has done good service to her best interests.

The High Church party holds its ground by a double tenure, that of the first and the last settlement of the Anglican system since the Reformation. At the earlier of those epochs, comprising the interval between the years 1536 and 1547, the enormous majority of the Bishops and clergy, while agreed as to the imperative need of a very large measure of change and amendment, were by no means inclined to follow the example of the Continental Reformers, but were in favour of a policy much resembling that of the earlier programme of the Old Catholics in our own day.

At the accession of Edward VI., the dominant party in the State, headed by the Protector Somerset, belonged to the so-called “Gospellers,” a Zwinglio-Calvinistic school, who were nearly as hostile to the Lutherans, or more moderate Reformers, as to the Roman Church itself. But they formed such a very small minority of the nation—not more than a twelfth, as Paget admits in a letter to the Protector\*—that although they were prepared to carry matters to extremity by force of new laws and foreign mercenaries, and did succeed in mutilating the formularies in part, yet they were unable to carry out their programme, which, as the *Reformatio Legum* and the *Zurich Letters* inform us, included a *third* Prayer Book intended to supplant the Second, as it supplanted the First (issued by Cranmer as a mere blind, when the Second Book was already drawn up), and to sweep away every vestige of distinction between the Church of England and the Congregationalist bodies at Zurich and Frankfort; while refusal to accept the new teaching on grace and

\* Strype, *Rec.* ii., 110.

the Sacraments was to be treated as heresy, and left under the old penalty of burning alive.\* This is what might have been, nay, what would have been, if Edward VI. had lived even a year longer. Then came the reaction under Mary I., followed by the counter-reaction under Elizabeth, due to the blundering cruelties of her sister's advisers.

But there are two very noteworthy facts about the posture which religious affairs assumed at Elizabeth's accession. In the first place, the sees and parishes of England were then universally in the hands of Bishops and Clergy who had resumed, or had never broken off, communion with the See of Rome, amounting in all to about nine or ten thousand persons. But it appears from the Reports of the Visitors appointed by the Crown in 1559, that of this great number only one hundred dignitaries and eighty parish priests refused to conform to the new state of things, and were consequently deprived. Yet it is idle to suppose that any large proportion of the conformists were very eager in the cause of Protestantism, and that they did not rather sympathize in the main with the disused rites. The other fact of importance is that even the return of the Marian exiles, and the advancement of some of the more extreme amongst them, such as Jewell, Grindal, and Horne, to Bishoprics, was not sufficient to reinstate the Zwinglian programme which had been cut short in 1553.

Even Mary's cruelties had not effaced the memory of Edward's plunderings, massacres, and inhuman legislation, and there was no disposition on the part of Crown or nation to replace a Roman Inquisition by a Protestant one. Therefore Foxe the "Martyrologist" and his party failed in an effort to get the *Reformatio Legum* enacted by Parliament in 1571, and such changes as Elizabeth's influence caused to be made in the Common Prayer Book, were backwards in the direction of the comparatively Catholic First Book of 1549, and not that of the still-born Third Book of 1553, a policy followed in all subsequent revisions. Thus, at the outset of the Reformation in England, the great majority of those who took part in or were affected by it, sided with that more temperate school which was practically identical with modern Ritualists, and can never have intended to exclude themselves. Afterwards, the rise of the Puritan party within the Church of England under the fostering care of Grindal and Abbot, and its coalition with the Presbyterians, ended, as all men know, in the abolition of Episcopacy and of the Prayer Book by Parliament in 1643, and the temporary eclipse of the Church. Consequently, at the Restoration, there came a reaction very like, in breadth and intensity, to that which marked Elizabeth's accession. The chief revisers of the Prayer Book of 1662 were men

\* See Hallam's note on this subject, "Const. Hist.," vol. i. chap. 2, where after striving to disprove the above statement, he is obliged to allow it.

of the most advanced type of High Churchmanship then current, several of whom were doctrinally far more hieratic than the average High Anglican of to-day, as, for instance, Sheldon, Cosin, Sanderson, Heylin, Sparrow, Gunning, Pearson, and Thorndike, and the lay Parliament was eager to do all it could, and a great deal more than it ought, to press hardly on those who had lately been the intolerant oppressors of liberty of conscience. Thus the whole aim of the settlement in 1662 was to insure not mere impunity, but supremacy, for the High Church party. And that being so, it would be idle for me to contend here for the legality of its position, were it not that loud assertions have been often made of late that clergymen who believe what the majority in 1547, 1559, and 1662 believed and enacted are not entitled to enjoy the benefits of the Church of England, because they reject the opinions of those who formed the small minority at those three dates.

But this same charge of disaffection and precariousness of tenure is also brought against the Low Church party by some of their opponents, who are enabled, with very little difficulty, to point out numerous discrepancies between the official obligations of members of the school and their habitual practice. To my mind, the case cannot be made out on this side either.

A minority which was suffered to mould the formularies in 1552, which is almost exclusively responsible for the Thirty-nine Articles, which saw its leading members raised to the highest dignities in the Church under Elizabeth and James I., and which was not excluded definitely or implicitly at the last settlement, cannot be equitably harried now. It can show an unbroken tenure from 1559 till 1643, and though it disappeared as a school within the Church immediately after the Restoration, till revived again by the Evangelicals about 1750, yet no one is justified in laying hold of such a gap in its prescription as constituting a real flaw in its title-deeds. It is quite reasonable to say : "There were a hundred years since the Reformation when you did not visibly make a part of the Church of England, and therefore you cannot now claim to be its sole true representatives ;" but it is not fair to press this further into a plea for their exclusion.

The Broad Church party, in its turn, has been more than tolerated. Its earliest champions, Hales and Chillingworth, were protected and encouraged by the illustrious Laud ; its heads of a later day, albeit men of far inferior mark and worth, such as Tillotson, Tenison, Hoadley, and White Kennett, were advanced to the highest dignities of the Church. In this case also, therefore, general assertions as to the incompatibility of the school with Anglican formularies must give way before historical and legal fact.

So far, I have dealt merely with the question of bare legal right, and the result is to establish the joint tenure of the three schools.

But a more interesting debate now arises, as to the proofs of utility which each school has given. For I suppose few would gravely contend that if any particular school or class within a religious society were marked by permanent noxiousness or incapacity, the society would not be justified in taking decisive steps for its suppression or expulsion.

What, then, as regards the past history of the Church of England, have the three chief schools within her pale severally done for her?

I answer that the High Church school has maintained, against the action of the other two, all the outward framework and polity of Anglicanism, the episcopate, the liturgical formularies, the parochial system, historical continuity with ancient Christianity, stateliness in public worship, culture amongst the clergy, social influence with the wealthy and educated laity. Bating a very few great divines of other schools, such as Usher, Lightfoot, and Adams, the whole splendid array of names on which the reputation of the English Church for eloquence and learning is based belong to it. Lancelot Andrewes, Jeremy Taylor, Thomas Jackson, John Pearson, Henry Hammond, Brian Walton, John Cosin, Isaac Barrow, Herbert Thorndike, William Beveridge, William Cave, George Bull, William Wake, Joseph Butler, belong to the great fraternity who wrung from the admiring Continent the praise, *Clerus Anglicanus, munuli stupor*; while the annals of piety were not less illustrated by a Herbert, a Ferrar, a Ken, and a Wilson. I purposely refrain from carrying the list on into the present century, because that would trench on another part of my subject.

As to the Low Church school, though I cannot look with favour on its action under Edward VI., Elizabeth, or James I., yet there are two great services to be ascribed to its energy at other times. It boldly resisted, under Charles I., the strong Erastian tendency of Overall's school, which would have led, had it been successful, to the establishment of a hyper-Byzantine Cæsarism in this country, and have ended in making the Church a mere department of the Home Office, strong in wealth, rank, and power, but miserably enfeebled in spiritual vitality. It did a far greater work in its revival of practical religion towards the close of the last century, when Newton, Cecil, Venn, Scott, and Romaine, carried out the undertaking begun by James Hervey and Walker of Truro. For this alone it is entitled to the deepest gratitude, and has by it fully justified its claim to a high place in the annals of the Church of England.

Nor has the Broad Church party failed to accomplish its full share of useful labour. Thrice it has done good service to the cause, not of the Church of England only, but of Christianity at large. It was the first to do open battle with the grisly chimera of Calvinism, which, by dint of the keen clear intellect of the famous man from whose brain it sprang, and the confident audacity of assertion by

which his adherents claimed primeval antiquity and Divine origin for his novel figments, had succeeded in conquering more than half of Protestant Europe, and awing even the remonstrant Lutheran body into silent acquiescence. Even the great English divines who rescued their Church from the theology of Jewell and the discipline of Abbot, did not speak out frankly against the hideous distortion of the Gospel current in Holland, Switzerland, and Scotland. They believed themselves compelled, by the political and religious conditions of the time, to make in some sort common cause with the advocates of a creed which was logically and historically alien from their own, against that mighty Church which, however they might take exceptions to details and exaggerations of its teaching, was then at one with themselves on all the fundamental questions of Christian belief. Therefore the Stewart age in England showed a character in its gallery, not only unknown before or since, but one which a hasty thinker would pronounce impossible, the High Church Calvinist Bishop; of whom there was more than one specimen, learned, able, and famous in those days, amongst whom Morton, Davenant, Carleton, and Hall are the most conspicuous. The Low Church variety had been, of course, familiar under Elizabeth, but the union of high prelacy with supralapsarian tenets was a novelty, and perhaps helps to account for the very little resistance made by the Laudian school of reformers to Calvinism as such. Their contest was mainly reducible to two heads, for Episcopacy as against Congregational Independency, and for a fixed liturgy against extempore prayer. And as the High Church Calvinist bishops were agreed with them on these heads, though not favourable to some of their ritual innovations, they quite failed to recognize the irreconcilable difference of their creeds. It was to Thomas Adams and John Hales that the task fell of combating Calvinism itself, and assailing it, the claimant of a far-descended monopoly in orthodoxy, as a vulgar modern impostor, betraying in every word and gesture its ignoble origin. From that time, Calvinism, though still very powerful in the Church of England, as it continued to be down to living memory, ceased to dominate as of right, and had to content itself with being tolerated where it had once asserted mastery.

The second good service done by Broad Churchmen was the revival of religious philosophy, of a tone akin to that of the great school of Alexandria. We are happily living at a time when the ignorant clamour against the schoolmen of the Middle Ages is giving way to a juster estimate of their powers and merits, and when it is beginning to be understood that the influence exerted by St. Anselm, Albertus Magnus, Alexander Hales, Duns Scotus, St. Thomas Aquinas, and William Occam, was due to something more than the ignorance of their contemporaries. When the Reformation shattered Scholasticism, it enthroned no other philosophy in its stead. Calvin's mighty intellectual effort, the *Institutes*,

though clear to pellucidness, and admirable in methodical arrangement, did not found a school of thought, although it formulated many dogmas, and the speculative thinkers who have followed in their great master's steps have been few, of whom Jonathan Edwards was the ablest. Lutheranism had to wait till Leibnitz for a philosopher; but English Broad Churchmen founded a school of their own at an earlier date, and it is needless to cite other names than those of Ralph Cudworth and Henry More to vindicate its intellectual force and sincere devoutness. Of the enormous importance of religious philosophy as contributing to the expansion of human thought, and of the necessary feebleness of any religious system which fails to evolve such a philosophy, it is not needful to say many words. It is enough to remark that all dogma goes sooner or later into the crucible of metaphysics, and none survives which cannot resist that solvent. Our own day has seen the cardinal doctrines of both Lutheranism and Calvinism succumb when so assailed, and all systems which have not even their show of coherence are inevitably doomed. And therefore honour is due to the men who first showed how the highest thought had room for its play within the Church of England.

The third service of this school was its contribution to the Apologetic war against Deism in the last century. Bishop Chandler, as controvertor of Anthony Collins, William Paley, and Bishop Watson of Llandaff (who, low as he stands for personal or professional character, showed himself an able disputant against Gibbon and Paine), all belonged to it, and indeed its whole tone and method are closer akin to the discussion of evidences than to more strictly theological study.

It would not be a difficult task to show that each of the three schools has also done much disservice in times past to the common interest, but that is not an inquiry of much practical value now, when the matter to be discussed is the present attitude and relative bearing of them all to the Church of to-day.

I have shown, as I think, sufficiently, that unless we propose to create an entirely new Church of England, we cannot set about the exclusion of any one of its three main constituents, since each can produce evidence of ancient tenure and eminent services. I might also show, did I not fear the length of the digression, that the three ways of viewing religious questions which have resulted in the formation of these three schools are to be found within the Catholic Church at every period of its history, save that age of lead and darkness, the tenth century. I will only say that, roughly speaking, and with large allowance for necessary modification of a general statement, the Egyptian Church represented, in its great school of theology, ancient Broad Churchism, of which Origen, S. Clement, and Synesius are examples; the Church of North Africa is the correlative of modern Evangelicalism; while the High Church view, driven from Constanti-



noble by the Erastianizing influence of the Imperial Court, domiciled itself in Milan and Rome.

Even when Christendom was practically split into East and West, each fragment of the mighty whole included similar constituents, and the student of mediæval history will have no difficulty in recognizing their contemporaneous influence within the Latin obedience, down to the attempted suppression of all variety in our own day in favour of the extremest wing of a solitary section of a single school.

The abstract thinker and the practical statesman will therefore agree in this, that it is historically as well as metaphysically impossible, even if it were desirable, to enforce the absolute supremacy of one form of thought, one school of theology, in a Church. There will be always, at the very least, two broadly marked divisions even in the narrowest and most rigidly formulated communions, and most usually a third, which will either aim at reconciling the less extreme of the other two, or revolting from what it thinks the extravagances of both, will strike out a fresh path for itself. The Roman Church for many centuries was parted into Gallicans and Ultramontanes; the Ultramontanes themselves were ranged under the opposing banners of Dominic and Francis, and now are divided into Maximizers and Minimizers; the Scottish Establishment in the last century had its Highflyers and Moderates; the very Mormons have their polygamists and anti-polygamists; the most fanatically narrow-minded sect of the present day, the Plymouth Brethren, have split into two hostile camps; and so with all others.

Hence, giving up the whole notion of uniformity as unattainable even if a good—which I do not in the least believe it to be—a practical man's first question must be, Which of these schools shall I myself adopt? and his second, How may those schools which I regard as less satisfactory be kept at their best? For it is clear that if we must always have High, Low, and Broad Church, under one name or another, it is the interest of the most zealous members of any one of them that the members of the others shall be as cultured, devout, and active as may be; if for no higher reason than that they will be thus enabled to see some, at least, of the merits of their rivals, and exchange a policy of detraction and persecution for one of healthy emulation in the same cause. An illiterate bigot of any school, especially if his own life be not edifying, does much more harm to the common cause of Christianity than he does good either to his own party by unhesitating service, or to an opposite section by the force of reaction from his garbled statements. The reason of this is that he directly interferes with the principle of competition, which, as men are constituted, is necessary to the healthy energy of every system. If there be no rivalry whatever, either languid formalism or iron despotism will be the issue, as severally proved by Sweden and by Spain; and no choice being left save that of entire conformity or

entire revolt, a very large number will sooner or later choose the second alternative, and break with Christianity altogether. If there be rivalry, but only of a poor and feeble type, the tone of the dominant creed will be lowered from lack of resistance, and no pains will be taken by authority to keep up a high moral or intellectual standard.

There is an objection which may be taken here to my argument, which is this : Granted that competition is good for one of the competing parties, as the struggle against Paganism was good for the early Church, yet if truth be one, deflection from that truth cannot be good for any, and all will suffer in proportion as they recede further from it. It may have been good for Christians to be persecuted by Nero, by Decius, by Diocletian, but it cannot be truly or reasonably said that the struggle did any good to Paganism, seeing that it proved its destruction. And similarly in the rivalry of bodies professing Christianity under various forms, there can be little satisfaction to a clear-sighted believer in holding that the inferior varieties subserve no use except to bring out the latent energies of the best one. Mormonism, for instance, is but a very clumsy instrument for teaching the sanctity of Christian marriage and the plain fact that facile divorce, so frequent in the United States, comes to the same thing as polygamy. Would it not be better to have no Mormons, and to have a higher view of matrimony current everywhere ?

But to argue thus, while perfectly sound so far as it goes, does not touch the real point mooted. The rivalry of competition is entirely different from the rivalry of opposition. If, in a time of scarcity of corn, two farmers or two contractors strive to undersell each other, the public is the gainer ; but if some ignorant peasants, angered at the high prices, burn the corn-ricks of one of the competitors, and thus destroy a quantity of food, then the public, the fire-raisers, and the sufferer, all lose by the crime.

So it is in religious questions. The existence of a great outlying mass of ignorance and sin, often in active hostility to Christianity, serves as a stimulus to religious zeal, exactly as the existence of a great scarcity of food spurs on agriculture. Only a certain number of minds, necessarily a small minority in all ages and countries, are able to take the highest spiritual ground in doctrine and life. Very few men are theologians, not very many more are saints ; those who have been both saints and theologians during the last eighteen hundred years are a very slender band indeed ; almost as rare as great scientific discoverers ; and outnumbered twentyfold by celebrated warriors. But just as we lay down meadow where it is too wet for wheat, or sow barley or oats where it is too cold, so, too, there are various aspects of religion, good and sound as far as they go, which are better suited to many types of mind than the loftiest speculations of erudite divines, and the Catholicity of a Church must be tested by the number of various

temperaments whose wants she can satisfy, while the moral right of any particular section to be tolerated within her pale will rest entirely on the amount of proof it can adduce that it belongs to the productive, not to the non-productive, far less the destructive, classes.

It will be seen from this line of argument, that in my view a purely negative and critical school has no place within the Christian Church. Negation and criticism are needful to all schools in their turn, but they must not make up the sum of their programme. There were thousands of educated men in the days of Valerian or Maximian who were quite ready to say, "I disbelieve in Jupiter, in Minerva, in Apollo, and all the rest of the Pantheon." They not only were not Christians, but they were not even efficient combatants against the idolatry they rejected, till they learnt to add: "I believe in God the Father Almighty, and in Jesus Christ His only Son, our Lord."

The best school of religious thought, therefore, at any time will be that one which is most comprehensive in its range of ideas and most manifold in its practical energies. But here, owing to a widely current misapprehension, I must dwell on the fact that to speak politely about a doctrine or usage is not the same thing as to comprehend or include it. Any school or society which habitually leaves a tenet or practice on one side, no matter how tolerant the members may be of such tenet or practice when upheld by others, must be counted as excluding it. If a wealthy collector of pictures tells me that his sympathy for schools of painting is universal, that he recognizes and admires Venetian, Spanish, Dutch, and French art as equally good in their several ways, and yet I find that in his own gallery there are no works of any artists outside of the Dusseldorf school, I refuse to credit his professions, and treat him as a mere narrow specialist.

Applying this principle to religious questions, and looking round on the various communions of Christendom, I find that the Church of England satisfies more of the conditions of Catholicity than any other I can see, and therefore my adherence is a matter of deliberate and intelligent choice, not of mere hereditary custom or arbitrary preference. I believe myself to be very fully alive to the defects, abuses, and scandals to be found within her pale; but I see not merely that these are accidents and not integers of her system—an excuse which might be truthfully made on behalf of several other bodies—but that diligent and mainly successful efforts are being made to clear them away. A reformer in the Roman Church, or in a modern sect (I speak under correction), nearly always goes out of communion, and either founds a new sect, or joins some existing society alien from his old associations, because there is not room for lateral expansion in any of the sects. Only in the Church of England, so far as I can see, is there in Western Christendom a fair

field for honest work in amendment and improvement; only there can a man rise to a new level of thought and develop a fresh set of energies without in the least impairing his loyalty, or breaking with his earlier ties. But this recommendation is not one that has always been predicable of Anglicanism. On the contrary, the whole history of the eighteenth century tells an opposite story, and shows that there was a time when there was not spiritual activity enough to produce or tolerate variety of opinion, nor keenness of apprehension enough to facilitate efforts of reform. We must therefore look to a later day and a different form of theology from that of the Georgian era for the remarkable change which has taken place in this respect, and while recognizing that this change is the resultant of a great variety of forces, nevertheless endeavour to attribute the chief merit to whatever agency is best entitled to it.

There is a very simple way of arriving at the truth, which is to ascertain at the outset of inquiry the date of the first clearly marked stirring amongst the dry bones. Now there is a clerical Conference held every year at Islington, strictly confined to members of the Evangelical school, but so largely attended by them as to be fairly representative of their whole body in England, and reported and accepted as such by the journals of the party. I have for some years past carefully studied the reports of the proceedings at this conference, and I have found one statement repeated annually by at least one speaker, and acquiesced in by the whole meeting. It is that amidst much which is dark and discouraging, there is the cheering certainty of a great movement for good in the Church of England, of a deeper spiritual life, more varied activity, a wider interest amongst both clergy and laity alike in religious questions, a profounder study of theology, a heartier devotion, both in private and public worship, a brighter outlook in the home and foreign mission-field; and that this improvement dates from a given period. That period, when the speakers become definite, is always fixed at the same date. That date, as named by the speakers at the Conference of 1873, was exactly forty years previous. What event in the English religious world marked 1833? The reply is inevitable: The publication of the *Tracts for the Times*, and the beginning of the movement which is, in its present phase, called Ritualism.

Consequently, when living Evangelical leaders themselves fix 1833 as the date of the new life of the Church of England, they are not merely renouncing all claim for their own school to be the source of that new life, but establishing the claim of the section which they most oppose to the chief share in its origin. And as the Broad Church party did not then exist as a coherent body with a theory and policy of its own, but was made up of merely scattered units, it cannot corporately put in any plea to partake the honours, though several of those units must be reckoned amongst the component forces which

brought about the results we now see. As for the great central mass, it was then, as always, mainly inert, and only to be stimulated into motion by impact from without.

The first title, then, which the advanced High Church party has to general respect is that of recent and eminent services to English religion. The difference in the nature and permanence of its work from the amount of success attained by the early Evangelicals consists, as I pointed out in a former paper, in its policy of dealing with corporate questions more than with personal ones, in its effort to reform the doctrine and discipline of a whole Church, instead of confining its efforts to proselytizing individuals. Now, it is perfectly true that the power, nay, the very wish, to achieve this vast undertaking, could not have existed unless a large number of persons singly influenced by strong religious enthusiasm had been available as teachers or as disciples, and that the creation of such a class was mainly owing to Evangelical efforts in the past, but it is none the less true that no general reforms of any extent or value were made until the Oxford movement initiated them. The Church of England, after forty years of Evangelical influence, was the object of bitter hostility and still more bitter contempt to great masses of Englishmen, on the ground of her swarming abuses and anomalies, and her corporate failure; while after forty years of Tractarian labours, the feeling of contempt has entirely disappeared, and the hostility which remains is mainly due to jealousy, and is thus a panegyric instead of a censure.

And this brings us to the second claim of the school, which is that it alone treats Christianity as at once a divine revelation and a historical polity. No fact comes out more sharply on a dispassionate examination of the Christian Church at the Nicene period—the very earliest as to which we have clear and abundant information—than the universal prevalence of a vast hierarchical and liturgical system which does not bear the very faintest resemblance to any modern Protestant sect, but which even then claimed without contradiction to represent Apostolic institutions.\* The Greek Church exhibits that same system arrested in its growth about a thousand years ago, the Roman Church the same system run wild in some of its parts and unduly stunted in others, but still perfectly recognizable in most of its features; and consequently these two vast and ancient communions have displayed a permanence and vitality which have been proof against external and internal troubles that would have wrecked any less deep-rooted organism ten times over. It has been the singular destiny of the Church of England to preserve amidst all the fierce commotions of the Tudor age and all the changes since that time certain main relics of the very same system, instead of rejecting

\* See this proved by an unwilling witness, in the Rev. Dr. G. A. Jacob's "Ecclesiastical Polity of the New Testament."

and abolishing all alike, as was done in Scotland, Holland, Geneva, and much of Germany. Hence the English Reformation has differed from that of the Continent almost exactly as the English Revolution of 1688 differs from the French Revolution of 1789. In England, a younger branch of the same dynasty sits on the throne, and popular rights are more clearly and legally defined, but in all other constitutional respects, the England of Victoria is the England of James I. But in France the volcano is not yet exhausted, and there are few, even amongst students in history, who can name off-hand all the contradictory experiments in Government which have been tried without success in that unhappy country ever since the fatal attempt was made to break entirely with the past. It is so with Continental Protestantism. I believe that I am speaking strictly within bounds when I allege that the numerical majority of Protestants all over the world have given up the main tenets of the chief Christian creeds,—the Incarnation, the Atonement, the Resurrection, the Ascension, and the Judgment to come. And as regards the effect on the devotional life, I will cite just two facts. The population of Berlin is given in the *Almanach de Gotha* of 1871, according to the census of 1867, as 702,437. It is now considerably more. But Professor Brückner of Leipzig alleges in a lecture on the present condition of religion in Prussia, of which the English edition before me bears date 1867, that there is church accommodation in Berlin for only 40,000 persons, which is found in practice to be a great deal more (twice as much, another writer states) than is needed. That is all that Pietism, representing the Evangelical element in the Church of England, and Rationalism, representing the Broad Church element, have been able together to do for the capital of one of the greatest realms of the earth. Things are very far from being as they ought to be in England, but compare with these statistics the incessant call for more churches in London, and the continual subdivision of parishes to relieve the present districts of overwhelming crowds.

The second reason, therefore, for giving in one's adhesion to the advanced High Church party is that it contains more elements of permanence, as tested by survival during at least sixteen hundred years, than the competing sections. It is not very satisfactory to attach one's self to a mere fleeting and transitory phase of opinion, which changes as we look at it.

There is a third reason, adapted to the needs of another class of minds, which is that this is at present the only school in the Church of England in which men of other schools can find some part at least of that which attracts themselves, united with other elements. I may take the two Missions of 1869 and 1874 to illustrate my meaning. The former of these two movements originated solely in the Ritualist camp, having been devised, organized, and started by the Evangelist Fathers, a congregation of Anglican preaching friars

set on foot a few years ago at Cowley St. John, close to Oxford. The second grew out of the first, and although much more widely shared in by men of other schools than that of 1869, still is traceable to precisely the same origin. Now, the comments of the press, especially of the Evangelical press in 1869, exhibited the sheerest bewilderment at the entire absence of ceremonial display or rubrical observance in the services conducted by the most extreme Ritualists in the most notable churches of their school. Bible-classes, extempore prayers and preachings, hymns freely inserted everywhere, direct appeals to the emotions and to personal needs, made hundreds of Evangelicals believe for the moment that Ritualists had seen the error of their ways, and now that they were in earnest, and not in play, had felt that only simple Evangelical methods would be of any avail in winning souls. I shall not here digress to show where the misconception lay, but will merely point out that so far the Low Church school was convinced that its favourite weapons were as familiarly known to, and as deftly used by the most extreme Ritualists as by its own members. But no one will pretend, had the conditions of the problem been reversed, that Ritualists could have found their cherished doctrines and usages taken up in any Evangelical church. Therefore, when an Evangelical joins the High Church ranks, he is not obliged to give up anything positive which he held before. He does but enlarge his system of belief and practice, while the Ritualist turning Evangelical would have to negative much of his previous convictions, without adding one positive notion to his stock of religious ideas. The same is true of the Broad Church party. It is unnecessary to spend time in proving that a High Churchman who passes into the Broad Church ranks must leave behind him a great deal of historical Christianity, and adopt a form of opinion less clear and definite than his earlier belief. That is, he *narrows* his system by the omission of certain elements which it formerly included. But I do not know of any positive tenet or practice upheld by Broad Churchmen which is denied or rejected by advanced High Churchmen. As, then, a man can continue to hold within the High Church ranks all that is positive in either Low or Broad Churchism, but the converse proposition does not hold, the High Church school is the broadest and most comprehensive of all, and least likely to take a sectarian tone.

The fourth reason is that, tested by the formularies of the Anglican Church, the only school which facts allow to be truly representative of the mind of that communion is the High Church party. I am not, in making this assertion, forgetting or retracting what I said above as to the joint action of two contrariant sections in compiling the Prayer Book, still less the attitude they severally bore towards the Articles. But here are some matters to be taken into account. As to the Articles, the Declaration of Charles I. prefixed

to them in all copies of the Prayer Book, that they are to be taken in their literal and grammatical sense, and not otherwise, was held at the time to be a blow struck at Puritan interpretations, while it is exactly on the literal and grammatical sense, elucidated by the history of the time when the Articles were drawn up, that Tract XC. is based.

Then, as regards the Prayer Book. Both High and Low claim it as making for them. But three awards have settled the dispute. First is the allegation of Mr. Spurgeon and other leading Nonconformists, that the Prayer Book is destructive of the Low Church position. Secondly comes the action of the Puritan school in the Irish Church, which, so long as the Establishment lasted, loudly denounced High Churchmen as traitors to the plain meaning of the Prayer Book, but as soon as Disestablishment came, insisted on striking out or altering materially all the passages in dispute. Thirdly is the very similar conduct of Bishop Cummins and his new sect in America, who have abandoned even the American Prayer Book as too High Church, and have gone back to a tentative formulary drawn up in 1784, but never authorized for use; not because they were not tolerated under the existing Book, but because it did not allow of their persecuting High Churchmen. These three separate judgments, therefore, make it clear that in Protestant minds free to act on their convictions, the Common Prayer Book is a High Church document, and that only.

There are other reasons which weigh with myself, but I think these four, of practical achievement, of permanence, of plasticity, and of representative character, are those which mainly cause the steady flow into the High Church school of the very best elements of the other two. I have known very many Evangelicals who have gradually advanced from grade to grade, till they were well-nigh in the van of the Ritualist movement. I have known not a few Broad Churchmen melt insensibly into the High Anglican ranks. I have also known some three or four High Churchmen who made shipwreck of their faith altogether; but I have never known a single instance of a conversion made by Evangelicals from the Tractarian ranks. I do not allege that there have been none such, but if there had been more than a very few, and those few very obscure, I must needs have heard of them. Hence, it is not surprising to find that of the twenty thousand clergymen belonging to the Church of England, more than one-half belong to some shade or other of the High Church party, which has far more varieties of type within it than either of the other schools. I base this calculation on the fact that the party has grown much stronger since 1862, yet in that year Archbishop Trench, then Dean of Westminster, got up a High Church clerical protest against the efforts conjointly made by men of the two other schools to press forward Liturgical Revision in their



interests, and obtained more than ten thousand signatures to it. Nearly thirty years previously, in 1834, a joint lay and clerical address of a similar kind, also emanating from the High Church school (exclusive of the Tractarian body), was presented to Archbishop Howley, and was signed by more than seven thousand clergymen and two hundred and thirty thousand laymen. The difference in the two clerical lists of 1834 and 1862 approximately represents the growth of the party in the interval.\*

On the other hand, the Evangelical newspapers and speakers, when they come to details, usually claim five thousand as the number of clergymen of their school, which leaves five thousand more to be distributed amongst Broad Churchmen and Nondescripts. Their relative proportions may be approximately stated as fifteen hundred of the former, and three thousand five hundred of the latter. I make this computation mainly on the basis of the list of petitioners against the Athanasian Creed, although the large sprinkling of Evangelical signatures therein is a disturbing element in the estimate. It is probably in excess as regards the numbers of the Broad Church party. The relative proportions may then be stated thus :—

High Church, 50 per cent.

Low Church, 25 „

Broad Church, 7 „

Nondescripts, 18 „

It may be reasonably supposed, therefore, that the bishoprics, deaneries, and canonries are shared amongst the various schools in much the same ratio. But this is very far from being the case. The facts, as nearly as I can tabulate them, are as follows, omitting fractions :—

Out of 28 Archbishops and Bishops, there are—

High Church 7, instead of 14.

Low Church 7, their fair ratio.

Broad Church 5, instead of 2.

Nondescripts 9, instead of 5.

Out of 29 Deans, there are—

High Church 5, instead of 14.

Low Church 7, their fair ratio.

Broad Church 7, instead of 2.

Nondescripts 10, instead of 5.

\* Two other statistical facts make in the same direction. *Hymns Ancient and Modern*, a High Church book which appeared in 1861, although denounced then and ever since on doctrinal grounds by the Evangelical school, has driven out Kemble, Mercur, Bickersteth, &c., in hundreds of churches, and has circulated between seven and eight millions of copies. The *Priest's Prayer Book*, intended solely for advanced High Church clergymen, first published by myself in 1864, is in its fourth edition, of which only a few copies remain. The four editions amount to nine thousand copies. The book has been unsparingly attacked from the first, and charged at by more than one Bishop.

Out of 130 Canonries Residentiary, there are—

High Church	25, instead of 65.
Low Church	30, instead of 33.
Broad Church	14, instead of 9.
Nondescripts	61, instead of 23.

So much for patronage almost wholly in the gift of the Crown, for there are only a very few Canonries which are distributed by others than the Premier or the Chancellor for the time being.

Now as to dignities episcopally conferred, it will be enough to take the Archdeacons. And the first remark to make is that the great majority of these gentlemen are too entirely obscure to be known out of their local spheres, so that I am in a great degree reduced to guess-work in classifying them. My calculation, whatever be its value, is this.

Out of 69 Archdeacons, there are :—

High Church	9, instead of 85.
Low Church	13, instead of 17.
Broad Church	7, instead of 5.
Nondescripts	40, instead of 12.

The gross total, then, is 256 dignitaries, of whom by ratio, and assuming, as it is but fair, that equally fit men (save in one respect) will be found in each section proportionably to its numbers, there ought to be 128 High Churchmen, 64 Low Churchmen, 18 Broad Churchmen, and 46 Nondescripts. The actual proportions are : 46 High Churchmen, little more than a third of their just ratio ; 57 Low Churchmen, seven-eighths of their rights ; 33 Broad Churchmen, not far from twice as many as their due number ; and 120 Nondescripts, very nearly three times as many as could reasonably claim high preferment. After all deductions and corrections for misconceptions and errors in this calculation, the figures are very remarkable. And the two facts which come out most clearly are, that the High Church party does not exercise social and political influence at all commensurate with its numbers, and that safe, inert colourlessness, devoid of enthusiasm and high principle, is the surest road to promotion, whether from Crown or Bishop.

There is another fact which deserves notice, and that is that there are men belonging to the extreme Left of both the Broad and Low Church parties amongst the Bishops, Deans, Archdeacons, and Canons. But there is not even one member of the extreme Right of the High Church school in any of these positions (except Archdeacon Denison, who was not so when appointed), or in the least likely to attain it. This is of course due in a great degree to political causes, to the usual combination of High Church and Conservative opinions, which puts most of the school out in the cold

when there is a Liberal Ministry in office; and to the equally powerful pressure of the Orange and National Club vote under a Tory Cabinet. But faults in the school itself are more to blame than the Treasury Bench is. Chief amongst these faults is lack of party loyalty, one proof of which is the technical meaning which attaches to the phrase "an extreme man." If any clergyman be now so described, with no further details, every one immediately takes for granted that he is a Ritualist, not because of any lack of extremes in other schools, but because Broad Churchmen and Low Churchmen invariably support their vanguard, and will neither say a word in its dispraise themselves, nor suffer any one else to do so if they can help it; whereas moderate High Churchmen are anxious, before everything else, to impress upon the public that they have no sympathy with Ritualism. No one has ever heard of Evangelicals denouncing Dean Close, or Mr. Ryle, or Bishop Baring, for indiscretion, far less for treason, to the interests of their school; nor has there been any such expression of opinion from Broad Church quarters against *Essays and Reviews*, or Mr. Voysey, or Dr. Colenso, as we have heard in times past from nominal High Churchmen against Tract XC., or more recently against the Petition of the 483.

Yet this conduct is at once illogical and ungrateful. It is illogical, because if moderate High Churchmen could or would think, they would see not only that the school they blame as extreme is proceeding to work out the inevitable deductions from principles they themselves profess to accept, but have never set to work, but also that it is extremely convenient to have some one in the front of the fighting, to take all the hard knocks, while getting none of the prize-money. For it is a mere matter of turning over files of newspapers to see that what is now accepted almost everywhere as reasonable and tolerable, was the fiercely-contested badge of extreme men but a very short time back. Any clergyman, save in a very few of the most backward parishes of England, may now have a handsomely decorated church, with stained glass, encaustic tiles, costly hangings, elaborate metal-work, choir stalls, open seats, choral service, surpliced choir, weekly communion, general offertory and surplice in the pulpit, without necessarily passing, I will not say for a Ritualist, but for a High Churchman of any shade. Yet every item in the catalogue—and I might have made it much longer—was once fought over, and denounced by press, and mobs, and Bishops, and treated as *the* proof of extravagance, disloyalty, and all the rest of it. As soon as each position was won, the moderate men, who had waited till the fighting was over, marched into it with flags flying and drums beating, and the Bishops, who had cursed the forlorn hope up hill and down dale in their Charges, tried to look and speak as if they had been living all along only with the one object of seeing the new improvements adopted at their own earnest instigation.

Another and even more marked result is that shown by the course of Parliamentary legislation. The English Church is stronger than all the Nonconformist sects together. The High Church party is stronger than all the other schools in the Establishment together. But all, or nearly all Church legislation for many years past has been adverse to High Churchmen. It is very nearly certain, too, that if the school had been loyal collectively to its leaders—and those only are leaders in any movement who advance in the task of working out its principles into practice, for people who stand still or go back do not lead—we should probably have had none of the miserable prosecutions with which for eighteen years past the Puritan school has been incessantly harassing High Churchmen; and we should most certainly have had very dissimilar judgments from the Judicial Committee of Privy Council, which has never yet decided any ecclesiastical suit on its merits, but solely according to the personal bias of the judges, or their opinion as to public expediency. Thus the “safe” policy is an utter failure, even when viewed from the temporal side. As a religious question, it is much more than a failure, it is (unless when due to mental dulness) sheer cowardice and treason. For it means that a clergyman believing a certain doctrine to be Divinely revealed truth, or a certain usage to be necessary to the full teaching of such a truth, keeps it back from his flock, lest proclamation of it should interfere with his own professional advancement, or with the ease of his parochial and social intercourse. To keep things quiet is his *cne* aim. Yet Christ came to send fire and a sword on earth, and St. Paul counts being “in tumults” amongst the proofs of his ministry, and showed that he meant it, by being the centre of no less than ten riots recorded in the Acts of the Apostles. Many years ago, in Norfolk, I learnt a useful lesson—the meaning of “moderate.” If a Norfolk peasant be ailing, he or his friends will tell you that he is “only moderate.” If he be seriously ill, he is “very moderate.” If all but given over, he is “very moderate indeed.” And now, when I hear that a clergyman is “very moderate indeed,” I know that vital religion is at its last gasp in him, and that he will never do any more good in this world.

And yet, singularly enough, the great and patent evils I have pointed out as the result of dulness and fear are more than counter-balanced by advantages in an entirely different direction. First of all, it is unquestionable that if High Churchmen had availed themselves of their full social and political influence, they would have exercised such a strong pressure on Government and on the Bishops (who dearly love to shout with the largest crowd), that the whole guidance of the Church of England and all its highest posts would have fallen into their hands. And the inevitable issue would have been, not merely the ascription by rivals of all their success to merely

secular causes, but their own certain degeneracy, and substitution of political ascendancy for spiritual power, the very canker which ruined the Scottish Church in 1560, the English Church in 1640, the French Church in 1790, and the Irish Church in 1869.

Next, had the High Church party been as homogeneous throughout as the two other sections, it would have taken a sectarian colour, exactly as they have done; and thus given less play for variety of temperament. There is no tyrant majority amongst High Churchmen now, no Shibboleths which must be repeated accurately under pain of suspicion or exclusion, no current clap-traps whose utterance is an *Open Sesame* into the innermost shrine of their party. And that is one main reason why they count ten thousand against the five thousand of one rival school, and the fifteen hundred of another.

Thirdly, the spontaneous and irregular character of the High Church movement, incapable as it is of being formally tabulated, proves its title to be a living energy, not a manufactured engine, whose action can be accurately predicted beforehand. And, therefore, this one fact is the refutation of the charge of organized conspiracy sometimes brought against the school, and repeated lately in official utterances by two of the least capable of the Bishops. I should have thought myself that no war could be more openly and legitimately waged than that which "Ritualists" are carrying on against popular religiosity, and I should as soon have thought of applying the word "conspiracy" to the German war against France in 1870.

But there is a fourth reason, outweighing all the others in its importance, why the lax order of the High Church party is a definite gain. It is very closely akin to the second, from which it is a deduction. It is that the numerous sub-schools and shades of which it is made up, form, as it were, an easy flight of steps, by which the ascent from its lowest levels to its loftiest heights is singularly facilitated, although there is never any compulsion put upon recruits to go one pace higher than they like.

Hence arises a very curious result, which I think I should doubt if I were an outsider arguing on mere *à priori* grounds. It is that when any number of the advanced pickets of the extreme Ritualist school push forward into fresh territory, and a tremendous outcry is made at their audacity and extravagance, the consequence is not that they isolate themselves from their former companions and occasion a strong reaction. Quite the contrary: the effect has invariably been that the particular level they have just vacated, being observed as at an appreciable distance from their new position, immediately loses the character of "extreme," and some, if not all, of the gentlemen on the step next below walk up, quite satisfied that every one will allow that they are "moderate men," since there are other people clearly overstepping them. And exactly the same process goes on down to the very bottom of the staircase,

and even beyond, so that every advance made by the Ritualist forlorn hope is like a pull at the end of a long cord or lever, which affects and lifts things at a great distance; for not only is the entire Church of England influenced, but even cultivated Nonconformist bodies find their ritual and their theology brought within the sphere of centripetal attraction, and receding further and further from the standards of the Reformation.

This circumstance, in its turn, is the refutation of the statement often made by a small number of persons imperfectly acquainted with the facts, that there is an entire departure on the part of modern Ritualists from the Tractarian principles of 1833—40. There is a change of ground, true enough, because the whole line is advancing; but there is no change of principle, for the original principle was that the English Church had very far gone from original righteousness in doctrine and discipline, and that it was necessary to reform her, and to carry on that process to its completion. The men who want to stop short are only those who have never understood the principle of the revival at all, and to whom its tenets are mere phrases learnt by rote, and not vital and energizing laws. They are like dull boys who learn propositions in Euclid by heart, but who break down at once if the examiner obliges them to put the letters X Y Z where A B C stand in the book they use, and who of course cannot understand that if a theorem be once proved, its corollaries must needs follow. A clearer logic, even if it did not give heed to the assertion of unbroken continuity in the movement made by the three men most competent to express an opinion, Mr. Keble, Dr. Newman, and Dr. Pusey, would argue that as each fresh tract of country reclaimed by the Ritualist pioneers is thankfully settled by the rear-ranks so soon as the pioneers move ahead once more, it is at least probable that the men whom they thus confess to have been guiding them right so far, are guiding them right still, as there is no perceptible change in their course, and the last twenty years have fully established that the said course is not to Rome, since in that interval not only have the clerical Verts been few and obscure, but the Roman Catholic body has actually increased less than it should have done by births alone, without counting immigrants or converts.

The objections most usually raised against the school are two, priestcraft and formalism. As I am not discussing the theological aspect of Church parties in this paper, it would lead me too far afield to enter into a detailed defence. It is enough to say here, that so far as "priestcraft" means that the Ritualist clergy know their business and are able to do it, the phrase is a compliment at the expense of other schools, since in words so compounded the word "craft" means occupation or knowledge, as in "handicraft," "woodcraft," and has nothing to do with guile. If anything else be

intended, the sufficient reply is that the Ritualist movement is very much more a lay one than a clerical one, as the two Archbishops reluctantly confessed when apologizing to the Church Association for being less able than willing to carry out its and their scheme for "stamping out Ritualism." And as to formalism, if that mean the absence of inward spirituality, and the substitution of mere outward observances and gestures for better things, the one sufficient answer is that the books intended to promote private meditation and devotion which issue from High Church publishers exceed tenfold in number the similar current books of Evangelical origin, while the Broad Church publications of the sort can be counted on the fingers of one hand. If the reference be to the great stress laid at present on certain external adjuncts of public worship, I beg to say in the first place that this stress is purely accidental and temporary, and will cease the moment it has overcome the inertia which it is attacking; and next, that the noise and disturbance on the subject have come always and exclusively from the Low Church side. There has not only been no attempt whatever made to force the obnoxious vestments on any reluctant clergyman, but the very clergymen who themselves wear them are quite willing and ready to officiate without them in churches or amongst congregations where they are unfamiliar. I have conducted scores of services myself in my ordinary walking-dress, without so much as a cassock or a surplice, but where is the Evangelical clergyman who would officiate in a chasuble? And that being so, it seems to me that it is he, not I, who is making a vital question of a garment.

The whole dispute is due to a divergence of theory as to the use and objects of going to church. The Protestant view is that it is for the edification of the church-goer, and there stops short. Consequently, in nearly every sectarian place of assembly in the Christian world, and in Low and Broad Church congregations also, the sermon is the one thing on which all else hinges. In most sects, the so-called prayers are sermons also, but oblique ones, as Archbishop Whately styled them. The hymns are little more than overtures between the acts, to allow of rest and change to preacher and people. Given a dull preacher, there is really no reason, except to keep up respectability, why an educated Protestant should go to Church or to meeting at all, because he can read his Bible and his favourite book of sermons more quietly and thoughtfully at home. But the Catholic view, although not in the least degree making light of preaching, puts another conception above it, that of Worship. The primary reason of going to Church is to do public homage to a Personal King, to attend His court in token of loyalty to Him and harmony with our fellow-citizens.\* The secondary

\* It will be seen from this passage that I hold Mr. J. M. Capes to be entirely wrong in the opinion as to the use of daily service which he expressed in a recent number of this Review.

reason is to make petitions to Him for our own needs and those of others, or else to offer thanks for benefits received. The third reason is to obtain such practical instruction as to the laws of the kingdom as may guide our conduct in daily life. But while this, as well as the second object, can be adequately attained in the humblest room and with the barest and simplest forms, it is plain enough that the first cannot be carried out unless we bring in the elements of stateliness and splendour. Man is a compound being, and cannot bisect his personality, or serve God with only half his nature. He must needs give body as well as soul, and offer the best things of which his senses are cognizant, not less than the highest of his mental aspirations. Hence the religious use of painting, sculpture, music, flowers, incense, rich vestments, and all the rest of what is popularly called Ritualism.

If we surround human rulers with pomp of this kind, if officers of state in rich uniforms, if military bands, if gorgeous apartments, if elaborate etiquette and ceremonial are recognized as suitable attributes of a Sovereign's court; it is obvious enough that the practical lesson taught by banishing similar adjuncts from Divine service is that the Person chiefly concerned therein is of much less importance than an earthly king. And though I am quite aware that there are not a few people of all ranks who would at once accept this position, and declare themselves ready to sweep away all official ceremonial everywhere as mere obsolete rubbish, I can only say that they show singularly little knowledge of human nature. Of the two shams, sham simplicity, which is for the most part real squalor, is worse than sham splendour; and the simplicity current in anti-ritualistic churches is mostly of this kind. It means dirt, meanness, and irreverence, and as a consequence, the entire loss of the notion of a Personal God, since if that were realized, no one would dare to insult Him in such a fashion. So long as there are hundreds—I am afraid, thousands—of churches in England of which such strictures are true, there must be stress laid on Ritualism, and according to the working of the law I have mentioned, there must be what is called extreme Ritualism at one end of the lever to lift the dead weight of neglect and irreligion at the other end. To stop extreme Ritualism is simply to shorten the lever, with the results familiar to all students of physics, and therefore till Catholicism has brought back the Personal Christ out of the vague haze in which Protestantism had enveloped Him, the ceremonial movement will have to go on. Ritualists must supply the kinetic energy, till they have lifted the most backward units of the Church of England into the potential energy of a position much higher than they now occupy.

If this energy can be supplied from any other quarter, or if it can be shown that no need exists for its application at all, then some case can be made out for the opposition which the Ritualist school meets



at the hands of those of its own household, those moderate Anglicans who do not comprehend that it is doing twofold work for them, securing their impunity and giving them converts, as well as at the hands of members of confessedly rival sections. But otherwise, it would be sounder policy to aim at such co-operation with the school in all its best work of practical reform as would deprive it of the monopoly of initiation. It cannot be driven out; the success of the efforts made these forty years past to coerce it into inaction has not been encouraging; systematic exclusion from high offices and rich endowments has simply ended in keeping its muscular system in full training, not in weakening its influence; and, as I have already said, each fresh indignation meeting, "exposure," prosecution, controversy, leaves it stronger by an appreciable number of converts, while no discernible cartel of exchange exists in favour of other schools. The question, then, which Low and Broad Churchmen have to put to themselves and answer is, "How may we best retain all the good of the High Church school in the Church of England, and diminish what we consider its evils?" It is obviously not for me to offer a reply, because I should probably claim the alleged evils as amongst the chief excellencies of the school, but I may at least point out that this is the true problem to be solved, as mere point-blank resistance has proved of no avail, and the suggestion made by the *Pall Mall Gazette* a few years ago, to enact a series of penal laws on the model now made familiar by the Falk legislation in Prussia, failed to meet acceptance with statesmen.

But I may very well point out what seem to me the chief defects of the other schools, passing over the Nondescripts as merely people who from intellectual or moral dulness are unable or unwilling to think or act definitely in any religious matter whatever.

As a general rule, the favourite orators of the Evangelical party have nothing but sugared praises for their adherents, and consequently the mass of the school is never subjected to the sharp and unsparing criticism with which the High Church organs visit the misconduct of High Churchmen. But there are two exceptions. Mr. Ryle and Canon Bernard deal more faithfully, and tell them, the one that they are too fond of splitting into cliques, and too regardless of practical reforms, sorely needed in the Church of England; the other that they keep too exclusively to certain separated fragments of Christian doctrine, which become distorted by exaggeration, and entirely omit others of equal or greater importance, which are essential to useful preaching and healthy spiritual life. I have preferred to give the opinion of two of their own leaders, first, because it proves that when I say that the three great defects of modern Evangelicalism are lack of corporate life, exhaustion of practical energy, and a sorely mutilated theology, I am obviously doing no more than translating the language of their own censors into equivalent and interchangeable

terms. If I add that the second fault is due to the working of an invariable law of dynamics, that it is impossible to get more force out of anything than is put into it, it will be plain enough that as long as the Evangelical party neglect their own work for the amusement or business, whatever they like to call it, of harrying Ritualists, that work will be left undone; precisely as if a whole savage tribe were to make a foray into a neighbouring territory, and leave no one to attend to home tillage. In the event of failing to carry back supplies from the enemy's spoils, the returning tribe would starve.

And that is exactly what the Evangelicals are suffering now. It would be unjust to say that all members of the school are committed to the policy of persecution, but it is at least certain that those who abstain from active share in it, also abstain from all protest or remonstrance publicly made. And as a broad general rule, the conduct of controversy is incompatible with a high standard of piety. In the few examples to the contrary, such as St. Athanasius and St. Francis de Sales, those eminent persons were the defenders of a menaced position, not the assailants. But it has been the misfortune of the Evangelical party to use allies and weapons which have been fatal to itself. Taking the worst view of the Ritualist movement, it is, even so, a religious effort, erroneous it may be, superstitious, retrograde, what you will, but nevertheless a striving after Christianity in some fashion. But it is impossible so to qualify the Anti-Ritualist movement as a whole. No doubt it has sincere zealots in it, but what of the Wapping rioters who for many weeks in 1859 made a hell of the Church of St. George's-in-the-East, and received for their efforts not merely solid coin from those who hired them, but impunity from the police magistrates before whom their ringleaders were vainly brought time after time, and the informal approbation of the Bishop of the diocese himself? What of a similar effort on a smaller scale about ten years later in Stoke Newington? What of the circulation of the *Confessional Unmasked*?—an act only to be paralleled by the issue of all the most unpleasant facts in medical science in a popular form to gratify prurient curiosity, or rather by the opening of those dens of infamy, now happily suppressed, the so-called Anatomical Museums? When a party uses violent rioting and gross indecency as its weapons, and actually treats them as convincing proofs in its own favour, it is in a very bad way indeed. What the Evangelicals as a school entirely fail to understand is, that there is no sort of analogy between their warfare against Ritualism and the attack of the Reformers on the Church of Rome in the sixteenth century. The success of that assault was due to the existence of grave practical scandals and oppressive regulations unredressed and unreformed by the Church, and to the competing offer of giving people something which they were denied, such as

vernacular services and an open Bible. The Reformers professed, truly or not, to maintain a much higher standard of morals and diligence than their opponents, and invited attention to their zeal for souls as contrasted with Catholic neglect. But the modern Evangelical has no such weapons available, for his rival, with a minimum of fifteen services a week, gives seven times as much of the Bible to his people as the remonstrant with only two services does, and so of all other parish work in proportion. In truth, the rule mostly acted on now is that when a new High Church incumbent takes possession of a parish, he immediately casts about to see how much *more* he can do than his predecessor did, while an Evangelical tries how much *less* he can do. And there are two or three cases in London itself so recent and notorious that I need not cite them.

Further, the Evangelical school has not only failed to produce any real theologian for many years past—I can cite only Mr. Garbett amongst its living members who can be allowed that title even by courtesy—and to buy or read the standard works of its once famous leaders, but it has fallen away remarkably from its old standards of belief. When I compare such writings as it does produce now with the works of the great Puritan divines, or even with those of men of the time and school of Thomas Scott and Richard Cecil, I observe a conspicuous declension in force, clearness, and orthodoxy, as orthodoxy was understood by the giants of the party. I am inclined to attribute this to a cause which is usually overlooked—the recent absorption of the majority of the Quaker sect into the Church. The conforming Friends naturally attached themselves to the section nearest to themselves, and that section had not vitality enough to influence the converts at all as much as the converts influenced them. The endosmose largely exceeded the exosmose. From this dates the markedly lowered views of the Sacraments and the strong tendency to Semi-Arianism which have since marked the school. This came out most noticeably in the controversy which raged at the time of the suit *Sheppard v. Bennett*. The view of the Eucharist which Mr. Bennett upheld had this in common with the opinions of Luther and Calvin, that, right or wrong, it could be held only by a Christian, and a Christian who believed that the ordinance had something supernatural about it. But the opinions freely ventilated by the Evangelical organs, and indeed advanced on their behalf in the pleadings, might be held without a solitary tittle of change by an avowed Atheist. For an Atheist would freely concede as a historical fact that the Eucharist was designed as a memorial of a common meal alleged to have been taken by Christ and the Apostles; and as a psychological fact, that it is quite possible for the associations connected with it so to work on the emotions as to form a religious stimulant to the communicants. And the popular teaching of the Evangelicals goes no further. What

it once was, may be found in hymns by Wesley, Doddridge, and Watts.

Hence I draw the conclusion that the Evangelical school is not discharging its true office in the Church of England, that of promoting subjective and personal religion, in order to correct the possible rigidity and formalism likely to be engendered in any highly organized religious system. It is now obstructive and destructive, but not constructive; and the inevitable result is that it is dwindling both in numbers and in quality with astonishing rapidity, for the elder members are dying out, the flower of the middle and junior ones are being absorbed into the Anglican and Broad schools; and the latest recruits, besides being few in number, are rarely gentlemen by birth or education. Two circumstances will serve to illustrate this change. So long as the stamp-duty on newspapers continued, it was easy to obtain tolerably correct statistics of their circulation. I find that during the ten years before the abolition of the duty the *Record* diminished steadily several hundred copies a year, and that the *Guardian* then, though not now, a moderate High Church paper, increased by almost exactly the same numbers; denoting, as it would seem, a simple transfer of subscribers. The other fact is this. There is a Clergy List (Bosworth's), which marks with an asterisk the names of members of the Church Association. I have gone straight through the first fifty names of 1872, as a fair average (comparing therewith Crockford's Directory, which gives the dates of degrees, &c.), and find this result. Two Church Associationists graduated in 1814, ten between 1823 and 1829, eleven between 1830 and 1840, twelve between 1840 and 1850, six between 1850 and 1860, six are non-graduates, while only *three* have graduated between 1860 and 1872.\* So there are actually more graduates of George IV.'s day in this specimen list than men who have been at the Universities during the last quarter of a century. This marks a very significant decline, and is even more noteworthy than the diminution of the 320,000 Anti-Ritualist petitioners of 1851 to the 60,000 of 1873. The conclusion is that the policy of the Evangelical school is acting injuriously upon itself, and upon the whole Church of which it is a part, so that it can regain credit and influence only by competing with Ritualism in open market, offering equal or superior quantity and quality of goods, and not seeking a monopoly to be secured only by wrecking the shops and reviling the characters of its rivals, or by obtaining legislative enactments against them, such as have recently been attempted. There will be always a Low Church party of one kind or another, and it can be no satisfaction to these who are convinced of that fact to see that the kind now subsisting is steadily deteriorating in all valuable qualities, any more

\* The last fifty yield nearly the same results. But there are five names since 1860. Out of these five, however, three are graduates of Dublin, and one a non-graduate, leaving only one for Oxford and Cambridge.

than an educated Irish Protestant can rejoice in the disappearance of the old French or Spanish bred Roman priest in favour of the Maynooth variety.

Nor is the present attitude of the Broad Church school much more satisfactory. As I understand the position of such a party within a Church, it should fulfil one of these three functions: It might be a Moderate party, endeavouring to unite in itself the excellences of two other contending schools, representing opposite extremes, much as the little knot of which Erasmus was the head tried at first to keep a middle course between the Roman Court and the Lutherans. Or else it might aim at the presentment of a high standard of Christian life at a time when the rival schools are fighting about questions of theological opinion, because in times of hot controversy the zealots on either side are apt to be very tolerant of moral deficiencies amongst their adherents, so long as their accentuation of the Shibboleth is correct. Or thirdly, it might endeavour to strengthen the intellectual side of religion, when either the emotional or the philanthropic aspects threatened to obscure it.

But, to my thinking, the Broad Church party does not discharge any one of these three duties at present. So far is it from constituting a mean between the extremes of High and Low Church, that each of them has far more in common with the other than with it, and the function of link is discharged by a section of the moderate Anglican school. This came out very clearly during the London Mission in February last; for while High and Low Churchmen joined freely in the movement, and worked it in their several fashions, the Broad Church Clergy, almost to a man, not merely held aloof from it, but denounced it freely. I know, of course, the nature of the objections, plausible enough in themselves, which many of them entertained against the whole scheme, as being unhealthy and spasmodic, but I cannot discuss that question now. I must content myself with insisting on the one point which their conduct proves, that they are not the middle party in the Church; but constitute an extreme of their own, the shortest side of a scalene triangle, not the diameter of a square.

Nor have they done more for practical religion. As I have taken the indictment of the Evangelicals from their own trusted chiefs, so I will do in this case also. In the number of this REVIEW for March, 1868, there is a paper by Professor Plumptre on "Church Parties." In this he alleges (1) that the Broad Church school has done no great work, founded no useful institutions, helped forward no large scheme of benevolence or devotion. (2) It has entirely failed to reach the ignorant and poor. (3) Its contributions to devotional literature have been very scanty. (4) It fails to take account of sin, and is a physician for the whole, not for the sick. (5) It is negative, iconoclastic, and confounds freedom with licence. (6) Its members

are narrow, intolerant, and unable to recognize the merits of men of other schools. That is a tolerably comprehensive schedule, and I beg to remark that it is from a Broad Church pen.

If, then, the Broad Church party is neither a conciliating nor a working element in the Church, what are its claims as an intellectual school of religion? how far has it helped to adjust the relations of faith and science? what has it done for Christian philosophy?

Here, if anywhere, it must make its stand, and justify its position; and here, if anywhere, those of its lay advocates who have not looked very closely into its condition, believe its strength to lie.

It is necessary at the outset of this inquiry to guard against a piece of sleight-of-hand used in behalf of the school, exactly analogous to a conjuror forcing a card. I mean the plan of crediting it with the names of distinguished men, whose sole agreement with its system consists in denying what it denies, but who also deny what it asserts. By this stratagem the idea is given currency that the Broad Church party, though admittedly small in numbers, contains an overwhelming proportion of learned and able men, far outnumbering, not in mere ratio, but in actual sum, the total aggregate of gifted members of all other schools. This is a complete delusion, for the late John Stuart Mill, Professors Tyndall and Huxley, Sir Charles Lyell, Mr. A. R. Wallace, Mr. Herbert Spencer, Mr. Greg, and a host of similar writers and thinkers of the day, whatever their several theological stand-points may be, belong to no *Church* party whatever, and some of them cannot be even classed amongst Theists, not to say Christians, however unattached. The truth is that the fighting strength of the advanced Broad Church school now consists of about fifteen persons, of whom only Bishop Thirlwall, Dean Stanley, Professor Jowett, Mr. Llewellyn Davies, and Canon Kingsley are of prominent mark; while the ten others are of the calibre of Professor Plumptre, Dr. Farrar, and Mr. Stopford Brooke, respectable staff-officers, but not equal to the command of a regiment, to say nothing of a division, much less an army. And even of these fifteen the only one who can lay claim to lucidity of thought and strictness of method is the aged Bishop of St. David's, although even he is not a scientific theologian. Theology, like every other department of human study, grows clearer with advancing knowledge. Some things, no doubt, may be rejected which were once admitted, but those which are retained become more definite and concrete. But the Broad Church school has enveloped its credenda in a misty haze, and has occasionally, at least, lent its support to persons who are clearly outside all Church categories whatever. Mr. Leslie Stephen, in his lately published "*Essays on Freethinking and Plainspeaking*," discusses this question, and although his personal sympathies are strongly enlisted on the Broad Church side—it is the only one he has a good word for—comes to the conclusion that the leaders of the party are playing fast and loose

with truth, deceiving themselves where they are not trying to deceive others, and destroying the reputation for candour and courage which first won them hearers and disciples. Nay, he makes the following very pregnant remark: "*If it were one's ultimate object to destroy the Church of England, one would not need object to the methods pursued by the Broad Church party.*" Once more, I beg to draw attention to the fact that I am citing the language of one who was himself formerly a member of that party, and has since gone where he thought its premises fairly led. Where that is, another writer may tell us. David Frederick Strauss, in his latest work, "*Der Alte Glaube und der Neue*," after postulating first what is in truth the Broad Church position, asks as its result, "Are we still Christians?" and answers, "No." He then asks, "Have we still a Religion?" and again the answer (unless the whole group of ideas historically connoted by the word be abandoned) is "No." I have one thing more to urge in this connection. It is that I feel strong personal sympathy with much of the revolt against popular Christianity noticeable in those writings of Mr. Dunbar Heath's which led to his deprivation, in Mr. Greg's "*Creed of Christendom*," in Mr. Voysey's "*Sling and Stone*," and in Mr. Stopford Brooke's sermons on "*Freedom in the Church of England*," wherein he very reasonably protested against many of Lord Hatherley's *obiter dicta* in the Voysey case. But in each and all these cases the monstrous dogmas concerning Atonement, Justification, and Future Punishment, against which they lift their voices, are no part whatever of the Catholic Faith. They are Lutheran and Calvinist heresies, and when they chance to be discoverable (as seldom happens) in more ancient theologians, they yet are not articles of belief, but matters of private opinion, like a sweet thing I found in the Jesuit Lorinus while I was busy with my "*Commentary on the Psalms*." He was incidentally discussing the question as to whether the places in which Lazarus and Dives are depicted were Heaven and Hell, or only intermediate stations. And he concludes for the second view, because the sight of Dives' tortures is not expressly mentioned as an element in the bliss of Lazarus, whereas the vision of the perpetual agony of the lost is to be one of the chief delights of glorified saints in Heaven. Ugh! But I deny entirely that the war against Calvinism and Lutheranism has been effectively carried on, in England at least, by modern Broad Churchmen. They have denied, but they have not affirmed, and their half-truths have seemed faint and weak beside the clear outline and strong colouring of the impugned beliefs. The two creeds have rotted and fallen by their own inherent viciousness, and not because of the vigour with which they have been assaulted. I have no doubt whatever that the Broad Church party has served many times as a city of refuge for men who fled out of the horrors of the one heresy and the immorality of the other, because they were thankful to find that

they might abandon all they so abhorred without ceasing to call themselves Christians, but I see no evidence of actual rescue. It is surely some wider influence that has left Mr. Spurgeon the solitary champion of the expiring superstition of Calvin, like a Libanius uttering his vain apology for the fallen gods of Greece and Rome. The Broad Church party, therefore, cannot claim to have rendered intellectual service to the cause of religion in England, for it has not produced any theological works of mark; its mode of conciliating unbelief has been exactly that of the English negotiators of the Treaty of Washington, namely, giving up all the points in dispute, and paying heavily for the honour of doing so; and instead of bringing zealous recruits in crowds to the ministry of the Church (as Simeonites and Tractarians respectively did in their several heydays), it has secularized the tone of thought at Universities, and reared a class of men who are so far from taking Holy Orders, that they do not even carry the old Pagan honour into secular life, but with cynical frankness acknowledge their materialist aims and their sincere Mammon-worship. If the claims put forward on behalf of Broad Churchmen were well founded, they should have originated the Woodard Schools, the diocesan theological colleges, the organized women's work, the congresses and synods of the day; it should have been from one of them that the Bampton Lectures of 1866 proceeded; St. David's ought to be the model diocese of England for zeal and efficiency; and Westminster Abbey the brightest light in the firmament of England's Church. Does not this bare recital, on the contrary, sound like the bitterest irony?


What, then, is needful for the Broad Church party? First, and above all, to take Samuel Johnson's advice, "Clear your mind of cant." No school is so lost in mere talk, and unmeaning talk, to the prejudice of action. Next, to study theology, instead of practically arguing, as Dr. Arnold did in all seriousness, that the main qualification for pronouncing authoritative decisions in theology, is to know nothing whatever about it. Thirdly, to face, once for all, the alternative put before them by Strauss,—Historical Christianity or the Worship of the Cosmos,—and to make their choice. No other Christianity is more than mere windy verbiage. Fourthly, to work. I doubt they feel on this last head like the Parisian beggar on whom Marivaux bestowed alms, but the prescription is imperative, and they must submit to the labour-test before obtaining relief. Whenever any Broad Churchmen follow this regimen, they are almost at once absorbed into the High Church ranks, and not infrequently advance to a foremost position. We want a body of men who will keep the human side of Christianity prominent, but this can only be done by those who believe passionately in the Divine side, and they are not to be found just now in the Latitudinarian camp. Lastly, Broad Churchmen need to dissociate themselves from a body of dis-



reputable camp-followers, who damage their character. A clergyman now-a-days who is simply godless and lax, if not actually dissolute, who would have been simply regarded twenty years ago as a black sheep, finds now that by learning to repeat a few words of Broad Church phrasology, especially in depreciation of dogma, he can make good his standing, and be accepted as an exponent of liberal ideas in religion, without being obliged to regulate his personal conduct by even the laxest standard exacted by the other schools. And the more respectable members of the party, conscious of their own numerical weakness, as well as of their haziness on questions of faith and morals, have not courage enough to disown him. And yet till such excommunication is put in force, the whole section must needs suffer in general esteem.

Such is my estimate of the relative attitude of Church parties at the present time. It is necessarily imperfect and *ex parte*, but if it be supplemented, as I hope, by counter-statements, it may assist in the formation of a sound judgment on the entire question.

RICHARD F. LITTLEDALE.



## THE PERSONALITY OF GOD.

*"Esse Dei per ipsam suam puritatem est esse distinctum ab omni esse." S. Thomas Aquinas.—De Esse et Essentia, 117.*

THE position of Agnostics as represented by Mr. H. Spencer is a very peculiar one. A great deal, it appears, is known about the Unknowable. First, it is known that it exists. Secondly, that it is something mysterious and venerable, and accordingly it is printed in capital letters, as Mr. Huxley conjectures, to inspire fear, "like grenadiers' caps." Thirdly, it is known that it is so far beyond our faculties, as to render it hopeless even to form a conjecture what it is like. Yet, fourthly, it is known to be so far unlike what we do know, as to be in direct contradiction to a portion of our knowledge. It is especially supposed to be in contradiction to the idea of personality. That this is the case is not only the doctrine of Mr. Spencer, but also of defenders of Christianity such as Dr. Mansel, the late dean of St. Paul's. "There is a contradiction," he says, "in conceiving the Absolute as personal." Such also is Mr. Herbert Spencer's conclusion. His position seems to be as follows:—"The consciousness," he says, "of an Immutable Power manifested to us through all phenomena has been growing ever clearer, and must eventually be freed from its imperfections. The certainty that, on the one hand, such a power exists, while, on the other hand, its nature transcends intuition, and is beyond imagination, is the certainty towards which intelligence has from the first been progressing." ("First Principles," p. 42.) Further on, he uses this Immutable Power as synonymous with the Ultimate Cause and the Absolute. He then allows that Dr. Mansel is right so far as he thinks there is a contradiction between the notion

of the Absolute and Personality, or Intelligence and Will (p. 109). It is this proposition which I intend to oppose in this paper. I accept the view that an Immutable Power, the Absolute, exists, and I maintain that there is no reason that it should not be a Personal Being.

I begin by allowing that this Personality of the Absolute is a truth which has only gradually entered into the scientific idea of God. A broad distinction should be made between the popular and the scientific idea; they proceeded in inverse ratio. Of course, in Polytheism there is no want, but an overplus of Personality; and in what I take leave to call the truth, I Am that I Am, there is no lack of the same element. It was different, however, with Hellenic thought. The first difficulty was to find the Absolute itself, that is, to heave the Being of God entirely out of the Universe of things, and to disentangle it from matter. Towards this all thinkers had been dimly struggling, but it does not seem as if the conception of a veritable Absolute, that is, of a being without any necessary relation to any other being, had entered into older thought, till Aristotle invented what was its equivalent, *Actus Purus*, pure actuality, as an expression for God. We must place ourselves in the very heart of Hellenic thought before we can enter into the expression. What first struck the Greeks was that perpetual change was a law of the Universe. That Thought was the only permanent thing had long been perceived, but it was a bold conception which led Aristotle to see in Thought the actual cause of all change, and yet to preserve it from being swamped and swallowed up in change. This he did by a complete separation of Potentiality (*dύναμις*) from actual existence. He laid down the principle that all motion must come from a mover external to the moved. By movement he meant all variation of any kind, all succession, all changes, mental and material. Nothing can change itself by itself; even the things which are partly potential and partly in act, and therefore seem to change themselves by their own solitary power, require something else to determine that which is in act to effect a change, else why should it not have moved before. This is plainly but a variety of the modern expression that that which begins to be must have a cause, that it must proceed from something previously existing. In Aristotle's view, that which is potential is non-existent, in as far as it is potential, and therefore nothing actual could ever have come into being, unless there had existed a wholly actual or Absolute Being, a Being who is all act. From this plainly results His Unity and Immutability, for there can be but one Absolute, and He is whatever He is all at once. At first sight, a more complete contrast to modern opinions can hardly be imagined. What we call potential is only the actual in disguise. It is energy stored up. Yet Aristotle's theory was one of development. According to him, the ordinary forces of Nature are competent to produce all forces, even to the souls of animals. Even generation is for him a development;

and creative power steps in only where the animal soul is replaced by the thinking spirit of man. Matter was in his view eternal; even the universe had no beginning. In one sense, he would not deny that there could be an infinite series of changes. But what he did assert with all his might was that an eternal set of changes requires an eternal mover, so that side by side, so to speak, with this endless change, this false Infinite, there must have been a true Infinite and Absolute, in whom was no change, an Eternal Act without beginning, giving shape and form to all this formless chaos.

What concerns us most, however, is the question whether, according to Aristotle, this Absolute was a Person? I do not think this can be proved. It is true, indeed, that sometimes, by what I should call a happy inconsistency, the popular God intrudes into the scientific, and Aristotle attributes a careful Providence to his Absolute Being, but this is not a part of his philosophical demonstration. What, after all, is this pure Act, but Thought? How can we conceive the self-contained and the Absolute except as very Thought? Thus the pure energy, the active power of Aristotle is a Being engaged in *θεωρία*, everlasting self-contemplation. It is the assertion of the identity of Being and Thought where the subject and the object are the same. If he is the prime mover, and communicates movement to the highest heavens, it is not by material impulse, but because he is the *τὸ Ἐρώμενον*, the object of all desire. But can God Himself love? Is not emotion inconsistent with this immovable Mover of all things? Himself the End of all things, can anything else be an end to Him? I do not think that Aristotle ever asked himself the question. He had already passed over more bottomless abysses than this. He had never asked himself how his ultimate matter (*materia prima*) could have any existence at all, when it had no attributes whatsoever; how, though nothing could be predicated of it whatsoever, yet it was not nothing. He had so little risen above the level of the symbolical as to imagine that the *form* was "educed out of the potentiality of the matter," though that formless matter had no energy whatever. All this presented to him no difficulty; it was not wonderful therefore that the question seems never to have struck him whether this Absolute could have a will, and so be a Personal Being. To us this seems strange, but it is not more strange than the fact that he does not seem to have clearly caught the idea of a Personal Being at all. Two things have always appeared to me singular in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. I doubt whether he ever had a clear idea of the freedom of the Will, or of human personality. Freedom to a Greek would have a purely political, not a moral meaning. The individual, according to Aristotle, has *προαίρεσις*, an intellectual power of choosing an end, yet I should conjecture that he never inquired perfectly into the ultimate springs of choice. Secondly, in all his system of morals God is never named, except incidentally. The notion that the Absolute could have any-

thing whatsoever to do with human actions apparently never entered into his head.

Such was the point of development that was reached by Aristotle, and I have no hesitation in allowing that, wonderful as was the step science had gained in establishing the existence of the Absolute, another step was required before it completely overcame its Pantheistic stage. God had been connected with the universe by the idea of Cause, and rescued out of and raised above it by being described as Absolute Reason. Yet I do not claim as yet for this Absolute Thought any exercise of Will. The laws of thought are necessary, and this thinking Being, lost in the contemplation of Himself, runs the risk of becoming an indifferent spectator of the state of the world, which has thus slipped into existence from his conscious intellect. This I have no difficulty in allowing; what I deny is the assertion of those who would bar all further progress, by declaring any addition of will to thought to be a contradiction in terms. Mr. Spencer has even asserted, as an historical fact, that all progress in the scientific idea of the Absolute has lain in the direction of destroying what he calls its anthropomorphic elements, and ridding it of personality. He has even ventured on prophecy, and proclaims the fated and inevitable approach of a millennium in which the Absolute will have become the Unknowable. I, however, deny the fact, and disbelieve in the iron fatalism of thought. He will not, of course, accept the Christian centuries as an authority, yet he cannot deny the fact that the mediæval Aristotelians who corrected the great Hellenic thinker, not by rejecting his Absolute, but by adding on to the active forces the freedom of the Will, form a considerable gap in the continuity of what he calls a fatal progress. The God, even the scientific God of the Christian, is more anthropomorphous than the God of Aristotle. Mr. Spencer probably passes over with contempt the Christian system, as a retrogression of the great, irresistible wave of science. Yet he cannot deny that what he calls anthropomorphic conceptions of God have threatened to flow back upon us from unexpected quarters, for the Absolute Ego of Fichte contains more anthropomorphic element than the Aristotelian God, even though it falls far short of the Christian. I do not claim for the German school the merit of shaking themselves free of Pantheism, yet, at all events, the very notion of the Absolute Ego shows that the tide of science refuses to flow in the narrow channels dug for it by the partisans of the Unknowable. Progress does not consist in the negation of what we have gained, but in proceeding to higher truths.

I now go on to show what I have affirmed, that there is nothing in the notion of an Absolute Being inconsistent with the idea of Cause; and here I cannot do better than quote the words of Mr. Mill, who treats this very question in his answer to Dean Mansel. He first cites from that writer an important definition, on which

is founded the supposed inconsistency :—" ' By the Absolute is meant that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other Being.' These latter words," proceeds Mr. Mill, " admit of two constructions. The words in their natural sense only mean capable of existing out of relation to anything else. The argument requires that they should mean incapable of existing in relation with any thing else. Dr. Mansel cannot intend the latter. He cannot mean that the Absolute is incapable of entering into relation with any other being, for he would not affirm this of God. This, however, is the meaning necessary to support his case. For what is his first argument ? That God cannot be known by us as Cause, as Absolute, and as Infinite, because these attributes are, to our conception, incompatible with one another. And why incompatible ? Because a ' Cause cannot, as such, be absolute ; the Absolute, as such, cannot be a Cause. The cause, as such, exists only in relation to its effect ; the cause is a cause of the effect, the effect is an effect of the cause. On the other hand, the conception of the Absolute involves a possible existence out of all relation.' But in what manner is a possible existence out of all relation incompatible with the notion of a Cause. Have not all causes a possible existence apart from their effects ? Would the sun (for example) not exist, if there were no earth or planets for it to illuminate ?" I have inserted this quotation, notwithstanding its length, because if any man on earth was a judge of ideas logically inconsistent with each other, it was Mr. Mill, and he can see no incompatibility between the conception of the Absolute Being and that of cause. In reality, what is denied of the Absolute Being is not relation altogether, but only necessary relation, and what is incompatible with this Being is any compulsion, either within or without Him constraining Him to become a Cause. What our adversaries have proved is not the inconsistency of Absolute and Cause, but the compatibility of Absolute and Free-will. I do not mean to stretch this argument too far. It does not prove that the Absolute being is a Cause ; this cannot be proved by any argument derived from the necessity of things, though it can be inferred in many ways ; but it does demolish the argument which attempts to show it to be impossible for the Absolute to be the Cause of anything, for it leaves it open to Him to be a Personal Cause, that is to create by an act of volition. What is inconsistent with the Idea of the Absolute is any being by His side which is not utterly dependent upon Him. Strange that men should ever have thought perfect independence inconsistent with the idea of the Absolute. The very contrary is true ; a part of the idea is absolute freedom. Eternal, self-determining activity, pure act, without an atom of potentiality, energy not stored up, but ever actual, such is the conception at once of the Absolute and of Freedom.

A parallel argument may be drawn from what has been used as a

plea for Pantheism. It has been argued that the Attribute of Infinity is inconsistent with any other real existence by the side of the Infinite. This is one of the many instances in which the materialism of Pantheism betrays itself. Existence is here treated in the same way as food by the advocates of natural selection, as though there was a quantity of it all so swallowed up by the Infinite that outside of Him there could be no more. What is proved is that no being can be outside of or independent of the Infinite, that He is immanent in all things, protecting them by His existence, calling them into being, and keeping them in His hand. But this is not Pantheism, it was not a Pantheist who said that "in Him we live and move and have our being." Again, it has been urged against human freedom that it is incompatible with the Absolute and Infinite God. It is incompatible, no doubt, with the existence of another independent and Absolute source of action, but who ever supposed human personality to be free in the sense of independent of God? This would be to ignore its whole nature. It would plainly be inconsistent with the idea of the Infinite that a being should exist beside God without any bounds, wholly free, but such is not the liberty which we claim for the will of man.

It will be necessary for me to dwell upon this, because I think that the confusion between an absolute and a relative freedom has been productive of important consequences in this controversy. On the one hand, Fichte has confounded together the Absolute and the relative Ego, on the other, the defenders of Human Free-will have been attacked as though they held that each act of will was an act of creation and a causeless commencement. I must confess that Human Free-will has at times been defended in a way which lent a pretext to this objection. It has been argued sometimes that motives are not causes, sometimes that men can act without any motive at all. The fact is that the freedom of the human will consists, not in acting independently of motives, but in choosing one of two or more motives. How this is an act of creation or an instance of a causeless act I cannot conceive. If the volition produced an act without any motive at all, this would be an instance of a commencement without cause, but even then it would not be an act of creation. No doubt it is a bringing into being an entity which a moment before did not exist; but this is not creation, nor is it peculiar to the will. All living things, and above all, spiritual things, have the power of self-determination. There is spontaneity about all living organisms, yet no one would argue that their actions are uncaused. Again, there is a true spontaneity about the intellect; it produces its own thought, yet no one could call this an instance of creative power. A thinker who makes a discovery in experimental science, or a metaphysician who elaborates a system, brings into being an idea which a moment before was non-existent, yet no one calls him a creator because the

raised it out of the depths of his consciousness. If an act of volition, then, is causeless, it cannot be because it is self-determining, but because it is free. I think that if we contrast the spontaneity of nature with the liberty of the will, we shall be able to detect the meaning and the proof of the freedom of the will. Even in natural objects I believe that there are active powers; their capacities for being acted upon are not simply passive, else the effect would be a mere repetition of the cause. Latent powers are evoked by the forces of nature which come into being by contact with the cause. Indeed, there is more, at least phenomenally, in the effect than in the cause, just as the flash of the lightning and the roar of the thunder are other than the clouds which produced them. Why, then, do we not ascribe freedom or consciousness to the electricity of the atmosphere? The reason is because the phenomena are so tied to the chariot-wheels of the substance, that they cannot but follow, and no choice is left. The whole force of the substance goes into the phenomena, because it has no power of reflection, and therefore no reserve force to fall back upon. In other words, natural force has no self-consciousness even when it has spontaneity. It is otherwise with man; he not only has a habit, but he knows that he has it. Spirit, therefore, instead of exhausting itself in the production of effects, can turn back upon itself, pause to consult itself, and judge the motives which solicit it. I hold that will is nothing but thought, with a reference to outward action superadded. Of course I know that the will often acts against the reason, according to the saying, "*Video meliora, proboque Deteriora sequor*," therefore the moment comes when reason and will part company. But up to that moment the man is free, so that the *onus probandi* lies with those who assert that this predominant desire overwhelms the reason so as to convert a being up to that time free into one bound by necessity. For this I have never heard anything alleged but an unproved assertion, that in the presence of a dominant pleasure a man must follow it, because the motive on which we act must be the strongest motive.\* Free-will, then, is a consequence of free thought. It is true that there is no volition in mathematics, but there is free-will in morals, for ethical syllogisms are not in necessary matter. There is always something to be said on the other side in favour of vice and against virtue, from the point of view of pleasure. On the other hand, as long as the judgment subsists, with all its categories, the mind can negate what the lower desire affirms. Will is free because thought is free, that is, thought can have before it opposite motives on the same subject-matter, neither of which has constraining reasons for it, therefore the force of the spirit can give the casting-vote. It can throw itself into the scale, and cause the motive of submission to the universal reason to outweigh the particular, and it is in this, Hegel

\* *Spectator* for Saturday May 9.



tells us, right-doing consists. The question for us to decide now is, **What is this universal reason?** I do not believe that it is the State, nor that conscience of the community which Hegel calls *Sittlichkeit*. I hold this universal reason to be a personal God.

While, however, I claim for the intellect a freedom which is real, I contend that this freedom is not absolute. The Ego knows itself to be a being with a cause, because it had a beginning; it is conscious of dependence on the Absolute, of whom its whole being is a free gift, from whom its own freedom is rather a concession than a possession. For we must remember that our free actions are the exception. In the immense majority of our actions we belong to the kingdom of nature. Slaves of the laws of generation in our birth, we are slaves of corruption in our death. Of our vital actions one class alone are free. I mean such as involve morality. Even here, however, simultaneously with our new-born feeling of freedom, there comes on us as a part of it a feeling of another slavery in the shape of obligation and duty. There is, therefore, a very real distinction between the Freedom of the Absolute and our relative freedom. The argument, then, drawn from the Absolute and the Infinite against human freedom proves indeed that we should not be free unless He willed it. In other words, it proves His freedom, since we should not be free unless by a distinct act of His unfettered Will.

We have here reached the very heart of the question on which we are engaged. If once it were made out that personality, that is, intellect combined with a will, is not incompatible with Absolute Being, I believe that mankind would be with me in attributing the remarkable phenomena of man's moral being to a personal God. I must confess that I have never seen the imperative obligation of the moral law satisfactorily accounted for except on this view. For this I now proceed to offer proof. I do not claim for the arguments which I am about to adduce that they amount to a strict demonstration. I prefer to put them into a hypothetical shape, and to affirm that granting that there be a moral law, granting that there are certain actions to which there is immutably and necessarily attached the notion of intrinsic badness and goodness, then it follows that they derive this quality from conformity or repugnance to the nature of a personal being. I bow before the supremacy of conscience, but I still ask myself what right has one part of my being to lord it over the rest. When I hear this voice within me, and I ask myself who spoke, if no better answer can be returned than I myself, even though it be my highest self, I am still dissatisfied with the enormous disproportion between the authoritativeness of the tone and the littleness of the speaker. Like the child in Scripture, when this voice calls to me out of the darkness, I feel inclined to exclaim, "Who art Thou, Lord?" Nor can I consider the moral law simply as supreme truth. The account of it is not even exhausted by saying what is true, that

moral sense is a kind of intellectual intuition. That evil is something more than a violation of the feeling of harmony, something more than unreasonable action, is proved by the poignancy of the pain which the consciousness of evil-doing inflicts, a pain utterly different from that caused by a false note in music to the most sensitive musician, or a paralogism in reasoning to the sternest of logicians. Nor can I agree with one whose opinion I respect exceedingly, that the whole account is "that every ethical decision is\* in truth a preference, an election of one act as higher than another." Good and bad are not related as high and low. Moral judgments are not all relative, and when I praise a good action, as such, I have in my mind, not "what might have been done," but what must never be done, and what is unlawful throughout all time and all space. With a member of this Society, who has written one of the most suggestive of books, from the thoroughness with which he probes questions to the bottom, though I seldom agree with his solution of them, I "desiderate in moral treatises a dissertation on the *criterion* of actions," by which I mean "that feature which makes the act right," not "that which makes us suppose it right," the *causa existendi* of good actions, not the *causa cognoscendi*, what Aristotle calls the "final cause" of good. Even if definite morality were denied, if it were denied that actions in themselves are good or bad as distinguished from the actor, yet it would still be possible to ask what quality in the actor's word, thought, or deed relegated his act into the category of bad, what made the enormous difference between the side of the Devil and the side of God. It is my conviction that the common-sense of mankind would hold that "whenever reason ratifies to me the intrinsic turpitude of this or that act, it further ratifies the prohibition of that act by some supreme legislation." Common-sense, however, is not enough for science, and I now proceed to inquire how it can be made out scientifically that the phenomena of the moral law indicate an Absolute Intellect and a Personal Will. "There are two things," says Bentham, "which are very apt to be confounded, but which it imports us carefully to distinguish, the motive or cause, which by operating on the mind of an individual is productive of any act, and the ground or reason which animates a legislator in regarding that act with an eye of approbation." It is the ground of the goodness or badness of actions which I am here considering, and I observe that even those who believe that the term "moral" is a simple ultimate idea, incapable of analysis, still ask the question, what is the ground or foundation of morality, just as Kant inquires "how synthetic *a priori* propositions," such as those concerned with morals, "are possible."

\* *Essays, Theological and Philosophical*, by James Martineau. Second Series, p. 14. I am happy to say that I have reason to think there is less difference between myself and this distinguished writer than I at first supposed.

I begin, then, by saying I do not think that any school of thought denies that moral law, the prescribing or the prohibition of certain definite actions, is an intellectual act, or the act of a conscious intellect with a purpose in view. Difficulties have been raised as to the apparent instances of design in the rational universe. Some thinkers have held that organic nature shows traces of a formative power instinctively executing an unconscious design, as a bee executes its hexagonal cells without knowing that that figure is the least wasteful of material. In the case of the moral law, however, no such difficulty can be urged. Even to the necessarian the moral world is a realm of ends consciously chosen by an intelligent being. To a utilitarian the virtuous man is he who constantly acts with the notion in view of the happiness of the greatest number. As for the school of Kant, there is no inference necessary to make out that a moral being, whether a legislator or a subject, is *ipso facto* a rational being. "The Categorical (*i.e.*, absolute or unconditional) imperative is not one which commands mediately or by the representation of any ulterior end whitherward the action might point, but is one which by the bare representation of the act cogitates it as immediately incumbent, and makes it objectively necessary" (p. 170). Every word in this sentence implies a conscious intellect. Again, "The idea, Freedom is the product of the Pure Reason" (p. 69), by which man "is raised into a cogitable, super-sensible world, and breaks the bonds of caprice and imagination." I do not fear, therefore, to assume that to be capable of morality, a being must be intelligent. If he be a legislator, he must be rational in order to enact the law; if he be a subject, he must apprehend it in order to come under its operation. A Kantian would add, he must be a legislator, and re-enact it within himself, to be its subject.

The moral law, then, is the act of an intellect. Whose intellect? Here, I fear, I must beg leave to differ from my German friends. According to Kant, it would seem that not only every moral being is intelligent, but every rational being is capable of being a standard of duty to every other. This famous Categorical imperative presents us with the idea of every intelligent being as universally legislative (p. 45). There is, however, an imperfection in the human conscience which disqualifies it at once from being the standard of morals for all possible beings, or from being the ultimate ground of the moral law. It labours under this great defect, that we are forced to consider it as practically infallible, when all the while we know that it may be mistaken. Such a conscience can plainly possess only a relative value. One intellect, and one alone, can be the ground of morals; that is one which is necessarily all that it is,—in other words, the Absolute. Either, then, the moral law is groundless and indefensible, or its ground is the Absolute. Either the human conscience is an arrant impostor, a claimant on a monstrous scale, or it is a shadow of the Absolute.

I believe that this reasoning would be convincing for all of us, if it were not for a phantom which stands in our path to frighten us. I mean the Impersonal Reason. That the Absolute is Thought, I believe will not be denied. Science has never gone back from Aristotle's discovery that the Absolute is Thought. The only being which is self-contained, perfect in itself, and wanting no relation outside itself, in a word, the Absolute, is plainly Thought. The last word of German philosophy thus coincides with the last word of Greek. "We have then," says Hegel's English interpreter, "the Universe composed of thought and its other, Thought meaning all the notions which we find implied in the structure of the world ; for God is a Spirit and thinks, and the form of His thinking must be contained in His work. Nay, as God is a Spirit and thinks, His work can only be thought ; as God is a Spirit and thinks, the form of His thinking can only be that which is. In rigorous accuracy only God is." I fear, then, but little contradiction when I say that the Absolute is Reason, and that the Moral Law is the Thought of the Absolute.

This is not denied, nay, it is affirmed by Hegel, but it is affirmed in a way which is useless to my purpose, for as I have already implied, to a Hegelian, Thought is impersonal, in other words, thought does not imply a thinker. I have too much intellectual respect for Hegel to pass this over in silence, though it would be absurd to affect to think it possible to refute him in the space at my command. As far, then, as my subject is concerned, I need only point out what I consider the fundamental mistake of the system. His arguments do not apply to the Absolute at all, but to the abstract idea of Being in general. Of this *Sein* or Being, it is perfectly true to say that it is nothing. This has been sneered at as nonsense, but it is a mere fact that that which is perfectly undetermined is nothing in particular, and therefore nothing. Of it, nothing can be predicted as known ; it is pure abstraction, it has no attributes. But this is not the Absolute, for by the Absolute is designated that which has no necessary relations outside itself, for the very opposite reason, because it is perfect in itself, that is, it has, or rather is, the very plenitude of being. It is almost incredible that a man like Hegel should have fallen into so great a blunder. Did he not see that he was compelled to hypostatize Reason, whilst he insisted on its impersonality ? With him the Notion and the Idea are spoken of as if they had an independent life, a movement, a self-evolution of their own, previous to having found a thinker to think them, for spirit comes later into the field. It must come at last, and so, to our astonishment, we learn that the Notion, the bare naked thought, "traverses a number of development-steps before it manifests itself as spirit." Thus thought, instead of being evoked by the spirit, on the contrary, evokes the spirit. How far we are here from the active forces of Aristotle ! The Absolute becomes ! The necessary Being progresses ! And what a progress !

The notion of Being *an Sich*, in itself, that is, in other words, thought without a thinker, is gradually transformed into Being *an und für Sich*, that is, it becomes personal!

I do not think, then, the view of an Impersonal Reason tenable. I shall not be quitting my subject, but, on the contrary, completing it, if I point out the source of this strange mistake. It was due to what I cannot but consider a very false principle, which arose through German philosophy, the separation between the intellect and the will. It had been begun in Kant. The possibility of truth being real to the Practical Reason, and unreal to the Pure Reason is an instance of what I mean. The being of man is very complicated, his actions involve thought, and his thoughts are actions. If I might venture to point out the original mistake of so great a thinker as Kant, I should say that he diverged from the truth, and took a fatally wrong turning, when he laid down that the Ego in a proposition such as "I think" does not indicate a reality, but is only the expression of the logical necessity for reducing our thoughts to unity. My belief is that it indicates a great reality, the truth that human thought is the active operation of a thinker. If for "I think" we substitute "I doubt," it seems to me that the free activity of the thinking spirit appears. Of course I do not mean that we have the power of doubting whatever we choose, for I have already stated that human freedom is limited or relative. There is such a thing as necessary truth; and short of this, oftentimes the intellect comes down upon the will with such overwhelming evidence, that it is overpowered, and cannot but believe. It is easy to mistake the intellect, as Hegel did, for some all but physical outward force which compels assent. But in cases of legitimate doubt, the will announces its freedom, and its action becomes at once visible. It suspends the judgment, it throws its weight into the scale and closes with a side. At this moment I do not inquire whether it is right or wrong, I only state the fact. Again in proving a logical dilemma the intellect often takes lower ground than it might for the purpose of persuading, and this it does at the bidding of the will. It seems, then, that the Ego in propositions is not simply a logical or grammatical expression for the unity of thought, but implies personality. Kant answers himself at the expense of consistency in his *Metaphysic of Ethics*. He there lays down that all Intelligent Beings possess freedom. From this view it would directly follow that this Absolute Intellect is also an Absolute Will. To me I must confess the contrary is inconceivable. Intellect and Will are so intertwined, both subsisting in consciousness, that they are inseparable. We thirst for knowledge, and falsehood is intolerable to us, because we both see the truth and love the truth. This love for truth impels and guides the physical investigator in his experiments as well as the metaphysician. Again, it is inconceivable that a Being should see

moral goodness perfectly, and not at the same time love it. A being who should look with a cold, purely intellectual gaze at moral evil, in whom vice created no indignation and virtue no delight, would be not the Absolute, but something very different. I believe, then, that intellect in the Absolute implies will as well as intellect, that is, personality.

I trust that I am now in a condition to answer two objections, in responding to which I hope to be able to throw light upon this great question. The first I will state in the form of a quotation from Bentham, cited by Mr. Hodgson:—"Bentham, I think it was, who recently remarked that if the Will of God was the criterion of right and wrong, we should still need a criterion of the Will of God." It appears from the context that the criterion here means the way in which we know right from wrong. I shall, however, take it in a sense in which I have before used it, as the formal cause of right, as that which constitutes right. Now on this I observe, if by this it were meant that the ultimate idea of wrong is that which is prohibited by God, it is difficult to avoid reasoning in a circle. A man lives and enjoys life in peace. Suddenly there comes before him some object of desire to which he feels a strong attraction. Simultaneously there arises within his mind a feeling which bids him pause, and threatens him with a sharp pain called remorse if he yields. If, furthermore, he asks, Why should I not do this thing? the answer, Because it is prohibited by God, will hardly satisfy him, for, he may still ask, Why should what is prohibited by God be wrong? If it be said that God is our Creator, and therefore Supreme, this is hardly satisfactory. If our Creator were an Omnipotent demon, I hardly think we should be bound to obey him. To Creator you must add All-holy, before you can realise the necessary obligation of conforming your actions to His. The ultimate reason, then, is that He is Holy, and the question arises, Why is He necessarily Holy? Why may not our Creator be a Demiurge or an Ahriman? I answer, because our Creator is the Absolute, that is, a Being who cannot but be all that He is, whose acts are not alternations of activity and repose like ours, but identical with His essence, so that His action is everlasting repose. It follows from this that in Him Will and Intellect are not separate faculties from His essence, but are the Essence itself. Finite beings can sin because their will is separate from, and can oppose their reason. In God, on the contrary, they culminate in a higher unity, and thus God's will is necessarily conformed to the highest reason,—that is, to His own reason.\* I cannot help thinking that this is the ultimate notion of right, conformity to the nature of God. We are thus, says Dr. Mansel with a happy inconsistency, impelled by the consciousness of moral obligation, to assume the existence of a moral Deity, and to regard the absolute standard of right and wrong as constituted by the nature of that Deity.

Strange that the same author who has spoken so well of the identity of the moral law with the nature of the Deity should have gone on to say that human goodness is different, not only in degree, but in kind, from the goodness of God. If this were true, then human goodness would not give us an idea of God's goodness at all. He even argues that what in man would be demoniacal malevolence, might be quite consistent with benevolence in God. "We must remain content with the belief that we have that knowledge of God which is best adapted to our wants and training. How far that knowledge represents God as He is we know not, and we need not know" (p. 96). I must confess that I, for one, am not content with a knowledge of God which is utter ignorance. Rather I know that my conception of Him is inadequate, but true. I know that I know Him not as he is, but because I do know in what respects I know Him not, my ignorance turns into transcendent knowledge, and my darkness into light. He gives me warning when He is unlike me by the failure of my faculties to apprehend Him, but this very unlikeness teaches me what He is not, so that the very negation turns into a positive perfection. "We cannot say that our conception of the Divine Nature resembles that Nature in its Absolute existence, for we know not what that absolute existence is." We know, however, thus much, that it differs from our own finite and conditioned being, therefore we know something about it. Because however inadequately we are enabled to say what that Divine Nature is not, we do know therefore in a measure what it is. Goodness is goodness even in God, only that being the goodness of an Absolute Being, it is not a separate quality from his substance, but one with it. It is essential goodness, not separable. It is not true, then, that as we have not the ability to affirm, we have not the ability to deny. Behind this sort of sanctified Unknowable we disdain to shelter ourselves. Rather because we have the ability to deny, therefore we have the ability to affirm. Thus much we know of the Absolute, that it is wanting in all the imperfections of the Relative. Because, then, human goodness is relative, we know that the goodness of God is essential and necessary. In the same way, because the human person implies a multitude of faculties over which the Personality reigns supreme, and because this involves weakness, therefore we deny multiplicity and affirm simplicity of the Divine. This multiplicity, however, is not essential to the idea of Personality. The true contradiction would be to assert Personality, and at the same time to deny Intellect and Will to God. There is no inconceivableness in the notion that Will and Intellect, which are two in the finite being of man, may be one in the Divine nature. This is a true *aufhebung*, or elevation, multiplicity reconciled into a higher unity; the false *aufhebung* is destruction. There are some contradictions which no amount of manipulation could reconcile, such are justice and cruelty, good and evil. Others are not contradictions, but only aspects of the same thing which look like contradictions because

we do not adequately know the reality itself. A thing which is really one may look like two to us, yet to say that it is two is not false, because in that one thing there is a reality which makes it look like two to us. Our knowledge is not an island of light surrounded by utter darkness, but rather a lucid mist, through which we see objects really, but imperfectly. In this way it is that God seems to us to be divided into Substance and Attribute, though in reality each attribute is the one substance. This apparent contradiction is, then, not confined to will and intellect, but it is true of all attributes. There is as much difference between the *aufhebung* of Hegel and this reconciliation of what seems to be different by identity in a higher oneness, as there is between "Friend, go up higher," and "Tolle, crucifige."

I believe that most arguments against God's Personality arise from a confusion between human personality and personality in general, as those brought against human free-will arise from forgetting that it never pretends to be absolute. In corroboration of this, I will conclude with an objection and a reply from German authors. "Personality," says Strauss, "means a self-gathering itself together in opposition to another, which it thus separates from itself. Absoluteness, on the contrary, is the All-embracing Limitless, which excludes nothing from itself, except that very exclusiveness which forms the very concept of Personality. An absolute personality, then, is a *non-ens*, which is incapable of being thought." On the other hand, answers Lotze, "Only in the notion of a finite spirit lies the ground why the development of its personal consciousness comes to pass through the reaction of a Non-Ego, not because it requires the opposition of a strange Ego in order to be a personal being, but because the conditions of its being in this or any other respect lie not in itself. This limitation does not take place in the essence of the Infinite. He alone, therefore, is capable of a personality (*Für-sich-seyn*, being for self) which wants neither to be induced, nor to be further developed through something which is not itself, but is self-contained in an eternal, unbeginning, inner movement. In God alone is perfect Personality, in all limited spirits there is only a feeble imitation of it."

In the case, however, of German philosophy, translation is hardly enough, and we will conclude this article with a commentary on what we have quoted.

It is true of human personality that it is antagonistic and repellent, and therefore implies limitation. But is this true in any sense which compels us to affirm limitation of all personality whatever? Can the reality of personality be affirmed, when all limitation is denied, as it must necessarily be of the Absolute and Infinite? We think it can. It is quite certain, indeed, that human beings only become conscious of their own personality, through contact with others. In the half-



slumber of infantine life it is probable that the consciousness of the child's own personal being only fitfully visits its dreams through the love and smiles of others. But what right have we to assume that this defect is so inherent to all intellect, that we are at liberty to affirm that where limitation is not there personality cannot be. Even of human personality it is not true that *omnis determinatio est negatio*. I affirm that things are determined by what they are, not by what they are not. Differentiation indeed implies antagonism and duality, but determination is constituted by identity and oneness. This is true even in the world of nature: an eagle is such because it is an eagle, not because it is not a lark. But if we turn to the far higher and richer kingdom of intellect, it is doubly false that beings are what they are by negation. Shakespeare is sufficiently himself by possession of the poet's finer nature, without our affirming of him the absence of mathematical genius. He would be Shakespeare still though Newton had never lived. I believe the contrary view to be based on the original pseudos of Pantheism, that the order of Being and the order of Knowledge are identical. Because we arrive at the knowledge of our own personality through contact with that of others, it does not follow that personality itself is constituted by the sharp shock which comes from knocking one's own self against another self.

Nor need we shelter ourselves under the vagueness of mystery in order to affirm Personality of the Absolute or the Infinite. The human Ego indeed, not being the plenitude of being, not only leaves room for his neighbour, but the human *meum* implies a *tuum* to determine what is otherwise indeterminate. It is not so with the Absolute: He leaves upon our mind a sufficiently positive idea of Himself by being God. The effect of the addition of the attribute personal to the Absolute does not render it unmeaning, but the very contrary. It saves it from being the unmeaning abstraction which Mr. Mill pronounces it to be when it is alone. It determines it and saves it from being nothing, as they say in Germany. It renders it concrete, as we say in England, and gives a real though inadequate answer to the question, what is God? To prove a contradiction in terms, you must prove that the contradiction covers the whole ground of the meaning of the terms, so that nothing is left. Such contradictions are not far to seek. Thus, to say that the Infinite is material is a simple contradiction, for matter, whatever else it may mean, implies limitation. Again, to affirm of an Absolute Intelligence or Will that it is conditioned on the possession of a brain, to affirm evil of the Infinite, are contradictions, for matter and evil are directly opposed to the Infinite and the Absolute. But to add the attribute personal to the Absolute God is not contradiction; it only means that He possesses Intelligence and Will, that is, it makes Him conceivable, for it renders it possible for the human mind to form a real representation

of Him. What contradiction is there in affirming the highest kind of being, that is, the capacity of love, of Him who is the plenitude of all being? Surely, it is the denial of it, not the affirmation, which would put the limit to the Infinite.

What effect, then, on the Absolute has the uniting it to the attribute of personality? Not to annihilate but to transform it. It forces us to transcend human personality, but it does not present us "with an incompatible attribute, so that the mind cannot unite them under a single image." It forces us, indeed, to think the Personal Being to be unlike human persons in one respect—that He has no necessary relation to any other being. We are not forced to think that there are two Gods, because there is one, as it has been argued that one human individual cannot be conceived without another. It prevents us from transferring bodily to God the whole qualities of human persons; but there is quite enough of personality left to justify our looking on God as personal. It strips off from the Absolute Intelligence the notion of succession in time; but this only means that there is an Intelligence without the imperfections of human thought, and until we are prepared to affirm that no intellect can be such unless it is bound to go through premisses before it can reach a conclusion, and that no Will is worthy of the name as long as with one glance it can take in the end, together with the means, unless we are ready to assert that the laborious processes and painful efforts of human intelligence are essential to all thought, we have no right to say that an Absolute Personality is a contradiction in terms. We do not even ascribe relativity to God, when we assert that He possesses knowledge, for there are conceivably intellects besides that of man; and who can prove that there is not one that requires no object but His own self, and in that self comprehends all things, since the universe was conceived eternally in His mind, and flowed out of it in time without effecting a change in His immutable being. This of itself constitutes God a Personal Being, for such an abiding self-consciousness is personal identity.\*

I do not see how it can be said that in the proposition, "The Absolute is a Personal Being," the latter half of the sentence destroys the first. It gives a meaning to what Mr. Mill calls "an unmeaning abstraction," by making it concrete. It means simply this: "The God, who, by His essence, has need of no one, and in His solitary greatness has no necessary relations with anything finite, has of His own free will entered into the relation of Creator to His creatures." The word absolute does not annihilate but purify personal attributes such as love, when we apply them to God, from all selfishness,

\* The existence of such a superhuman intellectual being, whose objects would come into being by the mere fact of its representing them to itself, and who would require neither space nor time to conceive them, is distinctly contemplated in a remarkable passage of Kant's *Critic of Pure Reason*, p. 119 of Hartenstein's edition, *Dritter Band*.


interestedness, and emotion. It is the love of a Father with more than its tenderness, and without the defects incident to emotion. Human love is a passion, because it is needed to fill up a craving in the human heart ; but the creative love of God had no motive outside itself ; it springs from God's own intrinsic lovingness. It became a passion when the second Person of the Holy Trinity assumed a human heart, when the only being who had a right to be selfish sacrificed Himself.

I fear that my readers may accuse me of palming off mystical theology upon them in the guise of metaphysics. My only excuse is the obscurity of the subject. The original revelation of Himself from God to man has become vague and obscure to His fallen creature. Like Dante's pearl\* on a white forehead, it is pale and colourless. The very clearness of its transparency prevents its making an impression on human sense. Only when drops of blood appear upon the brow, and the head is crowned with thorns, does the whole pathos of the Divine Face appear.

J. B. DALGAIRNS.

Paradiso, Canto iii. 14.





## ROCKS AHEAD ;

OR, THE WARNINGS OF CASSANDRA.

### PART III.

**T**HE religion of a nation ought to be the embodiment of its highest Intelligence in the most solemn moments of that Intelligence. It should be—if not the outcome, at least in harmony with the outcome—of the deepest thoughts, the richest experience, the widest culture, the finest intuitions of the best and wisest minds that nation counts among its children. This is not to say that it need be the *discovery* or the elaborated produce of the nation's intellect working by itself without guidance or without illumination ; for most among us hold religion to be an external gift, a matter of authoritative communication from on high—a revelation, in short, dealing with topics which transcend man's natural capacities ;—and many who do not accept this, the ordinary view, still admit it to be more or less the issue of those gifted moments of gifted men whose untraced suggestions, intuitions, spontaneous conceptions of the inner spirit, reach very near to something which may be vaguely spoken of as Inspiration. But, at least, the religion of a nation—its creed, its notions concerning supernal natures and invisible things—its views of God and a future life, in short—ought to be such as the noblest and most enlightened Intelligence of the nation can cordially accept and embrace ; and will not either last, or guide, govern, purify, and elevate the nation, if it be not.

Now I allege that in England the highest Intelligence of the nation is not only not in harmony with the nation's creed, but is distinctly at issue with it ; does not accept it ; largely, indeed, repudiates it in

the distinctest manner, or, for peace and prudence's sake, discountenances it by silence, even where it does not demur to it in words; and that in this dis-harmony and divorce lies a grave and undeniable peril for the future. The fact is not new, but its dimensions are; the dis-harmony is spreading to many classes, and is assuming a more pronounced significance; no candid observer will deny it, and no wise patriot or statesman will regard it as a matter to be ignored.

The phenomenon in question is neither new in England, nor confined to England; on the contrary, it is traceable with at least equal distinctness in nearly every country on the Continent—in France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, and Germany. In some it has begun even earlier than here; in some it is yet more marked and menacing. In France the great outbreak of unbelief at the close of the eighteenth century was, no doubt, hastened and exasperated by the violent suppression of heresy a hundred years before. The revocation of the Edict of Nantes unquestionably paved the way to, and largely affected the character of the atheistic eruption of the Encyclopædists and the revolutionists three generations later. The Gallican Church, no doubt, regarded it as a signal triumph when she induced Louis XIV. to silence and banish her comparatively moderate antagonists. "But what was the consequence? Where, after this period, are we to look for her Fenelous and her Pascals? Where, for those bright monuments of Piety and Learning, which were the glory of her better days? As for piety, she perceived that she had no occasion for it, when there was no lustre of Christian holiness surrounding her; nor for learning, when there were no longer any opponents to confute, or any controversies to maintain. She felt herself at liberty to become as ignorant, as secular, as irreligious as she pleased; and, amid the silence and darkness she had created around her, she drew the curtains and retired to rest."\* Acuteness, knowledge, controversial capacity passed over into the hands of her enemies; the Church, long undermined by Voltaire, Rousseau, and their successors, fell with a crash in 1790, and the faith which she had so travestied and dishonoured fell with her: and it is not too much to say, that, since that day—in spite of partial and transient reactions and revivals, of concordats, pilgrimages, galvanic spasms of ghastly activity—nine-tenths of the strongest and finest intellects of France, political, legal, scientific, literary, and polemical, have been arrayed in unconcealed, unceasing, relentless, and contemptuous hostility, not only to the Church and her pretensions, but to every form and claim of Christianity. Nor is this hostility in any way confined to the intellectual or cultured classes. It prevails in even an exasperated shape among the working men of the whole city population, provincial as well as metropolitan. A really eminent literary or scientific man who should avow himself a Christian would be received with scorn, amazement, or incredulity among his brethren;

\* Robert Hall: *Modern Infidelity*.

and an *ouvrier*, who even speaks of religion with respect, becomes suspected by his fellow-toilers from that fact alone. The Divorce of the Intellect of France from her Religion is a *fait accompli*; and how much of her past calamities, and her present chaos and collapse is traceable to the influence of this divorce, it is impossible to measure.

In Spain, where the amount of intellectual activity and culture is of course far less considerable than in France, whatever there exists is tacitly or avowedly unbelieving, even when not arrayed in actual hostility to the Church. And, indeed, it could scarcely be otherwise, for nowhere probably is Christianity presented in a form so utterly impossible of reception by any trained intelligence; nowhere, too, certainly not in France, are the capacity, the reputation, and the habits of the Priests so little calculated to inspire reverence for the creed they teach, or the pretensions they put forth. The authors of "The Practical Working of the Church in Spain" found the old religion nearly everywhere sinking into contempt. The clergy candidly confessed that they had lost their hold over the middle class: that "if it were not for the poor there would be no worship of God in the land." Mr. Grant Duff\* thus sums up his observations:—

"Our own impression is that the form of Romanism which prevails in Spain is lower, and retains less of the real spirit of Christianity than that which exists in any other Catholic country with which we are acquainted. Over the lower classes it still has very considerable hold; but rather as a superstition than as a religion. On the other hand, the creed of the bulk of the men among the educated classes is pure indifferentism, and probably in their hearts the majority of those who are opposed to religious toleration oppose it in order that they may not have the trouble of settling what attitude they are to take up towards the religion of the state. At present they are Catholics, as a matter of course, just as they are Spaniards. If they could be anything else, they would be ashamed to profess belief in a system which they utterly despise. This state of things need surprise nobody; it is the natural result of the forcible suppression of free thought, and is seen in a less degree even in those countries—pagan and other—where public opinion, and not penal legislation, is the supporter of the existing creeds. We cannot expect that miserable hypocrisy, injurious alike to morality, to literature, and to statesmanship, soon to pass away; but a beginning is made. Any one who knows Spain could mention the names of Spaniards who are as enlightened in these great matters, and as earnest, as the best among ourselves."

In Germany, where religion presents itself in such a multitudinous variety of creeds that it might be fancied possible for every modification of mind to find a home in one or other of them, a large majority of the eminent men in every department of intellectual enterprise have embraced views which, though by no means distinctly unbelieving, would certainly not be recognised as Christian in our country.†

\* Studies in European Politics, p. 58.

† Strauss, in his last work, "The Old Faith and the New," answers the question, "Are we still Christians?" for his countrymen, far more distinctly in the negative than I have ventured to do.

And though it would not be correct to say that in Germany the Intelligence of the nation is divorced from its Religion, this is solely because the Religion has been so extensively modified and rationalised by the free working of the Intelligence, that the natural antagonism which cannot fail to spring up between a progressive culture and a stereotyped and rigid creed which sternly refuses to accept the slightest innovations (and which is so manifest and mischievous elsewhere), has been largely qualified, or altogether evaded.

In Italy the same phenomenon is observable as in France and Spain, though in a somewhat modified form and mitigated degree. As in Spain, so in Italy, Catholicism has long shown itself in forms peculiarly repellant to cultured and instructed natures, and the priesthood has been seen too close at hand for its pretensions to be for a moment tolerated, or its intellectual capacities in the least respected by either thinkers or observers. But, as in France, the sceptical tendency, inevitable to educated and enlightened minds, has been complicated and exasperated by patriotic instincts; and Religion, embodied in and therefore confounded with the Church, has presented itself as the irreconcilable and ruthless foe, not only of all freedom of thought and intellectual activity or progress, but of the most passionate aspirations of an awakened people after national union, liberty, and greatness. The love of country and the thirst for truth have therefore in Italy combined to foster deadly hatred of the common antagonist of both. This may probably explain a peculiarity which I believe to be real, but of which I am not informed enough to speak without diffidence, namely, that whereas in other Catholic countries the Church has kept its hold upon the women, in Italy, its connection with local tyranny and a foreign yoke has united a great proportion of both sexes in a common detestation.

Finally, we must glance at Belgium, probably far the most priest-ridden country in Europe. Between the Catholic Church and Liberal-political institutions there goes on a fierce and incessant conflict, in which of late years the Church seems to be gaining ground. According to M. Emile de Laveleye, the clergy have nearly made themselves masters of the nation by means of those very free institutions which they combat and condemn. They are the most unwearied and successful of electioneers. The Liberal chiefs, no longer as a rule believers, are at a grievous disadvantage in the strife because unprepared openly to avow their unbelief; and are discovering too late that, in order practically to defeat the pretensions of the Church, it is necessary to assail and to renounce its creed. The following comments of M. de Laveleye on the state of affairs in Belgium are full of warning and suggestion :—

“How happens it that the Liberal party has thus lost ground in a free country, and what means can be used to resist ultramontaniam? A grave

problem, involving the future of Catholic countries. *The weakness of the Liberal party comes from the fact of its having to confront a situation full of contradictions.* Catholicism, having by the mouth of its infallible chief, condemned liberty and modern civilization, a good and sincere Catholic can no longer defend these liberties. What can be done by one who would fain save them at all cost? Separate himself from the Church? *But neither people nor family could live without faith. So the Liberal is forced to surrender his wife, his children, and the schools to the priest, whose influence he tries as hard as he can to combat. On one side he attacks him without cessation, and on the other he invites him, appeals to him, and has daily recourse to his ministration.* This contradiction is the deeply-seated cause of the weakness of the Liberal party.

"To make a way out from this desperate position, an association has been formed with the name of *La libre Pensée*, the members of which undertake to celebrate births, marriages, and burials, without the intervention of the clergy. This society counts a certain number of adherents, but it is not likely to extend, for not many people will go so far as to renounce publicly all positive religion. The only course would be to pass over to the Reformed Catholicism of Döllinger and Père Hyacinthe, or else to Protestantism. Since the Church proclaims as a dogma that she and modern civilization exclude one another, the plain conclusion for those who do not wish to sacrifice liberty is to quit the church that condemns it. But the time of great religious movements seems gone. The unconscious scepticism of our epoch has so enervated men's souls that they have not enough energy left to abandon a creed in which they have ceased to believe.

"Not long ago it used to be supposed that the political influence of religion was about to disappear. Facts now clearly prove this to have been a mistake. The action of religion on the fortunes of nations is immense and decisive. The constitution of the state ends by modelling itself after that of the church; or, if not, then the state remains a prey to periodical troubles. Protestantism resting on free inquiry and individual interpretation, the constitutional and representative régime, is the political form that best suits the Reformed nations. Catholics realizing the ideal of an absolutist organization, absolutism is the natural constitution of Catholic nations: this is what Bossuet maintained, and he was right. The French revolution, and the men who have adopted its principles, like the Belgian legislators of 1830, thought they found a solution in separating the church from the state. Let the church, they said, govern itself in its own way within its own domain. The state will constitute itself on the base of modern principles within an independent sphere which it will make respected. The attempt has failed, because the clergy will not accept the separation of the Church from the state. They mean to rule the state. It is necessary therefore either to submit or fight. The offered truce has been refused. *But to fight against the influence of the church, it is necessary to attack its creed.* This is what the Philosophers of the eighteenth century did. That was the peculiar task of Voltaireanism. By spreading Voltairean ideas, you manage to hold ultramontaniam in check. Hitherto, that has succeeded in France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Only this success has cost dear, for in spreading scepticism you have weakened the moral spring, and so prepared that confused and morbid state from which Catholic states have so much trouble in emerging. When we reflect on recent events and on the present situation of the Continent, we are driven to the conviction that the solution propounded by the French revolution has not succeeded. If the country preserves its faith like Belgium and Ireland, it will fall into the hands of the clergy. If it forsakes its faith, it will fall into anarchy, like Spain and Mexico."

Such is the state of affairs in the principal continental countries.



The case of England is widely different. Here the mass of the nation, even of its educated classes, are still sincere, if not very consistent or logical, believers. They may not have inquired deeply or systematically into the foundations of their faith, but they are attached to it, and do not question it. Some modify this or that dogma of their creed to suit their reason, or to bring it into harmony, as they would say, with the growing enlightenment of the age. Some discard details which they dimly perceive or feel to be obsolete. The Christianity of thousands may be little different from the "civilized heathenism" it has been named by a popular writer; the theory of many and the practice of most may be what divines would disavow, and what probably Christ would have been utterly unable to recognize as his teaching; but still they call, and would enrol themselves as Christians; they accept the doctrines of their respective Churches and Sects, and feebly, fitfully, and at a distance, are supposed to guide their conduct by the precepts of their faith. Not only Religion, but their special form of it largely influences their thoughts, and materially modifies their behaviour. Collectively the nation recognizes Christianity, feels and enforces respect for its fancied ordinances and its accredited administrators, and, when not too difficult or too inappropriate, follows, or assumes to follow in the course it preaches. Nay, we may go much farther than this: the number among us whose temper is imbued, and whose indifference or selfishness is controlled and transmuted by a genuine Christian spirit, is so vast, as essentially to modify and colour the general social aspect of the nation. "The faith of Jesus," whatever that may mean, is undeniably a living influence in our community, both upon our thought and our action. Nevertheless, it is true even here that the Divorce I have spoken of between the highest Intelligence of the nation and its Religion—that is, its ostensible and professed creed—is inchoate, "looming," visible in the not very remote distance; proceedings have been instituted before the great tribunal of ultimate appeal, and a *Rule Nisi* is about to issue.

I am well aware that this is a rash assertion, and one in confirmation of which I can only summon each man's personal observation and inner consciousness to testify. It is a statement easy to deny, and impossible to prove. First appearances are dead against it. Indifference to religion certainly is not our national characteristic. Our religious controversies and squabbles may be said to be precisely those which are carried on with the greatest acrimony and pertinacity. Divines and their flocks display a ferocity in their love of Truth, which would be refreshing if it were not so disturbing. Theological dogmas, crotchets, passions are, more than any others, the terror and the stumbling-block of statesmen and social reformers. The nation's religion has long stood in the way of the nation's education. Sectarianism is very powerful, and very full of life. The

Church is at least as vigorous and aggressive. Perhaps there is more intellectual activity, if not intellect, enlisted in the work of sects and creeds than in any other career except that of money-making. Religion, in one form or another, stimulates and vivifies the daily life of the English people in a remarkable degree. Still, I believe it to be true, that the strongest mental power, the finest thought, the highest intelligence among us is yearly diverging more and more from Christianity, is discarding all faith in it, assuming towards it not so much a hostile, as an isolated, neutral, almost supercilious, attitude—an attitude which may perhaps best be described as one of silent renunciation and disapproval—of looking, and “passing by on the other side.” The preponderant intellect in every line—statesman-like, legal, scholarly, scientific, literary, industrial—is no longer *believing*, is, as a rule, distinctly *unbelieving*; and I venture to say this in the face of such flagrant and splendid contradictions as are offered by the names of Gladstone, Selborne, Acton, Faraday, and Wordsworth; well knowing, also, that the still greater names I might, if it were not unseemly, quote in proof of my assertion, would in many cases not be ready to avow their disbelief, and in some would resent its being attributed to them. In a country like England, where conformity to at least some form of Christianity is enforced by still extant legal penalties of a very harsh character, and by social penalties nearly as intolerant and severe, it is not easy to avow entire dissent from the National Creed; and, therefore, the weight and numbers of such dissenters will never be accurately known till they have become preponderant—if, indeed, they ever should.

I must, therefore, be content to argue on the *assumption*—admittedly unprovable—that this Divorce (and latent antagonism) between the highest Intellects of the Nation and the National Belief is in progress and in view, though by no means as yet an established fact;\* and that, being in progress, it is a phenomenon ominous of danger.

Sooner or later the Thinkers of a People must inoculate and interpenetrate that people with their thought; and the great Thinkers of England are not believers. The educated classes, as a whole, are still believers; but the most highly-educated among them have ceased or are ceasing to be so. The tone of conversation; the concessions to free speculation that are now habitually admitted; the opinions and doctrines that are avowable and allowed, and that it would be deemed intolerance and bad manners to suppress or resent; and the enormous change that has taken place in society and in literature, in these respects, in a single generation, all are indications

\* A strong collateral confirmation may be found in the disposition so manifest of late years among the most large-minded of our Divines, to modify, volatilise, ignore, eliminate, or cover with a mystical and nebulous halo (as Coleridge did), some of the least credible features of their creed.

pointing in the same direction. The change in the tone of controversial writing is another; the advocates of established creeds are no longer assailants, but are content to stand on the defensive—and cannot always stand. The marked disinclination which, I am assured, prevails at the universities among the ablest of the undergraduates to enter holy orders, may also be referred to as a significant feature.—Another very important fact must also be adduced. A very large proportion, probably the majority, of the operative classes in towns are total unbelievers; and these are not the reckless and disreputable, but, on the contrary, consist of the best of the skilled workmen, the most instructed and thoughtful, as well as the steadiest. The hard-headed, industrious, reading engineers and foremen, the members of mechanics' institutes, the natural leaders of the artisans, are sceptics intellectually, not morally; they disbelieve because they have inquired, argued, and observed, and have been unable to obtain from their Methodist fellow-workmen, or even from ministers of the Gospel, satisfactory answers to their doubts. Among manufacturing artisans and the highest description of citizen labourers, it may be stated, with even more confidence than of the ranks above them in the social scale, that the intellect of the body is already divorced from the prevalent creeds of the country.\*

The range and form of this scepticism varies widely in the different classes. Among working men it is for the most part absolute atheism, and is complicated by a marked feeling of antagonism towards the teachers of Religion, a kind of resentment growing out of the conviction that they have been systematically deluded by those who ought to have enlightened them. Thinkers of the higher order among the educated classes, and more especially scientific men, by no means as a rule go so far as this, but content themselves with pronouncing God to be unknowable, and His existence unprovable; the distinctive doctrines of Christianity, and the details of its historical basis neither made out nor in any way admissible; and a future life to be a matter of pure speculation, which may or may not be in store for us, but as to which no rational man would dare to dogmatise. Literary men and scholars are often sceptical merely as to special creeds, though sincerely and deeply religious in tone and temperament. But all concur in repudiating existing forms of Christianity—that is, the common religion of the nation; the Jehovah of the Bible, the Heaven and the Hell of Divines and Priests, the Resurrection of the Gospels, and the Salvation-formulas of Creeds and Churches.—We have now to inquire briefly into the evils menacing our national well-being, which are likely to spring up from this attitude of mind both in our highest trained Intellect, and among the most vigorous and steady of our artisans.

\* I am assured, however, that this can scarcely be stated as broadly as a few years ago—considerably owing to the Ritualists.

The worst of these evils, so salient in Continental countries, afflicts us in England, thank God ! only in a very modified degree. The mental severance observable there in family life, is far less marked here than either in France, Italy, or Belgium. Congregations do not consist very flagrantly of one sex only. The men are not, as a rule, unbelievers, while the women and children are still orthodox, or at least unsceptical. The women of the upper and middle classes are not nearly so much under the influence of the clergy, nor so systematically manipulated by them—neither are the men so independent or antagonistic—as in Catholic nations abroad. Here there is a sufficient variety of sects, and sufficient emancipation from the absolute necessity of affiliation to any sect, to enable even indifferentists and sceptics to secure a fair education for their children without having them mischievously inoculated with doctrines which the parents disapprove. Moreover, religion has not yet assumed that obtrusive and predominating place in all schools and colleges which it is apt to insist upon where priests are openly at issue with statesmen, and where the Church and its creeds are fighting for their life ; and which there is some danger of its assuming, even in this country, as the conflict, comparatively latent now, becomes more conscious and more critical. There are still seminaries—and (thanks to the strong sense and the imperious will of our unfanatical educated classes) will always be—where first-rate intellectual training can be given to the youth of the nation with no more admixture of dogmatic Christianity than parents may count upon correcting in after life by their own teaching, or eliminating by the slow enlargement and enlightenment of years. Education can be managed without the necessity of either handing over the plastic nature of the child wholly to the Priest on the one hand, or placing it under an avowedly secular system on the other. Still, two serious mischiefs remain, both of them very pernicious to the happiness and integrity of our national life :—in a large, and I fear a growing, degree, the perfect openness and confidence which should exist in family life, and without which family life can never reach its ideal point, is impaired ; and the brave sincerity which ought to stamp the social intercourse of man with man is dangerously compromised.

The vast numerical majority of both sexes among the educated classes is still believing, but the proportion of sceptics is growing fast ; and (which is the important point whereon to concentrate our attention) it is growing far faster in one sex than in the other. The tendency of the masculine intellect is towards inquiry ; that of the feminine intellect is towards receptiveness. The one is more logical, the other more emotional ; and as logic strengthens, or where logic prevails, there, as all experience shows, faith and positive creeds almost unavoidably lose ground. Moreover, what the highest Intelligence of the nation *is*, the prevalent masculine Intelligence of the

nation is assuredly on the way to become. The day is, therefore, *approaching, and in sight*, when the mass of cultivated men and cultivated women will no longer think alike on religious subjects. External conformity may be preserved often at considerable sacrifice, but that genuine harmony, which is the secret of inner peace in "domestic life," will suffer hazardous interruptions and sad enfeeblement. The mischief will be grave just in the ratio of the common earnestness. In proportion to the mental integrity of the husband, and the depth and sincerity of religious feeling in the wife—in proportion as both parties are conscious that the topics on which they differ are precisely those in which difference goes deepest down into the tenderest recesses and the richest springs of the inner life—will the "fault" (to speak geologically) most jar, will the jagged edge of the broken link be most painfully and roughly felt. Woman needs sympathy in all her feelings—most sympathy in those which are most exquisite and sacred ; if she does not find it at home, she will seek it abroad—in the Church or the vestry, at the rectory or at the manse. Confidence and reliance tend to follow sympathy ; the Priest, or the Pastor, with no blame perhaps on either side, steps into the husband's chair ; and this no Englishman will endure without bitter pain and a savage struggle. In Catholic countries often a sort of compassionate and tender indulgence, which has in it a touch of unacknowledged scorn, enables the husband to concede religion, and religious exercises, and religious consolations to his wife as something which her frame requires, but which his manlier nature can dispense with. But this spurious substitute for blended being lies too far below our ideal to content us for an hour.

In most instances a further element of bitterness will follow want of harmony in the religious views, and will be severest in the most devoted natures. The mournful and revolting tenet, which is common to most Sects and Churches, and avowed when they are rudely pressed, that Salvation depends not on character, but on creed, too often clouds with the most cruel of anxieties the years of a believing wife linked with an unbelieving husband ; leaves to her restless affection no secure hour of sunshine or effusion / over which the shadow of a nameless terror may not steal ;—nay, as devoted love is usually too vigilant to be judicious, is apt to make the domestic hearth one long scene and course of Proselytism, which in the end becomes, or seems like, Persecution. To be for ever feared for, prayed for, and exhorted, in place of being cherished, trusted, and believed in, is a trying fate ; and perhaps the sun in his wide circuit shines down upon no sadder spectacle than such strange misuse of Faith and Love—when priests' and women's misconceptions of the life that may be are brought in, not to ennoble or embellish, but to embitter and torment the life that is ;—and God himself is summoned in to assist in the perversion.

The second mischief indicated may be despatched with very few words. An assumption is tacitly current in society which is the reverse of true, and which taints the whole air of social life with insincerity. The leading minds of the nation are supposed to be believers—and they are not. Nay, more; not only are they presumed to hold the ordinary views, but it would be deemed uncourteous, if not insulting, to presume otherwise; and properly so; because to presume, or to speak as if we presumed, otherwise would be, in the current state of narrow intolerance which prevails everywhere but in the great centres of intelligence, to hold them out to the reprobation of the mass of men. In consequence the leading Intellects of whom we speak, partly out of unworthy deference to established prejudice, partly out of mistaken consideration for the weaker brethren, are apt to acquiesce in the tacit assumption of the outside world; and thus timidity is generated among the higher, and impertinence among the commonplace orders of intelligence. The inferior brains impose silence on the superior by virtue of their numbers, and in no field is the tyranny of lower natures so pernicious as in that of mind. The evil is of no modern date; it has been felt more or less in every age of partial and undiffused light; but a mischief is none the less grave for being as old as the time of Socrates.

We must now turn to speculate on the political and social consequences to be anticipated when scepticism shall have spread among the masses of the community; when the doubts and denials of the more cultivated minds shall be no longer concealed from classes wholly unprepared to bear them; when, in a word, the bold unbelief which already prevails among the more trained and strong-headed artisans of our cities, shall have taken possession of the great body of those who live by labour. What changes must we look for, and what dangers shall we run when the Proletariat as a whole shall have ceased to believe in a God who has ordained their lot and prescribed their conduct, or in a future life which is to redress the inequalities and atone for the often wretchedness of this? The day of this sad apocalypse may be far distant; but in spite of revivals of many sorts and in many quarters, it is difficult to doubt that the current has set in that direction. Now, the first point which it is important to remark in this connection is, that Scepticism takes a different form in comparatively uncultivated and in elaborately educated classes. What is *doubt* in the latter appears as *denial* in the former. The hard, rough, plain, trenchant intelligence of the self-made, self-trained man of the people—accustomed to see only one side of the shield, to call a spade a spade, to use clear words to express distinct ideas, to discern only broad lights, and overlook, ignore, or despise all shadings and nuances—adopts a very sharp outline into all his convictions, and holds them with a rigid positiveness some-

times rather startling to more flexible and better furnished minds disciplined in the niceties and subtleties of the schools, aware that language is but a very imperfect vehicle of thought, especially in metaphysical and theological matters, and conscious that there may be often a latent grain or element or nucleus of undeveloped truth in propositions that, broadly stated, seem glaring and unmingled falsehood. The fine, scholastic, matured thinker, like Coleridge, can say and unsay things in a breath, can almost affirm and deny propositions in a sentence; and inferior intellects of the same order can "half say one thing and half believe another." But the shrewd, honest mechanic can do nothing of the sort, and has no great respect or trust for the man who can. His instrument of thought is not delicate enough to play with dogmas, and want of downright assertion or negation appears like want of integrity to him. He cannot suspend his judgment:—with him unbelief immediately and inevitably becomes disbelief, and disbelief fast becomes mixed with contempt and indignation towards the sceptic or the half-believer, whom he regards as coquetting and tampering with the unclean thing. Nebulous tenets, vague dissent, luminous conceptions with a coloured halo round them, are not for the skilled workman:—he is angry with the Teachers of a Church that have so long misled him and seem to be bent on mystifying him still. When the lower classes reach the point, therefore, of abandoning Christianity, their rejection of it will be not, as often among the upper ranks, languid and reserved, but absolute and most probably resentful. Their disbelief will be apt to be as intolerant and dogmatic as the credence of the Orthodox.

The operation of unbelief, too, upon minds of this order will be as different as its special intellectual form. Religion—the precepts and the tenets of the revealed Word—lie much more distinctly, immediately, and exclusively at the basis of morality, states of feeling, and social order, with them than with us. We can *underpin* these things by the resources of Philosophy—they cannot. We can see that, even were the Commandments of Sinai and the Mount of Galilee discarded, or had they never been, the interests and the good sense of men would dictate and impose a course of conduct to each other almost identical with that which has now the sanction of Christianity. The Code of duty to ourselves and towards our fellows would be pretty much the same, though the motives enforcing it were altogether changed. The theoretical foundation might be removed and replaced, without materially affecting the practical superstructure. But it would scarcely be so with even the best instructed of the mass of mankind. They have been so trained to be good and do right, to forego luxury and to endure hardship, to respect property and control passion, in the name of the Ten Commandments and the Sermon on the Mount, that to be told to do all these things in the name of "a well-

understood self-interest," and the interests of humanity at large, and the development of their own higher natures, would be a startling change of front in the face of an ever-watchful foe—the most notoriously perilous of tactical operations. It might upset the stability of their entire conceptions of self-rule. The accredited teachers of our population have so habitually held the language: "Be virtuous, because your eternal welfare is at stake upon the issue, and because you shall be repaid tenfold,"—that they will scarcely be heard or understood when they begin to say instead: "Be virtuous, because you ought, because it is wise to be so. There are, probably, no endless torments for the vicious and malignant, no bliss indescribable through all ages for the unselfish and the pure: there is no Heaven and no Hell, as you were once taught; but the bosom of the bad man is a Hell of stormy passions, and the bosom of the righteous is a Heaven of sunshine and of peace. We lay upon you the same obligation of ceaseless self-control and self-denial as before; but the objective, concrete, intelligible, *sure* recompense for a life of effort and of patience which we could once so confidently promise must no longer be a portion of your creed. The burden of duty remains as heavy as ever, but you may no longer count upon the old ample wages at the close of the weary day."

There can, I think, be little question that the doctrine of Christianity which has exercised the widest influence—the widest *police* influence, so to speak, though perhaps not the most wholesome moral influence—has been its delineation of the future life as one of *compensation* for the troubles and inequalities of this. The teaching of the Gospel is startlingly explicit on this head. The last are to be first; the poor are to be rich; the slave is to be free; those who had a bad time of it here are to have a good time of it there—and *vice versa*. The doctrine has been ridden hard; it has had much to do, and has done it well. "This light affliction, *which is but for a moment*," is to be repaid by an exceeding, even an eternal recompense. The joys and pains of earth are so poor and so short in comparison with those of the next world, that those who have drawn blanks in the lottery of life below ought to esteem themselves in truth the favoured of fortune, and would be foolish as well as rebellious to murmur or to envy. This sublunary scene is only the first act of the drama: the last act will set all right—will reverse as well as rectify the balance. No doctrine could have been devised so admirably qualified to instil endurance and content amid the privations and inequalities of human lots, to make the needy, the suffering, and even the oppressed, patient under what they have almost been induced to regard as a passing cloud or an insignificant distinction. No bolts or bars, no laws, no army of retainers, have been such effective guardians of the possessions of the great and affluent; the established



order of things has had no defence half so cheap, half so mighty, or of half such unsleeping vigilance. Why, indeed, should men of sense seek to overthrow arrangements and distributions of the elements of happiness that the brief space of fifty years will reverse for ever in their favour? I am far from saying that the doctrine is unassailable; still less that it has operated on the whole beneficially on the material progress of mankind;—I am only pointing out what a potent ally it has been to the governing, enjoying, richly endowed classes of the earth. What will be the result, what the possible catastrophe, when this doctrine is no longer accredited—when it is discarded as a delusion—when it is resented as a convenient deception and instrument of oppression;—when the poor man is convinced that there is no wealth of gold and jewels awaiting him in the spiritual kingdom—that if he is wretched here he is wretched altogether—that what he lacks now will never hereafter be made good to him—that the promises and hopes dangled before him to keep him quiet have been mere moonshine, and that in very truth the Bank in which he had insured his fortune, in which he had invested all his savings, to have a provision in which he had toiled with indefatigable industry and endured with exemplary patience, is a fraudulent insolvent;—when, in fine, he wakes up with a start to the bewildering conviction that *if* he is to rest, to be happy, to enjoy his fair share of the sunshine and the warmth of life, *he must do it now, here, at once, without a day's delay?* Will there not come upon him that sort of feverish haste to be in luxury and at peace, to *immediatize* all that earth can yield him, to sink the uncertain future in the passing present, which has been depicted in such vivid colours as pervading and maddening the daily thought and talk of the Socialists and Communists of the French metropolis? If his paradise is to be here or nowhere, why should there be a moment lost in beginning to construct it? and why, again, should any other man's wealth or welfare stand in his way? If he is not to have the upper-hand elsewhere, why should he submit to be kept under now?—Will there not come upon him, also, the ominous question—a question to which in his ignorance and his passion he will have no answer ready—"Why should not I, whose time is so short, *take* what it will need so many slow hard years to win?" And with all this will there not come—there did come in Paris—a fierce resentment at the flagrant inequalities around him, the comparative (often positive) wretchedness in which he has hitherto remained, and the fables which he has been told to pacify him,—till he will hate as well as envy those above him, and learn to regard their spoliation as an act of righteous restitution?

It may be maintained with considerable plausibility that the purely *arbitrary* inequalities of men's lots and fortunes are by no means as vast or as habitual as at first appears; that those who are indigent

and wretched without fault of their own or their parents are in most communities comparatively few ; that, if the poor were as prudent, as sagacious, and as energetic as the well-to-do, or the well-to-do as unthrifty and improvident as the poor, the individuals of the respective classes would often change places ; and that in a well-ordered and decently educated nation there would seldom be discrepancies of earthly condition obviously and distinctly needing a future world, regulated on altogether different principles, to redress the unmerited balance of the present. It may be argued, too, with much more than plausibility, that, be there a reversing and compensatory hereafter, or be there not, the variations and injustices of men's earthly conditions cannot be rectified by class spoliations and uprisings, or by social revolutions ; that masses of men cannot become affluent or happy by a leap ; that the only road to competence and leisure is the old one, and the only reliable instruments those which have wrought successfully in all ages—industry, frugality, persistence, and instruction. But it demands mental and moral enlightenment of no common order for the unfortunate and destitute, living in the midst of luxury and splendour, to recognize the absolute accuracy of these “wise saws” and sober economic reasonings ; and the ignorant, undisciplined, and reckless may fairly enough plead that the very lack of intelligence and self-control which has made and kept them squalid and miserable is itself almost as much a cruel partiality of fortune as the lack of land or funds. It may well be that if the pedigree of wealth and wisdom, of privation and ignorance, of health and disease, were traced far enough back and with omniscient insight, some points and personages in the ancestry of each would afford at once the explanation and the justification of the painfully unequal apportionment we see, and so “vindicate the ways of God to man.” But no one, except a born Philosopher, will ever recognize with cordial acceptance, the absolute equity of the decree which makes him suffer for his father's and forefathers' incapacities or errors ; the actual inequalities of men's lot, both as to enjoyments, opportunities, and possessions, are so utterly enormous in nearly every civilized country, and so admittedly excessive and undesirable ; to him that hath is so habitually given, and from him that hath not is so ruthlessly taken away the little he hath ; so many spend their lives among struggles and pains which, if this life be all, are at once inexplicable and unspeakably grievous, that only the prospect of a far different and absolutely certain future can ever heartily *reconcile* the less lucky among us to the sights we see around us. And if mere observers feel this, how incomparably more vivid must be the sentiments of the sufferers !

No doubt the practical, if grumbling, acquiescence in the prevalent inequalities of fortune, and in the privations and hardships of their

own condition, which is the normal state of the masses in most European and in nearly all Asiatic countries, is due, not exclusively to their religious hopes, but in a very large, though varying measure, to two other influences—namely, the actual or potential repressive force of police and law, and the unconscious but leaden, almost mountainous weight of habit. The social system, with its imposing hierarchy, its half-invisible but time-honoured fences, its grey old massive walls, its thousand buttresses and bulwarks and interlacing of chevaux-de-frise, lies upon the mind of the peasant, the citizen, the artizan who for generations has grown up amidst it, with a solid pressure which is only disturbed by crises of unusual fermentation. His thoughts are moulded by it, as those of his ancestors have been; what has been so long seems to him almost as if it was there by a law of nature; what stands so firmly looks as if it stood by right; what *is* conveys the impression that it ought to be. This invaluable legacy from the past, this inherited stability, is a mighty power in support of the existing order of things, but it operates only, or mainly, while unquestioned; let rude inquiry, pert denial, insinuating doubt, pertinacious demand for the production of title-deeds, once come into the field, and the spell is broken. Its magic may not be dispelled at once—there is strange tenacity of life in such hereditary sentiments; but the foundations are undermined by degrees; and some leaves fall off every time the tree is shaken. Now, in most countries, certainly in England, every existing social institution, every origin and sustenance of our unequal distribution of this world's goods, has been put on its defence, and it is hard to deny that weak places have been found; Communistic theories have been much discussed, and discussed in circles where the flimsiest arguments are not easily distinguished from the most cogent; and even cultivated intellects and keen economists have not been wanting to maintain that the actual distribution of property and opportunities is unwarrantable and unfair. The official guardians of rank, property, and order—Administration, Soldiers, and Policemen—are still upright, and present a formidable and to all appearance an irresistible array, and the classes who have are as yet far stronger than those who want;—but the latter are the more numerous, and the two are curiously intermingled. The masses, too, have still a wholesome and well-founded conviction that in case of violence or attempted spoliation their numbers would be almost powerless against the solid front of law and its authorized executors. But nevertheless the conclusion remains and admits of no dispute,—and it is on this that I wish to concentrate the attention of my readers:—that, when the change I have indicated shall have come over the religious belief of the working classes in this country, the burden of protecting our anomalous and unequal system and of maintaining the Social Hierarchy as it now exists—hitherto sustained by the belief in a compensating world hereafter, by the force of ancestral sentiment

and habit, *and* by the armed force of Government and Law, *i.e.* by the three in combination—will be thrown upon the two last powers exclusively;—that one of those at least is already materially weakened, and that the other (as I showed in my first paper) has been deliberately undermined.

When we look around in search of agencies by which the evil I have indicated may be mitigated or averted, we see three—effectual enough, perhaps, if put in operation, but the adoption of which can scarcely be anticipated with very sanguine confidence. Perhaps they all—two of them, certainly—partake too much of the old infantine recipe for catching birds by putting salt upon their tails.

A teaching, at once economic and philosophical, which should imbue the minds of the people with the conviction (undoubtedly, we apprehend, the true one) that, as a rule, the course of action of the wise and good man will be the same on earth, whether there be a further scene of existence or not, would neutralize the most obvious and the coarsest of the dangers to which the abjuration of the Christian creed must otherwise expose the country. The practical maxims for the conduct of life, which would be laid down by a moralist and lawgiver thinking only of the happiness of the individual and the wellbeing of society, would not be so widely different from the precepts of the Gospel, modified and interpreted as those now are by the requirements of our actual civilization and the temperaments of modern thought, as to cause any sudden disruption or confusion when the basis of allegiance and sanction was transferred. The ethical and legal codes would remain substantially the same, though the authority which framed them and the ruler who enforced them had been changed. Whether the goal at which we aim be an ideal heaven, or a worthy earth and a perfected humanity—whether the penalties we seek to avoid be those of a Scriptural hell or of human reprobation and social inflictions—the majority of the actions to be wrought or eschewed would probably not be as discrepant as we might at first imagine; for the lessons of enlightened self-interest, if not exactly generous or ennobling, are apt with trained intellects to be very efficient; and the affections, after all, are the most potent influences to action among believers and unbelievers alike. A moral Governor of the universe, and a thoroughly sagacious Ruler of the community would lay down much the same principles of action, though the tone of the former would be loftier, his requirements severer, and his language more positive than negative—dealing rather with commands than prohibitions. No doubt, with the loss of a God who sees our doings, and who rewards obedience with absolute fidelity, much of the buoyant cheerfulness of virtue might die out; still, on the whole, it would have to be admitted that, even without a God, duty persistent and enlightened pays at last. No doubt, with no hope of a coming world of rest, of compensation, and of undying felicity, much

of the colour would fade from life, and a sadder, soberer hue would steal over the prospects of humanity. Still, if men were what they ought to be and might be, Earth, we all trust, might grow immeasurably nearer to a Heaven than it is. We should not be surrendering, or ceasing to aim at an ideal Future; but that future would be less distant and less dim; it would be located nearer to us; it would be more scientifically wrought for; its constituent elements would be such as the mass of men could better appreciate and realize. Nay, it has been argued,\* and it is difficult to refute the argument, that the prevalent doctrine of a future life, in the hands of the Church, has often exercised an influence by no means friendly on the material wellbeing of communities—an influence which has gone far to neutralize its beneficial operation in an ethical direction.

But unfortunately for the prospect of such philosophic views as I have suggested being adopted as a basis for the practical moral code to be henceforth inculcated in our community, the habitual language of the majority of Christian teachers has pointed in a diametrically opposite direction. They have spoken as if, apart from a future life, the law of self-sacrifice could have no significance or obligation,—as if laying down life and joy for Love's, or Truth's, or Virtue's sake, would be mere folly, if there were no coming scene where such surrender would be instantly recompensed tenfold—as if even self-denial, self-control, the postponement of an immediate to a distant good—of a lower to a nobler aim—were almost questionable sense. They have often even sunk below the standard of Pagan and Prophetic moralists, and preached as if Righteousness was to be followed mainly, if not solely, for the loaves and fishes that would follow it at last—mainly because the payment for it, if not prompt, was at least absolutely certain.† The Gospel, indeed, tells us that "Godliness has the promise of the life that now is, as well as of that which is to come;" but this has never been a favourite text among divines, and so complete and rapid a change of front, as our needs may require, is scarcely to be expected from them.

A second source of safety may be found—and, if we are sagacious and forecasting, will be diligently sought—in a prompt rectification of those extremest and crueller contrasts of men's lots on earth for which (if there be no redressing future) Providence might, with at least some show of justice, be arraigned. Nine-tenths of the accusations and reproaches which man flings upon his Maker are monstrously unfair; both because no law of equity even suggests

\* *Enigmas of Life. Realisable Ideals*, p. 19 to 26.

† Robert Hall, perhaps the finest and purest genius among them, goes so far as to maintain (*Modern Infidelity*, p. 20) that apart from the hope of future recompense, "a deviation from rectitude would become the part of wisdom; and should the path of virtue be obstructed by disgrace, torment, or death, to 'persevere would' be madness and folly."

that every human being is entitled to be *as* well-endowed or *as* happy as his neighbour, and because in the majority of instances his privations and distresses are due to his own folly, or are the direct results of a system of causation which in its habitual operation is beneficent as well as righteous. But this thesis cannot be maintained in all cases, nor made convincing to most minds. He would be a bold disputant who should undertake to prove that every man has what he deserves, or ought to be content with what he has; and even were his argument logically tenable, it is certain that no miscellaneous audience could be made to listen to it with either patience or profit. Disease, pain, and all the life-long wretchedness of incapacitation, are entailed upon the child by parental or ancestral wrong; and the child may recognize in the arrangement an inevitable fate against which it would be idle to rebel, but never a just decree to which it was a duty unmurmuringly to submit. A man may perceive that his destitution is traceable to his ignorance or stupidity, or want of steady purpose and severe self-control; but the very capacity of thought which thus quickens his perception will carry him a step further, and teach him to ask whence came that want of training which lost him all golden opportunities, and left his faculties so undeveloped and so torpid;—especially when he sees by his side others, originally no whit better than himself, whom advantages and aids, denied to him, have landed in a widely different condition. Refine as audaciously and as ingeniously as we please, the salient fact stares us in the face, that men's share of happiness in our complicated civilization depends more on luck than on merit (if we look deep enough and far back enough into causation), and most of all, perhaps, upon the place and grade in which we first set foot upon this earth. Some open their eyes upon ease and luxury, others upon squalor and privation; the steps of some are surrounded from infancy with the most vigilant care and guidance, the steps of others with habitual neglect; some come into the world saddled and bridled, some booted and spurred;—and on the whole the bright, smooth, joyous life is the portion of the few, and the hard and struggling career is the portion of the many.

Probably no statesmanship and no philanthropy can altogether alter this;—perhaps, even, such narrow statesmanship and such blundering philanthropy as we possess, in attempting to mend matters, may aggravate the mischief. But at least we may remedy those more flagrant discrepancies which no logic can defend and no sophistries can gild; at least we may remove all purely artificial injustice; at least we may abstain from exasperating all natural sufferings and sores. We cannot re-distribute property, but we may see to it that no unwise or partial laws favour unequal distribution. We may so arrange matters that *opportunities* of bettering themselves shall come some time in their life to all; that want of instruc-


tion at least shall not hold them back; that industry shall have a fair field, and frugal economy shall find safe investments. We cannot preclude sickness and disease from invading the hovel, where they are so incomparably more disastrous than in the mansion or the palace; but we can at least contrive that they shall not be unavoidable inmates or companions, and that when they come they shall be met by something of the same alleviations and antagonists as among ourselves. In a word, we can and we ought, and if we are wise we shall, without delay proceed so to set our house in order that inequalities shall lose the irritating aspect of injustice; that there should not be the enormous temptation which there, now undeniably, is on every side of us to undisciplined natures deprived of the opiate hopes of a rich hereafter, to covet and seize the alluring treasures which lie so lavishly around them here; and that every man should be so justly treated, so tenderly cared for, and so sedulously taught, that these two things shall be made very clear to him:—*first*, that competence and comfort lie within his reach by the legitimate path of prudence, integrity, and toil; and *secondly*, that by no other means and no shorter cut can they ever be secured. I believe it to be possible—I do not say easy—to render property and order respected and secure, even without the aid of a future life, if only our people are intelligent, and our laws are just.

Is there no other way of escape? Is it hopeless to avert and preclude the danger, instead of meeting and mitigating it when it comes? Is it idle to dream that in the course of years the Religion of the nation may be modified in the direction and under the guidance of its best Intelligence, since that Intelligence can no longer accept the common Creed?—The thing is possible, but not likely. I seem to see how it might be done, but I have no hope that it will be done. The divergence is too wide; the sources of the alienation lie too deep. At first sight it would appear as if the essential teachings of Christianity consisted so much of sound morality, pious emotion, and ennobling sentiment which Philosophy would cordially welcome, and of hopes and doctrines which Science, though not affirming or endorsing, makes no pretensions to deny,—that not only peace, but a sincere alliance, might well exist between forms of thought which only misunderstanding and mismanagement have rendered hostile. In the Christian spirit and the basis of the Christian precepts and the kind of character they foster, our highest wisdom finds everything to admire, and nothing to gainsay;—and as regards the belief in a Creator and Moral Ruler of the Universe, and in a future world of retribution and of progress, the scientific Intellect at most is silent and declines to dogmatise. Here, then, one might fancy, is a common ground on which the Religious and the Philosophic mind might meet in friendship, and issue forth to make

joint war against the powers of Evil. But unfortunately Theologians have decreed that the vital essence of the Christian Faith shall lie in its other tenets—in historical assertions which Research will not admit—in formulas and “schemes” of Salvation which Reason utterly disputes. Doubtless there are Divines who take a larger view, who would willingly keep in the background those special dogmas which are most open to question and most liable to distortion and abuse, and whose truer sense of relative values and proportions would classify differently the articles of their Creed;—and if these Divines were uppermost or most numerous, and could give the tone and direction to the Thought of Christendom, there would be a chance for the reconciliation which I suggest. A course of authoritative preaching from ten thousand pulpits, persistent for an entire generation, which, without controversy or ostentatious neglect, should allow Original Sin and Imputed Righteousness, the legend of the Fall and the story of the Incarnation, Baptismal Regeneration, Eternal punishments, the Trinity and the Atonement, gently to fall into the shade as mysteries which it is vain to seek to penetrate, and regarding which silence is our least injurious and most respectful course;—while the same preaching should bring out into prominence and light the doctrines on which Christ most loved to dwell—the Fatherhood of God, His Omnipresence and his Love, the conviction that His eye is ever on us, and his ear ever open to our pleading, the need of purity and truth in our own nature, and of boundless sympathy and love to our fellow-men, Jesus as our pattern and our guide, and the Creator and Guardian of all as so just, so loving, and so wise, that—doing his will—we may leave our future in his hands with *absolute* trust, insisting on no pledge, prying into no details, asking for no chart or picture of the vague unknown;—a course of preaching such as this (is it quite in vain to dream?) might leave our grandchildren in possession of a creed wherein every thing that to us is hard, questionable, and repellent, shall have become simply obsolete—a Faith which Piety and Science might combine to uphold—a National Altar before which the highest Intelligence and the most fervent Devotion might in transparent sincerity kneel side by side,—a Religion in which should lurk no seed for wars, no standing-ground for the Sacerdotal element, no fair pretexts or gorgeous disguises for the low bad passions of humanity.

W. R. GREG.





## CONTEMPORARY EVOLUTION.

### PART IV.

IN the second part\* of this Essay, an attempt was made to investigate the probable effect on Christianity of the further development of the great modern process of social evolution. It was therein stated that a trustworthy result could be arrived at only after considering (1) the *political*, (2) the *scientific*, and (3) the *philosophic* aspects of the question. Want of space then limited the inquiry to the political aspect alone, the others being deferred for subsequent consideration. The result so far arrived at was that the political evolutionary process tended to increase the coherence and strength of the Christian organism, and to give greater efficiency to its action, by occasioning a series of internal integrating processes responsive to external disintegrating influences. Nevertheless a reservation was made as to the possible effects of scientific and philosophic Evolution, to the effect that if contradiction thence arose such Evolution must be fatal, while political change (by giving increased liberty of action) must hasten the final catastrophe. It remains then to consider the scientific and philosophic aspects of Contemporary Evolution in their relation to Christianity, the subject being treated, here as before, altogether without reference to the truth of that religion, and from the stand-point of Natural Science only.

The accelerated advance of Physical Science is the "common-

\* See CONTEMPORARY REVIEW for February, 1874.

place" of our day. That it will address itself with augmenting power to increasing audiences is certain. Not less certain is it that, as before pointed out, theological questions are more and more calling forth zeal and energy in regions where a quarter of a century ago apathy and stagnation largely prevailed. Manifest, again, to the most cursory observer is the wide divergence of views and sentiments between large numbers of those more especially devoted to one or the other of these fields of activity. In the first part of this essay\* it was sought to pourtray and symbolise this divergence as concretely embodied in a mediæval abbey and a modern museum. How marked such divergence appears to the average middle-class mind in England to-day is evidenced by the contrast drawn last year in the *Times*, between the British Pilgrimage to Paray-le-Monial and the British Association Meeting. It was evident that, in the writer's opinion, there would be more or less inconsistency in anyone taking part with full sympathy in both these gatherings.

To those who think that such divergence of sentiment has its foundation in the intellect and is the expression of a real and necessary *rational* divergence, the effect of the further progress of Evolution cannot be doubtful. Those thinkers will also naturally desire the complete and final overthrow of a superstition clogging the wheels of scientific progress, and will justly be moved to discourage (in all ways not conflicting with the equal rights of their fellow-citizens to liberty of conscience) a system they deem to be in contradiction with reason. On the other hand, there are those who are convinced that this divergence is not fundamentally a *rational* one at all, but, except where volition intervenes, the result of feebleness of imagination, absence of due mental flexibility or simply of ignorance or prejudice. The author of this essay can at least testify that he has met with several, in many respects highly-gifted minds, who have had personal experience of this relative impotency, and who have only after many efforts, and sometimes wide oscillations, succeeded in effecting the mental synthesis referred to.

Yet the conflict at present existing between the two schools of thought is, as was earlier pointed out, the result of a gradual and steady growth through preceding centuries, and is, whatever be the result, likely for a time yet further to become intensified from two special causes. One of these (1) is the action of the principle of the division of labour. The other (2) is the special character of some physical science teaching. The principle of the *division of labour* renders necessary the application of one man's almost entire energy to a more and more restricted field of scientific labour. Only intellectual giants can now hope for eminence in widely remote areas of study and research. To take an example from one science, men have not only almost ceased to be general zoologists, and

\* See CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, Sept. 1873, p. 601.

become ornithologists, entomologists, &c., as the case may be; but we hear now of lives being devoted to the study of small sections of Natural Orders, and that this naturalist is a *Carabidist*,\* and that a *Curculionist*,† while a German naturalist has even published a quarto volume, with large plates and numerous tables, the whole being devoted to the anatomy of the lower part of the hindmost bone of the skull of the carp! Now Physical Science must continue not only to grow in complexity as well as mass, but also to diffuse itself over an increasing area. The general diffusion of modern instruction will hereafter render a certain acquaintance with the facts and most approved theories of science, the common property of all who have the least pretension to be deemed "educated," and influences as yet active, but in a very limited field, must sooner or later become all but universal. At the same time the clergy, diminished in relative number through the consequences of the Renaissance movement, will come to have less and less time to spare for any special acquisitions in physical science, and far from monopolizing the physical knowledge of their time (as was the case in the early part of the Middle Ages), they must have even less and less chance of often occupying distinguished positions in the scientific arena, such as those filled by numerous continental Abbé's before the epoch of the great French Revolution. Besides relative numerical decrease in the clergy and the increasing subdivision of the field of physical science labour just spoken of, a simultaneous growth in theological science must render the attainment of eminence in any one of the more and more restricted branches of physical science still more difficult and all but a matter of impossibility to a clergy devoted to a theology which, whether true or false, is also ever-increasing in complexity as well as mass by a development responsive to the actions of surrounding influences. Thus it appears to be inevitable that as time goes on we shall come to have a population more and more imbued with physical science, and at the same time, a clergy less and less raised above the mass of the laity as regards a knowledge of such science. These conditions, accompanying as they will a growing appreciation of physical science, must favour the already widespread belief in a real antagonism of reason between Christianity and Science. The mere existence of such a belief (coinciding as it does, with other anti-Christian tendencies which it helps to intensify), cannot but produce results temporarily, at least, very hurtful to the Christian organism, since it tends altogether to direct from the examination of the Church's claims, enquiring minds which otherwise might, perhaps, find her acceptable to their mental states, and to destroy the belief of others who, from a very distinct cause, may be specially susceptible to such influence. Hence there seems

\* *i.e.*, devoted to that family of Beetles termed *Carabidæ*.

† *i.e.*, devoted to the long-snouted Beetles termed *Curculionidæ*.

but little reason to expect that the existing wide-spread connexion between familiarity with physical science and disbelief in Christianity will, for a considerable period, diminish—to anticipate, that is, that a movement which has been gradually growing in strength for six hundred years is likely soon to be arrested. So far, then, the scientific aspect of Contemporary Evolution appears hostile to the growth and influence of the Church. Yet we may find hereafter (when we have considered the second cause) compensating actions leading to results quite opposite to those which have as yet appeared.

The second cause of hostility was stated to be "*the special character of some physical science teaching.*"

Physical Science occupies itself with the phenomenal Universe as far as accessible to our senses; the collocations of causes in the visible world, together with the laws of their action—in short, with the coexistences and successions of phenomena, from Mathematics and Sidereal Astronomy to Biology and Sociology.\*

Theology occupies itself with an asserted noumenal Universe, inaccessible to our senses, the collocations of causes in such an invisible world, together with the laws of their action—in short, with the relations of spiritual entities from God down to the human soul.

Such being the case—the two domains being so distinct—it seems difficult to conceive how *any* development of Physical Science can possibly conflict with Natural Theology, and yet the fact is patent that it is very often supposed to do so. It is true, of course, that Christian Theology does make a limited number of assertions with respect to certain facts (such, *e.g.*, as those contained in the Church's Creeds), which were at one time subjects of sensible experience. It is manifest, therefore, that if science, *e.g.*, history, could demonstrate any one of these assertions to be false, such science must be not merely hostile but deadly in its action on Christianity. No writer, however, as yet has even claimed to have established a demonstration of the kind. Indeed, all competent minds have recognized the fact that Physical Science, apart from *d priori* philosophical conceptions, must be alike incapable of disproving them or of establishing their impossibility. Nevertheless, there are always more or less widely diffused amongst Christians various "pious opinions" (as they are termed), which are often held with great tenacity, although forming no part of what the Church affirms as Divinely revealed. This it is which is the region of conflict, and it is strewn over with weapons more or less hastily caught up by assailants as possessing a fatal

\* Mr. G. H. Lewes ("Problems of Life and Mind") professes to embrace "Metaphysics" within the range of science. He does so, however, merely by calling "Metaphysical" certain physical conceptions by which phenomena are mentally connected in scientific minds, and by bestowing the new name "Metemprics" on that which has been hitherto universally called "Metaphysics."

efficiency and afterwards abandoned in disappointment. Not that the weapons were pointless or their wielders unskilful, but that by the destruction of an encumbering delusion they conferred benefits on the cause which was the real object of their attack. In England, both the assailants and the supporters of popular Christianity are peculiarly liable to become involved in such contests. They are thus liable because of the often startling ignorance of Christian dogma amongst the former and the prevalence of a certain peculiar superstition amongst the latter. This superstition is the somewhat grotesque belief that the ever freshly surging questions of Theology—presenting themselves in new aspects in each succeeding age—are to be answered by revelation indeed, but through a printed book and not through some living authority capable of addressing to each succeeding epoch its specially fitting response. Nevertheless, not in England alone, but throughout the civilized world, such conflicts have raged from time to time, and two noteworthy ones may be here suitably adverted to.

It is not probable that Physical Science will again be the occasion of so great a disturbance to prevalent "pious beliefs" as when it first introduced Heliocentric Astronomy to the Christian world. The primitive cosmological conception had in its favour alike the convictions of the majority of the learned, the language of books revered as sacred, and the enormous force of a habit of mind unbroken for untold ages. Yet the result of the universal acceptance of the new astronomy, so far from destroying the Christian Church (as it is asserted it would have destroyed Hindooism), has been to show that it was in fact prepared beforehand for the greatest change of cosmological conception which the world has yet seen.

The second instance is that of the apparent conflict between Evolutionary Biology and Christian dogma, and, indeed, no better test question as to the effect of scientific progress on Christianity could well be devised. The general acceptance, till modern times, of one special view of creative action, together with the unhesitating consent of almost all men of science as to the indefinite durability of specific characters, made it in the highest degree unlikely that authoritative Christian teaching, in early mediæval times, should have laid down principles rendering the assimilation of Evolutionary Natural History by Theology not only possible but easy and natural. Nevertheless, the pages of this REVIEW\* have made evident that such assimilation is thus easy and natural, and so far as the present writer is aware, not even an attempt at a reply has yet been made to the statements and reasonings there brought forward. Christians may surely be pardoned if they consider this a proof case, and assert that the Religion which has borne this strain will bear any that Physical Science can bring to bear upon it. It might also be simi-

\* See the number for January, 1872.

larly shown that various other scientific questions (by some supposed to have a tendency conflicting with Christian dogma)—such as the antiquity of man, the phenomena of savage life, the necessity of nervous action to human thought, &c.—are beside the question, are indifferent matters in this relation, and necessarily futile as a basis of attack on the Church, and that, of course, whether the Church's claims be well- or ill-founded. On the other hand, it would not be difficult to show that there is a tendency in Modern Science—notably in Biology—to direct men's minds in the *opposite* direction. That is to say, to direct them towards conceptions once generally current,\* but which have, during the last three centuries, gradually passed out of general consciousness and become “forgotten” rather than “rejected.”

Such being the relations existing between Christianity and Physical Science, What, it may be asked, can be the peculiar character of science teaching which tends to prolong the hostility which has so long occupied us?

Shortly then, it is not the science teaching itself, it is the metaphysics which consciously or unconsciously happen so often to have been propagated with it. In considering the teaching of Physical Science, two very different things require to be well distinguished. (1) The facts as to the coexistences and sequences of phenomena, and (2) The special system of philosophy which such facts may be made use of to inculcate.

Physical Science being by its very nature occupied exclusively with phenomenal conceptions, must plainly be capable of adaptation to, or explanation by, more than one system of Philosophy; and that it is so experience proves. The Berkeleian, the Kantist, the Peripatetic, and the Materialist find no difficulty in presenting the facts of science in harmony with their respective views. We have seen that Physical Science itself must be simply indifferent as regards Christianity, but the very reverse is of course the case with the Materialistic or Pantheistic philosophical systems so often associated with it. The existence of such association is notorious, and the names of Vogt and Buchner may well be quoted as prominent inculcators of such teaching. With loud professions of Man's necessary ignorance is often joined a confident assertion as to the details of that course which would certainly be followed by a Being of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, did such a Being exist.

For one of the latest examples of the spirit of this teaching we are indebted to Dr. Struther, who last year propounded at Bradford an argument which has been† thus summarized:—“Because one or two individuals have died from the impactation of cherry-stones in

\* This is particularly striking in Mr. Lewes's “Problems of Life and Mind,” although reference thereto will come better under the head of Philosophy than of Scientific Evolution.

† In *Nature*, Oct. 16, 1873, vol. 8, No. 207, p. 509.

the appendix vermiformis, therefore there is no God." We have no evidence of the possibility having occurred to that gentleman that an indefinite number of final causes for the structure in question may (though unthought of by him) have preceded the existence of matter at all, and that amongst them might be the intellectual and moral effects of its contemplation on the minds of different men.

The specimen cited is typical because the religious doctrines directly and openly, or obliquely and covertly attacked in connexion with the teaching referred to, are not those of Christianity specially, but of Theism generally. The direction of attack has indeed greatly changed since the epoch of the "Deists." It is now pretty generally admitted, with regard to "Christianity" and "Theism" that arguments really telling against the first, are in their logical consequences fatal also to the second, and that a *Deus unus et remunerator* once admitted, an antecedent probability for a revelation must be conceded.

It would be, at the same time, invidious and superfluous here to cite examples of the popular Materialistic science teaching referred to but a significant specimen or two of its moral tendency may perhaps be worth quoting. Dr. Lewins tells\* us:—"Earth is Paradise if the healthy operation of every anatomical structure could be preserved. . . . "All that is fabled by poets, saints, martyrs, founders of sects and systems, under the term Saturnian, or Golden Age, Kingdom of Heaven, Paradise, &c., is comprehended in that supreme *bien aise* which results from the equilibrium of the bodily functions." Harmonizing with such declarations and with that exaggerated estimate of brute existence now so popular, is the teaching of Professor Ed. V. Hartmann. This expositor of science, impregnated with Antichristian Philosophy, teaches † as follows:—"It is important to make beast life better known to youth as being the truest source of pure nature, wherein they may learn to understand *their true being* in its simplest form, and in it rest and refresh themselves after the artificiality and deformity of our social condition." Again he tells ‡ us:—"The individuals of the lower and poorer classes and rough savages, are happier than the instructed and well-to-do classes." And he goes on to affirm that similarly brutes are happier than men, ending with the remarkable sentence: "Let us only think how *agreeably* an *ox* or a *hog* lives, almost as if he had learned to do so from Aristotle."

Here we have an actual modern resurrection of that old Pagan frame of mind satirized by Dr. Newman in the soliloquy of Jucundus:§—

\* "Life and Mind," by Robert Lewins, M.D.

† "Philosophie des Unbewussten," p. 359.

‡ Op. cit., p. 712.

§ "Callista," pp. 48, 49.

"Enjoyment's the great rule: ask yourself have I made the most of things? . . . I've often thought the hog is the only really wise animal. We should be happier if we were all hogs. Hogs keep the end of life steadily in view."

This (temporary and accidental association of certain metaphysical teaching with physics,\* must naturally tend to make Christian ministers assume a jealous if not hostile attitude towards Physical Science, and also to alienate a certain number of their disciples from them. Surely there is not merely much excuse for, but merit in such hostility, when the nature, in their

\* An instructive instance occurred last year, on the part of one of our leading thinkers, of the assumption that a protest against such association must necessarily be unscientific. Mr. Gladstone in an address given at Liverpool had remarked: "Upon the ground of what is termed evolution, God is relieved of the labour of creation; in the name of unchangeable laws, He is discharged from governing the world." Upon this he was taxed by Mr. Herbert Spencer (CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, October, 1873, p. 670) as "conspicuously making himself the exponent of the anti-scientific view," as regarding as "irreligious any explanation of Nature which dispenses with immediate divine superintendence," and as overlooking "the fact that the doctrine of gravitation, with the entire science of physical astronomy, is open to the same charge" as the doctrine of Evolution. Mr. Spencer is one of the last men to make an ill-considered charge, least of all against a thinker of a school opposed to his own, and it is therefore interesting to find that he does not appear to contemplate even the possibility of right being on Mr. Gladstone's side. That gentleman has written to vindicate himself from the charge of hostility to science, and to say (CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, December, 1873, p. 163) that his complaint is that the functions of the Almighty as Creator and Governor of the world are denied upon grounds, which . . . "appear to" him "utterly and manifestly insufficient to warrant such denial." But in fact what Mr. Gladstone said was most true and just—not in opposition to Mr. Spencer (who is open to criticism of another kind)—but in opposition to the general tendency and effects on men's minds of the teaching in vogue—an effect boastfully announced by outspoken adherents. Caro ("L'Idée de Dieu," p. 47) observes: "Science conducts God with honour to its frontiers, thanking him for his provisional services." Mr. Gladstone said no more than this! But there is a further misunderstanding. To explain the conditions of the solar system, considered with reference to physical science alone, the laws of astronomy are of course sufficient; but to adequately explain such conditions as parts of a great whole of which our own intellectual faculties form a portion, astronomical laws are *not* sufficient according to the teaching of a definite school of philosophy which claims Aristotle for its founder. Therefore, according to that philosophy, to say that a full recognition of the "doctrine of evolution" dispenses with "immediate divine superintendence," whether in the moon's motion or in the fall of a projectile, would be absurd. But this is the very error into which the unlearned are apt to fall, and this is the absurdity against which Mr. Gladstone meant, no doubt, to protest—the absurdity, that is, of supposing that "gravitation" or "evolution" if accepted are not "utterly and manifestly insufficient" to account for the phenomena, apart from Divine action, when such phenomena are considered as part of a universe made up of spiritual as well as of material existences. It seems then evident, that Mr. Gladstone, in the passage first cited, speaks as the adherent of one school of philosophy, while Mr. Spencer speaks as the adherent of another. The claims of these rival philosophies cannot be stated in this note, but whether the Peripatetic be true or false, all who hold it have a perfect right to speak as Mr. Gladstone spoke, without on that account having one fraction the less of love for physical science or of desire for knowledge of the laws of the phenomenal universe, from "gravitation" to the sociological value of the art of music and the *true* teleological relations of the "locomotive" and the "fiddle" respectively.



eyes, of two conflicting interests is considered. For anyone who accepts not a Revelation, but only Natural Religion, must regard *religious* and *physical* truth as possessing no common measure, just as the grandeur and beauty of Saturn's rings, and the grandeur and beauty of an heroic act of generous self-denial, cannot be compared together. To such acceptors of Revelation questions as to "the age of the world" or the "law of new specific origins," must appear trivial details when weighed in the balance with such questions as "Is the human will really free?" "Are our efforts after virtue lovingly responded to by an Infinite Being who knows every secret of our hearts so intimately that the closest human scrutiny is but an utterly inadequate symbol of it?" "Has a Revelation been made, and if so, what are its contents?"

If we before thought it just that those convinced of scientific truths should be moved to discourage a system they deem to be in contradiction with reason "from the scientific point of view, we must surely also think it just that those convinced of philosophic truths should be moved to discourage a system they deem to be in contradiction with reason," from the philosophic point of view. So long, therefore, and in so far as Pantheism or Materialism are associated with Physical Science, those who uphold Theism will be more or less opposed to such science while so associated. Thus it seems that the two special causes considered, act together to prolong the already long-standing antagonism between Physics and Theology.

Yet of any real antagonism between them we have found no trace, even in such a proof case as the application of the Evolutionary hypothesis to the appearance of new species of animals. Physical Science should then be considered alike by the philosophic Christian and Antichristian as neutral and indifferent. The question whether the philosophies in vogue accept and collocate the facts of science better than any other philosophy, cannot be considered till we come to the question of Philosophic Evolution. Meanwhile it appears that it is only possible for the advance of science to influence Christianity through such philosophy as may be incorporated with it. Philosophy affords then the real battle-ground for the contending forces, and it is on that all-important field that the future of Europe, the endurance of an existing social system, and the fate of Christianity must be decided.

But we may ask, Has not the advance of science itself an indirect effect upon the struggle? Does this advance tend to hinder or promote the study of philosophy? If it does do either, then, of course, it indirectly aids in the conflict, though itself inoperative directly. Now every physical science is, when once its study has been fairly begun, intensely interesting. Most popular sciences, such as zoology, botany, geology, &c., are followed with comparative facility; and are, to most minds, far easier than philosophical study

where the intellect has so constantly to be turned in upon itself. Yet from the limitations imposed by their very nature on the physical sciences, they tend to leave the minds of the more inquiring (and as education becomes diffused, of a greater number), with an unsatisfied craving after deeper explanations—in fact, with a desire for consistent philosophical conceptions to serve as a support for the laws and phenomena, and to embrace in one whole, all that such sciences make known. Yet within the last century there has been an increasing inclination to direct minds more and more exclusively to phenomena, and philosophy (especially in this country) has been more and more discredited and neglected till the very name “Metaphysics” has become a by-word of reproach. As might have been expected, however, a reaction has set in, and for the last five-and-twenty years the importance of philosophy and its actual necessity as a basis for science, has been more and more obtaining recognition, and the reaction is well exemplified by the declarations of our most esteemed teachers of Natural Science. On the continent the same spectacle meets our view, and Strauss, Buchner, Vogt, and Hartmann aid powerfully, even by their destructive efforts, in directing popular attention to fundamental questions of philosophy which underlie all physical science.

There can then be little doubt but that the further advance of science must aid indirectly in furthering that Philosophic Evolution which has next, and last, to occupy us. Nay, it is probable that the great philosophic reaction, towards which we seem to be rapidly approaching, would not be possible did not physical science attain a great development and wide popularity—so many minds being driven into philosophy through science. Thus through the science of matter, an increasing number of thinkers will come to have their attention directed to the science of mind. Recognizing that “the proper study of mankind is man,” and the all-importance of the old Delphic *Γνωθι Σεαυτόν*, they will necessarily be led to “Psychology” (the portal of “Metaphysics”), and thence to those questions which have occupied the noblest minds in all ages.

But leaving for the present the question of philosophy, let us seek the best answer we can get to our special question here—the effect of Scientific Evolution on the Church and on her ministers.

We have seen that Physical Science must go on increasing and diffusing itself while the disconnection of the clergy from the pursuit and attainment of distinction in the field of such science is likely to widen. At the same time we have seen that the assertions of Christian theology are not of a nature to be capable of disproof by any science of the kind. If physics could demonstrate that there is no knowable or personal First Cause; that no prototypal design in eternity preceded the orderly evolution of the physical universe in time; if it could show that death, which necessitates the

cessation of intellectual action as we experience it, necessarily or certainly renders all intellectual action impossible; if it could demonstrate that Christ never lived or never rose, that the Blessed Virgin was not immaculately conceived, or that there is no Divine presence in the Eucharist, then indeed the triumph of such science would but be another phrase to denote the annihilation of Christianity; but to all such questions Physical Science can have necessarily nothing to say. But it is here contended not only that the growth of Physical Science cannot in itself have an ultimately detrimental effect on the Church, but that its very growth is accidentally calculated to indirectly bring about results of an opposite character. If when we come to consider Philosophic Evolution, we find reason to believe that such Evolution will not be prejudicial to Christianity, then the number of Christians (and of the adherents of that natural religion of reason which Christianity takes for its basis) must continue to be large. In that case both its teachers and disciples must come to share in, and be more or less thoroughly imbued with, that physical science culture which it has been supposed will hereafter be so generally diffused. They will thus be guarded from simply accepting—as so many (through ignorance) now accept—the dogmatic assertions of some physical experts that a real incompatibility exists between science and religion. Also many adherents of Natural Theology will as surely become convinced that arguments which they have discovered to be futile as directed against natural religion, have neither more nor less weight as directed against Christianity.\* On the other hand the very arguments which they have to adduce in favour of Natural Theology will by many be seen to apply further, and plainly serve as supports to the foundations of Christianity while harmonizing with its whole genius and structure.

Again, Physical Science being almost universally diffused, will have lost its aspect of novelty, and also “aggressiveness” will be clearly seen to be no proper attribute of science, but only of certain definite philosophical systems, previously associated with it.

\* The late Mr. John Stuart Mill in his “Autobiography” (p. 70) laments that “those who reject revelation, very generally take refuge in an optimistic deism, a worship of the order of nature and the supposed course of Providence, *at least* as full of contradictions and perverting to the moral sentiments as any of the forms of Christianity, if only it is completely realized.” At pp. 38-39, he tells us that his father held Butler’s “Analogy” in esteem, and that it “kept him, as he said, for some considerable time, a believer in the divine authority of Christianity, by proving to him that whatever are the difficulties in believing that the Old and New Testaments proceed from, or record the acts of, a perfectly wise and good Being, the same and still greater difficulties stand in the way of the belief that a Being of such a character can have been the Maker of the Universe. He considered Butler’s argument as conclusive against the only opponents for whom it was intended. Those who admit an omnipotent as well as perfectly just and benevolent Maker and Ruler of such a world as this, *can say little against Christianity, but what can, with at least equal force, be retorted against themselves!*” On this subject consult the *Dublin Review* for January, 1874, Art. I., “Mr. Mill’s Philosophical Position.”

The laity will not find many amongst their clergy distinguished in Physical Science, but this result will not be altogether unwelcome to them, because however proper they may deem it for priests, under peculiar social conditions, or now and again through some special vocation, to devote themselves to physical science, yet they must abstractedly consider "Pegasus harnessed to the plough," as a symbol quite inadequate to represent the incongruity between such an employment and the ecclesiastical state. Yet though they will not find their clergy distinguished, they will find them universally as well acquainted with physical science as will be the bulk of cultivated men not specially devoted to it. They will thus be naturally encouraged to an increased confidence and trust in their religious teachers whilst the latter will *demonstrate* to the laity (by the mere fact of the mode of life they have chosen, for all their physically scientific culture) the really neutral character of all physical science in its relations with religion. Finally the clergy, having been compelled by circumstances to make this closer acquaintance with physical science, will know and be able to point out readily and exactly, what they may deem to have been the inferential errors of the preceding period as well as to combat more effectively such venerable conservatives as may continue to reiterate arguments analogous to some of the Dysteleological\* arguments of to-day.

If the foregoing views are correct, it seems to follow that, together with the changes anticipated, the Church's Ministers may not improbably regain much of that social and political influence which they have at present lost. Not that such influence will be exercised directly, as was the case in the Middle Ages—the process of division of labour alone would render that impossible. Their influence will only be able to be exercised indirectly by the peaceful process of persuading public opinion.

Thus it appears to the writer of this essay that the process of Scientific Evolution, and the action of the actively anti-Christian section of the community will probably result in the development of a clergy and laity more thoroughly, because more reflectively and self-consciously, Christian and scientific in their physio-philosophical views than the world has yet seen. Some of the most recent developments in Physiology, notably that of the nervous centres and the most modern discoveries in Anthropology are, to say the least, singularly harmonious with the Church's traditional teaching. Such developments and such discoveries may be, and probably are, fatal to crude views popularly considered religious and Christian in this country—such, *e.g.*, as the *reciprocal action* of soul and body, and

\* Dysteleology is a term which Professor Hæckel, of Jena, has devised to denote the study of the "purposelessness" of organs. An argument founded on such a conception, and relating to the appendix *vermiformis*, has already been noticed.

the existence of a primitive civilization, in the vulgar acceptance of that phrase. But they harmonize perfectly with the traditional teaching of theologians concerning the *anima forma corporis*, and *homo sylvaticus*, and with principles laid down centuries before such discoveries were made. Few religious controversial errors are more common than that of supposing that a Christian doctrine has been refuted, when in fact it is but a past Cartesian superstition that has been laid low, and thereby the old traditional view has become the more strengthened and justified. Descartes forsook the old traditional teaching as to the soul for speculative novelties of his own which have spread far and wide with the natural result of disgusting scientific physiologists with views erroneously supposed to be specially orthodox. Here, however, we are approaching the philosophical domain.

To conclude, there appears much reason for supposing that the process we have attempted to follow will be the occasion indeed for the abandonment of Christianity by many individuals, but that nevertheless the Church herself will be strengthened and made not only more capable of self-defence on the scientific arena, but also more vigorous and better armed for attack against adversaries who now possess very great influence. We have here, in fact, another aspect of the same process referred to in "Political Evolution"—that which renders bracing climates, rough living, and absence of medical aid, beneficial to a "community"—however fatal to "individuals," by killing off weak members and reducing it to a compact community of hardy and vigorous survivors.


The doctrines of the Church, whether they are or are not founded on fact, will at least receive an unexpected and powerful support and justification, if it comes to be demonstrated with regard to fresh scientific theories hereafter (as it has already been with Evolution), that they are powerless weapons as employed against her, she having asserted beforehand principles amply sufficient to shield her from such attacks. As to Evolution as applied to animal life it is absolutely unquestionable by anyone who understands the meaning of the terms that "it is evident that ancient and most venerable theological authorities distinctly assert *derivative* creation, and thus their teaching harmonizes with all that modern science can possibly require."\* It can hardly be denied to be a noteworthy fact, that the Church should have unconsciously provided for the reception of modern theories by the emission of fruitful principles and far-reaching definitions centuries before such theories were promulgated, and when views directly contradicting them were held universally, and even by those very men themselves who laid down the principles and definitions referred to. Circumstances so remarkable, such "undesigned coincidences" which, as *facts*, cannot be denied, must

\* "Genesis of Species," 2nd Edition, p. 305.

be allowed to have been "preordained" by all those who, being Theists, assert that a "purpose" runs through the whole process of cosmical Evolution. Such Theists must admit that, however arising or with whatever end, a prescience has watched over the Church's definitions, and that she has been so *guided* in her teaching as to be able to harmonize and assimilate, with her doctrines, the theories of modern science.

There seems then to be nothing in the process of Scientific Evolution to cause reasonable alarm and anxiety to Christians, or to afford their opponents any well-grounded hope. Such evolution can indeed be indirectly influential through the philosophy which may be mixed up with it, but by that alone. The question then as to the future course of the philosophic aspect of Contemporary Evolution is the supremely important question of all those connected with that great modern movement—the Renaissance—made up as it is of the partially allied, partially conflicting elements of Paganism and Civicism. To this question the writer proposes to next address himself and thereby to terminate his essay on Contemporary Evolution.

ST. GEORGE MIVART.



## LORD ELLENBOROUGH'S INDIAN ADMINISTRATION.

*History of the Indian Administration of Lord Ellenborough in his correspondence with the Duke of Wellington. To which is prefixed by permission of Her Majesty Lord Ellenborough's letters to the Queen during that period. Edited by LORD COLCHESTER.*

“**O**MNIUM consensu capax imperii nisi imperasset,” are words which have been applicable to many rulers since the days of the Emperor Galba ; but to few could they have been more justly applied, than to the Governor-General of India, whose brief administration, as recorded in his letters to the Queen and to the Duke of Wellington, forms the subject of the volume, lately edited by Lord Colchester. Of the men who had previously held that high office in recent times, not one had entered upon its duties with such advantages of previous preparation as were possessed by Lord Ellenborough, when he sailed for Calcutta late in the autumn of 1841. Thirteen years before he had been selected by the Duke of Wellington for the presidency of the Board of Control ; and in that capacity, and subsequently as one of the leading members of the Opposition, he had taken an active part in the discussions which preceded the passing of the East India Company's Charter Act of 1833. He had again presided at the India Board during Sir Robert Peel's short administration in 1834 and 1835, and was holding the office for the third time, when, in the autumn of 1841, he was appointed to succeed Lord Auckland as Governor-General of India. Whatever failings he had exhibited in these periods of his official career, they were evidently regarded by those who were associated with him in public business as comparatively unimportant. The most eminent members of the Court of Directors appear to have cordially concurred in his selection for the Governor-Generalship,

entertaining "the highest opinion of his talents, energy, and indefatigable application to business," and anticipating "the best results from his administration;" and so warmly was the appointment approved by the Great Duke, that, immediately on hearing of it, he wrote to express his desire to be present at the dinner, which, according to the custom of the East Indian Company, was to be given by the Court to the departing Proconsul, being anxious, as he said, "above all things to manifest my concurrence and appreciation in your appointment." Indeed one of the most remarkable facts brought out in the volume before us, is the sincere regard which the Duke entertained for a man, whose character so little resembled his own, and whose failings were of a kind, which, it might naturally be supposed, would have been especially repugnant to his straightforward and unostentatious temperament; but it is impossible to read the correspondence, without finding repeated evidence, that the Duke of Wellington had a high opinion of Lord Ellenborough's capacity, and a sanguine expectation that he would acquit himself worthily of the arduous trust which had been confided to him. It was rumoured at the time, and the rumour has often been repeated since, that the Duke shared in the disappointment which was very generally felt at Lord Ellenborough's acts, and that his real opinions but ill accorded with those, which, out of loyalty to his colleague, he felt bound to express in Parliament; but from the letters now published it seems evident that there was no ground for the rumour. Writing on the 4th of March 1843, at the close of the first year of Lord Ellenborough's government, having before him the whole of the Governor-General's proceedings in connection with Afghanistan, including that most silly and mischievous proclamation regarding the Gates of Somnāth, the Duke winds up a brief account of the proceedings of the House of Lords, in reference to the vote of thanks, with the remark, "Everything appears to be going on satisfactorily in your quarter, and I sincerely congratulate you." In another letter, written in the following month, full of friendly cautions to his correspondent to be more careful and circumspect in his dealings with his masters at the India House, the Duke distinctly states that he considers the public welfare to be involved in the continuance of Lord Ellenborough's supreme administration of the local affairs of India; and after Lord Ellenborough's recall, when the Court of Directors had expressed their not unreasonable dissatisfaction at the course taken by a number of military officers, in giving a public entertainment to the displaced Governor-General, the Duke took the trouble to write an elaborate memorandum in his capacity of Commander-in-Chief, for the purpose of showing that the conduct of the officers was not deserving of censure; and sent a copy of it to Lord Ellenborough, for the purpose, as the covering note states, of affording him some amusement. Whatever the Duke may have



thought of Lord Ellenborough's manner of writing and of talking, and of ignoring those to whom he was officially subordinate, on each of which points he gave him friendly warnings from time to time, it would seem that, to the last, he retained the high opinion he had long held of Lord Ellenborough's talents, and of his fitness for his important office in all essential points. And in India the view taken of Lord Ellenborough's appointment was quite in accordance with that held by the Home authorities. In those days the only opinion in India that found public expression, was the opinion of the two great Services—the Covenanted Civil Service, and the European officers of the Army. Matters in this respect are a good deal altered now. The non-official European community is considerably increased, and there is in every part of India a large and constantly increasing body of educated natives, many of whom are very competent to form, and are very ready to express, an opinion on the acts and policy of the leading statesmen, both in this country and in India. But in 1841 the public opinion of India, as far as it could be said to exist, was confined to the two great Services, and by them the selection of Lord Ellenborough was very generally approved. They believed him to be an able and sagacious man, firm of purpose, well fitted to cope with, and, as far as might be, to retrieve the disasters which had been inflicted on the Empire by the unfortunate policy of his predecessor, and well qualified by his knowledge of the leading facts and principles of Indian administration, and by his capacity for mastering details, to develope the moral and material progress of the country.

And, in addition to the advantages which Lord Ellenborough possessed in his previous official training, and in the established confidence both of the Home authorities and of the Indian services, the circumstances under which he entered upon his office were, in other respects, by no means unfavourable. A leading member of a great political party, which a few months before had been borne into power by the voice of the nation, their political opponents disorganized and discredited by a series of administrative and financial blunders; succeeding a Governor-General who had gone far towards imperilling the British power in India by a policy ill-advised in its conception and disastrous in its results, but whose errors, though grave, were by no means incapable of being retrieved by a vigorous and courageous administrator—Lord Ellenborough had ample scope for an early display of those qualities which his friends and the public believed him to possess. To relieve the garrisons still remaining in Afghanistan; to rescue the prisoners and hostages in the hands of the Afghans, or if that, unhappily, were impossible, to avenge their fate by a prompt and stern retribution; to replace the flag of England on the walls of the city which had seen it dragged and dishonoured; to prove to the people of British India and to the native states that the power of Great Britain, however for a time it may

appear to waver, rests on a firm and stable foundation ; to bring the war in China to a satisfactory termination ; and having thus vindicated the honour and restored the prestige of his country, to introduce cautiously, but thoroughly, such reforms as were needed in the civil and military administration ; to restore the finances ; to command the respect and confidence of the Services, through whose agency the administration is conducted ; to rule the subject races with even-handed and impartial justice ;—in the words which he spoke at the banquet given in his honour by the Directors of the East India Company—

“To restore peace to Asia, and from that peace to draw the means of creating a surplus revenue, the best guarantee of public improvement and of liberal, even of honest government, and, in possession of that surplus revenue, to emulate the magnificent beneficence of the Mahometan Emperors in their great works of public utility ; to perfect and extend the canals of irrigation, the only certain source of fertility in the East ; and gradually and cautiously, and with due circumspection and regard for the feelings, and even the prejudices of the natives of India, to impart to them whatever of useful knowledge we have ourselves inherited or acquired, and thus to elevate the character, and extend the happiness of the people”—

these were objects not unworthy of a great ambition, but which could not be regarded as beyond the capacity of a statesman, who, with the unanimous approval of those best qualified to judge, had been entrusted with the destinies of British India.

It has seldom happened that expectations so high, and withal so reasonable, have been so signally disappointed. For the satisfactory termination of the war with China, some share of the credit may fairly be claimed for Lord Ellenborough. From his accession to office as President of the Board of Control, in August, 1841, up to his departure from England, and again on his arrival in India, he gave close attention to the arrangements being made in connexion with the expedition, very sensibly availing himself of the advice of the Duke of Wellington, whose papers on the subject are among the most interesting and instructive documents in the present volume. The chief credit for the successful issue of the war is doubtless due to the firmness and resolution with which the British Commissioner, Sir Henry Pottinger, applied the military and naval resources at his disposal ; but the energy and care with which Lord Ellenborough directed the preparations are deserving of recognition. Lord Ellenborough also evinced considerable energy in urging on the supply of carriage and material, which, though intended for a different purpose, enabled Pollock and Nott to advance to Cabul ; and there can be no question, that in the subsequent operations, which resulted in the destruction of the mutinous army of Gwalior, the measures of the Governor-General were characterized by sagacity and foresight. It must also be admitted that in the distribution of his patronage, a

very important branch of the duties of an Indian Governor, he was generally actuated by a high sense of duty. Lord Ellenborough has the merit of having recognized the ability of the late Mr. Thomason and of Sir Henry Lawrence; and although, in this matter of patronage, his action was on several occasions warped by unreasonable prejudices, there are no grounds for imputing to him those errors of nepotism and favoritism which so many administrators are unable to avoid.

But when we have said this, we have said nearly everything that it is possible to say in favour of Lord Ellenborough's administration. If the decision of the question of marching on Cabul and rescuing the captives had rested with Lord Ellenborough, those measures, so essential to the honour and prestige of the British Empire in India, would not have been carried out. The two armies would have returned disheartened and discouraged, their leaders smarting under a sense of disasters unretrieved, of a solemn duty unfulfilled; the belief in our invincibility destroyed; the fidelity of our native troops and the allegiance of the native states rudely shaken. No sooner had these dangers been averted by the judicious and honourable reluctance of the Generals to act on the orders which they had received from the Governor-General, than he committed himself by his silly and pompous proclamation of the Gates to a complete departure from those sound principles of impartial treatment of the various races and religions which had hitherto characterized British rule in India; and, before many weeks had elapsed, he had given his sanction to an act of aggression, the injustice of which was denounced from one end of India to the other. By this unjust aggression, by his vacillation regarding the advance on Cabul, by the disingenuous, though palpable, misuse of language, whereby he endeavoured to disguise his change of purpose, by his illtreatment of such men as Outram, Eldred Pottinger, and Macgregor, by his avowed and unreasonable hostility to the Civil Service, by his contemptuous indifference to the authority of the Court of Directors, Lord Ellenborough, before he had been a year in office, had forfeited the respect and confidence of the best men of all classes, and had grievously disappointed the expectations with which his appointment had been welcomed.

That part of Lord Ellenborough's administration which has been most generally and most justly criticized, and which did more than anything else to injure his reputation as a resolute and sagacious statesman, is the course taken by him in connexion with the movements of the forces under Generals Pollock and Nott. We need not repeat the oft-told tale of the Cabul disaster, the murder of Sir Alexander Burnes, the assassination of the Envoy, the incapacity of the General, the ill-judged and fatal convention, and the treacherous destruction of the greater part of the army on its retreat towards

Jellalabad. These lamentable events had all occurred after Lord Ellenborough's embarkation for India, while he was on his long sea voyage round the Cape; but although Cabul had been lost, and a large British force had been destroyed, Nott still held his own at Candahār, Sale was making a brave stand at Jellalabad, and at Ghuzni there was still a garrison, which, it was hoped, would hold out until relief could be sent. Before Lord Ellenborough's arrival in India steps had already been taken, having for their object the relief of the garrisons still in Afghanistan. One unsuccessful effort had been made by a Brigade of native troops under Colonel Wild to penetrate the Khyber Pass in aid of the garrison at Jellalabad, and General Pollock had been appointed to command a larger force assembled for the same purpose. The action of the retiring Governor-General, after the intelligence of the destruction of General Elphinstone's force reached Calcutta, had been marked by much vacillation and indecision; but a few days before the arrival of his successor, he had furnished General Pollock with instructions, in which he was told, that, while providing for the safe withdrawal of the force at Jellalabad, he was to consider it "one of the first objects of his solicitude to procure the release of British officers and soldiers and their families and private servants and followers who were held in captivity." Lord Ellenborough's accession to office was immediately followed by the despatch of a letter to the Commander-in-Chief, containing a vigorous and statesmanlike announcement of the policy to be adopted. It pointed to the relief of the garrisons at Jellalabad, Ghuzni, Khelāt-i-Ghilzie, and Candahār; to the re-establishment of our military reputation by the infliction of some signal and decisive blow upon the Afghans, which should make it appear to them, and to our own subjects and to our allies, that we had the power of inflicting punishment upon those who commit atrocities and violate their faith; and that we withdrew ultimately from Afghanistan, not from any deficiency of means to maintain our position, but because we were satisfied that the king we had set up, had not, as we were erroneously led to imagine, the support of the nation over which he had been placed. In this, as in Lord Auckland's final order, the release of the prisoners was pointed out as "an object deeply interesting in point of feeling and honour." This letter, which was signed by the Governor-General and the members of his Council, Mr. Bird, General Casement, and Mr. Prinsep, was worthy of the reputation which Lord Ellenborough had brought with him. The policy which it laid down, was at once resolute and prudent. While urging the importance of striking a decisive blow—"a blow which might re-establish our military character beyond the Indus, and leave a deep impression of our power, and of the vigour with which it would be applied to punish an atrocious enemy,"—it deprecated in the strongest terms

any rash exposure of the troops or the incurring any unnecessary risk, and prohibited the occupation of any advanced position beyond the Khyber Pass, unless the General should be satisfied that he could by his own strength overawe and overcome all who disputed the Pass, and keep up at all times his communications with Peshawur and the Indus. While expounding the general views and opinions of the Government, it left to the commanding Generals a full discretion as to the manner in which those views and opinions should be carried out. Had Lord Ellenborough adhered to the policy enunciated in this, the first state-paper issued by him as Governor-General, he would have justly merited the thanks which he eventually received from Parliament. But before many weeks had elapsed, he had abandoned every part of his programme, except the withdrawal of the garrisons, and had practically resolved to leave the prisoners and hostages to their fate. On the 7th of April he left Calcutta for the north-west provinces, unaccompanied by his Council, and shortly afterwards receiving intelligence of the capitulation of the Ghuzni garrison and of the repulse of General England on his way to Candahar with reinforcements for General Nott, he directed the latter General to evacuate Candahar and Khelat-i-Ghilzie, and to take up a position at Quettah until the season might enable him to retire upon the Indus.

Orders to a similar effect were sent to General Pollock through the Commander-in-Chief; and although these orders were followed by a communication sent direct to the General, in which the possibility of his advancing to Cabul was adverted to as a thing to be desired;—an intimation which Pollock very properly took advantage of to delay the evacuation and eventually to obtain the rescission of the previous orders, it is impossible to read the official correspondence, without being forced to the conclusion, that Lord Ellenborough's deliberate opinion, if an opinion so vacillating can be designated as deliberate, was against any advance; and that in his estimation the release of the prisoners and the re-establishment of our military character, had ceased to be other than very secondary considerations, in comparison with the paramount object of withdrawing the troops in safety from Afghanistan. That this conclusion is in no way overstrained, is proved by more than one passage in the volume now before us.

In a letter to the Duke of Wellington, dated the 17th of May, 1842, Lord Ellenborough writes:—

“When General Pollock reached Jellalabad the force had half rations for eight days, and hardly any carriage. Since, provisions beyond the daily consumption have come in; but the means of movement are still wanting, and to advance to Cabul, where our captured guns defend the Bala Hissar, would be wild. *The General thinks so. He has been ordered to retire, but I am apprehensive that, partly necessary considerations for the health of the*

*troops, and the influence of the entourage of Jellalabad, will make him linger there in the hope of making some arrangements for the release of the prisoners."*

Again on the 7th of June :—

"I regret to say that in Major-General Nott I do not entertain the smallest confidence as an officer. He is a brave man, but his own troops do not respect him as a general. *There is such a real madness in some military men, and in all political men with respect to Afghanistan, that I am convinced that every pretext will be sought to remain there without any attainable object, without adequate means of movement, and without communications. Every possible effort is making to procure camels below the passes, and I think that by the beginning of the cold weather this army will be able to move as a tolerably equipped army to Quetta, and thence to the Indus. Major-General Pollock's army is yet more destitute of the means of movement than that of Major-General Nott. The camels (2400) were hired only to Jellalabad. Some drivers would not go beyond Peshawur. Of the Government camels (1600) many have been stolen and lost. There is a difficulty there, too, arising out of the season, not insurmountable, however. A greater difficulty exists in the influence of the political officers—the men anxious for revenge, and the others naturally clinging to the hope of relieving the prisoners. All these, since his arrival at Jellalabad, have got round Major-General Pollock, have led him to misunderstand the plainest instructions, and to act upon the passions of others, not upon his own reason."*

The italics in both passages are ours. It is plain that whatever temporary inclination he had felt to approve of an advance by Pollock's army upon Cabul, Lord Ellenborough, when these letters were written, was altogether opposed to any such movement; that he regarded it as impracticable; that he disapproved of the influences which he believed were being brought to bear upon both the Generals, but more especially upon Pollock, to delay the withdrawal of the troops until an attempt had been made to rescue the prisoners; and that he considered the instructions which he had given to be perfectly clear and decisive against any such policy.

The depreciatory allusion to Nott is singularly inconsistent with what Lord Ellenborough wrote less than a month afterwards. On the 6th July that gallant, but irascible, officer, in whom on the 7th of June the Governor-General had "not the slightest confidence as an officer," is described as having "thoroughly re-established among his troops the feeling of superiority." In August he is again mentioned in terms of high praise. In a letter to the Duke, dated the 17th of that month, adverting to General Nott's resolution to advance to Cabul by way of Ghuzni, or, as the Governor-General terms it, "to retire a portion of his army by the route of Ghuzni and Cabul, Lord Ellenborough observes that "Major-General Nott writes with a full sense of the difficulties before him, but he thinks them worth incurring for the advantages to be derived from a successful march, and he looks at the whole measure with a grave and prudent resolution which affords the best omen." What was the origin of this remarkable

change of opinion on the part of the Governor-General, does not appear ; but it is evident from these letters, that having in the first instance greatly under-estimated the merits of Nott, he subsequently, if anything, over-valued them ; while of Pollock, who seems to have been the better General of the two, he expressed a very mean opinion to the last. We have already seen how Lord Ellenborough attributed to General Pollock a weak subservience to the views and influence of others. In a subsequent letter he writes with reference to Pollock's army : " I am doing all I possibly can to send on to it camels and mules, but I cannot make a General, and it wants that more than anything else. Had he had any real energy, he would not have allowed the camels he took with him to be sent back. If he had any real mind, he would not be in the hands of the boys about him." Some months later, referring to a hasty step taken by General Nott in tendering his resignation of his command in General Pollock's army, which the former afterwards admitted to have been an ill-advised and uncalled-for act, Lord Ellenborough at once assumes that Pollock was the one in fault, and again writes of him to the Duke in very disparaging terms, contrasting his conduct unfavourably with that of Nott, for whom he says he has " a much higher respect than for any officer in the service."

This prejudice against Pollock continued undiminished even after the successful return of the expedition. When the army returned to India, Pollock was relegated to the comparatively obscure post of Divisional Commander at Dinapore, while Nott was selected for the important office of Resident at the Court of the Nawab of Oudh. Eventually, not long before his own departure from India, possibly under the influence of a tardy repentance for past injustice, Lord Ellenborough appointed Pollock as Nott's successor at Lucknow on the retirement of the latter ; an appointment which, while it was creditable to the Governor-General's candour, afforded evidence, if evidence were needed, of the injustice of the original supersession ; for if Pollock was fit for the office, it was only reasonable, that in the distribution of rewards at the close of the war, he should have been preferred to an officer, who, however distinguished, had just held a position immediately subordinate to his own.

But the truth is, that in addition to his seniority in military rank, Pollock was superior to Nott in some of the qualities most essential to the successful discharge of the office for which Nott was thus selected in the first instance. It may seem invidious to institute a comparison between two men who have both deserved so well of their country ; but the disparaging terms applied in these letters to the one whom we honestly believe to have been the superior man of the two, render it impossible to avoid such a comparison ; and there can be no question, that, while equally brave, equally firm, equally competent as a General, Pollock was greatly Nott's superior in tact, in

temper, in consideration for others, in fact, in all those qualities which are usually considered essential in a post, the duties of which partake more or less of a diplomatic character. Pollock was also, if we may judge from what took place in Afghanistan, the more enterprising and the more chivalrous man of the two. At the very time that Lord Ellenborough was writing to the Duke of Wellington that Pollock considered an advance upon Cabul to be impracticable, and was only detained at Jellalabad by the influence of injudicious advisers, there was on its way to the Secretary to Government a letter from that General, which shows how utterly unfounded was the Governor-General's impression:—

"It is true," he wrote, "that the garrison of Jellalabad has been saved, which it would not have been, had a force not been sent for its relief. But the relief of the garrison is only one object. There still remain others which we cannot disregard. I allude to the release of the prisoners. I expect about nineteen Europeans from Budecabad in a few days. The letters which have passed about other prisoners have already been forwarded for the information of his Lordship. If, while these communications were in progress, I were to retire, it would be supposed that a panic had seized us. I therefore think that our remaining in this vicinity, or perhaps a few marches in advance, is essential to uphold the character of the British nation, and in like manner General Nott might also hold his post till a more favourable season."

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"I cannot imagine any force being sent from Cabul which I could not successfully oppose. But the advance on Cabul would require that General Nott should act in concert, and advance also. I therefore cannot help regretting that he should be directed to retire, which, without some demonstration of our power, he will find some difficulty in doing."

This is not the language of a man who needed any extraneous influence to impel him to the bolder course. It shows that what he deemed to be perilous, was not the advance, but the premature withdrawal of the troops. It proves that he, equally with Nott, well deserved the panegyric which we have already quoted; that he, like Nott, was not insensible to the difficulties of the enterprize which he desired to undertake, but "thought them worth incurring for the advantages to be derived from a successful march," and that he too looked at the whole matter in hand "with a grave and prudent resolution" which afforded the best omen of success, and which, we may add, ought to have elicited the confidence, not the distrust, of the Governor-General. Nor did Pollock confine himself to urging upon the Governor-General the policy which he deemed essential to the maintenance of the national honour. He took upon himself the responsibility of requesting Nott to delay his retirement from Candahar until the receipt of further orders from India; a suggestion which Nott readily acted on, and which materially contributed to the success of the expedition; for there can be no doubt that if Pollock had been left in the north of Afghanistan without the sup-



port of Nott's army in the south, the opposition which the former met with upon his advance to Cabul would have been much more serious, and the difficulties in the way of the rescue of the prisoners would have been greatly enhanced. Lord Hardinge's subsequent remark that "the whole of the merit of the advance from Jellalabad to Cabul" was due to Pollock, fell even short of the truth. Had it not been for Pollock's intervention, Nott's force would have been withdrawn to Quetta, and the permission to "retire" by way of Ghuzni would in all probability never have been given. Further, had the question of sending a force to rescue the prisoners depended upon Nott, it would not have been sent; for, when offered the command of such a force, he declined it, and did what he could to dissuade Pollock from sending one.

The letters now published throw no new light on the causes which induced the Governor-General at length to sanction the advance on Cabul. Whether the change in his purpose was caused by Pollock's letter, which was omitted from the correspondence when first laid before Parliament—an omission which has never been satisfactorily accounted for—or whether it is to be attributed to inward promptings in the breast of the Governor-General, who, on further reflection, was ashamed of his previous orders, but lacked the moral courage to admit his error; or whether he was influenced by a knowledge of the strong feeling of indignation which his order to retreat had evoked from the European community in every part of India, can never be certainly known. The letters to Her Majesty and to the Duke have left this part of the question exactly as it was left by the official correspondence. Whatever may have been the cause, after several week's vacillation, Lord Ellenborough at length, on the 4th July, summoned resolution, not to order the advance, but to leave it to the discretion of one of the commanding Generals, upon whom was imposed the entire responsibility of the division. The General to whom this important discretion was entrusted was not the senior General in Afghanistan—not Pollock, who had so urgently pressed the policy which was now to be allowed, and who, as the senior officer, must exercise the command in the event of the two armies becoming united; but Nott, who was the junior officer of the two, and who commanded the weaker force. In granting this permission, the Governor-General was careful to state that nothing had occurred to induce him to alter his first opinion, that the measure commended by considerations of political and military prudence, was to bring back the armies now in Afghanistan at the earliest possible period at which their retirement could be effected, consistently with the health and efficiency of the troops, into positions, wherein they might have easy and certain communication with India, and that to this extent the instructions which the General had received, remained unaltered. The despatch went on to say that the improved position of General

Nott's army induced the Governor-General to leave to his option the line by which he should withdraw his troops from that country. It concluded with a statement of the advantages to be gained, and of the risks to be encountered, and a copy of it was sent to Pollock with a covering letter, in which the measure left to Nott's discretion was designated as his adoption of "the line of retirement by Ghuzni and Cabul." Writing more than a month afterwards to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, Lord Ellenborough reiterates the extraordinary assertion that there had been no change in his views. "You will perceive," he wrote on the 16th August, "that I adhere absolutely to my original intention of withdrawing the whole army from Afghanistan, and that I have in the most emphatic manner repeated the order before given for that withdrawal." As might be expected, the private letters in no way justify or explain the strange perversion of language, by which the Governor-General sought to maintain an appearance of consistency by describing an advance into the heart of an enemy's country as a retirement. Such language, if it had been used by one of the Generals who had all along urged the advance, might have passed for grim irony. Emanating from the Governor-General who had ordered the retreat, it can only be regarded as a transparent and futile attempt to evade the imputation of change of purpose.

Nott proved himself worthy of the discretion permitted to him. He, like Pollock, had all along held that the honour and interests of his country demanded that vengeance should be taken for the murder of the British Envoy and the treacherous attack on General Elphinstone's force. So far back as the 25th of February he had expressed this opinion in a letter to the Government of India, and he had again done so more fully on the 24th of March. "If," he wrote on the latter date,

"Government intend to recover even temporarily, and for the saving of our national honour, their lost position in that country—even if doubtful of the policy that it may be deemed expedient to pursue—I earnestly hope that, before any retrograde step is made in either direction, our whole position in Afghanistan will be deliberately viewed, and that the effect which a hasty retirement would certainly and instantly have upon the whole of Beloochistan, and even on the navigation of the Indus, will be taken into consideration. At present the impression of our military strength among the people of the country, though weakened by the occurrences at Cabul, is not destroyed; but if we now retire, and it should again become necessary to advance, we shall labour under many disadvantages, the most serious of which, in my opinion, will be a distrust of our strength among our soldiers, which any active form of weakness is calculated to induce. And in what other light would the withdrawal from Jellalabad or Candahar be viewed?"

In June he wrote to his daughters:

"I received an order from the Supreme Government months ago to fall

back. I did not do so, and laid hold of an 'if' in the letter as the excuse ; but now—what now ?—well, never mind, murder will out—the keen wind blowing over the bleached bones of our comrades, now in heaps on the rugged Afghan mountains, will whistle the imbecility and infancy of some high functionaries over Asia ; and the thousand petty states that did tremble at the noble lion's breathing will now crow in derision if he attempt to roar."

Nott's decision, on being furnished with the discretionary power given to him by Lord Ellenborough, was exactly what might have been expected from the writer of these words. He at once marched upon Ghuzni, and, after having beaten the Afghans in more than one encounter, found that city, when he was about to assault it, already evacuated, and in the vicinity of Cabul effected a junction with Pollock's victorious army. The Afghans having been thoroughly beaten, the British flag replanted on the Bala Hissar, the Bazaar destroyed in which the Envoy's mutilated remains had been insultingly exposed, and the prisoners released (though in this part of the enterprise Nott, as we have said, most unaccountably declined to take a part), the united forces returned to India, and were received in triumph by the Governor-General on the banks of the Sutlej. Their return had been preceded by the issue of two proclamations, the first of which, written while the Governor-General was still in ignorance of the fate of the prisoners and hostages, contained a reflection at once ungenerous and unstatesmanlike on the policy of Lord Auckland ; while the second, addressed to the Princes and Chiefs and people of India, announced in stilted language the recovery, from the tomb of the Mahomedan Emperor Sultan Mahomed, of the gates of the Hindoo temple of Somnāth, which eight hundred years before had been carried off to Ghuzni. The last of these proclamations was one of the most ill-judged, and, as the historian of the war justly designates it, the most ridiculous document that ever emanated from the bureau of a statesman. Though addressed to the whole people of India, it contained an open insult to the Mahomedan section of the community, and in thus pitting race against race, and, as it were, identifying the Government with the special protection of the Hindoo religion, as opposed to that of the Mahomedans, it involved a mischievous departure from the established policy of the British Government. The attempt to justify it, on the ground of the disaffection of the Mahomedans, which is made in the letter to the Duke of Wellington of the 4th of October, 1842, is weak and silly in the extreme ; the only proof of the said disaffection which the Governor-General is able to adduce, being the alleged consternation of a native nurse and of some of the Commander-in-Chiefs' domestic servants on hearing the salutes which were fired in honour of the recapture of Ghuzni and Cabul. Lord Ellenborough's policy appears to have been, if policy it may be called, to win the confidence of the Hindoos

by presenting to them the recovery of the Gates as a guarantee of the future security of themselves and their religion against the Mussulmans. Such a manifestation, if it had any effect at all, was certain to excite the hostility of the class who had most reason to resent British rule; the class which formed a most important element in the composition of the native army, and which, as subsequent events have shown, was well able to seduce their Hindoo fellow-subjects into making common cause against their foreign rulers.

We cannot quit the subject of Lord Ellenborough's conduct in connection with Afghanistan, without adverting to the unreasoning prejudice which he evinced against the Political officers employed in that country and elsewhere on the north-west frontier, and which is frequently betrayed in these letters. We have already quoted one passage in which he speaks of the madness of the political agents in respect of Afghanistan. To this we might reply in the words which were once used, we believe by the elder Pitt, respecting General Wolfe, that it would have been well if some of these mad Politicals could have bitten the Governor-General before he ordered the withdrawal of the troops; but in the language of sober seriousness, it is difficult to exaggerate the services which these men rendered at that critical time. George Clerk in the Punjab, maintaining the wavering alliance of the Sikhs, pressing on reinforcements in spite of the avowed opposition of the Commander-in-Chief, and pushing on carriage for Pollock's force; Outram in Scinde rendering a similar service to Nott at Candahār; Macgregor at Jellalabad, by his knowledge of the country and his acquaintance with the Afghan chiefs, enabling Pollock "to obtain abundant supplies from every quarter;" Rawlinson at Candahār, at one time pitting one tribe of Afghans against another, at another time expelling the whole of the Afghans from the city, encouraging the Ryots in the surrounding country to repair their irrigation works, and in every way rendering invaluable aid to Nott; and lastly, Eldred Pottinger, while still a captive, deposing the Governor of the Fort in which he was confined, issuing proclamations, granting remissions of revenue, and bestowing *khilāts*;\* —all these men were doing what men could do to uphold the honour of their country; were rendering services which a discerning and magnanimous statesman would have been prompt to recognize; but all, with the exception of Clerk, were included in a common condemnation as hare-brained boys or madmen, anxious only for revenge, and guided by passion rather than by judgment. Macgregor at an early period was removed from his appointment as Assistant Political Agent; although, so invaluable were his services deemed by Pollock, that the latter continued to employ him in the discharge of practically the same duties as those from which he had been ostensibly removed. In the following year Outram was left without employment; and when

\* *Khilāt*, a dress of honour.

this gallant and already most distinguished officer subsequently applied for a personal interview with the Governor-General, it was declined. Eldred Pottinger, who was entitled to courteous treatment and consideration from the ruler of British India, if it were only for his gallant defence of Herat, and whose bearing throughout the disasters in Afghanistan, was proved beyond doubt to have been consistently brave and wise, met with studied neglect. In regard to Rawlinson, whether in consequence of his close association with Nott, whom Lord Ellenborough delighted to honour, or because he had made himself acquainted with the real value of the work done by the Political Agent of Candahār, Lord Ellenborough appears to have changed his opinion; for shortly after the return of the troops from Afghanistan, Rawlinson was selected for an important mission at Bagdad; and in one of the letters in the present volume (p. 432) Lord Ellenborough thanks the Duke for having attended to his wishes regarding Rawlinson's promotion in military rank.

More discreditable, however, than the prejudice which these letters evince on the part of the writer, are the extraordinary inconsistencies which they betray between his private and his official writings. While in a private letter to the Duke of Wellington (p. 277), Captain Macgregor's removal from his political appointment is described as "a strong hint that orders were to be obeyed, not misinterpreted and evaded," we find on turning to the official correspondence, that, in reporting the matter to the Secret Committee, Lord Ellenborough mentioned that he had taken the opportunity of according to him (Captain Macgregor) "his approbation of the able and zealous manner in which he had discharged his duties as Assistant Political Agent." The same thing occurs in regard to Outram. In the private letters every opportunity is taken of disparaging his services. He is accused of breaches of official confidence, as unfounded in fact as they were foreign to his honourable and chivalrous nature. In direct opposition to the facts, he is discredited with the blame of General England's repulse at Hykulzie; and yet in the official orders and despatches, Outram is thanked for the "zeal and ability he manifested in the collection of the means of carriage and supply, and in his various transactions with the native chiefs and tribes, tending to facilitate and secure the descent of the several columns of the army." So in regard to Pollock. In the private letters Pollock is described as no General, as "destitute of real energy," as "misunderstanding the plainest instructions," as miscalculating the value of objects," and "acting upon the passions of others, not upon his own reason." According to the official notification dated 21st September, 1842, Pollock had, "through the prudence of his arrangements, and the correctness of the movements directed by him, had the gratification of affording to his troops the opportunity of proving their superiority to the Afghans on the very scene of the late disaster on the retreat from Cabul." In each one of these instances,

the truth is told in the official, and not in the private letters, the publication of which is, under the circumstances, almost incomprehensible.

Another of the prejudices, of which evidence is given in the volume before us, is Lord Ellenborough's extraordinary aversion to the Indian Civil Service. Of this there is a remarkable indication in one of the first letters written by him to the Duke of Wellington from Calcutta (page 186), where he recommends the removal of the two Members of Council at Madras from their appointments. The nature of the recommendation, and the offhand manner in which it is made, are very characteristic. The Governor-General does not take the trouble to specify the grounds on which he advocates the adoption of this severe treatment of two experienced public officers; but it is to be inferred from the context, that he disapproved of the measures taken by the Madras Government in dealing with a case of insubordination, amounting to mutiny, which had occurred in certain Native regiments at Hyderabad, and with claims urged by other regiments proceeding on service to China. In each of these cases, as in almost every case of mutiny in the Madras army, with the exception of the mutiny at Vellore, the misconduct of the men was attributable to changes made in the regulations regarding their pay and allowances, or regarding the pensions payable to their heirs in the event of their dying on foreign service. Lord Ellenborough admitted that the Sepoys had a grievance, and that it was one calling for redress; but he disapproved of the manner in which redress was given by the Madras Government. That Government consisted of the Governor, Lord Elphinstone, and two Members of Council, Messrs. Charles May Lushington and John Bird, assisted in military matters by the Military Secretary to Government, Colonel Steel, an able and distinguished officer. The Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army,\* who usually had a seat in the Council, was absent in command of the army in China, and the officer in temporary command had no seat in Council. Now, at Madras, as at Calcutta and Bombay, it has not\* generally been the practice for the Civil Members of Council to take a prominent part in dealing with the military questions coming before the Government. The military orders, if not submitted in the first instance by the Military Secretary, generally emanate from the head of the Government; and we may be sure that in the case under notice, the policy adopted by the Madras Government, whether right or wrong, was the policy of the Governor and of the Military Secretary, Colonel Steel. And yet Lord Ellenborough, disapproving of what had been done, suggests the possibility of Lord Elphinstone, whose term of office had nearly expired, being retained at the head of the Government, and recommends the removal of the two Civil

\* Of late years the Civil Members of Council have sometimes taken a more active part in the discussion of military questions than was the case formerly.

Members of Council, one of whom had nearly a year, and the other upwards of three years, still to serve. It is only due to the memory of two valuable public servants that it should be known that Lord Ellenborough's disparagement of their official character was wholly undeserved. They were both men of considerable ability and of large experience. One of them, Charles May Lushington, was said to have defects of temper which detracted from his usefulness; but he was a man of unquestionable talent, and by no means addicted to timid counsels. His colleague, John Bird, one of three brothers, all of whom rendered good service to the State, commanded the respect and confidence of all who knew him. Employed in early life in the Ceded Districts under Sir Thomas Munro, and afterwards in various important offices in the two great branches of the civil administration, he had acquired a thorough knowledge of the people and of the revenue and judicial systems. Shrewd in judgment and transparently straightforward in all his ways, he was commonly spoken of in the service as "honest John Bird." As a Member of Council, he was invariably independent, but never captious; as loyal and trustworthy a colleague as it was possible for an Indian Governor to have at his side. But it sufficed for Lord Ellenborough that Mr. Bird belonged to the pampered Service which he was bent on crushing, and so his long and honourable career was to be closed by a disgraceful removal from office.\*

Lord Ellenborough's opinion of the Bengal Civil Service was equally biassed by the prejudice to which we refer. Before he had been a month in Calcutta, he wrote to the Duke that there were "few men of business;" that Lord Auckland had told him that he should find "a great want of *instruments*," and that he could find them more easily in the army than in the Civil Service. Again, "there is a *bad* want of business-like habits everywhere. Men work to but small account. I have no assistance. Altogether it is most disheartening." An able civilian who had sat with Macaulay in the Law Commission, and who was selected by the Court of Directors for a seat in Council, is designated by the Governor-General as "a prejudiced gentleman of the Civil Service, who has been mumbling laws and regulations and dabbling in codification for years in the Law Commission." His colleague, Sir H. Maddock, "could not be trusted with the civil patronage of Bengal. He could not execute it well even if he tried. All the Civil Servants job for each other. They constantly act in the spirit of a corporation." Acting on this deeply rooted prejudice, Lord Ellenborough arbitrarily removed from his office Mr. Brian Hodgson, the eminent Resident at the Court of Nepaul, and displaced several Civil Servants employed in the Saugor and Nerbudda territories, one of whom at least bore a high character,

\* It is perhaps hardly necessary to say that no attention was paid to Lord Ellenborough's rash suggestion.

and had managed a portion of the territory for some years with great credit and success. The profession which was thus treated, and to which this wholesale condemnation was applied, contained at that time such men as George Clerk, James Thomason, Robert Mertins Bird, Frederick Currie, Henry Ricketts, John Lawrence, Robert Montgomery, Frederick Halliday, John Peter Grant, besides many others, less known to fame, who were rendering excellent service to the State.

Lord Ellenborough more than once in these letters takes credit for the attention bestowed by him upon the important subject of the finances, and for the reforms which he instituted in that department. When he arrived in India, the financial department had no separate secretary, whose special business it was to watch the receipts and expenditure of the Empire. The creation of such an office was a step in the right direction, but it was not followed by any material reform of the system, until eighteen years afterwards the introduction of the Budget system, involving, as it did, the publication of an annual review of the finances, induced a more careful and business-like management of this branch of the administration. And it may be doubted whether Lord Ellenborough had any real conception of the principles which lie at the root of Indian finance. The revenues and expenditure of British India were in his time composed of the receipts and disbursements of three Presidencies, one of which, Bengal, was divided into two provinces, namely Bengal Proper, administered by the Governor-General, or by one of the Members of his Council acting as a Deputy-Governor, and the North-Western Provinces, administered by a separate Lieutenant-Governor. Then as now, in order to an economical and efficient management of the finances, it was absolutely essential that some one central authority should be invested with the general control. Opinions may differ as to the authority to which that control should be assigned; whether it should rest with the Home Government, acting in direct communication with the Governments of the various Provinces, as was proposed by Mr. Bright; or whether, as was settled (and we venture to think wisely settled) by the legislation of 1833, and by the Acts of Parliament which have been passed since, the control of the finances, as well as the general direction of the administration, should be entrusted to a central authority in India, acting of course in subordination to the Home Government. But to any one who has given careful attention to the subject, it would appear to be a strange suggestion, that while retaining the expensive machinery of a Governor-General and Council, charged with a general responsibility for the well-being of the country, two Provinces which now supply not much less than a third, and which in those days probably furnished a still larger proportion of the entire revenues, should be in a great measure relieved from control on the part of the



central authority in India, in regard to the disposal of those revenues. And yet this is practically the suggestion which was made by Lord Ellenborough not many years after he had ceased to be Governor-General. When examined before the Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1853, he made a remark which implied disapproval of the present system "of compelling the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay to send all important matters for approval to the Governor-General in Council;" and on being asked whether he would recommend a recurrence to the old system with regard to those references, or the maintenance of the system as at present established, he replied: "I think it would be better to go back to the old system; I am sure it would be agreeable to the Governor-General in Council, and that he should be relieved from that business. And anything which does relieve the Governor-General from the business now thrown upon him is a public advantage." In other words, so impressed was he with the inconvenience which was occasioned by the multiplicity of references from the Minor Presidencies, that in order to get rid of it, he was ready to sacrifice the command over the finances of those Presidencies which had been secured to the Government of India by the legislation of 1833. The inconvenience was doubtless a very serious one. The references were not confined, as the question and answer imply, to important matters, but included the most petty details of expenditure, and involved a heavy demand on the time and labour of the Government of India, resulting not infrequently in profitless controversies regarding trifling matters which might well have been left to the discretion of the local authorities. But the proposed remedy was worse than the disease. Experience had amply shown, that the previous system, under which the authority of the Government of India over the minor governments was imperfect and ill-defined, in a financial, if not in other points of view, was a very unsatisfactory system. Under it, there was in practice no central authority which could interpose promptly and effectively to check waste. The Court of Directors were too remote, and their action was of necessity too slow. What was wanted, was a central authority in the country, armed with sufficient powers to enforce, not an ill-judged parsimony, but a wise and prudent management of the finances. In order to the attainment of this object, it was not necessary or desirable that the interference of the central authority should be carried into the most minute details. What was needed, was so to regulate the relations of the central and of the minor governments, that, while reserving to the former a full and complete command over the resources of the Empire, the latter should be invested with definite powers and responsibilities within certain well defined limits, so arranged as to ensure that the local knowledge of the minor governments should be fully utilized, without impairing the central control. It is one thing to condemn

a minute interference in petty details. It is another thing to abandon altogether the power of control. The latter is what Lord Ellenborough's recommendation amounts to; and that he should have made such a recommendation shows, we think, that he had not seriously considered one of the most important, if not the most important, of the questions connected with the finances of India.

We may here observe in passing that the solution of the problem of the financial and administrative relations of the central and local governments, though considerably advanced since Lord Ellenborough's time, is still very far from being complete. Under his immediate successors the system of minute interference, of which he recognised the evil, without being able to suggest a practical remedy, continued in an intensified form. It was somewhat abated under the Government of Earl Canning, and still more under the Government of Lord Lawrence; but it was reserved for the lamented Earl Mayo to take the first decided step towards placing the relations of the supreme and local governments upon a satisfactory footing by the establishment of the system of provincial grants. That system is still very imperfectly developed, and there is still continued the anomaly of permitting the Governments of Madras and Bombay to correspond direct with the Secretary of State,—an anomaly which is really useless and is often mischievous, fostering, as it does, a false notion of independence and an undue impatience of the control of the Supreme Government.

We can only glance cursorily at the remaining incidents of Lord Ellenborough's administration. Regarding the conquest of Scinde, the letters confirm the opinion long since formed, that, in that unjust measure the error of the Governor-General consisted, first, in leaving too much to the discretion of his General, and afterwards in ratifying that officer's acts by proclaiming the annexation of the country. Sir Charles Napier was permitted to decide the question of peace or war: and, being bent upon war, he decided it according to his wishes. In the letter to the Duke of the 22nd March, 1843, written after the annexation had been declared, there are expressions which appear to indicate that the Governor-General was not altogether free from misgivings as to the justice of the acts which had received his sanction. "It was," he says, "really impossible for me to form a decided opinion as to the authenticity of the Persian letters"—referring to certain letters of a hostile character, purporting to bear the seals of some of the Ameers of Scinde, the discovery of which had been made the ground for demanding a new treaty:—

"That could be much better decided on the spot, and, being satisfied that if the letters were genuine, we were justified in requiring new terms, and that policy required us to avail ourselves of coming to a new settlement if we were justified in doing so, I left the matter in Sir C. Napier's hands. . . . Subsequent events and discoveries, and the late treachery of the Ameers, seem to have proved that I was right in believing them to be at once hostile

and not to be depended upon. *I do not see now what course is to be pursued but that of taking the country we have conquered," &c.*

We may be certain that Lord Ellenborough would have used more decided language, if he had been thoroughly satisfied of the justice of his cause. The incident which led immediately to the battle of Meānee, and which is referred to as "the late treachery of the Ameers," was the attack on the Presidency by the Beloochee troops, in regard to which it has been clearly established by the best possible evidence, that the Ameers were free from all complicity in the proceedings of their feudatories, and that they had expressly warned the Resident (Outram) to retire to a place of greater safety. The truth seems to be, that without having formed any definite intention of annexing Scinde, Lord Ellenborough found it at his mercy, and could not resist the temptation to take possession of it.

The conquest of Scinde was followed in less than a year by the intestine disturbances in the native state of Gwalior, which resulted in the defeat and dispersion of the mutinous army of that state by the British troops. As we have already observed, there can be no question that in this latter affair the proceedings of the Governor-General were characterized by sound and foreseeing statesmanship; for, by the dispersion of the Gwalior force, he averted what would have proved to be a serious danger to the Empire, had that force been in existence when the war with the Sikhs took place two years afterwards. His Minute on the state of affairs in Gwalior is justly described by the latest historian of British India, as "one of the ablest State papers on the records of the Council."

When the Gwalior campaign was fought, Lord Ellenborough's administration was drawing to a close. The battle of Maharajpore took place on the 29th of December 1843, and on the 14th of April following Sir Robert Peel announced in the House of Commons that the Governor-General had been recalled by the Court of Directors. It seems strange that the recall should have followed so speedily on the wisest act or series of acts in the Governor-General's career. It may be, that, alarmed at his warlike tendencies, and not fully realizing the sound policy of this last enterprize, the Court regarded it as only another instance of that predilection for military display and general restlessness, for which Lord Ellenborough had become notorious; or possibly the decision had been long arrived at by the working members of the Court, and its execution had been merely delayed by the difficulty of obtaining the concurrence of so large a body, in a measure which was at once unprecedented, and which was certain to be distasteful to the Government of the day. Had the recall followed immediately upon the annexation of Scinde, preceded as that unjust measure had been by the Governor-General's vacillating conduct regarding the advance on Cabul, and by the ill-judged proclamation of the Gates, the assent to the step taken by the Court

would have been more general and more complete. As it was, it cannot be said that the occasion was happily chosen. The Court had certainly very strong reasons for being dissatisfied with their Governor-General. Ever ready to criticize and to condemn the acts of others, he had shown himself weak and vacillating at an important crisis. He had allowed his Government to be committed to an unjust aggression, and had followed it up by an unrighteous annexation. He had treated the Service by which the civil administration of the country must be mainly carried on, with neglect and contumely, and had acted with marked injustice towards eminent men in the sister Service. Constantly separated from the Members of his Council, he had kept them for lengthened periods in ignorance of his proceedings. Towards his masters in the Court he had borne himself with studied insolence and disrespect: disregarding their orders, and arrogating to himself the powers and responsibilities which belonged to them. He had lowered the dignity of his office and the prestige of the Government by public reflections on the policy of his predecessor. He had been guilty of an ill-judged and mischievous departure from the principle of non-intervention in matters connected with the religious sects, which had long been the established policy of the British Government. For the improvement of the country, on which he had dwelt so forcibly in his parting speech to the Court, he had done little or nothing. The only important public work that was projected during his government, he had stopped. To the education of the natives he had given no encouragement. Improvements in the laws and in the administration of justice, if we may judge from his slighting allusion to the Law Commission, already quoted, he appears to have regarded as matters beneath his notice. All these considerations, doubtless, combined to bring about the decision of the Court of Directors. The question is, whether that decision, following so immediately upon the successful termination of operations of vital importance to the Empire, was not ill-timed.

Lord Ellenborough, after his recall, not unfrequently spoke in the House of Lords on Indian affairs, and always with a shrewd sagacity, which was seldom discernible in his official acts. Once again, fourteen years after his recall, on the accession of the Derby Ministry in 1858, he resumed his former post as President of the Board of Control; but only to afford an additional and final proof of his incapacity as a practical statesman. Without consulting his colleagues in the Cabinet, he sent out a despatch, severely censuring the policy of the Governor-General, at a time when it was essential to the re-establishment of our power in India that that high functionary should receive the cordial support of the Home authorities. To obviate the embarrassment which this ill-advised proceeding must otherwise have caused to the Government, Lord Ellenborough resigned, and never served again.

That which we may regard as his latest act, the injunction which he left behind him, that these letters should be published after his death, without, as the editor says, introduction or comment, was, we are disposed to think, one of the most indiscreet acts of his life; reviving, as it does, the recollection of his errors, confirming the popular impression of his character, and bringing to light failings and inconsistencies which might otherwise have passed unnoticed. What may have been the motive which prompted it, it is exceedingly difficult to surmise. Lord Ellenborough, when he gave the directions which resulted in the publication of these letters, must have been aware that many of the opinions and statements which they contained were inconsistent with the actual facts. The injustice of his strictures on Pollock must have become apparent to him very shortly after they were penned; and he lived long enough to know that his estimate of Outram had been ludicrously incorrect. As he read of the events of the mutiny, and watched the subsequent progress of Indian administration, he can hardly have failed to perceive that he had done but scant justice to the Indian Civil Service. We can only suppose that the overpowering self-esteem which was such a prominent feature in his character, obscuring his judgment with a sort of judicial blindness, impelled him to a course which his reason can scarcely have approved.

A. J. ARBUTHNOT.



## THE PROTESTANT PULPIT IN GERMANY.

WHAT is a sermon?

In answering this question we may follow a twofold method. We may ask ourselves, What it is that constitutes the characteristic idea of Christianity? and having settled this point to our satisfaction, we may proceed to a discussion of the special forms in which this idea is to be embodied. We shall thus arrive at the construction of what may be called the "ideal sermon." Or we may prefer not to float between heaven and earth and to have a solid foundation to stand upon. We may go to history, we may interrogate the practice of the Church, we may place ourselves, as it were, under her pulpits and ask her preachers for an answer to our question. After having made our observations and our experiments, we may then go on to the fabrication of theories, unless we are satisfied that the world is already groaning under the burden of ideal schemes and of prophetic expositions, and that the very best thing that could happen to our country would be a St. Bartholomew's Night for all theories, especially religious ones.

The sermon is essentially a creation of Protestantism. In the Catholic system it occupies an altogether subordinate place. The centre of the Catholic religious service is adoration; the centre of a Protestant service is the sermon. Catholics go to church to pray; Protestants go to church to listen to a sermon. But the object which the Catholic and the Protestant preacher has in view varies also considerably. The Protestant preacher looks on his congregation as

chiefly composed of men and women more or less heathen. He comes to them with a set of formulas, called the Gospel, and expects that his proclamation will lead to conversion, or, in other words, that the result of his preaching will be to make his hearers Christians. He believes that the people sitting before him have the sword of God's justice suspended over their heads, and that unless they repent they must, sooner or later, meet their doom. Hence the sermon is, in the eyes of the Low-Churchman or of the Dissenter, all-important.

But the Catholic preacher stands up in the belief that he is to address Christian men and women. Uninitiated in the mysteries of Evangelical freemasonry, he cannot tell whether those before him are Christians or not. He knows that in "baptism" they were made Christians, and that to remain Christians they must partake of the Sacrament of "the Eucharist." His ordinary purpose in preaching a sermon is to state in as objective a form as possible the doctrine of the Church, and to remind his congregation of the faith in which they have been brought up from their earliest days. He furthermore urges the necessity of the observance of certain religious rites and practices which the Church has ordained. He may, it is true, adopt the phraseology with which Protestants are familiar, but on his lips the words have a totally different meaning. In short, whilst the Protestant preacher stands always before his congregation in the character of a missionary, the Catholic preacher looks upon the sermon as part of the service in which the Christian congregation is engaged.

In addition to the different views held by Catholicism and by Protestantism as to the nature of a religious service and the object of preaching, there is another influence at work which must not be overlooked. Protestantism is a legalized democracy; Catholicism is a legalized absolute monarchy. No one can deny that under the former there is more scope for individual exertion than under the latter. The Catholic preacher is bound to deny his individuality; the atmosphere in which he breathes and lives is one of authority, and the greatest of dogmas is to him the submission of the individual to the collective voice of the Church. If he desire to be free he must leave the precincts of the Church and build his tabernacle elsewhere. But Protestantism is the deification of individualism. Its spirit is the spirit of criticism; its continual refrain is the everlasting "Why?" It stands up in defence of the rights of the individual, and declares its readiness, if needs be, to sacrifice the whole to the claims of the individual. The Protestant preacher—in accordance with the principles of the Reformation rightly understood—is the embodiment of freedom. Unshackled by creeds, unfettered by dogmas, unless of his own forging, he has but one measure of truth, and acknowledges but one authority—his conscience. He believes that every age proposes to its children a problem, and that

its solution is not to be found in an antiquated past or in a problematical future, but in the living reality by which he is surrounded. He dreads the letter "that kills," but he has intense faith in the spirit "which gives life." A faith built on external authority, whether of the Bible or of the Church, he would deem but a disguised scepticism. His weapons are spiritual; a victory which is not the result of moral conviction would seem to him but another name for a defeat. The principle in whose final victory he believes is the *ideal* Christ. All his efforts are directed towards the bringing of that Christ before his contemporaries, and to point to him as the source of morality, the truly human, and, therefore, the truly Divine, and the symbol of all progress. The day of triumph will be to him when the Divine element shall have interpenetrated all that is human.

But I forget that it is not now my object to give a picture of the Protestant preacher; I have merely made these preliminary remarks to prove the assertion with which I started. Catholicism has had great preachers, though it would perhaps be better to call them religious orators. The eloquence of some of these men remains till this hour unsurpassed, nay, perhaps, unequalled. But they have obtained their triumphs by transforming the pulpit into the platform. Protestantism, on the other hand, not as seen in the light of Geneva or of Westminster, but as developed in accordance with its fundamental principle, opens up a vast field for the preacher. If it has had few great preachers, if its pulpits are not a power, if its congregations, as we are told, are chiefly composed of superstitious women and effeminate men, the blame must be cast not on the system but on its unworthy representatives.

The history of the German pulpit begins with the Reformation. Though I desire chiefly to call the attention of my readers to the modern German pulpit, it will be interesting to glance rapidly at the period to which it owed its origin.

The sermons of Martin Luther bear the impress of his powerful individuality. The Reformation born out of the depth of a human heart conscious of imperfection and longing for a purer and fuller life, lays hold of the pulpit in order that the new life, which it believes to have obtained, may become the light of men. The office of the preacher was, in the eyes of the reformer, of paramount importance. The ignorance of the people was immense, and unequalled save by the ignorance of its leaders. The chief object of Luther was, therefore, to teach the people. The crisis through which Europe was passing made itself felt amongst all classes; Luther, who was the leader of the vanguard, could not but undertake the duty of enlightening the popular mind on the work which he and his companions had undertaken. The didactic element is therefore strong in those sermons. And, as I said, it would be difficult to deny its necessity. We, living in the second half of the nineteenth



century, have very little to learn from the majority of sermons except patience. The sermon, as a means of teaching, has outlived itself. We generally know all that the preacher can tell us; nine times out of ten we can guess what he is going to say. But in the sixteenth century the masses were emerging from what, without exaggeration, may be called a state of barbarism. It is possible that we may be advancing towards a similar condition, that the multitude of books, leaving man in utter uncertainty as to what to read and what to leave unread, making him unlearn the next day what he had learnt the day before in the sweat of his brow,—it is possible, I say, that this great intellectual movement may culminate in the temporary apotheosis of an intellectual Nirvāna, and that we shall once more have to look to the pulpit for light; meanwhile we are satisfied if it give us warmth, if it stir up within us an enthusiastic morality.

The object then of the sermon of the Reformation was to impart knowledge. Its teaching was contained in a theological formula. "Acknowledgment of sin and acknowledgment of the grace of God, this is the whole of our burden and of our message," Bugenhagen wrote in the year 1526. To those men, trained all their lives in scholasticism, the truth presented itself in the dogma of "justification by faith." The truth which they taught was great and everlasting, though the form in which every succeeding age endeavours to express it must vary considerably, though there must always remain a wide gulf between the theological child of Shem and the philosophical child of Japheth. Luther, brought up in the Pharisaism of the Middle Ages, and passing through the same experience as his great prototype, must needs express the truth in the words of St. Paul. St. Paul, the first and greatest of Protestants, the antagonist of Peter, is reflected in the monk of Wittenberg, raising his protest against the Church of St. Peter.

But a theological dogma never appeared less stern than in those homilies of Martin Luther, where the thunder of Sinai, rolling majestically and reverberating far and wide, so as to rouse the most distant echo, is always followed by healing and refreshing streams, flowing in abundance over the parched ground and leaving everywhere the germs of future fruitfulness behind them. The theological dogma is never absent; it is preached with all the power of earnest conviction and of a clear terse diction; it is held up as the universal remedy, and defended with boldness and fervour against the attacks of those who dare deny its efficacy; there is little or no morality in his sermons. But in the hands of Luther such preaching is safe. For he is above all things a man of faith; his heart refuses to be silenced; his heart gives him that eloquence which exercises a well-nigh magical power over his generation. He might have taken his place among the mystics. He has dug deep into the well of his spiritual experience; "*oratio, tentatio, et meditatio*" have brought

the treasures of his inner life to the surface, and hence the cold dogma is transformed in a centre of warmth.

Though Luther never wrote a theory of preaching, nor supplied his followers with a Homilist, a "pons asinorum," he often drew a picture of the ideal preacher. "A preacher," he says, "should be a dialectician and a rhetorician, i.e., he should be able to teach and to exhort. If he is going to speak on a certain subject, let him in the first place put it under its proper heading. Then let him accurately define it. Thirdly, let him quote sentences from Scripture to prove it. Fourthly, let him try to illustrate it. Fifthly, let him give instances so as clearly to explain it. Lastly, let him exhort and rouse the indolent, and rebuke the false teachers with their followers, but in such a way that it may be understood that the sole motive by which he is actuated is the glory of God and the welfare of the person addressed." But, as is often the case, Luther hardly expected to see his ideal realized, and when he was asked on a certain occasion to send one of those ideal preachers to a neighbouring town, he took a bit of paper, drew a preacher, and sent the drawing to the petitioners, with the addendum that he supposed they had wished for a picture, and not for a reality. The blending of dogmatism and mysticism is peculiar to Luther; the form of his sermons, or rather homilies, is also characteristic of the man. His theory of a preacher we have quoted from his "Table Talk;" his theory of preaching he explains in the same book as follows: "I endeavour to take a theme and to stick to it; I desire that the people should be able to say, The sermon was on such and such a point. I remain *in statu* on the chief point, the theme, which I have chosen for discussion." But there are so many exceptions to the rule laid down, that one hardly knows which is the rule. Generally—I suppose it is owing to the fertility of his mind, and to the incapability of restraining himself—Luther wanders from place to place. Applying the Horatian "*rapere in medias res*," he begins at once, without any introduction, to give a literal explanation of the portion of Scripture which he has chosen. He then makes remarks, exegetical and practical, about isolated passages and expressions. There is no attempt at any peroration. It is, indeed, possible to trace a certain regularity in this irregularity, but the style is like the man himself. He has left the narrow cloister cell; he sits no longer under the shadow of Aristotle; he has broken with time-honoured traditions; his style, also, is no longer wrapt up in the swaddling clothes of scholasticism; it is no longer weighted with long, learned words; it is no longer the vehicle of ingenious, subtle definitions; it is simple, free, pure, and fresh, often revolutionary, often rugged, sometimes almost repelling, but always true. The sermons of Luther are natural. Nature is always simple. That simplicity is here, as elsewhere, the mark of truth.

The popular style of Luther's homilies seems to me their chiefest

attraction ; they are models of what an address should be, which is intended for all, from the highest to the lowest, and the most learned to the most illiterate. It is well known what extreme care the Reformer took with his translation of the Scriptures, and how his German Bible marked an epoch in the language of his country. In the same way he devotes a great deal of attention to the language of his sermons. His sermons are decidedly not rhetorical in the sense in which we understand the word. His style is rough and ready ; he would never dream of "making a phrase ;" he would not for a single moment sacrifice a thought, because he knows not how to express it elegantly. He is brimful of thoughts which must in some way or other be expressed. But with all this he generally hits on the right word, and manages to express his thoughts most plainly and forcibly. Like a sledge hammer his words fall on what he believes to be error and heresy ; the delicacy of the nineteenth century, which calls ugly things by beautiful names, is still unborn. Besides having the power of clear expression, he also excels in description. He loves poetry, the first flower at the gates of "Paradise lost," and delights in music, the harmony of an eternal world. If he has shorn the altars of their magnificence, and drawn away the people from the contemplation of a magnificent ritual, he has at any rate admitted the poetical element in his preaching. He *paints* the truth before the eyes of his hearers, and this is one more instance of his knowledge of the requirements of the masses.

Such is the sermon of Luther, which, because of the mighty personality of the preacher, will exercise so powerful an influence on succeeding generations. It will be looked upon as a model, and to question its authority will be an act bordering on the heretical. Melancthon, it is said, tried to improve its form and to correct the method which he deemed defective. Unable to preach himself, it was likely that he would be able to tell others how to preach. He represented the intellectual side of the Reformation ; he was the nearest approach to what we are now pleased to call a Broad-Churchman. He was a calm, moderate man, a quiet student who made no claims to anything heroic. A profound classical scholar, he was anxious to impart a little of the classical precision to the sermons of his teacher. Whether, if he had succeeded in the attempt he would have brought about a reformation or a deformation, whether the classical masterpieces are models for the Christian pulpit, or to what extent the rhetorical element in sermons has proved beneficial to the Church—these are wide questions into which we do not now enter. Melancthon's attempt proved abortive : the Lutheran sermon is stereotyped for good or for evil, and becomes, as we have said, the model for the preachers of the Church.

The preachers of the Reformation proclaim to the world a dogma, which is in their eyes an article of faith, by which the Church stands or falls. They look upon themselves as the twelve of old sent into

the Jewish and the Heathen world to make proselytes. They are to teach the ignorant the way to salvation which lies in the belief of the doctrine "of justification by faith." The object of their preaching is to convert the world by means of the Pauline-Augustine-Lutheran theology.

Without any doubt, so long as the spirit of these men—those melancholy, choleric saints—shall reign supreme in their hearts, so long as they shall be animated by their faith, their hope, their love, their boundless enthusiasm, and unlimited energy, the world will acknowledge their power, and in many instances yield itself a willing captive. But if ever the day should come when their first love waxes cold, when the fire on the altar burns dimly and with an uncertain flame, their theology will prove a snare instead of a salvation. Unable to regenerate the world it will threaten themselves and their Church with destruction. It will be at the best like one of those huge stone monuments, hiding from view a venerable mummy.

The story of the period subsequent to the Reformation, at which we now cast a rapid glance, will show us the truth of these remarks. Theology reigns supreme, but where is religion? The chronicler of that period, in the history of the German pulpit, looks back with regret to the days of Luther, and involuntarily there passes over his lips the naïve exclamation of the old historian: "There were giants in the earth in those days."

Humanity requires now and then an interval to pause and to take breath. The period of the Reformation, if followed by a time of rest to admit of the process of spiritual digestion, might have been followed by a continued reformation or a reformation of the Reformation. Unfortunately, hardly had the ashes of Luther become cold before theological excitement had taken the place of religious enthusiasm. The theological schools are about to take possession of the pulpit; let us see what use they will make of it.

The dogma of the Reformation, which is at length deprived of its centrality, and buried under a host of other dogmas, is at first asserted with vigour. The pulpit is changed into an arena. The number of sects, considerable even in the days of Luther, is daily on the increase. One sect is naturally intolerant of a fellow sect; the Lutheran preachers fulminate from the pulpit against those upstarts who dare to raise a protest against their gospel, and cordially anathematize those who are called by a name different from theirs. In addition there is the great controversy with Rome, that "man is not justified by works but by faith." There is therefore an endless source of discussions and disputes. Controversy in the pulpit suffers from the disadvantage that the speaker has everything his own way, that his opponent is but a man of straw raised up by himself and kept up till it pleases him to knock him down. But such a method has its charms for some of the weaker brethren. It should also be remembered, as we stated elsewhere, that the very breath of theology is strife.

This embittered warfare against Rome had one great disadvantage: it re-introduced scholasticism. Rome, put out at the front-door, returns by an unknown back-door. If in former days, before the Reformation, preachers spent hours in discussing "whether God could have sinned if He had liked to," or whether it would have been possible for Him "when He became incarnate to adopt the nature of woman," the preachers of Protestantism now indulge in subtle definitions and far-fetched discussions about the intricacies of the favourite doctrine of "justification by faith." The old weapons laid aside by Luther are once more taken in hand, and the one-sided theological dogma, which rightly to know is salvation, is discussed, argued about and defended, in accordance with the ingenious and hair-splitting methods of the most orthodox scholasticism.

The seventeenth century witnesses, therefore, a retrograde movement. The principle of the Reformation—subjectivity—is discarded; the moral element, which had constituted the grandeur of Luther's work, vanishes, slowly but surely. Once more a faith, which rests on authority, is proclaimed. It is true that the authority is vested in the Scriptures, and not in the Church. But the Scriptures and the system of the Church are well-nigh identified; the use of the Bible is merely to prove the Protestant dogma. The objectivity ascribed by the Catholic to the Church is now ascribed to a theological system, and Protestantism is only too ready to endow it with magical attributes. The old doctrine that evil is a want of knowledge or an incorrect knowledge is revived. Unless a man believe rightly he will be damned. But let him accept the teaching of the Church; let him give an intellectual assent to the pure doctrine which she teaches, and all will be well. This is the only good work the Church requires of her members. And this is what is called orthodoxy.\*

But this period in the history of the pulpit stands out as one during which men were much more anxious to learn how to preach than what to preach. If they had got a good handbook of "Systematic Theology" they had obtained the necessary material for their sermons. But how to dish up this spiritual food, and in what way to prepare it, so as to give the hearers the idea that they got every Sunday something new and not merely an old thing warmed up, these were the chief questions which occupied the age. It seems that there were more than a hundred methods in which to write a sermon on a certain text. Thus, merely to give a few instances, one might adopt the *methodus Ursiniana*, according to which one of the classical orations of Cicero or of Demosthenes was to be closely followed; or one might take the *methodus allegorica*—i.e., represent the teaching of the text in the form of pictures; or the *emblematica methodus*

\* Evangelicalism is still the same. It preaches under another form the Roman doctrine of the "*opus operatum*;" makes salvation dependent on the assent to a theological theory, and builds its authority on an inspired book, the inspiration of which it is unable to prove.

—i.e., preach in emblems; or, if none of the methods seemed to commend itself to the preacher, the *mixta methodus*, which united all the virtues and the vices of the other ninety and nine. It must have been a matter of difficulty for the preacher to make up his mind as to what method he would adopt. But having once settled this point, let us not think that his labours were at an end, for the sermon itself was of the most elaborate description.

We are generally satisfied with one exordium; the preacher in those days usually gave three: a general one, a special one, and a very special one. These exordia were generally divided into a good many parts. After the introductions the preacher commenced his sermon. This sermon was to be a great exhibition of learning. It resembled Joseph's coat, not in the brilliancy of its colours, but in the multitude of its patches. The preacher quoted the Fathers, not in the masterly way in which Bossuet quotes them, as a means to an end, but in a most wearisome fashion, reading out long extracts in Latin or Greek and then slowly translating them. Or his sermon consisted of an endless string of texts, which seemed to have a merely verbal connexion. At other times he would read out a list of the different views held by different commentators as to the meaning of a certain passage, to wind up with the exhortation to his hearers, to go and do likewise. Often, too, he chose a subject on the first Sunday of the year, and announced that he would give a course of lectures on this during the following Sundays. This harping on one string during fifty-two Sundays must have got rather wearisome. But the chief exhibition of the bad taste of the age was in the application of the pictorial method. A pulpit, however much under the influence of the theological law, cannot help being swayed by the spirit of the age and the customs of the society in whose midst it is erected. The coarseness of the age revealed itself in the illustrations and the witticisms that came from the pulpit. "Mary as the spiritual papermill" was announced by a great preacher on the first Sunday of the year as the subject on which he would discourse for the remaining fifty-one Sundays. "The Rich Man as a Brewer," or "Christ as the model of a tailor," or "Christ the great garden," and such like subjects formed the material of discourses listened to with eagerness and applauded for their cleverness.

But even in those days a sermon came to an end. Not, however, without a formidable peroration. Most sermons ended with a fivefold application:—1st, didascalium; 2nd, redargutivum; 3rd, institutivum; 4th, correctorium; 5th, consolatorium. Certainly, after having listened to the exordia, the narratio, the propositio, the confirmatio, the confutatio, and peroratio, it would seem to us that the hearer stood in need of consolatio. But his chief consolation must have been the "Amen" with which the preacher concluded. There may have been

\* Vid. *Hedegeticum* (Carpzov); *oratoria ecclesiastica methodica adornata* (olearius).

"grace" and art in the pulpit of that day. Nature was conspicuous by its absence—give us Nature!

A few men, such as Herberger, Andreä, whom Herder called a "rose among thorns," Müller, and Arndt formed, indeed, an exception to the general rule. Val. Andreä ridiculed in his book published under the title of "*Menippus sive satyricorum dialogorum centuria*," the orthodoxy of the day, and insisted on a living faith instead of a dead dogma or a wild superstition. In the midst of perilous times, when a fierce war raged around him and the political and the social order was showing unmistakable signs of decay, his words, however full of life and of fire, were like those of one crying in the desert. But his word and life were like a prophecy pointing to better times. Arndt, the Protestant Thomas à Kempis, deserves also a word of recognition. His well-known book, "*Vom wahren Christenthum*," was written not merely for the purpose of edification, but also as a protest against the tendency of the pulpit of his day. "I desire," he writes, "to draw away the attention of students and preachers from the scholastic theology of our time. I wish to rouse the Christians from a dead belief to a living faith. Thirdly, I wish to point from speculations and theories to the practice of faith and to godliness. Fourthly, I wish to show the meaning of a Christian life in accordance with the words of the Apostle, when he says: 'for me to live is Christ.'" The style of Arndt is not to be commended. His allegorizing method and his sentimental tone are not always edifying. But placing his sermons alongside of those of his predecessors or of his contemporaries, one feels as if wandering from a garden with artificial beds and walks constructed according to geometrical laws, towards some shady dell, where birds warble and fresh breezes play on the leaves, and little brooks merrily leap over the stones, celebrating, all of them, the Divine disorder.

But if Andreä and Arndt thus commenced to undermine the inert mass of dead orthodoxy which was in reality a great heresy, other men rose up after them to carry on their work with vigorous and unsparing hand. Their inner life had been hemmed in within the prison vaults of the orthodox dogma; their intellect had not dared to call in question the greatness of the Protestant Diana of "justification by faith." Spener, the Pietist, is the first of these men, who, bringing about a great revolution in the theological world, changed altogether the aspect of the Protestant pulpit.

If one had told that cautious, timid, gentle German Methodist, that the theological dogma is one of the many imperfect passing forms in which humanity tries to embody great truths, that the paramount question is not, what we think, but rather the spirit that animates us in our thoughts, he would have recoiled from those ideas. He had no wish to reform theology; the desire to upset any of the articles of the Church's creed was far from him. He wished to be a pious son

of his Church, and to live in communion with her until the end of his life. Yet the principles which he proclaimed led to a complete indifference in regard to doctrine and to an assertion of subjectivity fatal to the idea of the Church. We may truly assert that none but a wise man can know all his children.

The "*pia desideria*" with which Spener opened his campaign against the orthodoxy of the day, contain a cry of lamentation like those heard from the lips of pious men before the era of the Reformation. The condition of the Protestant clergy is painted in truly dark colours, and the lamentable condition of the congregation is attributed to a degenerate clergy; theology is occupied with useless and vain disputes about words, and if Luther could rise from the dead he would rebuke its spirit; the reading of the Scriptures is well-nigh entirely neglected. Spener's remedy is a more earnest reading of the Bible; he also desires to impress upon his readers the fact that the knowledge of truth does not suffice, but that Christianity demands a carrying into practice of our belief. He leaves the doctrine of the Church, as we said, untouched, but he insists upon a reform of life. If hitherto the great question had been, *Do you believe rightly?* his question will be, *Do you act rightly?* Spener's merit consists in this, that he led his generation from the contemplation of incomprehensible dogmas to the realities of practical life.

This moral element, called in theological language the Holy Spirit, is the very essence of Spener's system. The basis on which his building rests is faith, and not knowledge. The test to be applied to a creed or a dogma is a moral one. Its measure of orthodoxy or heterodoxy is the influence which it has on the life of the individual. Spener acknowledges the difference between theology and religion. He lays the chief stress on morality, or, as he would have called it, sanctification. The conversion, the cultivation of the inner life, the growing in purity, understood in an ascetic sense, and an anxious "working out" of one's individual salvation—such is the task set before every one born within the pale of the Christian Church.

It is but natural that the pulpit should have become the mouth-piece of this revival. The form of the sermons is completely changed; rhetoric finds no favour in the eyes of these pious men, who believe in a continued inspiration, and style seems to them of little importance, since they have started on the mission of rescuing a world on the verge of destruction. In the first place they endeavour to teach the people. The meaning of the words of Scripture, buried under a mass of scholasticism, must be brought to the surface. But the moral tendency which characterises the school is never lost sight of, and becomes ere long supreme. In the introduction to his sermon, Spener generally points out the importance of his theme; he then passes on to an explanation of his text, and, instead of keeping the application till the end, applies the truth all through. Afterwards he made use of the exordium to explain the teaching of the Catechism



or some portions of Scripture, so that his hearers, as is the case in Scotland, had in reality two sermons in one. Numerous are the volumes of sermons which he published, and though their style is rather heavy, as he confessed himself, though there is a great sameness of tone, and often a want of appreciation of the points which require explanation, there is, on the other hand, a rich practical vein, and a well-nigh inexhaustible mine for those who desire edification.

If we wish to see the Pietists in all their excellency we must turn to Würtemberg. The flower of that school is undoubtedly Bengel. Whatever may have been the influence of Spener upon Bengel, it seems to me that in the end the disciple far surpassed the master. And when Pietism was well-nigh extinct at its centre, it flourished in great prosperity in the Southern Kingdom.

The intellectual element, put altogether in the background by the Northern Pietist, is once more brought forward. The "*Gnomon N. T. in quo ex nativa verborum vi simplicitas, profunditas, concinnitas, salubritas sensuum coelestium indicatur*," asserts the duty and the right of Biblical criticism. His interpretation endeavours to carry into practice the principle—"to put nothing into the text, but to take everything out of it." The depth and warmth, which are seldom found in the sober-minded Spener, are found in the Würtemberg school. The glowing atmosphere of the South has transformed the sombre Pietism of the North.

But the pulpit, as the mouthpiece of Pietism, becomes as one-sided as when the orthodox preachers proclaimed from it the infallibility of their dogma. The prominence given to feeling, to the religious sentiment, is bought at the sacrifice of every other principle in man. The assertion that everything must tend to religious edification sets undue limits to the domain of the intellectual, and leads to the exclusion of a sphere which is contemptuously described as—"the world." The subjectivity of its mysticism is apt to degenerate into that religious selfishness and morbid temper with which the Evangelicals of our day have made us familiar. Thus the Pietism of Spener narrows the horizon as much as the orthodoxy of his predecessors. On the one hand it calls forth the spirit of individualism, which makes off all authority, and admits of nothing else but an "independent morality;" on the other hand, it gives rise to an "*ecclesiola in ecclesia*," or a set of mystics living in pharisaical seclusion from a world they believe doomed to destruction.

Gottfried Arnold, Joachim Lange, and especially the fiery Franck, Professor of Divinity at Halle, preached sermons, combining the excellencies and the defects of the Pietist school. The reader will be charmed with the true piety of those productions; he will most likely sympathise with the endeavour to build a sure and certain faith on the shifting sands of feeling; but he will often also, as he becomes painfully conscious of their intellectual weakness, exclaim with Ambrose—"Quid sine capite est homo cum totus in capite sit!"

The Church had hitherto proved herself unable to continue the work of the Reformation; her pulpits had presented to the world a Christianity suffering either from ossification or from softening of the spine. But the Spirit of a great age was about to teach her. Philosophy and so-called Rationalism will become her saviour.

Attempts made within the Church to bring about a reconciliation between pietism and orthodoxy proved unsuccessful. But the effort to fraternise with the spirit of the world was equally abortive. The influence of English Deism, and afterwards of French atheism, the steady advance of science, and especially of physical science, complete the work begun by Pietism. If the sun really stands still, how can the Bible be true? Orthodoxy cuts the knot by anathematising the impious men of science. And thus fighting against truth, that is against God, she prepares her own downfall.

The influence of philosophy, which is to regenerate the Church, makes itself felt in Christian Wolff, who brings the philosophy of Leibnitz down to the popular level. Wolff was not a Rationalist, in the sense which the word obtained afterwards. He gave the first impulse to those attempts at alliances between theology and philosophy, which have generally turned out *mésalliances*. He promises to the Church and to the world a rational theology. If it be impossible to obtain certainty about the religious truths which the age calls in question, he will at any rate show their *possibility*. The tribunal to which he appeals is the common sense of humanity. The test which his philosophy applies to truth, is a practical one. In how far does it tend to promote happiness, in how far is it useful? this is the highest point which his philosophy reaches.

The possibility of a certain thing is demonstrated by Wolff according to the mathematical method. To him the ideal preacher would have been the senior-wrangler. This mathematical method he applies to every department of science, and to every question that comes before him. The pious mind has ever had a peculiar horror of mathematics; the Pietists declared frankly that the study of Euclid and piety were incompatible. On the other hand, some of the leaders of the orthodox party were clearsighted enough to understand that the principle "*rationis sufficientis*," which Wolff, and especially some of his disciples, had strongly insisted upon, was at the very best a sorry ally. Lastly, the world was divided into two parts, one of which desired a more thorough investigation of the questions discussed, the other of which did not see why it should trouble itself about possibilities and probabilities. Is there not also a voice which tells man not to value things merely because of their greater or less usefulness, which assures him that a thing is good not merely because it promotes happiness? If so, that instinct of humanity contributed with other causes to the rapid decline of the philosophy which had exercised an influence that seems well-nigh incredible. "*Doctrina mea contemnitur*," said Wolff at the end of his life.

But for a long time it seemed that the philosophy of Wolff had reconciled the spirit of the Church with the spirit of the world. The pulpit became altogether Wolffian. Sometimes, as in the sermons of Rambach, there is a curious mixture of the sober mathematics of Wolff and the gushing sentiments of the Pietists. The voice is that of Jacob, but the hands are like those of Esau. But ere long the mask is altogether thrown off. Wolff is held up before the eyes of the theological students as a master, and his method is spoken of as necessary to theological salvation. Henceforth the preachers will demonstrate to their congregations the possibility of theological truth, and in support of their arguments they will appeal to reason. The Church is transformed into the theological school. Philosophical sermons also come into fashion. The preacher appears to his simple congregation as an intellectual Blondin walking over the Niagara of everlasting questions along the thin rope of the Wolffian philosophy.

But this state of things did not continue. A Reformer, who is said to have studied Tillotson, arose in the person of the chancellor of the university of Göttingen : Johann Lorenz von Mosheim. The learning of Mosheim was universally acknowledged ; his geniality was equally remarkable. The number of sermons which he published was considerable. The churches in which he preached were crowded. Besides his sermons, he published a book on Homiletics, in which he defined his theory of a sermon, and propounded rules to be observed by young preachers. "The object of a sermon is to edify ; all subjects which tend not to edification are to be excluded from the pulpit. The doctrines of Scripture which are not necessary to salvation should be omitted. Sermons should enlighten the mind and stir up the will. In order to rouse the intellect, a demonstration ought to be as simple as possible ; the most important arguments should be selected, and the most difficult portions should be carefully explained. To stir up the will the preacher should work on the desires and the affections, and try to show that the omission or the commission of a certain act tends to promote happiness. In order to make a resolution firm, it must be built on a rational notion of its usefulness." This extract gives the reader a fair idea of Mosheim's method of preaching. The subjects of his sermons are chiefly practical. Keeping himself aloof from the Pietists and the orthodox and from all "isms," he endeavours to carry out his theory in his sermons. His theme belongs generally to the domain of morality and not to theology. There is a gentle, persuasive tone about his discourses, and the listeners would most probably return home with a feeling of respect for Christianity, if not of admiration. The style is elegant, and, in short, Mosheim's sermons are models of what a fashionable sermon ought to be : not too brilliant in conception or too vigorous in tone, but just a trifle above common places, written in a graceful style, couched in calm, moderate language, and last, but not least,

kept within reasonable limits. "I charge you, O preachers of our Jerusalem, that ye stir not up nor awake our fashionable congregations until they please."

In Mosheim the pulpit of those days reached the climax of excellence. His sermons were well adapted to the times and to the congregations that flocked to hear him. Considering that our preachers are generally not good philosophers, and that if they were their congregations would not understand them, it was surely a wise plan to banish unintelligible questions from the pulpit. Considering also that Mosheim was surrounded on all hands by extreme pedantry and unutterable bad taste, the very thought of which increases our self-esteem, we must allow that his sermons were marvellous productions. It was but natural that young men should have endeavoured to imitate the great preacher, who knew so well the art of attracting congregations.

Unfortunately the successors of Mosheim did not succeed in keeping the pulpit on the height which it had reached during his lifetime. There was decidedly a falling off in style; the sermons became flowery, and though the weaker minds mistook this for poetry, men of taste naturally felt disgusted. Some exceptions to the rule were now and then met with: Cramer, Teiller, and Jerusalem, not to mention others, whose names are long since forgotten, clothed their thoughts in language which bordered on the poetical. But on the whole the style was prosaic. However, the contents of the sermons were even more prosaic. The practical philosophy of Wolff began to bear fruit. The great criterion of utility was now applied to the theological dogma, without the least hesitation. The calm, philosophical, mathematical sermons of the first period, when Wolff's influence had been most powerful, were discarded for practical sermons. It was found that the vast majority of dogmas were not necessary to salvation, and as they were matters of only speculative importance, men agreed to differ on them and not to bring them forward before mixed audiences. There still remained a vast field: natural religion and morality. If the Scriptures or the doctrine of the Church contained any contribution towards the moral improvement of the human race, there was of course no objection to making use of them. In fact, it was rather gratifying to be able to do so, because it was paying respect to venerable traditions which had held undisturbed sway for centuries. Only let the ideas of the first century be translated into the language of the eighteenth.

Practical morality, then, was the watchword of the pulpit. The Supreme Being is looked upon in the light of Chief Commissioner of a kind of spiritual police; the ministers consider themselves as directors of morality. Common sense is invoked from a hundred pulpits; morality is insisted upon with a never-flagging eloquence. Sometimes the preacher leaves what may be called the region of the

specifically Christian, to wander at his good pleasure through the wide, wide world. The conversational idea, which is said to be the favourite theory of one of our great liberal preachers, is fully carried out in the sermons of Zollikofer. They are not like after-dinner conversations, but they are friendly chats. There a farmer may get advice about his crops, or a mother may learn what to give to her child when it is teething. Who can deny that those sermons are practical? There is no idealism or vagueness about them; common sense reigns supreme, and the preacher is not too proud to condescend to the very minutiae of life. Those reflections may seem to you rather dry; the moralizing may appear slightly prosy; you may also think that the directions given to you dwell too much on particulars; but you have the consolation that you have saved your doctor's bill, and that you have a guide to steer you through the moral mazes of life.

The intensely shallow views held by those men could not prove satisfactory. The theology of silence does not satisfy the human mind; the philosophy of "*cui bono?*" can hardly quench the innate thirst after the ideal. Criticism goes on its way, and declares that it will not rest before it has reached and examined the very sources, whence springs the river which, broadening and deepening through successive ages, has swollen into the mighty river of tradition and dogma. The intellect asserts its right to investigate the questions to which the popular philosophy of the day has assigned a place among the heterogeneous mass in the lumber-room. The conscience cries out against that immoral morality which reduces everything to mere selfish calculation, and asks for a truly religious morality. The human heart, with its poetry, pants like the hart after the water-brooks of the ideal.

The intensely ideal side of Christianity has found one preacher, whom we cannot pass over; I mean Herder. He may be far removed from the picture of the orthodox preacher, such as the Church delights to paint him; he may have been unable to join in the everlasting "*Miserere*" of the penitent, or to fathom the mysteries which others superstitiously believed or carelessly explained away; he may have known little of Divinity, but he knew all the more of humanity. He has done for Protestantism what Chateaubriand has done for Catholicism. In the poetical pages of Herder the harp of the East, which had hung for many a year on the willows, makes itself once more heard on Western shores. The grandeur of Hebrew poetry, in its conceptions of the Infinite, is brought before a generation satiated with common sense. The life of the ideal—in other words, Religion—the ideal temper, which turns away from the profane man, the man whose five senses may be developed, but who lacks that sixth sense which constitutes the truly divine in man, has found in Herder its most eloquent preacher and its most eminent

prophet. In reading his works one is transferred to the land where the beautiful reigns in peace over a free and happy people, and unconsciously one falls down, amidst the universal harmony, to kneel and to adore.

But if Herder gave utterance to the cry of the human heart, the protest of the human conscience made itself heard from the lips of Kant. In him the great principles of the Reformation, morality, freedom, and subjectivity, celebrated their triumph. The knowledge of the objective was indeed left a matter of uncertainty, but the great moral truths which are the postulate of the practical reason, were set on a throne "far above all principalities and powers." The "categorical Imperative," commanding all to do whatsoever is good, was declared the sovereign ruler to whom man owes an implicit obedience. To Christianity the mission was assigned of spreading morality and of helping man in the endeavour to yield it a willing obedience. In the end man is pictured to us as standing forth in his personal moral self-consciousness.

Along with the voice of the conscience the intellect raised its protest. The impatience of dogma became an impatience of all authority. The principles of Kant, which admitted of a Revelation, might equally be turned against it. The canon in which the Revelation is embodied was now freely criticized. The religion of Reason was acknowledged to be the only true one. In accordance with the dictates of reason, the "supernatural" was declared "unnatural," and hence either admitted, but with explanations so as in reality to destroy its idea, or openly attacked. Miraculous words and miraculous facts were equally rejected. A favourite theory, that of "accommodation," became the means of removing many difficulties. Christ and his apostles had accommodated themselves to the times in which they lived and to the people in whose midst they moved. The books of the Bible were then subjected to minute criticism, and the last word was the necessity of having another Christianity, revised and augmented in accordance with the dictates of Reason.

Such were the expressions in which the "enfants terribles" which seem to abound in every movement were wont to indulge. There was a cautious supranaturalism and a cautious rationalism, both of which found numerous adherents. The pulpits of the day became, in some cases, the expression of the faith of reason. The preachers would then adopt a calm philosophical tone, and endeavour to bring before the minds of their hearers the system of Kant. But mostly their efforts were directed towards the moral improvement of their congregations. In rhetorical language they painted the majesty of the "practical reason" and the glory of the man who obeys its "postulates;" they endeavoured to commend morality through the intellect to the will, and then waited quietly for the results which could not but flow from the contemplation of so majestic a vision,

and so philosophical a discourse. In an atmosphere so impregnated with morality, who could foretell what might happen?

There are many names of preachers of those days handed down to us. It is possible that some of the sermons which were delivered to large congregations were indeed admirable; the fact of their being exceedingly wearisome to the reader is the greatest testimony in their favour. But there is one, who was then "the prince of preachers," and whose sermons are even now readable, Frank Volkmar Reinhard. He belonged to the moderate supranaturalists, to whom I formerly alluded. He had spent his childhood in the midst of pietistical influences; hence no doubt he never felt thoroughly at home in the new atmosphere. He seemed to have somewhat of the feeling of David, clothed in the armour of Saul. He had studied intently the classical orators, especially Cicero, and this kept him from adopting altogether the method then in vogue. Looking at a few of his sermons—he published fifty-one volumes, and I suppose no one could be expected to read the whole of them—there is great ingenuity in the invention of his theme, a logical order of arrangement, and a clear though now and then rather cold style. His method of preaching, which seems to be followed by many amongst us, is to choose a text, to dismiss it as curtly as possible, and then to preach a sermon on a subject, which by the aid of only the greatest ingenuity can be connected with the text, or which has only a merely accidental relation to it. But once admit the excellency of this method, and we can understand the enthusiastic judgment of one who wrote:—"I feel attracted by the irresistible persuasiveness of each word he utters. I am listening to one who, after all his struggles, has arrived at the conviction that the truths which he proclaims are divine. His sermons come out of the Bible, and are built upon that foundation. They will last as long as the Bible will remain the source of consolation for the afflicted and the sorrowing." These are somewhat exaggerated words of praise, but the fascination felt by the audience can easily be imagined. Reinhard tried to realize the ideal which he painted, when he said to himself, "Let thy discourse be simple so as to be understood, easy in order to be remembered, stirring so as to rouse the feelings, and touching in order to impress the heart; talk about Religion with lofty simplicity, noble dignity, and beneficent warmth." The Church party also owes him a debt of gratitude: on the anniversary of the Reformation in the year 1800, he had the courage to preach a sermon on the dogma of "justification by faith." This was almost as bold an act as it would be to insist from an Evangelical pulpit on "the necessity of good works."

I have dwelt on Reinhard, because he seems to me the most favourable specimen of the preachers of that period. The theological dogma was dethroned; the sentimental piety of Spenser shown in

all its weakness; the system which professed to know everything laid bare in all its shallowness; and the morality which was based on selfishness discovered in all its wretched impotence. Kant came as the apostle of *religious morality*. He pointed out that there is no difference between the contents of religion and of morality. He preached a faith containing moral ideas—a natural religion—and called upon men, after they had once recognised their duty to obey it, without hesitation. On this foundation, as we remarked and as we have seen in Reinhard, it was possible to maintain a theological Christianity. The more so, when Jacobi proclaimed after him in inspired language the philosophy of faith, that is of a direct perception within ourselves of the Divine. But on the other hand, the sceptical elements of Kant's philosophy once let loose might gather in a storm, the destructiveness of which no one could foresee. Aided by other causes, the hurricane broke forth, and in the end it seemed that nothing would remain, not even morality.

It was Schleiermacher, who, standing above the extremes of supernaturalism and of Rationalism, ushered in a new era. Religion was not to him a "*modus Deum cognoscendi et colendi*;" the knowledge of and submission to duty did not to him supplant Christianity. Religion is based on the "*absolute feeling of dependence*."\* He pointed out to each department of Christianity its proper sphere, and exalted above all the religion of faith.

The intense originality of the person and the system of Schleiermacher are universally acknowledged; his widespread influence, not limited to any school, admits of no denial; he is the father of modern theology. His sermons, which cannot be imitated, but which richly deserve to be studied, are as unique as his person. The view he held regarding preaching was original. According to ancient and modern Protestants, as we remarked before, the essence of the sermon is to instruct, and its object is to convert the audience. Schleiermacher protests against this theory. He looks upon the sermon as forming part of the religious service, as a religious act. He is not in the pulpit to teach; instruction is quite a secondary object. He is not there to persuade men to something, or to convert them, if you prefer the expression. Standing in the Christian Church, his sermon is the expression of the Christian consciousness, which is common to all; the preacher, if I may use the expression, is the concentration of the congregation, or rather he presents before the congregation the truths which are the object of a *common* faith, and the contemplation of which cannot but quicken the consciousness of the *individual*. We do not presume to discuss the merits or the demerits of this view, but it seems at any rate far above the Protestant theory of preaching.

The object of preaching thus briefly stated, let us glance at the

\* Die Frömmigkeit ist rein für sich betrachtet weder ein Wissen noch ein Thun sondern eine Bestimmtheit des Gefühls oder unmittelbaren Selbstbewusstseins.



contents of his sermons. Schleiermacher believes that religious dogmas and moral propositions are both utterances of Christian piety. In many of his sermons, what may be called morality prevails; in others, the Christian dogma reigns paramount.

The blending of theology and of morality, for which St. Paul is often remarkable, is repeatedly found in the sermons of Schleiermacher. The religious dogma is to him the reflection of the Christian consciousness; if he preaches the dogma it is in order to lead to morality.

He becomes thus the mouthpiece of a religious morality, and not of an utilitarian or a philosophical or a merely theological morality. A great philosopher, and a master of dialectics, he never introduced philosophy in the pulpit. He would never have been guilty of the absurdity of endeavouring to demonstrate the existence of God to a Christian congregation. He left philosophy to the schools; philosophy—which word I think ought to be restricted to denote metaphysics—has nothing to do with the will or the conscience; it appeals exclusively to the intellect. Theology too—if it be a science, and was it not once called the “Queen of sciences?”—belongs to the schools, and should not be brought forward in the pulpit. Theological doctrines, their history and their growth, are matters of interest to the student; let them be kept within the learned circle.

The centre of Schleiermacher’s system and of his sermons was the person of Christ. Christ was to him the source of faith; the centre from which all things proceed, and towards which all should tend. Let orthodoxy preach a book, clinging to every letter of it, like a drowning person laying hold of everything within his reach, so as to escape death; he will proclaim a living person and stand in the freedom wherewith truth alone makes free. He therefore handles freely not merely the traditional dogma, but also the book in which God’s words are contained. On the other hand he has no sympathy with those who believe in a Christianity without Christ; there are certain limits which he does not transgress, and there are positive elements the denial of which would involve the destruction of the Christian Religion. Thus he places himself above parties in asserting Christianity to be a real moral force proceeding from a living person.

“A theologian is, ‘according to him’, one who wishes to reconcile knowledge and faith.” We have not space to dwell upon the way in which he attempted to carry out his ideal. He followed after it from the moment when he pronounced his “*Reden über die Religion an die gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern*,” till the hour when after having partaken of the Sacrament he breathed his last. And men of all classes, except perhaps a few belonging to the extreme right or the extreme left, will rise from the contemplation of his life and the reading of his sermons, with the reflection that never was a majestic ideal followed after in so grand a way and so nearly reached. If he

seems to have failed, it is perhaps because the thing itself is impossible. If the intellect plunges us continually in the stream of paganism, and the heart raises us for ever towards the banks of Christianity, is it because the dualism between the two is indeed irreconcilable, or because the revelation of their harmony would be too glorious a sight for our weakness?

The period after Schleiermacher was one of intense activity; too great and too many-sided to be the founder of a school, his influence made itself felt in every direction. The last attempt at reconciliation between historical Christianity and philosophy in the noble system of Hegel, looking upon Christianity as the adequate contents of philosophical truth, had proved a failure. The spirit of Schleiermacher standing, as we have seen, on the heights above Supernaturalism and extreme Rationalism, both equally destructive of Christianity, could alone save the Church from relapsing into either of the extremes.

The second half of the nineteenth century—I am merely considering it in a religious aspect—seems to me to bear an eclectic character. Religious beliefs are put into the kaleidoscope, and who can foretell whether they will ever coalesce into a whole which in the midst of great variety will yet present substantial unity. The time after Schleiermacher is marked in every department of Christianity by works mostly unparalleled in other countries for vastness of learning, patience of research, and fearless love of truth. In some the spirit of a refined rationalism—intellectual and moral—asserts the supremacy; in others there breathes a pious supernaturalism, which attempts to be faithful to the principles of the Reformation once deserted; in others again, the Church and her Creed, or the Scriptures, as interpreted by the individual Christian consciousness, stand prominently forward. In nearly all these is the attempt made to bring the Christianity of the Church into harmony with the Christianity age.

The pulpit is naturally the echo of the feeling which animates modern German Protestantism. We have seen the pulpit of the Reformation under the influence of Protestant scholasticism, Evangelical asceticism, shallow intellectualism and utilitarianism, deadening supernaturalism, and lastly of a lofty philosophical morality. We now see it under the influence of an eclecticism, which seems to follow upon periods when thought has run through a certain cycle, and to reign over men until the coming of a new master-mind, opening up to humanity unknown ways and hitherto untrodden paths.

The German pulpit presents therefore the most varied aspects. On the one hand, the revival of an intensely High-Lutheranism has brought to the front preachers like the eloquent Bavarian pastor, Löhe, hardly admitting of salvation without the pale of the Church; on the other hand, the principle of individuality and of "speaking with tongues" has found representatives, after the model of Harms.

Some, like Steinmeyer, excel in exegesis, and adopting the analytical method in their sermons, endeavour to give a full explanation of their text, and, if possible, to shed new light on it; others, like Kohlbrügge, must needs preach the theological dogma; Krummacher, well known amongst ourselves, softened down the hard dogma in a torrent of sentiment poured forth in highly poetical language. Tholuck and Julius Müller, men of well-known learning and culture, preach sermons full of philosophical thoughts; Hoffmann and Büchsel, not to mention others, preach plain practical sermons, in which the Gospel is understood in the narrow sense peculiar to Evangelicalism. These are but a few names, illustrative of different styles amongst the so-called orthodox. Rationalism has, if not greater preachers than those mentioned, men who are more than a match for their opponents. We find amongst them less monotony than amongst the old school; their sermons are often marked by great brilliancy and depth of sentiment, but there is frequently an absence of depth and a want of earnestness when treating of the doctrines of the Church. As to style, there is all the difference between the classical Theremin impressing his hearers in most elegant language with the beauty of virtue as conducive to happiness, and the pietist of Würtemberg endeavouring to preach Shemitic ideas in the language not of Japheth but of Shem.

The powerlessness of the pulpit is, I need hardly say, as much a matter of complaint in Germany as amongst ourselves. The milk provided in ordinary sermons for the people is decidedly largely adulterated with water. The divorce between the theological schools and the Church—a principle which I believe to be based on truth—has unfortunately sometimes produced sermons weak in intellect and in sentiment. The preacher, leaving his learning at the porch, and wishing to *edify* his congregation, has satisfied himself with a string of commonplaces and of pious sentiments. The poor sermons delivered now and then by men of admitted learning are one of the standing miracles of the age: one would think that they had understood the words: "Blessed are the poor in spirit," as meaning, blessed are the foolish.\*

But apart from the general weakness of the pulpit, there is the undoubted fact that the people have deeply drunk at the springs of unlimited scepticism which flowed so freely for more than a century. It is not true that German congregations consist exclusively of women and children; there is always a large minority of men. It would be unfair to draw a parallel in regard to Church attendance between Germany and ourselves. With us attendance at Church belongs to the "bon ton," and besides, we have not yet passed

\* Most of the questions which trouble us belong to theology or to historical criticism, and have therefore nothing to do with religion. Religion is an intuition of the conscience. The gospel of the conscience, antecedent to every other gospel, speaks with absolute authority. I hope to have some time the opportunity of developing this thesis with its most important consequences.


through any similar conflict, and our innocence is therefore not that of the tried man but of the unconscious child. In addition, we owe our increased church-going to the "Catholic revival." Protestantism, even at its very best, supplies but a weak motive for going to church; everything centres around the preacher, and if he be clever and eloquent, people are of course glad to go and hear him; but if he be not, why should they go to Church? Catholicism alone is able to fill the churches. The moral earnestness, however, inherent in the Teutonic race, which breathed through their "Eddas," and formed the warriors before which Romans trembled, and inspired the religious movement of the sixteenth century, will yet gain the victory. It will yet find expression in an ardent religious faith and a quickened religious life.

Many are the remedies suggested to make the pulpit once more a power. Where so many doctors stand around the patient assuring him that he is dying, and shutting him out from every particle of light and fresh air, we are afraid that his case is hopeless. If Nature were allowed to do her work, and if plenty of fresh air were given, it is quite possible that he would revive.

That there is an immense field for the Protestant pulpit no one will deny. But it must accommodate itself to the new order of things, which so far from tending towards its decline, as is alleged, gives it a scope which it never had in ages gone by. Let it place itself under the influence of real life, and not of theological dogma, or of the philosophical school. Let its tone be human, let its basis be a sound psychology, founded on a true ethical method. Let it bring Christianity into contact with life, and with all the intellectual, political, and social forces of our age. Let its text be a Divine morality, shedding its light over all that is human. Let it bring Christian principles to bear upon the problems and topics of the day; let it stand, as it were, on a vantage ground to be the centre of a spiritual life-giving and preserving force. In one word, let the Protestant pulpit be human, in order that it may be divine.

But one condition is absolutely required; without it culture and the greatest development of natural gifts are powerless: it must have freedom. With his breast pressed against thorns, with his hands and feet tied to foregone conclusions, kept within the narrow space jealously guarded by vigilant sentinels—can the preacher breathe, and speak, and move? Protestantism, if faithful to its principles of individualism and of progress, can set the captive free.

A. SCHWARTZ.



## ‘DANTE.’

**T**HE historical relations of Dante are far too intricate to admit of reasonable compression, his philosophical tenets and speculations are those of a long forgotten school, while his fondness for enigmatical utterances in the various sciences, especially astronomy, has given rise to an amount of subject matter that would demand a treatise for itself in explanation. I propose therefore to speak of the man in his more general relation to humanity, as an artist treating of subjects that are of universal interest.

And certainly, if any man ever merited attention and study, it is Dante.

To count by years, his life was not a long one; nor, to estimate by position, a very successful one; and, from what we know of the details of his private history, it was not a happy one. Of the special details of that life, I do not mean to speak. They were much of the same sort that are familiar to us all, not through the pages of history, but in the experiences of our every-day life. His sorrows were such as many now endure, his losses such as all must sometime or other feel, his faults and sins the counterpart of those that disfigure the outer and inner lives of every man. We feel thus in the case of any man, but there is perhaps none with whom we can more readily sympathize, and whom we are more compelled in studying to admire. Our sympathy takes its rise indeed from the circumstance that we are copartners in the common mind of humanity: the gift of reason

is the inalienable right of every individual. But men differ so widely in their grasp of the faculty, in its development and manifestation, that its fuller action on any one member of the race stamps him with a peculiar mark for consideration. Nay, the very equality of gift which would seem to stereotype us into uniformity, has another side, by virtue of which, as any number of strings that are in unison will vibrate an answer to one of themselves when struck, so the words of a true man, once uttered, will go on re-echoing through all time. It is precisely in the power of producing vibration that one recognizes the action of the loftier minds in humanity. There is, as it were, actual physical motion in their works. Göthe reads Shakspeare, and the hidden chords of his soul are struck everywhere, and thrill with an awful, unending vibration. He does not *know* any more of Shakspeare, but he has himself *felt*; his own nature becomes conscious of itself and its powers, in the thrill. As he says: "They are not poems! One fancies oneself standing before the opened books of Destiny, in which the whirlwind of the most agitated life is raging and with resistless haste dashing to and fro the leaves." It is thus in Homer one hears the roar and din of battle, the shouts of gods and heroes, it is thus in Dante one listens to the "*ulti guai*" of the damned in Hell, or the organ-toned songs of the blest in Paradise.

These things are intelligible to all, we can all read and feel them; our common humanity is at home in them all.

And that humanity may well feel proud that it can take on forms so varied as are exhibited in this one man, Dante,—the politician, with his rare knowledge of men as individuals, and in their aggregation as states,—the philosopher, with his vast comprehension of all sciences and his lofty speculations on the mysteries of being,—the poet, with his perception and love of all that is beautiful and true in the scenes of nature, or the monuments of art, the special productions of mankind, or the more immediate works of God. And all these powers united in one man, who has fused their action into one immortal song

On man, the heart of man, and human life.

A poem, in which are embodied, amid the most vivid reminiscences of his life, the whole play of passions, political and individual, that agitated him; the best and deepest and most sacred thoughts of his cultivated mind, on humanity, its duties and destiny; and his testament of warning and instruction to his own city, his country, and mankind. A work which plainly manifests and carries out the special activity of the Poet, the Seer and Maker, whose function it is to pierce into and divine the innermost heart of things, and legibly transcribe their symbols; as the Germans have expressed it in their term "*Dichter*," to "*densify*" into substantial existence the

misty conceptions which float before the untrained or ungifted eyes of the multitude,—or as Shakspeare has coupled the two definitions:—

And as imagination *bodies forth*  
The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen  
Turns them to *shapes* and gives to airy nothing  
A local habitation and a name.

# I.

It is plain, on even a cursory examination of Dante's main work, that the perfect mastery therein shown of every branch of science, could not have been attained save at the cost of very great labour and patient study. In the "Convito," he states that he had weakened his eyes by fatiguing them with too much reading. But there was with him the continual spur of a wish to externalize and embody that idea of Unity which possessed him, and which lies at the root of all he said or did. His earliest work, the "Vita Nuova," wherein he describes the commencement and growth of the one love that stayed with him for ever, concludes with a passage that unmistakably refers to the great poem which was to sum and measure his genius, and of which the "Convito" was intended to be an allegorical explanation. His two Latin works, addressed to the learned, "De Monarchiâ" and "De Vulgari Eloquentia," had a similar scope; the one a plea for unity of empire, the other for unity of language.

Yet everywhere, while satisfying the imperious demand of his nature for unity, there is perfect command over all the details, which are harmoniously arranged in all their fulness with the masterful ease of a comprehensive yet orderly mind. Thus in the "Commedia" along with the narrative, each Cantica has a particular branch of science allotted to it, from which are drawn topics and examples. The Inferno is relieved by disquisitions on geology, meteorology, &c., the changes brought about in the earth by disruptions and cataclysms; the Purgatorio treats in its illustrations more of the action of life in animals and plants; the Paradiso is informed by discussions or explanations on metaphysics and theology. In other words, the references in the Canticas are respectively inorganic matter, organic matter, and mind. It is needless to point out, how admirably these harmonize with the contents of each part.

Dante is certainly an admirable specimen of a mediæval student,—what we should call his college career, his scholastic success, was remarkable, but he is also the very model of a workman in the poetic art. In particular, his subtlety in arrangement and balance is extraordinary; we can hardly estimate too highly the artistic skill which has brought together such masses of apparently heterogeneous

conceptions without either confusing or repelling his reader.\* Every-where he maintains the freedom, yet observes the limits of art. Thus he never represents God as speaking : there could hardly be a surer instance of the perfect restraint of his art.

But besides the close, long continued thinking of the eager student, and the cultivated instinct of the genuine artist, we can feel in his work the even, accurate judgment of the practical man of the world. Considering the age in which he lived, we can hardly avoid a slight feeling of wonder at his valuation of some of the studies then deemed all-important. To Dante the ultimate application of all knowledge was, that it should be converted into the actual practical life of the man, to enable him to educe what was best in him. It is with this view he says of Solomon :—

Clearly he was a king who asked for wisdom  
That he might be sufficiently a king ;  
'Twas not to know the numbers in which are  
The motors here above, or, if "*necesse* "  
With a contingent e'er "*necesse* " make,  
Non si est dare primum motum esse ;  
Or, if in semicircle can be made  
Triangle, so that it have no right angle.

Not astronomy, or logics, or metaphysics, or geometry, singly was to educate a man ; but that eclectic mixture of all which should enable him to be sufficiently a "man." And his own whole life and study and work show that it was with him no mere idle theory, but a very positive, workable conception.

The aim of the work is entirely practical. As he says, it is "to take away those who live in this life from their state of misery, and to lead them on to a state of happiness."

It was no merely speculative theory which he had spun out and embellished for the purpose of pleasing the ears, or gaining the applause, of his countrymen. It was certainly not for any such reward that he had made himself "haggard" over the work, that he had concentrated all the powers of his mind and devoted the hours of his exiled life. The years, as they rolled, would give scope for his work to act, men would see these things in a clearer light, the great problem of life which remains for each man to solve, might be found more easy of solution to some through his aid—this was his hope.

But the Poem has had a curious hard fate. While on the one hand, it has been vilified as the very embodiment of barbarism and

\* Dante is not to be read in translations : matter and form in him are so absolutely blended, the idea and its expression are so fused, that any severance is an irreparable loss. Mr. Longfellow has, however, put almost all excuse of incapacity out of the power of English educated people ; a very little practice should enable any one to read the original with the help of his line for line (and generally accurate) translation. But without the original very little of Dante will be really got at.



unintelligibleness, on the other it has been the object of the most senseless verbal imitation and hair-splitting allegorizing, or still worse, the occasion of theories absurd as those spun out of it by the author of the "Antipapal Spirit." Volumes on volumes have been written on minute points of criticism which, when solved, shed no new light, while the real aim, as expressly declared by himself, has remained unenforced, well-nigh unmentioned save in a meaningless iteration of Dante's phrasology.

Yet the Poem touches all mankind, at least all of Christendom. Something of its special features excepted, it has a deep imperishable interest for all; the grand Triad is the unavoidable journey of every individual on earth, either straight on to the end, through the slough of sin, over the hill of repentance to the haven of peace, or no farther than the first, and there for ever embedded. And its practicalness, its helpfulness, lies in its enforcement of the possibility of success for all in honest effort. This Dante has very clearly enounced in the Paradiso.

The greatest gift that in his largess God  
Creating made, and unto his own goodness  
Nearest conformed, and that which he doth prize  
Most highly, is the freedom of the will,  
Wherewith the creatures of intelligence,  
Both all and only were and are endowed.

Every one has the power within himself to will the first steps, and then the divine grace and help is freely given,—

The bread the pitying Father shuts from none.

And how readily that aid is accorded, is signified very beautifully in the Purgatorio, when the fiend coming for the Soul of Buonconte, is met by God's Angel and thwarted in his purpose, whereupon he shouts :—

Oh, thou from Heaven, wherefore dost thou rob me?  
Thou bear'st away the eternal part of him  
For one poor little tear that takes him from me.

But this ready help from above is not to be presumed on.

And I have seen a ship direct and swift,  
Run o'er the sea throughout its course entire,  
To perish at the harbour's mouth at last.

No one will maintain that Shakspeare's was not a greater mind, that his insight into nature and man was not infinitely vaster than Dante's, but there is no such deep underlying truth in any of his plays. The unsatisfactoriness of life, its deceits, its treacheries, are dwelt on, and when that bourn from whence no traveller returns is in imagination crossed, there is the nameless dread, the terrified shrinking, but there is little else that might not have been uttered by very pagans. It may be said, that it was not Shakspeare's business or purpose to write on such matters. Still he often enough has religious

quotations and allusions, and he can hardly be said to have left the question of futurity untouched.

There is in some respects a deeper note in the great mind of modern times. Faust passes through all the joys and pleasures and triumphs of earthly life, under the guidance of the subtlest of spirits, but in no case does anything earthly satisfy him, give him real happiness, and the tempter is foiled by the want of consent on the part of the Man's *will* which cannot find its resting-place save in God alone. Or as Dante says:—

Well I discern, that by that truth alone  
Enlightened, beyond which no truth may roam,  
Our mind can satisfy her thirst to know ;  
Therein she resteth,  
  soon as she hath reached that bound,  
And she *hath* power to reach it ; else desire  
Were given to no end.

But Dante has also the nobler, the higher truth :—

May the light that leadeth thee on high  
Find in thine own free will as much of wax  
As needful is, up to the highest azure.

This *will* has with him far more meaning than the merely negative will of Göthe.

And yet it is a very sad poem, sad in its utter abnegation of all hope from any human quarter. His painting of the state of Italy is a very terrible one, and very true. But it has seemed to many distorted, vicious,—they have called Dante a fierce wild *partizan*, a renegade ; one knows not what of ill names has been spared him. That he was never mistaken, never harsh and uncharitable, none would undertake to assert,—and yet, whenever in the consciousness of his function as a poet, he feels called on to pass a judgment, it is ever done with perfect simplicity of heart, and desire for justice. There is no consciousness of triumph in him, as of a righteousness that had been made perfect by its journey and experiences, much less the Pharisaical spirit, which, without ever having felt the pressure of the temptation, pitilessly showers its wrath on the failure of the tempted, but the sternest, most uncompromising conviction that the complete subjugation of evil will and tendencies in Self, when accomplished, was a mere personal duty that in no way gave a man the right to judge arbitrarily or hastily of others. And it may partly be from this very evenness that he has so little influenced his nation, as a people. Individuals have been stirred to the heart by this wondrous effort of imagination, but it in reality is not sufficiently *partisan* to sweep on a numerical majority. It represents principles rather than passions, and is thereby the very antipodes of the purely Italian character, whose essentially lyric and subjective tendencies are far better exhibited in the Canzoniere of a Petrarca, than in the

plastic, objective productions of a mind such as was Dante's. For him, mere names were nothing, and he had a strong instinctive dislike to anything like mob. Guelphs and Ghibellines were alike reproached and condemned.

To the public standard, one the yellow lilies  
Opposes, the other claims it for a party,  
So that 'tis hard to see which sins the most.

And he has not shunned to involve those for whom his heart felt a deep yearning on earth in one common ruin with his bitterest foes, when there was equal fault attributable to both, and that too while his whole bodily frame was convulsed with the passion of sorrow that it should be so. Everybody knows the sad tale of Francesca, but the words in which he tells the pity that had so utterly confused him, are hardly enough dwelt on :—

And all the while one Spirit uttered this,  
The other one did weep so, that for pity  
I swooned away as if I had been dying,  
And fell, even as a dead body falls.

But the Italian words have a dull heavy thud, as of one whose heart had beaten with such mad violence that it had suddenly stopped its pulsation, and the body had there dropped dead. The concluding line with its five alliterative dissyllables is inexpressibly mournful—  
"E CADDI COME CORPO MORTO CADE."

It was a terrible tale for him to hear, and to relate, but it was the most direct and striking example of the suffering that sin entails; and as such, one feels that he had no choice but to set it down. And surely this, the first story in the poem, has a deep significance. For the whole has as a ground-thought the meeting of Beatrice and Dante in the bright world beyond, where all is pure and sinless. And it was not for him a mere dream. Those memories of his journey he carried with him in his life. The women shrank in terror from his dark, weird, sorrowful face, and whispered to each other that it was he who had been in Hell, and saw the damned. He had, indeed, seen and shuddered at the miseries of the lost, he had witnessed the expiatory sufferings of the repentant, and hopefully forecast his own arrival among them in Purgatory, he had mingled with the chorus of the redeemed in Paradise, had heard the perfect music of the everlasting harmonies, and had at last been rapt into ecstatic vision of the glorious Trinity, of which vision he remembers nought save the incommunicable thrill.

Even as he is who seeth in a dream,  
And after dreaming, the imprinted passion  
Remains, and to his mind the rest returns not,  
Even such am I; for almost utterly  
Ceases my vision, and distilleth yet  
Within my heart the sweetness born of it.

## II.

In endeavouring to obtain a clear idea of Dante's meaning and aim, his own minor works are of the utmost importance, not only as furnishing explicit declarations at times of his fundamental principles, but as throwing cross-lights on passages in the "*Commedia*" which might otherwise be wrongly construed.

To enter on anything like detail is not intended ; but some knowledge of his leading ideas is necessary.

It is plain from every one of his writings that the great object of his life was to restore to humanity the order, and consequent happiness, which had been lost. This loss, in his eyes, had its source in the confusion of two spheres of government, through the absorption of the temporal power by the spiritual guides. This ecclesiastical domination, against which Dante protested, was the natural result of a state of things so unsettled as was that of the Middle Ages.

In the very conception of feudal institutions there lay the idea of a supreme head somewhere, from whom all authority emanated, and to whom submission was due ; but the feudal lords were totally opposed to yielding this submission to any one of their fellows, and therefore sought in the spiritual side a theoretical head to fill up the gap in the system. Not that the Church ever acted directly on the government, but this acknowledged position of headship gave her naturally an immense influence, the irresponsible exertion of which could not fail to bring about inequalities and inconsistencies everywhere.

It was this meddling with the functions of the temporal authority that Dante deprecated. From it he had seen most of the evils proceed that had embittered his life, and ruined his country ; and the only remedy he knew lay in a return to the old Roman theory of Empire. For Dante, the two powers, spiritual and temporal, were essentially distinct and incompatible in the same hands.

The Pope, as the head of the Church, was to be the director of spiritual affairs, as the Emperor, at the head of all the powers of the State, had to wield the temporal government. Nor for this purpose was it any more necessary that the Emperor should be an Italian by birth, than it was in the case of the Pope. It was the office, not the man, that was of importance ; besides, there was always the traditional name of Roman Emperor. In his book "*De Monarchiâ*," he lays down the following principles. Providence has given man two aims to pursue,—the happiness of this life, which is got by morally virtuous conduct, and the happiness of eternal life, which consists in the fruition of the Divine aspect. We attain to the first through philosophical teaching, by the practice of moral and intellectual virtues ; to the second, by means of the theological virtues, Faith, Hope, and Charity.

The three *Canticas* have therefore their special reference: the *Inferno*, corresponding to the disordered state of the world, brought about by the absence of rightful rule; the *Purgatorio*, to the amelioration of that state by moral virtues, the exercise of which leads man to the terrestrial *Paradise*—(figured by Dante as an abode at the top of the mountain of *Purgatory*, in which our first parents dwelt while yet uncorrupted); and the *Paradiso*, to the full fruition of God's sight through the maintenance of the theological virtues. And therefore, in the end of the *Paradiso*, Dante represents himself as being examined by St. Peter on Faith, by St. James on Hope, and by St. John on Charity (or Love), just before he is admitted to the final beatitude.

On earth, then, this is the necessary course. From out the disorder and tumult of an ill-regulated, unsystematic life, by the grace of God, (which is figured by Lucia at the beginning of the first *cantica*), we are brought to our senses, and under the guidance of reason (Virgil) we are led to survey the mischief which this disorder entails; after which, by a resolute effort of our free-will (figured by Cato, at the beginning of the second *cantica*), we set out on our toilsome journey up the mountain—*i.e.*, to rid ourselves of evil habits and tendencies by self-denial and restraint. Now, in order to do this effectively in the world, we must be in a state of freedom and peace, which can only be had under a sufficiently powerful, righteous government, and therefore the earthly head must be one and independent; as Dante says, "the authority of the temporal monarchy flows down immediately from the fountain of universal authority, that is, God."

There is then, further, the additional exercise of a higher virtue, (figured by Beatrice at the beginning of the third *cantica*)—*viz.*, the theological, through which alone we can see God. Virgil says to Dante on one occasion:—

What *reason* here discovers I have power  
To show thee; that which lies beyond, expect  
From Beatrice, *faith's*, not reason's task.

And as one Emperor was indispensable for the maintenance of the conditions needful for the application of the philosophical teachings of human reason, so there is an equal need of the Supreme Pontiff to deliver and expound the revelations of the Holy Spirit in reference to things supernatural, that transcend human reason. This lofty conception of Law as co-ordinate with Theology, was but natural in one so thoroughly penetrated with the ancient Roman greatness, which had given birth to the systems of jurisprudence that found their highest development and expression in the magnificent Code of Justinian. And this equal importance which Dante attributes to earthly rule is further justified to his thought by the consideration that the Gospel had not been given till the Roman Empire had

been consolidated by Augustus Caesar, as the necessary starting point for a scheme of morality that was to be operative on the whole world.

And the Emperor is particularly needed, Dante writes, "because human cupidity is at the root of all the ills, and men, like horses vagabond in bestiality, must be restrained in the road by bit and bridle." It was the old contest, that is ever new, of individual will, self-will, against the objective will that embodies the commands of Right : as our Poet laments that

On earth there is no one who governs,  
Whence goes astray the human family.

The Emperor is, therefore, to blame for not manfully and vigorously taking up the power, as is Italy for her intrigues against the Emperor, and her opposition to the ancient principles of right. Both accordingly are lashed with an unsparing reproach and sarcasm, in a well-known passage of the *Purgatorio*; the one, that he has allowed the garden of the Empire to run waste, the other, that she will not permit the rightful lord to administer the laws which Justinian had given the land after he had freed it from the Goths.

Addressing the German Emperor, Albert :—

**Come, see the Capulets, and Montagues !**

**man**

Who carest for nought ! Come, cruel one !

Come, and behold the oppression of the nobles,

**And mark their injuries !**

**Come, and behold thy Rome, who calls on thee**

Desolate widow, day and night with moans,

"My Caesar, why dost thou desert my side?"

Come, and behold what love among thy people :

And if no pity touches thee for us,

Come and blush for thine own report. For me.

Come and blush for thine own repro  
 If it be lawful, O, Almighty Power !

Who wast in earth for our sakes crucified,

Are thy just eyes turned elsewhere? or is this

A preparation, in the wondrous depth

Of thy sage counsel made, for some good end.

Entirely from our reach of thought cut off ?

So are the Italian cities all o'erthronged

With tyrants, and a great Marcellus made

Of every petty factious villager.

My Florence ! thou mayest well remain unmoved

At this digression, which affects not thee,

Thanks to thy people, who so wisely speed.

Many have justice in their hearts, that long

Waiteth for counsel to direct the bow,

Or e'er it dart unto its aim ; but thine

Have it on their lip's edge. Many refuse

To bear the common burdens ; readier thine  
Answer uncalled, and cry, " Behold I stoop."

Make thyself glad, for thou hast reason now,  
 Thou wealthy ! thou at peace ! thou wisdom-fraught !  
 Facts best will witness if I speak the truth.  
 Athens and Lacedæmon, who of old  
 Enacted laws, for civil arts renowned,  
 Made little progress in improving life  
 Towards thee, who usest such nice subtlety  
 That to the middle of November scarce  
 Reaches the thread thou in October weavest.

This satire on his native city is very bitter, but those who have read her history know how richly she deserved it.

And here should be noted the art with which Dante, in preparing the latter half of the canto for this magnificent burst, has kept the tone of the former half studiously low, so that it comes upon the reader unexpectedly, like a thunderclap.

But this is only one of the infinite touches with which our Poet has perfected his work. To convey some definite idea of the manner in which he has disposed his larger materials, the *Purgatorio* is better suited, as being the *Cantica* which has at once the most direct interest, and a structure that is easiest of analysis.

With the peculiar doctrine of Purgatory I have nothing to do ; the idea is well enough understood, and is clearly set forth in the opening lines :—

Of that second kingdom will I sing,  
 Wherein the human spirit doth purge itself,  
 And to ascend to heaven becometh worthy.

The antipodal hemisphere was supposed to be an immense body of water, out of which rises an island with a mountain in its middle, directly on the meridian of Jerusalem.

This mountain is in the form of a truncated cone, ending in a plain where is the Terrestrial Paradise. When Lucifer was hurled headlong from heaven, the shock of his fall drove him down through the earth, which was consequently protruded by so much on the other side. The *Inferno* is in the conical rift, the *Purgatorio* on the prorupted mountain.

And as the *Inferno* is divided into circles, narrowing as one descends, but with ever-increasing torture, down to the centre where Lucifer had stuck fast, so the opposite mountain has a series of concentric ledges rising to the summit,—ledges on which repentant souls are purged from the remnant of their sin so as to become fit for Heaven. I may observe, in passing, that there is a very marked distinction in kind between the punishments inflicted in Hell and in Purgatory—a distinction which should have saved Dante from the imputation of being filthy-natured at all events. (This, I believe, is owing to the fact, that the first *Cantica* has been most read.) But there is not a shadow of the obscenity that usually attends natures that love to grovel in disgusting topics. And surely he is not to be censured for connecting

the ideas of filth and sin. Who has not shuddered with the horror which froze the heart of the old Hebrew prophet when he was Divinely commanded to eat the dung-baked cakes? The *Inferno* is a chapter on moral diseases, and pathological works often exhibit very painful descriptions. The pencil is sometimes necessary for the purposes of science, to aid such descriptions, but in Art, M. Doré might have known that the spheres of the Poet and the Painter are not altogether coincident. In the *Purgatorio*, there is nothing repulsive.

In the seventeenth canto Virgil explains to Dante what sins are here expiated, and how these sins were occasioned. The germ of all acts is love, either of a wrong object, or misapplied in defect or excess. Now, no being can hate itself, or the First Cause on which it is dependent; hence the evil that one loves, is of one's neighbour. This evil may be wrought in three different ways: by pride, by envy, or by anger. By the first, men desire the abasement of their neighbour that they may themselves excel; by the second, are brought even to desire the loss of life's best gifts themselves, provided only that others may not be raised above them; by the third, men long for evil to be inflicted on those who have put them to shame, or in any way injured them. These, then, form the tripartite division of the first series of sins—viz., those arising from love of a wrong object. In the second series, that of defect in love, there is but one sin, sloth; in the third, where love errs by excess, there is again a threefold division, comprising avarice, gluttony, and wantonness. These constitute the seven so-called capital sins:—

Pride, envy, anger—sloth—avarice, gluttony, wantonness.

Now, there is a remarkable correspondence of treatment adopted in reference to each of the seven offences just mentioned. In every one of them we find a special punishment adapted to the crime, a special hymn sung by the guardian angel, a special prayer to be used by the penitents, a special series of pictures or delineations of some well-known historical character who is taken as the representative of each class of offenders; and in all, appears a vision of the Blessed Virgin, some act or words of whom, as recorded in the Bible, are set down in each section for meditation and encouragement. We shall take the circles in their order, beginning from the lowest upwards.

In the first are the proud, whom he represents as compelled to bear a tremendous weight of stones, giving them the appearance of the figures which are used in place of corbels to sustain a ceiling or a roof, and bent, so that their knees touch their breast. So great was the burden that

He who had most patience in his looks,  
Weeping, did seem to say, "I can no more."

As they enter this circle they hear the hymn, "Blessed are the poor in spirit," sung in such wise that speech could not describe it.



Ah me ! (says Dante) how different are these entrances  
 From the infernal, for with anthems here  
 One enters, and below with wild laments.

On the floor beneath their feet are sculptures which remind of those who had sinned by this sin of pride. There is portrayed Lucifer, he that was created more noble than all other creatures ; there is Nimrod, looking as if bewildered at the people who had proudly leagued with him in Sennaar ; Niobe, in the midst of her children lying slain ; Saul, expiring on his sword at Gilboa ; Sennacherib, slaughtered in the temple by his own sons ; the rout of the haughty Assyrians ; the ashes and caverns of Troy :—

What master of the pencil, or the style,  
 Had traced the shades and lines, that might have made  
 The subtlest workman wonder ? Dead, the dead—  
 The living, seemed alive.

As images of the virtue opposed to this sin were seen (but on the wall of the mountain, not on the pavement,) the Emperor Trajan, meekly yielding to the prayer of the poor widow, and King David dancing, with his loins girded, before the sacred ark, while on the humble psalmist, Michal looked down, even as a woman scornful and afflicted. The latter, childless in her wifehood, is brought in as a contrast to the Virgin Mary, who is depicted in the instant of the salutation of the angel, to whom she is answering with an utter absence of pride, "Behold the handmaid of the Lord."

The word envy, in Latin, "*invidia*," expresses the dislike to "look upon" another's prosperity ; on this sin, which is punished in the second circle, a penance is imposed, such that Dante says :—

I do not think there walks on earth this day,  
 Man so remorseless that he had not yearned  
 With pity at the sight that next I saw.

The envious stand in a crowd, clad in vile sackcloth, leaning their shoulders against each other, as a group of blind and poor stand near the confessional to crave alms ; but their eyelids are pierced with a thread of wire which knits them up. Passing on, the visitors listen to the sweet strains of the hymn, "Blessed are the merciful," and as a commemoration of one of the acts of unenvying charity, are heard the words of Mary, "They have no wine," while Cain's lamentable cry, "Whosoever findeth me shall slay me," rings ever in the ears of the penitent as a salutary warning.

In the third circle, that of anger, Dante feels the waving of wings that fan his face, and whisper, "Blessed are the peacemakers who know not evil wrath."

There is portrayed Haman, a shape—

As of one crucified, whose visage spake  
 Fell rancour, malice deep, wherein he died.

This passage is classical, as having furnished his idea of the character to Michel Angelo, and may be compared with the Homeric lines from which the old Greek sculptor derived his inspiration in moulding the head of the Cloud-compeller.

To show, once again, Dante's inconceivable care in details, I may note that, along with Haman, as instances of anger, are joined Amata and Philomela. Of these, the latter actually perpetrates the deed, and is punished accordingly by the deities, whereas Amata, as also Haman, only meditate it, but both suffer the penalty, the one, however, at her own hands, the other is put to death.

In this third ledge, the fitting punishment is a bitter and foul air, dark as hell, and of a rough texture to the feel, a thick cleavable smoke. But before becoming enveloped in this smoke, at the entrance appears the vision of a temple, and in its door-way, a woman, with the sweet behaviour of a mother, saying, "Son, why hast thou thus dealt with us? behold, thy father and I have sought thee sorrowing."

We have now passed the first triad of crimes, and are come to the sin that lies midway between the violent passions just treated, and those of the upper triad.

The fourth ledge bears on it the slothful, who are compelled for ever to run without ceasing round the mountain. As the illustrative warning are given two examples, the one referring to lukewarmness in things spiritual, the other to want of perseverance in things temporal,—viz., the Jews in the desert, and those Trojans who, weary of wandering about with Eneas, chose rather to remain behind with Acestes in Sicily. The counter instances are Mary, who ran to the mountains, and Cæsar, who ran to subdue Illyria. The conjunction is noteworthy: Mary's haste was to salute the mother of him that was the forerunner of the Prince of Peace; Cæsar's, to annihilate Pompey's generals, and to prepare the way for universal empire. Dante elsewhere couples the two ideas together, *e.g.*, where Beatrice says to him:—

Soon shalt thou be with me for ever,  
A citizen of that Rome, where Christ is Roman.

In the fifth circle—

As avarice quenched our love  
Of good, without which there is no working; thus  
Here justice holds us prison'd hand and foot,  
Chained down and bound, while Heaven's just Lord shall please,  
So long to tarry motionless outstretched.

There is no avarice in Mary; hers the simple poverty that was made manifest in the lowly hostelry where she laid her sacred burden down. Horace had complained—

"Magnum pauperies opprobrium jubet  
Quidvis et facere et pati."

But the "auri sacra fames" was forbidden to Christians, who are taught in this circle that they are "Blessed, who hunger after righteousness." And the penitents tell of Achan, how he stole the spoils, so that the wrath of Joshua still appears to sting him here.

In the sixth circle, Dante encounters a crowd of silent and devout spirits, whose dark cavernous eyes, and pale emaciated face tell of the severity of the punishment they undergo. They are here resanctified by deprivation of food and drink, for having followed their appetites beyond measure on earth. The hymn, "Blessed are they who thirst after righteousness," is further illustrated by the story of Gideon's warriors, of whom those were rejected whose thirst overpowered their zeal—the opposite virtue being displayed by Mary, who was more thoughtful of making the marriage feast complete and honourable than of satisfying her own longings.

Finally, in the seventh circle, Sodom and Gomorrha, laid in ashes, point to the penalty inflicted on the wanton, who here wander amid flames, while the strain, "Blessed are the pure in heart," has its counterpart in the words of Mary, "Virum non cognosco."

It may be seen from this slight sketch how thoroughly Dante was impregnated with his subject-matter. I have given it more especially because it is very common to hear Dante blamed for his seemingly indiscriminate huddling together of personages, as if his object were merely to give dignity to his work by a well-sounding roll of names, or lend it weight by the exhibition of his learning. Nothing could be more unjust. The poem is a treatise *in concreto*, in which the varieties are differentiated with the accuracy of an abstract system of jurisprudence. But the very objection testifies to the unobtrusiveness of his schematism, which is not, however, the less absolute for its not immediately striking the reader. For it is not to be supposed that these points of resemblance lie on the surface. A casual reader, nay, even a careful reader, unless after special study, would certainly miss the greater portion. An examination of the other two *Canticas* brings to light an equally symmetric treatment, which will be best felt and appreciated by individual study.

### III.

This orderly arrangement was natural and essential in Dante's judgment, as he writes—

All things what e'er they be  
Have order among themselves, and this is *form*,  
That makes the universe resemble God.

Next to this all-pervading symmetry, perhaps the most striking feature in the "*Commedia*" is the abundance of similes, the aptness, homeliness, and intelligibility of which make a selection very difficult.

No poet has dwelt more on little children, and the loveable side of their relations to their nurse. In describing the affection of the blest souls for the Virgin, he compares it to that of a babe stretching forth its arms—

For very eagerness towards the breast  
After the milk is taken.

Again, in speaking of his eagerness to gaze into the river of light, he adds—

Never did babe that had outslept his wont,  
Rush with such eager straining towards the milk.

The pure, gentle affection with which Beatrice watches his face and thoughts, and the constant smile of sympathy that irradiates her countenance when he looks towards her in some difficulty, are very affectingly described;—

Whereupon she, after a pitying sigh,  
Her eyes directed towards me with that look  
A mother casts on her delirious child.

His love of birds, too, is a singularly noticeable feature.

Like as a lark that in the air expatiates,  
First singing and then silent with content  
Of the last sweetness, that doth satisfy her.

Who has not heard "the sweet voiced bird" leave off suddenly her song in a clear bright tone, as if listening to what she had been singing, and then after a few moments' inner content, again burst forth in a fresh strain—

Of linked sweetness, long drawn out.

Now it is the rooks bestirring themselves at break of day to warm their cold feathers; now the stork, circling round her little ones whom she has just fed; now a dove, meeting her companion dove, and both fluttering in joy round and round. Or it is the bird waiting the live-long night upon the nest of her sweet brood amid the loved leaves, till the sun rise, that she may behold the longed-for looks, and find the food wherewith to nourish them, a duty, in which the heaviest toil is grateful to her. Or it is the falcon, which—

Issuing from his hood  
Doth move his head, and with his wings applaud him  
Showing desire, and making himself gay.

His sympathies, indeed, are mostly for the animal creation; but he has also, as might be expected from his training and attainments, a very quick sensitiveness to all forms of natural beauty, and his artistic proclivities peep out everywhere, in his appreciation of the fine arts. There is a picture of a fair valley, clad in all the brilliancy of a Mexican prairie, where—

Gold and silver, and scarlet and pearl white,  
 The Indian wood resplendent and serene,  
 Fresh emerald the moment it is broken,  
 By herbage and by flowers within that hollow  
 Planted, each one in colour would be vanquished,  
 As by its greater vanquished is the less.  
 Nor in that place had nature painted only,  
 But of the sweetness of a thousand odours  
 Made there a mingled fragrance and unknown.

With reference to music there is one remarkable passage in the *Purgatorio* which will, besides, illustrate Dante's mode of utilizing allegory. Dante well knew how everything is made to be forgotten by music,—even duty, and that there is ever this danger, lest it should enslave; hence he has very aptly given to the embodiment of Freedom (Cato) the office of rebuke for this sensuous indulgence.

On the entrance into Purgatory, Virgil and Dante meet some souls who have not yet begun their ascent up the mountain. Among them is the great musician Casella, whom Dante supplicates on this wise:—

If some new law take not from thee  
 Memory or practice of the song of love,  
 Which used to quiet in me all my longings,  
 Thee may it please to comfort therewithal  
 Somewhat this soul of mine, that with its body  
 Hitherward coming, is so much distressed.

Casella assents and begins one of Dante's own songs so melodiously that all were entranced—Virgil and himself, and all that people,

As if naught else might touch the mind of any.

Even reason was silent; this music, absorbing all their attention, has instantaneously overpowered every consideration, even repentance is forgotten. But it must not be thus. Man's freedom is not to be so mocked. The siren must not be so ruinously victorious.

We all of us were moveless and attentive  
 Unto his notes, when lo! the grave old man,  
 Exclaiming, "What is this, ye laggard spirits?  
 What negligence, what standing still is this?  
 Run to the mountain to strip off the slough  
 That lets not God be manifest to you."

The Greeks had taught the lesson before, but in a different way. Ulysses, who knew or feared that he would be overcome, made use of his free will beforehand, and caused himself to be tied to the mast, that he might not yield to the temptation when his ship passed the rock-bound coast, where the subtle temptress sang.

It could not but be that one who exhibits such a wistful tenderness and sympathy as are manifest in his writings, should also have the humorous side that usually accompanies the pathetic. Not the broad genial humour which characterizes Shakspeare, but genuine humour nevertheless.

Shakspeare, in his expansive sympathies with all mankind, condescends to humour some of their weaknesses; he will come down among them, and laugh with them. But Dante is a more haughty, exclusive soul. He never laughs, and will not descend. His host, Can Grande, was one day amusing himself in his court with the tricks of some buffoons, and turning to his taciturn guest, said to him—"You see, these poor fools can make us laugh, and you, the wise man, cannot." One can fancy the scornful curl of the lip, and the swift glitter of his eye, as Dante answers, that "Men are most amused with that which most resembles them,"—the fools may laugh with the fools.

There is a passage in the *Inferno*, which bears somewhat on this point, and reminds one of the quarrel in Horace's journey to Brundisium, the parties being a perjurer and a coiner, who mutually revile each other. Dante is standing near, a grimly amused spectator, when suddenly Virgil comes upon him, and bursts forth:—

"Little wants it that I quarrel with thee."  
 When him I heard in anger speak to me,  
 I turned me round towards him, with such shame  
 That still it eddies through my memory.  
 And as he is who dreams of his own harm,  
 Who dreaming, wishes it may be a dream,  
 Such I became, not having power to speak, . . . . and still  
 Excused myself, and *did not think I did it.*

Virgil then forgives him with a caution not to indulge in this unseemly amusement of listening to brawls.

One droll scene at which, the devils themselves being the sufferers, we can afford to smile, is that in which he narrates the device of Ciampolo to escape from the demons.

In this circle, the sinners lay beneath the surface of a lake of boiling pitch, above which if any raised his body, he was immediately hooked up by the torturing fiends, and savagely torn. Ciampolo on being caught, had declared that if they would let him off, he would call up a number of his companions and so furnish them with more sport, but on their letting him loose, he immediately plunged and disappeared. His tormentors were so vexed at this trick, that two of them flew at each other, and both fell into the boiling liquid beneath, where they stuck fast with pinions glued. As Dante says, "the heat was umpire between them." They were finally fished out by their comrades in woful plight. The incident is very real, and splendidly told, how one

Grappled him by his tresses, smeared with pitch,  
 And drew him up so that he seemed an otter.

Rabelais himself could not have been more at home in the delineation of this encounter. Dante has indeed a wonderful power of bringing up a picture in a few brief touches,—his language is ever clear, unforced, direct.

Ulysses is describing the manner of his death on the distant ocean on which he and his companions had sailed for many a day, when suddenly there appeared to them a mountain higher than any they had ever beheld.

Here is the scene :—

Joyful were we, and soon it turned to weeping ;  
 For out of the new land a whirlwind rose,  
 And smote upon the fore part of the ship.  
 Three times it made her whirl with all the waters ;  
 At the fourth time it made the stern uplift  
 And the prow downward go, as pleased Another,  
 Until the sea above us closed again.

And here is Bunyan's picture of the man and the dust-pan :—

The heavens are calling you, and wheel around you,  
 Displaying to you their eternal beauties,  
 And still your eye is looking on the ground,  
 Whence He, who all discerns, chastises you.

Dante's language, besides being as direct and vivid as Bunyan's or Byron's, is as melodious and rhythmical as Göthe's,—which Beethoven, in one of his letters, speaking of the influence which Göthe's poetry exercised on him, calls "that language which bears in it the secret of all harmonies."

The two poets, Dante and Göthe, admit of curious comparisons and contrasts; the men were of very different natures, and had a very different fate, but they were, at least, both perfect artists; in both the solidarity between the idea and its rhythmical expression is adequately maintained. It would be out of place here to investigate the relation between the two poets, and the debt that I believe Göthe owes to Dante; but with the splendid chorus of the Archangels in "Faust" may be compared the following terzet of Dante :—

Ye keep your watch in the eternal day,  
 So that nor night nor sleep can steal from you  
 One step the ages make upon their path.

Faust indeed was to Göthe what the *Commedia* was to Dante. "It was the chosen work of Göthe," writes Marmier, "it was the beloved child for whom he cheerfully toiled to acquire the riches of science, to store up the precious fruits of inspiration. It was ever with him in his waking hours, it visited him in his dreams, it lived with him in solitude and in the world." These words are equally applicable to our Poet and his work.

And no more excellent example than Dante can be given of Göthe's famous saying, that "Great works are the daughters of Solitude." In his loneliness Dante had worked out his idea, slowly, calmly, methodically. His is a poem, one of the completest works that exists in any language; no afterthoughts, visible or discoverable, no loose patched or uncertain lines; the cantos distributed into three books, whereof the first, as introductory, contains one canto more than the other two. Each canto, each scene is worked out for the whole,—

in no case is anything inserted for its own sake alone, all has reference to the ultimate scope and bearing of the whole. The unity for which he wrote and struggled and suffered,—unity of language, of aims, and of government, he has himself sought for and attained in that which lay under his own hand. He seems to have always had every part of his work before him as he constructed it; no part is sacrificed to another, there is no padding, no redundancy, no useless epithet. Everywhere, even in the loftiest flights of imagination, is the strictest fidelity, the most scrupulous measurement and keeping. The accuracy in proportion of Swift, the naïveté and vividness of Defoe,—charm of incident, grace of narrative, fertility of poetic invention, majesty of eloquence, blended and exhibited in the facts of history, the details of natural scenery and science, and the subtleties of metaphysic,—and all perfectly symmetrized with incomparable artistic skill. The picture is invariably cut sharply; even in the Paradiso, amid the blaze of eternal light, the outline stands out clear, the individuality of the personages is unmistakable—in the Inferno, amid the fires of eternal torment, every visage has its own characteristic marks.

But the work is a whole, and so demands to be estimated. In the beginning he at once plunges into the story, with no pedantic or egoistic prologue,—with a simplicity and directness and truth of conviction that to be appreciated must be compared with other introductions of mediæval poems.

And there is no unequalness in the Poem,—it is preserved throughout at the one degree of tenseness, regard being had to the subject. And in the end, he ends in the End.

It is the natural process, the inevitable conclusion of all true philosophy. Man begins with the whole mystery lying before him, and works his way through every variation of thought and speculation,—but the gap between the Finite and the Infinite has to be leaped somewhere, and sooner or later, the philosopher is brought up against the dead wall of the Unknown: Man cannot by searching find out God. When the mysteries of the Godhead were overpowering Dante, suddenly

There smote my mind a flash of lightning,  
Wherein came its wish.

And there the poem ends, for the poet can tell us no more; to speak of it he knows is useless,—it must be *revealed*.


Oh how all speech is feeble, and falls short—  
 . . . . . for this, to what I saw,

Is such, 'tis not enough to call it little.

And something similar must be the record of any one who attempts to put into language the feelings called up in him by the study of a great master.

**ROBERT ATKINSON.**





## STAR-GAUGING: SIR W. HERSCHEL'S TWO METHODS.

### PART I.

THE account of Sir W. Herschel's labours and views presented in our text-books of astronomy, is unfortunately so inexact, that the title itself of this paper will appear strange to many readers. We not only hear nothing about Sir W. Herschel's employment of two different methods of star-gauging in such treatises, but we actually find neither of his methods presented correctly, inasmuch as the properties of the two methods are assigned to a single nondescript method, the incongruities thus arising being apparently altogether overlooked. It is partly with the hope of rendering better justice to the greatest of observational astronomers than has heretofore been accorded to him, that I now write, but partly and chiefly in order to prepare the way for submitting to the notice of students of the heavens a method of research which promises to throw light on the noblest but most difficult of all the problems of astronomy, the determination of the laws according to which the sidereal universe has been constructed. It was this problem which Sir W. Herschel regarded as the end and aim of all his astronomical researches, even of those which seemed to bear little upon it. He observed other objects for practice and to test his telescopes,—the stars alone he studied as the final aim of his researches,—“A knowledge of the construction of the heavens,” he wrote in 1811, after more than a quarter of a century of stellar study, “has always been the ultimate object of my observations.”

I cannot but express some degree of surprise at the fate which has befallen the noble series of papers in which Sir W. Herschel presented his researches to the world. As I have elsewhere pointed out, little "has hitherto been done to bring the records of his labours properly before the students of astronomy. His papers, merely collected into a volume, would form a most important addition to astronomical literature; but, if suitably edited, and illustrated by the work of his son, and of others who have succeeded him in his own field of work, the volume would do more to advance the study of sidereal astronomy than any work which has been published during the last century." With very few exceptions, what has hitherto been done in making Herschel's words and work public, has been an injustice to his memory. It seems to have been supposed that his papers could be treated as we might treat such a work as Sir J. Herschel's "Outlines of Astronomy;" that extracts might be made from any part of any paper without reference to the position which the paper chanced to occupy in the complete series. Nay, it seems to have been thought a tribute of respect to his memory thus to quote his words without question or debate. The idea does not seem to have occurred to any one (with the solitary exception of Wilhelm Struve), that it is but an ill compliment to the great astronomer to assume that he laboured from 1784 to 1818 upon a subject scarcely touched before his day, without making any such progression towards new knowledge that his earlier views had to be corrected in the light of later researches. It seems to have mattered little that he himself in so many words expressed the fact that his views had altered. He had said such and such things in 1784 and 1785: and those things the world was bound to accept as his teaching, whatever he might say thereafter to the contrary. And if anyone should express doubts as to those earlier views, and should endeavour to strengthen his position by quoting Sir W. Herschel in 1818 against Sir W. Herschel when thirty-two years younger, it was the fashion to denounce such attempts as altogether rash and presumptuous. This is as though every writer on astronomy should present Kepler's youthful fancies about the relations between the regular solids and the planetary orbits as the matured views of that astronomer, and denounce as irreverent any attempt to suggest that, on the whole, the laws of elliptic motion subsequently discovered by him were better worthy of respectful consideration.

We owe, I conceive, to French writers part of the misconception which has arisen respecting Herschel's labours. It pleased Arago to forsake in Herschel's favour the usual attitude of French men of science with respect to foreigners. He published a work, purporting to be an Analysis of Herschel's Life and Labours. In this work the earliest ideas of Sir W. Herschel respecting the constitution of the heavens,—the views which he entertained before he

had made any systematic observations whatever,—are presented with an unfortunate perspicuity. I refer to Herschel's paper of 1784, about which I shall presently have to speak more at length. It is here we find the first enunciation of the famous grindstone theory of the universe, at least the first remarks of Sir W. Herschel on that theory, for it is to Wright of Durham that the first enunciation of the theory is really due. This theory Arago presents, making use of the relations which in 1784 Sir W. Herschel expected to find. At p. 456 Arago says, "the galactic system is a hundred times more extended in one direction than in another," and he then refers to a picture of a certain solid figure illustrating Herschel's ideas in 1784 respecting the shape of our system. But as Wilhelm Struve justly remarks, the only section based on Herschel's observation (presented in the paper of 1785) shows the greatest extension as exceeding the least not in the proportion of 100 to 1, but only as  $5\frac{1}{2}$  to 1; while the solid figure pictured in 1784 did not in any way relate to observations made by Herschel. It is not too much to say that Arago probably limited his real study of Herschel's papers to the paper of 1784, dipping into the others to gather thence the more striking passages, in full confidence that they accorded well with the views enunciated in 1784, and consequently without any attempt to understand the gradual progression of Herschel's ideas respecting the universe.

The effect of this has been disastrous. All the French writers and most of the continental writers,—Guillemin, Flammarion, and the rest,—follow Arago unhesitatingly. Too many of our English writers of text books have borrowed directly from French authors. A few others have presented original analyses of Herschel's papers, but still such analyses have only been sound for the earlier papers (1784 and 1785), while the blending of matter taken from later papers introduces the same real confusion of ideas as in Arago's work, though not always accompanied with the same unfortunate perspicuity of statement.

Passing over such occasional reference to Sir W. Herschel's labours as we find in the pages of writers of a higher order than those just mentioned, it may be said that the elder Struve alone, of all astronomers who have dealt with Herschel's papers, clearly recognized the change which took place in the great astronomer's views as his labours proceeded. We owe this, I believe, to the fortunate chance which led Struve to go over a second time, with close attention, the series of papers which he had probably before read once through (no astronomer would be worthy of the name who had not done so), but without a careful consideration of the bearing of the several papers on Sir W. Herschel's progressive researches. While on a visit to England he received from Sir J. Herschel a volume containing not only the complete series of the elder Herschel's papers, but many valuable manuscript notes by the

great astronomer. Struve had already carried out a series of researches into the laws of stellar distribution; and he was under the impression that his results were opposed to those which Sir W. Herschel had obtained. On carefully re-reading Herschel's papers, however, he found that his own results were in agreement with those to which Herschel had been led during the later portion of his observing career. In fact, Struve had overlooked, as I believe every first reader of Herschel's papers invariably does overlook, the fact that Herschel not only adopted new views of the heavens as his labours proceeded, but abandoned the very principles which he had taken for his guidance in the earlier part of his career. It was the merest accident that Struve, already engaged in the careful study of stellar distribution, received the interesting present just mentioned, which led to the re-examination of the great master's papers on the heavens. Yet Struve, a skilful astronomer, an excellent mathematician, a laborious student, and doubtless a careful reader, might fairly have been expected to derive correct impressions from his first reading of those papers. The fact that he did not, that by his own account the second reading almost reversed the ideas he had derived from the first, renders less surprising the fact (for such it is) that men like Nichol, Grant, and even Sir John Herschel, among those who have published their impressions, and others of the utmost eminence in astronomy who have not done so, have entertained altogether erroneous impressions respecting the relations which exist between the earlier and the later views of Sir William Herschel. There are many who have read every paper by the elder Herschel on the constitution of the heavens, who would be quite unable to explain by what steps he was led to abandon the principles on which he based his first method of star-gauging in favour of those which formed the basis of his second method. Nay, my own experience has taught me that not a few of those who have read Herschel's papers have not recognised the distinction between the two methods, even if they are aware that Herschel ever employed more than one mode of star-gauging.

For my own part, I have not found five successive readings of Herschel's series of papers, and the analysis of some passages, as carefully as one analyses the most concentrated portions of a process of mathematical reading, to be one whit more than the proper mastery of Herschel's papers require. They are not, by any means, easy to understand. Sir W. Herschel was seldom at the pains to indicate that he had changed his views, being, for the most part, satisfied with presenting his newly-adopted opinions without any special reference to those he had before entertained. Where he did refer to any change of opinion, he did not enter into details, but simply noted that the views he had formerly entertained had given

place to others, the results of a more complete acquaintance with the facts. Nor was Sir W. Herschel a particularly lucid writer; we shall see, as we proceed, that at times, in order to understand his meaning, we have to examine the context more carefully than is usually necessary in scientific or explanatory writing.

In 1774, Herschel enunciated his general views respecting the sidereal system, and the method which seemed to him, at that time, the best for attempting to ascertain the true figure of the system. This, *his first method of star-gauging*, has been described though not with strict accuracy in most of our text-books of astronomy. If we suppose that our sun is a member of a system of suns, scattered with a certain general uniformity throughout a region of space having a certain well-defined figure, then a method exists by which it is possible to determine that figure, provided only that a telescope can be constructed which is powerful enough to reach to the limits of the system in all directions. For manifestly the farther the system extends in any given direction, the greater will be the number of stars lying towards that direction (since we have supposed a certain general uniformity of distribution); so that if we use the same telescope with unchanged "power," and direct it in turn to every part of the heavens, then, by counting the number of stars brought into view in these different directions, we can determine the relative extension of the system along those directions—in other words, we can determine the shape of the system.

This is the famous method of gauging the heavens. I give another description of it (borrowed from the pages of that fine work, Grant's history of "Physical Astronomy"), because the method should be very carefully considered by the reader. Grant speaks of the plan as a "remarkable method, devised by Herschel for ascertaining the configuration in space of this great sidereal system, by examining the heavens at different distances from the Galactic Circle, and numbering the stars visible in the field of view of his telescope. Assuming that the stars are uniformly distributed throughout space, and that the telescope suffices to penetrate to the utmost limits of the sidereal stratum constituting the Milky Way, it is manifest that the number of stars visible in the field of view of the telescope would increase with the length of the visual line, and would thereby afford an indication of the distance from the observer to the exterior surface of the Milky Way. Hence, by comparing together the lengths of the various lines formed in this manner, and taking into consideration their respective distances from the Galactic Circle, the actual configuration in space of the Milky Way may be ascertained. Such is a brief outline of the celebrated method of gauging the heavens, which Herschel practised to a vast extent in the early period of his researches on the constitution of the Milky Way." Here the italics are mine. I invite special attention to Grant's recognition of

a change in Herschel's methods of research towards the latter part of his career as an observer. It is remarkable that, notwithstanding this, Grant failed to notice how and in what respects Herschel modified the views to which his earlier method of star-gauging had led him.

It will be noticed that this plan of star-gauging consisted essentially in applying one and the same telescopic power to different parts of the heavens. It involved the assumption of a general uniformity of stellar distribution within the limits of our system. And it required that the telescope should penetrate to those limits,—at least, if in any part of the heavens this was not the case, the shape of the system towards that part could not be determined.

It is necessary to notice, however, that the general uniformity of distribution by no means implied the non-existence of clustering aggregations of stars, or of streams, branches, and nodules of stars within the limits of the system. On the contrary, Herschel, so early as 1785, clearly indicated his recognition of such varieties; and all that he insisted upon at that time was that such peculiarities were themselves so distributed as to produce within the system, regarded as a whole, a general uniformity of distribution.

It is absolutely essential, if we would understand Herschel's earlier views, to take his own preliminary description, which somehow appears to have escaped the notice of commentators; unless we suppose the difficulty of grasping Herschel's real meaning to have caused them to misunderstand the passage.

"It will be best," Herschel says, "to take the subject from a point of view at a considerable distance, both of space and of time. Let us suppose, then, numberless stars of various sizes scattered over an indefinite portion of space in such a manner as to be almost equally distributed throughout the whole. The laws of attraction, which no doubt extend to the remotest region of the fixed stars, will operate in such a manner as most probably to produce the following remarkable effects":—

"Form I. In the first place, since we have supposed the stars to be of various sizes, it will frequently happen that a star being considerably larger than its neighbouring ones, will attract them more than they will be attracted by others that are immediately around them; by which means they will be in turn, as it were, condensed about a centre; or, in other words, form themselves into a cluster of stars of almost a globular figure, more or less regularly so, according to the size and original distance of the surrounding stars."

"Form II. The next case, which will also happen almost as frequently as the former, is where a few stars, though not superior in size to the rest, may chance to be rather nearer each other than the surrounding ones; for here also will be found a prevailing attraction in the combined centre of gravity of them all, which will

occasion the neighbouring stars to draw together, not, indeed, so as to form a regular, or globular figure, but, however, in such a manner, as to be condensed towards the common centre of gravity of the whole irregular cluster. And this construction admits of the utmost variety of shapes, according to the number and situation of the stars which first give rise to the condensation of the rest."

"Form III. From the composition and repeated conjunction of both the foregoing forms, a third may be derived,\* when many large stars, or combined small ones, are situated in long-extended, regular, or crooked rows, hooks, or branches; for they will also draw the surrounding ones, so as to produce figures of condensed stars, coarsely similar to the former, which gave rise to these condensations."

"Form IV. We may likewise admit of still more extensive combinations when, at the same time that a cluster of stars is forming in one part of space, there may be another collecting in a different, but perhaps not far distant quarter, which may occasion a mutual approach towards their common centre of gravity."

"Form V. In the last place, as a natural consequence of the former cases, there will be formed great cavities, or vacancies, by the retreat of the stars towards the various centres which attract them; so that upon the whole, there is evidently a field of the greatest variety for the mutual and combined attractions of the heavenly bodies to exert themselves in."

After considering the possibility of catastrophes during the evolution of the forms here described, Herschel proceeds to consider the position of the terrestrial observer in his "own retired station, in one of the planets attending a star." He shows that to such an observer, placed in a far extending stratum "or branching cluster of millions of stars, such as may fall under Form III.," considered above, the following appearances will be presented:—To the naked eye, "the heavens will not only be richly scattered over with brilliant constellations, but a shining zone or Milky Way will be perceived to surround the whole sphere of the heavens, owing to the combined light of those stars which are too small, that is, too remote, to be seen." Let this passage be particularly noted before we proceed, as on its right comprehension depends our entire judgment as to Herschel's earlier views. He here presents the sidereal system as a far-extending stratum or branching cluster of millions of stars, of Form III., and therefore including within its limits many subordinate clusters a nebulae of Forms I. and II.; while he regards the light of the Milky Way as resulting from the extension of the system towards that zone

\* Here the words "may be derived" are not intended to imply doubt as to the fact that the groups of the third form exist. The context shows that Herschel means that *we may deduce* the existence of the third form from considering that both the other forms must be compounded and repeatedly conjoined. It is important to notice this, because "Form III." is the key of the whole passage, being the form which Herschel attributed to our Milky Way at this stage of his researches.

much farther than in other directions.\* This must be borne carefully in mind in reading what immediately follows. "Our observer's sight," proceeds Herschel, "will be so confined that he will imagine this single collection of stars of which he does not even perceive the thousandth part, to be the whole contents of the heavens. Allowing him now the use of a common telescope he begins to suspect that all the milkiness of the bright path which surrounds the sphere may be owing to stars. He perceives a few clusters of them in various parts of the heavens, and finds also that there are a kind of nebulous patches; but still his views are not extended so far as to reach to the end of the stratum in which he is situated, so that he looks upon these patches as belonging to that system which to him seems to comprehend every celestial object. He now increases his power of vision, and applying himself to a close observation, finds the Milky Way is indeed no other than a collection of very small stars. He perceives that those objects which had been called *nebulæ* are evidently nothing but clusters of stars. He finds their number increase upon him, and when he resolves one nebula into stars he discovers ten new ones which he cannot resolve. He then forms the idea of immense strata of fixed stars, of clusters of stars, and of *nebulæ*, till going on with such interesting observations he now perceives that all these appearances must naturally arise from the confined situation in which he is now placed. *Confined*, it may justly be called, though in no less a space than what before appeared the whole region of the fixed stars; but which now has assumed the shape of a crookedly branching nebula, not one of the least, but perhaps very far from being the most considerable of those numberless clusters that enter into the construction of the heavens."

It cannot be denied that the passage just quoted is not very easy to understand. At one stage, or rather throughout the greater part of the passage, it seems abundantly clear that Herschel is describing our sidereal system as including multitudes of subordinate clusters and *nebulæ*. But then at the end, he describes it as itself a nebula, greater than some, but less than others, of numberless clusters, composing the sidereal heavens. And the perplexity which the passage as a whole thus occasions, is accompanied by a perplexity arising from the variety of meaning which may be attributed to the different sentences. For instance, where he says that the observer "forms the idea of immense strata of fixed stars, of clusters, and of *nebulæ*," he might (so far as the grammatical interpretation of the sentence is concerned) mean either (1) the idea of immense strata, composed of fixed stars, clusters, and *nebulæ*, or (2) the idea of immense stellar

\* In fact, his views at this stage corresponded closely with those which had been advanced by Lambert nearly a quarter of a century earlier. In the papers of 1784, Herschel presents views more nearly resembling those which Wright of Durham had advanced half a century earlier, and which Kant adopted a year or two before Lambert advanced his more correct views.



strata, star-clusters, and nebulae. The latter has been the meaning usually adopted—if, at least, this particular sentence has been discussed at all: such a meaning accords with the theory (the familiar Grindstone Theory) commonly assigned to Herschel. Nevertheless it should be manifest, from the passage just quoted (regarded as a whole), that Herschel not only recognized star-strata, including within their limits subordinate clusters and nebulae, but that he regarded our sidereal system as a star-stratum of that kind. How, then, are we to remove the difficulties I have noted in the passage, as a whole, and in its several parts? It must certainly be by taking a meaning which covers both the two views which appear contradictory, for no one will for a moment admit that Sir W. Herschel really held contradictory views. Accordingly, we must believe *both* that Herschel held our galaxy to be a stratum, including in its limits star-clusters and nebulae, *and* that he regarded it as one among many systems of its own order, that is, one among many star-clusters and nebulae, and of a higher order than those (spoken of under the same name but) really subordinate to, and included within, itself and its fellow systems.\*

That this is Herschel's meaning we perceive clearly from a passage following almost immediately after the one just quoted. "It will appear," he says, "that many hundreds of nebulae, of the first and second forms, are actually to be seen in the heavens, and their places will hereafter be pointed out; and many of the third form will be described." Thus, there can be seen in the heavens many hundreds of clusters and nebulae of one kind (Forms I. and II.), and also many clusters of a higher order (Form III.), within which the others exist as subordinate parts—or, in other words, we can see the clusters and nebulae which form part of the architecture, as it were, of our own sidereal system, while we can see, but not in such great numbers, external nebulae of the same order in the scale of creation as our own galaxy. Herschel, in fact, describes ten nebulae of the latter

\* The case is one of those to which I have referred above, where we have to reason from the context in order to understand Herschel's true meaning. And it would be unfair, I think, to blame the ordinary commentator for failing to apply such reasoning to Herschel's voluminous papers. What, however, does seem unfortunate is the course adopted by our text-book writers, in selecting passages from Herschel's papers at random, notwithstanding these difficulties, and stringing them together as Herschel's matured views. It is as though a person not very familiar with a language were to pretend to analyse a book in that language by selecting from the book all the sentences he was able to understand. I may note, in passing, that the author of one of the best treatises on observational astronomy in existence, has been led into a most curious misapprehension. Herschel had expressed a belief that the stellar stratum extends one hundred times farther in the direction of its general level than at right angles to that level: but later (in the paper I am quoting from above) he assigned  $5\frac{1}{2}$  to 1 as the proportion. Now the late Admiral Smyth, at p. 310 of his "Bedford Cycle," presents a picture of the sidereal system, showing that he had combined these two different results into one, thus giving to our system length, breadth, and thickness as 1,  $5\frac{1}{2}$ , and 100.

order, speaking of them as external Milky Ways. Instances of the fourth order "will be related," he proceeds; "a few of the cavities mentioned in the fifth will be particularized, though many more have already been observed: so that upon the whole, I believe it will be found that the foregoing theoretical view, with all its consequential appearances, as seen by an eye enclosed in one of the nebulae, is no more than a drawing from nature, wherein the features of the original have been closely copied; and I hope the resemblance will not be called a bad one, when it shall be considered how very limited must be the pencil of an inhabitant of so small and retired a portion of an indefinite system, in attempting the picture of so unbounded an extent."

In further confirmation of this interpretation of Herschel's views at this stage of his labours I will now quote a passage which is perfectly irreconcilable, I venture to affirm, with the simple theory of the sidereal system so commonly attributed to Sir W. Herschel.

"If," he says, "it were possible to distinguish between the parts of an indefinitely extended whole, the nebula we inhabit might be said to be one that has fewer marks of profound antiquity upon it than the rest. To explain this idea, perhaps, more clearly, we should recollect that the condensation of clusters of stars has been ascribed to a gradual approach; and whoever reflects upon the number of ages that must have passed before some of the clusters could be so far condensed as we find them at present, will not wonder if I ascribe a certain air of youth and vigour to many very regularly scattered regions of our sidereal stratum. There are, moreover, many places in the stratum where there is the greatest reason to believe that the stars, if we may judge from appearances, are now drawing towards various secondary centres, and will in time separate into different clusters so as to occasion many subdivisions. Hence we may surmise that when a nebulous stratum consists chiefly of nebulae of the first and second form, it probably owes its origin to what may be called the decay of a great compound nebula of the third form; and that the subdivisions which happened to it in the length of time occasioned all the small nebulae which spring from it to lie in a certain range, according as they were detached from the primary one. In like manner our system, after numbers of ages, may very possibly become divided so as to give rise to a stratum of two or three hundred nebulae; for it would not be difficult to point out so many beginning or gathering clusters in it. This view of the subject throws a considerable light upon the appearance of that remarkable collection of many hundreds of nebulae which are to be seen in what I have called the nebulous stratum of *Coma Berenices*. It appears from the extended and branching figure of our nebula, that there is room for the decomposed nebulae of a large, reduced, former great one to approach nearer to us in the sides than in other parts. Nay, possibly, there

might originally be another very large joining branch, which in time became separated by the condensation of the stars : and this may be the reason of the little remaining breadth of our system in that very place ; for the nebulae of the stratum of Coma are brightest and most crowded just opposite our situation, or in the pole of our system. As soon as this idea was suggested, I tried also the opposite pole, where, accordingly, I have met with a great number of nebulae, though under a much more scattered form."

I apprehend that this conception even of the possibility that the two great nebular systems which lie (roughly) towards the galactic poles, may be the fragments of branches formerly belonging to our own sidereal system, which is itself tending towards a dissolution into such fragments, cannot in any way be reconciled with the absurd cloven grindstone theory which is advanced over and over again in our text-books as the outcome of Sir W. Herschel's labours.

I could quote several other passages from the fine paper of 1785, in confirmation of the thesis, that, even at this early stage, Sir W. Herschel not only recognized great variety of structure within the limits of our sidereal system, but also regarded large numbers of clusters and nebulae as forming parts of that system. I will, however, content myself with two short passages ; one indicating his ideas respecting the relation between our Milky Way and star-clusters, the other showing what orders of nebulae he alone regarded as probably external systems, resembling our own in extent and importance. "Some parts of our system seem indeed," he says, in the former, "to have already suffered greater ravages of time than others, if this way of expressing myself may be allowed. For instance, in the body of Scorpio is an opening, or hole, which is probably owing to this cause. . . . This opening is at least four degrees broad ; but its height (*sic*) I have not yet ascertained. It is remarkable that the nebula 80 Messier, which is one of the richest and most compressed clusters of small stars I remember to have seen, is situated just on the western border of it ; which would almost authorize a suspicion that the stars of which it is composed were collected from that place, and had left the vacancy. What adds not a little to this surmise is, that the same phenomenon is once more repeated with the cluster of stars 4 Messier, which is also on the western border of another vacancy, and has, moreover, a small miniature cluster, or easily resolvable nebula following it at no very great distance." The other passage runs thus :—"There are some very remarkable nebulae which cannot well be less, but are probably much larger than our system ; and being also extended, the inhabitants of the planets that attend the stars, which compose these nebulae, must likewise perceive the same phenomena ; for which reason these nebulae may also be called Milky Ways *by way of distinction*."

It was to a sidereal system which he regarded as thus complex in structure and in shape that Sir W. Herschel applied his first method of star-gauging. He believed himself to be gauging, not, as has been so commonly supposed, a simple cluster of stars belonging to the same order in the scale of creation as the clusters and nebulae discernible in the telescopic scrutiny of the heavens, but a great clustering aggregation of stars, star-clusters, and nebulae, belonging to the same order as certain of the more remarkable and extended of the nebulae.

In what sense, then, it may be asked, did he recognize general uniformity in the sidereal system? And in what respect did his views at this stage differ from those which he subsequently adopted?

It is easy to reply to these questions, when once the scope of Herschel's series of researches has been recognized. It is manifest that at this early period he regarded the sidereal system as presenting a general uniformity of *structure* within its irregular boundary, such uniformity arising, not from a general uniformity of stellar distribution, but from a general uniformity in the distribution of the stars, star-clusters, and nebulae within the system. He believed, in fact, in what may be termed regular irregularity; and one may present his theory on this point in some such manner as this: "If any two very large portions of the sidereal system be compared with each other, the number of stars, star-clusters, and nebulae, in these several portions, will be proportional (or nearly so) to the volume of those portions respectively." That this was his view is not only clear from the passages I have cited, but is strikingly manifested by his applying to our sidereal system the term "*Milky Way*," as inclusive of the whole, and his use of the same term for external systems, all those nebulae which he regarded as external, being at this stage of his labours called indifferently external systems, galaxies, or *Milky Ways*. But he also, even more distinctly, shews that he believed the sidereal system to be regularly constituted, when regarded as a whole, in the following remarkable passage, which presents more clearly than any other I have met with his true views at this time:—"The rich parts of the *Milky Way*, as well as those in the distant broad part of the stratum, consist of a mixture of stars of all possible sizes, that are seemingly placed without any apparent order. Perhaps we might recollect that a greater condensation towards the centre of the system than towards the borders of it should be taken into consideration; but with a nebula of the third form, containing such various and extensive combinations as I have found to take place in ours, this circumstance, which in one of the first form would be of considerable moment, may, I think, be safely neglected."


But Sir W. Herschel by no means regarded this view of the sidereal system as demonstratively established, notwithstanding the

fact that it was presented in company with the long list of star-gauges for which he is so justly celebrated. He knew perfectly well, what many of his admirers have overlooked, that a hypothesis cannot be established by the observations it has been devised to interpret. He reasoned thus:—Granting the truth of a certain hypothesis, a series of star-gauges, described in the paper of 1785, has a certain significance, and shews the sidereal system to have a certain shape: if the hypothesis be *not* true, they cannot be so interpreted.

This question, then (to be answered by other observations) remained for him,—“Is the sidereal system constituted as supposed in the hypothesis I have been employing?” If he had overlooked this question, he would not have been Herschel. No matter how great his skill as an observer, or how numerous his observations, he would not have been entitled to a higher position as a reasoner or as an interpreter of observations than any of his predecessors in the discussion of the stellar system, and not to so high a position as Wright, or Kant, or Lambert, or the ingenious Michell. But he was not thus negligent of cardinal considerations. He clearly recognized the weak point of the theory he was discussing (rather than advocating). “*I would not be understood,*” he says (immediately after the words last quoted from the paper of 1785) “*to lay a greater stress on these calculations than the principles on which they are founded will permit; and if, hereafter, we shall find reason, from experience and observation, to believe that there are parts of our system where the stars are not scattered in the manner here supposed, we ought then to make proper exceptions.*”

In Part II. I propose to describe how Herschel *did* “find reason, from experience and observation, to believe that” the Milky Way itself, which he had thus far regarded as not only resembling the rest of the sidereal system, but as being the sidereal system (the stars scattered over our skies being merely parts of the Milky Way stratum) is composed of stars quite differently arranged from those composing the rest of the sidereal system; I shall shew how he devised another mode of star-gauging differing essentially in plan and principle from that which he adopted in 1784, and first applied systematically in 1785; and then I shall endeavour to shew how the careful comparison of his results with others obtained since his time, suggests a method of star-gauging combining the principles of both Herschel’s methods, advantageously applicable with every order of telescopic power, and promising, if patiently applied by a sufficient number of observers, to lift the veil from some at least of the mysteries of the stellar depths.

R. A. PROCTOR.



## RELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN ENGLAND.

*History of Religious Thought in England.* By the Rev.  
JOHN HUNT, M.A. 3 vols. Strahan & Co. 1870-3.

THE history of ideas is a kind of history which is quite modern. Its object is to trace the genealogy and growth of opinions, to mark their varieties, their recurrence under different forms, and their final stages when they reach boundaries which they cannot pass. Actions make the history of the external world, but thoughts are the precursors of actions. They bear fruit which interweaves itself with the texture of the world's events. Ordinary readers are most interested in what men have done, but the philosopher occupies himself more with thoughts and words.

Mr. Hunt's work is limited to one branch of the history of ideas. It treats of religious thought, and that only in England, for a period of about two hundred and sixty years, or, as he expresses it, from the Reformation to the end of the last century. The area to be gone over seems small, but it includes great variety, and to a speculative mind might give birth to many theories concerning the philosophy of history or the laws by which religious thought is developed. Mr. Hunt, however, has striven rather to follow the actual history of opinions. He makes the record, and leaves the philosophy to make or manifest itself. In an article on "Church and Dissent," in the *Edinburgh Review* for Jan., 1873 (probably by the Dean of Westminster), the writer says of Mr. Hunt's book, that "by sheer determination to present the exact truth, it produces a picture of all the various streams of theological opinions from the sixteenth century to the end of the eighteenth, which every ecclesiastic, whether conforming or non-

conforming, ought to read, if only as a counterpoise and check to the narrow and imperfect statements which he is in the habit of hearing within his own immediate circle. To include in one survey the whole of this vast literature—to show how Bacon, Hobbes, Selden, and Locke, no less than the more professed divines, contributed to the sum total of religious belief—how even Lord Herbert of Cherbury, Tindal, and Toland, had their effect in modifying and stimulating devout thought and inquiry on the momentous question at stake, no less than their more orthodox and Christian opponents, was a task which no one had yet attempted, and which Mr. Hunt has shown himself well qualified to perform. To treat these various authors from the literary rather than from the polemic point of view, has of itself an elevating and widening tendency, for which every student of theology, every lover of peace and truth, ought to be grateful."

I quite agree in the opinion here expressed, that the tendency of the work is catholic. It breathes a spirit of charity towards all parties, and it is not the less catholic or charitable because it tells the truth concerning them all. The Church of England at the present time has come into strange confusion, but there is nothing more likely to dispel this confusion, if that be really possible, than to have the dust cleared away from facts, and see matters as they really stand. My present object is to see what light Mr. Hunt has shed on the origin and history of the parties into which the Church of England is divided.

The Reformation era may be properly divided into three stages. There is what I shall call the stage of transition. There is next the reign of Edward VI. And lastly, there is the settlement under Elizabeth.

The time of transition is not easily described. I do not think that we can get any more correct idea of its character than by consulting the authoritative documents that were put forth in King Henry's reign. The first of these bears the date of 1536, and is called "Articles devised by the King's Highness Majestie to stablyshe Christen quietness and virtue among us," &c. In these Articles the Scripture with the three creeds were to be the rule of faith. Nothing taught by the first four General Councils was to be rejected. The sacraments were reduced to three, Baptism, Penance, and the Sacrament of the Altar. The first was declared necessary to salvation, as it brings remission of sins. Penance was necessary, as without it no man could be saved who had committed mortal sin after baptism. It consisted of three parts—contrition, confession, and amendment of life. In the "Sacrament of the Altar" it was declared that under the appearances of bread and wine was contained the very body and blood of Christ, really and corporally. An article on Justification made contrition, faith, and charity concur in the remission of sins. Images were to be allowed in churches, but the people were to be warned

against kneeling, censing, and offering to them as they did to God. The saints were to be honoured and prayed to, yet not as if one were more merciful than others, or as if they heard us sooner than Christ. Holy water was to be retained as reminding the people of their baptism and of the blood of Christ. It was lawful to pray for souls departed, but the Pope's pardon and masses to deliver from Purgatory were not spoken of with much respect. This document was called the King's Articles, but it had the sanction of the whole clergy in Convocation. It retains substantially Roman Catholic doctrines, and rejects only what may be regarded as popular extravagances or abuses.

The next document was set forth in 1537. It was called "The Institution of a Christian Man," and also, "The Bishops' Book," because it was the work of the bishops of both provinces. It appears, however, never to have had the sanction either of King or of Convocation. Henry, without having read it, ordered it to be printed and all who had the cure of souls to preach according to its doctrine, which can scarcely be said in any point to have differed from the King's Articles. Next year Henry had time to read the book, and objected to several sentences. In 1539 he passed the famous Six Articles, which were clearly in favour of the most objectionable of the Pope's doctrines.

The year following, the King appointed a commission to consider the doctrines and ceremonies still retained in the Church. In 1543, these commissioners published "A Necessary Doctrine and Erudition of a Christened Man." This book, being approved both by Parliament and Convocation, it was properly and formally for a time the Confession of Faith of the Church of England. Its doctrine generally varies but little from that of the "Bishops' Book." The account of justification is more scholastic, and penance is made to consist properly in absolution. For the third part, "Amendment of Life" was substituted "Satisfaction." God's justice had to be satisfied. In this word is supposed to be the difference between the Lutheran and the Romanist idea of penance. The "Bishops' Book" followed the Lutheran, and the "Necessary Doctrine" followed the Romanist. There was a change, too, in what was said concerning the Eucharist, but it consisted chiefly in a more particular account of the transubstantiation of the elements. The "King's Book" affirmed that the bread and wine do not nourish the natural body like other food, but become something spiritual, which gives the recipient heavenly strength. The doctrine of "Good Works" is that of the Schoolmen, which we find condemned in one of the Thirty-Nine Articles. Besides these things there were several expressions which seemed to indicate the adoption of some grosser forms of Roman Catholic doctrines than were to be found in the "Bishops' Book."

So far there was a wave of retrogression; but since this commission had been appointed several things had been done both by the King



and Convocation in the way of progress. In 1541 a translation of the Bible was published, and the laity permitted to read it. The Archbishop then moved the Convocation for the examination, correction, and reformation of all mass-books. The King's approbation was obtained that they should be purged of all legend and superstition, and that the names of all obscure or doubtful saints should be taken out of them. A check was afterwards put on the free reading of the Scriptures; but in 1545 the "King's Primer" was published. This was a book of devotion in English, the object of which was, that people who did not understand any language but their own, might pray with the understanding. The King's Primer contained prayers to the Virgin, but these were not so numerous as in the earlier primers. There were prayers for the dead, written in the belief that many true believers die with their sins but partially forgiven, and that the remission of these is to be obtained by the prayers of the living.\*

The Primer had not been published a year when the King died. It may therefore be regarded as the last expression of the progress made in Henry's reign. The next was properly the era of the Reformation. In 1547 the first Book of Homilies was published. In 1548 a commission of learned divines was appointed to draw up an order of divine worship in which they were to follow Scripture and the primitive Church. This resulted in the first Prayer Book of Edward VI., which was not greatly in advance of what had been done in Henry's time. In 1552, the Parliament, without the sanction of Convocation, authorized a second Prayer-Book. I do not suppose that any will now dispute what Mr. Hunt says of this book, that it was much more Protestant than any of its predecessors. Everything relating to the Mass was expurgated, and even the name altar taken away. The Act of Parliament, however, which authorized the book, declared that the first book "contained nothing but what was agreeable to the Word of God, and the primitive Church." This was a curious declaration after what seems to most people a change so great as to mark the boundary between Catholicism and Protestantism.

The essential difference between the two books is confirmed by the rest of the proceedings during this reign. Our Reformers had come under the influence of those of Switzerland, and had become the friends and allies of Calvin and Bucer, Peter Martyr and Zwingli. The same year saw the Articles of Religion, which are the formal systematized dogmatic teaching of the Church. It is fair and reasonable to conclude that the Articles and the Second Book of Edward being composed by the same persons and issued in the same year, were at least meant to teach the same doctrines. The want of agreement, real or supposed, between the Articles and our present Prayer-Book, has long been a ground of contention. The efforts that have been made to reconcile

\* Besides Mr. Hunt's book, see a good account of this era in "The Church and State in Conflict," by Dr. Corrie, Master of Jesus College, Cambridge. Hatchards. 1874.

the Articles with some parts of the Prayer-Book, as understood by one party, are among the most immoral acts in all ecclesiastical history. The inherent and ineradicable Calvinism which betrays itself in almost every sentence has been pertinaciously denied. The very men who first took the Articles in an opposite sense to that of the compilers of them, surreptitiously added a declaration that no one was to be allowed to put his own meaning on any Article, but was to take it in its literal and grammatical sense. The clergy who ceased to believe Calvin's doctrines have long since persuaded themselves that they were written under the influence of Luther and Melancthon, rather than of Calvin and Zwingli. The materials they used are taken, it was said, from the Augsburg Confession, and could not, therefore, have anything to do with the theology of Calvin. In recent times we have had the writer of Tract XC., Dr. Pusey, and Bishop Forbes, denying that they are even Protestant, or at least explaining away the meaning of the very parts that were written expressly to condemn the doctrines of the Church of Rome. It is a hopeful sign of this party after its many devious wanderings, that some of its members are beginning to look fairly at facts, and to admit truth even where it condemns themselves. In a volume just published, edited by Mr. Orby Shipley, one of the writers devotes a paper to proving that the Articles of Religion are of "Zwinglian Origin." He maintains that Zwingli was the real father of the English Reformation, that for ages we have lived in ignorance of his influence on our Reformers, and that when they completed the Articles they had not any idea of an apostolical succession of bishops, but regarded the ordination of Presbyterians to be as valid as Episcopal ordinations. One of the best parts of Mr. Hunt's book is where he has settled, I believe for ever, the Calvinistic character of the Thirty-Nine Articles.

With the Articles of Religion and the Second Prayer-Book of Edward VI. the Church of England differed but little from the Protestant Churches of the Continent. Cranmer in fact was in communication with Calvin for a general union of all the Reformed communities. But a great change was yet to come. When Edward died, the bishops, with the exception of the Reformers, who were a minority, went with Mary for the restoration of the Papal religion. But when Elizabeth came to the throne she was abandoned by the whole Episcopate, with the solitary exception of Anthony Kitchen, Bishop of Llandaff. In all previous changes the Church might be said to have acted, for even when Convocation was not consulted, the assent of the bishops and clergy was assumed. The Episcopate never proceeded to the position of dissent. It was otherwise when Elizabeth began her reign. By her own authority she had to reconstitute the Church. The Catholic bishops failed her, and she had to turn to the remnant of those who were Protestants and who

had refused to conform under *Mary*. It is not till his final chapter that Mr. Hunt discusses the question of the Catholic Church and the Anglican relations to it, but the facts he establishes and the principles on which he reasons must, I think, stand at the foundation of all arguments on the subject. The Catholic Church is one community. The Church of Christ is one. It cannot under any circumstances be two. There can be no branches of the Catholic Church unless they are united to one stem. Protestants who say that the Catholic Church is invisible make the saints of all countries and communities one in Christ. Catholics make the Church one by a visible unity. If the Catholic Church be not a visible unity, it is not in the sense required a visible Catholic Church. The Church of England in separating from Western Christendom, by that very act established itself on the Protestant basis. It could point to no Church unity but that which is invisible. In the time of Henry VIII. the bishops separated themselves from the Pope and all the bishops who took the side of the Pope, and yet maintained that they belonged to the Catholic Church. But, as the Catholic Church could not be divided, both parties could not belong to the Catholic Church. The untenableness of this position was soon discovered. The bishops who did not go entirely with the Reformation refused to take the same position under Elizabeth. The significance of this fact it is generally convenient to let pass unnoticed. Mr. Hunt sums up the results of all the changes in these words :—

“The immediate cause of the Reformation in England was King Henry’s quarrel with the Pope. The Church and the State came in collision, and to secure the kingdom from the interference of the Pope the King was declared head of the Church. This was done without any renunciation of Roman Catholic doctrines ; but it involved the separation of the Church of England from the visible Catholic Church. The English bishops and clergy withdrew their allegiance from the Roman Pontiff, took the oath of royal supremacy, and resigned every claim to ecclesiastical independence. This separation took place before any question of doctrine was raised. It happened when all Europe was disturbed with the throes of the Reformation, and it made easy the introduction into England of the Reformed doctrines. If the separation under Henry did not constitute the Church of England a distinct Church from that over which the Bishop of Rome presided, this was clearly done in the next reign. The adoption of the ‘Articles of Religion,’ and the substitution of the English Liturgy for the Mass, made a complete revolution in the doctrine and service of the Church of England. But its distinct position was even more definite when, under Elizabeth, bishops were consecrated without the usual sanction of the Roman See. The position which the Church of England assumed by this step was that of separation from the whole visible Catholic Church throughout the world.”

This means in other words that the Church of England became a Protestant Church. The separation from the Church Catholic will be denied, but I cannot see on what grounds, if we regard the Catholic Church as one undivided visible community. Elizabeth’s

bishops were not in communion with any other bishops in any part of the world. On the contrary they made common cause with the non-*Episcopal* bodies that had separated from the Church of Rome. In their society they were in their proper place, and in the place where English bishops ought to have been to this day. There is no evidence that any who accepted office under Elizabeth had any belief in an apostolical succession or in the divine institution of the *Episcopal* order. Some of them would have preferred the establishment of the discipline of Geneva, and only submitted to be bishops as the best thing to be done in the circumstances.\* The four Protestant bishops who acted as consecrators fairly represent the character of the Church as re-established under Elizabeth. William Barlow, who was the oldest, was entirely of Cranmer's opinion that consecration or ordination was not necessary to making a bishop. He said moreover, that bishops were not necessary to the constitution of a Church, but that wherever three persons met to worship God, if they were only "cobblers or weavers," there was the true Church. Coverdale, another of the consecrators, was altogether a Puritan. He refused to wear the *Episcopal* dress, and officiated at the making of the new Archbishop, robed as a Geneva minister.

It was not without reason that Roman Catholics denied the validity of the Elizabethan consecrations. Those who consecrated were bishops, but they were not bishops in office. The consecration was ordered by the Queen, and was not the action of the Church, if the Church is to be regarded as represented by the bishops in office or by the majority of bishops. The story of the Nag's Head was a fable, invented with the same disregard of truth which is still seen in Roman Catholic editions of Cobbett's "*History of the Reformation*," where Elizabeth is painted consecrating bishops with her own hands. But, though it was a fable from the point of view of those who believe that the Catholic Church is visible and an undivided unity, it was a fable that had in it an ideal truth. The eccentric but honest Non-juror, Henry Dodwell, following the principle of Church authority to its ultimate, denied that Elizabeth could deprive the bishops whom she found in the sees, and if she could not deprive them, those whom she appointed could not occupy. He calls the deprivations one of the errors of our "dear mother," and contrary to "primitive antiquity." †

The continuation of the hierarchy, or to speak more correctly of a hierarchy, was the work of the Queen. As a stroke of policy it was wise, though it failed to meet the approbation of many, and even of some of those who became bishops. The Queen also imposed many ceremonies that had been set aside in the time of Edward. To some these were a stumbling-block, and to others something to laugh

\* See "*Religious Thought in England*," vol. i., pp. 40, 41, 43.

† *Ibid.*, p. 86.

at. Among the laughers was Bishop Jewel, who said that the doctrines were everywhere good, but that "in the masking and ceremonies there was a little too much foolery." The Queen, however, was politic. The clergy that served under Mary had almost, without exception, conformed to the new ecclesiastical regimen. But they were very ignorant, and if left to themselves would have had no good influence. Jewel supposes that the Queen conceived the idea of recommending them to the people by a "comical dress."

The interference of the Queen in matters ecclesiastical provoked opposition from the Puritans as well as from the Roman Catholics. Some of them also believed that the Church had an independence of the State, and that Christ had given it rulers who were to govern and exercise discipline. It was on this ground that John Knox refused a bishopric under Edward; and it was on this ground that the Elizabethan Puritans had their chief contention with the Church in Elizabeth's days. Their first objections were to the vestments and the ceremonies, which to their minds recalled the mass and the sacrificing priest. They were to them the ghosts of things departed. Those who conformed willingly, regarded them as things indifferent, but the desire to get rid of them was very strong. Mr. Hunt says that, "immediately after the Thirty-Nine Articles were subscribed in Convocation, petitions were presented in both Houses against private baptism, baptism by women, the sign of the cross, organs, copes, surplices, saints'-days, and kneeling at the communion. In the Lower House one of the most sweeping of these petitions was supported by fifty-eight members, with only fifty-nine against it." \*

The Puritans, or, to speak accurately, some of them, not only maintained the independence of the Church and that Christ had given it a government, but they also held that this government was not Episcopal. The leader of this party, Thomas Cartwright, set forth a system of polity which was Presbyterian in its form, and every part of which he held to be of divine appointment. He argued that as God under the old dispensation took such care of forms that He gave commands even respecting the pins of the tabernacle, much more would He order all that concerned the more glorious house of the Christian Church.

Whitgift and Hooker answered Cartwright, and defended what would now be called the Erastian connection of Church and State. They also defended Episcopacy, and the order established in the Church as reasonable, becoming, and agreeing with the general spirit and customs of the Christian Church in all ages and countries. A divine origin had been claimed for the Presbyterian discipline, but neither Whitgift nor Hooker maintained a divine institution of bishops. This was felt to be a disadvantage. The Puritans, by appealing always to Scripture and never to reason, had many things

\* Vol. i., p. 48.

on their side that told well with the multitude. Hooker, conscious of this, said, "If we did seek to maintain that which most advantageth our own cause, the very best way for us and the strongest against them were to hold even as they do, that in Scripture there must needs be found some particular form of Church polity, which God hath instituted, and which for that very cause belongeth to all Churches and all times. But with any such eye to respect ourselves, and by cunning to make those things seem the truest which are the fittest to serve our purpose, is a thing which we neither like nor mean to follow." \*

Hooker's successors however had not his scruples. Whitgift had a chaplain named Bancroft, who afterwards became Archbishop of Canterbury. On Feb. 9, 1588, in a sermon at St. Paul's Cross, Bancroft refuted the Puritans, and for the first time since the Reformation preached the divine right of Episcopal government. The doctrine was so novel that it amazed even those who most hated the Puritans. Whitgift said it was not true, but he wished it were. This was the birthday of the High Church party. It was born out of the extravagances of Puritanism, on Plato's principle, that opposites generate each other.

Bancroft's doctrine had a new development under Archbishop Laud. It blossomed into a kind of Ritualism, which exasperated not only the Puritans, but all moderate Churchmen, and ended in the entire overthrow of the Episcopal Church. It is clear from the history that the Puritans were not alone in protesting against the innovations of Laud's party. In his time, and not without great opposition, began the moving of the communion tables from the body of the church or chancel, and the placing them altar-wise as they now stand. In his time, too, began that trifling with the meaning of the Articles, which ever since has been more or less one of the sins of the High Church party. When they rejected the theology of Calvin, they made out that the Articles rejected it too. Bishop Montague, of Chichester, one of Laud's supporters, contradicted the plain meaning of the Articles on many points, such as by saying that we get heaven by our own deservings, and that General Councils cannot err, and yet Montague maintained that he followed the Articles in their literal and grammatical sense. The men who opposed Laud's party were not merely Puritans, but such churchmen as Archbishop Ussher, and Bishops Carleton, Williams, and Morton.

The last settlement of the Church took place at the restoration of King Charles. The men who had opposed Laud's party before the "Great Rebellion" were now side by side with them at the re-establishment of the Church. I take particular notice of this that we may come as near as possible to a comprehension of the nature of the settlement under Charles II. Laud's party had a Prayer-Book

\* Quoted by Mr. Hunt, vol. i., p. 58.

revised according to their ideas, but they could not get it authorized. A copy of this Prayer-Book, in the handwriting of Sancroft, who at that time was chaplain to Bishop Cosin, still exists. It is supposed that this book was drawn up under the auspices of Bishops Cosin and Wren. It contains some of the favourite doctrines of the party—as the “real presence” in the Eucharist, and the benefit of prayers for the dead.

The Articles of Religion were allowed to stand as they were under the Elizabethan settlement. Changes, however, were made in the Prayer-Book. Mr. Hunt says :—

“Many additions were made, and alterations to the number of six hundred. But scarcely one of these alterations was of a kind likely to conciliate the Puritans. On the contrary, some things were made more offensive. The word priest was substituted in several places where formerly it was ‘minister.’ ‘Bishops, pastors, and ministers of the Church’ were changed into ‘bishops, priests, and deacons,’ and not content with the Apocryphal lessons in the calendar, they added the extraordinary story of ‘Bel and the Dragon.’ The revised book passed the Commons by a majority of six, and with it some rigid laws which the Lords tried to mitigate. The Commons shewed great jealousy lest any of Laud’s peculiar doctrines might be introduced into the new book.”\*

It is evident that these changes were in the direction of the High Church party, but to what extent is a question which it would require some ingenuity to determine. The retention of the Articles, and the insertion of the “black rubric,” were clear gain for the Evangelical side. If there be anything that really favours an extreme High Church party it is not directly expressed, and can only be proved at the sacrifice of the reputation of the compilers. I quite agree with what Canon Swainson said the other day in Convocation on this subject. The bishops either misunderstood the meaning of the rubrics which they restored, or they were wanting in honest dealing. The rubric about the ornaments was objected to by the Puritans, and the bishops answered that they looked only to the surplice. The greatest direct change was in making the bishops a distinct order from the presbyters; but this doctrine was now received by many who altogether repudiated any connection with Laud’s disciples. It was this which made Richard Baxter say that Hooker and Ussher, Devanant, Field, and Mason would now be ejected as Nonconformists.

It might have been expected that after 1662 there would have been but one party in the Church. This was probably the intention of those who framed the Act of Uniformity, but that Act struck only at the Puritans, and did not strike the whole of them. Many of the Presbyterians conformed by an agreement with the bishops, who allowed them to subscribe in their own sense. Another party, called Latitudinarians, which had become very influential during the time

\* Vol. i., p. 296.

of the Commonwealth, subscribed to Episcopacy and the ceremonies as matters quite indifferent.

We have thus at the Caroline settlement three distinct parties in the Church. The Presbyterians, however, seem to have approximated to the Latitudinarians. This, in their circumstances, was almost inevitable. Henceforth, until the rise of the modern Evangelicals, we read only of two parties.

Thus far I have traced the origin of the three parties. I will now speak of each in detail.

And first of the Evangelical. The Evangelicals are, I may say, the same as the Presbyterians, who conformed on the inducement that they were to subscribe in their own sense. They were called Presbyterians, but they were in reality the old moderate Churchmen who were indifferent to ceremonies and forms of ecclesiastical polity. Though displaced in 1662, they were the rightful heirs of the Church as constituted under Edward and Elizabeth.

The Evangelical party alone receive the Articles of Religion in their natural sense as the compilers intended them to be understood. But there is another important point which Mr. Hunt makes good in defence of the position of the Evangelicals. It is commonly supposed that their condemnation is written in the language of the Prayer-Book concerning the sacraments. Mr. Spurgeon is usually quoted as having triumphantly demonstrated their dishonesty in continuing to use the Baptismal service. But there are not many religious parties who could not be caught in traps if the language they use were always to be taken in its most literal sense. The New Testament writers would have but little chance of escape, and the condemnation of Jesus, especially for the Sermon on the Mount, would be as conclusive as Mr. Spurgeon's condemnation of the Evangelicals. No Calvinist, I grant, in the present day would choose to speak of either of the two Sacraments as the Prayer-Book does, and for this reason, that the language of the Prayer-Book has in his judgment been misunderstood, and doctrines inferred from it which it was never intended to teach. But though the modern Evangelical with this experience would revise these misunderstood phrases, it is still true that the old Evangelicals, the Calvinistic Reformers, both at home and abroad, did use this language, and that in a sense compatible with the rest of their theology. Mr. Hunt says:—

“It is sometimes convenient to forget that the whole Church of England followed Calvin in doctrine for seventy years after the Reformation. In the Baptismal service we thank God that every baptized child has been regenerated by the Holy Ghost. To a Calvinist, who believes that one who is once made a child of God cannot fall finally from grace, these words cannot have the same meaning as to an Arminian, who does not believe that grace is indefectible. At first sight we would pronounce the words of the Baptismal service to be opposed to Calvinism, and subversive indeed of its first and essential principles. But the fact with which we have to



deal is, that we receive these services from men who held the doctrines of Calvin. And then we have another fact, which is, that the same language which is used in the Baptismal service concerning regeneration is common to many Calvinistic writers of the time of the Reformation, both English and foreign."\*

The Puritans, in the time of the Commonwealth, were clear on Baptismal regeneration. They assumed that all the children whom they baptized were elect children, and therefore they believed that in baptism they were made members of Christ, children of God, and inheritors of the Kingdom of Heaven. Dr. Cornelius Burgess wrote a book on the "Baptismal Regeneration of Elect Infants," in which he reviewed the whole question as it was understood by the Reformers both at home and abroad, as well as by the Anglican writers who succeeded the Reformers. They never understood baptism as in every case conferring regeneration. Cartwright makes the same objection that Mr. Spurgeon now makes, and Whitgift, the leader of the doctrinal Calvinists, answered, "We teach far otherwise. The outward signs of the sacraments do not contain in them grace, neither yet is the grace of God of necessity tied unto them." Hooker calls baptism "the door of our actual entrance into God's house, the first apparent beginning of life, a seal perhaps to the grace of election;" but he adds that "all who receive the sacrament do not receive the grace of the sacrament." The Calvinistic confessions used language which is the counterpart of that in the Prayer-Book. The Reformed Church of France said in its standards, that in baptism God bestows what the sacrament represents. The Old Confession of the Church of Scotland said, "By baptism we are ingrafted into Jesus Christ, and made partakers of the righteousness whereby our sins are done away." Nearly the same are the words of the present Confession, which makes baptism the *seal* of regeneration, and says that by the right use of baptism grace is "really exhibited and conferred by the Holy Ghost." This which is said to be done in all cases is really believed to be done only when the infant is one of the elect. In the same way Mr. Hunt shows from the most express declaration of the Reformers, and the great writers of the English Church, that all that is said concerning a presence of Christ in the Eucharist means a spiritual presence, the same in kind as the Divine presence in other acts of worship. This was the clearly expressed view of our Reformers, who said plainly that on these subjects they agreed entirely with Calvin and the Swiss divines. It is again found that these divines used language quite as strong as that in the Prayer-Book. Calvin, for instance, who held strenuously to a spiritual presence, and a spiritual presence only, said that the verity is nevertheless joined to the signs, and that in the sacrament we have "true communion in Christ's body and blood." †

\* Quoted by Mr. Hunt, vol. i., p. 227.

† Ibid., p. 25.

The rise and progress of the High Church party has been already traced. The great Churchmen who may be regarded as belonging to it have generally been both moderate in the statement of their own opinions, and tolerant of others. But the High Church party has rarely been without an element of disturbance. It has had a kind of excrescence, of which it could never fairly get rid, which it has often carefully nourished, and which in many ways has compromised its character. It ruined the Church of England in the time of Charles I. It sowed the seeds of lasting contention in the time of Charles II. It troubled both Church and State in the time of William of Orange. It stultified itself in the long and fanatical opposition of the Lower House of Convocation to the Upper House; and it disgraced the character of the English clergy under the leadership of Sacheverel. In later times it threw stones and brickbats at the Methodists, whose cause some High Churchmen would now make their own.

This excrescence of High Churchism has turned up in our day under the name of Ritualism. The Ritualists take the name of the Catholic party, and claim the Church of England as their inheritance. About fifty years ago there was a man who got possession of large portions of the commons in the south of London. There was no one whose special business it was to protect them, and this man used to set up poles, which at the end of three years if not interfered with were removed, and a fence substituted. The poles were then placed further off, and again at the end of three years new territory enclosed and appropriated. This proceeding was parallel to that of the Ritualists. They stretch out their poles periodically, and if not thrust back lay claim to new territory. While men slept they have got into possession, and now the rulers both in Church and State are at their wits' end to know how to get rid of them.

The Ritualist claims to belong to the High Church party, and when he defends that party he wishes people to believe that he is defending himself. This is one of his arts which I must regard as intentional. By this course he gets step by step to the restoration of doctrines and customs which were abolished at the Reformation. By means of the ornaments rubric, which was due either to an oversight or an act of deception, he gets back Roman Catholic vestments. By a declaration of an Act of Parliament, which, so far as I can judge, was also due either to deception or to a remarkable obtuseness in the understanding, he gets from the second book of Edward to the first, and from that he goes back to the time of Henry, when the Church of England stood in separation from the Church of Rome, but substantially agreeing with the doctrines of the Church of Rome. The proper High Churchman abides by the settlement of 1662; but the Ritualist overrides all settlements to get back to the unsettled ground when there was no real Reformation,

but only a temporary quarrel with the Pope. His creed is to undo every change that has been made since the documents used in the time of Henry VIII. The last of these, the "Necessary Doctrine and Erudition," being the one that most agrees with the Church of Rome, is, I suppose, the one which the party would prefer. It was the same which Bonner reprinted to convert Protestants in the days of Queen Mary. It is no secret that the Ritualists condemn the Reformation and malign the Reformers. If they are consistent they must take the side of the bishops who were deprived by Elizabeth, and the Elizabethan consecrations being contrary to the canons, must be regarded as invalid. This would end in self-condemnation, which is the career the party has followed since the Oxford Tracts. It goes about seeking rest till it finds that its only true rest is obedience to Rome.

The Ritualist cannot connect himself with any party in the Church of England since the Reformation. Like his favourite prototype, Melchizedek, he is without father or mother. His nearest relations are Queen Mary's bishops, who gave up the Reformation as soon as they saw to what it was tending, and probably before that they were not very zealous for its progress. The Churchmen of the time of James I. and Charles I., even those who were the greatest innovators, never approached anything like a doctrinal agreement with the Church of Rome. Bishop Andrewes, notwithstanding many conceits, perhaps I ought to say along with many other conceits, maintained that the Pope was Antichrist. Among all kinds of High Churchmen I do not read of one who thought that the Church of England had not adopted the doctrines of Protestantism as opposed to the Church of Rome. If there be an exception it is Herbert Thorndike, whose meaning is rarely intelligible, and who died under a cloud as to his ecclesiastical position. Jeremy Taylor, who, however, belongs more to the Broad Church than to the High, maintained that toleration could not be yielded to Roman Catholics because their worship was idolatry. Writing on the Eucharist, he denies every conception of a presence of Christ except as the presence of a spirit. Bishop Cosin, who is generally taken for one of Laud's strictest disciples, wrote a history of the doctrine of transubstantiation, and declared his judgment that between the "real" but "spiritual" presence in the Church of England and that of the Church of Rome there is a great gulf fixed. If the Ritualist could hope for progenitors anywhere in the Church of England, it would be among the Non-jurors; but even here his disappointment will be complete. They said a great deal about "truth, primitive and Catholic," but they meant by this phrase, Protestant truth as opposed to the errors of the Church of Rome. Bishop Hicke, one of their most eminent writers, speaking of the Mass, says that "The worship of a leek, or an onion, or a head of garlic is not more against common-sense than the worshipping of a

wafer, the work of a baker or confectioner's shop." Charles Leslie, and many other Non-jurors, write with equal decision, showing a clear antagonism to the doctrines of the Church of Rome.

I have not undertaken to discuss the question of how we are to deal with the Ritualists. There is no reason why we should be bound for ever by the settlement of 1662, or by any previous settlement. There is no reason why, if we think proper, we may not set aside the Reformation; so far as that goes, we may set aside Christianity itself should we ever cease to believe it. But whatever we do let it be done on the basis of fact. If the end of any party is the furtherance of that which is true, that end will be best served by ingenuous proceeding. Mr. Hunt's book is entirely in favour of the claims of the Evangelical party, though his own principles are clearly not Evangelical, and so far he is self-condemned. He has put an end to the theory that the Church of England is a compromise or comprehension. It has become so in the evolution of history, but it was not intended to be so at any of the eras when great changes were made. There are Broad Churchmen who have gone as far from the doctrines of the Reformers as any of the Ritualists. A Liberal party, as well as a High Church party, has a historical position in the Church, and with this position no one wishes to interfere. But this is not the same as men denying Christianity under the plea of being liberal, or introducing Roman Catholic doctrines under the pretence of being High Churchmen.

JAMES PEARSON.



## GREEK PAINTERS.

COMPARED with the sculptor whose group or statue in marble or bronze may fairly be expected to outlive the accidents and wear of many centuries, a painter, it must be confessed, works at a disadvantage, entrusting as he does his fame to a material which is not only in itself at the best of a highly perishable nature, but is even in these days, with every means of precaution, subject to complete destruction from a variety of the most simple and common causes. There are times when this reflection arises with regard to comparatively modern art all the more bitterly perhaps, owing to the inferior quality of the more fortunate sculpture. But it is a reflection which never fails to occur and to awaken regret when we think of the entire loss of the paintings of the ancient Greek masters, and remember the different, though still sad, fate of the sculptors who were their fellows once. Nor is there any refuge in the thought that after all a nation which produced great sculptors may have furnished but indifferent painters, for one reason because we possess criticisms of ancient paintings by men whose judgment as to sculpture we have the means of testing, and for another reason—lest it be said that a just critic of sculpture might be blind to the qualities of a picture—because numberless painted vases still attest the extraordinary skill of a class of painters whose position was little above that of mere workmen. If, however, the doubtful prospect of lasting fame maintained by the existence of their works does not oppress modern painters, it assuredly seems not to have acted seriously on the spirits of the brotherhood in ancient

Greece, disappointing though it must have been to some to see their work fading before their own eyes had become dim. But possibly it is in most cases an injustice to ascribe to a great artist such an ulterior motive as a lasting fame, so true is it that the creative faculty in art asks only the means of expressing itself. Like virtue it is its own reward, or it is like the creative spirit in nature which works out its designs towards the one end of producing organic completeness and perfection, indifferent apparently as to whether its flowers blush unseen or deck frequented gardens. From what artistic motive, for example, was it that the backs of the statues in the pediments of the Parthenon, where they could not be seen by mortal eyes, were not only finished with elaborate care, but so conceived that, still in their shattered remains they exhibit touches of composition which never fail to win the spectator? Some have honestly asked whether this was really not so much labour and thought thrown away; but the question was once answered by the German sculptor Rietschl in a manner which deserves to be accepted as final. He did not, he said, know why the Creator had caused to grow in lonely places unseen by man flowers as beautiful and perfect as those in gardens, but he supposed it was done from some constitutional impulse to create objects entirely perfect of their kind. So it was with the sculptor of these statues; the creative faculty was constitutional with him, and the same may have been true of all his great contemporaries in art.

But even were we to go so far as to assume that the ancient masters, sculptors and painters alike, were swayed by this motive, and still further to infer that both regarded with indifference the prospect of a lasting fame, it would still remain to be considered whether among the laws of compensation in human affairs there may not have been one which secured some adjustment for what now appears the unequal fate of these two classes of artists. The brief existence of a butterfly is felt to be in some way equalized by its lovely colours and the shining hour which it enjoys. The attractive beauty of short lived youth has often been the theme of contemplation, and similarly with regard to the Greek painters, if it is not a mere shallow semblance which appears to associate their captivating tints and effects with the transitory beauty of nature, it would be satisfactory if it could be distinctly known that their glory, though more ephemeral than that of the sculptors, was brighter while it lasted. It may be a more enviable glory which consists of the praise of the few in many ages than of the many in one age; but that distinction may here be passed over. We are at the present day in the position of heirs who have inherited from the Greek sculptors something which enables us to do some degree of substantial justice to their memory, while from the painters we have received only records. It seems as if the former had barely enjoyed their estate, while the

latter were prodigal of theirs. We think of Pheidias dying in prison, while fate in partial recompense has preserved the sculptures of the Parthenon, and we compare him with Zeuxis the painter who lived in splendid luxury and fame, and of whose works yet no particle remains. It is not said that Pheidias had not also in his life obtained high honour, and much less can it be affirmed that he and Zeuxis were perfect representatives of their class, since among the sculptors, Lysippos, for example, acquired a fortune as well as renown, while on the other hand, the painter, Protogenes, of Rhodes, was condemned to poverty and neglect. But the work of the painter had in ancient, as well as in modern, times the advantage of being able to address itself to a more varied circle of spectators than the sculptor could command. The fascination of colour, the range of subject, and above all the possession of a sunlight and shade of its own were together an irresistible combination of attractions in the hand of a master. Such combinations were worked out by men like Zeuxis, Parrhasios, and Apelles, and the result was a very generous appreciation in which apparently all classes joined, the cobbler, as well as the conqueror of the world, coming forward in the case of Apelles as a critic, and each receiving unceremonious reproof. In a word, the art of painting was a popular art among the Greeks. That sculpture in its best days was not, is perhaps no less true than that its chief characteristic in the period of decline was the claim which it made to popularity by the imitation of pictorial effects in composition.

If, then, it is true that an artistically gifted nation like the Greeks bestowed a more popular and kindly recognition on their painters than on their sculptors, there would be in this fact alone such an element of compensation as is desired. But is it really true? The records of the lives of Greek artists are extremely scanty, and have already been called upon to prove so much else that it may be doubted whether they will bear this additional strain, the more so since the indefiniteness of the term "popularity" will necessarily exclude reliance on statements which by any possibility might be otherwise construed.

A fortune amassed in the course of a professional career ought perhaps to be regarded as a sign of popularity. On the other hand, there have been instances of public favourites who have reaped small gain and died poor. But this much, it is hoped, will be granted that of all the forms into which popularity resolves itself, none is more constant and reliable than that which consists in the propagation of anecdotes concerning its idols. Now the first observation which occurs to us on comparing the records of the Greek painters with those of the sculptors is, that the former are rich in anecdotes, the latter conspicuous for the absence of anything like romance. It is not to be denied that the greater part of these anecdotes are found only in the works of writers who lived at a late period long

distant from the persons of whom they speak, and it is equally true that these writers sometimes differ as to the painter to whom their tale applies. But while under the circumstances it is manifest that the statements of such writers have not by themselves any positive value for the personal history of a particular artist, it is no less obvious from the very confusion which exists that the anecdotes in question had been handed down from a remote time, and were not the invention of a later age. If, then, there is no reasonable doubt as to the stories told of the Greek painters having been produced in the age in which they lived, it may be maintained that they lived in an atmosphere of considerable popularity. A short outline of the lives of the most eminent of the painters may serve to strengthen the case which it is here endeavoured to establish.

In priority of date stands Polygnotos, who, leaving Thasos, where an active and important branch of the Asia Minor school of painting had for some time existed, and where, under his father Agalaophon, he had learned the technical skill of his art, settled in Athens while yet a young man, and there acquired the patronage and friendship of Kimon, then at the head of Athenian affairs, and zealously employed with the embellishment of the city. Evil report said that the painter's acquaintance with Kimon's half-sister, the beautiful Elpinike, was more than intimate. His services in Athens were directed towards the mural decoration of the Theseum, the temple of the Dioscuri, and, more important perhaps, the Stoa Poekile. In these works he was assisted chiefly by Mikon and Panaenos. For himself while so engaged he had no thought of pecuniary reward. But when the task was finished he received what was the highest honour of the State, and then very rarely conferred, the right of a burgess of Athens. His next and greatest work was at Delphi, where he was commissioned to execute a series of paintings on the walls of the Lesche, a building erected there from some motive of gratitude by the people of Knidos. The subjects were the taking of Troy and the visit of Odysseus to the underworld. The surpassing excellence of the paintings obtained for him the rights of hospitality in all the States which belonged to the Amphictyonic League. Apparently the Council of that league, and not the people of Knidos, had been his employers on that occasion. At Thespiae we hear of pictures from his hand which within a century after their completion had suffered so much as to require to be altogether restored. And again the same misfortune befell, if not so rapidly, his pictures in the Pinakothekē at Athens, of which, in the time of Pausanias, only seven were in a state from which the subjects could be made out. It is true that the very exceptional honours paid to Polygnotos may have been partly in recompense of his liberality, as is distinctly stated to have been the case at Athens; and we are the less anxious to press any doubt on the point since painting had not in his time



developed those charms which are most potent with the public. It was still stately in its composition, elevated in its motives, and simple in its colours. But as a commodity it was then, compared with sculpture, scarce; and very probably its rarity procured for it a wondering reception which was afterwards accorded it from its magical presentment of solid, substantial forms, more life-like to the many than the rounded and tangible figures of the sculptor.

After Polygnotos, we have Apollodoros, of whom his younger contemporary Zeuxis is reported to have said that he opened the door of art. The particular service which is spoken of in this manner consisted in the introduction of a gradation of colours for the expression of light and shade, and a method of transition from one colour to another. It is perhaps characteristic of the relation of mutual compliment which existed between these two artists that when Zeuxis afterwards left Athens, Apollodoros declared that he had taken away art with him. But in another sense from that intended it was also true that Apollodoros had opened the door for art, since his innovation had introduced it into the houses of the rich and noble, among whom the patronage of painters now became a fashion. Alcibiades, who was then nothing if not foremost in fashion, is said to have carried away by force a favourite artist of the day, Agatharkos, and compelled him to decorate his house with paintings. This taste for the pictorial decoration of private houses doubtless originated in the warm appreciation with which the then novel effects of the scene-painters in Athens were received. At the same time it furnishes a ready instance of the difference between painting and sculpture, that the former with its own sunlight and shadow may be taken home and enjoyed, while the latter can only be rightly valued in the clear, open air, and therefore very frequently under less kindly circumstances. Of the works of Apollodoros little is known beyond the motto which he attached to them, *μυμήσεται τις μᾶλλον ἢ μιμήσεται* ("People will find fault rather than imitate"), the sharp edge and alliteration of which found favour. At first sight, and in the light of less ambiguous pretensions made by other painters, the verse directly contains a challenge, and we should not have thought otherwise of it but for its revival as the motto of a modern scholar from whose mind vanity was far removed. Pliny ascribes the line to Zeuxis, but there is less occasion for adopting his correction, since the latter artist will be found to have expressed himself to much the same effect, though in quite different terms. "My native place," he says, "is Herakleia, my name is Zeuxis, and if any man say that he can paint better, let him show it and win." Probably the Herakleia so honoured was the town of that name in Bithynia, and in that case the residence of Zeuxis in Asia Minor would be accounted for partly by patriotic selection. It was at Ephesus that he established himself after quitting Athens, where he appears

not to have remained long. Far, however, from being locally fixed in Ephesus he is afterwards heard of at work in many places both distant and widely apart. At one time he is at Croton in Southern Italy, commissioned at a heavy fee to execute paintings for a temple of Hera, and when the work apparently is done we find him proposing to paint of his own will a figure of Helena (Cicero de Juvent. II. 1). As a preliminary step he asks to be shown the most beautiful young women in the town, and on being taken to the Palaestra, is told that the most beautiful of the youths whom he sees there exercising have sisters still more dazzling in form and grace. Of the maidens thus indicated he was permitted to select five, and to have their presence by him while he worked out his conception of Helena, the unequal beauty of one model being complemented by the others. When the picture was finished the artist wrote beneath it, as a modern painter might write in the pages of an Exhibition Catalogue, those lines of the Iliad (III. 156), in which the old men of Troy, beholding Helena on the tower, conveyed their admiration of her loveliness in the words, "For such a woman it is no hardship for Trojans and Achaeans to have borne long ills."

But in another respect also the conduct of Zeuxis then formed a precedent for modern times. He placed the picture on view and charged a fee for admission, upon which the wits of the day remarked that the Helena of Zeuxis was a hetaera. Otherwise, if even so, the painting brought him no gain, it having been undertaken as a gift to the people of Croton. It was probably about this time, while yet resident in the South of Italy, that he painted a figure of Alkmena, and presented it to the town of Agrigentum, not apparently from a benevolent motive, but, it is said, because its value in his eyes was beyond any price which they could pay. The fame of Zeuxis did not escape Archelaus, the King of Macedonia, whose court was then an attraction for men of note in poetry and philosophy. A commission was given him to decorate the palace with paintings, for which the sum of over £1600 was allowed. The work is said to have been admirably done, but what the subjects represented were is not known. We hear only of a figure of Pan, not included in the commission, which the painter made a gift of to the king, again from the conviction that its merits were beyond mere money value. Yet, notwithstanding these presents, Zeuxis acquired a large fortune by his profession, and was not, it appears, unwilling to make an ostentatious display of it. When attending the Olympian games, he was conspicuous for his apparel, on which his name was worked in letters of gold. In painting, however, it was less easy to assert his individuality, though the desire was there equally strong, if we may judge from the anecdote which hinges on his picture of a group of Centaurs, the female suckling her offspring, and the male playing with a young

lion. This work was exhibited in Athens, and, contrary to the sanguine expectations of the artist, the visitors were so taken with the peculiar novelty of the subject that they overlooked for the moment the perfection of skill with which it was presented to them, and Zeuxis, hearing no word of praise for himself, ordered the picture to be removed. *Arts celare artem* was his motto in practice, but he did not feel that art should conceal the artist, if only for an hour. With regard to his power of vivid realization, there is another tale, describing a competition between him and Parrhasios. Zeuxis painted a fruit piece which, when exposed, attracted the birds, while Parrhasios painted a curtain which even his competitor tried to draw aside, and so confessed himself surpassed. It is very likely that it was against this singular realism of Zeuxis that Aristotle appealed, pronouncing its effect on the spectators as purely sentimental (*pathos*), and comparing it disadvantageously with the *ethos*, or moral effect, derived from the highminded bearing of the figures painted by Polygnotos. Eccentric, prosperous, and applauded through life, Zeuxis, we are prepared to hear, died a strange death. It is not because we believe the slenderly vouched-for report, but because we accept in part as evidence of the strange personal popularity which ancient painters enjoyed, that we repeat the statement of his having died from laughter at the picture of an old crone which he had painted.

Parrhasios also was a native of Asia Minor, having been born at Ephesus, and there trained to his profession by his father, Euenor. It was usual, however, to regard him as an Athenian, from the circumstance of his having been admitted to the freedom of Athens, and of his having spent most of his life there. Nor did he live in obscurity. It would seem, from a conversation between him and Socrates, reported by Xenophon in the "Memorabilia" (III. 10, 1), that the painter had added to his other attainments an acquaintance with philosophy. But probably his relations towards Socrates originated not in a kindred bent of mind, but from the motive of following the fashion set by Alcibiades, whom, in other respects, he appears to have made his model. He would walk, dressed in purple, through the streets, and wearing a golden crown on his head. In verses composed to accompany his pictures he described himself as prince of artists, delicately fed, and descended from Apollo. Having once undertaken to paint a figure of the god Hermes, he produced a portrait of himself, and wrote the name of the god beneath it, no one being the wiser. But it does not follow that, in personal appearance, Parrhasios was what is usually ascribed to a Greek god, since of all the Greek deities Hermes is the least distinguishable from the ordinary type of the Athenian youth as it is presented, for example, on the frieze of the Parthenon. For the town of Lindos, in Rhodes, he executed a figure of Horakles, apparently in some new attitude, or under some new

type. Otherwise there seems no occasion for the painter's remark that the hero had so appeared to him in his sleep. But with his boasting there was a touch of humour once, when, on being defeated by Timanthes of Samos in a competition, of which the subject was the "Contest of Ajax and Odysseus for the Armour of Achilles," Parrhasios replied to his consoling friends that for himself he was not sorry, but he grieved because Ajax had again been worsted by an unworthy rival.

In singular contrast with the air of refinement and luxury in his personal manners were the grim and painful associations called up by the most celebrated of his pictures. We do not think that, in the whole range of Greek legend, it is possible to find three more harrowing scenes than where Telephus seized the infant Orestes, and would not let it go alive unless Achilles cured him of his cruel wound by the rust from his spear; or where Philoctetes was abandoned in Lemnos by his comrades, who could no longer endure his screams; or again, when Prometheus was bound alive to a rock in the Caucasus mountains, there to submit while the vulture gnawed his liver, which daily grew afresh. Yet he chose each of these subjects; and with regard to his Prometheus, there is a report that he found his model in an Olynthian captive, whom he purchased of Philip of Macedon, and put to torture. Doubtless the story had no more truth in it then than in after times, when, under a slightly altered form, it was repeated of Michael Angelo. For, in the first place, no Athenian citizen would have ventured to challenge one of the most rigorous laws of the state by torturing a free-born Greek; and in the second place, Parrhasios, being apparently at the height of his fame in the time of Socrates, could scarcely have continued his artistic activity, not to say produced one of his most celebrated works, after the capture of Olynthus. More genial but still clearly in the vein of illustrating the remarks of Socrates, in the conversation already referred to, that a painter could express the thoughts and inward emotions of men, were the pictures of Odysseus feigning insanity when called on to join the Trojan expedition, and of the Athenian *demos*—that is, in this case, the body of Athenians qualified to have a voice in public affairs. How discordant the voices used to be is a matter of notoriety, and even if they were ever quite harmonious, it was not such a moment that Parrhasios had before his mind. The picture is described as exhibiting every expression of cruelty, anger, injustice, fickleness, pride, and conceit, with every shade and opposite of these qualities. Unfortunately there is no record of the nature of the design by which he contrived to express so much. The term of "many-headed monster," so applicable to the *demos*, and at the same time, so obviously suggested by Pliny's description of the painting, has led some to suppose that the *demos* may here have been personified by a figure with a head composed of a number of masks, such a

frequently occurs on engraved gems, though generally at a late period. But it may fairly be doubted whether anything approaching artistic greatness could have been reached in this way, and we have no alternative but to assume that the picture in question was a great achievement. Nor from analogous instances of personification does it appear otherwise than inevitable that we accept the picture as having consisted of only one figure, however impossible it may be to realize the fact. We have, for example, the description of a painting executed for Alcibiades, in which he appeared seated on the lap of Nemcas, a personification of the Nemean games, and being crowned by Olympias, who discharged the same function in regard to the national contests at Olympia. But in each of these cases it is all but certain that the personifying figure was closely assimilated in form to Victory, and in reality represented only success in the games. It may well be that for the figure of the demos some moment of specially strained attention was selected, in which a variety of passions might be seen contending in the face and action of the figure; and it is the less necessary to assume the presence of every emotion ascribed by Pliny to the picture, since imagination frequently led later critics to see in masterpieces of art a vast deal more than actually existed. In proof of this, we may appeal to the great number of epigrams on Myron's group of a cow suckling her calf, from all which it will be gathered that not one habit or peculiarity of those animals under the circumstances was omitted by the sculptor, though it is perfectly certain that this was not the case. A true work of art must be suggestive of much that cannot be expressed in itself; but there is a limit to its suggestiveness which it is not always within the reach of every one to discern. Among the other works of Parrhasios are mentioned pictures of two boys, illustrative of the innocence and trustfulness of youth, and of two Hoplites running in a race, the one perspiring, the other laying down his armour to breathe. His designs for torcotic work were highly valued. It remains only to be mentioned another path into which the eccentricity of his genius led him—the production of obscene subjects.

In a little time the art of painting culminated according to the judgment of the ancients in the works of Apelles. So far, however, as can be made out from the records, it was in his case the culmination less of genius than of technical skill. He is compared with Correggio, and there appears to be no doubt that of all the ancient painters he did most to exhaust the resources of colour and of accurate drawing. In the former direction his training in the school of Ephesus must have been of infinite assistance. To improve himself in the latter direction he left Ephesus and proceeded to Sicyon, where was then a school of painting distinguished for its elaborate instruction in drawing. It was probably when studying there that on some visit to Corinth he saw the young maiden Lais drawing water at the fountain of

Peirene, and became enamoured of her beauty; and it may have been on this occasion of his residence in the mainland of Greece that he saw Phryne bathing on the way to Eleusis, and thereupon conceived the design of his celebrated picture of Aphrodite rising out of the sea (*Anadyomene*). There is no mention of his having been a second time in Greece proper; and, further, he must have been a young man when Phryne's beauty was at its height. The completion of his studies was not, it is said, the only object of his visit to Sicyon. The masters of that school stood high in public favour, and he hoped by allying himself with them to open the way more readily for his own success. Thence he went to the Court of Philip of Macedon, and if it is rightly conjectured that he owed his commission to work there to Pamphilos, one of the leaders of the Sicyonian school, it would probably not be wrong to trace the imputation of such a motive to envy of his ultimate success. Alexander, on succeeding to the throne of his father Philip, appointed Apelles to be the Court painter to the exclusion, so far as the portrait of the monarch was concerned, of all others of the craft. But portraits of Alexander by other painters are not unfrequently mentioned. When the campaign began in which the East was to be made vassal of the West with its Macedonian leader, Apelles followed his royal patron as far as Ephesus, where he established himself. Alexander also halted his forces for some time in that neighbourhood for other reasons than that the occurrence of his own birth and the burning of the great temple of Diana in the same night was a coincidence with more than a passing attraction to his mind. The new temple seems to have been in process of construction. It was completed under the direction of Alexander's architect Deinokrates. When monarch and painter were together in Ephesus, it happened that the former ventured some remark about a picture, and was told by the artist to be silent on such subjects, lest the boys rubbing down colours in the studio should laugh at him. The same reply is said to have been made also by Zeuxis to the Megabyzos, or High Priest, at Ephesus, and a similar conversation may easily have occurred among many other less exalted persons, since it obviously forms what may be called a stock anecdote of the profession. On another occasion, when Alexander's opinion was invited on the merits of a picture of a horse, he seems to have profited by the advice just recorded, while his horse, being uninstructed in the matter, neighed towards his pictorial kin. Upon this the painter addressed his patron: "Sire, the horse knows a painting better than you do." But here, again, there is another version of the story. There had been a competition between Apelles and some other artist or artists, the subject chosen being a horse. The judges disagreeing about the rival merits of the paintings, it was resolved to leave the decision to a living animal of that class, the verdict to be given in neighing. Such freedom of address on the part of Apelles may have

been warranted by the intimate friendship which existed between him and Alexander, a friendship which amounted to the gift of one of his favourite mistresses, Pancaste, to the painter, who became enamoured of her charms as she sat to him, apparently for a portrait. It was not, however, alone to his patron that Apelles displayed a facility of rebuke. A brother artist had shown him a picture which had been executed in some marvellously short space of time. The criticism of Apelles was, that he wondered such stuff could not be produced much more rapidly. Another had painted a figure of Helena, of which Apelles said, that he had made her golden, because he could not make her beautiful. But the remark which most of all caught the temper of the time, and has come down to our day as a proverb, was that which contained his advice to a shoemaker not to look above the shoe. The individual thus counselled had discovered something amiss in the sandals of a figure painted by Apelles. The necessary correction was made, and the critic, pleased so far, now pushed his animadversions to other parts of the picture, with the effect of drawing down on himself the warning, *ne sutor ultra crepidam judicaret*, as it is expressed by Pliny. More savage seems to have been the spirit in which he met some calumny invented by a brother artist, Antiphilos, by painting a large allegorical picture of Calumny.


It remains to notice the acquaintance of Apelles with Protogenes, a Rhodian painter, so immeasurably laborious and slow, that his profession was far from being a source of due profit and comfort. The long siege of Rhodes by Demetrius Poliorcetes, with its terrible hardships, could not move him from his easel, and yet, when with all this patience he had finished a work, purchasers were hard to find, until Apelles caused a report to be spread, that he intended to buy the pictures of Protogenes and sell them as his own. The acquaintance, thus ripened into friendship, began, it appears, by an advance on the part of Apelles. On his first visit Protogenes was not at home, but there was in his studio a tablet prepared for a painting. On this, instead of leaving his name, Apelles drew a coloured line, confident that its exceeding fineness would guide Protogenes to its authorship. The latter, accepting the line as a challenge, drew within it another still finer, and in a different colour. Apelles returned, and finding what had been done, took a brush, and divided his original line a second time. Beyond this Protogenes could not go. Probably he had not the habit in which his rival indulged, of letting no day pass without practice in drawing subtile lines.

It is not, we now repeat, pretended that the various incidents which diffuse an air of gaiety over the lives of the great painters of antiquity, are in each case truthfully reported as they stand. It is merely argued that the existence of so many anecdotes concerning their personal habits, is strong evidence of their popularity as a class ;

and it is evidence, as has been said, which becomes the stronger by being set off against the very different state of records with regard to the contemporary masters of sculpture, of whose lives the very little that is known is mostly of a sombre hue. The life of Polykleitos is absolutely unknown, Myron died in poverty, Pheidias in prison, while even of the sculptors of a later time, when they, too, appealed to sentiment, and were better appreciated, there is scarcely an incident handed down capable of moving hilarity. If, then, the painters of Greece enjoyed in their life a far more kindly recognition than the sculptors, there would be in that fact some compensation for the short existence of their works and the consequent danger of oblivion. We who live now are heirs of antiquity, and if some of our ancestors have bequeathed us nothing, it is at least a source of satisfaction to know that while they lived they thoroughly enjoyed their estate.

ALEXANDER S. MURRAY.





## EXILED POPES.

I MUST commence the slender labours with which, in obedience to your Grace's wish, I am to entertain the Academia to-day\*, by premising that I have found, on looking into my subject, such a vast extent of matter, that I must for lack of time, to say the least, narrow and limit the title of these remarks by certain distinctions which I shall at once proceed to lay down. First, then, by the exile of Popes I do not mean such deportations of the successors of S. Peter, accompanied with violence, and often ending in martyrdom, as that (for instance) of S. Clement I. in Pontus, and others of the august line during the three centuries which preceded the conversion of Constantine. The remoteness of those events, the scanty records of that period of ecclesiastical history, and the sameness both of cause and of effect, seem to me to make them less fit than others for my purpose, which is to draw from a brief review of more recent events some inferences of relevance for the present moment and the immediate future. Suffice it then to say, that of the thirty-three saintly pontiffs who occupied the Roman See from S. Peter to S. Sylvester I., some six or eight added this form of suffering to the glories of martyrdom, or of imprisonment endured by them as chief representatives of the Christian name. But it is not of such exile that I would speak. I regard the term in a more precise sense, viz., as applying to Popes who, being temporal sovereigns, were con-

\* This Essay was lately read before the Academia of the Catholic Religion.

strained by the political conditions of their times for a time more or less protracted to leave their natural home, the throne of Christian Rome, and wander or remain stationary at a distance from the Holy City. In this sense, then, the exile or non-residence of Popes does not occur earlier than the eighth century. Traces are not wanting, indeed, of a recognition of the Christian community and of its head as having a civil existence during the three centuries of persecutions which we know were both local and intermittent. Relations of this kind between the State and the Popes remind us of that which existed between Christian communities and the Caliphs or the Sultans in Africa and Asia, and which still exist in the Ottoman Empire, where the Bishops of Christian communities are recognized also as their civil heads by the State. And again, the Holy See undoubtedly possessed, even from so early a date as the fourth century, various, and sometimes ample, territorial endowments both in the East and in the West; and these (entitled the patrimonies of the Holy See of Peter) were accompanied by civil powers, often of great extension and, at least in the Duchy of Rome, even equivalent to the "Regalia;" yet, in the above restricted sense, the temporal sovereignty of the Popes does not date earlier than the pontificate of S. Gregory II., and about the year 726. The learned Pope Gregory XVI., in his work, "The Triumph of the Holy See," notes, that the dignity and prerogatives of the Roman See are not inherent in it as in their source and origin, but are derived to it from the Person of the Vicar of Christ, in whom they are inherent, and from whom they derive to his See. Now one of these prerogatives is an absolute and unlimited spiritual supremacy over all persons, sovereigns as well as subjects; hence the resolute manner in which the Roman pontiffs appear in history to adhere to the idea of a temporal sovereignty as giving the *πῶς στῶ* to their spiritual power; hence also the instinct of all the enemies of that spiritual power to attack and to destroy the temporal power. Humanly speaking, indeed, the spiritual power could never have been wielded at all without this fulcrum, and consequently those who wish it never had been, and never shall be, a reality, are all agreed in wishing it destroyed. Exile, then, in the sense of local exclusion from the Roman See, has been an intermittent, but an often-recurring symptom of the world's impatience of the yoke of Christ's Vicar for the space of more than eleven centuries; and now, A.D. 1874, what would not the world give if it could see him once for all permanently un-crowned, a subject *in*, or an exile for ever *from*, his own city! I propose (briefly, by necessity, and I fear most incompletely) to touch on the theme of these exiles; and, if I can, trace in them some common features to conclude, by way of an induction, to some particulars as to what we have to fear or what to hope in the immediate future.

I. And first, as to the chronology and the duration of these exiles.

If we run through the pontificates of fifty Popes from S. Gregory II. down to Sylvester II., we shall find that continuous residence in Rome was the exception rather than the rule; if we trace the history of the Popes on through the eleventh century, it is almost the same; from the year 1130 till the end of the twelfth century, the twelve pontiffs who reigned from Innocent II. down to Innocent III. were scarcely ever to be found at Rome. Innocent II. was the longest resident of this series, and he passed not more than seven years there out of the thirteen years of his pontificate, being disturbed and driven out repeatedly by the turbulence of faction. The glorious pontificate of the great Innocent opened the thirteenth century with the re-integration of the temporal dominions of the Holy See, and an almost continuous residence in Rome for eighteen years. But these eighteen years represent more than half of the period of residence in their See by successive Popes during the remainder of that century. The next century opens with the tragedy of Boniface VIII. Outraged and maltreated, it is yet certain that he died, not at Anagni, as Dante and the Ghibelline authors have it, but after a month's interval from the date of Colonna's violence, and at Rome. His successor, however, never went to Rome; and then, after a long and divided conclave at Perugia, Clement V. was elected, and like his five successors dwelt, in peace at least, but in exile from Rome at Avignon. This brings us to the year 1378. For seventy-two years the Romans saw their Sovereign Pontiff for scarcely four years, in the persons of Urban V. and Gregory XI. Then comes the deplorable forty years' schism, terminated by the election of Martin V., during which Rome was again deserted by her legitimate pastors. The reign of Martin V., which, though he often had to leave Rome, promised an æra of tranquillity for the Holy City, was succeeded by that of the great Eugene IV. Out of the sixteen years of his reign, nearly ten were passed in wandering from place to place, and we are astounded when we read of all that he did and suffered for the Church during that eventful time, including the suspension of one General Council which had degenerated into schism and heresy, and the solemnization of another, which, for a time at least, re-united the long-separated Orientals to the Apostolic See. Nicholas V., while he had the glory of finally extinguishing the schism of Bâle, and of stimulating the progress of letters throughout the Christian world, was also enabled to live in Rome, but his latter years, at least, were menaced by repeated seditions, and by a conspiracy (which nearly took effect) to massacre himself and the Cardinals in the very act of celebrating the Divine mysteries, so that for years he appeared but rarely in the city. During the next hundred years, from the middle of the fifteenth to the middle of the sixteenth century, the Roman See was often beset by many and powerful enemies; but its occupants, a succession of pontiffs distinguished by

very great natural and supernatural gifts, which have made them the marks for more than ordinary calumnies and obloquy, were never driven from Rome save once, when the longest and most terrible siege and sack of Rome, in 1527, drove Clement VII. (first, for seven months besieged in the Castle of S. Angelo) into an exile which lasted till the following year. Thenceforward the pontiffs remained undisturbed at Rome, and their efforts were more often directed to unite and stimulate the princes of Christendom in resistance to the Turk, or to the no less arduous task of checking the tide of heresy, than to the defence or augmentation of their temporal power. It was only the last year but one of last century that once more beheld the stricken and venerable Roman pontiff deprived of his dominions. The spoliation of the greater part of his states in 1797, and a money indemnity on a scale which reminds us of later transactions of that kind, in which France figures on the other side, was followed up by the Directory in the following year by the proclamation in Rome of the republic, "one indivisible and eternal," which, represented by a very dirty and disreputable mob, took possession of the Quirinal by an "irrevocable" decree. The eternity of this republic lasted for nineteen months. Meanwhile the Pope, eighty years of age, was torn with violence from his See, hurried from place to place, and carried at the risk of his life over the Alps, to die at Valence on the 29th of August, 1799, after a pontificate, then the longest save that of S. Peter, of twenty-four years, eight months, and two days.

The opening of this nineteenth century of the Christian *æra* finds the Holy Apostolic See vacant, and the Sacred College scattered and fugitive throughout the Italian peninsula and in Cisalpine countries; nor was it till the 1st of December, 1800, that thirty-four out of the forty-five Cardinals who then composed the Sacred College, could be assembled in conclave on the Island of S. Giorgio at Venice, then a part of the Austrian dominions. More than four months elapsed before the election of Pius VII., who, though much solicited to remain under Austrian protection, from the first declared that he would nowhere reside save in his own city, and who accordingly made his entry into Rome on the 3rd of July, and on the 24th of November of the following year took solemn possession of the See in the Lateran Basilica. Meanwhile the events of the intervening months had brought one more of the earth's mighty one's for the second time into Italy, and at the very outset of the momentous negotiations, which the Pope opened with Napoleon for the restoration of religion in France, he must clearly have foreseen the great struggle on which he would sooner or later have to enter for the liberties of the Church. Early in November, 1804, the Pope left Rome, with sore misgivings on the part of himself and of all concerned, to take his share in the humiliating solemnity of Napoleon's coronation in Paris, whence he returned only in the following May. Thenceforward the

Pope was engaged in an incessant struggle with the Emperor, who from the outset menaced him with the loss of his temporal sovereignty unless he consented to become the tool of his Continental policy. How Pius VII. was at last deported with outrage and violence, concealed for fear of the sympathy of the Italian people, the Sacred College dispersed, his ministers arrested, his very servants carried off and imprisoned, and, as we all now know, the most atrocious means adopted to force concessions which his conscience disallowed, by isolating the Pontiff from his natural councillors, intercepting his correspondence, concealing the place of his imprisonment, and even attempting to shake his reason — how this unheard-of species of coercion was varied by other arts of persuasion, and continued for five consecutive years, and how the sufferings of Christ's Vicar were at length ended by God's visible judgments on his cruel oppressor, and Pius VII. returned to his city to reign once more in peace—*these* are events almost within the memory of some among us. Pius VII. was once more obliged to leave Rome by the return of his great enemy from Elba and the events which ensued in the south of Italy; but his journey, commenced on the 22nd of March, 1815, was happily rendered unnecessary by the downfall of Murat, and on the 7th of June he re-entered Rome, soon to receive there the news of Napoleon's final reverse at Waterloo on the 18th of that month; and there, in his lately desecrated palace of the Quirinal, he was enabled to close his long and arduous pontificate of more than twenty-three years.\*

For twenty-five years the Popes, though, as of old, often harassed by sedition in the provinces and conspiracy in Rome itself, reigned supreme in the Holy City; the last exile is that of our most Holy Father, which we all remember, in 1848–49. Aware that the Revolution had made its plan to seize his sacred person, force him to abdicate the temporal power, confine him in the Lateran Palace, and even to put him to death, Pius IX. gave notice to the Sacred College that he meditated flight, to save his person from outrage and his faithful servants from certain death; and on the night of November 24th, with the aid of the Bavarian Minister and the Ambassador of France, carrying on his breast the Body of Christ in the silver pyx which had been presented to him a few days before by the Bishop of Valence as that similarly used by his great predecessor, the exiled Pius VI., our most Holy Father left the Quirinal and safely reached the Neapolitan frontier before his enemies were aware that he had fled from Rome. Fourteen days afterwards Louis

\* It was no new glory for the successor of S. Peter that he was thus enabled to revenge himself on Napoleon by according to his mother, his uncle, and two of his brothers a hospitality as splendid as it was generous; nor was it an unwonted irony of Providence, which thus early in life made a Roman citizen and Papal subject of that Third Napoleon, of whose return for these benefits we will here say—*nothing*.

Napoleon Bonaparte was elected President of the French Republic, to be one day the prime cause and author of that last spoliation of the temporal power which he lived so signally to expiate—let us trust, as some say, to repent and wish undone. The Pope's exile lasted till the 12th of April, 1850, a period of sixteen months and eighteen days. Slowly, but inexorably, from that time the enemies of the Catholic name have been once more depriving the Vicar of Christ of his temporal dominions, and when Rome itself was at length stormed and taken on the 20th of September, 1870, he entered on that captivity (from which may God speedily deliver him!) whose fourth year has now worn on to its mid way. On the whole, then, the history of the temporal power presents a likeness to that of God's dealings with man, either the individual or the aggregate, in whom the Spirit of God, ever striving with his spirit, yet never arrives at a complete ascendancy, but sways in perpetual combat to and fro in the ever doubtful issue of life or death eternal.

II. Such, in brief, have been the exiles and imprisonments of the Popes during the eleven centuries and a half of their possession of temporal sovereignty. Let us now briefly sum them up in two or three ways. If we take them first in the aggregate of time, it will appear that in the first of these centuries the Popes were repeatedly wanderers, seeking aid from the Kings of France against their Lombard and other enemies, so that at least twenty-five years were thus passed away from Rome; the next century gives a similar proportion, emphasized also with violence and bloodshed, while the "iron age" which succeeded gives a still larger proportion of time spent in exile by the Roman pontiffs; the eleventh century gives the same result. The pontificates were usually short, and that of the most distinguished Pope (S. Leo IX.) was one of constant journeying in the interests of the Church; for here I may notice that, so far as I have observed, there is no trace of any unwillingness to live in Rome on the part of the Popes till we come to the unhappy period of the Avignon exile. Thus, for instance, S. Leo IX., by birth a German, and for twenty years Bishop of Toul, in France, is recorded to have had so tender a veneration for the Holy City that he made for many years a pilgrimage thither, year by year, sometimes accompanied by several hundreds of pilgrims—a marvellous achievement in those disturbed times. These three centuries supply indeed the most disastrous pages in the history of the Popes—and yet even in these what brilliant exceptions are afforded by such pontificates as those of Gregory IV., Leo IV., Benedict III., and Gregory VII. Of the fifty-eight Popes who reigned during those ages of political and social disorder, five were canonized saints—Pascal I., Leo IV., Nicolas I., Leo IX., and Gregory VII.

In the next century, as I have said, the Popes appear to have been almost constantly absent from Rome from 1130 to 1198. During

the thirteenth again, not more than thirty-three or thirty-four years were passed at Rome, and during the fourteenth hardly as many. The fifteenth century gives about fifty years of residence at Rome; the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth an uninterrupted residence save the brief exile of Pius VI., and the present altogether (including the present obsession of the Holy Father), a total of rather less than eleven years' exile and imprisonment. Adding these figures together, we find that the aggregate absence of the Popes from their See during eleven centuries and a half of temporal sovereignty has amounted to rather less than 400 years; that is, a good deal more than one-third of their whole period.

Next, if we reduce the absences of the whole period to an average, we shall find that they represent an average period of more than thirty-five years per cent. Further, if we distribute the period of exile by average over the 125 pontiffs who were in exile during these eleven centuries and a half, it would give an average of about three years and three months' exile to each average pontificate of rather more than six and a half years; this latter average, I should remark, being notably raised by the fact that the pontificates of the three last exiled Popes are also three of the longest which the Church has seen, amounting together to more than seventy-five years—those of Pius VI., VII., and IX., of that name.\* Lastly, I remark that the 300 years from 1574 to the present time give an average of only three years and eight months' exile per century, and the same for each of the three pontiffs just named, they being the only exiles of that long period.

Next, let us attempt to distinguish this long time of exile, or absence, in the order of causation. Not all the absences of the Popes from Rome can be traced to actual violence or the immediate fear of it. The Roman pontiffs not unfrequently undertook long and arduous journeys, prompted by motives of a different order—the desire of discharging more adequately the duties of their high office, the encouragement of the good, the depression of the wicked, the vindication of the oppressed, the confirmation of the faith, the eradication of heresy and schism. Such eminently were the frequent journeys and sojournings in foreign lands of such Popes as S. Leo I., S. Stephen II. (or III.), S. Leo IX., B. Gregory X., Eugene IV., and Martin V., and in modern times of Pius VI. to Vienna, and of Pius VII. to Paris. Such also, but with a tinge of more purely political motive, the journeys of Boniface VII., Gregory VI., S. Gregory VII., and many more down to Clement VIII. Allowing, however, for such absences the utmost space of time which they can demand, and

\* Up to the present Pontificate the three longest, after S. Peter's, were those of Pius VI., twenty-four years, six months, and fourteen days; Adrian I., twenty-three years, ten months, and 17 days; and Pius VII., twenty-three years, five months, and six days. Pius IX. will have reigned twenty-eight years on the 16th of June, 1874.

allowing also for the absences of some few Popes, especially of the French pontiffs at Avignon, on motives which savour more of personal likings and interests than of the higher ones which we have named, there remains a far larger proportion of time in the history of the great spiritual dynasty of Christ's Vicars, during which they could not and did not reside in their See of Rome, than we should have thought *a priori* either likely or desirable. Of this phenomenon we have but one account to give—the providence of God chose that Peter should found his supreme and infallible throne at Rome, the then mistress of the whole known world. Three centuries elapsed, and that which at the first appeared not to be (so faint and so unrecorded is that dawn of the great day which has succeeded), remained in sole possession, and became manifest as the living and energizing heart of the great Christian body throughout the world, while the mortal and corrupt remains of the Imperial polity perished and crumbled age after age, leaving scarcely a trace behind. From out these ruins, rough-hewn at first and incomplete, shaped and fashioned "*tusione plurimâ*" by second causes so manifold and diverse as almost to defy analysis—human passions, human needs, the death throes of effete institutions, the struggles of new nations into life—emerges the temporal power of Christ's Vicars, itself in its turn the lure tempting the sensuality and the ambition of worldly men to their own loss and the detriment of the Holy Apostolic See. Then, as the mighty leaven, hidden and unseen, works, and the Spirit of God moves upon the face of the troubled waters, the stately form of Christendom, crowned and bearing aloft the Cross, walks through the centuries, faithful but yet secular, ever and anon all but shaking off the yoke of Christ, always bearing it with reluctance and with protest. Thus one sees the undying occupant of S. Peter's barque sailing down the stream of time, ever storm-tossed, yet never submerged, now barely avoiding shoal and rock, now gliding on the smooth treachery of rapids. What S. Paul says of the Apostolic College is eminently true of the Apostolic Head: "We are cast down, but we perish not." What form of suffering, nay, of degradation, has he not passed through; and yet when has the truth of God perished from his lips? If, then, we wish to give in one sentence the history and the apology of the Apostolic See, this is briefly told in the words of the same Apostle: "We have this treasure in earthen vessels, that the excellency may be of the power of God, and not of us." In the catacombs and prisons with Peter and Paul, Clement and Xystus, Alexander and Marcellinus, in peace and honour with Sylvester, and Leo, and Damasus, and Celestine, and Gregory; struggling with heresy and heretics in high places, with factions at home, and with barbarian hordes from without; borne by saints and martyrs for the love of Christ and of souls, or sometimes, alas! by unworthy mercenaries, for love of ease and pre-eminence—the treasure of God's promised aid and guidance



is handed on in never-failing succession from age to age. Regarded as one complex fact, the history of the temporal power presents rather a contrast than a parallel to merely human institutions. They rise by slow degrees, culminate and decline as by a law, but *this* power seems to baffle precedent and belie anticipation. When it should fall it rises, and *vice versâ*. It is a kind of comet in our political firmament: no one has defined its orbit, no one can describe its zenith, and no one (save the prophet Cumming) ventures to predict its apogee.

III. The first reflection that I will base on the facts on which we have dwelt is, that if we allow our minds a sufficient verge, and survey the exiles of the Popes in their entirety, it will follow that we shall in no wise allow our affliction at the present state of Rome to take the form of surprise and consternation. Bismarck and his German Empire, Napoleon III. and his "accomplished facts," Cavour and his sturdy king, dispossessed kings, eternal republics, one and indivisible, empires and kingdoms a little but not much more eternal, constitutions written and sworn to and forgotten before the ink is dry, unalterable laws which no one will obey, small tyrants at Bâle and Geneva, or greater ones at Berlin; plébiscites, petroleum, *modus vivendi*, and the star of the Napoleonic dynasty—all these things will have their little day and do their little worst, and go their way to join the long phantasmagoria of human things, washing about with the rest at the foot of the rock of Peter in ceaseless flux till time shall end. He has lived through far louder storms, and looked forth upon many a darker horizon than those of to-day. It is only the necessary egotism of our brief personal span of time which makes us ever think otherwise—a something of sense analogous to the difficulty we find in realizing in winter that it will ever be warm again, and *vice versâ*. The main second cause of all the exiles of the Popes has always been the greed of power and of conquest, and the rogues of this hour are mere pettifogging thieves compared with many of their predecessors, from Alaric and Genseric down to Napoleon I.

: Next, I would say, and as a consequence of what I have just read, let us not dream of any compromise. I think it may sometimes occur to very good Catholics that the absolute refusal of the Holy Father to admit any shadow of compromise has in it some human element—a firmness, partly of habit and of age, which his enemies would characterize by another name. For instance, it has been said that the refusal to officiate with the solemnities which become his august station savours of a certain pettiness. I believe that, first of all, the Pope is governed in this by the intimate sense of his office; that he feels that, whatever anyone else may do, he, as formally representing Christ, and as Visible Head of His Church on earth, cannot put on the sacred vestments and wear the triple crown of his unequalled sovereignty while the King of Sardinia bears sway and rules in

iniquity in the Holy City. Like Israel of old, he, too, must say, "They that led us into captivity required of us the words of song; and they that carried us away said, Sing ye to us a hymn of the songs of Sion. How shall we sing the song of the Lord in a strange land? If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand be forgotten if I make not Jerusalem the beginning of my joy." But if this were not enough, I am sure that the mere knowledge that this tyranny is but for an hour, would suffice to render this or any other form of compromise impossible to the Vicar of Christ. For next, I would consider how unbending and complete must be our certainty of the restoration of the Popes to sovereign independent sway. To attempt even to *enumerate* the restorations of the civil power of the Popes would be too long a task; it is sufficient to remember that there is hardly any imaginable contingency to which it has not been exposed, and that out of all it has emerged triumphant, and not rarely in the person of the same pontiff who had suffered its loss. If we had lived like the temporal power for twelve centuries, we should surely be surprised at nothing. As the skilled player at a scientific game at length acquires such a knowledge of all possible moves that he is never without resource, so to the Pope nothing is new, nothing quite unforeseen or without remedy. At the worst he can suffer and wait, for he never dies.

It would be amusing, were the subject another one, to see how eminently true is the adage that "history repeats itself" in regard to the vicissitudes of the temporal power. Three times, for instance, within this century have the Popes been imprisoned in their own palaces for a time. On the 2nd of February, 1808, the troops of Napoleon I. entered Rome, and planted eight pieces of artillery opposite the gates of the Quirinal Palace. Pope Pius VII. from that day refused to leave the palace while the French remained in Rome. This was intended to be for a long time, for on the 17th of May, 1810, Napoleon issued his decree by which the city was declared an Imperial and free town, and, with the whole of the Papal States, *irrevocably* united to the French Empire. The palace of the Quirinal was "irrevocably" furnished with extremely fine French furniture "*ad uso di donne e di secolari*," which was all turned out in 1814 when the Pope returned to his own again.

On the 16th of November, 1848, a furious mob of hired men, such as the one who the day before had murdered the Pope's minister, Count Rossi, on the steps of the Cancelleria, besieged the Quirinal, battering its gates, pointing artillery at the Pope's apartments, and shooting his secretary of the Latin letters, Monsignor Palma, at one of the windows. The Pope remained a prisoner there till his marvellous escape on the 24th.

On the 20th of September, 1870, the troops of the King of Sardinia entered Rome through the breach at Porta Pia, proclaimed it

irrevocably the capital of his kingdom, and the Pope retired within the walls of the Vatican till the present day. In the interval the Quirinal Palace has been once more furnished "*ad uso di donne e di secolari*," until the time shall come for the reversal of these new "irrevocable" decrees, which are at least good for trade, for I suspect the decrees will be worn out long before the chairs and tables. Nay, for ought we know, *more* eternal decrees and upholstery may be in reserve for future use.

IV. If there is then any force in induction, any inference to be legitimately drawn from the history of the past, it leads us to the conclusion that the temporal power of the Popes is not destined to final extinction. Once more, looking at the relative proportions of Papal exiles in the various ages of the Church, I think we have a distinct ground for anticipating a durable and perhaps a not tardy restoration of this power. I base this not merely on the arithmetic of the case, but much more on the consideration of cause and effect. It is true that in the history of the Papal temporal dominion we meet with many instances of emperors and princes re-erecting, defending, or consolidating the Papal throne; but the main and most lasting factors in its origin and maintenance have always been what the world calls "*circumstances*," the state and exigencies of human society, and above all, the force of the Christian idea representing the displacement or the dependence of its centre and head. If, then, it is true—as we are so often told in tones either of exultation or of despondency, according to the source from which they proceed—that our whole political and social system is in a transition state, and if the restoration of the temporal power already thrice effected in this century by statesmen who represented reaction from the avowed main drift and tendency of the age on that account, have proved abortive; if, in a word, we are on the eve of a social disorganization on a scale such as we have not seen since Europe, so to speak crystallized round the Christian idea, the past would bid us *now* "lift up our heads because our redemption is at hand," for it was under analogous conditions that the temporal power took its rise, and by common consent was esteemed necessary to the integral form of the Christian commonwealth.

If we are soon to witness irruptions of barbarians, not from the frozen North, led by Attilas and Genseric, and Totilas and Ricimers, or by Mahomets and Solymans from the fanatical East, but from the lower strata of our own society; if thrones are to be shaken and kings to become an extinct species, property esteemed a robbery, and station a crime—these are the very conditions which did but make the Pope most necessary, these the very billows which did but lift up and make more evident to society the only ark of salvation. It is not in merely political considerations that we have to seek for the causes, though we may often see in them the occasions,

which, by raising or depressing the temporal power, increased or diminished the direct action of the Papacy on human society, but rather in those interior, divinely ordained qualities of man in his social condition which underlie his whole being.

In the midst of the strange confusion in which we live, especially here in England, with principles professed by the many, which if acted out would destroy all human society; or again, with consequences happily and illogically accepted, that spring only and exclusively from principles which they scout and repudiate, it is a source of ineffable consolation to reflect on the great truth with which we of the clergy daily commence the public and united prayer of the whole Church, viz.—that “it is God who hath made us and not we ourselves,” and that, by consequence, there is in all, even in the most ignorant and depraved, *some* response to the true and the good whenever it is placed before them. I believe that revolutions and changes in all possible directions and degrees have always been, and always will be, a condition of human society in *hâc providentiâ*, but just as truly as that (whatever occurs in this way) the enormous, overwhelming majority of the human race will continue in the same physical conditions in the material order under all such changes, so also whatever mutations may be yet in store for our race, certain ideas in the moral and intellectual order will always seek and always find expression; the ideas of *father*, of *priest*, and of *king* are such. They are united in the Creator, and the creature bears them stamped upon his soul; images faint and shattered, if you will, but yet indelible. I forget of what great man it is reported that he said, “Si il n’y avait pas un Dieu il faudrait l’inventer;” may we not say, “If God had not by a Divine disposition made His vicar King as well as Father and Priest, surely *men* would have made him such.” Let those among us who began life with ideas so strangely inadequate, to say the least, on some if not on all of these conceptions, say whether, when the union of them first dawned upon them, as expressed in the Person of the Visible Head of God’s Church, there did not run through their being a thrill of that great joy which accompanies the recognition of newly-acquired truth: for my part, I profess my firm belief that there is no truth outside the cycle of Christian dogmas so likely to win the hearts of men to obedience, and consequent faith, as the doctrine that the independent sovereignty of Christ’s Vicar is, in God’s present providence, necessary to the exercise of His supreme spiritual power, and an integrating part of His office. To this, by the Will of God, he ever tended from the first, to this he has ever adhered when once it was achieved, and to this, now that for a space he is once more deprived of it, he will once more return. But when?

We are often told that the condition of human society is different now from what it ever was before. No doubt there is great truth in

the remark, but only in the sense in which it becomes somewhat of a truism. Human society is *always* changing and varying, and the fact that there are always optimists and pessimists in every age who can find reasonable grounds for their views, only proves what we knew before, that the absolute is not to be found in the history, because it is not contained within the natural verge, of humanity. We are always tending to or from some supposed good, and experience teaches us to mistrust the promise of a goal which we never reach.

Those who have the most universal and complete knowledge of history seem the least apt to invest any one period of time with attributes which belong to the ideal. If our imagination fires at the name of the "Apostolic age," we learn to temper its fervour when we read in the Epistles of S. Paul how his Corinthian converts suffered from the corruptions of the famous isthmus—and how those of Galatia, taught by inspired lips, yet made foolish shipwreck of their faith. If the "ages of faith" reveal the gorgeous triumph of the Cross when all civil society, either in love or in hate, owned and proclaimed the sway of Christ, when Pope and Emperor were as the sun and moon ruling the day of God's manifestation and the night of this world's accidents,—"*hujus sæculi caliginosa discrimina*,"—in harmony and peace, we still recall with what frequent chasms, with what cruel rents and blood-stained episodes, the fair vision is marred and blotted in almost every age. Similarly, how can we believe that we alone in this age shall be the exception to this rule.


Thus, no doubt, history will record it as an age anything but ideal. Especially it is an age in which things are not called by their right names; in which, for instance, "moral force" means often bayonets or bludgeons, as the case may be, and "public opinion" something made to order by the few who have the knack, paid for in the secret-service money of cabinets, or at so much a line in the newspaper market; but withal, there are symptoms of better things, and as the spurious coin tells of the existence of the true, we may hope that such phrases indicate the growth of a really *moral* force, and a really *public* opinion among us, though neither battalions nor barricades are on God's side at present. The unity of the Church was certainly never more widely diffused, more consciously appreciated, or more intensely realized than it is now. Of this the Pope, sovereign and independent, is the direct outcome and expression. Given then the "circumstances," which are God's, the temporal power *must* reappear in some form, and if, as I have tried to say, the institution of the Pope's temporal power is a persistent bye-law of the great economy of God, though it has never been permanently in one condition, and, like the Church itself, never has been and never will be, ideal, we may yet hope that, among the redeeming features of our times, history will have to record that when emperors and kings, and those who govern them in their name, had

agreed to let the spoiler seize Peter's patrimony and imprison the Pope, the express image of his person, these very deeds rallied to him the love of his children in all lands as it never had been rallied before; that when the general voting by ballot revealed the secrets of many hearts, the great Catholic conscience made its voice heard, and so, noiselessly, by the moral force of public opinion, the gate of Peter's prison, "that iron gate which leadeth to the city," opened "as it were, of itself," and he went forth once more *free*—Pope and King—

"—— resonante plausu  
Urbis et Orbis."

Faxit Deus!

JAMES LAIRD PATTERSON.



## CHRISTIANITY AND ULTRAMONTANISM.\*

**T**HERE are two theories respecting the modes by which Christianity is believed to have been propagated in the world. One theory is, that it has been in all times and places propagated by a corporation or caste of men, who have been the exclusive depositories of its truths, and also the exclusive expounders of them, and that the other elements of Christendom have lain outside of this—not indeed as wholly useless, but as irregular, subordinate, intrusive forces. The other theory is, that Christianity is propagated not by one particular corporation or order of men, but by the joint influence of all good elements in human nature, and in the order of the world, working together; that it is not through any one form of polity, but through all the various institutions and characteristics of Christendom, that the advance of truth and goodness has been and will be accomplished.

These two theories no doubt overlap and intertwine with each other. Perhaps no one has held either of them with absolute consistency; nor does either of them run exactly parallel with the great external sections of ecclesiastical or social life. The former theory has been held by the Ultramontane section of the Roman Catholic Church, and has been lately put forth with much vehemence by a well-known advocate of that school; and has also been supported in varying degrees amongst the more rigid English Nonconformists and Scottish Free Churchmen, as well as in the ranks of the so-called Anglo-Catholic divines of the English Church. All these have been eagerly claimed as allies by those advocates of the Ultramontane creed who maintain that

\* The accompanying paper has been sent as a slight contribution towards the completion of a discussion recently agitated in this Review. It confines itself to the historical aspect of the subject, and has avoided, as far as possible, all personal references to the several combatants who have engaged in the controversy.

"the independence and supremacy of the Christian Church cannot be denied without denying the Christian revelation." "It is," such is the allegation, "strictly relevant to bring forward Anglicans, Presbyterians, Free Kirk-men, and Nonconformists, as witnesses to the importance of spiritual independence from the civil power." To these allies might also have been added the philosophical or indifferent politicians, whether in the Liberation Society of England, the French school of Auguste Comte, or the Italian statesmen who have adopted Cavour's maxim of "a Free Church in a Free State." On the other hand, it is not less "strictly relevant" to bring forward Anglicans, Presbyterians, Lutherans, Gallicans, and Orientals, of quite another type, as witnesses to the supremacy of law, the importance of national life, and the edifying spiritual functions of the lay and secular influences of the great outside world. The founders and martyrs of the Reformed English Church; the learned and devout school of the Latitudinarian divines, from Hooker to Arnold, including the distinguished names recorded in Principal Tulloch's "History of Rational Theology in England;" the enlightened group of "Moderate" Churchmen represented by Carstairs and Robertson in the Church of Scotland in the last century, and the most eminent divines of the same Church in our own time; Luther and his immediate disciples in Germany; the illustrious chiefs of Gallicanism, whether kings, lawyers, or prelates; the general tendencies of the Oriental Church in its relations to the seat of empire, whether in Constantinople or St. Petersburg,—all testify to a state of feeling, at least as much deserving of consideration as that of those who endeavour to restrict the operations of Christianity to its purely ecclesiastical agents.

It is necessary to mention this intermingling of the two principles, in order not only to take the question out of the sphere of a mere party wrangle between two opposing Churches or factions, but also because in the controversies on this subject it has been the aim of the two extremes, but especially of the Ultramontane champions, to represent the whole of the religious world as maintaining the principle of spiritual independence, on the one side, and the whole of the "antichristian" world as maintaining the supremacy of the civil power on the other side.

It is proposed here to consider the matter from an historical point of view, and to ask first, how far in point of fact the influences of the external world have been in earlier times kept apart from the ecclesiastical corporation; and, secondly, how far such a separation, where it exists, is demanded, as has been recently alleged, by Christianity itself.

I. There are many examples in which the historical question can be put to the test. Let us take the most obvious case, that of General Councils. If there be any such thing as an exclusive possession of truth by an organized corporation in the Christian Church, it



is, or at any rate it has generally been held by its advocates to exist, in Synods or Councils. If there be any synods and councils of clergy superior to others, it must be a synod or council of Bishops. If there be any synod or council of Bishops superior to all others, it must be, one would suppose, a General Council, convened from all quarters of the Church, and demanding the obedience of all the Church. Even Presbyterians, in claiming divine authority for their own synods, would hardly refuse to acknowledge that the principle would be tested in Episcopal assemblies. Even the Ultramontane advocates of the separate authority of a single bishop maintain that "the Decrees of General Councils are undoubtedly the voice of the Holy Ghost, both because they are the organs of the active infallibility of the Church, and because they have the pledge of a special divine assistance, and that these councils are wholly independent of the civil powers, and are in their own sphere supreme." Such an independence may be desirable or undesirable. But even in this signal instance, it has not passed unchallenged by the Churches of Christendom. There is a familiar article of the Church of England (the 21st) which declares, in the somewhat antiquated, but expressive language of the sixteenth century, that "General Councils may not be called together save by the commandment and will of Princes. And when they be gathered together, forasmuch as they be an assembly of fallible men, whereof all be not governed by the Spirit and Word of God, they may err, and sometimes have erred, not only in matters of ceremony, but in things pertaining unto God." And this proposition is a fair expression of the grounds on which a large part of Christendom refuse to accept the responsibility of the hypothesis which the Ultramontane section wishes to impose upon them. Even in the Confession of the Church of Scotland (Chap. xxxi.) the same statement is made, though in a more guarded form, and thus maintains a constant protest against the Ultramontane tendency which, no doubt, that Church has largely shared.

All the Churches, at the time of the Reformation, and probably all lay historians, have maintained the principle that the clerical corporation, of which the most solemn representative is a General Council, is not supreme, and has not been held supreme—but is subject, and ought, for the benefit of the world, to be subject, to those wider powers which are represented in the national governments of the world, whether called Princes, Emperors, or Magistrates. That the ancient Œcumenical Councils were so subject, during the time when they received most undisputed homage—i.e., during the six first centuries—is undoubted. They were assembled, they were controlled, they were guided by the Imperial power; and that Imperial power, in the most eminent instance of all, the Council of Nicæa, was represented by one who was not even baptized. And even long afterwards, down to the Council of Trent itself, the interference of this external power was felt at every turn. It was not till the

last attempt at such a Council—that of the Vatican—that the control of the Civil power was openly withdrawn. And those who were present in Rome during the sittings of that assembly know that even then the influences invoked and occasionally exercised were not less powerful because indirect and secret. But what is here insisted upon is not so much the fact, as the principle involved in the fact. That principle is that the exclusive claim to the possession of spiritual and moral truth by any particular body within the Christian society is not an essential characteristic of Christianity—nay, that it has often been, and been felt to be, a serious impediment to it. It was the principle rooted in the early practice of the Church, which confided the election of its pastors first to a body of promiscuous laymen—afterwards to the Emperors and Kings. It was the principle rooted in the British Constitution, and expressed not only in the Acts of Submission and Supremacy under the Tudors, but in the Acts of *Circumspecte agatis* and *Premunire* under the Plantagenets. It was the principle maintained by Charlemagne when he decided in his capitularies what legends should or should not be said in church, what saint should or should not be worshipped. It was the principle maintained by St. Louis when he insisted, against the remonstrance of his bishops, on keeping in the hands of his own courts the decisions whether excommunications were or were not just.

In all this there was felt to be nothing degrading—nothing anti-christian. If the spiritual independence of one part of the Church was curtailed, it was only that the spiritual independence of the larger part might be preserved. It is not more injurious or impious—rather let us say it is as Christian, as Evangelical, as Apostolical, that the exclusive tendencies in the clerical profession, as in the military or the legal profession, shall be restrained and influenced by the power which, according to the general instinct of mankind, and according to the language both of the Old and New Testament, has been placed at the head of human affairs. The question was really fought and decided in the struggle over the Constitutions of Clarendon. It was alleged on the part of Becket, as on the part of many high ecclesiastics of that time, that no clerk ought to be subject to civil jurisdiction for crimes or misdemeanors. It has in our day been often pleaded on his behalf that in him was represented the cause of spiritual independence. If so, then in him the cause of spiritual independence was entirely lost. Not only in Protestant communities, but in Catholic—not only by Erastians, but by Ultramontanes and Free Churchmen, is the claim which Becket put forth universally surrendered. There is not now, in any country of Europe, any clergyman who would desire—much less claim as a right—to be exempted from the protection, or from the jurisdiction, of the law of his country, if assailed by others, or if himself accused of crimes against society. The principle of the Constitutions of Clarendon has become the law

of Europe—that is, the law of Christendom. It lies deep in human nature and in the essence of Christianity. It is the principle that in the great institutions of society there is nothing “common” or “unclean;” that the natural ordinances of the family and the state, are as truly “ordained of God” as those that are more strictly ecclesiastical; that in this sense “the Nation is greater than the Church”—that is, the Nation in the sense of a society comprehending all the diverse elements of social life is greater than the Church, in the sense of the clerical corporation which, great and beneficent as it is, comprehends only a few.

II. But it may be said that those elements of truth which the ecclesiastical corporation represents are so much more precious, that they invest it with a moral superiority to which the more general factors of human society cannot lay claim. It is possible that a time might come, or that times may have been, when this superior claim of the clergy over the whole body of society may have been manifested, or may hereafter manifest itself. If ever, and whenever, that time should arrive, then it might be worth while to reconsider our position. But looking to the experience of the past, the beneficent action of the clergy, or of “the spirituality,” is not so self-evident as to support the immense superstructure built upon it.

Taking again the case of General Councils as the most complete instance—the voice not only of Protestant theologians, but of all impartial historians bears the same testimony, that “when they be gathered together, forasmuch as they be an assembly of fallible men, whereof all be not governed by the Spirit and Word of God, they may err, and sometimes have erred, not only in matters of ceremony, but in things pertaining to God.”

There is much, no doubt, to be said in behalf of those great ecclesiastical assemblies. But when their decrees are spoken of as “undoubtedly the voice of the Holy Ghost,” and when they are described as “the organs of the active infallibility of the Church,” it may be worth while to ask what they have done, or not done, for the permanent spiritual good of mankind? The Council of Nicæa:—What is there that actually remains to us from that venerable assembly? A creed, which, however good in itself, was for the most part not composed by the Council, but merely adopted by it—which, since its adoption, has been altered, mutilated, and interpolated in points which at the time were thought essential to it, so that in no single church in Europe is it now recited as once delivered, and of which the only word of importance that was inserted by the Council was adopted as a mere party move, and was afterwards hardly ever used by Athanasius, its chief champion. The Canons of Nicæa:—Of the whole twenty, most are merely temporary; and of those which are not, some are wholly disregarded, and hardly one strictly observed. Even of the one which at first sight seems to have obtained general acceptance, that on the observance of Easter, it has been said by a

learned Roman Catholic writer that "the Gregorian Calendar cannot be observed without running counter to the whole spirit of the Nicene Council." Of the Council of Constantinople, everyone knows what was said of its strange proceedings by the Bishop who presided, Gregory Nazianzen, and of its acts nothing is now cherished except a portion of a creed which it certainly did not compose. The Council of Ephesus—there remains from its violent and discreditable conflicts only the famous word *Theotokos*, which has not been deemed worthy of acceptance in any Protestant Church. The Council of Chalcedon:—How many Christian pastors in any Church have gone to its stormy debates or its ambiguous decisions for the purpose of refreshing their spiritual life?

Or let us pass to the later Councils. The Council of the Lateran gave us its sanction of Transubstantiation and of the Albigensian Crusade, of which the first is only accepted by the Roman Communion, and that in very diverse senses, and the second is now not accepted by any. The Council of Constance:—Read in Milman's History of Latin Christianity the comparative treatment of the three Johns—the blameless John Huss burnt alive, the infamous John Petit and the infamous John XXII. with difficulty condemned, almost condoned. Or read the stern judgment of Hallam—"It will be easy to weigh the retrenchment of a few abuses against the formal sanction of an atrocious maxim." The Council of Trent:—It effected, no doubt, many useful reforms of practical abuses; but do its acts contain anything like a code of permanent and universal truth? The Council of the Vatican, the largest ever held, and the least restrained by the external world:—Its two decrees throw no new light on any single subject. Its chief declarations are either disbelieved or explained away even by many of those who profess to accept them.

And, on the other hand, how many are the good words and works in which the Councils have had no part? The Creeds:—As we have said, even the Nicene or Constantinopolitan Creed is in substance the creed not of a Council but of Eusebius and Epiphanius:—The Apostles' Creed, and, with all its merits and demerits, the Athanasian Creed, is not sanctioned by any Council at all. The Canon of Scripture:—It was not adopted, or sanctioned, or explained by any Council until the Council of Trent; and the decision of that assembly, recognizing as authorised only the received version of the Vulgate, no educated man, either Roman Catholic or Protestant, can in the present day accept. Theology:—Is there any single theological question which any Council or Synod has argued or decided with an ability equal to that of any of the great theologians, lay or clerical? The nearest approach to it are the chapters on Justification in the decrees of Trent, and on the Bible in the Westminster Confession. But how inadequate to the needs of the case, how inferior to the truly inspired utterances of individual genius!—to the enlightenment of the world by Origen, by Jerome, by Augustine, by Dante, by Hooker, by Bacon, by Thomas à Kempis,

by Bossuet, by Luther! The formation of the hymnology, or of the music, or of the liturgy, or of the morals of Christendom—all these were the works of public opinion, of general instinct, or of gifted individuals—not the work either of a general council, or of the corporate or synodical action of the clergy as such.\* It is exactly in the capacity of guiding and instructing the world that these corporate meetings have most signally failed. The spirit of the corporation has prevailed, and this has occasionally produced results of moderation, of compromise, and of local reform. But it is very rarely that this corporate action has risen to the level of the eternal and vivifying truth which commends itself to the universal conscience of mankind.

What is true of the Councils is true also of the Popes. No one would say that the occupants of the Papal Chair have been the chief intellectual or moral oracles of mankind: with the exception of Leo the Great and Gregory the Great in early times, and of Benedict XIV. in later times, there is hardly a single Pontiff who ranks with the luminaries whose writings have enlightened the Church. But it is unnecessary to refute a claim which is not maintained except with so many reservations as to deprive it of any meaning. It is enough to state the well-known fact that whilst some brilliant examples of courage, generosity, and tolerance have been placed before the world on the pontifical throne, these have been counterbalanced by an average of mediocrity and by excesses of wickedness not surpassed in any European monarchy. It is enough to ask, whether, whilst there have been many bulls giving the pontifical sanction to the pernicious doctrines of the unlawfulness of usury, and of the belief in witchcraft—there have been any repudiating those doctrines?

The general influence of the clergy on European society has, doubtless, contained elements of the purest beneficence. Guizot, Arnold, Carlyle, even Hallam in his severely judicial chapter on ecclesiastical power, acknowledge their efforts in pacific arbitration, in mitigation of war, slavery, and lawless passion. In those early times, when the clerical profession embraced the larger part of the educated classes—lawyers, architects, and authors—this is only what we should expect even more than at present. And in modern times it may be safely maintained that it contains many, not only equal in virtue, but often superior in intelligence to the corresponding classes in the laity. But this very fact makes it the more important that we should not exaggerate their just pretensions to respect. It is in their pastoral, not in their synodical capacity, by their teaching and preaching functions, not by their corporate independence, by their co-operation with the nobler elements of the lay

\* There may, of course, be occasional exceptions. One such was the establishment of the Truce of God in the eleventh century, which seems to have been the work of the Provincial Councils.

world, not by their antagonism to it, that they have contributed to the nourishment of the spiritual life of man.

In modern controversies, sometimes by the extreme Right, sometimes by the extreme Left, it has been often said, it is more often implied, that but for the independent and exclusive action of the ecclesiastical body, whether as expressed in popes, councils, convocations, general assemblies or synods, Christianity would have ceased to exist. It may be worth while briefly to enumerate the elements which go to make up the best part of Christianity, and with which none of those ecclesiastical institutions had any, or if any, only the minutest, connection.

The whole literature of Christendom—poetry, history, philosophy, hymnology, science, theology, except a few isolated fragments of the ological speculation,—is the result of agencies quite independent of Pope or Council. The whole art of Christendom, from the Catacombs to Raphael, and from Raphael to Sir Joshua Reynolds (unless we except the decision of the 7th Council in favour of the sacred Byzantine pictures), is equally spontaneous and general in its character. The whole of European legislation for at least the last 300 years has been conducted by assemblies from which the ecclesiastical element was almost absent, or at any rate not predominant. The charities and philanthropic institutions of Europe have been fostered by great lay philanthropists, by the founders of religious orders, by philosophical sovereigns, but only in exceptional cases by the decrees of Pontiffs, Councils, or ecclesiastical assemblies.

These (briefly speaking) are the "historical facts, in the face of which" (to use the words of a celebrated Roman Catholic writer of the present day) "it is most difficult logically to maintain" the theory (to use the words of another writer of the same Communion) of the identity of "Ultramontanism with Christianity as it has been held by all men in all ages, by Catholics and Protestants alike."

No doubt Ultramontanism, like Calvinism, like Pelagianism, like Methodism, like Quakerism, is one element in the development of Christianity, and has produced many fervent and zealous spirits. But to maintain that it has been held by "all Christians in all ages, Catholic and Protestant alike," is a statement as incorrect as it would be to assert the same of Calvinism, Methodism, or Pelagianism.

No doubt Ultramontanism, whether amongst Catholics or Protestants, is (in part at least) the exaggeration or distortion of an undoubted and inestimable truth. That truth is the assertion of the independence of the moral and spiritual being of man above any external force or authority; the expression of the doctrine of the Emperor Charles V. that "the conscience is an impregnable citadel,"—the doctrine of the Apostles, that "we must obey God rather than man." But this truth is obviously quite irrespective of the conflict between the civil and the spiritual jurisdictions. It is quite as easy to be guilty of unworthy submission to external authority, in the

case of the ecclesiastical, as of the civil power. It is equally necessary to obey God rather than man, whether the wrong decision come from the supreme Cæsar or the supreme Pontiff. Those who resist decrees of Councils or declarations of Popes which they do not believe, are quite as truly vindicating the spiritual liberty of the Church and the supremacy of God and of conscience as those who resist unlawful demands of tyranny or of democracy.

We repeat, therefore, that, whilst conceding to Ultramontaniam, whether Protestant or Catholic, its place amongst the various elements which have contributed to the formation of Christendom as it now exists, we entirely decline the alternative claimed by one party in a recent dispute, and not sufficiently repudiated by the other—that "Ultramontaniam is identical with Christianity."

We cannot allow a name so great and so precious as Christianity to be usurped by a partial and one-sided tendency which is not even co-extensive with Roman Catholicism—which may have its merits, which has had many powerful adherents, but which cannot with truth be called, either in theory or in practice, the Christianity of the Apostolic age, or of the ancient Eastern Church, or of many of the best spirits of the Catholic Church of the Middle Ages, or of the leading principles of the Churches of the Reformation.

And if this tendency has made considerable strides in our own time, the results of this development are not such as to commend it to our homage. Most truly are those results delineated in the temperate but decisive language of a distinguished French Catholic writer, the latest historian of the Council of Trent:—"This endeavour to separate the lay element from the ecclesiastical, slowly, but constantly, pursued since the Council of Trent, this attempt to erect a barrier between those who impart and those who receive the instructions of the Church, has gradually detached the interest of the faithful from the affairs of the Church, which in the Middle Ages were the affairs of all the world. The State thus emancipates itself from the guardianship of the Church; the clergy thus become day by day, more and more, a caste apart, a state within a state, organized, more and more, on a purely ecclesiastical basis, and thus has been created the antagonism between ecclesiastical and lay society from which the world is now suffering."\*


A. P. STANLEY.

\* *Etude Historique sur le Concile de Trent*, par L. Maynier, p. 208, 209.

NOTE.—Professor Tyndall writes to us to correct a passage in his article published in the June number of this REVIEW.

Referring to Professor Tait as describing Mr. Lowe to be a man "compounded in about equal proportions of fiend and fool"—Professor Tyndall was quoting the words of an article in the *Scotsman* of April 24th. The writer of that article sets forth certain charges of Prof. Tait against Mr. Lowe, and adds, "The Professor might have taken some less circuitous, though he could not have taken a plainer, way of intimating that the late Home Secretary is compounded of about equal proportions of fiend and fool."

Professor Tyndall quoted these concluding words in his own article, and wishes to say that "they must be understood as the compendium of the *Scotsman*, and not as the *verbatim* utterance of Professor Tait."—*Editor of CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.*



## THE ETHICAL TEACHING OF CHRIST.

IT is a fact which is beginning to be widely felt, and which has from various quarters of late been fearlessly acknowledged, that the most startling inconsistencies between thought and speech and practice prevail with regard to the Ethical Teaching of Christ. I do not allude merely to the state of opinion and feeling among nominal Christians, or among those who, while they accept the creed in which they have been brought up, and in which they find much to admire and love, at the same time do not recognize any call to entire conformity with it. But even sincere Christians, whose hearts and lives may perhaps be such as Christ would have them be, rarely face the question with all its difficulties, and satisfy themselves upon it, whether they are living in that obedience to His rule, which He insisted upon so emphatically as necessary to true discipleship. But I do not now propose to inquire whether modern Christians are indeed christian in their daily behaviour, or to endeavour to remove the difficulties which may confront the believer in attempting to conform his life to Christ's Rule in the present age. There is another nearly allied question. A judgment is often passed upon Christ's Moral Doctrine which is correlative to the inconsistency of professed Christians. His teaching is asserted to be impracticable, contradictory to Economic Science, deficient, one-sided. And though such an opinion of it may not be inconsistent with considerable enthusiasm for the beauty of His individual character, it is utterly with the claims which Christians make for Him. And moreover the



interesting problem remains untouched by these assertions—how to account for the vast influence upon human life which Christ's teaching is admitted to have had.

My purpose in this paper is to endeavour to characterize the leading features of Christ's Ethical Teaching, and, frankly examining it in the light of the requirements of Moral and Social Science, to appreciate its value. I do not intend to deal with particular difficulties, or the opinions and language of particular writers, excepting by way of illustration, as there may be opportunity. The attack or defence of isolated points, apart from more general considerations, is little likely to lead to just results. But let us ask: Is Christ's Ethical Teaching a mere collection of detailed precepts and parables, or is there in it, though not perhaps superficially apparent, a connection of parts, a real unity, an organic life? Did it accomplish a revolution in Morality? Is it truly adapted to human nature? What is its influence upon Society?

The following remarks will contain some sort of answer to these questions. I shall *first* inquire whether there is anything in the Ethical Teaching of Christ corresponding to what, in a system reduced to scientific form, we should call a First Principle, a Law to which all other precepts are subordinate, from which they may be seen to flow; and if there is, what is its value. *Secondly*, I shall consider the relation of His teaching to Asceticism, and *thirdly*, to the Progress of Society.

## I.

We all know that nothing like methodical, systematic treatment of Morality is to be found in the Gospels. Such a mode of instruction would, indeed, have been inconsistent with one of Christ's most peculiar characteristics—namely, that His Mission was in an especial sense to the poor and unlearned; that now for the first time they were invited to share on equal terms with the learned in all the highest knowledge and action of which human beings are capable. If He had used the terms of the Schools, or had presented truth as an organized whole, and demanded close and sustained attention on the part of His hearers, He could not have moved the hearts of the People. But though not apparent in the form of delivery, it is quite possible that the substance of His teaching may be marked by unity of thought; and that it may contain some fundamental law, of which all other moral precepts are consequences—a law morally, if not logically, fundamental—enjoining some principle of action which on investigation will be found fitted to be the source of all moral conduct, though not bearing the marks, like the First Principles of those whose object is mainly philosophic do, of having been arrived at by a scientific induction.

Now, it will be generally conceded that, if Christ's teaching does contain such a First Law, it is to be found in the precept, "Love thy neighbour as thyself." But a twofold objection will be raised. It will be said, "This seems to be little more than one maxim among many, though expressed in the most general terms; and moreover it is of little practical value, for it does not appeal to any genuine human feeling."

How great its importance is, how vital its power, and how intimate is the connection between it and all else that is most distinctive in His Doctrine, will appear as we proceed. Meanwhile it is plain that Christ Himself, though He gave no appearance of system to His instruction, did regard that command as a first general law, which included all others, from which they could be logically derived. He replied to such questions as, "What is the great commandment in the Law?" "What shall I do to inherit eternal life?" by uniting some words from Deuteronomy vi. and Leviticus xix., so as to prescribe together Love to God and Love to our neighbour. Christ gave these precepts a prominence which they had not in the original passages; and—a point of the utmost importance—the word "neighbour" in Leviticus had an entirely different sense from that which Christ gave it. In Leviticus the foundation of the relationship is a common nationality, "Thou shalt not bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." Whereas with Christ it is a common humanity; as appears from the parable of the Good Samaritan, with which He answered the question, "Who is my neighbour?" Christ added on one occasion to the statement of His great Law, "on these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets." And again He said, "Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you do ye also unto them, for this is the law and the prophets." Still more to our purpose, He contrasts His own teaching with that of the ancients in a long passage of the Sermon on the Mount, on the very ground that their doctrine was one mass of prohibitions, whereas His consisted mainly of one great, positive principle. For the many "Thou shalt-not's" of the Old Law He substituted one comprehensive "Thou shalt"—Love all men with perfect purity and sincerity even as your Heavenly Father does.†

\* Matt. v. 17—48.

† There is what I must regard as an utter misconception of Christian Morality displayed in a passage of Mill's "Liberty" (pp. 28, 29, People's Edition), in which the characteristic of Christianity noticed above is absolutely inverted. "Christian Morality (so called) has all the characters of a reaction; it is, in great part, a protest against Paganism. Its ideal is negative rather than positive; passive rather than active; Innocence rather than Nobleness; Abstinence from Evil rather than energetic pursuit of Good; in its precepts (as has been well said) 'thou shalt not' predominates unduly over 'thou shalt.'" Mr. Mill does indeed guard himself, in the following paragraph, from making any such imputation against Christ's own teaching. His precepts "are irreconcilable with nothing which a comprehensive

Christ represents Love to Man as associated with, founded upon, part of, Love to God and the Love of God. "The second commandment is *like unto* the first." "Love your enemies, &c., *that ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven.*" "Be ye perfect, *as your Father which is in heaven is perfect.*" This, however, belongs to the relation of Morality to Religion, a subject which we are not now considering.

As to the contrast between His own and the Mosaic Morality, to which, as we have just seen, Christ Himself draws attention, I may further observe that it was thoroughly seized by His Apostles.

Christ's doctrine does not differ from the Moral Philosophies of Greece and Rome because of having a positive fundamental law. Scientific methods had been applied by the Greek and Roman Philosophers in their ethical investigations, and they had stated general principles and precepts. But Christ's does differ utterly from theirs in the nature of His Fundamental Law, so much so that His was the first truly *moral* system that the world had known. An ethical precept to be truly moral must be fitted for a perfectly impartial application. For that which bears the marks of impartiality will alone be universally recognized as right by the human mind; if it were not impartial, that person or class to whom it was not fair must necessarily reject it. And whether the moralist aims at constructing a scientific system merely, or appeals to the moral sense, he must look for universal recognition of his doctrine by all duly informed minds. For the Moral Faculty, if there be such a thing, and the Scientific Faculty, are alike in this, that they must be supposed to pass the same judgments wherever they are found—that is, in all sufficiently developed human beings. Truth is truth to all human minds. Hence in the First Law of any modern moralist, that there must be strict impartiality is commonly part of the assertion; as, for instance, in that of the Utilitarians, "to seek the greatest happiness of the greatest number, everybody counting for one and nobody for more than one;" or, again, in Mr. Herbert Spencer's, "Every man has freedom to do all that he wills, provided that he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man;" or Kant's, "So act that your maxim of conduct might be made Law Universal."

Christ's fundamental law—"Love thy neighbour *as thyself*"—is clearly marked by this impartiality; but the maxims of the Greek and Roman Philosophers were not. They all occupied themselves with deciding what was the Chief Good. Now it is possible they might so have defined the Chief Good that to seek it would have been a universally acceptable, and therefore moral, precept. But

morality requires." But if that were all, Christ would still be responsible for such a grievous misdirection in His followers. The fact is, that not only is Christian Morality not negative, but a negative morality is distinctly unchristian, or rather antichristian.

this was not the direction which their minds naturally took. They all placed the Chief Good in the full and harmonious development of the individual human being, or at best, of the individual State. But the circumstances of human beings and their relations to one another vary: hence they stated nothing fitted for universal acceptance. Their systems were simply ethical; they were not moral, as we now, from their English use, distinguish these two words.

But there remains another characteristic by which Christ as a moral teacher differs, not only from Moses and the Prophets, and from the Greek and Roman Philosophers, but also from the moderns. While almost all other moral teachers, whether they endeavour to construct their systems from the immediate information of the Moral Sense, or by Utilitarian considerations, or by any other method, present morality in the form of a limitation put upon self-pleasing actions—leave man free to enjoy and fulfil his natural desires and purposes, except in so far as they find it necessary to circumscribe and regulate him—Christ requires that *His* fundamental law shall be so received into the heart as to become henceforth the master-motive of the whole being. For the motives of the natural self, which other codes as well as the current maxims of the world allow as the great stimulus of human exertion and guide of life, though they control and modify them by justice to the rights and a certain amount of benevolent consideration for the feelings and wants of others, He substitutes a new mainspring of the whole life.

Now the question of course arises whether this design of Christ's is in any sort reasonable and adapted to human nature, and likely to meet with success. Many will say that it is not, that it is futile to expect men to be actuated by anything but self-interest; to enlighten that self-interest, to make it more far-seeing and patient, and to elevate and refine the self which is interested, is, they hold, the only sensible, practicable aim. Further, they object that the distinction between Love and Self-pleasing is itself illusory; that all our actions are selfish—are done for the sake of feeling pleasure or avoiding pain—that no human being ever did anything except in obedience to that which was the strongest desire of Self at the moment, and consequently that there never is, and never was, such a thing as self-sacrifice; and that the only meaning which can be attached to the distinction made between some actions as selfish and others as unselfish is, that one set are usual in human beings and others unusual, or that one set are the result of a less enlightened and more importunate desire; while all alike are, with regard to the individual who does them, a matter of self-gratification.

Nevertheless, we must assert it to be an elementary fact of our consciousness, in the face of whoever chooses to maintain the opposite, that there is a real difference of *kind* (to use that somewhat vague but expressive word, which, after introducing

some confusion into his Logic, did Mr. J. S. Mill such good service in his Utilitarianism, by covering his retreat from Benthamism) between what are commonly called self-interested and disinterested emotions or actions. Kant's distinction *does* hold that "the liking or disliking of an object desired need not precede the desire, and cannot always be regarded as the cause, but must sometimes as the effect, of the appetition." Pleasure is derived by the doer from a just or loving action, as it is from an action which solely gratifies Self. But while it does not necessarily interfere with the pleasure enjoyed in the latter case, that it should have been calculated on beforehand and consciously sought, if a man says to himself, "I will do this just or loving action because it will give me pleasure," he will get no pleasure out of it.

And there *is* a subtle bond which binds human beings to one another; it *is* possible and natural to love the humanity in human beings, "the race, the ideal of man, in each individual."\* The English word "Love" does not satisfactorily express the feeling, because we also denote by it a peculiarly partial and capricious emotion, which could not be enjoined as universally obligatory in a moral precept. But the feeling really meant—a settled principle of good-will to all men—can truly be a genuine one. And Christ says, Realize it; and not only realize it, but give it dominion over all your thoughts and actions. Whether Christ has any means of His own for putting this new law into the heart and writing it in the mind I do not here consider. But it is certain that with hundreds of thousands in every age since Christ's it has been done; that to them, in the words of St. Paul, "to live has been Christ;" and that it is through them in great measure that the general standard of morality in Christian countries has been raised.

It remains only that we should consider the connection between the other parts of Morality and the First Principle.

Love in the heart will necessarily secure the perception and observance of the ordinary, obvious rights of other men. There is little danger that these should be overlooked by one "who loves his neighbour as himself," and habitually considers his neighbour's position with his neighbour's eyes, so far as his imagination will enable him. But, further, Love will educate the conscience to a fuller recognition of rights. In the light of Love, Justice will be perfectly revealed, and will be fulfilled at its prompting. "Love worketh no ill to his neighbour, therefore Love is the fulfilling of the law." Moreover, as it is a dispassionate and impartial principle, only through a purely accidental ignorance, or through a *defective* operation of the great principle-of Love itself, can this Love seem to do harm. That which is just, is in the highest aspect best for all parties. When the Christian pursues the apparent advantage of one human being to the

\* See "*Eccle Homo*," c. xiv., on the "Enthusiasm of Humanity."

disadvantage of others, it is from a partiality in his Love, or from some mistake of judgment, which the great moral principle in its influence upon the intellect has a tendency to remove.

But this new principle not only provides for the recognition of ordinary justice, and the fuller development of our conception of justice, and also, of course, for the fulfilment of acts of ordinary benevolence; it further creates, through subduing to itself the claims and desires of the mere carnal self, three new classes of ethical maxims, which will be generally recognized as distinctive features of Christianity, and whose connection with the fundamental principle will also, I think, become manifest. First, the necessity of inward purity. In a heart over which Love reigns it is impossible that, for instance, an unchaste thought should dwell, which degrades into a chattel the human being which is its object. This dispassionate Love seeks and clings to the human being because it has a human soul. Unchaste passion thinks of the same being in a connection where the soul is bruised and sinned against. The two states of mind are contradictory to, and exclusive of, one another. Hence the struggles of the Christian soul against unchaste imaginations. This is, I believe, a more fundamental ground for the necessity of inward purity than the prudential one, good in its way, that purity of heart is necessary in order to secure uniform purity of conduct.

Again, non-resentment. That in Christ's precepts enjoining non-resistance which is inapplicable to the present time, seems to me fully explained by the position of the disciples whom he was addressing as the missionaries of a new religion in a world of persecutors; and much is still not inapplicable. Non-resentment, however, is the ground of non-resistance, and is also more frequently and widely taught. Consider, for instance, the passage, "Take heed to yourselves; if thy brother trespass against thee, *rebuke him*; and *if he repent*, forgive him. And if he trespass against thee seven times in a day, and seven times in a day *turn again to thee, saying, I repent*; thou shalt forgive him." The maintenance of one's own rights is here allowed for, but an inexhaustible forgivingness and freedom from resentment is inculcated. Resentment, no doubt, discharges a useful function in the lower stages of humanity; guards rights unprotected as yet by law, and creates a necessity for law. But Christ was beginning a new era; and to men who have reached a high general moral state, whose consciences have been enlightened through His teaching, or even, perhaps, through the progress of civilization solely, resentment can no longer appear commendable, or even allowable. Even when maintaining their own rights by physical force they would desire to be conscious only of Justice as their motive, and to be actuated by an anxiety for the general security of society rather than their own. Resentment is not even allied to any noble quality. It

is felt by the cowardly as much as by the courageous. It is a mere physical instinct prompting the quick return of an injury, and is entirely distinct from a reasoning, deliberate facing of danger.

Lastly, all property, whether in health, strength, good parts, leisure, or material wealth, is to be regarded as a trust. So-called Christian England, especially its Christian upper and middle classes, have managed most successfully to forget this very distinctive feature of their Master's teaching. "A man's right to do what he likes with his own" is more confidently asserted and believed in, and pushed to all its consequences, than almost any other axiom. Yet nothing can be more plain than that Christ's fundamental maxim, "Love thy neighbour as thyself," requires that in all use of property the effects of such use upon others should be considered; and nothing is more certain from His own parables and other utterances than that He Himself intended the idea of property to be swallowed up in that of stewardship, and all personal ambitions to be laid aside—those ambitions only remaining in which individual effort is identified with the progress of the common weal, or, to speak more largely and inclusively, with the advance of His kingdom.

For instance, the Christian landowner, who has really adopted into his heart his Master's principle, will, through it alone, be led to acknowledge what the progress of moral and economic science is gradually forcing into recognition, with regard to his class of property at least, that he has no right to extend deer parks and game preserves, diminishing thus the food supply of the community and the employment and housing for labourers, or to close coal mines, or to seclude beautiful scenery, at pleasure. Again, the really Christian capitalist must deem it his first concern not to amass wealth, but so to employ his capital as to avoid and overcome the many great evils in our present highly developed industry: such as the irregular demand for and occasional over-supply of labour, unsound speculations leading to commercial panics with all their attendant evils, wholesale adulterations, injuries to the health of work-people. In each case, for the satisfaction of "doing what one likes with one's own" must be substituted the satisfaction of beneficently exercising the power of which one finds oneself possessed, of uprightly fulfilling a trust for the good of all.

## II.

In establishing the new principle of Love in the heart of a man, and giving it dominion over his natural self, it is inevitable that some struggles and some pain should be caused. "Whosoever," says Christ, "denieth not himself and taketh up his cross and followeth after me, he cannot be my disciple." Hence to "crucify the old man with his affections and lusts" becomes the Christian's business, in order that,

to use the words of *In Memoriam*, though with a partly different meaning,

“ We may rise on stepping stones  
Of our dead selves to higher things.”

But nowhere in the New Testament is either pain or the suppression of any natural human desire or function, either of mind or body, regarded as good in itself. This is Asceticism's misrepresentation of Christianity. To endeavour to discover the true use of every function, both of mind and body, as it is in the Divine idea, and to realize this, is the bent given by a pure Christianity. When some member has become hopelessly entangled with and corrupted by sin, Christian prudence does, indeed, counsel unrelenting amputation. And, again, there is another case when suppression may be necessary. Some persons receive a call through Providence, through their own characters, through a voice of the Spirit, to do some special kind of work, and they may perceive that, in order to do it efficiently, they must deny themselves things which would otherwise be lawful. Yet such will approach most nearly to the “sweet reasonableness” of Christ, if they frankly recognize that their own circumstances are exceptional, and try to look in a kindly, large-hearted way on others differently situated. A due consideration of these two cases will, I believe, sufficiently explain the purport of those sayings and precepts of Christ which appear harsh and exaggerated. They urge that, on one of the two grounds I have stated, this or that natural good shall be surrendered in favour of the enthronement of God's will in the heart. They came home as test-questions which forced men to be sincere with themselves, to assure themselves whether they had really mastered that new principle, which by becoming his disciples they professed to have adopted for the law of their being. Generally it is quite plain from the context that they were proposed with this definite object, in such a way as to suit the spiritual state of particular men or the general circumstances of His disciples in that age. Other questions, essentially the same, might often with advantage be proposed to men of the present time as a test of their Christianity.

### III.

So far I have spoken of Christ's Ethical Teaching solely in its relation to the individual; we have still to consider its relation to the progress of human Society.

The majority of earnest Christians think, perhaps, but slightly of human progress. They relegate to an age altogether disconnected with the present, and to some unknown and far-distant region, the prospect of happiness and perfectness for the race as well as for the individual. But indeed it should be remembered that the feeling of mankind at large is similar to that of the ordinary sincere Christian.



**Most men, notwithstanding the enormous changes, and on the whole improvement, in the condition of human society which history records, and with which they are well acquainted, evidently experience the greatest difficulty in conceiving the possibility of further change; and even as to the past, in imagining the difference in average human character which must have corresponded to such differences in the social state. It must however be admitted that there are passages in the Bible which seem to encourage this tone of contempt for the present world.**

On the other hand, there are words of Christ in which the gradual and continued spread of His kingdom is distinctly contemplated; and there are prophecies of Holy Scripture which, like those of Social Philosophy, picture a happy future for the human race upon Earth. These prophetic passages are not inconsistent with, they may even be said to agree to, the doctrine of Evolution, though that doctrine does not of course appear in the Scriptures. The former set of passages alone furnish a discrepancy with this modern Theory; and that, I believe, only with the prevalent, but not with the necessary conception of it. That Evil will to the end be gradually evanescent is the belief of some social philosophers; that a Divine interposition will be needed before it can be finally cast out, seems to be the teaching of Scripture. And some confirmation at least of this latter expectation may be derived from the history of the world. Notwithstanding the well-assured steps of moral and general progress made by mankind, Evil seems to boil up with undiminished fury at point after point of Humanity's onward road. Does not this fact lend colour to the supposition that there may be some last desperate struggle before the Reign of Righteousness can be completely established?

Moreover it is more than doubtful whether we are at all *happier* than our remote forefathers were under far less advantageous conditions. For a heightening of human sensitiveness seems fully to keep pace with the diminution of ills, and the increase of capacities and cravings with the accumulation of mental and material objects of gratification. We are like men travelling towards the highest peak in a mountainous district, who as they look back see that they have traversed many leagues already, but as they look forward find, time after time, that what they have taken to be the summit has concealed higher points beyond. So there can be no question as to the progress already achieved by mankind; but each successive step serves only to reveal more steps yet to be taken. For such reasons as these, Comte, if I remember right, speaks with some contempt of the phrase "human perfectibility," except as meaning "possibility of indefinite progress." At least they lead us to conjecture that, if happiness is ever to be man's lot on earth, some discontinuity in the laws of Social Dynamics which we at present observe must occur.

However it behoves both the Christian and the Philosopher to be cautious in their speculations with regard to the future, even though the former may fancy that he has rightly apprehended the law of God's unfolding dispensations, and the latter that he has seized and firmly grasped the main chain of causation.

Laying aside the question, what are the definite views as to the future of the human race expressed in the Scriptures, let us inquire what are the actual social tendencies arising out of the characteristics of the Christian Creed. It will be generally admitted that Europe is largely indebted to Christian influence for the progress of the past eighteen centuries; yet if we look at the opinions and actions of consistent Christians in any one age, Christianity might appear to have a purely Conservative influence, and seem to promote acquiescence sometimes even in manifestly vicious institutions. Accordingly we have a twofold charge against Christian Ethics. On the one hand Mr. Fitzjames Stephen tells us, that if men took "the philanthropic passages of the four Gospels as the sole, exclusive, and complete guide of their lives, they would in sober earnest turn the world upside down. They would be a set of passionate Communists, breaking down every approved maxim of conduct and every human institution. In one word, if Christianity really is what much of the language which we often hear used implies, it is false and mischievous."\* On the other, Mr. J. S. Mill says, in the passage to which I have already alluded in a note, "It is essentially a doctrine of passive obedience; it inculcates submission to all authorities found established; who indeed are not to be actively obeyed when they command what religion forbids, but who are not to be resisted, far less rebelled against, for any amount of wrong to ourselves. And while, in the morality of the best Pagan nations, duty to the state holds even a disproportionate place, infringing on the just liberty of the individual; in purely Christian Ethics, that grand department of duty is scarcely noticed or acknowledged."

The conciliation of these opposite appearances furnished by an appreciative view of Christianity from within is, I believe, that Christianity stimulates progressive, most radical, and comprehensive social change, while at the same time, through another of its characteristics, security is provided that such changes shall be made with the minimum of distress and disturbance, and not till the fulness of time for each step has come.

I do not desire to ignore or underrate in the least degree the other forces through which human progress has been forced on, nor do I intend to inquire what actual share in the result Christianity can claim. But looking at Christ's Ethical Teaching merely as it is, I am convinced that all true human progress already realized, and the farthest-reaching anticipations of change, are really contained in it; that "no dream of civil reorganization can go beyond the life which

\* See "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity," by J. Fitzjames Stephen.

would follow naturally from the acceptance of the Gospel which we are charged to proclaim ;" \* while it would supply that, without which all such schemes are illusory.

Let us take the boldest scheme of all, that of extreme Communism, with its noble programme of a state of society in which "every man is to work according to his capabilities and to receive according to his needs." If Christ's new law, with its deduction that all property, whether in natural capabilities or in material wealth, is a trust, were received into all men's hearts, we should have a social state equivalent to Communism, whether it was in form established or not ; for, as in the early days of the Church at Jerusalem, "no man would consider ought of the things which he had was his own." There is of course, according to human judgments, no near expectation or possibility of such a universal reception of the Gospel ; but we may safely assert that till the hearts of men are changed, and Love becomes their supreme law, Communism will be impracticable ; or, at any rate, would be little if at all superior to the present form of society.

But to take the more reasonable hope of the Comtists, that, through the enlightenment and high principle of the few spreading to wider and wider circles, a public conscience will be formed sufficiently strong to control individual selfishness far more than at present. What could serve more to bring this about than that many men should obey the call of Christ to an entire self-devotion for the good of others ?

Again, consider those movements which are already completed, or still advancing, of political and social emancipation. We are continually approximating to a recognition of equal civil rights in all mature human beings. Some important steps in this direction will, it can hardly be doubted, be taken in England before many more parliamentary sessions have closed, by the assimilation of the County to the Borough franchise, and by the extension of the suffrage to women. The influence of Christianity tends to bring about such emancipations by discrediting the use of superior physical force or material position to keep down weaker classes, by favouring the spread of moral and intellectual enlightenment to all, and by encouraging the habit in the well-disposed among the more fortunate classes of considering the needs of others from their point of view.

But while Christianity has in these ways encouraged this, the main direction of social improvement—namely, the continual extension to more and more of privileges at first reserved by the few ; on the other hand, it seems often to promote an indifference to such movements, nearly allied to Conservative feeling. I do not think that Christianity could ever of itself lead a man to guard jealously the exclusive privileges of his own order, or to resist the claims of a less favoured class. But it may foster a contempt for purely secular advantages, and in persons of the oppressed side an indisposition to


\* See "The Faith One and Progressive." A sermon by Prof. Westcott.

press their own claims, which in minds of a certain intellectual bent may serve to form and strengthen even a false and injurious Conservatism. Yet consider these feelings on their good side. Though aspirations after the Heavenly may in a narrow intellect be unaccompanied with a perception of the sacredness of the Earthly, and may, in turning a man's interest from great social movements, seem to make him a less valuable citizen, the same religious bent in a man of larger views will take the form, not of indifference to progress, but of indifference to all which is not genuine progress. He will judge institutions chiefly by their fitness to the moral condition of the people for whom they are intended, and their power of truly elevating and regenerating their character. He will care little for extending liberty to a class when they are not in a state in which it will be true moral liberty to them. And though he may err in his estimate of their state, and be inclined to prolong too much the period of tutelage, the instinct itself is a most right and valuable one.

Again, Christ's ethics discourage self-assertion; yet the assertion of their own rights by an oppressed class, has generally been necessary before they have been granted. Nevertheless, the Christian spirit clearly discharges a useful function. The individual is prevented by it from pressing his own claims till the fit time has come for advancing those of the whole class to which he belongs. His attention is turned to deriving from his actual circumstances the spiritual culture which they are capable of imparting. Thus St. Paul, while he asserts uncompromisingly the oneness of all races of men, and so cuts away at one sweep the justification of slavery which has been advanced in ancient times, as by Aristotle, and by modern slaveholders also; at the same time writes many exhortations to slaves to fulfil faithfully the duties of their station. So also in some of the passages just alluded to, St. Paul asserts in similar terms the oneness of the sexes, in a way inconsistent with the idea of mere subordination of one to the other; and yet many of his exhortations to women were more directly applicable in an age when women held a lower position than at present, and still lower than they seem likely henceforth to do.

Thus is it that Christianity may seem at once Revolutionary and Conservative. It suggests and prepares the way for the most comprehensive change, and at the same time inculcates and produces in the minds of its adherents a patient obedience to the existing order. It works out a long slow progress, with the least possible distress and injury to character. Left to itself, it would liberate distressed classes by removing from without the artificial restraints upon them, and not by exciting them to rise and cast off the yoke. The selfishness of oppression and the violence of revolt, however the former may seem in some cases to justify the latter, are alike alien to its spirit.

V. H. STANTON.



## HEAT AND LIVING MATTER.

**W**ATER is boiling merrily over a brisk fire, when some luckless person upsets the vessel so that the heated fluid exercises its scathing influence upon an uncovered portion of the body—hand, arm, or face. Those who have seen much of the effects produced upon the human skin by such accidents, will have acquired information not unworthy of influencing their opinion on some more general problems connected with the action of heat upon living matter. Here, at all events, there is no room for doubt. Boiling water unquestionably exercises a most pernicious and rapidly destructive action upon the living matter of which we are composed. There is no need to appeal to the sufferer's sensations for this information. This, indeed, is a point of view which we may for the present dismiss. For however agonizing these sensations may be, they could only supply us with information upon a collateral point with which we are not at present concerned. Apart from such subjective effects there are objective effects. That is, we are easily able to see the changes produced by boiling water upon living matter—revealing themselves as they do by an immediately altered appearance of the skin, and by the terrible wound so quickly produced. Upon these distressing, though, unfortunately, only too familiar consequences of the action of heat upon living matter, it is not necessary for me further to dwell, I would merely have the reader so far bear them in mind that they may not be incapable of recall during the perusal of this article. The occasional revival of such impressions will perhaps prove a little instructive to those who may chance to be at all dubious as to the destructive effects of boiling water upon lower organisms.

Probably, however, some of my readers may already be possessed by the notion that the disastrous effects just referred to, are consequences following rather from the fact of the high organization of man's tissues than from any intrinsic incompatibility of nature between living matter and boiling water. The thought is natural enough and not unjustifiable. On the other hand, it will not do to attach much importance to it. Let us for a moment consider the effects produced upon an ordinary hen's egg by a brief immersion in boiling water. Here we have the 'white' composed of albumen, similar to that which enters so largely into the composition of living tissues, turned from a clear fluid into an opaque solid; and we have the 'yolk,' made up of a dense aggregation of the simplest living units, also more or less solidified. In spite of the investing calcareous shell, these very obvious and destructive effects can be produced upon this large egg or germ by an exposure for three or four minutes to the influence of boiling water. Yet the living matter in this case is so simple that it possesses next to no organization—it is so little vitalized that it can only be considered to be half alive.

The conclusion would seem, therefore, to force itself upon us that there is something intrinsically deleterious in the action of boiling water upon living matter—whether this living matter be of high or of low organization.

This subject is one of great importance in many respects, so that it may repay us to look into the evidence bearing upon it with some degree of care. It is of great practical importance, for instance, in reference to the process of disinfection by heat, where we have to do with articles of furniture or wearing apparel used by a person suffering from a contagious disease. Because, in such a case, what we ought undoubtedly to know is whether the temperature of boiling water, or even some lower temperature, suffices to kill any living particles which may act as so-called "germs of disease." This is a subject upon which there should be no room for doubt. Again, from a purely scientific point of view, the question is of equal cogency because of its bearing upon one of the most momentous problems in biological science—namely, that of the Origin of Life. It is on this latter account, more especially, that I now take up the inquiry as to the grade or degree of heat which proves destructive to different kinds of living matter.

A preliminary word of explanation, therefore, must be given concerning the bearings of this question upon the Origin of Life problem.

It is at present very generally admitted, upon the strength of well-known experiments, that living matter will appear and grow rapidly in hermetically sealed flasks containing certain fluids after the flasks and their contents have been thoroughly raised to the temperature

of boiling water for ten minutes or more. These experiments we may mentally label as series A. Other experiments, which we may similarly label series B, had also shown that a brief exposure in the moist state to a temperature considerably below the boiling point of water, is destructive to all kinds of living matter submitted to its influence. The experiments of series A, therefore, taken in conjunction with those of series B, must (if the latter results are as reliable as the former) be held to prove that living matter can originate independently, or *de novo*, through the mere productive properties of certain infusions or solutions.

If the facts are true, is it possible to stave off the conclusion? Whilst the candid reader is asking himself this question, I may further point out to him that as the previously discredited results belonging to series A are no longer denied, doubt is now only possible upon a subject hitherto supposed to be settled—namely, as to whether living matter is really killed by exposure in the moist state to a temperature of  $212^{\circ}$  F. Obviously, at such a juncture, it rested more especially with the Panspermatists, who chose still to be opponents of “spontaneous generation,” to show that this belief concerning the destructive efficacy of boiling water, upon the truth of which they had previously relied, was erroneous—seeing that the advocates of spontaneous generation had demonstrated the truth of their position with reference to experiments A. Should the Panspermatists fail to produce this evidence as to the untruthfulness of their old view, they must not expect to hear that they have the best of the argument; and still less will they be able to hold their ground if, whilst abstaining themselves from all experiments belonging to series B, their scientific opponents do make careful investigations in this direction, and arrive at the conclusion, that not only was the old opinion right as to the destructive action of boiling water, but that living matter unaccustomed to the influence of heat is killed by a brief exposure even to the much lower temperature of  $140^{\circ}$  F.

This is the present aspect of the problem, and those most interested in it may remember that knowledge would not advance in the rapid way which it does, were it not for the fact that the difficulties of one generation of men often disappear before the clearer, because more unprejudiced, vision of the next. Growing gradually more familiarized with the facts, those who come after us will be more and more influenced by them, and at the same time less warped by theoretical considerations already out of harmony with our present state of knowledge. We are now in a stage of transition. We are gradually learning to accept the doctrines of Evolution, as applicable to different departments of knowledge, though, as is so frequently the case when new doctrines are being adopted, this transition is being effected by many in a partial manner—they, unconsciously, perhaps, endeavour to make a sort of compromise, trying to retain some of their most

deeply-rooted convictions and mix them harmoniously with new views. Metallic mercury, however, will not mix with water, and there is a similar incompatibility between the explanations of the Panspermatists and our present state of knowledge in regard to the question of the Origin of Life.

It remains for me now, therefore, to trace the different steps by which we have arrived at our present knowledge concerning the destructive effects of heat upon living matter. And to do this effectually I must refer my readers to good work done near the middle of the last century by the acute and learned Abbé Spallanzani, whilst he was engaged in promulgating Panspermatist doctrines against the views of our own countryman Needham, who, in those days, steadfastly proclaimed the truth and reality of "spontaneous generation"—though the philosophical doctrines by which he was influenced caused him to limit the acceptance of the phrase to what we now understand by the term Heterogenesis.

I refer first of all to the work of Spallanzani, partly because he alone, of all those who have adopted Panspermatist views and have taken part in this controversy, has fairly and fully faced the question of the degree of heat which proves fatal to various living things, by making it the subject of direct investigation. Others who have since defended similar views (including Pasteur in France, and Huxley and Sanderson in this country) have not made the thermal death-point of living matter a special subject of investigation, and have more or less distinctly confounded the issues of this question with that of the cognate though really distinct problem, as to whether certain infusions could themselves prove mother liquids, and give independent birth to living matter. Dire confusion has thus been produced. A problem of a very simple nature has been made to appear very complex, whilst those who are able clearly to understand the real nature of the question at issue are left to marvel why the followers of Spallanzani have never ventured frankly to deal with the question of the limits of vital resistance to heat. Certainly they have displayed, to say the least, a strange sluggishness in reference to this exceedingly important problem. But apart from the fact that no Panspermatist or declared opponent of spontaneous generation, since the time of Spallanzani, has fully and directly experimented upon this subject, I am all the more induced to call the reader's attention to the Abbé's treatment of it because, with some few exceptions, his investigations were conducted in a manner which cannot be improved upon at the present day, and because his reasonings upon the subject are characterized by great sagacity and fairness—allowance being made for the actual state of knowledge in his time. The work of the learned Abbé to which I shall especially refer is entitled in the admirable French translation by Jean Senebier, "*Opuscules de Physique*,



*Animal et Végétale*," the translation itself having been published at Geneva in 1767.

Reflecting upon the import of experiments of his own that he had just recorded, in which living organisms were found in closed vessels containing infusions of certain vegetable seeds after these closed vessels had been immersed in boiling water for half, or, in some cases, nearly three-quarters of an hour, Spallanzani frankly avows (p. 48) that if the first of the new organisms had not come into being by some such independent method as that suggested by Needham, they must have appeared either because certain "germs" from which they had been derived had been able to resist the destructive influence of boiling water for nearly three-quarters of an hour, or because, after the cooling of the closed vessels, some of the organisms observed had passed from the air through certain imaginary pores of the glass. At the first glance these seemed, as he says, "*deux suppositions également impossibles, ou du moins très difficiles à concevoir.*" For very excellent reasons, not difficult for the reader to imagine, the Abbé then points out that the latter hypothesis, at all events, is entirely untenable. The question thus became one of the simplest description. If no good reason could be found in support of the seemingly improbable supposition that the experimental results referred to were to be accounted for by a survival of germs, then, as he confessed, he must admit the fact of an independent and germless origin of living things. If, on the other hand, it should appear probable that germs or reproductive particles of living things could survive the influence of such a prolonged immersion in boiling fluids, he would not feel at all bound on the strength of his previous experiments to believe in the independent origin of living matter. This simple issue was fully realized by Spallanzani, and acting in accordance with the most obvious of scientific principles, he carefully sought for fresh evidence by means of well-directed experiments, in order to guide him towards a conclusion as to whether germs of living things could or could not have resisted the action of boiling water for more than half an hour.

He approached the question in the following manner:—"Can one," he says, "find any proof sufficient to banish, or, at all events, to diminish one's natural repugance to admit that the germs of *Animalcules* of the lowest order have the power of resisting the action of boiling water? In reasoning from the germs or eggs of animals with which we are acquainted, would it be difficult for us to imagine *Animalcules* having this peculiarity? It is true that we are not acquainted with any eggs endowed with such properties. I have already considered this subject in the Ninth Chapter of my Dissertation. I there show how several kinds of eggs of insects—not to speak of eggs of birds—perish under a heat less than that of boiling water. I have shown also that the seeds of plants are destroyed

when they are exposed to the heat of boiling water, and that even those whose outer coat is of the hardest description are not thereby spared." But he goes on to say, as he had only been able hitherto to make his observations on a limited number of eggs and seeds, there was the chance that more extended observations might reveal some capable of resisting this generally destructive influence. He says he had never lost this hope, with regard to seeds more especially, since he had seen a statement by Duhamel to the effect that some grains of wheat had germinated after having been heated in a stove to a temperature above the boiling point of water.\* And as there is a considerable resemblance between seeds and eggs, Spallanzani was led to hope that something of the same alleged extraordinary capacity for resisting heat might be possessed by the eggs or germs of such organisms as make their appearance in previously boiled fluids. He was therefore stimulated to undertake fresh observations upon eggs and seeds generally, with the view, on the one hand, of ascertaining the precise temperature which proved fatal to each kind, and, on the other, of finding out whether these eggs or seeds were capable of resisting a greater degree of heat than the several animals or plants to which they belonged.

This latter part of the inquiry was rightly deemed by Spallanzani to be of great importance and capable of affording him much guidance towards the proper interpretation of his other experiments. He had already determined that the lower infusoria themselves are killed at a temperature of  $34^{\circ}$  Réaumur, or  $108\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$  F.; and now having found that such organisms would appear within closed vessels previously subjected to a temperature of  $212^{\circ}$  F., owing, as he was inclined to think, to a survival of their germs, Spallanzani was anxious to ascertain whether he could gain sufficient support for this hypothesis—that is, whether the difference in the capacity of resisting heat imagined to exist in this case between parents and germs, could be justified by the establishment of similar differences in heat-resisting capacity between other parent organisms and their germs.

In carrying out these inquiries, Spallanzani adopted the following method (p. 53):—He placed the eggs, seeds or organisms in a vessel containing cold water, into the upper strata of which was immersed the bulb of a thermometer. The water was then heated slowly, and when the thermometer indicated that the temperature had been attained, whose effect it was desired to test, the eggs, seeds, or

\* Heated in all probability in the dry state. But it is well known that seeds and desiccated animals can resist the influence of heat much better in the dried state than when they are thoroughly moistened and then heated. We are at present concerned, however, with the question of the effects of heat upon living matter under the latter conditions. I shall not dwell, therefore, upon those experiments of Spallanzani, in which he heated seeds in the midst of dry sand—since they also lie outside the boundaries of our present inquiry.

organisms were at once withdrawn and placed, under suitable conditions, in a separate vessel. The effects of different grades of heat upon the objects experimented with were thus estimated, and the temperature in successive trials was mostly made to differ from that last employed by  $5^{\circ}$  R. ( $11\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$  F.). Operating in this way, and, in the case of eggs or seeds, subsequently taking great care to place those used in the different trials, under similar conditions, alike favourable for germination or development, Spallanzani obtained the following results:—

Of Frogs' eggs only an extremely small number developed after having been simply raised to the temperature of  $131^{\circ}$  F., whilst not one developed which had been heated to  $144\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$  or upwards. Tadpoles produced from similar eggs all perished at  $111^{\circ}$ , and the same temperature likewise proved fatal to the parent Frogs from which the eggs had been derived, as well as to aquatic Salamanders and to Fish with which experiments were made.

Silk-worms' eggs, and the eggs of the Elm-moth (*Papillon de l'Orme*), developed less and less frequently when successive batches were heated to temperatures approaching  $144\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ . When they were actually submitted to this heat all perished, though the highest temperature followed by development is not recorded. Silk-worms themselves, as well as the caterpillars of the Elm-moth, were uniformly killed as soon as the water in which they were immersed attained  $108\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ .

Eggs of the common blow-fly only developed in very small numbers when raised to the temperature of  $135^{\circ}$ , whilst all perished at  $140^{\circ}$ . The larvæ developed from these eggs all died, as those of the silk-worm and elm-moth had done, as soon as the temperature of the water rose to  $108\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ . Other adult larvæ of the same species with which experiment was subsequently made perished at the same heat.

In addition, Spallanzani experimented with some aquatic organisms, though he was unable to discover and therefore to experiment with, their eggs. Thus Leeches perished at  $111^{\circ}$ , and the Nematoids known as "Vinegar Eels" at  $113^{\circ}$ . Other aquatic Worms were killed at  $111^{\circ}$ , whilst Water Fleas died at  $107^{\circ}$ .

So far, therefore, Spallanzani's results were most uniform; the different kinds of eggs were killed by mere momentary exposure to a temperature of about  $140^{\circ}$  F., whilst the animals to which they were related perished at or about  $110^{\circ}$ .

The Abbé next turned his attention to the power possessed by plants and their seeds of resisting the action of heated water. These observations were conducted in the same manner, though only the roots of the plants were immersed in the water whilst it was being heated. The plants were afterwards carefully replaced in earth. Much care was taken when the seeds were sown to keep the batches distinct from one another, and to place them as much as possible under the influence of similar conditions.

Spallanzani's first experiments were made with the seeds of the

Chick-pea, Lentil, Wheat-grass, Flax, and Clover. The water was heated slowly, and the seeds were taken out as soon as the desired temperature was attained, so that there was only a momentary exposure to the temperatures about to be cited. Of those which had been exposed to 190° F. many did not germinate, still fewer of the seeds that had been exposed to 201° produced young plants, whilst of those heated to 212° not one germinated. After the young plants (developed from seeds heated to lower temperatures) had grown for thirteen days, their capability of resisting heat was tested in the manner described, and with this result. Those whose roots had been momentarily exposed to 156° continued to live after they had been replanted, whilst those whose roots had been exposed to 167° and upwards, speedily dried up and perished, although, like the others, they had been replanted in carefully watered earth.

These were the only complete experiments made by Spallanzani with plants and their seeds; but many other kinds of seeds only, including those of the broad-bean, barley, kidney-bean, maize, vetch, spinach, beetroot, turnip, and mallow, were also exposed to the influence of heat whilst packed in dry sand. Although this method is less exact and trustworthy, and is one with which we are not now concerned, still it may be stated that only four of the numerous seeds with which experiment was made after this fashion, survived their brief exposure in the dry state to the temperature of 212°: all the others failed to germinate.

The Abbé's researches, therefore, taught him three things: (1), that eggs can endure a decidedly higher degree of heat than that proving fatal to animals of the kind from which they have been derived; (2), that an analogous difference exists between seeds and plants in respect to their capacity of withstanding the action of heat; and (3), that seeds and plants can resist higher grades of heat than eggs and animals respectively.

After calling attention to these conclusions, Spallanzani said (p. 64): "*Je suis sans doute bien éloigné de prétendre expliquer ces résultats; je sens la difficulté de l'entreprise, de sorte que j'hazarderai tout au plus quelques conjectures, en les donnant pour ce qu'elles valent, et en laissant à chacun la liberté de penser ce qu'il voudra.*" As his conjectures, however, cannot be much improved upon at the present day, I may as well call the reader's attention to them by briefly pointing out their nature.

At the first glance, the Abbé says, the superior power of resisting heat displayed by eggs and seeds as compared with animals and plants, might be supposed to be due to the latter feeling the effects of heat more rapidly, owing to their being free from those envelopes which enclose the egg or the seed. But the weight of this supposed reason soon disappears, in the case of eggs at all events. Looking to the

thinness of their investing membrane, this supposition, as Spallanzani says, "*paroit tout-à-fait peu vraisemblable, quand on pense à la facilité et à la rapidité du feu pour pénétrer une portion de matière si mince.*" He quickly dismisses, as even more improbable, the notion that the smallness of the germ or egg can act as its safeguard by rendering it less amenable to the influence of heat. Having thus cleared the ground, Spallanzani states what seems to him to be the principal reason of the difference observed. We ought to reflect, he says, upon the difference between the life of an animal in its egg stage, and its subsequent life as a developed organism. For however deficient our knowledge may be upon this subject, we may feel assured that life shows less of the characters of life in the egg than in the organism which is born from it. The life of the egg is "*très-foible*"—"sa vie est moins vie." And then Spallanzani asks, whether the fact of this life of the embryo within the egg being "so small and so feeble"—being "a life which deserves so little the name of life"—may not be the reason that eggs are able to bear the influence of heat better than the developed organisms whose life is more active and complex? He believes this to be the principal reason of the increased power of resisting heat displayed by eggs, and in support of it calls attention to the fact that many animals (as well as plants), when the rate of their vital phenomena is lowered, during winter sleep, are much better able to withstand many injurious external influences than when they are displaying to the full all the manifestations which go to make up their "life." Animals, such as frogs and salamanders, for instance, live longer after, and resist the effects of injuries better, when they have been incurred during the benumbing cold of winter rather than at periods when these organisms have been full of life and activity.

A similar difference obtains between the degree and complexity of the life of seeds as compared with that of plants, and this difference may in part similarly explain the superior power of resistance to heat shown by seeds—since here, also, amongst plants, we find that ability to withstand hurtful influences generally increases as their life becomes more sluggish. Thus Spallanzani says, "One may say that in winter plants live less fully than at other seasons, and during this period they are also much less liable to perish when they are plucked from the ground or unduly pruned, than if they had been treated in the same manner during summer."

Again, whilst a difference of the same kind may in part be cited as the cause of the less injurious effects of heat upon seeds and plants as compared with that which it exercises over eggs and animals respectively, Spallanzani points out that this difference between eggs and seeds is only in part due to the fact that the outer coats of most seeds are much harder than those of eggs, since the envelopes of some seeds which are only killed at a temperature near 212° are

not harder than the shell of an egg which is nevertheless killed at the much lower temperature of  $140^{\circ}$  F. The difference is explicable rather, according to Spallanzani, by the fact that the fluids contained within the egg are so much more abundant than those within the seed. In cases of short exposure to heat the animal embryo is thus more easily killed than the vegetal embryo, because its greater moisture causes it rapidly to experience the full effect of the heat, which the seed may possibly escape.\*

Now then for the application of the facts, towards the interpretation of Spallanzani's other experiments in which the lowest organisms appeared in closed flasks whose contents had been exposed to the temperature of boiling water for half an hour. Certainly the germs of such animalcules could not be supposed to have survived such an ordeal if they are to be compared with the eggs of animals whose death has been seen to be brought about by momentary exposure to a temperature far short of the boiling point. The supposition would, however, seem more possible if, instead of comparing these germs with the eggs of animals, one regarded them as belonging to the same category as the seeds of plants. Spallanzani frankly admits that the germs would seem to be more allied to eggs than to seeds, though he attempts to bridge the gap by saying that certain eggs are known (to which these germs may be allied), in some respects resembling seeds. Such eggs,—“become dry, are preserved in this state, and then develop like seeds after they have been placed in some damp medium.” “Why, then,” he adds, “may not the germs of the lowest kind of animalcules be possessed of a similar nature?” He next (pp. 69–73) adduces the various considerations which led him to consider this view as more and more probable, though none of them would be regarded as very relevant by physiologists of the present day. The space at my disposal will not permit of my following him into these details—the reader curious on this subject must therefore consult Spallanzani's work for himself.

The position of things about a century ago therefore was this. Not a single living thing, egg, or seed, had been shown to be able to resist, when in the moist state, an exposure to boiling water for a single moment. All naturally moist forms of living matter with which experiment had been made, had been shown to be killed by a

\* Spallanzani's argument thus naturally suggests the notion that many of the seeds with which he experimented required a high temperature to kill them, merely on account of their dryness. If the seeds had been well soaked in cold water beforehand, so as to have thoroughly moistened them, might they not have been killed at a much lower temperature—that is, only a little, if at all, above  $140^{\circ}$  F., or the temperature which proved destructive to the more moist animal germs? Facts which will be subsequently mentioned, since ascertained by Max Schultze and Kühne, would seem to render this very probable, and compel us to regard Spallanzani's experiments with seeds as needing repetition with the modification above suggested. The plants also, like the animals, should have been wholly, instead of partially, immersed in the heated water.

much lower heat—that is, at a temperature of about 140° F. or less. And in order to account for the appearance of the lowest animalcules in previously boiled fluids, Spallanzani assumed (1) that these unknown germs were of the nature of seeds rather than eggs—seeing that they were capable (as he supposed) of undergoing desiccation with impunity, and that this dryness conferred upon them the greater power of resisting heat which characterized seeds. Nay, further (2), although no seeds could be shown to be able to resist the influence of boiling water, Spallanzani assumed that these unknown seed-like germs might be able to do so. Thus alone was he able to continue in the Panspermatic faith—on the strength of these assumptions only, could he refuse assent to the probability of a germless origin of living matter, more or less after the fashion suggested by Needham and others. It will, therefore, be interesting for us now to consider how far the progress of science tends to confirm or reverse Spallanzani's assumptions.

Although it is doubtless true that the superior dryness of seeds does enable them to resist the influence of heat longer than moist eggs are able to do, and therefore also enables them apparently to resist for a brief period a temperature notably higher than would have proved fatal to them had they been in a moist state—it is altogether another question when we have to decide whether moist Bacteria or their germs are endowed with this seed-like property of developing after desiccation. To maintain his position, Spallanzani was compelled to assume that they did possess this potentiality. Modern science, however, on the basis of experiment, now declares that they have no such property. We are told most unreservedly by Professor Burdon Sanderson,\* not only that “the germinal particles of microzymes [Bacteria] are rendered inactive by thorough drying without the application of heat”—that is, by mere exposure to air for two or three days at a temperature of 104° F.—but also that, “fully-formed Bacteria are deprived of their power of further development by thorough desiccation.” Thus is the most important assumption made by Spallanzani swept away, and with it all the strength that his position may have appeared to possess. Neither he, nor any of his followers, can hope to save their germs from the full action of heat by assuming the pre-existence of a protective desiccation, when they are told on the unquestionable authority of Professor Sanderson, that such desiccation would be in itself destructive to them.

We are left, therefore, now face to face with only one other question. Has the progress of science, it may be asked, since the time of Spallanzani, in any way tended to strengthen the possibility that Bacteria germs or any forms of living matter in the moist state can resist the destructive action of boiling water, even for two or three minutes? And to this question a negative answer may be unreservedly

\* “Thirteenth Report of the Medical Officer of the Privy Council,” p. 61.

given, since the progress of science has shown, on the contrary, that such a supposition becomes more and more improbable in the light of all uncomplicated investigations bearing on the subject. To these results of modern research I must now call the reader's attention.

In the first place the specific question with which we are more immediately concerned, as to the thermal death-point of Bacteria and their germs, has itself been answered by most decisive experiments. As the writer has elsewhere already shown,\* all direct experimentation on this subject leads to the conclusion that Bacteria and their germs, whether visible or invisible, are killed by a brief exposure to a heat of  $140^{\circ}$  F. in the moist state. Thus Dr. Sanderson's experiments having proved that the germs of these organisms are, as regards their ability to withstand desiccation, related to eggs rather than to seeds, the writer's own experiments tend to strengthen this resemblance by showing that these naturally-moist Bacteria germs also (like the eggs with which Spallanzani experimented) are invariably killed at a temperature of about  $140^{\circ}$  F.

Although, therefore, my experiments are not favourable to Spallanzani's assumptions, they are entirely in accordance with his experiments. The thermal death-point ascertained by him for the eggs of Insects and of Batrachia agrees almost exactly with that which I have established for Bacteria germs, although at the time my own experiments were made I was unaware of these particular results obtained by Spallanzani.

Is there then anything in this fact concerning Bacteria and their germs at all at variance with what we might have been led to expect from our knowledge about the capacity for resisting heat shown by other kinds of living matter. Here again a negative answer may be unreservedly given. The grounds for this opinion must, however, be set forth, and in dealing with this important question I will range what I have to say under the following heads :—(1.) The results obtained by many other investigators working quite independently of one another (and in many cases also without distinct reference to the Origin of Life question) all go to show that different kinds of living matter are killed when in the moist state at or below the temperature of  $140^{\circ}$  F. (2.) The only known exceptions to this rule are cases of a special kind differing altogether from those with which we are at present concerned. (3.) Our knowledge concerning the thermal death-point of different kinds of Living Matter is remarkably harmonious, and is in accordance, therefore, with what we know about its fundamental unity in other respects. (4.) The assumptions entertained by some in support of their notion that living protoplasm unaccustomed to the influence of heat is able to resist the destructive action of boiling water, are of the most frivolous nature—alike unsupported by experiment and contradicted by all ordinary experience.

\* "Proceedings of Royal Society," 1873, No. 143, p. 224, and No. 145, p. 325.



(1.) Liëbig proved that sugar yeast (*Torula cerevisiæ*) entirely lost its power of growth and germination at 140° F. It has been ascertained by Tarnowski, after numerous experiments conducted, as Sachs says,\* "with all possible precautions," that spores of *Penicillium* and other common fungi, also most closely related by nature to Bacteria, "entirely lost their power of germinating when heated in their own nourishing fluids" to a temperature of 131° F. Again, it has been ascertained by Dr. Timothy Lewis† that the germs of tape-worms are invariably killed at the temperature of 131°, whilst Professor Mantegazza has shown that the male reproductive particles of frogs are killed by exposure to the same heat. So far, therefore, concerning germs, in addition to what I have already mentioned about Spallanzani's observations upon the eggs of Insects and Batrachia. Turning now to adult organisms of different kinds or to their elemental parts, the following facts may be cited. Pouchet ‡ found that all kinds of Ciliated Infusoria were certainly killed at 131° F., and whilst confirming this observation the writer found that a brief exposure to this temperature always sufficed to kill Amœbæ, Monads, Euglenæ, Desmids, Rotifers, Nematoids, and other minute aquatic organisms. The writer did not try to ascertain what was the lowest temperature which would prove fatal to these organisms, though this has been done by other observers. Spallanzani, for instance, ascertained that Ciliated Infusoria, Water-Bees, Leeches, Nematoids, and other worm-like creatures, all perished at 107-113° F.; whilst Max Schultze,§ and Kühne,|| in part working over the same ground, have quite recently fixed the limits for such organisms at temperatures varying between 104° and 113° F. At these temperatures the protoplasm entering into the formation of such organisms as well as that of the tissue elements of higher animals was not only killed, it became coagulated and assumed the condition named by Kühne "heat-rigidity." Both Max Schultze and Kühne also found that the protoplasm of plant-cells with which they experimented was always similarly killed and altered by a very brief exposure to a temperature of 118½° F. as a maximum. All accurate new observations, therefore, go to prove that different kinds of living matter, whether in the form of germ or of developed organism, are killed by a brief exposure in the moist state to a temperature at or below 140° F.

(2.) So far I have been referring to the influence of heat upon living matter when it is suddenly applied to an altogether unaccustomed extent. This is the mode of operation with which we are especially

\* "Lehrbuch der Botanik," 3rd Ed., p. 626.

† "Eighth Annual Report of the Sanitary Commissioners with the Government of India," 1871, p. 139.

‡ "Nouvelles Expériences," &c., 1864, p. 38.

§ "Das Protoplasma," Leipzig, 1863, pp. 33, 46.

|| "Untersuch. ueber das Protoplasma und die Contractilität," Leipzig, 1864, pp. 46, 103.

concerned, as with the view to the interpretation of experiments on the Origin of Life question we wish to know the effects of great heat upon organisms accustomed to ordinary temperatures, whether of air or of water. On the other hand, it should be pointed out that organisms have been found living in hot springs at temperatures very considerably above those I have just been quoting; although the very highest of the temperatures, under the influence of which living things have been reported as existing in thermal springs, is still a few degrees below the boiling point of water. The various observations that have been made upon this subject have been collected and criticized with much care by Professor Jeffries Wyman,\* to whose paper I would refer the reader. The most remarkable instances of this kind, in which *Confervæ*, or allied organisms, have been met with—that is, the highest temperatures cited which are at all trustworthy—are thus summarized by Professor Wyman. “The statements we have quoted,” he says, “give satisfactory proof that different kinds of plants may live in water of various temperatures, as high as 168° F. as observed by Dr. Hooker in Sorujkund; 174° as observed by Captain Strachey in Thibet; 185° as observed by Humboldt in La Trinchéra; 199° as observed by Dr. Brewer in California; and 208° as observed by Descloizeaux in Iceland.” As we have no grounds for criticizing these observations, we are bound to look upon them, provisionally at least, as correct and taken with all due care, though it is only fair to add that both Max Schultze and Cohn appear to be not altogether satisfied with some statements of the same kind.† Such instances, if thoroughly accurate, may perhaps be taken as examples of the highest temperature which it is possible for living matter to endure, even where it has been inured to the influence of heat in the most gradual manner. The real point of view from which these facts should be regarded is, indeed, pointed out by Professor Wyman when he says: “Having become adapted through a long series of years to their surroundings, such organisms may be supposed to live under circumstances the most favourable possible for sustaining life at a high temperature. It is a well-known physiological fact, that living beings may be slowly transferred to new and widely different conditions without injury; but if the same change is suddenly made they perish. In the experiments made in our laboratories, the change of conditions is relatively violent, and therefore liable to destroy life by its suddenness.”

(3.) Omitting, therefore, the facts concerning the existence of living organisms in thermal springs, which are altogether peculiar and which lie outside the boundaries of our present inquiry, all that we know about the unaccustomed influence of high temperatures upon living things can easily be shown to be even more harmonious

\* “*American Journal of Science and Arts*,” vol. xliv., Sept., 1867.

† “*Max Schultze, Das Protoplasma*,” Leipzig, 1863, p. 67.

than it may at first glance appear. We have only to bear in mind two or three general principles in order to be able to harmonize the several experimental results arrived at with the now very generally admitted doctrine as to the oneness or generic resemblance existing between all forms of living matter. We must bear in mind, first of all, the consideration enforced by Spallanzani, that there are different grades of vitality, or, in other words, forms of living matter which exhibit more or less of the phenomena known as vital, and that of these forms those which exhibit the most active life are those which would be most easily killed by heat. Thus we should expect the latent "life" of the germ, egg, or seed to be less easily extinguished than the more subtle and, at the same time, more active life of the fully developed tissue element or organism; and we should also expect that the vegetal element or organism would, as a rule, be less readily killed than the more highly vitalized animal element or organism. These principles, based upon the consideration of relative complexity of life, are, however, subject to the influence of a disturbing cause, since we must also take into account, in the case of animals, whether we have to do with the elements of a warm-blooded or a cold-blooded organism, owing to the fact that custom or habitual conditions tend to render the more active tissue elements of warm-blooded animals better able to withstand the influence of heat than similar elements of less highly vitalized cold-blooded animals. Keeping these considerations in view, therefore, we may see by the following figures how harmonious are the facts already ascertained!

*Temperatures at which Death occurs.*

Simple aquatic organisms . . . . . are killed at 104°—113° F.  
(*Spallanzani, Max Schultz, and Kühne.*)

Tissue elements of cold-blooded animal—

Frog . . . . . " " 104°  
(*Kühne.*)

Tissue elements of warm-blooded animal—

Man . . . . . " " 111°  
(*Stricker and Kühne.*)

Tissue elements of Plants—*Urtica*, *Tradescantia*, and *Vallisneria* . . . . .

" " 116½°—118½°  
(*Max Schultz and Kühne.*)

Eggs, Fungus-spores, and Bacteria germs . . . . .

" " 122°—140°  
(*Spallanzani, Liebig, Tarnowski, and others.*)

So far as we can ascertain by really scientific methods, free from all obvious possibilities of misinterpretation, these are the temperatures which undoubtedly kill the different varieties of that common

life-stuff known as Protoplasm—the “physical basis of life,” as it has been termed by Professor Huxley. That it should present this comparative unity in its behaviour towards heat as well as to other physical agencies, is surely not in antagonism with the most generally-approved biological doctrines, of which Professor Huxley has made himself the most celebrated exponent in this country. In his own forcible language he tells us as follows :—“Beast and fowl, reptile and fish, mollusc, worm, and polype, are all composed of structural units of the same character, namely, masses of protoplasm with a nucleus . . . . What has been said of the animal world is no less true of plants. . . . Protoplasm simple or nucleated is the formal basis of all life. . . . Thus it becomes clear that all living powers are cognate, and all living forms are fundamentally of one character.”

(4.) I now turn to say a very few words concerning the general attitude and specific statements made by those who, wishing not to give in their adherence to the fact of the occurrence of “spontaneous generation,” affect to believe that Bacteria germs or other kinds of living matter can resist the influence of boiling water.

In the first place it should be said that not one of these persons has striven to justify his position by scientific evidence bearing directly upon the death-point of Bacteria and their germs, whilst several of them have glaringly attempted to make good their position in the most unscientific manner,—that is, by adducing experiments admitting of two interpretations as though they were instances only admitting of one, and then of these two possible interpretations selecting that which the experiments were not originally destined to illustrate, and which is moreover contradicted by other less equivocal evidence, as to the very existence of which those who adopt this course take care to say nothing. This is a kind of treason to Science of which I hope the future may prove less prolific than the past has been.

And if we turn now to the specific statements made by those who profess to believe that Bacteria and their germs are able to resist the influence of boiling water—we discover in the first place that all who advance such suppositions find it convenient to pass unnoticed the several series of experiments by which it has been proved, that Bacteria and their germs are uniformly killed by an exposure to 140° F. for five minutes. My opponents find it most convenient to take no notice of these experiments, though no one has as yet attempted to dispute their cogency. They prefer to talk vaguely, as though these experiments had never been made, and to rely upon various theoretical reasons whose validity they do not attempt to test experimentally. To do this, indeed, would be dangerous, because they must be aware that such suppositions as they advance, respecting the possible

survival of germs, are opposed to generally-accredited scientific doctrines, even if they have not already been specifically refuted.

The suppositions principally dwelt upon may be ranged under three categories.

(a). It is assumed by some that the mere minuteness of the germs of Bacteria may serve to protect them from that destructive influence which heat exercises upon living matter generally.\* This is an old objection entirely unsupported by facts, and those who dwell upon it may be reminded that it was unhesitatingly rejected by the former chief of their school, Spallanzani, who said, "*un raisonnement de cette sorte est absolument contraire à toutes les notions que nous avons du feu.*" They may be further reminded that the writer's own experiments absolutely meet this objection, since they are of such a nature as to refer to the death-point of invisible germs of Bacteria just as much as to the death-point of those which are visible.†

(b). Others, without definitely committing themselves to the belief that Bacteria germs can resist the destructive influence of boiling water when they are immersed in it, affect to believe that some germs may have escaped its influence by being "spurred" out of the fluid on to the sides of the glass when the process of boiling commenced. How any such germs could escape the moistening and destructive influence of the hot steam with which they would still be in contact these reasoners do not say, though some of them are cautious about openly suggesting an antecedent and protective state of extreme desiccation in the face of Dr. Sanderson's experiments proving that this would be in itself destructive. The futility of this reasoning has, however, been completely demonstrated by the fact that organisms will occur just as freely under conditions where no such objection can be alleged;—that is, when the vessel and its contents are heated by submergence in boiling water, after it has been hermetically sealed—a mode of heating that has been occasionally adopted by different experimenters since the time of Spallanzani.

(c). The third objection raised is no less remarkable, owing to its being similarly brought forward as an unsupported supposition in the face of much other evidence testifying to its nullity. When the writer's earlier experiments were first recorded, the public was authoritatively told by Professor Huxley that the results were unworthy of credence, because the fact that tons of meats and vegetables were annually preserved from putrefaction by a very similar process was in itself the strongest evidence that he had in some manner deceived

\* Some of those who rely upon this supposed reason have resorted to direct attempts to ascertain the death-point of the germs of other organisms, although their results have been, in part, vitiated by the evaporation of the drop of fluid employed, so that the organisms were subsequently exposed to the higher degrees of heat in a dry state.

† See "Proceedings of Royal Society," 1873, No. 143, p. 227.

himself. It was never suggested or thought of, therefore, at this time that such moist meats and vegetables were incapable of being heated through, even when pounds of them were aggregated together. It was, in fact, implicitly said that they could be so heated, and the facts of the preservation of the meats and vegetables was itself deemed to be the best evidence that all germs contained in their interior had been killed. Now that the writer has demonstrated to unbelievers, and when others have ascertained for themselves, that organisms are to be met with and that putrefaction will occur within almost airless and hermetically sealed flasks whose contents have been previously boiled, the tactics of these unbelievers are entirely changed. Forgetting altogether their previous objection, upon which they relied so long as they doubted the writer's facts, they now advance an interpretation of his results, which must carry with it its own stultification to the minds of those who have not entirely forgotten their previous position. The writer's methods are declared to be faulty for not freeing his infusions from all particles, however minute and however soft. The oracles now shake their heads, and talk with apparent learning about "the protective influence of lumps." Whilst heat was previously supposed to be capable of operating as a germ-killer through pots of meats and vegetables, and whilst it has been proved to act in the same way through the thick and dry envelopes of seeds, now a pea or a minute particle of cheese, even though smaller than a pin's head, is thought to exercise a "protective influence" over imaginary germs! Such puerilities may safely be left to die a natural death, though it may be as well to remind those who trust to them, that although they do not put their notions to the test of direct experiment, others have, for certain practical reasons, had occasion to do so. Dr. Timothy Lewis, who has been for some time in Calcutta carrying on, in concert with Dr. D. Cunningham, important sanitary investigations, has, amongst other things, directed his attention to the vitality of tape-worm germs in cooked meat. He proved, first, that tape-worm germs are undoubtedly killed by exposure for five minutes to a temperature of  $135^{\circ}$ — $140^{\circ}$  F.; and then with the view of ascertaining also how far they would be likely to experience such a temperature in the ordinary process of meat-cooking, he made other important observations having considerable interest for us. Dr. Lewis found that when legs of mutton had been put into the boiler almost as soon as the water, their central temperature averaged  $140^{\circ}$  F. by the time the water around them had reached the boiling point, and that after the water had boiled for five minutes, the internal temperature of the legs of mutton which had remained in the boiler had on an average reached  $170^{\circ}$ . This is a practical method of dealing with the question which those sceptical dreamers who talk of the "protective influence of lumps" would do well to imitate.

After this I may perhaps be deemed fully justified in quoting two very typical experiments for the consideration of those who stave off their belief in the occurrence of "spontaneous generation" either by relying upon insufficient reasons for doubting the influence of boiling water, or because of their following Pasteur, Cohn, and others, in supposing that certain peculiar Bacteria germs are not killed except by a brief exposure to a heat of  $227^{\circ}$  or  $230^{\circ}$  F. For even if we could grant them these limits, of what avail would the concession be towards staving off the dreaded admission of the occurrence of "spontaneous generation," in the face of such experiments as those which follow?

*Experiment I.*—A strong infusion of turnip was rendered faintly alkaline by liquor potassæ, and to this a few separate muscular fibres of a cod-fish were added. Some of this mixture was introduced into a flask of nearly two ounces capacity. Its neck was drawn out and afterwards hermetically sealed by the blow-pipe flame, whilst the fluid within was boiling. When thus closed the flask was about half full of fluid. It was then introduced into an iron digester which was gradually heated, and afterwards kept at a temperature of  $270$ — $275^{\circ}$  F., for twenty minutes, though it seems also well to point out that, if we include the time taken for the water of the digester (in which the closed flask was immersed) to attain this heat, and also again to cool down to  $230^{\circ}$  F., the flask was exposed to temperatures above  $230^{\circ}$  F. for ONE HOUR, as I myself carefully noted at the time. When withdrawn from the digester the closed flask was kept at a temperature of  $70$ — $80^{\circ}$  F. for eight weeks, and during part of this time it was exposed to the influence of direct sunlight. After it had been ascertained that the flask was free from all crack or fault, its neck was broken, in order that its contents might be examined. The reaction of the fluid was found to have become decidedly *acid*, and it had a sour though not *foetid* odour, as though a fermentative process had been taking place in the solution. The fluid was very slightly turbid, and there was a well-marked sediment consisting of reddish-brown fragments, and of a light flocculent deposit. On microscopical examination the fragments were found to be portions of altered muscular fibre, whilst the flocculent deposit was composed for the most part of granular aggregations of *Bacteria*. In the portions of fluid and of deposit which were examined, there were thousands of *Bacteria* of most diverse shapes and sizes, either separate or aggregated into flakes. There were also a large number of monilated chains, of various lengths, of a kind very frequently met with in abscesses and other situations, where pyæmia or low typhoid states of the system exist, in the human subject. There were, in addition, a large number of *Torula* corpuscles, as well as of brownish nucleated spore-like bodies, gradually increasing in size from mere specks, about  $\frac{1}{1000}$  up to  $\frac{1}{500}$  of an inch in diameter. Lastly, there was a small quantity of the mycelium of a *Fungus*, bearing

short lateral branches, most of which were capped by a sing-like body.

*Experiment II.* A strong infusion of common cress (*Lepidium sativum*), to which a few of the leaves and stalks of the plant were added, was enclosed in an hermetically sealed flask in the same way, heated in the digester at the same time (and therefore to the same temperature) and was subsequently exposed to the influence of the same conditions as I have already mentioned in connection with the last experiment. This flask, was however, opened one week later—that is at the close of the ninth week after it had been heated in the digester to 270-275° F. Before breaking the neck of the flask the inbending of the glass under the blowpipe flame showed that it was still hermetically sealed. The reaction of the fluid was found to be distinctly acid, though there was no notable odour. The fluid itself was tolerably clear and free from scum, but there was a dirty-looking flocculent sediment at the bottom of the flask, amongst the debris of the cress. On microscopical examination (with a  $\frac{1}{2}$ th "immersion" objective) much altered chlorophyll existed, either dispersed or aggregated amongst the other granular matter of the sediment, and amongst some of this three minute and delicate *Protamoebae* were seen, varying in form, and creeping with moderately rapid slug-like movements. They contained no nucleus, and presented only a few granules in their interior. In the same drop of fluid, and also in others subsequently examined, more than a dozen very active *Monads* ( $\frac{1}{1000}$ th of an inch in diameter) were seen, each provided with a long, rapidly-moving lash by which neighbouring granules were freely knocked about. There were many smaller motionless and tailless spherules of different sizes, whose body substance presented a similar appearance to that of the *Monads*—and of which they were, in all probability, earlier developmental forms. There were also several unjointed *Bacteria*, presenting most rapid progressive movements accompanied by quick axial rotations. Many *Torula* corpuscles and other *Fungus* "spores" also existed, as well as portions of a mycelial filament containing equal segments of colourless protoplasm within its thin investing membrane.

A drop of the fluid containing several of these active *Monads* was placed for about five minutes on a glass-slip in a warm water oven maintained at a temperature of 140° F. All the movements of the *Monads* ceased from this time, and they never afterwards showed any signs of life.

These experiments are two of the most remarkable selected from several others in which even higher temperatures were originally had recourse to in order to free the fluids and flasks generally from anything like a trace of living matter. Nothing that has yet been alleged by way of objection to the admission of "spontaneous generation" as an every-day fact, at all affects such experiments as these



The shortest way out of the difficulty would therefore be to doubt the facts. I can assure the reader, however, that they are as true and just as reliable as those other results obtained when working with lower temperatures, which, though strongly disbelieved in at first, are now generally recognized as trustworthy. And although these now accredited results abundantly suffice, in face of our present knowledge concerning the limits of vital resistance to heat, to establish the strongest probability of the occurrence of "spontaneous generation," yet such experiments as those which have just been recorded even still further confirm this view, since it becomes incredible that whilst all known forms of living matter with which accurate experiment has been made inevitably perish at or about  $140^{\circ}$  F., the particular examples of the same forms which appear within our sealed flasks have been able to survive a much longer exposure to  $270^{\circ}$ — $275^{\circ}$  F. If this were true, then indeed would the cultivation of Science be a vain pursuit—"uniformity," in fact, must be postulated and granted, or Science with humbled and sorrowful crest must retire from the field.

A word or two must be said in conclusion with reference to the interpretation which should be attached to such experiments as those just recorded. And this subject cannot be better introduced than by means of the following extract from the already-quoted, and valuable paper by Professor Jeffries Wyman. He says:—"There can therefore be no certainty of the existence of spontaneous generation in a given solution, until it can be shown that this has been freed of all living organisms which it contained at the beginning of the experiment and kept free of all such from without during the progress of it. On the other hand, this kind of generation becomes probable, whenever it is made certain that Infusoria are generated in solutions in which the conditions just mentioned have been complied with. We say probable, because their appearance under such circumstances would not amount to a proof. The absolute proof of spontaneous generation must come from the formation of living organisms out of *inorganic* matter. If Infusoria are generated in solutions of organic matter, independently of spores or germs, the question may be fairly raised whether we do not begin the experiment with materials in which life already exists, even though this material is not in the form of distinct organisms." Now, these last few lines as they at present stand, tend to convey to the reader very erroneous impressions, and yet I am aware that views of the same kind are very commonly expressed, and seem to exist in an inchoate or half-realised form in the minds of many distinguished persons. It is for this reason, and on account of the authority attaching to Professor Wyman's statements that I am induced to take notice of this particular passage in order to attempt its rectification.

In the first place then, under the old term, "spontaneous genera-

tion" are included two processes quite distinct from one another—namely, Heterogenesis and Archebiosis. With regard to Heterogenesis, this is merely the opposite of Homogenesis; and the latter is the name for that mode of generation or reproduction amongst living things which is looked upon with most respect and which is most generally known. It is the process by which "like produces like," that is, where the offspring grow into beings like their parents. In Heterogenesis, on the other hand, we have the birth of dissimilar products, the beginning of a new branch from a "life-tree," in which the offspring have no tendency to assume the parental type. This occurs, for instance, where the protoplasmic matter of an animal or of a vegetal cell becomes modified and resolved into Bacteria. Here we have to do with the mere transformation of living matter. It can, therefore, only take place where living matter pre-exists. And seeing that many, amongst whom I may especially mention Needham,\* Pouchet, and Trécul, have, both now and formerly, understood by the phrase "spontaneous generation," merely such a process of metamorphosis of living matter as is implied by the term Heterogenesis, it is very misleading to say that "the absolute proof of spontaneous generation must come from the formation of living organisms out of inorganic matter."


It seems obvious, however, that when Professor Wyman wrote this passage, he, forgetting the more common acceptation of the phrase "spontaneous generation," must have used it in the same sense as I now employ the term Archebiosis—in the sense that is, of life-origination. But even taking it in this sense, how far, we may ask, is Professor Wyman justified in saying that its proof "must come from the formation of living organisms out of inorganic matter"?

The statement is, in my opinion, one which cannot be logically entertained by a believer in the ordinary physical doctrines of life and consequently should be professed by no consistent believer in Evolution. Those who do not assent to these doctrines ~~would~~ probably never be able to believe in Archebiosis at all—to the 'vitalist' life is an immaterial principle specially created, and therefore our flask experiments terminating in the birth of new organisms, if they carried with them any convictions at all, would simply be regarded by him as proving the occurrence of Heterogenesis. This is the view to which a vitalist would be driven, if he had become convinced that no germs of Bacteria or of such organisms as are found in our flasks, could have survived the preliminary process of heating. Such a vague sort of position is not open, however, to those who believe in the now generally accepted physical doctrines of life. They are bound to recognize the undoubted distinction which exists between mere dead organic matter, and that organic matter which displays the phenomena of life. They should no more think of calling a

\* See "The Beginnings of Life," vol. i. pp. 246-252, and vol. ii. p. 181.

body "living" which could not be made to display the characteristics of life, than they would call a body "magnetic," when it would show none of the properties pertaining to magnetism. If they had learned, therefore, that all living matter when exposed to heat of a certain intensity became lifeless matter, the process by which new living protoplasm comes into existence amongst this dead organic material, would be, for them, as much an instance of its new independent origin, as if the process had occurred in the midst of mere inorganic elements. The term Archebiosis is therefore applicable to the process that must take place in our ordinary flask experiments where we have to do with dead organic matter, just as it is also applicable to those more primordial combinations which first gave birth to living protoplasm upon the surface of our globe. The continued occurrence of an independent elemental 'origin' of living matter we are called upon to believe in at the present day, though the actual steps of the process by which it takes place, are unfortunately as completely unknown to us as are the steps by which its 'growth' occurs, whether from organic or from inorganic materials.

H. CHARLTON BASTIAN.



## THE POEMS OF MR. MATTHEW ARNOLD.

*"The Strayed Reveller," and other Poems.* 189.

*"Empedocle on Etna," and other Poems.* 1352.

*Poems (second edition).* 1854.

*Poems (second series).* 1855.

*"Merope," a Tragedy.* 1858.

*New Poems (second edition)* 1868.

*Poems (two volumes).* Macmillan. 1869.

THROUGHOUT the course of history analysis and synthesis have been observed to advance by alternate strides, the one accumulating Science, the other erecting Art. Equally alternate in its operations must be the activity of that mind which unites the opposite powers whereof Art and Science are the outcome. To be inspired and self-restrained, fervid and sceptical, at one and the same time, is an obvious impossibility; but to pass through these phases at successive periods, to reflect in the critical mood of to-day upon the passionate mood of yesterday, is an experience sufficiently familiar. To balance these moods skilfully, however, giving both free play, without suffering either to encroach upon the other's province, and correct the estimates of the visionary faculty without chilling its enthusiasm, is perhaps among the rarest of gifts. What is easier and more common is to keep the provinces entirely distinct, by not turning the critical faculty inward, but reserving its skill to dissect the productions of others. In this narrow sense, indeed, every poet must be more or less of a critic. Involuntarily, if not consciously, he criticizes what has been already achieved, and measures his own performance thereby. Attempts, therefore, to draw a strict line of demarcation between the poetical and critical functions, and represent their antagonism as internecine, are as futile as they are unjust, and only recoil upon the mischief-makers. The poet of our time who has avowed his high contempt of criticism, in a tone that curiously

resembles the outcry of wounded irritability,† asserts himself in the same breath the most unsparing critic of his fellow-craftsmen.\* The only justification of the assumption that the two spheres are necessarily hostile, lies in a distinction which the development of intellectual action has long since deprived of significance. It may be worth while to recal and insist upon it, if the era of decadence through which other literatures have had to pass should ever befall our own, and the rules by which the poet has been critically discovered to work be adopted as substitutes for his intuition. But this danger is happily as yet remote, and meanwhile we may be confident that by those rare seers, to whom the stereoscope and the microscope are equally familiar, their several uses are not likely to be confounded.

The number of our illustrious writers who have been at the same time poets and critics is not yet large. Milton, Dryden, Pope, Wordsworth, Shelley, Byron, and Mrs. Browning, in the first rank ; Sidney, Cowley, Prior, Young, Goldsmith, Cowper, Coleridge, Landor, and Scott, in the second rank, are nearly all that can be named among the dead. Of these the majority have been critics only of their fellows, and refrained from any systematic course of self-scrutiny. Wordsworth, Shelley, Byron, and Mrs. Browning, are eminent exceptions, being all intensely self-conscious ; but the process of submitting the successive moods of their own minds to revision is comparatively rare with the three first. With Mrs. Browning it is frequent, but her thought is little more than transfigured emotion. Among living poets, Mr. Tennyson has devoted two masterpieces, "The two Voices" and "In Memoriam," to the task of critical introspection, but they reflect only a single facet of his many-sided genius. In one remarkable poem, "Christmas-eve and Easter-day," and an occasional prologue or epilogue, Mr. Browning may be supposed to make his own mind the subject of analysis, but the personal element in his writings is infinitesimal as compared with the dramatic. The poet next in order, who has carried to its fullest extent the tendency which his forerunners and contemporaries have but indicated, and made it his special distinction at once to give rein to imaginative impulse and maintain the restraint of critical supervision, is Mr. Matthew Arnold. If his poetical are less widely known than his prose writings, they have already a recognized place in modern literature. They are free from certain blemishes and mannerisms which impair the value of his essays to those who most highly esteem them. The ironic humour that therein enlivens his gravest mood, and by which he has achieved the well-nigh impossible feat of making theology an entertaining study, is the only mental trait conspicuously absent from his poetry ; but the loss is atoned for by the discovery of other merits for which those who know him only

\* "Under the Microscope." By A. C. Swinburne.

as a prose-writer would never give him credit. Such differences as exist are manifestly superficial, and do not preclude a fundamental similarity. It is reasonable to interpret one transcript of a writer's mind by another. In studying the poems we have found such acquaintance as we possess with the essays of service as an explanatory aid, and shall scarcely err in attempting to trace a continuity of thought and purpose between the two.

Twenty, or even fifteen, years ago, Mr. Arnold might have been claimed as a partizan by the Neo-Pagan school of thinkers. Not only were his poems imbued with the purest classical spirit, but the elaborate prefaces, in which he laid down the principles that had governed their composition, betrayed his hostility to current modes of thought and feeling, and indifference to the moral and spiritual forces most actively working in modern society, under phrases of vague and sweeping condemnation, suggestive of a deeper aversion and a loftier disdain than they were perhaps intended to convey. In the preface to his collected poems (1853) he gives his reasons for rejecting the theory of modern criticism and the practice of modern art as radically unsound. Far from being "exhausted," as the critic contends, the past furnishes grander subjects for the poet than can ever be found in the present; its actions are greater, its personages nobler, its situations more intense. Far from the poet's ambition being worthy who depicts the condition of his own mind in a representative history, "no great poetical work has ever been produced with such an aim." "Faust," the work "of the greatest poet of modern time," is defective as a poem on that account. The highest art is objective; its noblest aim is to depict great actions. In neglect of the principles by which the Greeks were actuated, the weakness of modern art consists. For all sound intellectual guidance, "in the confusion of the present time," we are referred to them. By the close study of their models a young writer "will deliver himself from the jargon of modern criticism, and escape the danger of producing poetical works conceived in the spirit of the passing time, and which partake of its transitoriness." But they are not guides to us in Art alone. "Their commerce with the ancients appears to me to produce in those who constantly practise it a steadying and composing effect upon their judgment, not of literary works only, but of men and events in general." Those who have addicted themselves to such studies cannot accept the critic's invitation to find subjects for art in their own age. "They are told that it is an era of progress, an age commissioned to carry out the great ideas of industrial development and social amelioration. They reply that with all this they can do nothing; that the elements they need for the exercise of their art are great actions, calculated powerfully and delightfully to affect what is permanent in the human soul; that so far as the present can supply such actions they will gladly make use of them

but that an age wanting in moral grandeur can with difficulty supply such, and an age of spiritual discomfort with difficulty be powerfully and delightfully affected by them." His own poems have been composed under this conviction. "In the sincere endeavour to learn and practise, amid the bewildered confusion of our times, what is sound and true in poetical art, I seemed to myself to find the only sure guidance, the only solid footing among the ancients." In conformity with one of their principles, that "Art is dedicated to joy," and that the representation of situations "where the sufferer finds no vent in action" defeats this end by arousing painful emotions, he excludes from the collection his poem of "Empedocles on Etna." In the preface to the second edition (1854) Mr. Arnold justifies the spirit of these observations against the comments they had provoked, by a more distinct assertion of his convictions. We are to study the classic writers of antiquity, because "they can help to cure us of what is, it seems to me, the great vice of our intellect, manifesting itself in our incredible vagaries in literature, in art, in religion, in morals, namely, that it is *fantastic*, and wants *sanity*. Sanity, that is the great virtue of the ancient literature; the want of that is the great defect of the modern, in spite of all its variety and power." In the preface to "Merope" (1858) the writer refers to his principles as unchanged, and will not waste argument on critics who demand from a poet nothing but a representation of mental suffering. The animating motives of this attempt to reproduce the forms of Greek tragedy have been "a passion for the great Masters, and an effort to study them without fancifulness."

That absorbed in these studies and impressed with these convictions, Mr. Arnold should ever have become interested in the subjective processes of modern thought, should have set himself to investigate the sources of current beliefs, and appear in the character of a theological reformer, was the last development that might have been expected for his career. The phrase, however, that he has somewhere quoted from Cicero, may be fitly applied to himself—"Nemo doctus unquam mutationem consilii inconstantiam dixit esse." His prose writings, so far as we are acquainted with them, do not enable us to trace the steps by which this change has been effected. There is a wide gap to be filled, and all we can see is that it has not been bridged over suddenly. In his "Essays in Criticism," collected in 1865, the germs of his later essays are visible. There is an anticipation of "Culture and Anarchy" in "The Function of Criticism," of "Literature and Dogma" in "Marcus Aurelius." This last essay is a confession of the limitations by which the highest ethics of antiquity are circumscribed; that on "Pagan and mediæval religious sentiment" is a repudiation of the doctrines most distasteful to Christian feeling. In their tone these essays are almost antithetical to the prefaces from which we have quoted. The reprobation, indeed, of much that modern

society cherishes in its habits of thought and practice is as stern as ever, and the wisdom of the old world is still held up for our admiration and example; but the censure and advice are no longer offered by a "spectator ab extra," an alien who disdainfully comments on a polity in which he has no concern. They proceed from one among ourselves, who is qualified to censure us by reason of his close sympathy, to advise us by reason of his superior knowledge. In place of the narrowness which would restrict poetic art to objectivity, and condemn as sterile all ages that could not offer great actions for its themes, we find an avowal of belief that "the grand power of poetry is its interpretative power: that it interprets in two ways—by expressing with magical felicity the physiognomy and movement of the outward world, and . . . expressing with inspired conviction the ideas and laws of the inward world of man's moral and spiritual nature"—a catholic yet discriminating appreciation of poetic temperaments so dissimilar as those of Shakespeare, Goethe, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley, Keats, and Maurice de Guérin. The same insight that Mr. Arnold brings to bear upon the diversities of the poetic temperament penetrates still deeper. His intimate apprehension of such characters as Marcus Aurelius, St. Francis, Spinoza, Joubert, Heine, and Eugénie de Guérin, which embrace within their range the polar and tropical regions of the human soul—moral severity and sweetness, intellectual refinement and extravagance, religious ardour and sensibility—affords a guarantee of judicial impartiality, with which the partizans of every school, theological or secular, ought to feel satisfied. Himself no longer an extremist, but anxious, as he tells us, "to try and approach Truth on one side after another, not to strive nor cry, not to persist in pressing forward on any one side with violence and self-will," he assumes, for the first time in this volume, the position of arbiter between the World and the Church, the armies of Reason and Progress on the one hand, of Faith and Conservatism on the other.

His latest and most notable efforts have proceeded still further in the direction of conciliation. In "Culture and Anarchy" (1869), he has urged the duty of cultivating the totality of human nature as a remedy for the private and public mischiefs incurred by the independent development of its several provinces,\* pointing out the special need among ourselves of retrenching the excess of "Hebraism," and supplying the deficiency of "Hellenism"—of correcting, that is, a narrow and exclusive attachment to the ethical principles and religious sentiments inherited from Moses, David, Christ, and Paul, by a broad and comprehensive grasp of the rational principles and

\* "Friendship's Garland" is the satirical complement of the serious argument put forth on this head. It denounces with playful but keen ridicule the mechanical idol-worship and lack of spontaneous intelligence which constitute our gravest national defects, and have fatally depreciated our international significance.



æsthetic ideas inherited from Plato, Aristotle, Sophocles, and Phidias. That by thus fortifying the motives and means of right-doing by the motives and means of right-thinking, there would be set up in each individual, and in the State collectively, a standard of perfection or "best self," having for its object "to make reason and the will of God prevail," is the main drift of the essay. "St. Paul and Protestantism" expands this view by showing that the "best self" of which organized Hebraism stands most in need is the "sweet reasonableness" of Christ, and by clearing away the chief misconceptions which have given rise to schism, seeks to promote harmony in the bosom of the Protestant Church. "Literature and Dogma" gives the same view its most important development by aiming a blow at the misconceptions which interpose a barrier to the reconciliation of Science and Religion. Abandoning the metaphysical abstractions and literary figments of theology as unsubstantial and unverifiable, the writer falls back upon the simplest elements of moral consciousness and experience as a verifiable basis of belief. That while for Science God may be most adequately conceived as the "stream of tendency whereby all things fulfil the law of their being," for Religion, that is, "morality heightened by emotion," He may be most adequately conceived as "the Eternal Power, not ourselves, which makes for righteousness;" that the apprehension of this by Judaism constituted its historic vitality; and that the substantial benefit conferred by Jesus was to restore and perpetuate the failing intuition of this, by means of "a method of inwardness and a secret of self-renouncement," which have surpassed other rules of conduct in ensuring what it is the aim of all to attain, spiritual peace and joy—are the leading propositions here maintained.

Reconciliation is usually the product of a late stage of mental growth. It can never be attempted with better hope of success than by one who has served under the banners of both the parties between which he seeks to mediate, and has passed from the scene of conflict without losing his sympathy with either. Alike by the associations of his birth and training, and the natural bent of his genius, Mr. Arnold is exceptionally qualified for the task which he has undertaken. From both sides he is entitled to a respectful hearing, as the son of a man whose acumen and erudition were not less esteemed among "Hellenizers," than his moral nobleness and spiritual energy were held in veneration among "Hebraizers"—veneration which he did not forfeit by the concessions he had the courage to make in the direction of rational theology. That Mr. Arnold's training under such a father was imbued with the spirit of Hebraism, might be taken for granted had he not himself referred to it.\* What his intellectual training was he sufficiently indicates by his ironic allusion to his

\* "Rugby Chapel." *Poems*, (1869), Vol. i. pp. 225-234.

"having been brought up at Oxford in the bad old times when we were stuffed with Greek and Aristotle."\* The coincidence of such influences in early life is common to so many minds, that of itself it would confer no special advantage for the work of conciliation. We infer from the study of Mr. Arnold's poems, that he has acquired this advantage by having undergone the change just described, by a transfer of allegiance from one hostile banner to the other, and retirement from the strife into neutral ground without loss of sympathy with either combatant. The order in which his mind underwent this change, however, seems to have been the converse of that which he has since recommended us to follow. These poetic records of his progress show that Hellenism was at first the paramount influence; Hebraism being temporarily in abeyance, but gradually reasserting itself after a period of sceptical transition, which terminated in the ultimate vindication by each of its due share of authority. Speaking roughly, and with due latitude in the matter of dates, we may consider the Poems of his youth and the Prefaces of 1853-4 as on the same intellectual plane; the Poems of his early manhood as filling up the gap between the Prefaces and the Essays of 1865; the Poems of his maturity as explaining and justifying the tone of wise discernment and balanced conviction that characterizes his later Essays.

The interpretation thus put upon the poems will not be clear to readers who are content to accept them in their existing arrangement, and it is therefore necessary to revert to their original form and order. It must be obvious, however, that where we are dealing with successive transcripts of moods no rigorous limitation of dates can possibly be applicable. The least experienced in mental travail know how perpetually the lines of thought traverse and intermingle, how of two ideas, the one discarded yesterday may be the one accepted to-morrow, that the glimmer of light quickly obscured by mists may be the prelude of a revelation which finally commands assent. No other excuse is needed for freely extracting from these volumes any evidence of persistence, change, anticipation, relapse, or recurrence of idea that they may record, without carefully observing the consistency of the dates involved. Reserving for distinct consideration such as are obviously miscellaneous, we may tentatively group the poems into three divisions, corresponding with the periods of one-sidedness, transition, and equilibrium above noted. Each of these groups demands separate notice.

No one has more frankly admitted than Mr. Arnold in his later essays that Hellenism has its faulty side, "a side of moral weakness and of relaxation or insensibility of the moral fibre."† Nor from his present stand-point, probably, would he hesitate to endorse Mr. Gladstone's opinion that it was based upon a "principle of the

\* *Culture and Anarchy*, p. 23.

† *Ibid.*, p. 162.

sufficiency of this our human earthly life, without any capital regard to what is before us in futurity, or what is above and around us in the unseen world." \* At a time, however, when the influence of Hellenism was paramount, no such apprehension of its deficiencies could be reasonably expected of him ; and we cannot be surprised to find them reflected in the poems then composed. "The Strayed Reveller" is a vivid presentment of the splendid dream-world which intoxication with the cup of Circean pleasure has the power of creating. How momentary the enchantment, how hideous the waking, the author of the original myth did not neglect to show ; but of that side of the picture there is no trace in Mr. Arnold's transcript. It cannot be said to be needed, because like all his poems this is intrinsically pure. For the pollutions of the old world, which, to some Neo-Pagan artists seem to constitute its chief attractions, he has never shown the faintest relish. His silence, nevertheless, must be taken to imply that he was sensible of no defect in the conception. The poem ends as it began with the passionate cry of the Reveller for a fresh draught of delirious delight :—

"Faster, faster,  
O Circe, Goddess,  
Let the wild, thronging train  
The bright procession  
Of eddying forms  
Sweep through my soul!"

"Empedocles on Etna" (now happily restored to the collected works) is an elaborate attempt to portray in dramatic contrast the three leading types of Hellenic character—the thoughtful, brooding intellect that found expression in philosophy ; the sensuous, joyous imagination that embodied itself in art ; the credulous, matter-of-fact stamp of minds that made up the public with which philosophers and artists had to deal. Mr. Arnold's idea of Empedocles represents him as a teacher who has outlived not only his popularity, but his self-confidence, a thinker weary of the fruitless search after causes, dissatisfied with every explanation of the Universe that can be proposed, and though able to see for others, like his simple follower Pausanias, the wisdom of acquiescence in the inevitable, and that the moderate expectations thus dictated ensure sufficient happiness for man's life, is unable to apply the lesson to himself, and seeks refuge from despair in suicide. Full of pathetic majesty is the soliloquy of the troubled spirit as it braces up its strength for death. The retrospect of its bright youthful ambitions only deepens the sense of present gloom. Nor is the doubtful anticipation of the future more consoling, for Death may not be annihilation :—

\* "The Shield of Achilles," (*Cont. Rev.*, Feb. 1874, p. 335).

## THE POEMS OF MR. MATTHEW ARNOLD.

"But mind—but thought—  
If these have been the master part of us ;  
Where will they find their parent element ? . . .  
But we shall still be in them, and they in us, . . .  
And they will be our lords, as they are now ;  
And keep us prisoners of our consciousness,  
And never let us clasp and feel the All  
But through their forms, and modes, and stifling veils ; . . .  
And we shall feel the agony of thirst,  
The ineffable longing for the life of life  
Baffled for ever ; and still thought and mind  
Will hurry us with them on their homeless march ; . . .  
And then we shall unwillingly return  
Back to this meadow of calamity,  
This uncongenial place, this human life !  
And in our individual human state  
Go through the sad probation all again,  
To see if we will poise our life at last,  
To see if we will now at last be true  
To our own only true deep-buried selves,  
Being one with which, we are one with the whole world."

His solitary gleam of comfort is that though he has

"Lived in wrath and gloom,  
Fierce, disputatious, ever at war with man,  
Far from my own soul, far from warmth and light,"

he has "not grown easy in these bonds," he has

"Loved no darkness, . . .  
Allowed no fear."

In the sense that it hath been granted him

"Not to die wholly, not to be all enslaved,"

"the numbing cloud mounts off" his soul, and he breathes freely. In that moment, lest "the mists of despondency" should again envelope it, he takes the plunge.

Finely contrasted with this agony of morbid self-consciousness is the healthy, æsthetic serenity of Callicles, the young harp-player, whose love of natural beauty, and pity for the wounded spirit of Empedocles, have induced him to linger in one of the mountain-valleys within earshot, and minister the healing influence of music and song. A picture of the calm life which he desires for the sufferer is thus shadowed forth in his rendering of a Theban legend:—

"Far, far from here,  
The Adriatic breaks in a warm bay  
Among the green Illyrian hills ! and there  
The sunshine in the happy glens is fair,  
And by the sea, and in the brakes  
The grass is cool, the sea-side air  
Buoyant and fresh, the mountain-flowers  
As virginal and sweet as ours.  
And there, they say, two bright and aged snakes,  
Who once were Cadmus and Harmonia,

Bask in the glens, or on the warm sea-shore  
 In breathless quiet, after all their ills ;  
 Nor do they see their country, nor the place  
 Where the Sphinx lived among the frowning hills,  
 Nor the unhappy palace of their race,  
 Nor Thebes, nor the Ismenus, any more."

The verses assigned to Callicles illustrate in the most favourable aspect the writer's power of transmuting into English the manner of Greek lyrical poetry. Though not to be compared with the marvellous choric song in "The Lotos-Eaters," or even with some of the choruses in "Atalanta in Calydon," their gracious music must be confessed too exceptional with Mr. Arnold. His later attempts (in "Merope") to represent accentually the choric rhythm of Greek tragedy are far less satisfactory, but these are avowedly experiments, made in default of finding English measures that produce the same effect ; and criticism is frankly deprecated by the admission that "where the ear is guided solely by its own feeling there is a continual risk of failure and of offence." To an ordinary ear, we think, lyrical effect is best conveyed by regularity of metre and rhyme, as *e. g.*, in the concluding verses sung by Callicles in honour of the Muses :—

" Whose praise do they mention ?  
 Of what is it told ?  
 What will be for ever,  
 What was from of old.  
 First hymn they the Father  
 Of all things ;—and then  
 The rest of immortals,  
 The action of men.  
 The day in his hotness,  
 The strife with the palm ;  
 The night in her silence,  
 The stars in their calm."

Some passages are strikingly graphic, especially such as paint the strange contrasts of volcanic scenery. Callicles thus describes his resting-place :—

" For 'tis the last  
 Of all the woody, high, well-water'd dells  
 On Etna ; and the beam  
 Of noon is broken there by chestnut boughs  
 Down its steep verdant sides ; the air  
 Is freshened by the leaping stream, which throws  
 Eternal showers of spray on the moss'd roots  
 Of trees, and veins of turf, and long dark shoots  
 Of ivy plants, and fragrant hanging bells  
 Of hyacinths, and on late anemones  
 That muffle its wet banks ; but glade,  
 And stream, and sward, and chestnut trees,  
 End here. Etna beyond, in the broad glare  
 Of the hot noon, without a shade,  
 Slope behind slope, up to the peak, lies bare ;  
 The peak, round which the white clouds play."

The scene from the edge of the crater is still more vividly portrayed, as Empedocles gazes by night over the

"Sea of cloud

That heaves its white and billowy vapours up

To moat this isle of ashes from the world,

. . . . And that other fainter sea, far down,

O'er whose lit floor a road of moon-beams leads

To Etna's Liparæan sister-fires,

And the long dusky line of Italy."

Though the direct intrusion of his personality is precluded by the dramatic form, the choice of theme and method of handling are commonly sufficient to mark a dramatist's sympathy. As respects the theme, we have Mr. Arnold's admission that to one situated as Empedocles, "modern problems have presented themselves; we hear already the doubts, we witness the discouragement of Hamlet and Faust" (Preface of 1853). The poem is temporarily excluded from his collected works, on the ground that its exhibition of unrelieved mental suffering is too painful, and a protest entered against the view that to attempt a representation of the state of one's own mind is a worthy poetic aim. This would not of itself amount to a confession that in the thoughts and feelings thus depicted the writer had been reflecting his own scepticism; but such a construction may be reasonably put upon it when we find him giving personal expression to similar thoughts and feelings in poems composed at the same time. We shall presently have to speak of the latter as a separate group, but any one may discover this similarity for himself who, after reading the soliloquies of Empedocles, compares the tone of "A Summer-Night," "Self-Deception," and "The Scholar-Gipsy." The persistence with which Mr. Arnold contrasts "the disinterested objectivity" of Callicles with the subjective anguish of the philosopher may be taken to indicate his consolatory faith in the remedial virtues of Art. In "Memorial Verses," another poem of this period, we find Goethe singled out for admiration because he prescribed the same panacea for the ills of his own time. To a mind dominated by the influence of Hellenism, no other conclusion could so fitly suggest itself.

"Mycerinus," though not belonging to the first group by its subject, strictly belongs to it in treatment. The legend told by Herodotus of the Egyptian King who, in the midst of his just and pure reign, was warned by an oracle that he had but six years to live, is here expanded into an impressive and painful picture. The spectacle of a man who, deeming long life to be the reward of just deeds, arraigns the Gods for withholding it, admonishes his subjects to pursue vice instead of virtue, if they would avoid his fate, and devotes his remaining years to a continuous revel, is one which perhaps no one but a Neo-Pagan artist, an imitator "not to the manner born," prone to exaggerate the

defects as well as the merits of his idol, would select as a congenial theme. If Mr. Arnold is right in his view that the highest aim of Greek tragedy was to produce "a sentiment of sublime acquiescence in the course of fate, and in the dispensations of human life," \* Æschylus and Sophocles would no doubt have forborne the subject. A distinctively Christian artist might choose it to deduce a moral from it; an artist of complete culture might suffer it to point its own moral. Mr. Arnold does neither the one nor the other, but goes out of his way to thrust in a suggestion that throws no light on the positive darkness at which it is directed, and serves to obscure the true significance of the story. "It may be," he says, "that the eye of Mycerinus on his joyless feast"

"Dwelt with mere outward seeming, he within  
Took measure of his soul, and knew its strength;  
And by that silent knowledge, day by day,  
Was calm'd, ennobled, comforted, sustained."

That motives can safely be detached from conduct, an heroic spirit consist with an ignoble life, is a tenet which the author of "Literature and Dogma" would assuredly refuse to sanction. Apart from its ethical flaw, the poem is a fine one, statuesque in conception, lofty in diction, and solemn in rhythm. The writer's adherence to the Greek "principle," to which Mr. Gladstone has referred, has been maintained, it need hardly be said, at the expense of historical fidelity; no doctrines being more deeply-rooted in Egyptian belief than those which are here ignored.

"Sohrab and Rustum" and "Balder Dead," narrative poems drawn respectively from Persian tradition and Scandinavian mythology, both belong to the first group in virtue of their Homeric treatment. We do not doubt that the author has done wisely to disregard as accidental the national peculiarities of the literatures that have furnished his themes, and obtain the advantage of following the world's greatest epical model by assuming all conceptions of an heroic age to be essentially similar. The simple flow of the narrative, unbroken by reflection, the breadth and ease of handling, the unrestrained expression of emotion, the diffuseness of the imagery drawn from natural objects, and the skilful use and repetition of sonorous names, remind one continually of Homer. The Eastern legend takes precedence of the Northern myth in right of its human interest, admitting a larger infusion of the pathos in which Mr. Arnold excels. It turns upon the fortunes of Sohrab, the unknown son of the great Persian warrior Rustum, who, in hope of winning a proud acknowledgment from his father, joined the hostile Tartar tribes, among whom he has attained high distinction, and, on the eve of a great battle, obtains leave from their general to challenge a Persian warrior to single combat. The challenge is accepted by Rustum, who fights

\* Preface to "Merops."

in disguise. He and his son encounter on the sands beside the Oxus, each unknown to the other, but the former stirred by deep pity for the daring boy who rushes on death, the latter agitated by strange yearnings towards the majestic warrior who answers to his ideal of father. Rustum, believing that he has no son, repels Sohrab's eager appeal to disclose his name with a taunt that admits of but one rejoinder. The father is at first worsted, and once at the mercy of his son. In the second onset, carried away by excitement, he shouts his battle-cry—"Rustum!"—as he hurls his spear. The name puts Sohrab off his guard, and he falls mortally wounded. A threat extorted from his agony that Rustum will avenge him, brings about the recognition he has so long sought. To prove his parentage, he bares his arm imprinted with the seal which Rustum had given to his mother :—

"Rustum gazed, and gazed, and stood  
Speechless; and then he utter'd one sharp cry :  
' O boy—thy father !' and his voice choked there.  
And then a dark cloud pass'd before his eyes,  
And his head swam, and he sank down to earth.  
But Sohrab crawl'd to where he lay, and cast  
His arms about his neck, and kiss'd his lips,  
And with fond, faltering fingers stroked his cheeks,  
Trying to call him back to life ; and life  
Came back to Rustum, and he oped his eyes,  
And they stood wide with horror, and he seized  
In both his hands the dust which lay around,  
And threw it on his head, and smirch'd his hair,  
His hair, and face, and beard, and glittering arms ;  
And strong convulsive groanings shook his breast,  
And his sobs choked him ; and he clutch'd his sword  
To draw it, and for ever let life out :  
But Sohrab saw his thought, and held his hands."

The death of the son in his father's arms, amid the awe-struck silence of the hosts as night falls, is told with simple solemnity. Not the least impressive touch of art is the recurring reference to the presence of the great river beside which the tragedy is enacted, that contrasts the calm dignity of its course with the unseemly turbulence of human passions, its unexhausted permanence with their transience and decay. The poet's faithfulness to his method of Greek conception is again shown in his treatment of death :—

" Unwillingly the spirit fled away,  
Regretting the warm mansion which it left,  
And youth, and bloom, and this delightful world."

The farewells of the dying son and the bereaved father contain nothing that betokens their conviction or desire of aught beyond the grave.

If Mr. Arnold fails to move his readers to equal interest in "Balder Dead," the subject rather than himself may be responsible. The



delineation of beings so anomalous as the Gods of Scandinavian mythology is attended with difficulties that Art can scarcely hope to overcome, the sense of which has a tendency to restrain one's sympathy. Those who are not thus repelled by the subject will find the treatment throughout in admirable keeping, and some of the descriptive passages singularly pictorial.

The special aptitude of Mr. Arnold's genius, in its early phases of development, for dealing with themes drawn from Hellenic or cognate sources, is attested by the inadequacy of his attempts in other directions. His "Tristram and Isolt," a half-dramatic, half-narrative version of one of the most vivid and passionate stories in the Arthurian cycle of legends, is curiously tame and cold; its highest effects being attained in some graceful touches of sentiment and faithful landscape-painting. An unavoidable comparison with the superlative art of the master to whom the Arthurian cycle is consecrated might be thought to explain his failure in this instance, if it were not equally conspicuous in his treatment of a mediæval subject, such as "The Church of Brou." For genuine sympathy with a conception of post-Pagan or distinctively Christian art, he seems at this period to have been constitutionally indisposed, the spiritual conviction upon which such sympathy should be based being as yet wanting. The evidence of this deficiency must be mainly negative, but positive confirmation could scarcely be stronger than the language of the fine sonnet composed during the revolutionary crisis of 1848-9, when the springs of so many earnest natures were sounded to their depths:—

"Who props, thou ask'st, in these bad days, my mind?  
He much, the old man, who, clearest-soul'd of men,  
Saw the Wide Prospect, and the Asian Fen,  
And Tmolus Hill, and Smyrna bay, though blind.  
Much he, whose friendship I not long since won,  
That halting slave, who in Nicopolis  
Taught Arrian, when Vespasian's brutal son  
Clear'd Rome of what most shamed him. But be his  
My special thanks, whose even-balanced soul,  
From first youth tested up to extreme old age,  
Business could not make dull, nor passion wild;  
Who saw life steadily, and saw it whole;  
The mellow glory of the Attic stage,  
Singer of sweet Colonus and its child."

One has only to compare this confession with that put forth in the stanzas of "In Memoriam," written at the same period:—

"And all is well, though faith and form  
Be sundered in the night of fear, &c."

to appreciate the difference as respects a basis of moral confidence between the "Hellenic" and the "Hebrew" spirit.

No tenets could better harmonize with a belief in the essential objectivity of Art than those of the Stoics, the most practical and least subjective of the schools. But it was the historic destiny

of Stoicism to fall before Scepticism, and a modern adherent could expect no otherwise for himself. Mr. Arnold had scarcely announced a sense of security in his fortress than it seemed to be shaken. Doubts as to the all-sufficiency of Greek art and Stoical ethics to sustain a soul in the "bad times" of social anarchy obtrude themselves in the contemporary sonnets addressed to a Republican friend. They deprecate, indeed, all rash attempts to forestal the Divine determination of events, and preach the wisdom of patience as the only remedy for existing evils, but betray a feeling that is appreciably warmer than the due temperature of philosophic apathy:—

"If sadness at the long heart-wasting show,  
Wherein earth's great ones are disquieted;  
If thoughts, not idle, while before me flow,  
The armies of the homeless and unfed—  
If these are yours, if this is what you are,  
Then am I yours, and what you feel I share."

In "Resignation," another poem of the same period, studiously calm as is the tenor of its individual counsels—

"Be passionate hopes not ill resigned,  
For quiet and a fearless mind; . . .  
For they, believe me, who await  
No gifts from chance have conquered Fate"

the surface is ever and anon disturbed by the welling-forth of emotional sympathy. It may be discerned in the description of the Gipsies, for whom—

"Time's busy touch,  
While it mends little troubles much; . . .  
They must live still; and yet, God knows,  
Crowded and keen the country grows!"

and yet more clearly in the closing lines, which remind those who prefer an "intemperate prayer" to Fate,

"For movement, for an ampler sphere,"

how many there are who suffer dumbly:—

"Not milder is the general lot,  
Because our spirits have forgot  
In action's dizzying eddy hurled,  
The something that infects the world."

In such passages as these there are indications, however faint, that "Hebraism," though still in abeyance, was troubling the writer's spirit. They inaugurate a period of transition which brought to a close his exclusive subservience to Hellenic influences. The first step taken in that direction was the abandonment of his cherished aversion to subjective poetry. His extravagant protests against it in theory continued long after he had assented to the practice, and were probably due to the consciousness of his own bias for what he deemed a fatal weakness. Nothing operates upon a strenuous nature

more effectually, perhaps, than such a consciousness as an inducement to over-act the tyrant. But the soul holds on its course in supreme unconcern for all theories and prépossessions whatsoever. Mr. Arnold became a subjective poet involuntarily, and because the pursuit of truth led him through the furnace of doubt. He has only added one more to the number of those who

"Learn in suffering what they teach in song."

The sensible decrease manifest from this time forth in the flow of his creative impulse, and the increase, *pari passu*, of introspection in its stead, are the first characteristics of this period of transition. The critical bent of his genius now unmistakeably asserts itself. Rarely is an impression upon the mental refina simply recorded, but has to be carefully analyzed, sifted, and reduced to a formula. So patiently is the process conducted, that the poet often seems to regard his subject as an entity apart, like a physician who, to watch the effect of an experiment upon himself, undertakes to regulate his own temperature and time his own pulse. In one or two poems, *e.g.*, "Youth's Agitations" and "Growing Old," he attains to the ruthless calm of a vivisector. This tone of self-scrutiny is common to both the second and third groups of poems. The distinguishing note of the former is their reflection of the sceptical phase through which the writer was passing. Every thinker worthy of the name has to make such a passage at some time or other, but perhaps it was never undertaken by a larger number of sincere and vigorous minds in company than at the period to which these poems belong. John Sterling, Arthur Clough, Mr. Francis Newman, Mr. Froude, and others of the fellowship, have severally recorded their experience. The incidents doubtless vary in each case, but we remember no more graphic expression of the moral uneasiness and spiritual darkness, often verging on despair, which are among the commonest sequels of such a crisis, than Mr. Arnold has given in his "Scholar-Gipsy."

Its imaginative thread is found in a story told by Glanvil of an undergraduate at Oxford, forced by poverty to leave his studies and join a tribe of Gipsies, from whom he acquired a knowledge of their secret lore. Having been recognized and accosted during one of his wanderings by two former fellow-students, he recounted the story of his flight, and of the learning he had gained, declaring his intention at some favourable opportunity of making it known to the world. The peaceful nomadic life, which, by a graceful fiction, he is represented as still leading in the rural neighbourhood of Oxford, and the happy confidence with which he waits for a "heaven-sent moment" to announce his revelation, serve as a pointed contrast to the chaotic unrest of which the University is a typical centre, the self-mistrust and hopelessness of regaining conviction from which the most thoughtful of its members suffer :—

"O life unlike to ours !  
 Who fluctuate idly without term or scope,  
 Of whom each strives, nor knows for what he strives,  
 And each half lives a hundred different lives ;  
 Who wait like thee, but not like thee, in hope.

"Thou waitest for the spark from Heaven ! and we,  
 Light half-believers of our casual creeds,  
 Who never deeply felt, nor clearly will'd,  
 Whose insight never has borne fruit in deeds,  
 Whose vague resolves never have been fulfill'd,  
 For whom each year we see  
 Breeds new beginnings, disappointments new ;  
 Who hesitate and falter life away,  
 And lose to-morrow the ground won to-day—  
 Ah, do not we, wanderer, await it too ?

"Yes ! we await it, but it still delays,  
 And then we suffer ! and amongst us one  
 Who most has suffer'd, takes dejectedly  
 His seat upon the intellectual throne ; . . .  
 This for our wisest ! and we others pine,  
 And wish the long unhappy dream would end,  
 And waive all claim to bliss, and try to bear,  
 With close-lipp'd patience for our only friend—  
 Sad patience, too near neighbour to despair ;  
 But none has hope like thine !"

The tone of sad yearning and bitter dissatisfaction in which this poem is pitched is fortunately not long sustained ; but with modified intensity it runs through all the poems belonging to Mr. Arnold's middle period. The "Stanzas in memory of Obermann" (1849), are an expression of deep sympathy with the philosophic Senancour, who, saddened by the spectacle which his age presented, retired to solitary communion with Nature ; an example which the poet, perplexed with the "hopeless tangle" of his own time, would fain follow, but for the fate that drives him forth into the world :—

"Thou, sad guide, adieu !  
 I go ; Fate drives me, but I leave  
 Half of my life with you."

In the "Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse," the sense of his own neutral, transitionary attitude, between allegiance to authority that has ceased to control him and acceptance of a system that does not command his reverence, prompts him to sympathy with those adherents of an outworn faith who have the courage to retire from a world that disowns them, and for which they know themselves unfit :—

"Wandering between two worlds, one dead,  
 The other powerless to be born,  
 With nowhere yet to rest my head ;  
 Like these on earth I wait forlorn.  
 Their faith, my tears, the world deride,  
 I come to shed them at their side."

In the "Memorial Verses" on the death of Wordsworth (1850)

his feeling is embodied in a tribute of reverence to the great poetic thinkers who have not been conquered by the problems of their age, but in their several ways have evinced the consciousness of mastery. Byron presented the spectacle of defiant force which, however terrible to witness in its strife "of passion with eternal law," was majestic in virtue of its "fiery life :"—

" He taught us little ; but our soul  
Had felt him like the thunder's roll."

Goethe offered the nobler example of calm æsthetic wisdom :—

" He took the suffering human race,  
He read each wound, each weakness clear,  
And struck his finger on the place,  
And said, ' *Thou artest here, and here !*'  
He looked on Europe's dying hour  
Of fitful dream and feverish power ;  
His eye plunged down the weltering strife,  
The turmoil of expiring life :  
He said, ' *The end is everywhere !*  
*Art still has truth, take refuge there !*'"

Wordsworth, the last of the triad, fulfilled the noblest mission by recalling the soul to sympathy with Nature :—

" He, too, upon a wintry clime  
Had fallen, on this iron time  
Of doubts, despairs, distractions, fears.  
He found us when the age had bound  
Our souls in its benumbing round :  
He spoke, and loosed our hearts in tears.  
He laid us, as we lay at birth,  
On the cool flowery lap of earth ;  
Smiles brake from us and we had ease ;  
The hills were round us, and the breeze  
Went o'er the sun-lit fields again ;  
Our foreheads felt the wind and rain :  
Our youth returned."

With his death, however, the hope of Europe seemed dead :—

" Others will teach us how to dare,  
And against fear our breast to steel ;  
Others will strengthen us to bear,  
But who, ah ! who will make us feel ?  
The cloud of mortal destiny  
Others will front as fearlessly,  
But who, like him, will put it by ?"

The same jaundiced mood that finds its sombre hues reflected in the world and, though solaced by the memory of the past, discerns no outlook of comfort in the present or the future, recurs in "A Summer-night ;" but here the gracious influence which Wordsworth had worshipped effects a partial cure. Though the poet still carries about with him

" The old unquiet breast,  
Which never deadens into rest,  
Nor ever feels the fiery glow  
That whirls the spirit from itself away ;"

and questions if there can be any life for man but that of "madman or slave," one who defies his fate or is made captive by it, yet the moonlit, starry heaven suggests that there is a possible alternative:—

"Ye heavens whose pure dark regions have no sign  
Of languor, though so calm, and, though so great,  
Are yet untroubled and unpassionate ;  
Who, though so noble, share in the world's toil,  
And, though so tasked, keep free from dust and soil !  
. . . . . you remain  
A world above man's head, to let him see  
How boundless might his soul's horizon be,  
How vast, yet of what clear transparency !  
How it were good to live there, and breathe free !  
How fair a lot to fill  
Is left to each man still !"

In the lines written beside the grave of Dr. Arnold, in Rugby Chapel (1857), this glimmer of hope has brightened. He is remembered as one whose "even cheerfulness" sustained him unwearied through a career of lofty and beneficent exertion, devoted to the service of the Father in whom he trusted and the brothers whom he loved. The son of such a man has assuredly warrant to

"Believe  
In the noble and great who are gone, . . .  
Not like the men of the crowd,  
Who all around me to-day  
Bluster or cringe, and make life  
Hideous, and arid, and vile ;  
But souls tempered with fire,  
Fervent, heroic, and good ;  
Helpers and friends of mankind."

Nor is the faith wholly vain that such souls may still appear amid their "fainting dispirited race," like angels in the hour of need:—

"Ye alight in our van ! at your voice,  
Panic, despair, flee away.  
Ye move through the ranks, recal  
The stragglers, refresh the outworn,  
Praise, re-inspire the brave !  
Order, courage, return ;  
Eyes rekindling, and prayers  
Follow your steps as ye go.  
Ye fill up the gaps in our files,  
Strengthen the wavering line,  
Stablish, continue our march  
On, to the bound of the waste,  
On, to the City of God !"

Here again Hebraism is plainly struggling to the surface. But the example of one who solves the problem of life by the energetic discharge of a recognized duty is not enough to stimulate a spirit which doubt has paralyzed for action. An example that should

suffice for this would be that of a man whose scepticism never let him rest, but urged him unceasingly forward in quest of a satisfactory solution. Such an one Mr. Arnold finds in Arthur Clough, to whose memory his "Thyrsis" is dedicated. It forms a companion ode to "The Scholar-Gipsy," but is pitched in a more plaintive key. Since Milton's "Lycidas" and Shelley's "Adonais," no more exquisite monody has been tuned in English to a classic strain. Borrowing the pastoral language of Theocritus, the poet bewails his fellow-shepherd with whom he had so often frequented the Scholar-gipsy's haunts, especially the neighbourhood of a great elm which they had associated with his wandering existence, and agreed to accept as a token that he still pursued it. Here Thyrsis and his friend had passed the spring of life, rejoicing in "each simple joy the country yields," assaying together their "shepherd-pipes," and cherishing aspirations which Fate and Time had combined to baffle. For Thyrsis "a shadow lowered on the fields," and he could not remain :—

"Some life of men unblest,  
He knew, which made him droop, and filled his head.  
He went; his piping took a troubled sound  
Of storms that rage outside our happy ground;  
He could not wait their passing, he is dead."

Upon his friend also the shadow has fallen :—

"And long the way appears which seemed so short  
To the less practised eye of sanguine youth;  
And high the mountain-tops in cloudy air—  
The mountain-tops where is the throne of Truth;  
Tops in life's morning-sun so bright and bare!  
Unbreachable the fort  
Of the long-battered world uplifts its wall,  
And strange and vain the earthly turmoil grows;  
And near and real the charm of thy repose,  
And night as welcome as a friend would fall."

But accepting as a happy omen that "the tree" still crowns the height, and the scholar-gipsy, "by his own heart inspired," still lives his peaceful life and waits for Heaven's opportunity, the poet calls to mind how Thyrsis, animated by the same ambition,<sup>8</sup> followed the same unworldly course :—

"What though the music of thy rustic flute  
Kept not for long its happy country tone:  
Lost it too soon, and learnt a stormy note  
Of men contention-tost, of men who groan,  
Which task'd thy pipe too sore, and tired thy throat:  
It failed, and thou wast mute!  
Yet hadst thou alway visions of our light,  
And long with men of care thou could'st not stay,  
And soon thy foot resumed its wandering way,  
Left human haunt, and on alone till night!"

To his friend a like path lies open :—

"Then through the great town's harsh heart-wearying roar,  
Let in thy voice a whisper often come  
To chase fatigue and fear.  
Why faintest thou ? I wandered till I died :  
Roam on ! the light we sought is shining still !"

In the third group of Mr. Arnold's poems we include those which take the motive here suggested as a point of departure. They indicate a gradual process of recovery from the morbid mental condition in which those belonging to his middle period were written, an approximation to the tone of balanced conviction and healthy hopefulness that characterises his later Essays. Criticism is the form of poetic reflection which these symptoms of convalescence commonly take ; the scene and subject of an unhealthy mood being recalled for analysis, and the partial or false view in which it originated corrected by subsequent experience. The poem of "Obermann once more" thus forms an answer to the "Stanzas in memory of Obermann," written twenty years before. The spirit of the hermit-philosopher with whose despair he had sympathized, and whose solitude he had yearned to embrace, now monishes him to avoid the error of a "frustrate life," and to advance by courageous and cheerful enterprize the attainment of that brighter day which had begun to dawn upon the world :—

"Despair not thou as I despaired,  
Nor be cold gloom thy prison !  
Forward the gracious hours have fared,  
And see ! the sun is risen.  
He walks the icebergs of the past,  
A green new earth appears !  
Millions whose life in ice lay fast,  
Have thoughts and smiles and tears. . . .

"But thou, though to the world's new hour,  
Thou come with aspect marred,  
Shorn of the joy, the bloom, the power,  
Which best beseem its bard.  
Though more than half thy years be past,  
And spent thy youthful prime,  
Though round thy firmer manhood cast,  
Hang weeds of our sad time ;  
Whereof thy youth felt all the spell,  
And traversed all the shade,  
Though late, though dimmed, though weak, yet tell,  
Hope to a world re-made !"

The tone of these verses may be compared with that of a passage in the contemporary Essay, commencing, "And is not the close and bounded intellectual horizon within which we have long lived and moved now lifting up ? and are not new lights finding free passage to shine in upon us ?" ("Culture and Anarchy," pp. 9, 10.) The active intercourse with the world for which he felt himself unfitted, and undertook only under compulsion, could have given no better proof of its tonic virtue than by thus clearing his perception



of the real state of society, and bracing his sense of the obligations of genius in regard to it.

The "Memorial Verses" on the death of Wordsworth are in like manner reviewed and answered in "The Youth of Nature," written beside his grave. The "sacred poet" may well be mourned by those to whom he was a priest, but with his death the hope of mankind does not die, for the "loveliness, magic, and grace" of Nature, which he interpreted, transcend and outlast him.

"They are here! they are set in the world!  
They abide! and the finest of souls  
Has not been thrilled by them all,  
Nor the dullest been dead to them quite.  
The poet who sings them may die,  
But they are immortal, and live,  
For they are the life of the world!"

The mood in which "A Summer Night" was written is in the same way summoned for comparison with the feelings suggested under similar circumstances at a later period. The wound inflicted on the writer's affections by a recent sorrow, to which the poem of "A Southern Night" is consecrated, has made him insensible to the pain of the intellectual trouble that formerly possessed him. The ideal life of man which, as figured in the purity of the starry heavens, once seemed so remote of attainment, now seems nearer to realization, in memory of the "high-souled" "gentle" lives whose loss he is deploring, in presence of the divine beauty of Nature to which they bore affinity:—

"And what but gentleness untired,  
And what but noble feeling warm,  
Wherever shown, howe'er inspired,  
Is grace, is charm?  
What else is all these waters are,  
What else is steeped in lucid sheen,  
What else is bright, what else is fair,  
What else serene?  
Mild o'er her grave, ye mountains, shine!  
Gently by his, ye waters, glide!  
To that in you which is divine,  
They were allied."

The assertion by the affections of their mastery over the intellect in supplying a ground of confidence when its assurance fails, is the theme of "Dover Beach." Standing beside the shore from which the tide is ebbing, the "eternal note of sadness" reminds him that—

"The Sea of Faith  
Was once, too, at the full, and round earth's shore  
Lay like the folds of a bright girdle furled;  
But now I only hear  
Its melancholy, long, withdrawing roar,  
Retreating to the breath  
Of the night wind down the vast edges drear  
And naked shingles of the world."

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But the reflection brings no longer the old sense that all is lost to him :—

“ Ah, love, let us be true  
To one another ! ”

The power of love to reveal man's inner nature to himself, of which his other faculties disclose no glimpse, is the subject of “ A Buried Life ” :—

“ Yet still, from time to time, vague and forlorn,  
From the soul's subterranean depth upborne,  
As from an infinitely distant land,  
Come airs, and floating echoes, and convey  
A melancholy into all our day.  
Only, but this is rare !  
When a beloved hand is laid in ours,  
When, jaded with the rush and glare  
Of the interminable hours,  
Our eyes can in another's eyes read clear  
When our world-deafen'd ear  
Is by the tones of a loved voice caress'd :  
A bolt is shot back somewhere in our breast,  
And a lost pulse of feeling stirs again.  
The eye sinks inward, and the heart lies plain,  
And what we mean, we say, and what we would, we know.  
A man becomes aware of his life's flow,  
And hears its winding murmur, and he sees  
The meadows where it glides, the sun, the breeze ; . . .  
And then he thinks he knows  
The hills where his life rose,  
And the sea where it goes.”

This and such a poem as “ The Future,” seem inspired by the conviction that our emotional and spiritual instincts, and the harmonies which imagination constructs upon them, impalpable as they are, afford a better guarantee of certitude concerning the mysterious problems of existence than we can obtain elsewhere. To how many of us a vague but tender trust in Love, an *abandon* of imaginative speculation, and sense of room for hope in the infinite possibilities of the universe, are incomparably more satisfying than the dogmatic affirmations of Theology, or the not less dogmatic negations of Science ! The poet's voice acquires a fuller and deeper tone than is usual with him as the mystery of the future is thus unfolded to his yearning gaze :—

“ Haply the river of Time  
As it grows, as the trees on its marge  
Fling their wavering lights  
On a wider, statelier stream,  
May acquire if not the calm  
Of its early mountainous shore,  
Yet a solemn peace of its own.  
And the width of the waters, the hush  
Of the grey expanse where he floats,  
Freakening its current, and spotted with foam,  
As it draws to the Ocean, may strike

Peace to the soul of the man on its breast :  
 As the pale waste widens around him,  
 As the banks fade dimmer away,  
 As the stars come out, and the night wind  
 Brings up the stream  
 Murmurs and scents of the infinite Sea.

The due limitation of the indulgence which should be given to the soul's "aberglaube" is rightly defined in Mr. Arnold's latest criticism. The tendency of such extra-belief "to substitute itself for Science," in cases where Science has something positive to affirm, is undoubtedly, as he points out, a fruitful source of superstition. But he is not less careful to allow that "that which we hope, augur, imagine, is the poetry of life, and has the rights of poetry."\* It fills up the gap which Science sternly seeks to widen and Theology vainly attempts to bridge over. Herein lies its value, and it is the recognition of this that constitutes the charm of these poems.

The criterion of inward assurance and the experimental sanction of happiness which our spiritual instincts possess, are possessed in a still greater degree by those moral intuitions, reliance on which, as the one verifiable basis of belief, is preached in "Literature and Dogma." Such poems as "Self-dependence," and "Palladium" attest that the talisman which the writer thus commends to the acceptance of all doubtful minds has been long cherished by his own. "Severely clear," he hears a cry from his own heart that answers to the cry of the "self-poised" stars—

"Resolve to be thyself ! and know that he  
 Who finds himself loses his misery !"

Like the Palladium that stood "high 'mid rock and wood" above Troy, which could not fall whilst it was firm—

"Still doth the soul from its lone fastness high,  
 Upon our life a ruling effluence send ;  
 And when it fails, fight as we will, we die,  
 And while it lasts we cannot wholly end."

The gradual reassertion by Hebraism of that share of authority which had long been denied to its influence, and the attainment of an equilibrium between it and Hellenism is shown more or less distinctly in "The Better Part," "Pis-aller," "Progress," and "East London." To those for whom a creed affords the only stronghold of moral security he has no other gospel to preach: "For God's sake, believe it then !" To those who find in the absence of supernatural control an excuse for lawlessness, he makes an inward appeal:—

"Hath man no second life ? *Pitch this one high !*  
 Sits there no judge in Heaven our sin to see ?  
 More strictly than the inward judge obey !  
 Was Christ a man like us ? *Ah ! let us try*  
*If we then, too, can be such men as he !*"

To those whom zeal for intellectual freedom impels to a rash iconoclasm he points the value of all religious safeguards :—

" Which has not taught weak wills how much they can ?  
Which has not fallen on the dry heart like rain ?  
Which has not cried to sunk, self-weary man,  
' Thou must be born again ! ' "

Every reader of " Culture and Anarchy " will observe the coincidence of its teaching with the drift of the foregoing. The cultivation of a standard of " right reason or best self," so eloquently urged in this Essay, is enjoined as emphatically in " Morality " and " The Second Best." That

" Tasks in hours of insight willed,  
Can be thro' hours of gloom fulfilled ; "

that he is the wise man

" Who through all he meets can steer him,  
Can reject what cannot clear him,  
Cling to what can truly cheer him !  
Who each day more surely learns  
That an impulse, from the distance  
Of his deepest, best existence,  
To the words, ' Hope, Light, Persistence,'  
Strongly sets and truly burns ! "

are the rules here prescribed for the healthy conduct of life. The depreciation of our national dignity for want of such a standard of collective right reason, which is the text of the writer's satirical sermon in " Friendship's Garland," is the subject of a pregnant allusion in the poem of " Heine's Grave."

Varied expressions of that intelligent sympathy with the spirit and history of the Christian Church which gives force to Mr. Arnold's conciliatory efforts in " St. Paul and Protestantism," will be found in two or three of his later sonnets. The simplification of religious ideas to which he has devoted his ultimate efforts is more than once referred to in his poems as a reform that cannot be averted :—

" Alone, self-poised, henceforward man  
Must labour ! must resign  
His all too human creeds, and scan  
Simply the way Divine."

The moral Pantheism, as one may succinctly describe it, which driven from Personal Theism as an unverifiable hypothesis, finds solid ground in a conception of God as " the Eternal Power, not ourselves, which makes for righteousness," and the Christianity that finds in the method and secret of its founder, inwardness and self-renouncement, the truest philosophy, are not obscurely avowed in such passages as the following :—

" God's wisdom and God's goodness ! Ay, but fools  
Misdefine these till God knows them no more.  
Wisdom and Goodness they are God ! What schools  
Have yet so much as heard this simple lore ? "

"When my ill-schooled spirit is aflame,  
Some nobler, ampler stage of life to win,  
I'll stop and say, 'There were no succour here,  
The aids to noble life are all within.'"

"Calm soul of all things! make it mine  
To feel amid the city's jar,  
That there abides a peace of thine,  
Man did not make and cannot mar!"

"The will to neither strive nor cry,  
The power to feel with others, give!  
Calm, calm me more! nor let me die,  
Before I have begun to live."

The classification thus attempted of Mr. Arnold's chief poems into three groups, representing three stages of mental progress, has been admittedly conjectural, and may be open to correction in detail. If, however, as we believe, it substantially affords the clue to their interpretation, the student who accepts it as a whole can correct the details for himself. It could be wished that in some future edition the author would take the matter out of his critics' hands, and indicate the true order in which his poems should be studied. Their existing arrangement is not unlikely to mislead some readers, and to them these volumes must appear a strange miscellany, a mirror of moods in perpetual flux and reflux. A writer of thoroughly unstable mind is scarcely entitled to take the public into confidence, and can certainly expect no sympathy. One could only criticize to condemn the tendency of such a poem as "Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse," if it were to be accepted as a definitive expression of conviction. A jeremiad which dismisses the time present as characterized by decayed Faith, and unvivifying Science, and avers that "the kings of modern thought are dumb," waiting for the future, till when it behoves them to follow the example of monastic seclusion, and "die out with these last of the people who believe," could only inspire irritation at the writer's morbid perverseness, or at best such regret as those eccentric utterances of Mr. Ruskin inspire, which seem to proclaim his alienation from the spirit of his age, and his resolution to neutralize the influence he has hitherto exerted upon it. Viewed, however, as one of many phases in an intellectual revolution, the mood here reflected cannot but excite the deepest sympathy, and we welcome its record as a valuable addition to psychological poetry.

The poems that cannot be assigned to one or other of the groups proposed are comparatively few. They do not manifest Mr. Arnold's possession of any qualifications hitherto unnoted; but to two of them, depth of feeling and faithful observation of Nature, they bear fuller testimony. In the series entitled "Faded Leaves," the swift process of a real love-tragedy is recorded with peculiar tenderness. Certain poems which in earlier editions were interspersed with the fore-

going, have since been collected into a companion series, entitled "Switzerland." The separation is judicious, as the latter mark with much delicacy the gradual awakening of the affections from an illusion not destined to last. Of the delineation of passion Mr. Arnold's poems scarcely afford an example. His "Modern Sappho," a study of a woman's heart, restrained by the height of its love from the low impulses of jealousy, might serve for a type of his own Muse. Her crystalline purity is not to be mistaken for coldness. It is not the flesh that is weak, but the spirit that is stronger.

Perhaps the most touching example of his pathetic vein is the lyric of "The Forsaken Merman" to his children, as they relinquish their fruitless quest for the mortal bride and mother who has left them, and returned to earth:—

"Call her once before you go—  
Call once yet!  
In a voice that she will know:  
'Margaret! Margaret!'  
Children's voices should be dear,  
(Call once more) to a mother's ear:  
Children's voices, wild with pain—  
Surely she will come again!"

"Call her once and come away,  
This way, this way!  
'Mother, dear, we cannot stay!  
The wild white horses foam and fret.  
Margaret! Margaret!"

"Come, dear children, come away down!  
Call no more!  
One last look at the white-wall'd town,  
And the little grey church on the windy shore;  
Then come down!  
She will not come though you call all day,  
Come away, come away!"

Mr. Arnold's skill in painting landscape has been shown in the extract given from "Empedocles on Etna." Many of the poems to which we have adverted as subjectively gloomy are brightened by occasional glimpses of that objective Nature which was the poet's first love. The touches that thus delineate the change of the seasons afford a relief which cannot be overlooked by the readers of "The Scholar-Gipsy" and "Thyrsis:—

"The sweet spring-days  
With whitening hedges and uncrumpling fern,  
And blue-bells trembling by the forest-ways,  
And scent of hay new-mown."

"Soon will the high Midsummer pomps come on,  
Soon will the musk carnations break and swell.  
Soon shall we have gold-dusted snapdragon,  
Sweetwilliam with his homely cottage-smell,  
And stocks in fragrant blow."

"Through the thick corn the scarlet poppies peep,  
 And round green roots and yellowing stalks I see  
 Pale blue convolvulus in tendrils creep,  
 And air-swept lindens yield  
 Their scent, and rustle down their perfumed showers  
 Of bloom on the bent grass where I am laid,  
 And bower me from the August sun with shade."

"This winter eve is warm,  
 Humid the air! leafless yet soft as spring  
 The tender purple spray on copse and briars."

If comparatively little stress has been laid upon Mr. Arnold's qualifications as an artist, it is because with him, as in a still greater degree with Mr. Browning, art has been made subordinate to thought. With Mr. Tennyson alone among the poets of our time—taking each at his best—one is sensible of that intimate harmony between spirit and form which not only forbids the separation of one from the other, but makes it inconceivable that the idea could be conveyed in more perfect language. The most quotable of Mr. Arnold's words are not so "married" to music that it would seem profane to divorce them, nor does that music, except in rare moments, keep us under its spell. Art, nevertheless, has been a matter of real concern with him, as is abundantly evident from the careful construction and diction of his principal poems. A few harsh phrases or uneven lines count for nothing, where there is so pervading an impression of order, tune, and polish. Though not specially epigrammatic, he is an eminently luminous writer. How much historic light, for example, is concentrated in this verse on the attitude of Oriental faith during the domination of Rome:—

"The East bowed low before the blast  
 In patient deep disdain;  
 She let the legions thunder past,  
 And plunged in thought again."

How truthful in its discernment and wide in its application is this reflection upon life's attrition:—

"This is the curse of life, that not  
 Another, calmer train  
 Of wiser thoughts and feelings blot  
 Our passions from our brain;  
 But each day brings its petty dust  
 Our soon-choked souls to fill,  
 And we forget because we must,  
 And not because we will."

His lyrical scope is limited, but he has treated several forms with success, especially that which for want of a better name must still be called the "regular ode." In several minor lyrics he has justified his adoption of accentual rhythm by proofs of its musical capability that were wanting in the choruses of "Merope." In his sonnets, though they are not always accurate in form, nor commended to our

ear by his division of the octave and sestette into their component parts, the arrangement of the sentences is skilfully adjusted to the conditions imposed. In the management of the eight-syllable couplet, a metre too seldom employed in modern verse, he is extremely successful.


We may conclude with the hope that Mr. Arnold's prolonged absence upon foreign service does not imply (as one of his critics supposes) that he has relinquished the arena in which his first laurels were won. Consummate as is his mastery of English prose, and immediate as may be its efficacy of operation, the gifts which have gained for him the third place in the hierarchy of living poets cannot fail to ensure a more permanent influence. *Pace* Mr. Carlyle's authority, poetic speech is to be preferred to prose speech as a medium of utterance, if for no other reason than this, that it takes firmer hold of the hearer's memory. Music, condensation, grace, point, emphasis, are elements of eloquence that no teacher can afford to despise, and he can never blend them so perfectly as in poetry. For one apophthegm of our greatest prose writers, Bacon, Hooker, Hobbes, Milton, Taylor, Addison, Gibbon, Burke, that dwells in popular remembrance, Shakespere, Milton, Dryden, Pope, Goldsmith, Burns, Wordsworth, Byron, Shelley, Tennyson, have uttered a hundred that recur perpetually and most forcibly when the nature is most deeply stirred. Enrolment in their number who have contributed more than any other teachers to supply food which the mind can most readily assimilate—

"Those rare souls  
Whose thoughts enrich the blood o' the world"—

is an honour which no one can be indifferent about retaining who has once shown the ambition and the power to secure.

HENRY G. HEWLETT.





## OUR SEAMEN.

FOR many generations English statesmen have been engaged in the discovery and redress of, or, at least, in the attempt to alleviate, the grievances and wrongs of the people. Such is the frailty of human nature, that a field will always be open for similar philanthropic labours, though its limits have been considerably narrowed by the successful efforts of the past—efforts, which an honourable rivalry has made the more vigorous and persistent. Hence it is that, in our age of advanced civilization, it can seldom fall to the lot of an individual to find the opportunity of evoking the sympathies of the public in a good cause, which has never been taken up before. Such, however, is the distinguished position of Mr. Plimsoll.

True it is that, when all that it is practicable to do has been done the sailor must still remain subjected to hardship, exposure, and danger. These, indeed, are the inevitable conditions of his lot—drawbacks, for which there are compensations to men of an adventurous spirit in the various incidents of a life at sea. But, until Mr. Plimsoll stood forth, to assert the claims of "our seamen" to the protecting care of the State, they were exposed to many needless perils and privations.

It is to be regretted that a strong case has been somewhat overstated. Mr. Plimsoll has been too eager to level his lance at all comers; too prone to listen to the inventions of idle tale-bearers; too prejudiced against the shipowners; too reluctant to acknowledge the honest intentions of the Board of Trade, and to recognize the wise

direction, in which it has been their endeavour to guide the course of legislation. In short, his judgment has been overpowered by his absorbing interest in a noble cause.

On the other hand, it will be generally allowed that, by his successful appeal to popular sympathy on behalf of the British seaman, Mr. Plimsoll has well earned the large acknowledgments he has received. His assertions may have been too sensational, and not always accurate, but it is most certain that a perfectly temperate and carefully measured statement would not have produced the great effect which has been wrought by the passionate harangues of the member for Derby. In olden days men were first moved to undertake the crusades by the exhortations of an enthusiast, who had never cared to examine the dangers before taking upon himself the responsibility of inviting the chivalry of Christendom to the task of recovering Jerusalem from the Saracens. Enthusiasm made Peter the Hermit insensible to difficulties ; and enthusiasm makes the modern champion of our seamen incapable of appreciating the honest purpose of those who are bound by their convictions to stand forward in opposition to the adoption of his proposals.

It must not be supposed that, because his own suggestions are impracticable, there is no remedy for the evils so effectively exposed by Mr. Plimsoll. It is the duty of the executive government, of the committees of Lloyd's, the Liverpool Registry of Iron Ships, and other Insurance Societies :—it is, above all, the duty of that vast majority of our shipowners who do their business honestly, and, by their successful enterprise, confer so much distinction on their country,—to make use of the opportunity afforded by the state of public opinion on this question. The practice of sending overladen and unseaworthy ships to sea is wrong both in a moral and a mercantile point of view. It ought to be and it must be suppressed. Something may be done in this direction by stricter laws, and Parliament is eager to enact them ; but much more may be accomplished by an improvement of the habits and customs of trade.

Meanwhile, Mr. Plimsoll may justly congratulate himself on the results already achieved by his persistent efforts. He has caused the Board of Trade to be armed with powers which, without external aid, they could not have obtained. The Department is in truth in a difficult position, standing as it does midway between the contending forces of the shipowning interest on the one side, and the humanitarian agitation on the other. I am confident, however, that the excellent judgment, rare knowledge of the varied business of his office, and devoted zeal of Mr. Farrer, will be fully recognized by all who have in any capacity been brought into communication with him. The British public is eminently just, and cannot but appreciate his services highly. It would be unfair to the Board to doubt their sincere desire to afford all the legal protection to the seamen which

the circumstances of the case permit, and they have not been slow to avail themselves of the sympathies aroused by the energy and zeal of Mr. Plimsoll. Relying upon the support thus opportunely afforded to them, they have introduced manifold improvements in the law, and made some progress in strengthening their staff of nautical advisers and surveyors.

The system of inquiry into the causes of maritime disasters, than which nothing can be conceived more calculated to promote the security of life at sea, has been developed considerably during the last three years. Prior to 1872 the average number of such inquiries, held under the direction of the Board of Trade, was 37 a year. The number was increased to 50 in 1872, and to 193 (of which, however, 34 were abandoned) in 1873.

The Department, meanwhile, has not neglected other equally important remedial measures. Powers have been gradually obtained from Parliament, which will materially increase the authority of the Government whenever it is necessary to interfere, to protect the seaman from the danger caused by want of caution, by inexperience, or by the culpable recklessness of shipowners. Under the auspices of Lord Carlingford, who was greatly assisted by the diligent inquiry, and by the preparation of measures, conducted under the direction of Mr. Shaw Lefevre, several important changes in the law were effected. According to the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854, as expounded by the Law Officers of the Crown in an opinion given in 1855, owners were bound to keep their ships in seaworthy condition, and seamen had a right to complain if they believed that the ship for which they were engaged was unsafe. As, however, the burden of proof lay upon the seamen, and they were not allowed to give evidence themselves, it was practically impossible for them to prove their case.

To meet this legal difficulty the law was amended in a sense highly favourable to the seaman by the Merchant Shipping Amendment Act of 1871. Under that Act the Board of Trade obtained power to hold an inquiry as to the condition of any merchant ship, upon receiving a complaint from a quarter of the crew, they being not less than five in number. The Board further obtained power to detain any ship suspected of being unseaworthy; but overloading was not expressly specified as a cause of unseaworthiness. Lastly, the magistrates were directed to receive evidence volunteered by the seamen with whom the complaint had originated.

Again, in 1873, a further Act was passed, in which overloading was separately defined to be a cause of unseaworthiness.

Furnished with the great powers conferred upon them under the recent Acts, the authorities of the Board of Trade may be regarded as lying under a moral obligation to interfere whenever they have reason to believe that it is the intention of a shipowner to send an

unseaworthy ship to sea. That they are duly sensible of their increased responsibility is manifest from the course of action they have thought it their duty to pursue. Within the space of a few months after the passing of the Act of 1873, 245 ships, suspected of being unseaworthy, were detained and surveyed by the Government Surveyors. Of these 190 were condemned for unseaworthiness, and 18 for being overladen.

The power of detaining ships, and compelling the owners to execute necessary repairs, or reduce excessive cargoes, is indeed amply sufficient to accomplish all that it is possible for the Government to do in the management of the mercantile marine of the British Empire. The weak point of our administration will be found, not so much in the want of the necessary powers for the repression of malpractices on the part of unscrupulous shipowners, as in the insufficiency, not the inefficiency, of the *personnel* of the Marine Department of the Board of Trade, and in the want of a legal adviser. The law is strong enough, but it has been suffered, in too many cases, to remain a dead letter; because there has been no law officer to perform the duties of a public prosecutor. The Board of Trade have hitherto been dependent for the management of legal proceedings on the solicitors acting for the Home Office or the Treasury; and the pressure of the business more immediately belonging to their own departments has caused delays, sometimes extending to months, in prosecuting the cases referred to them from another office. In the interval the essential witnesses, the shipmasters or the seamen, have gone to sea in other vessels, and prosecutions which ought to have been instituted have been abandoned.

While the Board of Trade has no proper legal staff, the Marine Department is not at present so constituted as to exercise the needful authority, or to command the confidence it is so desirable to inspire both in shipowners and seamen. The Secretary of the Marine Department of the Board of Trade is an able official, but he has no personal experience of nautical affairs. In the discharge of his multifarious duties, in many of which the knowledge of a sailor is required at every turn, he has one professional adviser only. While the energy, experience, and capacity of Captain Murray, whose services the Board of Trade had been fortunate enough to secure, are universally acknowledged, it is quite impossible for a single individual to get through all the work assigned to him under existing arrangements. It is his duty to report upon nautical inventions; to advise as to the working of the Chain Cables and Anchors Acts; to consider the many suggestions, continually brought forward both in England and abroad, for modifications in the rule of the road at sea; to inspect periodically the life-saving apparatus supplied by the Board of Trade to every Coastguard division; and to visit the ports where the Board

have reason to believe that the practice of overloading, or the unseaworthy condition or faulty construction of the ships, call for special activity, on the part of their surveyors. Besides these and other similar important duties, involving the necessity for frequent journeys and absences from London, the examination of the reports of the receivers of wrecks upon the circumstances which have led to maritime disasters within their districts, is in itself a sufficiently onerous task to occupy fully the time of a special officer. It has been the practice carefully to consider these reports before arriving at a final conclusion as to the expediency of a further inquiry or prosecution. In forming such a decision the circumstances to be taken into view cannot be duly appreciated without the aid of nautical advisers. The non-professional officers of the Board of Trade depend at present chiefly on Captain Murray, who may be absent from London in the discharge of his other duties at the moment when his advice is needed. It has been already pointed out that delay is particularly to be avoided when the testimony of seafaring men is necessary. It is therefore extremely desirable that a sea officer of experience should be attached to the Board of Trade, to attend exclusively to the examination of reports relating to wrecks and collisions. The officer in question should have no other duties requiring his absence from London. Being thus at all times on the spot, a prompt and reliable decision could be formed by a practical man in relation to every case that seemed to call for an inquiry.

The measures recently passed by Parliament, and those still in contemplation, give much additional responsibility to the local officers of the Board of Trade. It is now more than ever necessary that at the great seaports the Board should have for its principal representative an individual of high position and wide experience, superior to personal influence of every kind, and charged specially with the duty of doing equal justice as between the sailor and shipowner. The presence of such an officer would have more effect in checking the practice of overloading, and in preventing unseaworthy ships from being sent to sea, than minute regulations, carefully framed at the central office of the Board of Trade, but enforced at the ports by officials having no personal claims to exercise authority over the mercantile community. The Board should not be deterred from giving adequate salaries for these superior appointments by the groundless apprehension that Parliament or the country would view with dissatisfaction an augmentation of the public charge if required for such a purpose.

The mode of conducting official inquiries into the cause of losses at sea was severely criticised by the most experienced witnesses who gave evidence before the Royal Commission on Unseaworthy Ships. Founding their remarks on this subject upon the general tenour of the information obtained from the officers of the Board of Trade and

the solicitors of the Customs, the Commissioners have pointed out in their Report that "the present mode of conducting these inquiries assumes the shape of a criminal proceeding against the captain, rather than a careful investigation into the cause of the disaster. The chief point at issue seems to be whether the captain is to be acquitted or punished; and, inasmuch as he is on his trial, he may, if he pleases, volunteer a statement, but cannot be examined. The Court, again, has no power over the shipowner; he may be culpable, but he is altogether beyond the jurisdiction of the Court." The Commissioners have accordingly recommended that "the preliminary inquiry by the receiver of wrecks should be limited to such a narrative statement as would enable the Board of Trade, with the aid of their legal adviser, to decide upon the propriety of an official inquiry."

If such an inquiry is deemed advisable, with the view of ascertaining the cause of the disaster, and thereby guarding against future casualties, they have recommended that "there should be a complete severance between this inquiry and any proceedings of a penal character. It should be a mere inquest into the cause of a loss or casualty. The result should be reported to the Board of Trade, and the Board should have power to proceed criminally against the master, mate, or other member of the crew, whose neglect of duty may have occasioned the disaster."

Under the 11th section of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1871, it was declared to be a misdemeanour in a shipowner to send his ship to sea in an unseaworthy condition. The Commissioners thought that the master, like the shipowner, should be made amenable to the criminal law, if guilty of a similar offence, by leaving port in command of a ship which he knows to be unseaworthy.

Mr. Plimsoll has described with remarkable dramatic power the reluctance of shipmasters and seamen to face the charge of cowardice, which they fear may be brought against them if they honestly admit that they are afraid of going to sea in an unseaworthy vessel; and he has insisted, not without justification, doubtless in many cases, on the pressure owners can bring to bear upon shipmasters, by threatening to employ other persons if there be any hesitation as to going to sea. The suggestion of the Royal Commission will have the effect of protecting shipmasters in a dependent position. Neither officers nor seamen could be compelled to undertake a voyage which not only involved them in personal danger, but exposed them to the risk of imprisonment, perhaps for a long term of years.

In all the debates that have taken place on the losses of British shipping the blame for the numerous disasters that occur, which all admit to be excessive, and to reflect much discredit on our maritime community, has been laid upon the shipowners. Public opinion on

this subject is not just. The masters and the seamen are responsible for many disasters laid to the charge of their employers, who have been heavy losers by the carelessness of their servants. Whenever an accident occurs upon a railway, the whole machinery of the law is set in motion to punish the responsible persons. The public who, from constant travel, can appreciate the facts of the case, are, from motives of self-interest, resolved to do all that can be done to promote the security of railway travellers, by the terrors of criminal punishment, and by the imposition of heavy damages on the companies. Much of this has been accomplished by making use in the most stringent manner of the remedies provided by the common law. The same legal means exist for the punishment of similar offences at sea ; and yet, while the drivers of locomotive engines "have been found guilty of manslaughter where it has been shown that by their carelessness they have caused the occurrence of a fatal accident, there is scarcely a single instance of a prosecution of a master, a mate, or a man on the look-out, or at the helm of a vessel," although the cases have undoubtedly been numerous in which vessels have been lost by the negligence of the master or crew. The Commissioners were of opinion that "enactments relating to the punishment of the master or crew, whose negligence has occasioned loss of life or property, should be framed of a more definite and stringent character than those now in existence."

As to the constitution of the Court of Inquiry, valuable suggestions were offered to the Royal Commission by Mr. Farrer, Mr. O'Dowd, and Mr. Hamel. The opinion of the latter gentleman, from his long experience of twenty-eight years in the capacity of Solicitor to the Board of Customs, will be likely to carry especial weight. He pointed out grave objections to the courts as at present established. The stipendiary magistrates in the great ports, such as Liverpool or Hull, are lawyers of high standing and unquestionable independence ; but their time is already so fully occupied in the daily business of their courts, which must be first disposed of every morning before a nautical inquiry can be taken, that there is often considerable delay in the hearing of such cases. There are objections of a still more serious nature to a court composed of the borough magistrates of a seaport. They may be, as at Glasgow, in the case cited in his evidence by Mr. Burns, tradesmen of the town, who, however respectable and capable of dealing with the usual police cases, are without the peculiar experience which is necessary to enable them to give a judgment upon an intricate nautical question. They may be, on the other hand, shipowners with considerable knowledge of maritime affairs ; but their interests may be so closely involved, that they are unable to pronounce an impartial verdict. It was, therefore, proposed by Mr. Hamel, and his views are in close accord with those of Mr.

O'Dowd, that the coasts of Great Britain should be divided into three districts, and that a barrister should be appointed to each district, for the purpose of holding all the inquiries ordered by the Board of Trade. It was advised that two nautical assessors should be appointed for every court of inquiry, one to be acquainted with navigation and seamanship, and the other with shipbuilding. Upon the question of increased expense it would appear that there is no reason for apprehension. The cost of holding the 195 inquiries of 1873 was not less than £15,000; and Mr. Hamel expressed a firm conviction that with that expenditure he should be able to defray the costs and charges which would be imposed upon the Treasury by the adoption of his scheme in its entirety.

The opinion of the Royal Commission, as it is now well known, was distinctly adverse to the principles of Mr. Plimsoll's Bill "for the periodical survey of merchant ships, and for so marking ships, as to diminish the practice of overloading." The Commissioners have even thought it their duty to characterize the powers already entrusted to the Government under recent enactments as stringent and arbitrary; and their view has been that, as regards the survey of merchant ships, the main point for consideration is the more perfect organization of the marine department of the Board of Trade.

In giving evidence before the Commission, Mr. Farrer and Mr. Gray have, on their parts, been equally reluctant to accept any additional duties, powers, or responsibilities. They have insisted on the practical difficulties of determining the exact depth to which a vessel may be safely loaded, and on the impossibility of obtaining a sufficient staff of surveyors competent to undertake the task of keeping the entire mercantile marine under constant and thorough inspection. They have not attempted to conceal the fact that they have sometimes been misled, and that they are apprehensive that the same mistakes may be made in the future.

To meet the contingency of a complaint being brought by a ship-owner against the adverse decision of a surveyor, it has been suggested by Sir James Hope, with the concurrence of his colleagues on the Commission, that a prompt and efficient court of appeal might be constituted by giving the principal officer of Customs in the port the power of summoning three experienced shipmasters, who should be empowered summarily to determine whether an appeal by the owner or master of a ship, condemned as unseaworthy, is or is not well-founded.

The difficulty of fixing an uniform rule for the loading of merchant ships is insuperable. The rule that there should be three inches of clear side to every foot immersed has been adopted for the long voyage trades by the most experienced shipowners; and if every ship for which legislation was required were uniform in type, and employed in the same trade, no objection could be urged to a law,



compelling the loading of ships to be in all cases limited in accordance with a general and salutary usage of trade. But the mercantile marine is composed of ships of an infinite diversity of types, employed in the most varied branches of commerce; and overloading must, therefore, be regarded as a relative question. The nature of the voyage, the season of the year, the description of cargo, the stowage, the mode of construction of the ship,—all these points must be taken into account, in determining to what depth a vessel may be safely loaded. For the particular trade in which they are engaged, there can be no reasonable objection to the limited freeboard and peculiar stowage of the cargo, observable in a Thames hay barge. But even these vessels creep along the coast to Maldon, and other parts of Essex, at some distance from the mouth of the Thames; and it is difficult to draw an exact line of demarcation between a mere river voyage, where the rules of freeboard would not apply, and a coasting voyage, where they should be insisted upon. In the summer months it is no uncommon sight to see half a dozen barges from the Thames at anchor in the port of Portsmouth. These barges do not carry hay; but, when fully laden, their decks are almost level with the water. Their safety depends on the mode in which the hatches are secured, and even more on the judgment exercised by their crews in the selection of favourable weather for the prosecution of the voyage, and on their prudence in running for a harbour, upon the first indication of an approaching storm.

By special arrangements in the construction of a ship, a much deeper immersion may be made consistent with safety than that allowed under Mr. Plimsoll's Bill, which requires for a ship not being spar-decked, that there should be a spare buoyancy, equal to one-fourth part of the displacement, and, for a spar-decked ship, that there should be a surplus buoyancy, of one-eighth part of the displacement, reckoning in each case from the main deck downwards.

Among the experts who have supported the remedial legislation proposed by Mr. Plimsoll, Mr. Reed is perhaps the most distinguished; and he would, of course, decline to allow any such rule to be applied to vessels of his own design, constructed, like the *'Devastation,'* with a special view to combine complete safety with exceptionally low freeboard. But, as in the construction of the *'Devastation,'* so in the deck fittings of the steam colliers, special attention is made to keep these vessels safe, when deeply laden, and driven against heavy head seas, which completely sweep the decks. The coamings are of iron, and the hatches are of the same material, and secured in such a manner by iron bars and screws, that it is impossible for water to break through the hatchways into the holds. How is it possible to apply rules of freeboard, laid down for modern sailing ships, navigating from England round the Horn or the Cape, to coasting steamers of the special construction here described?

It would be tedious to multiply illustrations of the difficulty of applying fixed rules for determining the load line of merchant ships. The owners of small vessels in the coasting trades unanimously declare that they would be deprived of their scanty livelihood, if compelled to sail under the rules proposed by Mr. Plimsoll.

It should not be forgotten, in considering the subject of overloading, that there is serious danger in underloading also. When vessels are despatched from port to port seeking a cargo, there is a temptation to limit the amount of ballast to the smallest quantity possible. Yet a vessel in ballast, if too light, is in danger of being capsized in a squall; or, if caught in bad weather on a lee shore, she cannot ply to windward. Cases have even been known of colliers in ballast being driven by an off-shore gale from the English coast, and wrecked on the coast of Denmark.

These objections to any regulations as to load line are urged with the greatest regret: because it must be acknowledged that the malpractice of overloading prevails to a lamentable extent in some English ports. No vessels—I refer more particularly to steamers—are so frequently overladen as our own; and it is probable that in this circumstance, taken together with the carelessness, which leads to so many collisions, the most correct explanation will be found for the fact that the percentage of casualties at sea is probably greater in the British mercantile marine than in any other.

The prohibition of deck loads at certain seasons has been similarly insisted upon by Mr. Plimsoll. A distinction, however, should be drawn between a deck load of timber, and the stowage of carriages and agricultural machinery on deck. It is at all times undesirable, and in the stormy season extremely perilous, to carry timber on deck across the North Atlantic. But it is not equally necessary to prohibit deck cargoes of deals on vessels trading between the Baltic and England.

It has been said that the Norwegians buy our worn-out vessels, and that the otherwise mysterious circumstance that a ship is so rarely broken up in our own ports, because no longer fit for sea service, may thus be explained. From inquiry in Norway, I am satisfied that comparatively few English-built ships are transferred to the Norwegian flag, and that any old vessels, purchased from us, are employed in the timber trade from the southern ports of Norway. In the export trade in salt fish and oil from Bergen, Aalesund, Christiansund, Tromsø, and Hammerfest, to Spain, the West Indies, and Brazil, which is conducted with equal activity both in winter and summer, where the voyages are long, and the cargoes perishable, the vessels, although small in tonnage, are excellent in quality. There is no supervision over the Norwegian merchant shipping by Government surveyors, but the nautical experience and mercantile instinct of the shipowners have established a proper distinction between the

different trades, and led owners to provide suitable vessels for each. One would fain hope that equal confidence might be reposed in the discretion of British shipowners; and yet it must be acknowledged, not without humiliation, that with us commercial rivalry is so keen that unjustifiable risks might be run, unless the desire to reduce expenses to the lowest limit were controlled by the power, now conferred upon the Government, of detaining a ship in port, unless it is kept in sufficient repair.

The subject of deck cargoes in the North Atlantic timber trade has been vigorously attacked by the Parliament of the Canadian Dominion. They have revived the law, first enacted by the British Parliament; and deck cargoes of timber on ships, crossing the Atlantic between the 1st October and the 16th March, are now prohibited. There is an exception, however, in favour of deals, reluctantly conceded to the demands of the representatives of the ports of New Brunswick. The Royal Commission has recommended "a similar enactment by the British Parliament, as being calculated to give the sanction of the mother country to the views of the Canadian Legislature, and as an inducement to other timber-exporting countries to consider favourably the propriety of similar legislation." The rules of several mutual insurance clubs, managed by committees of thoroughly practical men, many of whom have been masters of vessels, prohibit such cargoes during the winter months. The effect of such a restriction on the price of timber to the consumer would be inappreciable; and it may be confidently assumed that, while much danger to life would be avoided, the trade would not be injuriously affected by the proposed law.

Whenever the attention of Parliament has been directed to the prevention of losses at sea, the prohibition of deck cargoes of timber has been recommended. Such was the conclusion of the Committee of 1839; and, at their suggestion, an Act was passed in 1840, prohibiting the carrying of timber on deck between the 1st September and the 1st May.

\* Again, the Committee of 1843 expressed the same views, and declared that no ship could be seaworthy, when her upper deck was lumbered with a large cargo. It may be presumed that a law, proposed by one Committee of Parliament, sanctioned by another, and highly approved by shipowners, possessing the wide experience of Mr. Rankin, would have been allowed to remain in force; unless some changes had taken place in the conditions under which the trade was conducted. Such a change occurred when, in 1850, the navigation laws were repealed, and when, in 1860, the differential duties on foreign timber were abolished.

These alterations were in strict accordance with the principles of free-trade; but they led to many abuses. To avoid the payment of proportionate tonnage dues, timber was carried in lengthened poops,

and under spar decks, thereby imposing a great strain upon the ships, and entailing considerable danger to the seamen. The deck law was further evaded by sending ships across the river St. Croix, which divides New Brunswick from the United States, in order that a deck cargo might be taken on board, and a final clearance obtained from a port in Maine. The difficulty of enforcing a law, so easily evaded, induced the Board of Trade to introduce a clause for its repeal into the Customs Act of 1862. The clause escaped the observation of shipowners in this country, and it received the sanction of Parliament.

It must not be supposed that the Board of Trade have viewed with indifference the practice of carrying cargoes on deck. Though they deemed it expedient to repeal a law, which it was impracticable to enforce, they have endeavoured in other ways to discourage deck cargoes. The Merchant Shipping Code, brought in by Mr. Shaw Lefevre in 1869, and only laid aside owing to the pressure of more urgent political controversies, contained a provision for imposing tonnage dues on deck cargoes. We may venture to hope that in the more quiet times in which we now live, an opportunity may be found for the various and important legislation relating to shipping included in the Code.

So much on the question of deck cargoes of timber. The stowage of agricultural machinery and carriages on deck would, however, equally fall within the prohibition of Mr. Plimsoll's Bill; and here the restriction would be productive of serious injury to trade. If it were necessary that threshing machines should be taken to pieces, in order to be despatched from Hull to Hamburg, our manufacturers would no longer be able to compete with foreign makers for the supply of implements to the German farmers. It would indeed be far better that we should lose our trade, than that the lives of our seamen should be imperilled; but there is no necessity for absolutely prohibiting steamers from carrying machinery on deck. Free circulation on deck is not so necessary on a steamer, where the sails are only auxiliary to the steam-power, as it is in a full-rigged sailing ship. Even in a steamer, however, it is dangerous to encumber the decks too much. It is, therefore, a question of degree. Where four threshing machines may be safely carried, it might be dangerous to carry twelve. The proper limit must be considered, in the first instance, by the shipowner, upon his undivided responsibility. If he fails to do his duty, the Government has now the power to step in, to compel him to restrict the loading of his vessel; and he may be punished, as for a misdemeanour, for obvious imprudence.

Mr. Plimsoll proposes that there should be special licenses from the Board of Trade, authorizing the carrying on the deck of the licensed ship of any specified goods or any particular class of goods. There is, it seems to me, a merely nominal distinction between the

system of special licenses, and the power of detaining any vessel in port, if laden beyond the amount, which, if licenses were required, she would be authorized to carry. In either case the Board of Trade may effectually prohibit the practice of overloading.

In closing my observations on this branch of the subject, I cannot but express once more a sincere regret that it is impracticable to lay down some positive regulations for the prevention of excessive loading. There is reason to believe that numerous ships are sent to sea overladen, and that some are lost in consequence; but I am of opinion that no regulations can be framed, for the purpose of securing a sufficient freeboard, which would not inflict grave injustice, more especially affecting owners of vessels of small tonnage, engaged in the coasting trade.

The other proposal contained in Mr. Plimsoll's Bill is to the effect that every British ship shall be surveyed, unless provided with a certificate of survey, and classed at Lloyd's, in the Liverpool books, or by some other British or foreign corporation, approved by the Board of Trade. At first sight it would appear not unreasonable to require that every ship should be able to produce a surveyor's certificate of seaworthiness; but there are objections almost insuperable, which I shall endeavour briefly to explain.

A certificate of seaworthiness from a Government official tends to remove responsibility from those persons, on whom it ought to rest, and to deprive the Board of Trade, as the public prosecutor of blameworthy shipowners, of the right to bring home to them their proper share of blame for avoidable disasters.

The official survey, which all ships sailing under the French, Belgian, and Italian flags are compelled to undergo, has become a mere formality. The underwriters and merchants entirely disregard the certificates thus obtained, and refuse to accept them as a guarantee either for seaworthiness or fitness to carry a dry and perishable cargo.

It would follow as a necessary consequence of the introduction of a Government survey, and the acceptance of certificates, granted by private associations, as of equal authority with those issued by the Government, that the regulations of the private associations must be approved by the Board of Trade. Immense evils would undoubtedly follow from the exercise of such a control over the genius and invention of our shipbuilders. The proportions of length to breadth, of steam-power to tonnage, involve considerations of the most serious and subtle character in regard to the form and construction of ships. These, indeed, are problems, which cannot be solved without much experiment at sea; and this practical experience will be first accumulated by those engaged in the merchant service, and be derived from them by the Board of Trade, under whose authority it has been proposed that they should work.

It is further to be observed that the survey of a ship must be minute and thorough, and repeated at frequent intervals, or it will be impossible to grant an honest certificate of seaworthiness. A shipowner, whose only motive for keeping his ship in seaworthy condition is his fear of the surveyor, will probably be negligent or parsimonious in many details of essential importance to safety at sea, but which cannot be regulated by Government inspection. The present writer has fitted out yachts of various classes, ranging from the smallest dimensions to considerable tonnage, and he can testify, from experience, how impossible it is to secure that ships shall be perfectly equipped in every respect by the mere inspection of surveyors, which, however conscientious, must be cursory and incomplete in many ways.

"It is," said Mr. Farrar, "utterly impossible for any surveyor to form an accurate judgment about a ship and her machinery, when she is presented to him completely finished, painted, and cemented. . . . In my position, I perhaps see more of the difficulties of a survey than of its benefits; but I do see that it may produce some very great evils, and I am the more afraid of it, because the difficulties are insidious evils: they do not appear on the surface. Last week, a very competent surveyor sent up to say, 'Ought you not to require that every ship shall have a double crank to her pump, in case one breaks; and ought not every ship to be provided with a cold-chisel axe, to cut metal in case of danger?' Captain Murray says, 'I should never think of going to sea without these things.' But where are you to stop? If we were to lay down strict rules, every shipowner or builder would build down to our rules, and that is the danger of which I am afraid."

Under the present rules, the Board of Trade require that the compasses of every sea-going passenger-ship shall be properly adjusted; but there are no means of ascertaining the competency of the persons whose certificates as to adjustment are accepted by the Board. I called attention to this inconsistency in a paper read before the Institute of Naval Architects; and the Council of that body, in commenting on my paper in their annual report, called the attention of the Government to the importance of giving a definite professional status to the adjusters of compasses. If the present rules remain in force, it is desirable that the qualifications of adjusters should be ascertained by an appropriate examination.

The objections, which I have urged to the system of a Government survey, are not taken, as indeed it will have clearly appeared, from a shipowner's point of view. I take my stand on the essential principle that complete responsibility for sending his ship to sea in a seaworthy condition should rest upon the shipowner; that negligence of duty in this regard should be punished as a grave offence; and that it cannot be so punished, if the shipowner is shielded from the

consequences of his neglect, by being furnished with a Government certificate.

The opposition to the proposal for a Government survey has been represented by fervid declamation as likely to come from wealthy shipowners, rich in gains ill-gotten by risking the lives of honest seamen, compelled by necessity to go to sea in rotten ships. The very contrary is the case. The wealthier shipowners are almost universally owners of ships classed in a high grade at Lloyd's or elsewhere, with a view to insurance on the most favourable terms. If their ships, like those of the Cunard and some other famous lines, do not happen to be classed, it is certainly not because they are not kept up in such a manner as to satisfy the most exacting requirements. No, the outcry, which would follow the imposition of severe conditions as to equipment and repairs by Government surveyors, would come, probably to the great surprise of the uninitiated public, from poor mariners and their families, who have passed their lives in the too crazy ships of which they are the owners. When vessels of this class, however unfit to pass a rigorous survey, have been safely navigated from port to port along the coast for a quarter of a century and more, would it not be esteemed an arbitrary thing that an official of the Government should at last swoop down on these unfortunate people, and, by prohibiting their vessels from again proceeding to sea, unless repaired at a cost entirely beyond the means of the owners, deprive them of their only means of earning a livelihood? It will be remembered that a vessel in the coasting trade, having almost always a harbour under her lee, and being manned by a crew, familiar, from their long local experience, with every sign of the coming weather, with every available creek and harbour, and all the sets of tide, and every danger of the navigation, may, if great caution be used, be safely conducted from port to port; although, if entrusted to a less experienced crew, the danger would be so great, that the surveyors would be under an obligation to detain the ship in port. With these considerations before us, it is obviously impracticable to draw the line equitably between the vessels that should be detained, and those which, although equally unseaworthy, may be allowed to go to sea in reliance on the discretion and special experience of their masters and crews. It would be an injustice, which the legislature would never sanction, to deprive a multitude of poor men of their only means of earning their bread, for the sake of restraining a few nefarious shipowners, who can already be reached through the existing laws; and it seems clear accordingly that a proposal for a general and continual survey of our merchant shipping by the Government ought not to be adopted.

It were needless to continue further discussion of the specific proposals, referred to the consideration of the recent Royal Commission. It will, however, be remarked that no attempt has been made

in Mr. Plimsoll's Bill to deal with two other principal causes of loss of life at sea. I refer to collisions and to the ill effects of our laws relating to insurance, under the operation of which it may, under certain circumstances, be a pecuniary benefit to the shipowner to lose his ship.

As to collisions, the suggestion, offered by the Royal Commission, that officers and look-out men should be more severely punished for neglect of duty, will probably be found to be the best practicable means of securing greater watchfulness.

The limitation of insurance upon ships is a more important and a far more complicated problem. But insurance lies at the very root of the question of security of life at sea; and the Legislature ought not to be deterred by an appreciation of the inherent difficulty from making an earnest effort to grapple with the question. As it was plainly put by Mr. Harper, the able secretary of the Salvage Association at Lloyd's, "it is in the very nature of things and in human nature, that a rule of law, which enables the assured to recover more than the value of the property insured, must have a tendency to make the shipowner or master negligent. If a man is in this position that, if he keep his ship, it is worth £8,000 to him, and, if he totally loses, it is worth £10,000 or £12,000 to him, what other deduction can you possibly draw but that he must have a bias in the direction of trying to get the £10,000 or £12,000? . . . If you were to do away with insurance altogether, I think the business of this commission would be at an end directly. . . . The care of a ship divides itself into a hundred particulars; care in the appointment of a master, care in the selection of a crew, care in the condition of the ship, when she leaves, and general watchfulness; and I say that it is certainly likely to be relaxed in the case of an owner, who knows that if his ship goes to the bottom, perhaps from the very circumstance that he has not paid sufficient attention to her, he not only gets the whole of his money, invested in the ship, but a large profit besides, into his pocket."

The dangers, arising from the anomalous condition of the law and from the complete indemnity from loss, which, in any case, it should still be permitted to the assured to secure, have been further aggravated by the keen competition for business of this description, both on the part of rival insurance companies, and from the excessive number of private underwriters at Lloyd's.

The owner of a ship may, as it is explained in the report of the Commission, "insure his ship for her full value; he can also insure his cargo, he can insure the freight, and, beyond these insurances, he can insure ten per cent. profit on the cargo." If a ship bound to Calcutta, via the Suez Canal, be lost on the outward voyage, the whole of the amount insured will be recovered, although the owner will have saved, owing to the loss of the ship at the inception of the



voyage, a large proportion of the seamen's wages, the dues for the Suez canal, port charges in Calcutta, and expenses in London on the ship's return. Here the owner is a clear gainer by the loss.

Again, a ship is said to have sustained a constructive total loss, if she has been damaged to such an extent that the cost of repairs would exceed the value of the ship, when repaired. Under the existing law, the shipowner's interest may often be to make out a case of total rather than partial loss.

Again, while it is the interest of the underwriter that the ship should be insured for her full value, because, in case of partial damage under three per cent. he pays nothing, on the other hand, the shipowner has an interest in undervaluing his ship, for he has a less premium to pay, and a better chance of recovering the amount of his partial loss from the underwriter.

There are objections to valued policies, that is to say, policies, in which the value of the property is fixed arbitrarily by agreement between the shipowner and the underwriter, and sometimes at an amount greatly in excess of her actual value. Valued policies have, however, been found of such utility for the convenient conduct of commercial transactions, that the Royal Commission have not thought fit to recommend any alteration of the law, relating to valued policies, even in cases of total loss. These cases are not more than as one to twenty of the proportion they bear to the number of partial losses; and the evils of the system of valued policies are not in the case of partial losses of a very serious nature.

Some of the anomalies of our law of insurance tell unfairly against the shipowner. He cannot recover from the underwriter the amount of the wages he is bound to pay to the master and crew of the ship during the time she is under repair. Again, in voyage policies, any deviation from the voyage, however slight, avoids the policy.

The recommendations of the recent Commission on the subject of insurance were of necessity cautious, and restricted in their scope. They have advised that the shipowner's liability for damage to property or person should be unlimited, and that he should be made liable under Lord Campbell's Act to the family of the deceased seaman, in cases where the death of the seaman has been occasioned by the ship being sent to sea in an unseaworthy condition. They have expressed an opinion that "any provision in a bill of lading or other agreement, having for its object or effect to avoid or limit the liability of the shipowner in such cases ought to have no legal validity." Finally, they have said that the "shipowner should not be enabled to recover his insurance, whether under a time or voyage policy, when it could be shown that he or his agent had not adopted reasonable means of making and maintaining his ship in a seaworthy condition, and that unseaworthiness was the cause of the loss."

These are all the positive recommendations of the Royal Commission ; but readers of the Report cannot have failed to perceive from the brief expositions of the law, which it contains, that an urgent necessity exists for a careful examination and revision of our present rules.

The law relating to insurance has been made what it is, as well by the decision of judges, as by the express enactment of Parliament. The judges have sought in their successive decisions to observe, on the one hand, the cardinal principle that the sum recoverable under a policy of marine insurance should not exceed a fair indemnity to the assured for his loss. On the other hand, where an agreement has been entered into between a shipowner and an underwriter, both of whom are presumably perfectly acquainted with the nature of their mutual obligations, there is an obvious objection to allow either party to escape the performance of his contract, except in a case of fraud.

The law on this subject, inevitably complex and difficult, has become the more complicated from want of a general code. I cannot express my own views as to the course we ought to follow more clearly than by quoting a few passages from the Report, in the preparation of which I have taken a humble part.

"Our whole system of insurance law requires careful revision, for not only does it allow the assured in some cases to recover more than the amount of the loss actually sustained by him, but it also, on the other hand, deprives him of an indemnity in cases, in which he ought to be protected by insurance. . . .

"It is difficult to interfere in the complex arrangements, which have grown up with the growth of trade, without incurring the risk of some new danger, while we are endeavouring to promote safety at sea. It would, therefore, be unjust to interfere with the contract between the assured and the underwriter ; unless our whole system of marine insurance were completely revised and amended, so as to restore marine insurance to what is its true character and only legitimate object, namely, a contract of indemnity, which should protect the assured from losses occasioned by events over which he has no control." . . .

"A complete and thorough revision of our law relating to marine insurance is, however, a task of equal importance, difficulty, and delicacy, requiring evidence of an extensive character, and necessitating a very lengthened and careful investigation ; and it touches directly on so many subjects, unconnected with the security of life at sea, on which it has only an indirect and somewhat remote bearing, that it did not properly fall within the scope of a ' Commission appointed to examine the causes of the deplorable loss of life at sea in British vessels.' . . . It is important that, before the task is undertaken, an attempt should be made to induce foreign nations to concur with

us in framing and adopting a general code of insurance law. To alter the English law of marine insurance to any considerable extent, might have the effect of throwing the business of marine insurance into the hands of foreigners, and there is so much insurance of foreign property in England, as well as of English property abroad, that it is most desirable that the law of marine insurance should, as far as possible, be the same amongst all commercial nations, and an examination of foreign codes leads reasonably to the conclusion that there is no insuperable difficulty in the way of attaining this object."

A Commission, appointed to revise the law of marine insurance, should be strong, both in commercial experience, and in the knowledge of legal practice, and the principles of jurisprudence. No subject could more worthily engage the attention of the Government; and it is to be hoped that the suggestion of the recent Commission that the subject should be fully considered, may not be unheeded by the present administration.


It will have been apparent from my observations on the proposals of Mr. Plimsoll that I am quite unable to accept them, as likely in any way to promote the safety of life at sea. It will, I trust, be equally evident that I regard the agitation of the public mind on the subject of unseaworthy ships, as having been productive, nevertheless, of eminently valuable and important results. There is an inevitable tendency even in the most vigorously administered public department to occasional fits of drowsiness. The Board of Trade has been somewhat roughly aroused to action; but the stimulus they have received has already led to some useful legislation, and will, doubtless, be followed by further legal and administrative changes, which cannot fail to prove a wholesome check on unscrupulous shipowners, and foolhardy and careless seamen. The Board of Trade have shown a commendable independence in not surrendering their own better judgment to pressure from without. They have rightly maintained that it is their province to preserve an attitude of observation, rather than to assume responsibilities, more properly belonging to the ship-owners themselves.

Nothing could be more fatal to British maritime Enterprise than a system of official inspection over every detail of this progressive and ever-changing branch of trade. The spirit of adventure, which animated and so eminently distinguished our forefathers would never have been developed, if they had been trained up in reliance on the protective care of the Government, rather than on their own independent forethought. How many expeditions, fruitful of blessing to mankind, would have been prohibited, if the sanction of a surveyer had been required before the explorers were allowed to set forth on their voyage. As it was well put by Mr. Milner Gibson, in an able speech at the Trinity House, Columbus would never have won the honour of being the discoverer of America, if, in his time, there had been a Board of

Trade at Cadiz, with a president at their head, responsible for the equipment of every ship in the port, and full of laudable zeal. The preparation of those quaint caravels for a voyage over an unknown sea to an imaginary land, indefinitely remote, would have filled a responsible public department with intolerable apprehension. The expedition would not have been allowed to start, and America would have remained undiscovered.

The mariners of England are inheritors of the glories of Drake and Raleigh, of Grenville and Frobisher, of Cook, and others in more modern times, whose illustrious names are too many for enumeration ; and it would be a boon of doubtful value, to substitute state control for self-reliance, the care of a too paternal government for manly independence. Our high positions among the maritime powers was not first attained under such a system ; and a change of policy in our legislation could only be justified by the existence of evils, irremediable by other means.

THOMAS BRASSEY.



## STAR-GAUGING: SIR W. HERSCHEL'S TWO METHODS.

### PART II.

A NEW interest is given to Sir W. Herschel's researches when his earlier papers are correctly interpreted. We see him preparing in 1785 to deal with the most stupendous of all the problems of astronomy. A noble theory of the universe had presented itself to his mind, and already he had carried out a series of observations tending to indicate the proportions of the sidereal system if that theory were true. But now he was preparing for labours of a more arduous kind, the thorough examination, in fact, of the stellar heavens so far as they were visible from his northern point of view. No celestial objects, except the members of our solar system, and the mysterious comets, were to be regarded as unimportant in this inquiry. The stars by their distribution in greater or less profusion, the nebulae and clusters within our system as representing various stages of stellar aggregation, those external to it as indicating its more striking characteristics, and other orders of objects (not suspected when he began his labours), as affording new evidence respecting its structure,—all might throw light on the theory he had advanced, or might, when carefully studied, afford reason for abandoning or modifying that theory.

I apprehend, then, that had the notice of astronomers been attracted, at this early stage, to the work on which Herschel was entering, they could not but have awaited with extreme interest the result of his labours. It does not appear that this was actually the

case. It may be that the difficulty and complexity of the problem he had taken in-hand, or perchance the quiet and unobtrusive manner in which he presented it as it then appeared to him, or some other cause may have been in operation, but certain it is that very little notice was taken of Herschel's special work then, or during the remainder of his life. None helped him, though his researches were manifestly far beyond the strength of any single worker. No comments on his stellar observations, so far as they related to the great problem he was attacking, were made by contemporary astronomers.\* It was alone, but confidently, that he advanced into the mysterious depths surrounding our solar system, seeking, by the dim light which made the darkness visible, to determine, if it might be, the forms dimly discernible within those gloomy wildernesses of space.

Many years passed before he again addressed the scientific world on the great subject which he had taken as the "ultimate object of his observations." Eleven years† after the enunciation of the theory described in the former part of this essay, we find him pointing out, as the result of his researches during that long period, that the hypothesis of a general uniformity of structure in the galaxy "is too far removed from the truth to be depended upon." And although this does not imply a definite withdrawal from the theory of 1785, yet the stress now laid by Herschel on probable varieties of structure is a novel feature in his theoretical treatment of the subject.

But it was in 1802, seventeen years, he it noticed, after the theory had appeared which is so commonly referred to as though it were the *result* of Herschel's observations instead of the occasion of them, that Herschel first began to present an entirely new view of the general structure of the universe. In the essay of that year he described the results to which he had been led by the study of double stars. As Struve has well pointed out, there was much in Herschel's work in this direction which naturally suggested the adoption of new views on the wider subject of the sidereal universe itself. He had begun to observe double stars, not with the idea of recognising any connection between the components of these objects, but on the contrary, in the belief that double stars are simply stars which, though really at enormous distances from each other, chance to lie nearly in the same direction as seen by the terrestrial observer.

\* To the general public Herschel was known as the discoverer of the Georginum Sidus, the observer of supposed volcanic eruptions on the moon, and for a variety of other such discoveries as are easily understood—or misunderstood (which comes to the same thing so far as general fame is concerned).

† The paper of 1789 contained a list of 1000 nebulae discovered by Herschel, and was prefaced by a remarkable essay on the gradual development of stellar nebulae. The reasoning does not readily admit of condensation, and this part of the paper is too long to be quoted in full.

He conceived (independently, we may suppose, though Galileo and Christian Huyghens had anticipated him) the idea of determining the distance of the brighter, and presumably the nearer, member of such a pair of stars, by noticing how much the orbital motion of the earth caused the brighter star to shift in position with respect to the fainter (necessarily much less affected by the earth's motion if really much farther away than the brighter). It would be interesting to note how the prosecution of this task, begun long before 1784, gradually led Herschel to the conception of binary systems, and later to the certain assurance that there are many systems of this class in the celestial depths. Still more interesting would be the history of the steps by which he was led from the same starting-point, but on another course, to the discovery of the motion of our sun through space, and therefore to the recognition of that most stupendous of the phenomena presented by the heavens to us,—the motions of all the suns accompanied by their attendant systems through the interstellar regions. But these matters, full of interest though they are, must here be touched on only incidentally, in their relation to the processes of star-gauging, by which Herschel hoped in a more direct manner to ascertain the structure of the universe. It was natural that the recognition of binary stars,—that is, of pairs of stars not merely connected by an optical relation, but specially associated by the bonds of their mutual attraction, should suggest to Herschel the conception of other and more complicated systems, and that he should be prepared thenceforth to find in the star depths other relations than those which the analogy of our sun had suggested. Our sun is an insulated star, the components of a "binary" are associated stars. May not higher orders of association exist affecting other stars than those manifestly belonging to clusters or nebulae? For note that, although the conception of associated stars had already (as I have shown) been abundantly recognised by Herschel in the paper of 1785, yet the cases in which it had been recognized were those in which it was obvious at a single view; the study of double stars had led to the conclusion that stars not obviously associated, stars to which the method of star-gauging would have been applied without any suspicion, might be so near as to be bound together, and, as it were, separated from other stars by their mutual attraction. Herschel never applied his first method of star-gauging to any field of view containing a cluster of stars, in such sort as to infer from the large number of stars in the cluster an enormous extension of the sidereal system in the direction of that field of view. He himself pointed out the objection to such an inference—the fact, namely, that a cluster is manifestly a rounded group of stars, not a region of the sky which is rich because of enormous extension in the line of sight. But until many double stars had been proved to be "binaries," or pairs of stars "whereof

the one more bright is circled by the other," he would not have thought of excluding fields in which double, triple, and multiple stars were numerous. Now, however, (in 1802), that he has to describe the recognition of binary stars, we find him for the first time drawing a distinction between insulated stars and all orders of multiple stars.

It is worthy of notice, especially by those who knew what interest Sir W. Herschel took in the subject of life in other worlds,\* that he regarded the insulated suns as alone, in all probability, the centres of planetary systems resembling our own. "The question will arise," he says, "whether every insulated star be a sun like ours, attended with planets, satellites, and numerous comets? And here, as nothing appears against the supposition, we may from analogy admit the probability of it. But, were we to extend this argument to other sidereal constructions, or still further to every star of the heavens, as has been done frequently, I should not only hesitate, but even think that, from what will be said of stars which enter into complicated sidereal systems, the contrary is far more likely to be the case; and that probably we can only look for solar systems among insulated stars."

Observing, then, that in 1802 Herschel first presented the distinction between insulated stars and "those which enter into complicated sidereal systems," a capital interest attaches to whatever he might at that time say about the Milky Way. In 1785, he had so fully believed the Milky Way to be only the richer part of our sidereal system, that he took the name Milky Way as a convenient title for the whole system, and called those nebulae which he believed to be external sidereal systems "Milky Ways," as adequately distinguishing them from the clusters and nebulae which form parts of our stellar system. Let us see whether in 1802 he so viewed the Milky Way—for we may be assured that if he did, his views in 1802 were in the main very much like those he had held in 1785, whereas if he did not, his views were greatly altered. His words are decisive on this all-important point:—

"The stars we consider as insulated are also surrounded by a magnificent collection of innumerable stars, called the Milky Way, which must occasion a very powerful balance of opposite attractions to hold the intermediate stars in a state of rest. For though our sun and all the stars we see, may truly be said to be in the plane of the Milky Way, yet *I am now convinced by a long inspection and continued examination of it, that the Milky Way itself consists of stars very differently scattered from those which are immediately about us.*"

So much as to the general and more important view of the

\* His discussion of the question, whether life can exist in our own sun, is, perhaps, the strongest extant proof of the interest which this subject had for him.



question. It is clear that by the words, "a long inspection and continued examination of the Milky Way," Herschel refers to the seventeen years of observation which had followed the enunciation of the views he held in 1785. It is clear also from the words, "I am *now* convinced" that he had changed his views, apart from the proof of the fact which I have deduced from the comparison of his statements in 1785, with the results to which he had been led in 1802. I mean, that no nice analysis of his words is required to show that in 1802 he came before the scientific world with entirely new ideas as to the construction of the universe; since he says as much very plainly,—*almost* as plainly as (we shall presently see) he stated the fact nine years later in the preface to the remarkable paper of 1811.

But let us see in what the change of view consisted:—

"On a very slight examination,"\* he says, speaking of the Milky Way, "it will appear that this immense starry aggregation is by no means uniform. The stars of which it is composed are very unequally scattered, and show evident marks of clustering together into many separate allotments. By referring to some one of these clustering collections in the heavens, what will be said of them will be much better understood than if we were to treat of them in a general way." He selects the fine portion of the Milky Way which occupies the lower half of the "Cross" in the constellation Cygnus (a group which may fairly be called the Northern Cross). Here he says "the stars are clustering with a kind of division between them, so that we may suppose them to be clustering towards two different regions. By a computation founded on observations which ascertain the number of stars in different fields of view, it appears that our space 'in Cygnus,' † taking an average breadth of about five degrees of it, contains more than 331,000 stars;‡ and admitting them to be clustering two different ways, we have 165,000 stars for each clustering collection. Now the above-mentioned milky appearances deserve the name of clustering collections,§ as they are certainly much brighter about the middle, and fainter near their undefined

\* One might pause here to ask whether, speaking as he does here of a "very slight examination," Herschel can be referring to results to which he had been led "by a long inspection and continued examination." But I think we need not find any difficulty in this, since results acquired with great labour may need but a very slight examination to indicate highly significant results.

† That is the selected portion of the Milky Way.

‡ More stars in this small space, as viewed by Herschel's 18-inch reflector, than in the whole northern heavens, including this space as viewed with Argelander's 28-inch telescope. And yet my chart of Argelander's results presents 324,000 stars as a collection bewildering in its richness.

§ The reader's attention is specially directed to the fact that the clustering collections here spoken of are not telescopic small clusters. They are two of the cloud-like masses which the Milky Way presents to ordinary vision on any dark, clear night.

borders. For in my sweeps of the heavens it has been fully ascertained that the brightness of the Milky Way arises only from stars, and that their compression increases according to the brightness of the Milky Way."

It is not easy to overrate the importance of the results embodied in the reasoning here quoted. Here are two rich regions of the Milky Way (which, according to the theory of 1785, indicated two projecting regions of the stellar system,) now viewed as clustering collections, and selected as typical instances of want of uniformity in the structure of the Milky Way. They are not clustering collections in appearance only—that of course would have been no new fact, and would not have been worth announcing to the scientific world; but they are real aggregations of stars, surrounded on all sides by relatively vacant space. Between us, therefore, and these rich clustering regions, there lies a vast space not so richly filled with stars. The continuity of structure within the sidereal system, which constituted the very basis of the first method of star-gauging is accordingly disproved. Thus the *first method of star-gauging is shown to be inapplicable in this case and in all similar cases. Moreover the case being typical of the general want of uniformity in the structure of the Milky Way, the first method of star-gauging fails for the Milky Way itself, to interpret the nature of which it had been originally devised.*

If any doubt remain in the reader's mind as to Herschel's real meaning—if, for instance, it be supposed possible that Herschel may after all have referred to aggregation in particular parts of the heavens, as distinguished from aggregation in particular regions of space—then what Herschel proceeds to say respecting the great rich regions in Cygnus, can scarcely fail to remove all question as to his meaning. Yet, before quoting his words, I must premise that, again we have to deal with a passage which, though really unmistakable, requires careful attention before its real import can be apprehended:—

"We may indeed," he says (as if expressing hesitation, though really about to render his inferences more certain), "partly ascribe the increase both of brightness and of apparent compression" in these clustering regions, "to a greater depth of the space which contains the stars, but this will equally tend to show their clustering condition; for since the increase of brightness is gradual, *the space containing the clustering stars must tend to a spherical form*, if the gradual increase of brightness is to be explained by the situation of the stars." In other words, whether we consider the greater central richness as due to the clustering of the stars towards the central parts of these groups, or to the shape of the groups themselves, or partly consider both causes of central aggregation, we are still led to the conclusion that the groups are roughly spherical in shape.

As the whole theory of 1785 was concerned in the reasoning here presented, I cannot too specially invite the reader's attention to the result to which Herschel had been led. I may illustrate the distinction between Herschel's views in 1802 and those which he held in 1785 in the following manner: We know that when a moderately thick low-lying mist covers a level plain, an observer placed on the plain sees through the mist above him, while near the direction of his horizon it is impenetrable, because the line of sight extends so much farther through it in such a direction. Now, let us suppose the case of a being—a visitant, let us say, from another world—not familiar as we all are with the appearances commonly presented by clouds, mists, or fogs, and introduced gradually to their various forms. If placed on a plain in the circumstances above described, he would readily convince himself that the impenetrability of the air towards the horizon was due to the fact that a mist within which he was himself placed had the shape of a flat stratum, so that where he looked along or nearly along the direction of the stratum's extension, the line of sight passed through a much greater range of mist. And we may conceive him attempting to determine the shape (the relative thickness and extension) of the misty stratum, by a method analogous to Sir W. Herschel's first method of star-gauging, estimating the extension of the mist in different directions by the apparent density of the mist in those directions. But now, suppose our observer introduced to a new state of things. Conceive him placed on a level plain, with mist enough low down to hide all terrestrial objects which otherwise might guide his eye, and that the sky for a considerable distance from the horizon is wholly cloud-laden, but not mist-enshrouded, the sky overhead being visible, with occasional cloud masses suspended there, while more and more clouds are in view the farther the line of sight is directed from the point overhead. We can readily conceive that the first interpretation he would assign to the observed appearances would correspond with the result of his former observations. He would suppose that towards the horizon there was a great extension of mist-laden air, and that there was also a great extension of misty matter towards those parts of the upper sky which showed an impenetrable cloudiness. He would not at first be prepared to conceive a state of things unlike that which he had formerly recognized, or to suppose there was not as in that case a *continuity of mist-laden air* between himself and those regions where he perceived dense cloudiness. Gradually, however, the idea would present itself that the round-looking cloudy regions were really round in space,—not bounded merely by an apparent outline on the sky, but by a rounded surface, *outside* of which he, the observer, was placed. A variety of observations, so familiar to us that we hardly recognize the process of reasoning by which the mind becomes satisfied with their signi-

ficance, would before long satisfy our observer of the justice of this conclusion. He would soon see reason to believe that not only the clouds seen separately overhead, but those confusedly intermixed towards the horizon through the effects of foreshortening, were in reality rounded masses of mist-laden air. Now, *just as markedly as the groups of clouds which are seen on a summer's day differ from a low-lying mist (so far as their relation to the observer is concerned) so completely does the system of great stellar clusterings recognized in the Milky Way by Herschel in 1802, differ from the stratum of stars, small clusters, and nebulae, of which in 1785 he supposed the Milky Way to be the foreshortened and the stars of our constellations to be the transverse view.*

But it does not follow that Herschel in giving up the most striking result to which his first method of star-gauging had seemed to lead, was bound to give up also the method itself. It had failed for certain cases, simply because the principle on which it was based was not applicable to those cases; but wherever there was any approach to the uniformity of scattering on which the method depends there the method might still be applied. Precisely as our imagined observer might still continue to test the shape and extension of a mist in which he found himself involved, by noting its apparent density towards different directions, abandoning that method only where he had reason to believe that cloudiness was due to mist within which he was *not* placed, so Herschel might still refer the richness of many of his star-gauges to great extension of stars in the corresponding directions, abandoning such inferences only where he had reason to believe that he was analysing the wealth of great clustering aggregations outside the bounds of which our solar system is situated.

But although after 1802 Herschel still occasionally referred to his first series of star-gauges, we do not find that he any longer regarded them in the same light as in 1785.

As my subject now is star-gauging according to the two methods devised by Herschel, I scarcely feel justified in entering at any length into another striking feature of the paper of 1802. And yet it may be well to notice how marked Herschel's whole conception of the constitution of the universe changed at that epoch. Not only did he in 1802 advance his proof of the association between double and multiple stars, deducing thence and otherwise illustrating his inferences respecting wider laws of association, but he also selected this occasion to abandon the theory that, the great irresolvable nebulae are composed of stars. He now regarded some among them as "possessing the quality of self-luminous, milky luminosity, and possibly at no great distance from us." \*

\* It is worthy of notice how readily a logically trained mind recognizes incongruities in results apparently presented with the highest possible authority. It is

In 1811, Herschel published another remarkable essay, mainly relating to the milky luminosity which he had now recognized, not

well known that Humboldt, quoting Arago's account of the results of Herschel's labours—so that the combined weight of these three names seemed to authorise the statement—presents our sidereal system as a “starry island, or nebula,” forming a “lens-shaped, flattened, and everywhere detached stratum.” Herbert Spencer, reasoning on the relations presented by Humboldt, shows the incongruity and absurdity of the statements (1) that this our island nebula has such and such proportions, and (2) that the nebulae are remote sidereal systems, whether we assume, with Humboldt and Arago, that the differences of star magnitude are due to differences of distance, or reject this assumption. In a letter written to a weekly journal on Jan. 31, 1870, Mr. Spencer, after quoting the passages in which he had shown this, remarks that “when they were written spectrum analysis had not yielded the conclusive proof which we now possess, that many nebulae consist of matter in a diffused form. But quite apart from the evidence yielded by spectrum analysis, it seems to me that the incongruities and contradictions which may be evolved from the hypothesis that nebulae are remote sidereal systems, amply suffice to show that hypothesis to be untenable.” Thus, in this case Spencer was led by abstract reasoning to reject a conclusion which, so far as his authority could be trusted, had the combined weight in its favour of Sir W. Herschel's opinion, Arago's, and Humboldt's, and which astronomical authorities had never been at the pains to question. Yet the conclusion to which Spencer was thus led on the comparatively slight evidence he possessed was, in reality, the same which Sir W. Herschel had adopted in 1802, after a score of years of persistent study of the heavens. Comparing the value of Spencer's abstract reasoning with that of the enormous mass of observed facts which astronomers had been collecting during a half-century since Herschel's day—so long as these facts remained unsifted—we find a curious illustration of the mistake made by those who would divorce observation from theory. In the same paper by Mr. Spencer, there occurs the following passage:—“The spaces which precede or follow simple nebulae,” says Arago, “and, *à fortiori*, groups of nebulae, contain generally few stars. Herschel found this rule to be invariable. Thus every time that, during a short interval, no star approached, in virtue of the diurnal motion, to place itself in the field of his motionless telescope, he was accustomed to say to the secretary who assisted him, “Prepare to write; nebulae are about to arrive.” How does this fact consist with the hypothesis that nebulae are remote galaxies? If there were but one nebula, it would be a curious coincidence were this one nebula so placed in the distant regions of space as to agree in direction with a starless spot in our own sidereal system. If there were but two nebulae, and both were so placed, the coincidence would be excessively strange. What, then, shall we say on finding that they are habitually so placed? (the last five words replace some that are possibly a little too strong). . . . When to the fact that the general mass of nebulae are antithetical in position to the general mass of stars, we add the fact that local regions of nebulae are regions where stars are scarce, and the further fact that single nebulae are habitually found in comparatively starless spots, does not the proof of a physical connection become overwhelming?” Here Mr. Spencer has deduced from the same facts which Arago and other astronomers have quoted in favour of the theory of external nebulae, the inference which Sir W. Herschel arrived at, as we may see from the passages quoted in pages 450, 451 of the first part of this essay (*Contemporary Review* for August). It is singular, however, how little weight the argument, from the improbability of repeated coincidences, here correctly applied by Spencer, has with ordinary minds. Michell employed this argument skillfully more than a century ago, in effect demonstrating the laws of association between certain groups of stars: but it was not till Sir W. Herschel had actually watched one star circling around another that even astronomers began to believe in such systems; and a third of a century later still, the idea was not accepted save by a few astronomers. Abstract reasoning must be strong indeed (and easy to follow, also) to overcome the inertia of slow apprehension.

only in nebulous patches but spread thinly over large parts of the heavens, and had learned to distinguish from the milky light produced by multitudes of distant stars. His observations and deductions are full of interest, and especially interesting are his ideas as to the evolution of stars from the matter producing milky nebulous light. However, except in so far as they indicate his changed views respecting the constitution of the universe, these matters, worthy of study though they are in themselves, do not here concern us. There is one passage, however, from the essay of 1811, which cannot be too carefully studied by those who would rightly apprehend the nature and results of Herschel's work during the twenty-six years which had now elapsed since he enunciated the stratum theory of the sidereal system:—"I must freely confess," he says, "that by continuing my sweeps of the heavens, my opinion of the arrangement of the stars and their magnitudes, and of some other particulars has undergone a gradual change; and indeed, when the novelty of the subject is considered we cannot be surprised that many things formerly taken for granted should, on examination, prove to be different from what they were generally but incautiously supposed to be. For instance, an equal scattering of the stars may be admitted in certain calculations; but when we examine the Milky Way or the closely compressed clusters of stars, of which my catalogues have recorded so many instances, this supposed equality of scattering must be given up. We may also have supposed nebulae to be no other than clusters of stars disguised by their very great distance; but a longer experience and a better acquaintance with the nature of nebulae, will not allow a general admission of such a principle; although undoubtedly a cluster of stars may assume a nebular appearance when it is too remote for us to discern the stars of which it is composed."

It will be observed that in this passage Herschel abandons two of the principles on which his views in 1785 had been founded,\* the general uniformity of stellar distribution, and the theory that all nebulae, whether components of our system or external, are formed of stars. Each of the two principles here given up was essential to that theory (in its entirety), while the first of the two principles was cardinal even as respects the general relations of the theory. Two links of the chain of ideas enunciated by Herschel in 1785 were now rejected (as in fact broken under the strain of observation). One of these, at least, had to bear so large a part of the theory, that with its failure the theory itself came to the ground.

It must have been, then, at about this time, certainly not later, that the necessity for a new method of star-gauging presented itself to Herschel's mind. He was, however, too busily engaged in observing nebulae and in endeavouring to detect the law of their

\* Compare the italicized passage in the quotation at page 452, *Contemporary Review* for August.

development, to enter on any scheme of observation for determining the constitution of the universe. It is necessary to notice, however, before we pass to the new attack made by Herschel on the wider subject; that he now recognized a much more complete series of celestial objects than he had imagined in 1785. Then, and in the remarkable paper of 1789, he pictured various degrees of stellar aggregation, from uniformly scattered stars to the most compressed clusters. Now, he placed at the lower extremity of the scale of celestial objects the widely spread luminosity first noticed in the paper of 1802. He passed from this irregularly diffused nebulosity through all the orders of gaseous nebulae—irregular nebulae, planetary nebulae, nebulous stars—formed by the gradual condensation of the gaseous matter, until the star itself is formed; then, and then only, he entered on the part of the series earlier recognized, passing on to the various orders of stellar aggregation,—diffused clusters, ordinary stellar nebulae, and more and more condensed stars, up to the richest clusters. He no longer speaks of external nebulae. He introduces the paper of 1814 in these words:—"The observations contained in this paper are intended to display the sidereal part of the heavens, and also to show the intimate connection between the two opposite extremes, one of which is the immensity of the widely diffused and seemingly chaotic nebulous matter; and the other the highly complicated and most artificially constructed globular clusters of compressed stars. The proof of an intimate connection between these extremes will greatly support the probability of the conversion of one into the other."

For much that relates to the sidereal heavens, Herschel refers in this paper of 1814 to the paper of 1785, and it may be that such reference has prevented most of his commentators from noticing how completely his views had changed. In reality it is only where he is speaking of insulated stars that he quotes the earlier paper. So soon as he deals with aggregations of stars, though he refers to the star-gauges of 1785 he no longer explains them as of yore. He dwells afresh on what he had written in 1802 respecting the clustering condition of portions of the stellar heavens. He explains that his expression "forming clusters" was "used to denote that some peculiar arrangement of stars in lines making different angles, directed to a certain aggregation of a few central stars, suggested the idea that they" (the former) "might be in a state of progressive approach to them" (the latter).\* "This tendency to clustering seems chiefly to be visible in places extremely rich in stars. In order, therefore, to investigate the existence of a clustering power, we may expect its effects to be most visible in and near the Milky Way." I would invite the reader's special attention to the circumstance that the

\* We may notice here, again, a certain inexactness in Herschel's manner of writing, accounting, perhaps, for the extent to which he has too often been misinterpreted.

Milky Way is here pointedly referred to as a stellar region, distinct in its characteristics from the region of the stars forming our constellations. In studying Herschel's papers we have continually to be on the watch for indications of the sort, and although this particular view is not new, since he had expressed the same opinion in 1802, yet as Herschel was now very near the close of his observing career, it is important to notice that in this critical respect he retained the views which he had adopted in 1802.

Thirty years had now passed since Herschel had enunciated his first method of star-gauging, and as yet we have found no indication of a second method. But at the close of this paper of 1814 he mentions a new mode of research, by which he hoped to determine the laws according to which the stellar universe is constructed. "The extended views I have taken," he says, "in this and my former papers, of the various parts that enter into the construction of the heavens, have prepared the way for a final investigation of the universal arrangement of all these celestial bodies in space; but *as I am still engaged in a series of observations for ascertaining a scale whereby the extent of the universe, as far as it is possible for us to penetrate into space, may be fathomed*, I shall conclude this paper by pointing out some influences which the continuation of the action of the clustering power enables us to draw from the observations that have been given."

We find Herschel, then, in 1814, preparing a scale whereby to gauge the extent of the universe, "as far as it is possible for us to penetrate into space."

But in 1814, Herschel reached his seventy-sixth year, and it was scarcely to be anticipated that he would live to complete in its entirety the task he had entered upon so late in his career—the most stupendous task which any astronomer had ever thought of undertaking. In 1784 and 1785 he believed that he had something finite to deal with; his telescopes reached as he supposed to the limits of the galaxy; he had but to gauge, by counting stars in field after field, to ascertain the shape of the sidereal system. Moreover he was then in the prime of life. Now, in his old age, the stellar system had widened on his view: Infinitely more complex than he had supposed, unfathomable (in parts at least of its extent) even with his mightiest instruments—how was he to hope in the few years remaining to him, to solve the mighty problem which he alone of all men who had ever lived had dared to grapple with?

There was no shrinking on his part, however, from the tremendous task which lay before him. He did not even allow himself to attack the work hurriedly. Thoughtfully he prepared the scale (the new method of gauging of which he had spoken in 1814), and not until 1817 did he describe the plan in detail and with illustrative instances of its application.



The reader may be prepared, after what has been said at the beginning of this paper (*Contemporary Review* for August), to find the new method differing little from the method of 1784. He may think that, since the two methods have been confounded together by many, perhaps the second is the same as the first, but applied on a larger scale and with higher powers, or if different from the other is still closely related to it. So far, however, is this from being the case, that the methods may be described as not only unlike, but even antithetical to each other.

In the first method the same telescope was to be applied successively to different parts of the heavens ; in the second the same part of the heavens was to be examined successively with different telescopes. In the first method the stars in each field were to be counted ; in the second, the observer was to note simply to what degree the telescopes successively employed separated from each other the component stars brought into view, or, in technical terms, to what degree the telescope effected the resolution of the stars in each field.

It seems to me tolerably clear that up to the year 1814, and possibly for a year or two longer, Herschel had been steadily advancing towards new and wider truths respecting the universe, and that the new method of star-gauging, as it first presented itself to his mind, was a well-considered means of attacking the great problem in the enlarged form to which it had grown. It is manifest that the higher the telescopic power we employ, the farther do we penetrate into the spaces surrounding us on all sides. It is, of course, probable (or rather it is certain) that many objects visible with a lower telescopic power may lie farther away than others brought into view with a higher power, because a very large star is visible from beyond depths which suffice to hide smaller but nearer orbs. Yet unless we assume that there are limits beyond which none of the larger stars exist, it is clear that each increase of telescopic power, by bringing into view new members of these larger orders, must carry our vision beyond the limits which it had before reached. And if we wish to form just conceptions of the structure of the universe, it seems manifest that our best, in fact our only available first step towards such knowledge, is to ascertain the aspect of the space surrounding us, as viewed with gradually increasing powers of vision. This, as I judge, was what Herschel proposed when, in 1814, he spoke of "fathoming the extent of the universe, so far as it is possible for us to penetrate into space."

But it is certain that the plan, as he began to carry it out in 1817 and 1818, does not correspond with this description. Nor does Herschel appear, in my judgment, to have worked in these years with his former skill and acumen. Power was not wanting, but there is no longer the elasticity which hitherto had been so marked a characteristic of Herschel's mind. I think, too, that it will become

manifest to anyone who carefully studies the whole series of Herschel's papers, that when he wrote these last two, the great array of facts which he had been so long engaged in gathering together was no longer present in its entirety to his mind. It must not be held to involve irreverence towards the greatest astronomer the world has known, to suppose that in his seventy-ninth and eightieth years his mental powers were not so great as they had been, and especially that his memory began to fail for facts observed during the preceding ten or twelve years of his life. Assuredly no honest student of science should allow his respect for the work of Herschel's former years to cause him to overlook defects, if such exist, in the reasoning with which Herschel's latest observations were accompanied.

It is not difficult to show that his reasoning in 1817 and 1818 was no longer so sound as in former years. He was now applying, be it remembered, a process by which he hoped to determine the relative distances of star-groups. Supposing that a particular clustering aggregation began to be resolved into discrete stars with a certain telescopic power, and was entirely resolved when a certain higher power was employed, there would be *prima facie* evidence as to the distance of the aggregation—because, given a group of stars of certain sizes and set at certain distances from each other, it is manifest that the farther away that group is placed the higher will be the telescopic powers required (1) to begin, and (2) to complete the resolution of that group into separate stars. But although such considerations may be reasonable enough when we are comparing two groups together, and even within certain limits when applied to different parts of the same group, there are circumstances under which their application to particular star-groups would be altogether incorrect, and which show also how unsafe the general principle is on which this particular method of star-gauging depends.

In order to show this, I will take as a typical instance a splendid pair of star-groups (not clusters properly so called) which adorn the uplifted hand of The Rescuer, quoting Prof. Nichol's account of Herschel's study of this remarkable object:—"In the Milky Way," he says, "thronged all over with splendours, there is one portion not unnoticed by the general observer, the spot in the sword hand of Perseus. That spot shows no stars to the eye; the milky light which glorifies it comes from regions to which unaided we cannot pierce. But to a telescope of considerable power\* the space appears lighted up with unnumbered orbs; and these pass on through the depths of the infinite, until, even to that penetrating glass, they escape all scrutiny, withdrawing into regions unvisited by its power. Shall we adventure into these deeper retirements? Then, assume an instrument of higher efficacy, and lo! the change is only repeated; those scarce observed before appear as large orbs, and behind, a new

\* A good opera-glass shows abundant stars in this wonderful group.

series begins, again shading gradually away, leading towards farther mysteries! The illustrious Herschel penetrated on one occasion into this spot, until he found himself among depths whose light could not have reached him in much less than four thousand years: no marvel that he withdrew from the pursuit, conceiving that such abysses must be endless!" The younger Herschel, speaking of instances such as these, where telescope after telescope has been directed to the same spot without apparently reaching its limits, says that here, "we are compelled by the clearest evidence telescopes can afford to believe that star-strown vistas lie open, exhausting their powers and stretching out beyond their utmost reach, as is proved by infinite increase of number and diminution of magnitude, terminating in complete irresolvable nebulosity."

It was thus that the elder Herschel interpreted these wondrously rich spots in the papers of 1817 and 1818. Followed as he has been in this interpretation by Sir John Herschel, Struve, Grant, Nichol, and others, it may seem incredible that an argument practically resistless opposes itself to such a conclusion. Yet there is such an argument; nor has its strength ever been impeached or even questioned:

Repeatedly in his earlier papers, Sir W. Herschel had noted the probability, rising almost to certainty in each individual case, and absolutely certain for many cases, that groups of stars which are rounded in appearance are roughly globular in reality, and that groups markedly distinct by their richness from *surrounding parts of the star-sphere* are really distinct as to richness from *surrounding parts of interstellar space*. If we consider the very group in Perseus which Herschel, as we have seen, regarded otherwise—or as a star-region extending away and away into space, along the track over which his telescopes of greater and greater power had carried him—we shall find abundant reason for that earlier interpretation. The group is much smaller in apparent size than the moon, but for the sake of argument imagine it as large. Conceive a cone having the eye as apex and just large enough to enclose the moon, extending out into space towards the great double cluster. Then, whatever else we may be in doubt about, we know quite certainly that the whole star region examined by Herschel is enclosed within that long tapering cone. If his later principle of interpretation is just, the brighter and, as he judged, the nearer stars of the cluster are so far away within this cone that their light takes about a hundred years in reaching us—but say two hundred years to favour his interpretation (as will immediately appear) as far as possible. The farther parts, we have seen, he regarded, on the same principle, as so far away that their light takes 4000 years in reaching us, or twenty times as long. How much farther the star-region extends (on this interpretation) we do not know. But here we have the farthest known

part, twenty times as far away as the nearest. Now, if anyone will make a very taper cone of paper (it should be a yard high if its base is only to a third of an inch in diameter, or three yards high for a one inch base), and will cut off a twentieth part of its length, from the apex, the remaining part will show the shape of the region of space occupied, according to the interpretation of 1818, by the stars of the rich cluster. The paper frustum (still nearly a yard high, if the first of the above-mentioned sizes be adopted, and at its thickest part only a third of an inch wide), is, indeed, immensely exaggerated in width, long and slender though it seems. That wonderful group of stars, then, forms in reality, if rightly interpreted by Herschel in 1818, a long, thin, almost cylindrical array of stars, happening by a singular chance to have its length directed exactly towards our earth! As there are two clusters, indeed, there are two such enormously long and slender arrays, thus strangely adjusted! And all other similar cases—of which Herschel cites no less than ten, while many others were recognized by his son in the southern Milky Way—must be similarly interpreted.

The objections to such an inference are manifest; and in corresponding cases Sir W. Herschel had clearly recognized them. Note again, how Sir John Herschel disposes of such conceptions as being utterly improbable in the much less marked case of the two *Magellanic Clouds*. "Were there but one such object," he says, "it might be maintained without utter improbability that its apparent sphericity is only an effect of foreshortening; but such an adjustment, improbable enough in one case, must be rejected as too much so for fair argument in two." How much more, therefore, in the multitudinous instances presented by the clustering aggregations of the *Milky Way*.

The inference clearly is, then, that where Herschel had supposed (in 1817 and 1818) that he was fathoming or attempting to fathom the depths of stellar space, he was in reality only scrutinising more and more closely, as higher and higher powers were employed, one and the same region occupied by many orders of stars—from suns perhaps surpassing our own many times in volume, down to orbs which, large though they may be absolutely, must relatively be regarded as mere star-dust. I do not speak of this conclusion as doubtful, for it appears to me demonstrated. As the elder Herschel spoke of the two great clustering regions of *Cygnus* as spherical in shape, as the younger Herschel spoke similarly of the *Magellanic Clouds*, so may we justly say of these regions which had been regarded as the fathomless parts of our stellar system, that demonstrably they are "island star-systems," infinitely rich in stars, and infinitely varied in structure. We may indeed apply to them the very words which Sir John Herschel applied on sufficient but far weaker evidence to the *Magellanic Clouds*, "it must be taken as a

demonstrated fact that stars of the seventh and eighth magnitude, and irresolvable nebula" (not *nebulae*) "may coexist within limits of distance not differing more than as 9 to 10." The caution which this discovery should inspire when we are dealing with other cases where the evidence is less simple, need hardly be insisted upon.

Both methods of star-gauging had been tried, then, when Herschel ceased from his labours, and in one sense both had failed. It had been at least demonstrated that the principles by which Herschel had hoped to be able to interpret either method, were unsound. He himself established the fact that the stars are not spread throughout our system with such an approach to uniformity that one can estimate the extension of the system in different directions by counting the stars which one powerful telescope brings into view. He also collected the materials which prove that we cannot hope to estimate the distances of different parts of the system by testing with different telescopes the degree of stellar resolvability in those parts.

Is, then, the problem altogether hopeless? It seems to me that it is very far from being so, and that even where Herschel's methods seemed to fail they afford excellent promise of success. His first method, for example, had to be abandoned so far as his original purpose was concerned, because he found reason to believe that the great rich regions of the Milky Way were situated like great clouds of stars in space, and are not mere ranges of stars extending continuously from our own neighbourhood. But it was the method itself which taught this,—which, in fact, effected this capital discovery. The second method, again, cannot be interpreted as Herschel hoped. It cannot tell us how far off, relatively, are different star-groups. But this application of the method has to be abandoned simply because the use of the method itself has taught us that the architecture of the heavens is too complex to be interpreted in so simple a manner. Here then is another great discovery effected by a method of star-gauging which, so far as its original purpose was concerned, has had to be rejected. We have learned, from the seeming failure of the two methods, two important and interesting facts—first, that the stars are gathered into certain regions of space, and segregated from others; and, secondly, that where stars are so gathered they exist in many orders of real magnitude, and are spread in different parts of such aggregations with very different degrees of profusion. Furthermore, over and above these valuable deductions, we have the observations themselves still available for use in other ways, still ready to reward whoever shall devote close and attentive scrutiny to them.


But it appears to me that so soon as we recognize the success of both methods in one sense, and their failure in another, a method of research presents itself which promises to combine all those qualities of each method which can really be trusted, and to be open to no

objections. It was a grand idea of Herschel's to determine the varying richness of the heavens in different directions under the scrutiny of one powerful telescope. It was an equally noble occupation to watch the heavens "widening on man's view" with the widening pupil of the telescopic eye. Each method of research proved effective as used separately. But only by combining the two can the secret of the star-depths be mastered. We must not limit ourselves, however, to the study of a star-field here and a star-field there. With each telescopic power employed, the whole heavens must be surveyed. The results obtained with each power must be compared together, after being carefully indicated in suitable charts (since the most powerful intellect cannot grasp those results presented merely as statistics). Differential charts, showing *by how much* each increase of power increases in each region of the heavens the number of stars brought into view, must also be constructed. No preconceived opinions must be suffered to mar the teaching thus obtained; but the architecture of the heavens, so disclosed must be viewed precisely as it is presented to us by these results: because then, though it may be far too complex for our comprehension, we shall be less likely to be deceived than if we were prepared beforehand to recognize in it certain characteristic features.

This is a work in which almost every student of astronomy can help. Gaugings with small telescopes should by no means be neglected. Indeed, when we remember that the structure of the stellar universe is so complex and varied that some of the nearer parts cannot be analysed to their inmost recesses, even by the most powerful telescopes yet constructed, we see that our information about these parts can alone be brought near to completeness, and it is precisely about these parts that the smaller telescopes can give the most useful information.

I believe there is a great future for that noble domain of astronomy which Sir W. Herschel made the chief object of his study. By such methods of star-gauging as I have indicated—by the application of spectroscopy to distinguish the stars into their various orders as respects physical structure—by the careful analysis of stellar motions, in order to recognize the laws of association—and by other methods of research, the stupendous problem presented by the stellar heavens may be hopefully attacked; and even should the observations directed to its solution fail, so far as their main purpose is concerned, there can yet be no manner of doubt that the collected results will be full of value and interest.

RICHARD A. PROCTOR.



## LONGEVITY IN A NEW LIGHT.

*Human Longevity; its Facts and its Fictions.* By  
W. J. THOMAS, F.S.A., Assistant-Librarian of  
the House of Lords. London: John Murray.  
One vol. 1873.

*Comparative Longevity.* By E. RAY LANKESTER.  
London: Macmillan and Co. 1873.  
*Thirty-fourth Report of the Registrar-General for*  
1871.

A STORY, perhaps better known than authenticated, is told of that sovereign who, if he never did a wise thing, never said a foolish one, that he invited a learned body in this country to explain why, if a fish is placed in a vessel full of water, no overflowing occurs. Various theories, more or less plausible, were concocted, without arriving at any unanimity of opinion, when it occurred to one of the members to inquire whether the fact were in reality as premised. The moral applies to much of the controversy on longevity. The battle to a great extent has been waged in the dark, and from what should be, or might be, by a curiously deductive process of reasoning, has been argued what is. The very term "anti-centenarianism," so far as it ever could be said to represent a theory, has been overstrained. Misconception perverted its meaning into the arbitrary limitation of human life to a century, and the magic of numbers sufficed to make the misconception attractive. To those who embraced this error the subject of longevity was restricted to a very narrow point of fact. The spell was broken as easily as it had been woven. Directly it was proved that a single person had overstepped the imaginary frontier, the charm of the illusion

disappeared, and the theory was supposed to be exploded. What was the use of prolonging a dispute over a mere crotchet, which a single instance sufficed to dispel?

But for this misconception, we need scarcely insist on the patent difference between affirming an impossibility, and inferring from certain premises an improbability. Had Mr. Lankester not assured his readers that he regards "abnormal" longevity as a subject fit only for "curious speculators," we should be surprised at his stating that "Sir G. C. Lewis and others have endeavoured to throw doubt on the possibility of man's longevity exceeding a hundred years." We prefer to have Sir G. C. Lewis' opinion in his own words. They are succinctly stated in a letter to *Notes and Queries*, reprinted by Mr. Thoms, in which he admits a case of 103 as authenticated, but a single sentence will show the real extent of his scepticism. The evidence of the past sufficed, in his opinion, to "*raise a presumption* that human life, under existing circumstances, is never prolonged beyond a hundred years." The scope of his inquiries was too limited, especially among the lower classes, which are admitted to have furnished the largest number of alleged instances to the contrary; and it is probable that further research would have modified his opinions. At any rate, it is unfair to stigmatise as a mere "fanciful conclusion," one which was founded on an impartial, if limited, investigation of fact. Mr. Thoms, who has extended those necessary researches in the same judicial spirit as his predecessor, embodies their results in the canon that "when the alleged centenarian is believed to be a hundred, or a year or two more, error may not unreasonably be *suspected*, but when the age is extended beyond, say 106, error so certainly exists, that no trustworthy evidence can be produced in support of it" (p. 193). The canon, or rather inference, is a fair one, so far as it is confined to probabilities, and rests upon adequate data. If the facts of longevity show that no one has yet exceeded the age assigned, it is quite legitimate to adopt that age as a practical limit governing the past, and to insist that any future instance of excess should be proved by evidence strong in proportion to the presumption of improbability thence derived.

The limit of longevity, thus understood, is in fact the lifetime of the longest-lived individual. It represents an existing line of demarcation, or flood-mark, so to speak, of human existence, liable indeed to be altered, but only under rigid conditions of proof. To convert, however, this limit into a *ne plus ultra*, is to make the unknown synonymous with the impossible. The term "natural limit" contains a general proposition which is apt to be overstrained, like the passage from Ecclesiasticus, "the number of a man's days are a hundred years at most," which Mr. Thoms has unfortunately chosen for his text. We know, for instance, that rivers cannot run



uphill, but what law of nature, as applied to longevity, corresponds in certainty and precision to the law of gravitation? Who shall determine where the possible ends and the impossible begins? We may infer what possibilities we please, but then inference is neither proof nor demonstration. It is necessary to bear in mind these distinctions, however commonplace they may appear, when discussing the term exceptional or abnormal longevity, for exceptions presuppose a rule, and the rule in this matter requires to be qualified. There are objections to any theoretical hard and fast line, and the logic of facts, which has disproved the limit of a hundred years, applies equally, in principle, to one more advanced. Sir G. C. Lewis admitted that centenarianism does not seem "on *à priori* grounds, inconsistent with the laws of nature." Mr. Lankester repeats the admission, but on the strength of it alone is "not indisposed to accept statements as to ages as great as 110 or 120 years being attained, even though such an occurrence were not absolutely demonstrated and proved." There is perhaps no *à priori* limit to human scepticism or to human credulity, but an opinion which, while admitting an occurrence to be exceptional, dispenses with the necessity of proof, scarcely approaches to the dignity or the authority of a rational belief. The Civil Law confined itself to a presumption of life ceasing at the expiration of a hundred years, and the same rule has been adopted in Scotland.\* In England, where, contrary to the statistics of sexual longevity, the husband is presumed to live longer than the wife, there is no *presumptio juris* relative to the continuance of life in the abstract, and a case is recorded where the Court of Queen's Bench declined to recognise the impossibility of a person who was alive in 1034, being still alive in the year 1827. It has been reserved to science in its more speculative forms to measure the intrinsic capacity of life, and physiologists and physicians have not failed to tell us how long we ought to live. "The man," said Buffon, "whose life is not cut short by accident or disease, reaches everywhere the age of 90 or 100 years." We pass by, for a moment, the largeness of this reservation, to remark that we have here a proposition involving a definite limit. The "fixed law," which he applied to all animals alike, was that the duration of life is regulated by the duration of growth; and assuming the latter to expire in man at the age of fourteen, he multiplied that number by seven. Flourens, in pursuing the principle laid down by his countryman, fixed the period of the completion of growth at the coalescence of the epiphyses of limb-bones with the shaft; and multiplying twenty years, the time when this union, in his opinion, is effected in man, assigned to him a

\* "Vivere usque ad centum annos quilibet presumitur, nisi probatur mortuus." *Corpus Juris Glossatum*, tom. ii., p. 719 n. q. Cf. Taylor on Evidence, i., p. 189. Ed. 1864.

hundred years as his lease of life. It is sufficient for our present purpose to observe that the soundness of this premiss has been challenged by Sir Henry Holland. "What is called epiphysis," he remarks in one of his essays, "is a very limited phenomenon of growth, and though seemingly one of the last in the series of osseous developments, cannot be admitted as an epoch in life, or as having any important relation to other structural changes." Professor Owen admits the conclusion to be "not unphysiological," inasmuch as it aims at a definition, however disputable in itself, of those successive changes of structure and composition which constitute life. But assuming this "fixed law," together with its later interpretation, to be supported by adequate *data*—a further point of dispute\*—a difficulty remains in the application of its principle, and we confess that with Mr. Lankester we can at present "see no good reason why the number 5 or 7 or any other multiple should express the ratio for a whole class of animals" (p. 45). The multiples, it is true, are not arbitrary, so far as they profess to be derived from the analogy of the brute creation. But an argument of this kind rests upon the likeness of its antecedents; and we cannot overlook the fact that over those external agencies, to which more or less all creatures are subject, man only, as an intelligent being, possesses and exercises to an extent wholly incomparable, the faculty of control. One good reason why such a general uniformity of life is observable in climates and under conditions so different, is that man's brain can adapt his body to the varying exigencies of existence. The individual struggle for mere life ceases with the faculty of combination; and society, even in its most primitive forms, exercises an influence over the causes of longevity which has no parallel among the brute creation. Mr. Herbert Spencer, while adopting the period of growth as a fundamental basis for calculation, defines that limit as the "excess of expenditure over growth," † thus discarding the theory of osseous development. Buffon's "fixed law" was, at the best, only a scientific hypothesis, and it is possible that Flourens' definition was founded on insufficient *data*. On the other hand, the doctrine of evolution, which Mr. Lankester has embraced with the fervour characteristic of its votaries, is itself so *à priori* and hypothetical, that a wider exercise of observation is still needed to distinguish between plausibility and proof. The real nature and relations of those "inherent limiting agencies" in the lifetime of an

\* We must observe that Lord Bacon's remark, "*De diuturnitate et brevitate vite in animalibus tenuis est informatio, quæ haberi potest; observatio negligens; traditio fabulosa*,"—is still far from being inapplicable to modern scientific research. Of the horse, one of the animals which Buffon selected to support his theory, there is little absolutely known as to the age he would naturally attain.

† "Principles of Biology," vol. i., p. 128.

individual, which are recognised with more general assent than explained, must remain, indeed, in their present state of uncertainty, until more is absolutely known of the component elements of life. We know that the duration of life in a being depends on the sum of the vital forces which it possesses, and that this *vis absdita quædam* diminishes more and more with the progress of age. 'Call it protoplasm with Professor Huxley, or germinal matter with Dr. Beale, we can trace it only in its manifestations of progress and decline. For all purposes of practical inquiry, it is impossible to regard man as a mere physiological unit, to separate him from the circumstances which surround him, and to treat him as an abstract entity. The very wear and tear of life—the expenditure involved in the act of living—is liable to infinite variations both of kind and of degree; but apart from those external conditions which are more or less subject to human control, each member of the human family receives and hands on the lamp of life with physical peculiarities inseparable from the past. We are but several links in the chain of human existence, and, like all links, we serve to show the continuity of the chain. To argue that a man with a perfect bodily organisation should attain a given "natural limit" of life, is to build a theory on data which do not exist.

Physiology is eminently a science of observation and induction, and in considering the facts of longevity, it is necessary to advert to the dangers of substituting speculation for proof. One thing, however, is sufficiently plain from experience, that the power to resist destruction, which enables each person to wage the "battle of life," exhibits successively an increase, a climax, and a decline. The intensity of mortality is inversely proportional to this power, and statistics furnish evidence of its decline in an increased proportion of deaths at the higher ages. The mean duration of life at different periods has formed the subject of very elaborate calculation, based on a comprehensive area of trustworthy facts. In one respect the testimony of death-tables alone is incomplete, for they furnish no means of comparing the number of those dying with the number of those left alive at given ages. This deficiency was supplied in the English Life Table, a monument of industry doing credit to this country, which was calculated by Dr. Farr, at the cost of prodigious labour, on the population living at two censuses, and on no less than 6,470,720 deaths. It is a solid and striking proof of its accuracy that the rates of mortality thus obtained agree completely with those deduced from a field of observation more than twice the magnitude of the above. By such means it is possible to bring the evidence of the past to bear upon the future, and to infer, in the only manner really justifying an inference, the probabilities of life at different ages on the principles prescribed by the doctrine of chances. We are no indiscriminate

admirers of statistics, and it is needless perhaps to insist on the false appearance of authority they may be made to present. "Mathematics," as Professor Huxley has well observed, "may be compared to a mill of exquisite workmanship, which grinds you stuff of any degree of fineness; but, nevertheless, what you get out depends on what you put in; and as the grandest mill in the world will not extract wheat-flour from peascods, so pages of formulæ will not get a definite result out of loose data." We are far from impugning the credibility of the census returns as regards the ages of the living. In the absence of a Population Register, such as Sweden, Belgium, and Holland possess, they furnish at present our only available guide, and one which, for general purposes, is sufficiently trustworthy. But the real lessons of statistics, however accurate, may be mislearned; and it is a common fallacy to imagine that mean results represent facts. Averages are founded on a balance between two extremes, but it is essential to the law of averages that the facts should admit of comparison. The only legitimate way to deal with an assemblage of facts of different kinds is to consider them in groups that are properly comparable. According to the English Life Table the mean lifetime of the people in this country does not exceed the modest proportions of 40·86 years, a limit far short of the three score years and ten of the Psalmist. But then this calculation includes a consideration of the sum total of those chances which constitute the uncertainties of life. The individual, so to speak, is merged in the mass, and the death-rate is influenced by every conceivable agency which shortens the span of existence. Of the total of 514,879 deaths of both sexes, in the year 1871, recorded in the last report of the Registrar-General, it appears that no less than 206,613, or nearly one-half, were those of children under five years of age, the proportion being somewhat larger with males. These figures suffice to show how enormously infant mortality curtails, from a mathematical point of view, the expectation of life at birth. There is much truth in the remark that the tendency of increased civilization is rather to prevent men from dying young than to make them live to be old. Sir T. Duffus Hardy, speaking of the middle ages on the authority of our national records, affirms that "three score years and ten was a great age, which few arrived at," and it is beyond dispute that since then the average longevity throughout this country has steadily increased. It would be a satire upon sanitary science were it otherwise. The promotion of longevity lies in the avoidance of disease, and in restricting the causes of mortality to a minimum. We leave statistics to guide the study of relative longevity: they are the handmaid of the goddess of health; but facts must be classified as well as collected, before inferences can be drawn in accordance with the complex conditions of society as it exists.

It might reasonably be conjectured that an increase in the average

lifetime of a population will be accompanied by a corresponding increase in the number of persons of an extreme age. But vital statistics at present are insufficient for proof, nor does deductive analysis yet supply any constant relation between a low death-rate at early and late ages which would establish such a conclusion beyond dispute. Out of 618 persons whose ages at death in 1871 are registered at ninety-five and upwards, it is noticeable that only 69 are alleged to have passed the century. Forty-four of these claimants to ultra-longevity are females, one of whom is stated to have reached the age of 109. These figures, such as they are, form the best practical exposition we can give of the so-called centenarian theory. It may be questioned whether they are numerous enough to regulate the probabilities of centenarianism in others with the fixity of a mathematical law deduced from a larger aggregate. At any rate, they are few enough in comparison to be classified, for the purposes of verification, by themselves. Their number, however regarded, entitles them at least to this kind of distinction.

We shall not waste time on historical conjectures, for the materials, as regards the past, are scanty and inconclusive. Patriarchal longevity, however treated, cannot throw any light on modern times. Pliny, while recording some myths,\* like the 157 years of Epimenides, for the lovers of the marvellous, does not speak of centenarians as common in his time, and includes, among credible instances of ultra-longevity, that of Perpenna, who died at the age of 98. A search made for old folk, by the orders of Vespasian, between the Apennines and the Po, yielded some startling results; and the Russian census, alluded to by Flourens and other writers on longevity, returned a proportion of centenarians throughout the empire of one in every thousand persons living, including many cases of over 150 years. It is enough to point out that evidence of this description—if evidence it can be called—rests entirely on personal testimony. In ordinary cases mere assertion may be taken as sufficient; but the authority of statistics deserts us when we come to exceptional instances of old age. The Registrar-General, while recording his list of 69 centenarians for 1871, takes care to remind us that “the district-registrars have no authority, even if they had the means and the leisure for so doing, to investigate the truth or falsity of the statements as to age made by the local informants of deaths: the informants are alone responsible for the correctness of those statements.” Centenarianism may be taken as a stage in life, at which passengers may be reasonably demanded to show their credentials. Reason teaches us to infer the improbable from the rare, and this circumstance alone should suffice to shift the burden of

\* “*Quæ omnia*,” he says, “*in scitiâ temporum acciderunt*,” and adds, with reasonable caution, “*annum enim alii ætate unum determinabant, et alterum hyeme; alii quadripartitis temporibus, sicut Arcades, quorum anni trimestres fuere; quidam lunæ senio, ut Egyptii; itaque apud eos aliqui et singula millia annorum vixisse produntur*.” *Nat. Hist.*, lib. vii., c. 48.

proof from the shoulders of the sceptic. "*Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat*," is a maxim of law peculiarly applicable to ultra-longevity, and centenarians cannot complain if the *ipse dixit* of themselves or their relatives are required to be corroborated. The greater the length of age alleged, the greater is the improbability, speaking from experience, of its occurrence, and therefore the plainer and more convincing should be the proofs. Need we say that these are principles of universal application in all matters of fact, and wherever a proposition is questioned?

There is the more need to insist on the paramount importance of proof from the fact that it has so frequently been overlooked or disregarded. More than seventy years have passed since Sir John Sinclair propounded, among other queries bearing on extreme old age, one simple question of fact—"What are the most remarkable instances of longevity, and how are they authenticated?" It is very likely that the answer would long ago have been forthcoming, had the necessity of authentication been more generally recognised; and we welcome in Mr. Thoms, with a satisfaction enhanced by such considerations, a conscientious inquirer after truth, who condescends to weigh evidence and honestly pursue its consequences, instead of hunting for arguments in favour of a foregone conclusion. He declares, as one result of his inquiries, that the "majority of cases of extreme longevity are entirely based on the unsupported testimony of the supposed centenarian" (p. 71). Without anticipating the results of further research, we must confess that this statement, so far as it applies to the past, is entitled to all the authority arising from a diligent investigation of proof. It was to a large extent on the faith of a list of unauthenticated cases, commenced by Dr. Fothergill at the end of the last century, and including a negress of 175, that Hufeland assigned 200 years as the possible limit of human life. Haller accepted, but did not examine, the stories of Parr's 152 years and of Jenkins's 169, which rest on the flimsiest foundation; and he collected in his "*Adversaria*," with an industry as persevering as indiscriminating, more than a thousand supposed cases of persons dying between 100 and 110; sixty between 110 and 120; twenty-nine between 120 and 130; fifteen between 130 and 140; and six between 140 and 150. When an argument is sought to be established on the so-called "concurrence of testimony," it is time to inquire what this testimony consists of, and how far it is receivable as evidence. In 1799 appeared Easton's work on "*Human Longevity*," a curious contrast to that of Mr. Thoms. It included a miscellaneous farrago of 1751 reputed cases, taken chiefly from rumour or public prints and periodicals; and no doubt the number might be very largely increased, if such authorities are to pass current as conclusive. Centenarian-hunting had, in fact, become a mania: the ends of the earth were ransacked for old people; and rival collectors vied in the quantity, if

not the quality, of their *protégés*. Little harm, of course, would have been done, had these longæval prodigies been confined to the mere lovers of the marvellous; but the cause of truth suffered when physiologists and mathematicians invoked untested assertions for scientific purposes of their own, and clothed them with the authority due to great names. Mr. Babbage's calculation of probabilities, as set forth in a table of annual decrements of life beyond the century, extending to one instance of 150 years, was based entirely on the unverified collection of Easton. No inference of practical bearing upon the study of longevity, could be drawn from such an omnium gatherum of examples, culled from sources so various, even if their accuracy be assumed; but it is noticeable that where observation is localised, and some show of evidence, to say the least, is adduced, ultra-longevity subsides into far more modest dimensions.\* Mr. Thoms has some grounds for being struck with the "simple child-like faith with which men of the highest eminence in medical science accept without doubt or hesitation statements of the abnormal prolongation of human life, which startle plain matter-of-fact men when their attention is called to them." Some doubt may exist how far extreme cases of exceptional old age, considering their rarity, affect the scientific study of longevity in general: at any rate, the sufficiency of proof, which underlies the whole matter, is an inquiry, not of medical science, but of pure fact, and determinable only by proper evidence. *Ponderanda sunt testimonia, non numeranda*. The very persistency and reiteration of a mere statement begets in time a creed which may easily be mistaken for enlightened belief, and when speculation takes the place of proof, the next step is to bend the facts to the exigencies of the theory. It may be, as Mr. Thoms suggests, that the confidence so properly reposed by medical men in the statements of their professional brethren with regard to such matters of personal knowledge as the "results of certain experiments, the products of analyses, the details of operations, and the effects of remedial agents" has partly induced them to extend the same acquiescence to less trustworthy information from other quarters. Little of man's knowledge is obtained by original research, and in many branches of science we may safely rely upon testimony; but then the value of the testimony is understood beforehand, and must be free from the suspicion of dishonesty or error. Were the exact ratio of age to growth determined beyond dispute, or were sure post-mortem signs of yearage—not of wearage only—traceable, we might have, as Mr. Lankester remarks, a

\* Dr. Halley's table of decrements, based on the bills of mortality at Breslau from 1687 to 1691, exhausted a list of 1000 deaths within 90 years. Price's Northampton tables, including 11,650 deaths between 1741 and 1780, does not go beyond the age of 96, the limit arrived at in the Friendly Society's statistics between 1823 and 1828. The Equitable Society's table, extending from 1760 to 1829, stops short at 97; and the Carlisle tables, the result of Dr. Heysham's observations from 1779 to 1787, ends with one instance of 104.

class of evidence from the examination of dead bodies. But no medical man of eminence, we suspect, would venture at present to say with confidence from the autopsy of an ultra-centenarian, whether the deceased were 110 or 130. Flourens has relied on the supposed authority of Harvey, who made a post-mortem examination of Old Parr, as confirming on medical grounds the story of his age. But the supposition, as Mr. Thoms has clearly shown, is unfounded: it was no part of Harvey's duty to examine the truth of the account, and he commences his report with a description of the "old, old man," which "had been furnished to him by others."

Speaking then of exceptional longevity as a matter of pure evidence, it must be confessed that the presumption of improbability is heightened by some preliminary circumstances which demand notice. There is the simple fact, worn threadbare with explanations, that centenarians are confined almost exclusively to the lower classes. The objection, of course, may be pressed too far, but even to minds not unduly burdened with scepticism, it suggests a *prima facie* element of doubt. Without imputing either ignorance or superstition, it is plain that the very impediments to proof tend to enhance its importance. Mr. Thoms has failed, like Sir G. C. Lewis, to find any well-authenticated instances of centenarianism in the peerage. It is answered, that the simplicity of life among the humbler orders confers the gift of longevity which the luxuries of the rich deny. There would be more real force in this argument, were the causes of longevity less theoretical than they are. All that can be said at present with certainty is that the presumption of age among different classes of the population is measured, speaking generally, by the mean average lifetime which they enjoy; and that on this point the evidence of statistics points to an opposite conclusion. Messrs. Bailey and Day, the well-known actuaries, concur in stating that "the average mean duration of life among the families of the peerage is throughout materially greater than with the general population"; and their testimony derives additional weight from the accessibility of the proofs at their disposal, such as family evidence and the records of the Heralds' College. A slight reflection, however, will convince one that the difference, as regards longevitarians, between the rich and the poor, is one of number rather than proportion. The healthy life of the insuring classes, again, is higher than that of the male peerage of Great Britain, and yet in the entire experience of the Life Assurance Companies of this country, which have existed in part since the time of Anne, there has been but one instance of a centenarian, that of Mr. Luning, who died in 1870 at the age of 103. Equally important, in one respect, is the experience of the National Debt Office, which records only two authenticated cases between 1790 and 1872; and, as Mr. Thoms points out, the Government nominees of the Tontine



represent not only a series of lives selected in the belief that they would prove to last long, but a class of persons who could easily be kept in view in future years. Insurance offices furnish a good criterion of age, for no one ever makes himself older than he is when insuring his life. It is impossible to separate the question of a witness's credibility from a consideration of the motives to misstatement; and, in deciding between contradictions, the earliest testimony of the centenarian, extorted under such circumstances, may fairly be quoted against his later recollections of his age. There are reasons in plenty for old people to "set the clock of their age" on too fast. Longevity is a ready passport to the exercise of almsgiving, especially in remote country districts; and we are far from seeing at present an end to that form of sentimental charity which "believeth all things." Without insisting too much on the plea of ignorance or superstition, we may reasonably bear these facts in mind when considering the prevalence of ultra-longevity among those who stand most in need of relief.

But let us assume that the claimant to long years appeals to incidents in his earlier life to support his statement. "Personal recollections," says Mr. Thoms, "unsupported by corroborative evidence, are of little worth," and the remark, thus qualified, is undoubtedly sound. But for the purposes of cross-examination they are of the utmost importance; and, fortunately, the garrulity of old folk supplies in many instances abundant materials for the task. For the cause of truth a bad witness is better than none; and if recollections admit of being tested, the more we have of them the better. The "simple annals of the poor" are often too uneventful for such inquiries, but even a trivial circumstance will sometimes provide a clue. With a soldier or sailor there are means of verifying dates—the crucial tests and keystones of such investigations—which are fortunately as accessible as they are conclusive. Take, for example, the case of *Frederick Lahrbusch*, who has himself supplied the means of exposing his imposture. He was alleged to have been born on the 9th of March, 1766; but as no evidence, even of his birthplace, is adduced, the statement is only noticeable in connection with the proofs brought forward to support his age. Two of these will suffice. It is stated that he joined the army on the 17th of October, 1789, and sold out of the 60th Rifles in 1818, after a service of twenty-nine years. With reference to the first statement, the *War Office Gazette* of the date alluded to gives no mention of his name, but his commission as ensign is found in the Army List as bearing date the 10th November, 1809, twenty years later than he affirmed. Another entry throws light on the cause and date of his retirement. So far from "selling out" his "captain's commission in 1818," in the Army List of 1819, under the head "cashiered" is found the name of "Lieutenant de Lahrbusch, 60 F." So again with *William Bennett*,

stated to have been born in 1766, and to have enlisted in the 32nd Regiment in 1793. Here the records of Chelsea Hospital come in, and they state that he enlisted in 1797, at the age of twenty, and was discharged on account of "general debility" in 1814. They prove, moreover, that, when applying for an increase of pension in 1862, he gave his age as 85. The 111 years attributed to *Joshua Miller*, a veteran sailor, who died in April, 1872, are reduced to 90 by the simple process of ascertaining the real name of his parents. The register on which his friends or his family relied, stated that "Joshua Miller was baptized as the son of Robert and Ann Miller, in the year 1761." The old man himself, when asked, gave his mother's name as "Thomasine," and the enigma was unriddled by the discovery in the registry at his birthplace of the entry "*Joshua Miller*, the son of Robert and *Thomasine* Miller, was baptized at Whickham, in the year 1783." How this first entry came to be accepted Mr. Thoms leaves his readers to conjecture. Probably some admirer of the old salt, in his zeal to make him out as old as he could, pounced upon the first entry in the register which seemed to favour his search.

The case of *Thomas Geeran* deserves to be epitomized. His story was that he was born at Scarriff in 1766, that he remained at school till the age of twenty; lived at home two years till the death of his father; then removed to Waterford, where he found employment; enlisted into the 71st in 1796, when under the influence of drink, and finally, after a service of twenty-three years, including India, Egypt, the Peninsula, and Waterloo, was discharged in 1819 without a pension. A careful search of the original muster-rolls, pay-sheets, and description-roll of the 71st from 1780 to 1830, gave no mention of any Thomas Geeran; but the pay-sheets of 1813 contained the name of a Michael Gearyn or Gayran, as then serving; and the description-roll further stated that he enlisted on March 3rd, 1813, giving his age as twenty-five, and deserted on the 20th of the following month. If Thomas and Michael were one and the same person, his age at death would be reduced from 105 to about 83. His identity is established as strongly as perhaps it ever can be: but his story abounds in contradictions sufficient to discredit altogether his personal testimony. Thus his alleged experiences in Egypt are spoilt by the fact, which Mr. Thoms has ascertained from the proper sources, that the 71st was not in Egypt at all: the injuries he stated he received at Vittoria from "a Spanish soldier" speak little for the friendliness of our allies: he was wounded in the back at Salamanca, an engagement in which his regiment was not present: he married, when a soldier of five years' service, at Gibraltar in 1801, though official records prove that from 1798 to 1805 the 71st was never stationed out of Great Britain.

We might multiply such instances of error or dishonesty; but

Mr. Thoms has given quite enough to show the specious character of circumstantial evidence of this kind ; nor is it necessary to insist on the authority of such documentary proofs as the records of the Admiralty and of Chelsea Hospital, both of which appear to have been freely consulted, in cases which have admitted of such tests. In many instances of exaggerated longevity experience shows that it is not difficult to detect a motive for misstatement. We refer our readers to one example, that of a certain *George Fletcher*, who, after serving in the army, ended his life as a Wesleyan preacher. The fraudulent addition of twelve years, which he stuck to after leaving the service, was rendered necessary to secure an extra pension, to which, in fact, he was never entitled. The story of an impostor, however, is too vulgar to excite interest, when a misstatement sinks into a falsehood. But fortunately it is not necessary to convict the claimant of wilful insincerity when refuting his personal recollections. The process of self-deception does not, of necessity, imply conscious dishonesty, however delicate may be the task of verification. A certain *Edward Couch*, who died in 1871, at the supposed age of 110, claimed, like another sailor, *George Brewer*, who was alleged to have reached 106 years, to have been present with Lord Howe on the "glorious 1st of June." But, unluckily for both, the Admiralty books show that the former did not join the navy till the 30th of that month, and the latter not until the 15th of February in the following year. It may be possible, perhaps, for an old veteran, who thinks he ought to have fought at Waterloo, to end by persuading himself that he actually did ; and if inclined to persuade others likewise, he may plausibly insist on the unlikelihood of his having fought there without knowing it. One claimant to longevity, we are told, was wont to relate in his ministerial discourses the sad events of the battle of Bunker's Hill, in which he believed he had distinguished himself in early life ; and it was not until after his death that his friends discovered from the register that he was not born when the battle was fought. We are probably far from having exhausted the list of the "last survivors of Waterloo," and possibly of Trafalgar ; and Americans tell us that the number of negroes reputed to have been servants to Washington still continues in apparently unabated profusion—an example, Sir G. C. Lewis observed, of their want of civilization, but which Mr. Lankester ascribes to the "imaginative faculties" of the coloured population. Self-interest affords a simpler explanation of intentional misstatements ; but the tricks of memory, in other cases, are too familiar to require comment. "I believe," says Mr. Thoms, "that the most conscientious self-examiner, when he comes to consider carefully what he believes to be his 'earliest recollections' would find it very difficult to decide whether he really recollected such event, or, having heard it much talked of in his youth, did not actually recollect it, but had it impressed upon his memory by what he

heard others say of it." Viewing memory as the result of an association of ideas, such questions as these remain to be answered. Were those ideas the result of unassisted observation? Was the impression contemporary with the event? Was it immediately conveyed to the mind of the observer? The more remote the event supposed to have been recollected, the more difficult is it to connect with certainty the event itself with the impression it created or the first remembrance of it. The lapse of time is sufficient to obscure, if not to obliterate, such distinctions; but, beyond this, the process of self-examination is rendered doubly difficult by the immaturity of the mind in extreme youth. The full-grown man cannot bring his increased powers of observation to recruit the feebler ones of his infancy, or render more vivid, by recollection an impression which he honestly believes he received when a child. The importance of the event itself is no sure criterion; indeed, very often the most permanent recollections derived from childhood are those which in after life would appear the most trivial and transitory. We know of a person whose only recollection, as a young child, of the interior of St. Paul's was the pattern of some oil-cloth which was placed on part of the floor. Mr. Thoms speaks of his own "earliest recollections" with appropriate diffidence. He believes that he remembers the funeral of Pitt, which he was taken to see at the age of two years and three months, from the circumstance of his father, in his uniform as a volunteer, bringing him a bag of buns. Dr. Johnson declared he remembered being touched by Queen Anne for the evil when he was an infant of only thirty months. An appeal for instances of "earliest recollections" in *Notes and Queries* elicited some curious replies, which Mr. Thoms has reprinted. One correspondent "distinctly remembers" the building of a new church by his father, a country parson, which was completed before he was eighteen months old: another recollects carrying a cat for a mile and a half at the age of two and a half. An incident, however, related by Lord Verulam, serves to illustrate the need of caution. He says in a letter to Mr. Thoms:—

"I well recollect an old aunt of mine, who lived to the age of ninety-two, often mentioning circumstances relating to the Rebellion of '45, as if she recollected them herself. And when reminded that this was before her birth, the answer was, 'But these things were the great subject of conversation when I was young.'"

The case of *Richard Purser*, who died in 1868 at the reputed age of 112, turns entirely on the old man's alleged recollections, and those of a clergyman who died in 1837, as reported by his surviving daughters. Mr. Thoms accepts as evidence only such as would satisfy a court of law. All we can say is that third-hand and hearsay recollections such as those would never satisfy the test he requires, which in a question of pure fact like the longevity of a

given person is an eminently sound one to apply. Nor, in recurring to those earlier instances of longevity which belong to history, is it safe or prudent to be guided by the so-called evidence of tradition. The lapse of time alone suffices to justify hesitation. Opinions and testimony do not gain force by growing older, and in traditional evidence each remove weakens the force of the proof. Local traditions, when looked into, pretty often mean some mere gossip of the neighbourhood, some loose assertion, or perhaps a guess; nor is ultra-longevity the only phenomenon which is believed in simply because no one has taken the trouble to question the proofs. The tradition of Jenkins' 169 years, when tracked to its source, shrinks into nothing but the old man's *ipse dixit*. Miss Saville, who interviewed him, and appears to have been convinced of his age by the circumstantial nature of his alleged recollections about carrying arrows up the hill at the battle of Flodden, reports that there were "four or five in the parish that were reputed all of them to be 100 years old or within two or three years of it, and they all said he was an elderly man ever since they knew him." Peter Garden, who deposed to having seen Jenkins the very year he died, when Garden was only twelve years old, laid claim himself to the respectable age of 126. There is a touch of the humorous in calling one centenarian to support his brother-centenarian's pretensions; but it is obvious that the credibility of such witnesses, when appealing to their own remote memories, depends upon the fact of their own longevity. Mr. Thoms puts the general value of such corroborative evidence in a very reasonable light:—

"Old Smith," he says, "is a hundred, and old Jones is sure of it, and he has known him all his life. Then old Jones is also a hundred. But when old Jones is questioned, he turns out to be 'hard upon eighty'—but he knows 'old Smith is a hundred, for he was a grown man when I was a boy.' Then comes the question of what age was the boy Jones, when Smith was a grown man; and it will generally be found he was about ten when Smith of twenty was a 'grown man,' and so old Smith proves to be 'hard upon ninety,' instead of a hundred, as had been stated and believed, because old Jones knew he was" (p. 62).

It not unfrequently happens that the friends of old Smith are as sensitive on the subject of their recollections as old Smith himself. It is a difficult thing at all times to test a witness's memory without incurring his suspicions that his veracity is being impeached, and his mistakes interpreted as falsehoods. The task requires tact and perseverance, but the witness has no cause for complaint, if his testimony, in such matters, is subjected to the necessary cross-examination in the sole interests of truth.

Passing, however, from oral testimony to the evidence of writing, there are two sources of information open to the inquirer after longevity, *viz.* tombstone inscriptions, and baptismal certificates; of

the former little need be said : they cannot be received as proof of the fact stated, in the absence of corroborative evidence. On a tombstone at Chave Priory, in Worcestershire, the village chiseller, hazy about his numeration, represented thirty-nine by the figures 309 ; and Mr. Thoms quotes another instance in the churchyard at Bickenhill, Warwickshire, where a tombstone to the memory of a Mrs. Ann Smith, who died in 1701, records that she "died a maid, and deceased, aged 708" (p. 46). Perhaps it is still more remarkable to find it recorded as a fact, that a man whose fourth wife survived him, departed this life in the 11th year of his age ; 61 having been converted into 11 (p. 50). There is, of course, no end to the vagaries of frolicsomeness or of ignorance ; but on the principle of "*litera scripta manet*," it is important to guard against even honest delusions perpetuated on brass or stone.\* The number of the centenarian's living descendants is sometimes quoted to confirm his age ; but, they show, in reality, the regularly recurrent fertility of the offspring rather than the longevity of the parent stock. The number of existing generations would be better evidence, but even that is liable to misconception, for, as Mr. Thoms has shown, a woman at the age of ninety may be a great, great, great, grandmother ; in other words, she may have existing descendants of the fifth generation.

"The only conclusive proof a person's age," said Sir G. C. Lewis, in a letter reprinted by Mr. Thoms from *Notes and Queries* (p. 155), "is a contemporary record of his birth, or the declaration of a person who remembers its occurrence." We have said enough to show the fallibility of remote recollections, but in such cases as the one contemplated, all the sponsors present at the baptism have probably passed away, and their testimony is rarely available. Up to 1644, as we learn from Mr. Burn's valuable work on parish registers, the minister was required only to register the baptisms of his parishioners. The parliament of William III. imposed a tax on every registration of birth, which naturally led to frequent omissions ; but even after the Act of 1694 expired up till 1836 the practice was generally discontinued. Mr. Thoms confines his remarks in the main to baptismal certificates ; and it is, no doubt, a fair inference,

\* Mr. Thoms quotes the inscription found on the coffin-plate of Macklin, the actor, as evidence of his having been 97, and not 107, as recorded on his monumental tablet in St. Paul's, Covent Garden. Whatever weight that evidence commands, it contradicts a statement given by Nollekens. "When Macklin died," writes that author, "the persons who conducted his funeral differed widely as to his age, though many persons had been applied to in order to ascertain the period of his birth. My amiable friend, the late Thomas Grignon, attended the funeral, and just as the men were lowering the coffin into the vault, a letter, containing a copy of the register of his birth, was put into the hands of the chief mourner, who immediately took out his pen-knife, and scratched upon the blank space '107'"—"Nollekens and his Times," edit. 1828, ii., 276

speaking generally, to suppose that baptism followed very shortly after birth. At the same time, the practice is not without its exceptions; and two of the cases of longevity mentioned in his pages depend largely on the contrary assumption, which, to say the least, is not absolutely disproved. The burden of proof, undoubtedly, lies upon the claimant to old age; but failing this, the exceptional character of the occurrence must regulate the suspicion of improbability. Subject to these considerations, the baptismal certificate has all the authority of a document which is contemporary, and bears a precise date. The inquiry, however, then turns on the identity between the centenarian and the person born or baptised. Here the case of Mary Billinge broke down. Her claim to 112 years rested on the evidence of a certificate of baptism at Eccleston, near Prescott, where she stated she was born, and which ran as follows: "Mary, daughter of William Billinge, farmer, and Lidia his wife, born 24th May, 1751, and christened the 5th of June." It is not always that the date of birth, in former years, is found recorded in the baptismal certificate; at any rate, her case shows the importance of making preliminary inquiries as to the relations of the centenarian in question. She had a brother and sister, whose parents are proved, on the authority of their baptismal registers, to have been not "William and Lidia," but "Charles and Margaret;" and this fact being established, a further search revealed the entry, "Mary, daughter of Charles and Margaret Billinge, born 6th November, 1772, christened 23rd December," thus reducing her years from 112, as recorded in Toxteth Park Cemetery, to a little over 91. Similar is the case of Mary Hicks, who died in Isleworth Workhouse in 1870, at the reputed age of 104, and was followed to the grave by eight other inmates whose ages averaged 78½ years. Broseley, Salop, was her birthplace, and the 11th of August, 1766, her alleged birthday; and another entry in the registry there, "Mary, daughter of Samuel and Mary Roden, 15th February, 1767," was supposed to record her baptism. But the story is cleared up by her nephew telling the rector of Broseley that the name of the old dame's father was John, not Samuel, and her mother's name "he thought, Sarah." On searching the register of baptisms again, this entry was found:—"November 14, 1773, Mary, daughter of John and Sarah Roden." There is certainly a conflict of testimony in this case between the old dame and her nephew, which Mr. Thoms admits to be "curious but not unprecedented." But the very doubts thus suggested suffice to support his dictum, that "certificates of baptism, unsupported by corroborative proof, cannot be received as evidence of longevity." It is clearly of the first importance to ascertain before consulting the register, which, among many entries possibly relating to the same family, at all events to the same name, is the entry required. The practice of calling several children by

the same name was not uncommon in earlier times in this country. John Leland, the antiquary, had a brother John; and the Protector Somerset, had three sons, named Edward, all living at the same time. More frequently, however, the particular christian name is found perpetuated among successive children after death. Thus the pedigree of Henry Hibbert, of Preston, East Yorkshire, states that by his marriage with Anne Burrell he had, 1,—a son *Henry*, born July 2 and buried July 10, 1660; 2,—a son *Henry*, born October 14, 1661, buried August 18, 1665; and 3,—a son *Henry*, born January 20, 1672–3 and buried March 16, 1679–80. A superficial examination of the register, by anyone previously unacquainted with these facts, might easily ascribe, with all the show of documentary proof, an additional twelve years to the youngest brother, and invest him, had he lived to see long days, with the spurious honours of ultra-longevity. Doubly important does such precaution become in parishes or districts, where from constant intermarriage, especially among the poorer and less migratory classes, one name has become, as it were, indigenous to the place, and represents not so much a family as a clan. A plurality of names, an uncommon christian name, or a surname used in its place are useful means of avoiding confusion in the search; but then it is the humbler classes who furnish most claimants to longevity. The register at Burbage, Wilts, has an entry, we believe, as follows:—"1781. Charles Caractacus Ostorius Maximilian Gustavus Adolphus, son of Charles Stone, a tailor, bapt. 29 April;" but it is not often that centenarian-hunters have such a clue to identity in those quarters where it is most required.

Subject, however, to the precautions we have mentioned, the register furnishes, to the competent investigator, the needful evidence. Unfortunately the whole system of registration, when centenarians now dying were in their infancy, in fact as late as 1837, was extremely imperfect. For a long time it suffered from being regarded as an ecclesiastical, rather than a social institution, affecting the whole nation without distinction of creed; and parish registers even now are silent as to Catholics or Dissenters. Formerly, according to Mr. Burns, the entries of birth or baptism were not made at the time; but the clerk made rough notes and copied them at uncertain intervals into the Register-books. False-spelling, in consequence, led to difficulties of identification. In the case of Richard Purser there are lacunæ in the register of baptisms at Redmarley from 1762 to 1765, and again from 1785 to 1789, which threw obstacles in the way of enquiry. The parish-book of St. Ewe, Cornwall, contains this memorandum:—"1677. The parishioners refusing to allow five shillings per annum for keeping a register, there was none kept for the years 1675-6-7; only these two baptisms were put down by me, Joseph May, clerk." As regards Maudit Baden, Mr. Thoms's searches were baffled by a lacuna in the period when




the patriarch was said to have been baptized; and tradition in this instance reported that "a former incumbent having gone to the church to marry a couple, accompanied by a favourite greyhound, the dog was shut up in the vestry while the ceremony was being performed, and amused himself by tearing out the leaves of the register" (p. 130). We have heard of a Sussex clergyman who was wont to direct his pheasants with parchment-slips from the same source; and it was stated once in evidence that the early registers at Christchurch were used as kettleholders by the wife of a former curate.

We are no doubt a very practical people, and many perhaps will measure the practical value of such enquiries as Mr. Thoms has so laboriously conducted by the means they afford of prolonging the span of existence. We are not sanguine in expecting much assistance from the study of a centenarian's habits. "Experiment," says Mr. Lankester, "of what will ensure long duration of life has been too rarely tried by man to make this class of evidence of any scientific value;" and we agree with him that there is not a sufficient number of trustworthy cases of extreme age to test by such means the conclusions of theoretical longevity. We cannot at present, for any practical purposes, get much beyond negative inference. It is easier to mark the effects of intemperance than of sobriety, as it is easier to trace hereditary disease than hereditary vitality. Bailey, in his "Records of Longevity," mentions a centenarian who went to bed drunk twice a week throughout his lifetime, and at the age of ninety-two cut four new teeth,—an interesting example of second childhood, but somewhat discouraging to the lovers of temperance. Dr. Massy, a believer in Geeran, attributed his death at last not so much to length of years as to "force of will;" but we doubt, on the other hand, whether mere force of will would make a *bond-fide* centenarian. Whatever predisposing causes lead to exceptional longevity in an individual; the circumstances of their lives, in some cases, might make one imagine that they had the gift of prescience, and arranged their conduct in anticipation of a prolonged old age. It is an appropriate termination to a long life to die with dignity, and most centenarians appear to have "preserved their faculties unimpaired to the last." Old Parr appears to have deferred his marriage till he was eighty. The Countess of Desmond ended her 140 years by a fall from a cherry-tree; and Mr. Gough Nichols has succeeded in proving, that if the story of her age is correct, she must have first become a mother when sixty-five years old. Of course it is open to contend that ultra-centenarians of this kind must not be judged by ordinary standards; but the argument cuts both ways, and the sceptic or enquirer may reasonably insist on a corresponding severity of proof in cases so contrary to ordinary experience.

We need not follow Mr. Thoms through some doubtful cases of extreme longevity. In that of Robert Bowman, where the question hinges on identity, he remarks with commendable candour, "I do not say he did not (reach the age alleged), but I do say there is at present not a particle of evidence that he did" (p. 206). We can hardly call that scepticism, where disbelief is made to rest on such a rational basis. He argues with force that "it is not because a case of exceptional longevity cannot be disproved, that it is necessarily to be believed" (p. 106). A verdict of "not proven" would perhaps best meet such cases; but though the burden of proof rest properly upon the claimant, yet when once the task of contradiction is undertaken, the enquirer is bound to show that reasonable impediments to disproof exist, irrespective of *a priori* considerations of probability or the reverse. Of the thirty cases selected by Mr. Thoms for investigation, no less than twenty-two are either disproved, or shown to be unproven; four are doubtful; and four only are shown to be indisputable centenarians. Whether this proportion would be maintained over a larger field of enquiry, must depend upon the competency of future investigators, or perhaps upon the further labours of Mr. Thoms. The pages of Easton and Bailey are open to anyone who chooses to dive into the remote past, and the Registrar-General furnishes an annual dish for his consumption. Each alleged case of ultra-longevity—for centenarianism involves an obsolete fallacy—must be treated separately, and on its own merits. The task is laborious and uninviting: it requires much perseverance, much enthusiasm, and a conscientious regard to truth. Mr. Thoms combines with these qualities a keen relish for miracle hunting; and with a good scent, no doubt, the chase is exhilarating. We cannot share the opinions he entertains as to the value of photographs in determining extreme old age, for, at the best, they cannot carry conviction. But we do not find that he has shirked difficulties, or failed to acknowledge counter-evidence or obstacles to proof; and he deserves every credit for abstaining from pushing his triumph, where successful, too far. Doubts about centenarianism have been likened to the superstition of a London cowkeeper, who said he had kept 999 cows, but that it was impossible to keep 1000; but the force of such comparisons disappears when it is understood that the real limit to longevity is the limit derived from proof. If an ultra-centenarian's age is to be believed in, simply because "highly respectable persons have no doubt of it," there is no need to collect and sift evidence. But the real value of Mr. Thoms's work consists not in the exposure of a score or so of mistakes or falsehoods, but in the means afforded for examining future assertions of longevity. His instances serve as test cases, useful in illustrating the rules of evidence he has laid down; but it would have been better, we think, had he arranged them more systematically, with that object in view,

and classified them according to the line of proof they suggested. We close the book with a feeling of relief, derived from the hope that we shall hear of fewer loose statements of ultra-longevity in future. Parish registers have done much to thin the ranks of pseudo-patriarchs, and no doubt an effective system of civil registration, such as has partially prevailed since 1836, will do more. Let it once be understood that claimants to exceptional old age must prove their claims by the rules applicable to all questions of fact, and a new era will have commenced in the study of longevity. We live in days when institutions are all put to the test. Be it so also with individuals, for there is no prescriptive right attaching to centenarians. The times, so rich in scientific prodigies, are yet so barren in miracles. It may be we have outlived the latter ; but, if so, we can better bear the loss if we have also passed the age of impostors. When next we are asked to give alms to a centenarian, or subscribe to an annual dinner in his honour, we may require, at any rate, with a good conscience some tangible proof of his age.

E. FAIRFAX-TAYLOR.



## SAILING FREE.

A REPLY TO "ROCKS AHEAD."

**B**ECALMED in May and June in the vessel of State, I was suddenly alarmed by a cry of "Rocks ahead!" and on looking up in the tranquil time before Public Worship and Endowed Schools disturbed the languor of Parliament, I felt tempted to say, "It is only Mr. Greg," and to resume a careless attitude. I remember to have heard Mr. Thackeray tell how that once on leaving London for Brighton he purchased a number of a cheap publication called "Mysteries of the Court," which was not calculated to sanctify the memory of his Majesty King George IV. Seven years afterwards, when about to re-travel the same journey, he bought another number of the mysterious issue, and to his surprise he found his Majesty "still at it." I have no hope whatever of detaching Mr. Greg from his favourite rôle; he has for years been pointing to "rocks ahead;" from his peculiar point of view there are, there always must be, "rocks ahead;" indeed, I believe if there are none visible to other eyes, he and the few who with him deplore the decline of patronage and privilege, and think that a nation falls because its neighbours rise into opulence will, if there be lack of more material obstructions, cast themselves into mid-stream, and seeing the dying image of their hopes reflected in its smooth and happy surface, will cry "Rocks ahead!" until the vessel rings with their unheeded shouts.

Mr. Greg appears in these papers as a seer, as an economist, and as a politician. Looking at him as a thoughtful passenger on board the ship of State, one might think that his cry was simply that of an amateur, spying these distant rocks, the mere sight of which of course bodes no danger. But it is not as a simple traveller only that Mr. Greg

must be regarded ; here he is especially Cassandra—Cassandra beloved and maltreated of the gods ; Cassandra heard and disregarded by inferior mortals. I may be thought presumptuous to attempt a reply to communications of this sort ; our Cassandra's eyesight is so superior to that of ordinary mortals. These "rocks" are visible, but only "to an observant and forecasting mind." "Englishmen never did look far before them ; but," says our Cassandra, "I will signalise those dangers which I seem to see coming." At first sight it must appear very audacious to find one who has no pretensions to prophecy looking straight in the face of superior wisdom of this sort and smiling with assured confidence and contradiction. Mr. Greg having, however, brought the rocks within the possible range of common sight, we may pause to look at them with him. They are three, and are labelled :—

1. The political supremacy of the working classes.
2. The approaching industrial decline of England.
3. The divorce of the Intelligence of the country from its Religion.

As I do not intend to devote three articles to a reply, I cannot equal Mr. Greg in expansiveness of argument. But I should not have taken up my pen if I did not feel that within the narrower limits to which I subject myself I could make it plain that Mr. Greg's arguments and statistics are confused, inconsequent, contradictory, and based upon error ; and I shall not fully attain my end if I do not still further discredit as political guides the members of the school of which he is a distinguished member, whose critical and intellectual eminence is ever vainly seeking the public ear, which is ever heedless, because these gentlemen display their incapacity in parading their belief that there is something magical and recondite about human progress—something which they alone can guide and fashion, which they only can impart and interpret—a doctrine at which humanity has laughed successfully through all the ages of its history. One of their fundamental errors is that which we may see lurking beneath the first of Mr. Greg's "rocks," and it concerns the distribution of political power. They have habitually and always viewed the diffusion of power with suspicion and dislike. It is no new idea to regard the political supremacy of the many as a danger to the State. I have always looked upon men of this school as would-be members of an oligarchy, which, if it held supremacy, would drive me into revolt, probably, sooner than any other tyranny. Hating all oligarchies, I should decidedly prefer a feudal or any other oligarchy to one based upon self-sufficient intellect. There would be surely more of human nature in the former, and this humanity is an excellent quality in rulers.

The diffusion of political power affects all matters of State ; and if our Cassandra would not admit the right of men and women to a directly representative share in the government which they support

by the payment of taxes, and to whose laws they are prepared to render obedience, then I shall not fear to fall back upon the inferior ground of expediency. I will go on to show that this diffusion of power is indispensable to the welfare of the people, to the enactment of just laws, though we shall observe by the way that it is not only in the attainment of their right as citizens, but in its civilising influences, that this diffusion is also valuable. I shall be prepared to contend that the truest measure of civilisation, and one which has never betrayed a nation to ruin, is to be found in the extension of civil rights, and that the country most civilised is that in which the largest proportion of the population is able in absolute freedom to perform the political duties of citizenship. We must be aware that there are at least two other definitions of civilisation, and that our Cassandras would perhaps talk of what they call "culture," and mourn the decline of culture as an evidence of the decay of civilisation. Now I am far from saying that they themselves are without—no honest-minded teacher is without—real value and function in the State. Mental culture is their proper work and duty; and though some trim their minds into strange and uncouth shapes, resembling "cultured" garden shrubs of the Georgian *régime*, and others force their intellect to unnatural and unwholesome growth, while all suffer more or less in narrowness, from the seclusion necessary to culture, or, I should say, from the exclusion of human infection, yet these evils are infinitely preferable to the diseases incident to many trades, and may to some extent at least be counteracted. These Cassandras will say, perhaps, that the spread of civilisation cannot be concurrent with the diffusion of political power because of the decline of culture, which they allege is a consequence of that diffusion, forgetting that under such circumstances culture does not decline, but only appears to do so because of the large number of persons, hitherto without its ken, who are suddenly brought within the admitted sphere of its influence. I cannot say whether Cassandra in 1874 would regard my definition of civilisation as more "unlearned" and vulgar than that third position, which, mistaking cause for effect, looks up to civilisation as a huge and beneficent idol whose head is the steam-engine, with the electric telegraph for brain; whose body is stuffed with paper money, with steam-ships for hands, and whose legs are a compound of railways and tramways. It is not this or that; that State is civilised in which the people are powerful, not for a moment, but as a permanent force; and they are unlike the despot or the oligarchy in this—that they can only be powerful where the authority of law is supreme, and where their intelligent sense of self-interest guarantees the security of property and the maintenance of order.

Accepting, then, what Mr. Greg calls the "Revolution of 1867," as due to the highest interests of the country, and its consequence,

the numerical superiority of the lower classes in the electorate, we have to consider whether the avowed bases of Cassandra's warnings are substantial. We cannot be too thankful for this change in the *modus operandi* of prophetesses, though it may well be doubted if their reputation would have survived had they in earlier ages made public all the grounds of their dicta. But here we must pause for a moment to supply an omission which is very conspicuous in Mr. Greg's papers. Perhaps Cassandra, scanning the horizon, scorns to look back upon "folly at the helm," but while I profess only a light reverence for prophetesses, I will say that if I took to the business myself—and I am sure it is a very alluring profession, though its gains are terribly reduced—I should certainly prepare my judgments by a careful study of the past. I want to know what we are to lose by the alleged "political supremacy of the lower classes;" I want to know what we have gained by the prolonged political supremacy of the upper classes. As to our country and its institutions, I believe I am at least as much of a Conservative as Mr. Greg; but from his arguments it would seem that he finds in the statesmanship, and in the laws of the past, something quite opposite to that which I see in them. The "concise" and "succinct" statements from the *Quarterly Review*, quoted by Mr. Greg, are, I believe, written by Cassandra, and these would seem to establish as a fact that the golden age of English history, in Mr. Greg's view, lies somewhere behind 1832. This appears marvellous, but it is at least intelligible. One way of refuting the assertion that we are going to ruin because of "the political supremacy of the lower classes," is to show that the extension of the franchise has been followed by universal improvement. There is to me something profoundly depressing in reading a passage like this: "Previous to 1832, in those old times when England was so great and paramount a nation, when we were so proud of our institutions, when we were so exceptionally free." I doubt if there is one among the teeming members of those classes, of whom Mr. Greg writes with such superb patronage, who, if he or she were asked for an opinion on English history, would give one so intrinsically ignorant, so blind, so mistaken, so utterly incorrect as this, which Mr. Greg reproduces with what looks like paternal pride. The period of his eulogy was a time when from the profligate Monarch on the throne to the knavish pauper "on the rounds," corruption and disregard of right rise as it were in a wall behind us. The Ministers, little more decorous than those of a former time, bribed only with patronage, the Bishops, Deans, and Chapters trafficked for their own advantage in leases of Church lands; in the Army, purchase ruled where nepotism did not; in the Navy, the people were robbed by the appointment and payment of the infant sons and nephews of those who had power, to ships years before the vessels could be launched; the Civil Service was filled with the creatures of

the governing class; trade was embarrassed by protective duties, designed to benefit the landed interest; the penal code was brutal and bloody; the foreign policy of England was rude, ignorant, and flagrantly extravagant, and the people at large—"when *we* were so proud of our institutions"—were, as our agricultural labourers yet remain, the most miserable in Europe. In every one of these points there has been a revolution, which I contend is due to the incorporation of the people in the government of the country. It is well for the reputation of men like Mr. Greg, that they are not tempted to set forth the national blessings of those "good old times." Change had been slow in the 150 years which preceded 1832, and it may be worth while to glance at what Lord Macaulay has said of England in 1685, when "the finest of the houses in Bath, then a place of fashion," resembled "the lowest rag-shops and pot-houses of Ratcliffe-highway," when between the north and south of London there was no communication save "a single line of irregular arches, garnished after a fashion worthy of the naked barbarians of Dahomey, with scores of mouldering heads, which impeded the navigation of the river." "If," wrote Lord Macaulay (who died when London was almost mean and miserable, compared with its present condition), "if," said this historian, "the most fashionable parts of the capital could be placed before us, such as they then were, we should be disgusted by their squalid appearance, and poisoned by their noisome atmosphere." Then as now there were Cassandras, who looked with fear upon the increase of wages. In 1680, a Mr. John Basset, M.P. for Barnstaple, remarked that the high wages paid in this country made it impossible for our textures to maintain a competition with the produce of Indian looms. "An English mechanic," he said, "instead of slaving like a native of Bengal for a piece of copper, exacted a shilling a day!" How well Macaulay scorned this shallow reference to old times when he wrote:—"It is now the fashion to place the golden age of England in times when noblemen were destitute of comforts the want of which would be intolerable to a modern footman, when farmers and shopkeepers breakfasted on loaves the very sight of which would raise a riot in a modern workhouse, when to have a clean shirt once a week was a privilege reserved for the higher class of gentry, when men died faster in the purest country air than they now die in the most pestilential lanes of our towns, and when men died faster in the lanes of our towns than they now die on the Coast of Guiana. We, too, shall in our turn be outstripped, and in our turn be envied. It may well be in the twentieth century that the peasant of Dorsetshire may think himself miserably paid with twenty shillings a week; that the carpenter at Greenwich may receive ten shillings a day; that labouring men may be as little used to dine without meat as they are now to eat rye bread; that sanitary police and medical discoveries may have added several more



years to the average length of human life; that numerous comforts and luxuries which are now unknown (or confined to a few), may be within the reach of every diligent and thrifty working man. And yet it may then be the mode to talk of the reign of Queen Victoria as the time when England was truly merry England, when all classes were bound together by brotherly sympathy, when the rich did not grind the faces of the poor, and when the poor did not envy the splendour of the rich."

Why are we in "vital" peril because of the numerical supremacy of the lower classes in the electorate? It is not difficult to find the soft spot to which Cassandra's warnings are directed. She says:—"In round numbers the population of this kingdom may be divided into *eight* millions of persons who hold realised property of some sort, and *twenty-four* millions who hold no property, but subsist by the labour of their hands. These twenty-four millions, or the householders among them, who may be reckoned at one-fifth, have now votes, or will have very shortly, or may have when they please, and they can, therefore, when they please, outvote and overpower the householders among the eight millions, who may be reckoned at one-fourth. That is, to put it broadly, there are, or may be, and soon will be, *five* millions of poor electors against *two* millions of well-to-do electors." The allegation is that these five millions of men will wreck the ship; that they will put their backs together and form a rock upon which the vessel that bears our Cassandra and ourselves must be broken. Why should this be? Why should 5,000,000 combine to ruin their country, and 2,000,000 to save it? Because the majority are stupid? Who says they are stupid? Cassandra. Is it not precisely because of this dangerous concentration of property that we need the influence of these 5,000,000 electors to render property more assured? Property cannot be so secure when its ownership is confined to a small minority, as when proprietorship is diffused. Have the few shown the most intelligent appreciation of the trust? No well-informed person, thoroughly acquainted with the population of other lands, will dare to say, in the face of facts, that the people of England are happier, that they have more self-respect, that they are wiser, and more thrifty and prosperous. Mr. Greg, in a manner which is to my thinking most odiously pharisaical, is "satisfied" that "properly trained, properly led, properly dealt with, they would make out and out the best Proletariat in the world." From the sublime heights of a morganatic alliance with the gods, Cassandra regards the masses of the English people, and while "repudiating with infinite disgust" anything like flattery, is graciously willing to admit that our lower classes are on the whole "more intelligent, more fair, more sober-minded, and, but for their drinking propensities, more respectable than those of most other lands." My opinion is not so favourable; I am inclined to think that the mass of

the people of England, while they possess unequalled natural capacity for government, are inferior in the points Mr. Greg mentions to the working classes of most other lands, and that for their defects we have to blame such false guides as this Cassandra, whose idea of a proletariat is closely akin to *l'idée Napoléonienne*, and who deprecates their partnership in national affairs with much of the manner with which a head master would refuse the voice of the first form on the question of holidays. It would then be seen that Mr. Greg's ideas have had their day, and that the real peril of this country is not the participation of the labouring classes in the work of governing, not the diffusion of property, but its restriction, due to the supposed but terribly mistaken self-interest of the extremely small class to which in this country alone the possession of real property in the agricultural soil is confined. The interest of the masses in the hands of representatives elected solely by the upper classes has been disregarded. We need no other proof of this than the repetition of Lord Derby's statement, that the produce of the country might be doubled. I have had some personal acquaintance with the people of every European State, and unusual opportunities for knowing the lower classes of England, and I never conceal my opinion that my own countrymen and women are the most wretched, not from want of money, but from lack of that self-control which nothing that I have observed will make general except the potential possession of property in land, and the desire to accumulate savings, which the careful possession of property of any sort engenders. And that now they are entrusted with the franchise, they will, with that cautious, prudent nature which is their inalienable birthright, set to work to remedy the peculiar evils under which they have laboured, owing to the long reign of privilege in this country, is my earnest and confident hope. Their first act is full of promise, and refutes at a stroke whole pages of Cassandra's argument. Compulsory education was the first great work of their first representatives. They are greatly inferior to the working classes of other lands in that economic, moral, and social training which the possession and management of property affords; and it seems to me that the safety and prosperous progress of our country depends upon the acceptance of legislation which will promote its diffusion. I wonder that men who have seen the peasants of Prussia, of Saxony, and of Bavaria perform the greatest national work of the age, and then return, having secured peace, to their fields; who have seen French peasants, after fighting their best to keep their *belle France* from the invader, save the realm from the mad schemes of Parisian workmen, and within a few weeks' after they had decreed with their strong arms the maintenance of a Conservative character in their government, lend the State 100,000,000*l.*; I wonder, I say, that men who have seen these things have lost their lesson. Mr. Greg has to unlearn the error of all men who believe

themselves qualified to govern, rather than to serve, the people. He has not a notion what good judges of their own self-interest the people are. He regards them as infants with dangerous tendencies. He would take them out walking in the ways of politics, having first prepared the ground. The paths that lead to foreign affairs they would find labelled "No thoroughfare—for Diplomats only," or "No road this way.—Keep the Balance of Power." If they turned their eyes to right or left at home, they would find similar reservations. The questions which affect property and taxation are announced as "fearfully complex," and they would be at once warned off from the close preserves of primogeniture, entail, and settlement. In Mr. Greg's school it is held naughty to think that all the children of a family have equal natural claims upon their male parent, and his pupils have to torture their rational powers to "make believe" that it is for the good of the commonwealth that a testator should be empowered and encouraged to put the largest possible area of land into life-tenure, or virtual mortmain. The leading principle of the school is, that politics are non-natural, and that simple ideas in public policy are ruinous and deadly. The proletariat is to obtain the nearest possible representative of Lord Palmerston, and having placed him in Downing Street, is evermore to look with awful admiration and unquestioning respect upon his mysterious doings. Yet I doubt if it would be possible for a Foreign Affairs Committee of working men to make two such blunders as the jealous opposition to the Suez Canal and the invidious and untenable exclusion of the Russian navy from the Black Sea. Both have been reversed by a Parliament elected since "the Revolution of 1867," and none are now heard to lament the change. I recall an interview which amused me greatly with one of Mr. Greg's high diplomatists. On the eventful day, in 1870, upon which the Secret Treaty between Benedetti and Bismarck, concerning Belgium, was published in the *Times*, I was in the cabinet of the British Ambassador in Berlin. An editor of the *Cologne Gazette* had shown me a summary of the Treaty, which I believe reached the eyes of our Ambassador by telegraph from London. He was full of Mr. Greg's ideas. "Ah," said he to me, with wonderful *gaucherie*, "England is declining; would you believe it, I have actually received to-day an application from an English viscount in the capacity of special correspondent for a *penny* paper, and I dare say he is paid as well as a secretary of legation!" I sighed, of course, responsively at the imminent downfall of my country, and reflected that possibly special correspondents were the *bêtes noires* of diplomatists of this sort, whose reputation could hardly survive the exposition of these modern competitors. Knowing what, in Mr. Greg's view, a "true statesman" is, can we wonder he should give us as his opinion that "the very depths of a true statesman's sagacity, the very forecast of a true statesman's vision, will alienate from him the sympathies of

the average elector?" It is wrong, perhaps, to suppose that a prophetess can be fallible; but if Cassandra could only know how often those whom she calls "true statesmen" have been saved from terrible errors only by observing and by following the simple expression of self-interest by the people, she might not perhaps altogether abandon a rôle so interesting, but she would certainly abstain from giving the grounds of her judgment so fully in future. Indeed, the cardinal error in Mr. Greg's political ideas is that of supposing that his "lower classes" are unable to see what is good for them because they do not recognise "fearful complexity" in every question. The undeniable fact is, that the nation is the best judge of the self-interest of the nation. What is the first, and, indeed, the whole duty of a statesman? Is it not to learn the will of the people, and to follow that, his peculiar business being to observe that in the management of detail no personal wrong shall be done, and every sacrifice of property shall be duly weighed and compensated? Why does not Mr. Greg bring forward a list of "vital" errors committed by enfranchised peoples? He is candid, he is intelligent, he is, outside English land and labour, fair and courageous, and he must know that while these are hard to find, the shores of the main-stream of history are rendered unsightly and horrible with the wrecks due to the bad seamanship of those "true statesmen," who were a guide unto themselves. He admits that "for the future our main security will be in the wider diffusion of property, and in all such measures as will facilitate this result," and yet he is so shortsighted as to mistake the only possible means to that end for a "rock ahead." Is there any lesson so patent and so plainly written in history as that the diffusion of property is concurrent with the diffusion of political power? Is it worth while to get one's self up as Cassandra, and to write twenty pages of this REVIEW, of which one half is a contradiction of the other half? Mr. Greg and I are at one as to the course which the ship should take—the direction being the diffusion of property. But he throws a boom across the channel in order to drive the vessel on his "rock ahead." He says:—"In a fair fight unquestionably the Propertied Classes *versus* the Proletariat would have a quick victory now; they will have an easy victory if they open their eyes and close their ranks in time." As one who feels that the "propertied classes" are the ballast of a nation, I pray they may exhibit no such folly. What can be more absurd than this; to prescribe diffusion of property, and then to tell the owners that they must close their ranks? That would be a course fraught with peril, and the only satisfaction it would bring would be the justification of Cassandra's warning. The ship would soon be on the rocks. Why I write "Sailing Free" is because I see that "the political supremacy of the lower classes" will bring about that "diffusion of property" which Cassandra admits is our only safety, and which I shall show could be accomplished by no

other agency. The history of property is, as any one would expect, a selfish record; its possessors have only consented through all time to laws which promote its diffusion when they were constrained by the political supremacy of rising classes. William, England's Conqueror, made large deer forests, and enacted that whoever killed a hart or a hind should be blinded. The chronicle of the time tells us that "the rich complained and the poor murmured, but he was so sturdy that he recked naught of them. They must will all that the king willed if they would live and would keep their lands." That was how the king acted when all was his. Then followed the diffusion of property enforced upon King John at Runnymede. Now let us pass on to a time when the owners of land under our present system held unquestioned "political supremacy"—a time just about two centuries ago. I will make a brief quotation from a former contribution of my own to this REVIEW:—\*

"About two hundred years ago the position in which the landowners and the people find themselves to-day was reversed; the former were mightiest in Parliament. And what did they do? They found a large taxation levied on the land, of which it is not untrue to say that it was the purchase-money of their estates; they threw off these feudal dues, and substituted an Act 'that the people of England should pay a tax of 1s. 3d. per barrel on all their beer and ale,' with a proportionate sum on all other liquors sold throughout the kingdom. And it was enacted that a moiety of this tax 'shall be settled on the King's Majesty, his heirs and successors, in full recompense and satisfaction for all tenures in *capite* and by knight service, and of the courts of wards and liveries, and all emoluments thereby accruing, and in full satisfaction for all purveyance.' This tax was carried in a House of 300 members by a majority of two. Then, again, when a land-tax of 4s. in the pound had been imposed, the landowners contrived, in 1697, so to frame the tax (9 Wm. III. c. 10) that it should not increase with the value of the land, as was at first intended, but should be a fixed annuity without rise in value."

It must be admitted, I think, that the diffusion of property can only be accomplished by the possession of power to enforce that diffusion, and I have no confidence that the owners of property, even in this enlightened age, would not be ready to follow pilots such as Mr. Greg on to his "rocks ahead." If they do not commit suicide by "closing their ranks," it will be, I am confident, because such a course would be as ineffective as a mop against the comet in face of "the political supremacy of the lower classes." It is time, however, that we should refer to the not less glaring folly of those who suppose or suggest that it is the interest of the "propertied classes" to "close their ranks." The blunder of the majority of those who have held property throughout history has been the assumption that the diffusion of property was synonymous with the impoverishment of themselves. This is Mr. Greg's error both in regard to social and international concerns. How few of the propertied classes have ever comprehended

\* "Free Trade in Land." By Arthur Arnold. *Cont. Review*, November, 1872.

the irrefragable truth that property has this quality—that its volume and value increase just in proportion as the ranks of the “propertied classes” are not “closed;” in fact, it augments as these ranks are extended. The safety of the British State demands the speedy increase of the “propertied classes,” not, of course, by the plunder of those now in possession, for that would defeat one of the two objects that we have in view—(1) the better security of property, and (2) the more productive employment of property. Mr. Greg fears an invasion of the rights of property by (1) a graduated Income Tax by (2) the imposition of all fiscal burdens upon realised property; by (3) the promotion of Mr. Mill’s claim for the “unearned increment” of land; by (4) the furtherance of such doctrine as that taught by Railway Acts and by the Irish Land Act, which he thinks “gave up the entire principle of the sacredness of property.” And another class of dangers to issue from this “political supremacy of the lower classes” is, that they will seek, “more or less through the instrumentality of legislation,” such things as “higher wages, shorter hours, more power of dictating conditions of work, and less strictness in the interpretation of contracts.” Of course they will. But will they press this to the point of national ruin, of self-immolation? Of course they will not. Where will they stop; where should they stop; to what point does the national interest demand that they shall succeed? Mr. Greg shall give the answer:—“With the possession of property will come Conservative instincts and disinclination for rash and reckless schemes. It is not in itself a political education, but it forms an excellent basis for it.” I met but yesterday with curious proof of this. Some men, who are members of the Agricultural Labourers’ Union, are also interested in the co-operative agricultural scheme of a well-known friend of that method of production, and when the accounts were overlooked the other day, the Union men objected to the high price of labour, in their new capacity as proprietors. Does not this show a way to avoid the “rock ahead?” I sail free of apprehension because, through the medium of this political supremacy of the unpropertied classes, I see clearly the channel to an open sea of far greater prosperity than we have ever yet enjoyed, when, by the instrumentality of good laws, such as will benefit both landowners and landless, by the wider distribution and registered transfer of land, by the encouragement of thrift, that careful fruitful mother of property, the incidence of taxation, direct as well as indirect, will be more general, the enforcement of contracts will be easy, because of the nearer equality of condition between the tax-paying and the contracting classes, and when the value of realised property will not only be vastly augmented, but will be guaranteed by millions in place of thousands of owners.

Mr. Greg has really much to discover concerning the classes of whose ignorance he is so certain. He has to learn that which, by their

enfranchisement, statesmen of both parties have admitted; that in all great national causes they are the best possible jury. It is almost puerile on his part to lead his followers headforemost on his first "rock ahead," by assuming that the decision of the details of administration must be submitted to the arbitrament of the five million voters. Mr. Greg sees far enough to notice that the degradation of the House of Commons must ensue if the residuum choose their members according to their length of purse. But what he does not see is that the remedy will come in the same way by which his "proletariat" will learn to co-operate in the national welfare—by the diffusion of property. If the "propertied classes" were foolish enough to "close their ranks," and to go on indefinitely as at present, I have no doubt Mr. Greg is right in predicting that "a larger proportion than hitherto of Ministers, especially of Cabinet Ministers, will in future be members of the Upper House." I am so ardently in favour of associating the propertied classes with the government of the country, that even if the House of Lords had not the high qualities which so many of its members possess, I should be devoted in upholding it; I should say:—"Wherever you can find 300 men who are owners—though it be only nominal owners—of more than half the kingdom, place them by all means in a Senate. But though I am thus steadfast in supporting the hereditary element in our Legislature, I think it highly perilous to rights of property, and a national danger of the extremest kind, that this can be said of the ownership of our soil. Of course it would never have happened if the wonderful wealth of English manufactures had not concentrated so much of the energy and intelligence of the country upon foreign trade. But, it must not endure. That would be certainly disastrous, not only because it involves the denial of that doubling of agricultural production, which in the opinion of a man like Lord Derby, the country is bound to accomplish. Mr. Greg does not yet comprehend that his first "rock ahead" is a sure and safe stepping-stone to the removal of this peril, and no one will gain so much by laws promoting the diffusion of property as those who are now the owners of property. Thrift, I think, is more engrained in the British character than in that of most European peoples, yet we are the least thrifty. The reason is not far to seek. There is no instance of a frugal people who, to use Mr. Cobden's expression, are divorced from the soil. Mr. Greg must lend a hand to pass such measures as those which I was permitted to indicate in this REVIEW;\* by these means, or by others such as have been adopted by the less pauperised nations of the Continent, the diffusion of property in land must be accomplished, and then the wasteful expenditure of the mass of the people will decline; then artisans will learn from the soil, that great parent of thrift, the value of saving, and the country

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will, far from being ruined, be happier, richer, safer because of "the political supremacy of the lower classes."

I must deal more briefly with the second "rock ahead," which, however, can be disposed of without prolonged or elaborate argument. I do not apprehend that I shall have great difficulty in proving even to Mr. Greg's satisfaction that the "rock ahead" which he has named "the approaching industrial exhaustion, or decline of Great Britain," is a phantom. Mr. Greg has raised a spectre of alarm about the coal supply, which I must not hesitate to say is built up of sensational and arithmetical delusions. The method is simple, and likely to deceive the unwary. He parades the coal-fields of the world, and the glory of them,—those which are near the surface as well as those which are deep,—and he compares them with our own in respect to the labour of getting the coal. It has been well known that our main advantage was not only in the position of our seams of coal, and in their proximity to our ports and our mines, but also, and perhaps chiefly, in regard to labour. No figures that Mr. Greg brings forward with regard to labour have any relevancy in comparison with those which I offer to him and his alarmed fellow-passengers in the vessel of State. He quotes Sir Charles Lyell's well-known account of the Pittsburg seams, and if the inferences which in this and in other places he apparently wishes us to draw, were really accepted, he and all his friends ought to appear much more frightened. Suppose Mr. Greg had put this part of the subject in another form; suppose after admitting that labour and population are prime elements in this question, he had put the matter thus:—The population of England is so much, that of the United States is so much; before the square miles of the States become as populous as those of England, and land ceases to attract from mining, the population must be nearly *fifty times what it is at present*. Although the population of the United States has at one time doubled in a quarter of a century, there are abundant signs in that country, as in all others, that the rate of increase of population is invariably subject to steady and continuous decline. I cannot venture to predict the time when the population of the United States will amount to fifty times its present total, nor do I think that any amateur Cassandra, with a grain of self-respect, would "put a date" to this problem. And if ever it should reach fifty times its present total, it may then be as disproportioned as at present to the population of these islands. Yet half the foundation of Mr. Greg's second "rock ahead" is built upon the fallacy of the near approaching equality of condition as regards the coal supply. In part, also, this "rock" stands upon the approaching exhaustion of our own stores. What I most complain of in Mr. Greg's three papers is, that there is a fallacious parade of care, with a show of calculation which is not borne out upon anything like critical examination. In this



matter, after promising "most sedulously" that he will "state no facts or premises that are doubtful," we find him writing in the following loose manner: "It is obvious that unless some great check should come to our prosperity and to our increasing population and manufacturing productiveness, our annual consumption of coal will go on augmenting, and will soon reach, not 120 millions of tons yearly, but twice, thrice, or four times that amount." Now I want to know why it is "obvious," and which is it to be "soon;" 240 or 480 millions? The climax of this rash and random statement is that the available coal-fields may be worked out in "*a hundred years.*" What is the ground for supposing that our consumption of coal will increase by this arithmetical progression? I know of none. Surely, if Mr. Greg were himself, and not Cassandra (who of course knew nothing about coal), he would never have piled upon our credulity not only this arithmetical progression, which is of course worthless, but all that plus the native resources of all the countries of the earth. We are actually asked to contemplate the decline of our coal supply by arithmetical progression, at the same time that we are bade to behold the men of all lands throwing out their own supply and manufacturing their own goods. This "rock ahead" begins to look very small indeed. It is just the contrary law which governs the whole earth. There is no such thing in real life as increase by arithmetical progression. At our present most extravagant rate of consumption it is estimated that the British coal-supply will last 1,200 years, and in days when a 99 years' lease is hardly distinguishable in value from a freehold, is the exhaustion of coal a "rock ahead" visible to "an observant and forecasting" mind? We may consider this part of the "rock" exploded. "But these figures only represent half the facts wherein our danger lies. The essential question is not how soon will our coal be worked out, but how soon will our cheap coal be worked out?" The answer to this is that our cheap coal is in no danger of being worked out. The recent famine price of coal was not due to the difficulty of getting it, or else the miners' wages would have been forced up by a percentage nearly equivalent to the increase of price. That coal famine was due to a speculative and wholly unreal demand for manufactured iron, which has left the peoples, who were purchasers of the iron—such as those of the United States and Russia—far more embarrassed by unprofitable cost than we were burdened by the coal famine. One result of that period was the opening in North Derbyshire alone of pits which are now beginning to turn out a supply of 60,000 tons a week, not an atom of which was available before the coal famine. In this country it increased capital and the wages fund, though, to the lingering injury of the relations between employer and employed, this increase was most inequitably shared between coal-owners and coal-miners. All through Mr. Greg's second paper there runs a palpable fallacy

which appears and re-appears with curious frequency—a fallacy which may be made very plain merely by asking him to consider that his remarks about cheap coal were written in 1834 instead of 1874. They would have been just as true then as they are now, but what he regards as cheap coal would have seemed to the Cassandra of '34 ruinously dear. He spends page after page upon this point:—"Cheap coal, we repeat, is obviously and notoriously indispensable to the continuance of our marvellous productions, and how is cheap coal to be secured when every year we have to dive for it deeper and deeper into the bowels of the earth, and to pay higher and higher wages to the miners who produce it?" This would have been just as true in '34 as in '74, and if we suppose it written 40 years ago, then our day supplies the true answer, and at once the sensational calculations of Mr. Greg's second paper tumble to pieces and fall to worthlessness. Mr. Greg is really the victim of one of the most hoary and inveterate of economic fallacies. There is hardly a simpler mistake to be made in politics than to regard the wealth of one's own country relative to that of others as the test of prosperity. We are more wealthy in '74 than in '34, not by virtue of the discovery of internal mines of wealth, so much as through the increased riches of those who are our customers, our rivals and neighbours. Coal is relatively as cheap now as it was in '34, and there is no reason to suppose that it will not be relatively as cheap in 1900 as it is at present. The labour that wins it may be rewarded with more money, but it does not follow that the coal is relatively dearer, to the damage of our export business. Mr. Greg has incautiously fallen headlong into the fallacy that the increase of our neighbours must be our undoing, but it would seem that he has designedly undervalued the progress of economy both of production and of consumption, which are more certain and inevitable in the future than any of his lamentable figures. He quotes Sir W. Armstrong's words, who said:—"Speaking generally of coal consumption in all its branches, there can be little doubt that without carrying economy to its extreme limits, all the effects we now realise from coal could be attained with half the quantity we use." I could find it in my heart almost to welcome a "coal famine," infinitely more prolonged than the last, if it were only to stimulate such economy, for the sake of our atmosphere as much as for the saving of our coal beds; but I have no doubt whatever that the event which appears to Mr. Greg as the foretaste of a scarcity which will soon be exhaustion, has in reality, even in its short duration, produced a permanent economy in consumption, the nominal value of which will in three or four years recoup the total extra sum which was paid for coal in that time of artificial scarcity.

We pass now from "the Exhaustion of Coal" to "the Deterioration in the character of British Labour," in which by "character" Mr. Greg

means "efficiency and conscientiousness." The general overlying error in this part of Cassandra's warning is in the absurd assumption, from the minor warfare of classes, that the industrial body will commit "happy despatch" and ruin the country in order to pay the salaries of the Trade Union secretaries. No one but a man whose mind was full of conscious condescension to a proletariat could be capable of the mistake involved in this assumption, but Mr. Greg is resolved not to see beyond the array of figures and statements which perhaps will deceive no one but himself. The first point is, "Does a reduction in the hours of labour involve a corresponding diminution in the produce of that labour?" Mr. Greg asserts that those who say "No" are theorists. I must be pardoned, therefore, if I state in defence of my claim to be regarded as practical that I have superintended the labour of 6,000 men in that textile district which is directly affected by the Factory Acts, and I deny, with a knowledge of factories in every town of Lancashire, that a reduction in the hours of labour involves a corresponding diminution in the produce of that labour. Mr. Greg does not put the matter fairly. He says that the assertion practically amounts very nearly to this: "That of two equally able-bodied and well-fed labourers, the one who lays down his spade and wheelbarrow at four o'clock will have done as much work as the one who toils till six o'clock—in fact, that nothing at all is done in the last two hours." This erroneous statement is only another consequence of Mr. Greg's view *de haut en bas* of the workman, whose labour he thus appraises precisely as that of a machine. The matter can only be rightly regarded as one affecting the man's whole life, and himself as one of the race and nation. If he works, with two intervals for meals from 6 A.M. to 5 P.M., will he be a better workman and turn out more and better work *through every hour of the day* than if he labours from 6 A.M. to 6 P.M.? I say that undoubtedly every hour of his day would be more productive, and that where he was not labouring in connection with machinery, over the motion of which he had no control, it would very likely happen that he would produce more in the nine than in the ten hours, while it is certain he would be a more healthy and enlightened citizen. If a man cannot try this question by uninterrupted daily labour from Good Friday to Christmas Day, he may get somewhat near the truth by noting how he treats his horses, which are practically his slaves. If Mr. Greg knows anything of horses, he would not think it at all absurd to suppose that the aggregate hours of a horse's working life would number far more if he worked nine than if he worked ten hours a day. I have known many poor farmers, but I never knew one who worked his horses at plough more than eight hours a day. I am quite certain that horses could not drag a plough for ten hours a day with anything like the vigour they possess for eight hours; and as the farmer is the owner of the horses and suffers by their in-

capacity, illness, or premature death, he does not feel tempted to make the experiment. There must of course be a point at which the advantage of a reduction of hours rapidly diminishes, and again a point at which it ceases to have any benefit in regard to the productiveness of labour and the bodily fitness of the workman. I cannot say whether this natural limit is ten hours or eight hours. I am inclined to suppose that for about half the world of labour it is one hour, and for the other half the eight hours limit is better; therefore perhaps it is best for the permanent interests of production to fix nine hours as the day's labour.

Of course the increase of the results of labour during shorter hours cannot be great where machinery is the producing agent. I am not going to contend that it is under any circumstances possible that the produce of all the factories of Lancashire and Yorkshire would be as large under a nine-hour as under a ten-hour system, but with all his knowledge of "mules, looms, winding-frames, &c.," Mr. Greg is evidently not aware how small the difference may become. He does injustice to accuracy in two points. Regarding the human being as a machine, he speaks of its 54 or 56 hours with no regard to the national cost and loss from sickness or premature decay; but I am now dealing with his estimate of the possible results of reduction of hours in the statement that "some attendants [upon "mules, looms, winding-frames, &c."] may no doubt, by greater energy and more unrelaxing vigilance, get as much out of their machines in (say) 54 hours as others will in 56 or 58." This is four hours; if we could get Mr. Greg to allow but two more, the case for reduction from 10 to 9 hours would, even in conjunction with machinery, be conceded. What will he say then with regard to the persons, of whom nearly every loom-shed in the cotton and woollen manufacturing districts will furnish several examples, who by "greater energy and more unrelaxing vigilance get as much out of their machines in 40½ hours as others in 54." The "three loomer" is by no means a phenomenon among Lancashire and Yorkshire lasses; most women can attend two looms, but not a few can serve three. This class, which simply by superior intelligence and quickness earn half as much again as the majority of women in the same shed, will certainly be more likely to increase with shorter than with longer hours, for their swifter faculties are those which are not extended in a population doomed to severely continued monotony of life, and theirs are precisely those natures which are soonest worn out by unduly prolonged labour. Of course in this argument I am not expressing an opinion in favour of legislation which operates to any extent as a restriction and disability upon one sex, and thus limits its powers of participation in the wages' fund.

In treating of the contention of labour for increased share of profits as bearing upon our national prospects, I think Mr. Greg does

the working class great wrong by persevering in one-sided argument. I find throughout his papers no appreciation of the fact that in this country, by restrictions which have the force of law, labour is deprived of that more equal partnership with capital which exists in other lands. Why, when in the opinion of great agriculturists and landowners such as Lord Leicester and Lord Derby the food produce of these islands could be doubled, why should English capital be wasted in the purchase of American "mines" which are metalliferous only on the surface and in the prospectus, and in the purchase of foreign bonds which may be worth only the paper they are printed upon? It is estimated by scientific agriculturists that to produce this increase of food a highly profitable investment of from 500,000,000*l.* to 800,000,000*l.* is requisite, and this sum will never be applied until there is a vast diffusion of property in land, and the use of the best machinery is universal. In Roumania I have seen ten of Clayton and Shuttleworth's threshing-machines in a morning where no farmer held more than twenty acres, and there is nothing to prevent the steam-ploughing of ten farms at a single operation. The real "rock ahead" is our land system, which the thing that Mr. Greg mistakes for a "rock ahead" is destined to shatter. The diffusion of the ownership of land is the sure means of diffusing the possession of capital; and while capital is less greedy in the distribution of profits when its possession is not confined to the employing class, so labour becomes more appreciative of the sensitive qualities and disposition of capital, of its fearfulness and immediate flight from the neighbourhood of Communistic power. As compared with continental countries—say with Germany—we are undoubtedly at a disadvantage, because our legislature has proceeded upon the monstrous and absurd notion that it is better for thousands than for millions to have "a stake in the country." It is a wonderful testimony to the ability of our race (which I believe to be naturally superior to all others in power of industrial production) that we more than hold our own in manufactures against such a people as the Belgians, in spite of the great advantage they possess in the virtual immunity from pauperism and the partial insurance against the fluctuations of industrial employment which their immensely productive land system affords. In Belgium and in other European States, the artisans are recruited from the agricultural districts in time of great industrial activity, and are in turn absorbed in rural occupations and cared for by the sympathy of agricultural friends and relatives when there is a glut of supply in the manufacturing markets. Mr. Greg fears that "the political supremacy of the lower classes" will induce them all to live on the poor-rate. I see a time when the owners of property will be strong enough to compel the virtual abolition of our Socialist Poor Law, which will then be needless. They are far removed in the social scale, but I believe it to be a fact that primogeniture is

the parent of pauperism. We have witnessed a time of great trial in the battles of labour and capital, but these we know are undertaken from a real or supposed self-interest, and it is quite reasonable to promise ourselves that as that sense grows more enlightened and the many become more wise as well as powerful, the wars will be fewer and the arbitrations more numerous. This indeed is already everywhere observed.

It seems strange that any one should question if working men have gained by the operation of the Trade Unions; and of course it is not possible to know whether they have or have not received a larger aggregate sum in wages. Yet it almost surpasses belief that so clever a man as Mr. Greg should overlook the facility which these Unions have introduced in settling the rate of wages. Mr. Greg must admit it would be absurd to doubt their effect in raising both the net average earnings of the individual workman and the aggregate earnings of the whole body of artisans, if we might assume that their endeavours have always been directed with the utmost sagacity to effect those objects. It would be simply imbecile to question that when there were two parties to a distribution of profits, each haggling as to the share which shall be allotted to the one in respect of his capital and superintendence, and to the other for his labour, the tendency of advantage is on the side which is most concentrated; but to concentrate the bargaining power of the workmen is not all that the Unions have done. The very first element of resistance to an inequitable distribution is the possession of accumulations—the power of waiting. Labour which cannot maintain itself for a time in idleness must be prepared to accept harsh terms, and we have only to suppose a time when the Unions will be actuated by a true sense of self-interest to establish incontestably their utility, not only to the workman but to the community which benefits by the results of shorter hours and higher wages—in the improved physical capacity and the higher intelligence of the working classes. And surely there are many most encouraging signs that this condition is fast being attained. I wish I could concur in Mr. Greg's silence as to the faults of the capitalist class. Do they not league to limit the output of coal? For my own part, I am more afraid of the sudden action of "rings" than of Trade Unions. I know of half-a-dozen village wheelwrights' men who lately quitted the neighbourhood of Exeter, and are now established as skilled miners in North Derbyshire; and from nearly every quarter of England that ogre of Mr. Greg's fancy, the champagne-swilling, dog-fighting collier, is finding competitors. I am sorry that Mr. Greg should make so great a mistake as to put upon the artisans and labourers the responsibility for whatever there has been of decline in our national reputation for the conscientiousness of British workmanship. This fault is surely rather to be ascribed to that cardinal evil of our

society, which Mr. Greg fully appears to see but will not help to remedy—the aggregation of property. It is the speculative manufacturers and contractors, in too great haste to join the narrow and therefore so envied ranks of “aristocracy,” who, in order that they may follow the lead in buying estates and riding to hounds, plaster their calico with size, who deliberately steam their workmen in order to make the worse sample of cotton seem better, who make coats of shoddy and knives of iron, who supply guns and powder to our declared enemies, who will only pay for scamped work. No artisan of any country deliberately prefers to do bad work. With artisans trained as ours are, the quality of their labour is mainly a question of materials and superintendence. Mr. Greg twists and turns to their disadvantage and that of his country every circumstance. Let us look at one of his statements. There is none upon which he seems to stand more firmly than that of Belgian competition in the iron trade. It is, I believe, a fact that in the spring of this year Belgian iron-masters did secure foreign orders for rails which had been offered to English makers in the first instance, and shortly before I read Mr. Greg’s paper, in which he deduced our national ruin from this occurrence, I met a member of parliament, who is chairman of a large iron company, and we at once began to talk of the reports concerning Belgian competition. He said he had examined some of these Belgian rails, and that he found them of very inferior quality to those of English make. He told me he had no fears whatever concerning Belgian competition [I shall be very glad to give Mr. Greg his name], and that no railway company in the United States which required rails for wear would have purchased such as these, from which Mr. Greg infers the downfall of our iron trade. It would be easy to accumulate proofs that the conscientiousness and quality of British labour stand relatively as high as at any period of our history.

But it is not in coal and iron only that, according to Mr. Greg, our trade is to be cut off; on no subject does he make more parade of statement, and upon none is he more lugubrious, than in regard to “our competitors in various textile fabrics.” Now I shall have written to little purpose if I have not made it clear that in regard to his statements and arguments connected with trade and commerce, Mr. Greg’s fundamental error lies in confounding our relative position, which of course declines as other countries approach a higher level of industrial and mechanical industry, with our actual position as regards wealth and comfort in the future. To understand this thoroughly we must make a brief digression into remarks applicable to all trades before we return to deal specifically with Mr. Greg’s observations upon the textile industries of the United Kingdom. It appears to me, that in order to fathom the depth of Mr. Greg’s mistake, we must obtain his point of view, which I have always regarded as that of a British Imperialist, one with whom the

external reputation of the Empire is well-nigh all-important, one who thinks the leaders of the people should be Masters, rather than, as they are, Ministers. I can fancy how hard it is to Mr. Greg to believe in the greatness of his country, when, from a military point of view, he sees her dwarfed from the equal authority she once held, and descended to be of little account upon the Continent of Europe; and I can well believe that were it not for some lingering echo of "Rule Britannia," some vague but hopeful assurance, such as Mr. Childers now and then gives out, to the effect that if we could no longer assault their inland towns, we could force half the world to keep within their ports, Mr. Greg would not have heart enough to assume the garments of Cassandra. He does not place "the effacement of England" among his "rocks ahead;" probably the subject is too painful; but I am sure he could write a well-stocked essay, to show that we have miserably degraded since the days of Walcheren and Waterloo. In trade the same theory haunts his mind. No foreigner must make a stocking; the increase of foreign spindles is deadly; and as for Belgium daring to increase her export of woollen yarns, it is enough to make Britannia weep and tremble with fears of approaching desolation. Now, regarding ourselves as a trading nation only, having some natural advantages, as we believe, of race, and some in regard to mineral wealth, it must be a benefit to us, as it is to individual tradesmen, to live among wealthy neighbours. It cannot be to our injury that those with whom we do business, with whom, in fact, we barter our productions, should be in a savage or semi-barbarous condition. The quantity of labour which we have to put into an article of commerce, for which some tropical people will most readily give, say, coffee, is but one side of the bargain. The other side is their production of coffee, which becomes more easy as they grow richer and their labour more intelligent and fruitful. It is quite conceivable that increasing wealth, due to the demand of other countries than our own, might enable the coffee-grower to produce two pounds of coffee with the same labour which he formerly bestowed upon the production of one pound. If no one else produced cloth, he must then give us two pounds of coffee for the same piece of cloth which formerly exchanged for one pound. But other people having common wants are also in the market, and let us suppose that their competition keeps down the price of cloth to the old rate of exchange. Then the coffee producer, through the increased wealth of his country, has another pound of coffee to deal with, after the purchase of our cloth; and, presuming the second pound is for export, he must buy with it something else, to the inevitable advantage of all industrial peoples; or, if there be nothing else that he wants beside cloth, the price of that commodity must rise. Mr. Greg's error is so patent, so curious, and in so able a man so startling, that one is almost inclined to apologise for setting forth



such elementary facts in commercial science by way of refutation. Is it possible he can suppose that 2,000,000 or 20,000,000 of people will exist in any country, under national laws, and not turn their attention to national wants—that because they happen to look at England from across the Atlantic or the Channel, and to know something of her mines, and factories, and workshops, that, therefore, they will have no thought of mining, of weaving, and of fashioning iron and hardware? We cannot be spinners and weavers for all the world; we do not feed ourselves; we cannot even clothe the English-speaking race and the Indian fellow-subjects of England. Time was when we could have clothed and fed ourselves, and Mr. Greg evinces no small desire to do it still, even at the cost of a protectionist policy. Why, in the name of all that is commercial, are we to take alarm because Belgium sends some woollen yarns to this country? Directly or indirectly she must send something, for she is an importer of British materials and manufactures. She must pay for these in some form or other. Is it any injury to us, whose cotton manufacturers are to a far greater extent engaged in supplying foreign customers than to meet home demand, that Belgium should pay her debt partly in woollen cloth, and are we in consequence to suppose that Belgium is therefore able to absorb a trade which surpasses by rapid leaps and bounds the powers of the greatest of industrial nations? There is no nation of Europe of which with any reason it can be asserted that within any conceivable time, their advantages for manufacturing industry will equal our own. All that is said of the quarrels between labour and capital is of universal application. We are terribly weighted in the race by the load of pauperism and the cost of strikes, which will never be onerous in countries where the ownership of land is associated with the lower classes. But neither in regard to cheap coal, or iron, or labour, have the nations of Europe at present, or in prospect, advantages equal to our own. Mr. Greg will say this is not so; but if he is right, why, then, is there need to protect their own industries by heavy protective duties against English manufactures? If foreign nations could compete with us on equal footing, why do our goods enter their countries, and maintain their place, notwithstanding that they are weighted with heavy duties? In 1876 Europe will be, to a great extent, clear of Commercial Treaties; a good many expire at the end of that year, and were there no renewal, nearly all Europe would, I believe, be free, and open to the invasion of our manufacturers. If our Cassandra were justified in half her prognostications, we should expect to see no great anxiety on the part of foreign manufacturers to handicap the Englishmen in the race. Surely if we are as Mr. Greg represents us, there could be no danger to the manufactures of these rivals and competitors, if we were free to take our goods to Berlin, to Paris, and to Vienna, and there compete with native industry. Has

Mr. Greg any doubt what would be the result ? At all events I have none, and in this confident opinion I am supported by that of all the practical men of England who have studied the question of our foreign trade. I will quote the opinion of a large employer in the textile trade, which Mr. Greg regards as menaced with ruin. If there is a practical cotton-spinner in the world, Mr. Hugh Mason is one ; and is he terrified ? Mr. Mason, writing last month, says :—“ I have not a particle of fear of ruin to our cotton trade by the adoption of fifty-six hours a week. Not one of the great powers could hold its own for a year in cotton manufacture apart from the high protective duties which prevent the entrance of British goods.” We may regard Mr. Mason, in his capacity as Chairman of the Manchester Cotton Supply Association, as the highest and most conclusive authority ; and we must observe that he says nothing about export ; he affirms that our competition would kill in one year the home trade of any one of the great powers of Europe. Incidentally, in the same letter, Mr. Hugh Mason touches upon our possession of a permanent advantage, one which appears wholly to have escaped Mr. Greg’s observation, and one which, happily for us, is inalienable, and is our absolute and unique possession. It appears to me to be a glaring defect in Mr. Greg’s argument that he should have made no allusion to the advantages of our insular position. “ I think it idle,” says Mr. Hugh Mason, “ to talk about foreign competition, so long as the kingdoms of Europe are divided into half-a-dozen vast camps for soldiers, and the claims of commerce are subordinated to the strife for military glory.” There is no prospect that this heavy tax upon the industry of Europe will be removed. The avoidance of all imminence of war will not lighten its pressure ; and even when the time shall come, as come it will I am certain, when there will be a considerable reduction of armaments, we can conceive no period in which the manhood of Europe will not be largely engaged in acquiring the art of national defence.

Mr. Greg’s second “ rock ahead ” is now seen to be but a canvas painted by himself in the most mistaken colours. Mr. Greg will perhaps take comfort in the reflection, that as Cassandra he is invulnerable, because the prophetess was invariably the victim of unbelief. But in truth the proper Cassandra of our day is the gipsy woman on a race-course, and such arguments as Mr. Greg puts in her mouth must be tried, and may be tested by the logic of facts and by the laws of economic science. I have not, I must admit, demonstrated the insecure foundation of Mr. Greg’s arguments more clearly than did a writer in the *Spectator*, who puts it thus : “ Mr. Greg’s error is really closely akin to that old Protectionist fancy that our nation suffers by the development of the resources of other nations, instead of gaining by it. Nothing is more certain, we take it, than that it is for England’s national advantage, to put it plainly, that she should lose her com-

mercial supremacy, if she loses it by no wasteful blunder of her own, but solely by the legitimate development of such of the resources of other nations as were hitherto unknown or unused." But I am far from intending to imply that Mr. Greg's labour has been entirely wasted. He does not appear to notice it himself, but he has surely made it clear to others that the diffusion of property by legitimate and well-ordered means is the one thing which more than any other is the need of this country. To strengthen and largely to recruit the conservative classes, not by such expedients as that recently in vogue, of drenching the residuum with beer and gin, but by directly counteracting, by diametrically opposing that dangerous tendency to the aggregation of property in fewer hands, which is the great, and, as I believe, the only peril of England; this is the great legislative need of the future. And it is no "rock ahead," because the power to accomplish this end is already in the hands of those who will partake the benefits of such legislation. Indeed, that power which Mr. Greg has named his first "rock ahead," is all that is requisite to liberate the industry of England from the trammels of feudalism, and at the same time from a social danger which it is a blunder to regard as insignificant. We must spread a real, not a spurious and delusive Conservatism, by making the many instead of the few personally interested in maintaining the rights of property. So long as the agricultural soil of England is mainly held by life tenants, who are but nominal owners, we are not sailing in the race with Belgium, with France, with Germany, with any of our neighbours, under fair conditions. Let us but have this "diffusion of property" by the reform of our land laws, by affording the artisan class that highest encouragement to thrift in the readiest and safest means of investing their savings, and then we shall pass on over the ground where Mr. Greg fancied he saw "rocks ahead," a nation more united, more wealthy, and more powerful than at any period of our history.


Mr. Greg's third and last "rock ahead" is one which people will see or will not see, according to their ideas of Religion. My firm belief is that no two persons can contemplate Mr. Greg's position from the same stand-point, and to those who concur in this opinion it is unnecessary to say more with reference to his fears concerning "the divorce of the Intelligence of the country from its Religion." If it be accepted that Religion is, and always has been, and must of necessity be, an exclusively personal affair, "the Religion of a nation" becomes an inaccurate expression, and the fact is admitted that the truths of Religion are perceived and accepted as the truths of Science are received and accepted in a manner which precisely accords with the mind of the individual. To say that "the Religion of a nation ought to be the embodiment of its highest Intelligence, in the most solemn moments of that Intelligence," has a grand sound, but it can only be received with this proviso, that the Religion

will be accepted only in its material aspects by the many (and if it yield none such, they will of necessity be evolved) with an ever-changing vision of its spiritual aspect varying from the lowest to the highest intelligence. This is true even where Religion consists of "Salvation formulas of Creeds and Churches." Though both accept the same formulas, yet none of us doubt that between the Religion of Dr. Manning and the Religion of a market woman of Toledo, there is a difference far wider than that which separates certain members of different Churches. Mr. Greg has put a commonplace truth into sensational language—that is all. From the foundation of humanity, what he pleases to call a "rock" has been discernible; but no harm has come of it: those who have cared to learn the truth have known that Religion, whether it be regarded as of Divine Revelation or of human construction, is in its acceptance the subject of mental condition, and therefore, to say that the "highest Intelligence" of a people is not in harmony with the Religion of the mass of the people, is a foregone conclusion. In order to rear his "rock ahead" out of the waters of fact, it has pleased Mr. Greg to assume that the "Christianity of the nations" is one solid uniform body of thought, severed from its head, which he places in a condition of timid or blatant (according to culture) negation of all Religion. There are, in fact, many Churches; but there are, at least, four Christianities,—all useful, all progressing, each attracting its members by natural selection,—and these exist in all countries, whether they have free expression or not. There are everywhere the Penal Christians, whose rude natures take delight in the barbarous punishments of Scripture history, and who find the most salutary discipline in the fear of hell, the fate of Ananias, and the cruel sacrifice of Christ. There are everywhere the Redemptionist Christians: these are especially the people of "Salvation-formulas;" Christ is not only their Exemplar and Saviour, but their Judge; and this milder and more humanising creed has made them, and will, beyond the time of our possible conception, continue to make them an adornment of any community. Thirdly, there are the Priestly Christians, including the Catholics and High Churchmen. With these Christ is the Founder of a system of theological government, which they claim the sole power to carry on with the agency of saints and priests. And, lastly, there are the Christians (and these, I suspect, include most of Mr. Greg's infidels) who see in Christ's teaching the highest morality, the sublimest principles of human government, the ennobling hope of spiritual immortality; they find all this overcast with Eastern metaphor and interpolated verbiage, which are to them not unintelligible or misunderstood; and having thus submitted Christianity to the severest rational test, they may, if they please, call themselves Christians. If there are any who seem not to be included in these four categories, it is only those of the last, who, in their revulsion from what they regard as the gross and superstitious exaggerations

of others, can find momentary satisfaction in nothing but expressions of contempt and abhorrence. I see no "rock ahead" in this religious progress. We are safe so long as we are free; and not only are we free, but we are becoming, and we must become, more free every day. Mr. Greg looks fearfully to a day when men and women will be still more harshly divided than at present; yet surely this is not the true lesson of the time, when the sexes are co-operating in all directions; and whereas formerly the clergy were the only class of men who sought their aid, we now find a serious conviction overspreading society that "it is not good for man to be alone" in other spheres than those of the Church and the family.

With the mechanical idea of the proletariat still in his mind, Mr. Greg evidently supposes that *en masse* they can suddenly be turned from millions who are kept straight by fear of hell into millions bent on the sensual enjoyment of lifelong lust and rapine by the removal of that terror. Does not Mr. Greg perceive that the hope or the fear of immortality being one of those things which he says are to the highest Intelligence "unknowable," are therefore ineradicable? To talk of a whole people being "convinced" that there is no "hereafter" is an absurdity. I cannot think that any man or woman was ever yet held back from any crime by fear of hell, while I fully believe that countless millions have been led to do good for love of Christ by such virtues as he taught; and as I cannot see how it is possible that the "highest Intelligence" can ever be divorced from the highest moral principles, I have not the slightest fear that the progress of Religion will bring anything that is hurtful. Mr. Greg will see nothing that tells against his miserable forebodings. Yet is there not every promise, in all we see around us, that every day more and more the error, which is that of Mr. Greg and of so many others, that Religion is of nations and not of individuals, is being abandoned? The nation is not less religious, truly; but it grows wonderfully tolerant, except to the secular law-breakers of the law Established and nationally endowed Church, and they can do exactly what they please when they cease connection with the official service of the State. That inequality of privilege which Mr. Greg says we must remove, is doomed; we have the promise of that in "the political supremacy of the lower classes." I cannot think with Mr. Greg that Broad Churchmen, who do not believe in hell-fire, are the most likely men to rob a church; but I do firmly believe that the well-being of our community demands "that no unwise or partial laws favour unequal distribution." There are such laws existent in all departments of our social life; some which are cruel, others which are most strikingly unjust, and some which are exasperating in their inequality. These were our "rocks ahead;" they were dangerous when we had no power to avoid them. But they are no longer our peril; we have acquired the political force which will bear us on our course with safety.

ARTHUR ARNOLD.



## NOTES ON THE THIRD ROCK OF THE GREG FORMATION (*SCOPULUS GREGGIANUS*).

IT is curious to read, in juxtaposition, the last Article in the last QUARTERLY, and the first in the last CONTEMPORARY. The former is one of those marvellous agglomerations of statistics, which hardly any one can write but a Secretary to some great Society, setting forth the immense increase in the apparatus and appliances, animate and inanimate, of the Church of England during the last half-century.

According to the latter, for some time past at least, the ground for whose benefit all this toil will have been incurred, has been and is gradually wearing away, and if the process continues, will eventually vanish ; leaving, if the zealous workers continue to work, and to keep up their fabric, the huge machinery spinning away *in vacuo*, or at least upon objects comparatively unworthy of its powers.

Mr. Greg says that the better part of English society, in two of its most important sections—the Thinkers, and the skilled artisans—is tending more and more to reject the “Nation’s Creed.” Now we know the ambiguity often latent under phrases such as these. It is by a somewhat arrogant monopoly that those who are supposed to do nothing but think and write, are called “*the Thinkers*.” I am not imputing this to Mr. Greg, who (p. 345) expressly enlarges the definition, and includes in it, for instance, Mr. Gladstone and Lord Selborne, who certainly would not be included according to

that technical use. But I am not sure that the prevalent custom may not lead some, from other parts of the Article, to attribute to him the narrower sense.

Then, *what* is the "Nation's Creed?" I regret that I am not acquainted with Mr. Greg's book, "The Creed of Christendom." But I remember what was said of it by Archbishop Whately, no illiberal or bigoted critic: that it often represents perversions of Christianity as if they were Christianity.

This is one of the cases in which the pea is perpetually hid under the thimble, so that we cannot see what it really is. It has often been observed of modern free-thinkers, that they tell us what they disbelieve, not what they believe. Mr. John Morley (*Fortnightly Review*, July, 1874) rejects with indignant scorn the title of sceptic, saying that in a negative sense he is troubled with no doubts at all. But he adds—nor does this either seem to trouble him much—that he has no "glorious Gospel" to proclaim, nor, indeed, any positive Gospel worth proclaiming, though we may hope it will arrive some day. So it mostly is with these writers:—*Vana recedentis sequimur confinia campi*. After nearly two thousand years, we are still in hopes of finding out what the Gospel of Christ really means.

But what I rather wish to point out is, that not even as to what these writers reject, are we always clearly informed. There is force in the plea advanced by Mr. Greg and others in this respect, that plain-speaking in the matter is hazardous, on account of the social intolerance concerning it, which I am not concerned to defend. I am only noticing the fact. So even Mr. Morley, whose object is to denounce compromise and concealment as hypocrisy, tells us, indeed, that he openly rejects everything—but everything in what? In the *popular* Creed. But the popular Creed may be something very different from that of enlightened believers. Mr. Greg says (p. 344) that what is condemned is the "ostensible and professed Creed." Ostensible and professed by whom?

I am aware that Mr. Greg, in his concluding paragraph, gives a notable list of doctrines which, I presume, constitute in his mind the main details of the Creed in question. To this I shall recur. At present I shall only say that, besides that Mr. Greg, I apprehend, is no *denier*, as Mr. Morley is, there may be as much question as to the exact sense in which he uses those theological expressions, as about the more general word "Creed."

I admit, however, that between any conceivable statement of the doctrines of the Church of England, and a confession of faith which should omit as unessential and unprovable the matters in the said last paragraph (p. 359), there is hopeless discord. And taking in that sense Mr. Greg's warning as meaning that those special doctrines are those from which he sees and foresees so much alienation among our people, I must first confess that I can see my way but very little

through a millstone, and that I entirely feel that both my opportunities and my faculties for such observation as is needed, are far inferior to those of Mr. Greg. Moreover, we must observe that this very statement of an ever-widening alienation is (p. 345) but a postulate; Mr. Greg expressly says that he cannot prove it.

Subject, then, to more or less of such qualifications as I have suggested, I go on to say that I have no doubt at all of the fact which Mr. Greg alleges; to this extent, that there is a great deal of unbelief, in whatever sense the word may be taken, in this country, and in particular among the classes specified by him (as above stated, the best of the working class are within his special scope (p. 346), though he does not mention them at the outset). Nor am I informed enough to be able to question or deny its *positive* progress, whatever may be true in this respect relatively.

I can only say that I should think it strange were it otherwise. Since when has it been the test of a true religion that "*many* there be that find it?" "*Religion a Weariness to the Natural Man,*" is the title of a mournful but most true sermon.

Religion, I take it, can be sufficiently defined in a general way, or at least in one aspect, as some positive and palpable belief in, or expectation of, a life to come after this. The Nirvana of Buddhism, a belief in future annihilation, is not a religion; it is the denial, the contradictory, of all religion. Mr. Mill said that the memory of the departed was to him a religion; but this is *sensu tralatitio*, as is the worship, or deification, of Humanity, of the Positivists. *Christian* religion is the complement of this general belief by connecting it with a sense of sin, of alienation from a God of perfect purity and hatred of evil, and a feeling of need of a Mediator and Redeemer.

What warrant have we for supposing that the majority of men have these requisites for true Christian belief? Of the first hundred men we may count passing over Westminster Bridge, how many are the least distressed by any sense of sin or moral evil, or have the slightest feeling of the need or the blessedness of a Redeemer?

These remarks may be surely extended to all forms of true and philosophic moral teaching that have ever been propounded in the world: all such, at least, as have included any restraint on conduct. When has such teaching ever found, or looked to find, other than "fit audience though few?"

Well. As to the particular advances with which Mr. Greg credits unbelief, I would ask concerning the first of them, how could any one suppose that times of intellectual activity should *not* be times of religious diversity among intellectual men, extending to all kinds of doubt and denial? Christianity has always had to choose between seasons of deadness and apathy, when the nominal reception of it is of the least possible value, and seasons of life, when its real reception



is balanced by much rejection and controversy. Again, I ask, how could it be otherwise? It is a silly notion of Christianity, even as to its mere rudiments, that it is self-evident and self-explained, and on the level of the lowest intelligence. It would be a great note of falsehood if it were, considering the profound mystery and complexity of human nature, with which it professes to deal. Among the minor parts of that mystery is the infinite diversity and inequality of intellect among men, and that alone is enough to account for what I have been here speaking of.

Small perplexity do any such admissions cause to those who receive the doctrine of Original Sin and predominant perversion and corruption—"not so much a doctrine as a patent fact"—which Mr. Greg would have us lay, along with others, with a bow of the most respectful neutrality, on one of our topmost shelves, there to await the moth and rust of natural oblivion and decay.

With regard to the artizans, even (nay, specially) those shrewdest and ablest of them of whom Mr. Greg speaks, I cannot think it unjust to say that their education and general progress has hitherto advanced no further than that stage, in particular, of logical development, which is by no means favourable to the accurate solution of serious mental difficulties. Very often, at least, as I apprehend, they reject Revelation in consequence of such a process, no less common than fallacious, as the deduction of large conclusions from small premisses—for instance that, which I can call nothing less than preposterous, of turning away from the whole of the New Testament because of some isolated passage or two which perplexes them in the Old. This, no doubt, they share with others. Archdeacon Hare knew a gentleman who said that he should abandon his whole faith in the Gospel ("how much less," said the Archdeacon, "than a grain of mustard seed!") if a single date in the Book of Chronicles were proved to be wrong.

One special *remora*—or drag-chain—on the spread of unbelief which Mr. Greg notices, but to which perhaps he hardly allows due weight, is the averseness from it of almost all the women of England. In one of the most Mephistophelian—it is saying a good deal—of its articles on these subjects, the *Poll Mall Gazette* some time ago asked of the infernal spirits the question, "Why do gentlemen go to church?" to which the infernal spirits made answer, "Very much to please the ladies." Mr. Morley, with something of that contemptuous bitterness which seems easy to him, but which is impossible to Mr. Greg, assumes that men cannot really be influenced by women in this regard, and denounces as hypocrisy the allowing it at all to appear as if it were so. Mr. Greg, too, (p. 348) thinks it impossible. I am not so sure of this. Coleridge, in his Table Talk, says that women were against the Reform Bill of 1831, and asks what hope of success there was for a cause opposed by "the whole matron-

age of England." There may be truth in his general idea, though he may have been mistaken in the particular case.

I am not well able to compare these times, as to this matter, with former ones, and see what light it would throw on the expectation, which Mr. Greg appears to have, that impending events will bring with them special and hitherto untried dangers. But I should have thought it hard to maintain that we are so much worse than our ancestors in these respects, or that for this purpose we should read the Homeric line as if it were *ἡμεῖς τοι πατέρων μέγα χεῖρονες εὐχόμεθ' εἶναι*. Montesquieu, I believe, was in England about the year 1720, and said he could find no appearance of religion anywhere; and, if I am not mistaken, the same might nearly be repeated of many times in the last century. And it is easier to say than to prove that the same evil would be much more noxious now than it was then.

Such considerations as these may somewhat modify the aspect in which Mr. Greg's vaticinations of evil are presented to us. If, however, he is right, I do not pretend to be able to impugn the delineation which he has foreshadowed in so striking and forcible a manner (pp. 349-355), of some probable results, chiefly among the working class, whose future in this country seems to be ever haunting Mr. Greg with the apprehension of strange and undefinable danger. I could only reply, with my old-fashioned beliefs, that whether or no I could apply the beginning of the line and say "*O passi graviora*," I should certainly maintain the end of it, and say "*dubit Deus his quoque finem*."

If I now turn to Mr. Greg's three remedies (pp. 355-359), I shall be doing little more than adopting his own confession, if I speak of their feebleness and untrustworthiness. He, indeed, says so in plain words\* (pp. 355-358), that is, as to their being attainable; and to have confidently propounded them would ill have squared with his self-chosen name of Cassandra. We read of that eminent lady constantly foretelling evil; but to exhibit nostrums was not in her line.

His first suggestion (pp. 355, 356), I say, with confidence, it is impossible that Mr. Greg can seriously rely on. It is, that admitting, nay preaching, to the people, that they have no future life to look to—nay, startling as it is to read when so explicitly put, anticipating the time when express atheism (p. 355: "The loss of a God who sees our doings," "duty without a God") shall be the recognized public teaching in England—still it may be possible to have a highly virtuous and moral society on the basis of "enlightened self-interest," limited to life *citra* the grave.

O dreary dream! and vain as it is dreary! Theoretically, I admit it is sound. There is a striking passage in Sir. J. Mackintosh

\* I am not sure which are the two which he likens to the attempt to put salt on birds' tails. I think the first and third.

("Life," ii. p. 124, second edit.) about a sermon of Atterbury's: "a doctrine that without a future state the practice of morality would lead to misery, is more immoral than anything in Mandeville; and its destructive tendency would justify the interference of the magistrate more than most, if its danger were not prevented by its monstrous absurdity." I agree in lamenting (p. 356) the tendency among Christian teachers (when it exists—and that it has existed is<sup>70</sup> certainly proved by the quotation in the note from no less a man than Robert Hall) to countenance such a notion as this, "that apart from a future life, the law of self-sacrifice could have no obligation." I can conceive the realization of this vision of an Utopia of universal earthly selfishness seeming less absurd to one who is determined to shut his eyes to the corruption of human nature, and can conceive our race starting again, as it were, *de novo*, equipped with a new assortment of motives and principles.

But that "a wise and understanding people," whatever may be the case with the torpid races of the East—a nation which, as such, *has* "tasted of the powers of the world to come"—*has* covered the land with churches and churchyards, and through long generations has in them buried its dead, in the "sure and certain hope" of resurrection and re-union—*has* believed that there is a God of love, and that He has "provided some better thing for us"—that such a nation should ever put up with the starveling's fare here held out, and thrive upon it—even to conceive the possibility of this seems to me beyond the reach even of ridicule. That Mr. Greg conceives it, as I have said, I wholly disbelieve. Indeed, if he did, I do not believe he could have written the last page of the article.

On Mr. Greg's "second source of safety" (p. 356), I need not dwell long. It is shortly this, that we should do what we can to improve the condition of society, and diminish its hardships, inequalities, and injustices. That this is sound advice, and that its adoption, as far as it went, would be very effectual, I cannot for a moment doubt; and I agree with Mr. Greg, that it should be "diligently sought." \*

To Mr. Greg's third and concluding remedy, I have occasionally referred already. It is a simplification of Christianity, and elimination from it of all that is disputable. At least, the limits within which no one who in any way cared about religion would dispute (p. 359)

\* With the striking passage (p. 357) beginning "Some open their eyes," readers may like to compare this of Sydney Smith, yet more beautiful and pathetic: "We talk of human life as a journey; but how variously ~~is~~ that journey performed! There are some who come forth girt, and shod, and mantled, to walk on velvet lawns and smooth terraces, where every gale is arrested, and every beam tempered. There are others who walk on the Alpine paths of life, against driving misery, through stormy sorrows, over sharp afflictions—walk with bare feet and naked breast, jaded, mangled, and chilled." (*Life*, i. 410.)

"the Fatherhood of God, His omnipresence and His love, the conviction that His eye is ever on us, and His ear ever open to our pleading, the need of purity and truth, of sympathy and love to our fellow-men, Jesus as our pattern and guide, God a just, loving, wise Creator and Guardian, in whom we may absolutely trust," are so wide, that the above statement is practically correct.

That this exposition of the full essence of Christianity, which I understand is what it professes to be, is nobly expressed, and that it sets forth a large body of vital and heavenly truth, is certain; but that by no means exhausts the matter. The further questions to which it cannot but invite us are many; nor can I attempt more than slightly to touch upon some of them.

The above passage sets forth, as compared with the whole of the New Testament, or with any formal confession of faith of any hitherto-organized Christian bodies, a *residuum*; a great and important one, but still a residuum. Are we driven to this? and what is it exactly?

What does it rest upon? Some of its doctrines, no doubt, rest on what we call internal evidence, satisfactory to the heart *disposed* to receive them. But others clearly do not: and as Mr. Greg prefaces them by saying that "Christ most loved to dwell on" all of them, I think I may take it that these doctrines stand, in Mr. Greg's mind, on the authority of the New Testament. This, then, is the first point which we meet with: that, without admitting any extreme theory of verbal inspiration or the like, we may assume the *general* authority of the Bible—that of the Old Testament resting on that of the New, which latter I take as conceded. (Not that I have failed to notice the very slight reference to Scripture, which is to be found in this Essay; but, in truth, it is enough for my present purpose to assume the authority of the words of Christ alone.)

What is the Bible? A "grand old book," says Mr. Tyndall: "supreme literature," Mr. John Morley. More than this, I conceive, Mr. Greg would say.

But if it is, what right have we to bisect the Bible in this way, pick out from it what we like—in this case nothing but what is gentle, rose-coloured, putting out of sight all "terrors of the Lord," and all that tells of sin and evil—and say that *this* is all that is essential?

What does Mr. Greg omit? He gives a short list of doctrines, which are "gently to fall into the shade," and, no doubt, eventually to vanish. They are these—I do not understand the list as meant to be exhaustive: "Original Sin, Imputed Righteousness, the Fall, the Incarnation, Baptism, Eternal Punishment, the Trinity, the Atonement."

Now, the "*proportion of the Faith*"—the arrangement and relative importance of doctrines—though Mr. Greg adverts to it, is clearly not the point. It is obvious that Mr. Greg's views must tend, as I

have said, to the ultimate *suppression* of these doctrines. But even if this question of relation *were* the real one, how idle it is, while statements about the doctrines in question abound—as indisputably they do—in Scripture, to demand that matters of such enormous magnitude—I am not now speaking of their practical moment—shall be kept out of sight. The Clergy would not admit that they have “decreed” that the essence of the Gospel is in these things *to the exclusion* of “morality, pious emotion” (p. 358) &c. But they do say that it is unreasonable to complain of their “ten thousand pulpits” because they do not suppress those doctrines, with the open Bible lying upon them.

If it were true, which I do not know that it is, that Christ *chiefly* loved to dwell on the points in Mr. Greg’s select list, it would not be enough. Surely no one will deny that He *did* dwell, often and emphatically, on *some* teaching or other connected with the matters in this *Index Expurgatorius*; and *why*?

The most prominent topic is, His own Person. Mr. Greg thinks that all that is essential is that we should look on Him as our pattern and guide. Not to ask other questions, Is this really all to which Christ Himself leads us?

As of old, the question still is, “What think ye of Christ?”—the “mysterious Sage,” as Shelley called Him. “The divine Hebrew Redoemer,” said Mr. John Sterling, “never put forth untenable pretensions.” Contrast this with the remarkable insistence, in “Ecce Homo”—which perhaps arrested the attention of the reader as much as anything in the book—on the fact of the inflexible and continuous assertion, by our Lord, of “boundless personal pretensions.”

Mr. Greg’s ultimate *summum bonum* appears to be simple trust in God for the future, with *no* knowledge whatever what it is to be. This is above Strauss’ acquiescence in annihilation, because, as I understand, Strauss *asserted* annihilation or absorption, in the Pantheistic sense, and to the express extinction of individuality; and I apprehend Mr. Greg would stop short of this. It is more like that of Job, “Though He slay me, yet will I trust in Him:”—an heroic sentiment, but one with which we are surely not invited to content ourselves if we can ascend higher.

Apart from the question of the authority of Scripture and its assertion of these doctrines, Mr. Greg must, I apprehend, assume that they are of no practical importance in life. This touches on the veriest A B of Christian teaching, and it is needless to say that it cannot be admitted. Mr. Greg must know full well that to millions on millions, since the Gospel was first heard of, Original (*congenital*) Sin and the Fall of Man have appeared indisputable facts, however inexplicable, and constituting the need of Redemption; that Imputed Righteousness, however we may dislike the mere term as technical and unscriptural, is only a name for one aspect of the Atonement, and that the Incarnation and the Atonement seem to us

the golden chain ever linking the humblest child of man directly to the Throne and Bosom of God: that the Sacraments are held by us to be permanent pledges, witnesses, and channels of *all* the blessings of the Gospel: that *what* Eternal Punishment can be is a question which *must* be faced and answered by those who believe in the Bible; and that the doctrine of the Unity of God, together with that of the Deity of Christ and that of the Personality and personal agency of the Holy Spirit, appears to us to lie on the face of Scripture, and to be of the deepest moment in the guidance of life and the conduct of devotion.

All this is unintelligible gibberish to some, explicit falsehood to others. Among neither do I place Mr. Greg. Others, among whom I do suppose he should be counted, demur to it because of the "oppositions of science"—I do not complete the quotation, because it is not the science which is false, but the opposition which is groundless.

However, my object is not to argue these points, nor to propound my own notions, and I feel too strongly my inferiority to Mr. Greg in intellect and knowledge, to be willing to do so. My object is to confirm his own misgivings (358) that the outhanasia which he desires for these doctrines is impossible, and that the mass of believers will never consent to give them up as unpractical. Christianity knows nothing of unpractical or unprofitable doctrines.


If any one cared to know anything about my opinions, I could refer them to some obscure Tracts of mine elsewhere, where I have occasionally touched on these matters. Here I will only say that I decline being taken to adopt the "popular view," whatever it be, of these disputed topics; and that if I were to suggest the first step of a *modus operandi* towards meeting such evils as Mr. Greg dreads, it would be one in which I expect he would take very little interest. Believing, as I do, that the old Church of England still has it in her to do good work for the people, I would say, Let her be unshackled—not in the sense of cutting the connexion with the State, but of giving or restoring to her the power and the duty of self-action, under the control of the State. Then let her abandon the superstition which sees an inviolable sanctity in every word of her existing formularies, the false modesty which looks on them as a giant's sword which our forefathers could wield and we cannot, the timidity which sees hobgoblins in the path of attempting to do so. Then may she consider whether any new statements, or concessions, on points in Mr. Greg's black list or elsewhere, are reasonable. But assuredly I do not look to her arriving within leagues of Mr. Greg's land of promise.

I know nothing more impressive than the deep pathos, the tenderness, the human sympathy, of Mr. Greg's writings. I cannot but contrast them with those of others, who seem to me to say to Christianity, as Joshua said to Achan, "Why hast thou troubled us? The Lord," or some other power, "shall trouble thee this day." I cannot

conceive the author of so beautiful and touching a book as the "Enigmas of Life," speaking of Baptism as a ceremonial mumumery, as does Mr. John Morley. I could even conceive his adopting the prayer which I once heard from a newly-made unbeliever: "Lord, I cannot believe: help thou mine unbelief." At all events, I believe that such a doctrine as that of the Incarnation of the Son of God has at times been as a burning fire within him, and that he never can be as if he had never heard of it.

For myself, "I have a good hope because of Thy Word"—not certain parts of it, but "the whole counsel of God."

LYTTELTON.



## RITUALISM AND RITUAL.

FOR some months past, and particularly during the closing weeks of the Session of Parliament, the word Ritualism has had, in a remarkable degree, possession of the public ear, and of the public mind. So much is clear. The road is not so easy, when we proceed to search for the exact meaning of the term. And yet the term itself is not in fault. It admits, at first sight, of an easy and unexceptionable definition. Ritualism surely means an undue disposition to ritual. Ritual itself is founded on the Apostolic precept, "Let all things be done decently and in order;" *εὐσχημόνως καὶ κατὰ τάξιν*, in right, graceful, or becoming figure, and by fore-ordered arrangement, 1 Cor. xiv. 40. The exterior modes of divine service are thus laid down as a distinct and proper subject for the consideration of Christians.

But the word Ritualism passes in the public mind for something more specific in terms, and also for something more variable, if not vague, in character. In a more specific form, it signifies such kind and such a manner of undue disposition to ritual as indicate a design to alter at least the ceremonial of religion established in and by this nation, for the purpose of assimilating it to the Roman or Popish ceremonial; and, further, of introducing the Roman or Papal religion into this country, under the insidious form, and silent but steady suasion, of its ceremonial.

All this is intelligible enough; and, if we start with such a conception of ritualism, we, as a people, ought to know what we think, say, and do about it. But there is another and a briefer account which may be given of it. There is a definition purely subjective, but in



practice more widely prevalent than any other. According to this definition, ritualism is to each man that which, in matter of ritual, each man dislikes, and holds to be in excess. When the term is thus used, it becomes in the highest degree deceptive; for it covers under an apparent unity meanings as many as the ripples of the smiling sea; as the shades of antagonism to, or divergence from, the most overloaded Roman ceremonial. When the term is thus employed, sympathy flies, as if it were electricity, through the crowd; but it is sympathy based upon the sound and not upon the sense. Men thus impelled mischievously but naturally mistake the strength of their feeling for the strength of their argument. The heated mind resents the chill touch and relentless scrutiny of logic. There could be no advantage, especially at the present time, in approaching such a theme from this point of view.

But perhaps it may be allowable to make an endeavour to carry this subject for a few moments out of the polemical field into the domain of thought. I have but little faith in coercion applied to matter of opinion and feeling, let its titles be ever so clear. But a word spoken in quietness, and by way of appeal to the free judgment and reason of men, can rarely fail to be in season. I propose, accordingly, to consider what is the true measure and meaning of Ritual, in order thus to arrive at a clear conception of that vice in its use which is designated by the name of Ritualism.

Ritual, then, is the clothing which, in some form, and in some degree, men naturally and inevitably give to the performance of the public duties of religion. Beyond the religious sphere the phrase is never carried; but the thing appears, and cannot but appear, under other names. In all the more solemn and stated public acts of man, we find employed that investiture of the acts themselves with an appropriate exterior, which is the essential idea of ritual. The subject matter is different, but the principle is the same: it is the use and adaptation of the outward for the expression of the inward.

It may be asked, Why should there be any such adaptation? Why not leave things to take their course? Is not the inward enough, if it be genuine and pure? And may not the outward overlay and smother it? But human nature itself, with a thousand tongues, utters the reply. The marriage of the outward and the inward pervades the universe.

They wedded form with artful strife,  
The strength and harmony of life.

And the life and teaching of Christ Himself are marked by an employment of signs in which are laid the ground, and the foreshowing, both of Sacraments and of Ritual.

True indeed it is that the fire, meant to warm, may burn us; the light, meant to guide, may blind us; the food, meant to sustain, may poison us; but fire and light, and food are not only useful, they are

indispensable. And so it is with that universal and perpetual instinct of human nature which exacts of us, that the form given externally to our thoughts in word and act shall be one appropriate to their substance. Applied to the circle of civilized life, this principle, which gives us ritual in religion, gives us the ceremonial of Courts, the costume of Judges, the uniform of regiments, all the language of heraldry and symbol, all the hierarchy of rank and title; and which, descending through all classes, presents itself in the badges and the bands, of Foresters and Benefit Societies.

But if there be a marriage—ordained by Providence and pervading Nature—of the outward and the inward, it is required in this, as in other marriages, that there be some harmony of disposition between the partners. In the perception of this harmony, a life-long observation has impressed me with the belief that we as a people are, as a rule, and apart from special training, singularly deficient. In the inward realms of thought and of imagination, the title of England to stand in the first rank of civilized nations need not be argued, for it is admitted. It would be equally idle to offer any special plea on its behalf in reference to developments purely external. The railway and the telegraph, the factory, the forge, and the mine; the highways beaten upon every ocean; the first place in the trade of the world, where population would give us but the fifth; a commercial marine equalling that of the whole of Continental Europe: these may be left to tell their own tale. When we come to pure Art, we find ourselves beaten by great countries, and even, in one case at least, by small. But it is not of pure Art that I would now speak. It is of that vast and diversified region of human life and action, where a distinct purpose of utility is pursued, and where the instrument employed aspires to an outward form of beauty. Here lies the great mass and substance of the *Kunst-leben*—the Art-life, of a people. Its sphere is so large, that nothing except pure thought is of right excluded from it. As in the Italian language scarcely a word can be found which is not musical, so a music of the eye (I borrow the figure from Wordsworth) should pervade all visible production and construction whatever, whether of objects in themselves permanent, or of those where a temporary collocation only of the parts is in view. This state of things was realized, to a great extent, in the Italian life of the middle ages. But its grand and normal example is to be sought in ancient Greece, where the spirit of Beauty was so profusely poured forth, that it seemed to fill the life and action of man as it fills the kingdoms of nature: the one, like the other, was in its way a *Kosmos*. The elements of production, everything embodied under the hand or thought of man, fell spontaneously into beautiful form, like the glasses in a kaleidoscope. It was the gallant endeavour to give beauty as a matter of course, and in full harmony with purpose, to all that he manufactured and sold, which has made

the name of Wedgwood now, and I trust for ever, famous. The Greeks, at least the Attic Greeks, were, so to speak, a nation of Wedgwoods. Most objects, among those which we produce, we calmly and without a sigh surrender to Ugliness, as if we were coolly passing our children through the fire to Moloch. But in Athens, as we know from the numberless relics of Greek art and industry in every form, the production of anything ugly would have startled men by its strangeness as much as it would have vexed them by its deformity; and a deviation from the law of Taste, the faculty by which Beauty is discerned, would have been treated simply as a deviation from the law of Nature. One and the same principle, it need hardly be observed, applies to material objects which are produced once for all, and to matters in which, though the parts may subsist before and after, the combination of them is for the moment only. The law that governed the design of an amphora or a lamp, governed also the order of a spectacle, a procession, or a ceremonial. It was not the sacrifice of the inward meaning to the outward show: that method of proceeding was a glorious discovery reserved for the later, and especially for our own, time. Neither was it the sacrifice even of the outward to the inward. The Greek did not find it requisite; nature had not imposed upon him such a necessity. It was the determination of their meeting-point; the expression of the harmony between the two. It is in regard to the perception and observance of this law that the English, nay, the British people, ought probably to be placed last among the civilized nations of Europe. And if it be so, the first thing is to bring into existence and into activity a real consciousness of the defect. We need not, if it exist, set it down to natural and therefore incurable inaptitude. It is more probably due to the disproportionate application of our given store of faculties in other directions. To a great extent it may be true that for the worship of beauty we have substituted a successful pursuit of comfort. But are the two in conflict? And first of all, is the charge a true one?

To make good imputations of any kind against ourselves is but an invidious office. It would be more agreeable to leave the trial to the impartial reflection and judgment of each man. But one of the features of the case is this, that so few among us have taken the pains to form, in such matters, even a habit of observation. And, again, there are certain cases of exception to the general rule. For example, take the instance of our rural habitations. I do not speak of their architecture, nor especially do I speak of our more pretentious dwellings. But the English garden is proverbial for beauty; and the English cottage garden stands almost alone in the world. Except where smoke, stench, and the havoc of manufacturing and mining operations have utterly deformed the blessed face of Nature, the English cottager commonly and spontaneously provides some little pasture for his eye by clothing his home in the beauty of shrubs

and flowers. And even where he has been thus violently deprived of his lifelong communion with Nature, or where his lot is cast in huge cities from which he scarcely ever escapes, he still resorts to potted flowers and to the song of caged birds for solace. This love of natural objects, which are scarcely ever without beauty or grace, ought to supply a basis on which to build all that is still wanting. But I turn to another chapter. The ancient ecclesiastical architecture of this country indicates a more copiously diffused love and pursuit of beauty, and a richer faculty for its production, in connection with purpose, than is to be found in the churches of any other part of Christendom. Not that we possess in our cathedrals and greater edifices the most splendid of all examples. But the parish churches of England are as a whole unrivalled; and it has been the opinion of persons of the widest knowledge, that they might even challenge without fear the united parish churches of Europe, from their wealth of beauty in all the particulars of their own styles of architecture.

Still, it does not appear that these exceptions impair the force of the general proposition, which is that as a people we are, in the business of combining beauty with utility, singularly uninstructed, unaccomplished, maladroit, unhandy. If instances must be cited, they are not far to seek. Consider the unrivalled ugliness of our towns in general, or put Englishmen to march in a procession, and see how, instead of feeling instinctively the music and sympathy of motion, they will loll, and stroll, and straggle; it never occurs to them that there is beauty or solemnity in ordered movement, and that the instruction required is only that simple instruction which, without speech, Nature should herself supply to her pupils.

*Quid fecerent, ipsi nullo didicere magistro.*

Take again—sad as it is to strike for once at the softer portion of the species—the dress of Englishwomen, which, apart from rank and special gift or training or opportunity, is reputed to be the worst in the European world, and the most wanting alike in character and in adaptation. Take the degraded state, in point of beauty, at which all the arts of design, and all industrial production, had arrived among us some fifty years ago, in the iron age of George IV., and before the reaction which has redeemed many of them from disgrace, and raised some to real excellence.

But, indeed, in too many cases, our repentance is almost worse than our transgressions. When we begin to imbibe the conception that, after all, there is no reason why attempts should not be made to associate Beauty with usefulness, the manner of our attempts is too frequently open to the severest criticism. The so-called beauty is administered in portentous doses of ornamentation sometimes running to actual deformity. Quantity is the measure, not quality, nor

proportion. Who shall now compete with the awakened English-woman for the house of hair built upon her head, or for the measureless extension of her dragging train? Who shall be the rival of some English architects plastering their work with an infinity of pretentious detail in order to screen from attention inharmonious dimension and poverty of lines? Or that I may without disguise direct the charge against the mind and spirit of the nation, embodied in its Parliament and its Government—what age or country can match the practical solecisms exhibited in the following facts and others like them. Forty years ago we determined to erect the most extensive building of Pointed architecture in the world; namely, our Houses of Parliament, or, as they are called, the Palace of Westminster. We entrusted the work to our most eminent Italian architect. Once was pretty well; but once was not enough. So, twenty years ago, we determined to erect another vast building in the Italian style, namely a pile of public offices, or as some would call it, a Palace of Administration; and we committed the erection of it to our most experienced and famous architect in the Pointed species. Thus each man was selected for his unacquaintance with the genius of the method in which he was to work. Who can wonder, in circumstances like these, that the spirit and soul of style are so often forgotten in its letter; that beauty itself unlearns itself, and degenerates into mere display; that for the attainment of a given end, not economy of means, but profusion of means, becomes our law and our boast; that, in the Houses of Parliament, dispersion of the essential parts over the widest possible space marks a building where the closest concentration should have been the rule; and that the Foreign Office, which is a workshop, exhibits a Staircase which no palace of the Sovereign can match in its dimensions?

If from the work of creation we turn to the world of action, the same incapacity of detecting discord, and the same tendency to solecism will appear. In what country except ours could (as I know to have happened) a parish ball have been got up in order to supply funds for procuring a parish hearse?

I shall not admit that, in these remarks, I have gone astray from the title and subject of the paper. What is Ritualism? It is unwise, undisciplined reaction from poverty, from coldness, from barrenness, from nakedness; it is overlaying Purpose with adventitious and obstructive incumbrance; it is departure from measure and from harmony in the annexation of appearance to substance, of the outward to the inward; it is the caricature of the Beautiful; it is the conversion of helps into hindrances; it is the attempted substitution of the secondary for the primary aim, and the real failure and paralysis of both. A great deal of our architecture, a great share of our industrial production has been or is, it may be feared, very Ritualistic indeed.

Let us now trace the operation of the same principle in the subject matter of religion. We encounter the same defects, the same difficulties, the same excesses; the same want of trained habits of observation; the same forgetfulness of proportion; the same danger of burying it under a mass of ornament.

It must be admitted that the state of things from which the thing popularly known as Ritualism took historically its point of departure, was dishonouring to Christianity, disgraceful to the nation; disgraceful most of all to that much-vaunted religious sentiment of the English public which in impenetrable somnolence endured it, and resented all interference with it. Nakedness enough there was, fifty and forty years ago, of divine service and of religious edifices, among the Presbyterians of Scotland, and among the Nonconformists of England. But, among these, the outward fault was to a great extent redeemed by the cardinal virtues of earnestness and fervour. The prayer of the minister was at least listened to with a pious attention, and the noblest of all the sounds that can reach the human ear was usually heard in the massive swell, and solemn fall, of the united voices of the congregations. But within the ordinary English Parish Church of town or country, there were no such redeeming features in the action of the living, though the inanimate treasure of the Prayer-book yet remained. Its warmth was stored, like the material of fire in our coal seams, for better days. It was still the bed or mould, in which higher forms of religious thought and feeling were some day to be cast. But the actual state of things was bad beyond all parallel known to me in experience or reading. Taking together the expulsion of the poor and labouring classes (especially from the town churches), the mutilations and blockages of the fabrics, the baldness of the service, the elaborate horrors of the so-called music, with the jargon of parts contrived to exhibit the powers of every village roarer, and to prevent all congregational singing; and above all, the coldness and indifference of the lounging or sleeping congregations, our services were probably without a parallel in the world for their debasement; and as they would have shocked a Brahmin or a Buddhist, so they hardly could have been endured in this country had not the faculty of taste, and the perception of the seemly or unseemly, been as dead as the spirit of devotion. There were exceptions, and the exceptions were beginning now to grow in number: but I speak of the general state of things, such as I can myself recollect it. In some places the older traditions and spirit of the Church had survived all the paralysing influences of the first Hanoverian generations; in others they were commended to the people by the lofty spirit and English pluck of men like Dr. Hook; in many cathedrals, with stateliness, a remnant of true dignity was preserved; and in a third class of cases the clergy known as Evangelical had infused into their congregations a reverent sense of the purpose for which they met together. For this and other

services they were pointed at with the finger of scorn by the very same stamp of people as those who are now most fervid in denouncing the opposite section. And it was for reasons not very different : both were open to the charge that they did not thoroughly conform to the prescriptions of the Prayer-book : both were apt to slide into the attitude and feeling of a clique ; both rather abounded in self-confidence, and were viewed askance by authority ; above all, both were zealous, and therefore troublesome. But of the general tone of the services in the Church of England at that time I do not hesitate to say, it was such as when carefully considered would have shocked not only any earnest Christian of whatever communion, but any sincere believer in God, any one who held that there was a Creator and Governor of the world, and that his creatures ought to worship Him. And that which I wish to press upon the mind of the reader is, that this state of things was one with which the members of the Church generally were quite content. It was not by lay associations with long purses that the people were with difficulty and with much resistance awakened out of this state of things. It was by the reforming Bishops and Clergy of the Church of England. And such an amount of effort could hardly have been needed, had the faculties and life of art been more widely diffused.

Had we, as a people, been possessed in reasonable measure of that sense of harmony between the inward and the outward of which I have been lamenting the weakness, it could not indeed have supplied the place of a fervent religious life ; but Divine worship, the great public symbol and pledge of that life, never could have fallen so low among us. And I think it has been in some measure from the same defect that, during the exterior revivals of the last forty years, there has been so much misapprehension and miscarriage, so much dissatisfaction and disturbance. More than thirty years have passed since agitation in London and riot in Exeter were resorted to for the purpose, as was conscientiously believed, of preserving the purity of the Reformed Religion against the use of the Surplice in the pulpit, and of the Prayer for the Church Militant. In vain the bishops and the clergy concerned made their protests, and averred that they were advising, or acting, in simple "obedience to the law." The appeal to that watchword, now so sacred, was utterly unavailing : Popery, and nothing less than Popery, it was insisted, must be the meaning of these changes. To me it appeared at the time that their introduction, however legal, was, if not effected with the full and intelligent concurrence of the flocks, decidedly unwise. But as to these particular usages themselves, I held then and hold now, that their tendency, when calmly viewed, must have been seen to be rather Protestant than Popish ; that Popery would have led to the use of a different and lower garb in preaching, not to the use of the same vestment which was also to be used for the celebration of the Eucharist ; and that no prayer in the Prayer-book bears so visibly the

mark of the Reformation, as the Prayer for the Church Militant. Be that as it may, I recollect with pain a particular case, which may serve as a sample of the feeling, and the occurrences, of that day. An able and devoted young clergyman had accepted the charge of a new district parish in one of our largest towns, with trifling emoluments, and with large masses of neglected poor, whom he had begun steadily and successfully to gather in. Within a year or two an agitation was raised, not in his parish, but in the town at large; it had grown too hot to hold him; and he was morally compelled to retire from his benefice and from the place, for the offences of having preached the morning sermon in the Surplice, read the Prayer for the Church Militant, and opened his church for Divine service, not daily, but on all festivals. The inference to be drawn from this is not an inference of self-laudation: not the *ἡμεῖς τοι πατέρων μέγ' ἀμείνονες εὐχόμεθ' εἶναι* but an inference in behalf of a little self-mistrust, and a great deal of deliberation and circumspection in these important matters. For, from a view of the modes which have become usual for the celebration of Divine service, in average churches not saddled with a party name, there appears this rather startling fact, that the congregations of the Church of England in general now practise without suspicion, and the Parliament, representing the general feeling out of doors, is disposed to enforce, by the establishment of more stringent procedure, what thirty years ago was denounced, and rather more than denounced, as Ritualism.

The truth is, that, in the word Ritualism, there is involved much more than the popular mind seems to suppose. The present movement in favour of ritual is not confined to ritualists, neither is it confined even to Churchmen. It has been, when all things are considered, quite as remarkable among Nonconformists and Presbyterians; not because they have as much of it, but because they formerly had none, and because their system appeared to have been devised and adjusted in order to prevent its introduction, and to fix upon it even *in limine* the aspect of a flagrant departure from first principles. Crosses on the outside of chapels, organs within them, rich painted architecture, that flagrant piece of symbolism, the steeple, windows filled with subjects in stained glass, elaborate chanting, the use of the Lord's prayer, which is no more than the thin end of the wedge that is to introduce fixed forms, and the partial movements in favour of such forms already developed, are among the signs which, taken altogether, form a group of phenomena evidently referable to some cause far more deep and wide-working than mere servile imitation, or the fashion of the day. In the case of the organ, be it recollected that many who form part of the *crème de la crème* of Protestantism have now begun to use that which the Pope does not hear in his own Chapel or his sublime Basilica, and which the entire Eastern Church has ever shrunk from employing in its services.



With this I will mention a familiar matter, though it may provoke a smile. It is the matter of clerical costume; on which I will not scruple to say that, in my judgment, the party of costume is right. A costume for the clergy is as much connected with discipline and self-respect as an uniform for the army, and is no small guarantee for conduct. The disuse of clerical costume was a recent innovation; but thirty-five or forty years ago the abuse had become almost universal. It was consummated by the change in lay fashions—a very singular one—to a nearly exclusive use of black. The reaction began in the cut of the waistcoat; which was carried by the innovators, without dividing, up to the cravat. This was deemed so distinctly Popish, that it acquired the nickname of “The Mark of the Beast;” and it is a fact that, among the tailors of the west-end of London, this shape of waistcoat was familiarly known as “the M. B. waistcoat.” Any one who will now take the pains to notice the dress of the regular Presbyterian or Dissenting minister will, I think, find that, in a great majority of instances, he too, when in his best, wears, like the clergyman, the M. B. waistcoat.

True the distance between these Presbyterian and Nonconforming services, and those of the Church of England, in point of ritual, remains as great, or perhaps greater than, before; but that is because one and the same forward movement has taken possession of both, only the speeds may have been different. I will give a case in point. Five and thirty years ago hardly any one had dreamt of a surpliced choir in a parish church. When such an use came in, it was thought to be like a sign of the double superlative in High Churchmanship, and was deemed the most violent experiment yet made upon the patience of the laity. How stands the matter now? As the purity of Welsh Protestantism is well known, I will take an instance from Wales. In a Welsh town, of no great size, the clergyman of the parish was moved, not long ago, to introduce the surplice for his choir. He determined upon a *plébiscite*; and placed printed slips of paper about the seats, requesting a written aye or no. Near two hundred and fifty answers were given: and of the answers more than four-fifths were ayes. In truth, there is a kind of ritual race; all have set their faces the same way, and none like to have their relative backwardness enhanced, while the absolute standing-point is continually moved forward.

This is matter of fact, and of the very widest reach, compassing a field of which but a little corner was covered by the recent Act of Parliament; and now the question rises to the lip, Ought this matter of fact, which will scarcely be disputed, to be viewed with satisfaction or with displeasure?

In my opinion this is a question extremely difficult to answer; and I will not affect to be able to give it a complete reply. It seems to me that ritual is, in what amount I do not attempt now to

inquire, a legitimate accompaniment, nay, effect, of the religious life ; but I view with mistrust and jealousy all tendency, wherever shown; either to employ ritual as its substitute, or to treat ritual as its producing cause. All, however, that I have thus far endeavoured to insinuate is, that the subject is a very large one—that it cannot be dealt with offhand—that it is exceedingly significant and pregnant in the manifestations it supplies. If we do not live in one of the great thinking ages, we live in an age which supplies abundant materials of thought; and with the many problems, which we shall leave to our children for solution, we may hand down to them the cordial wish that they may make more of them than we have done.

If we survey the Christian world, we shall have occasion to observe that ritual does not bear an unvarying relation to doctrine. The most notable proof of this assertion is to be found in the Lutheran communion. It is strongly and, except where opinion has deviated in the direction of rationalism, uniformly Protestant. But in portions of the considerable area over which it stretches, for example, in Denmark, in Sweden and Norway, even on the inhospitable shores of Iceland, altars, vestments, lights, (if not even incense) are retained : the clergyman is called the priest, and the Communion Office is termed the Mass. But there is no distinction of doctrine whatever between Swedish or Danish, and German Lutherans : nor, according to the best authorities, has the chain of the Episcopal succession been maintained in those countries. Even in this country, there are some of those clergy who are called Broadchurchmen, some who have a marked indifference to doctrine, and something like a hatred of dogma, yet who also are inclined to musical ornament, and other paraphernalia of divine service. From these facts, as well as from the growing ritual of the non-Episcopal Christians of this country, we may perceive that in the slashing manner in which the argument has been drawn from ritual to doctrine in our discussions, there has been something of that precipitancy to which, from the narrow and insular character of his knowledge, as well as from the vigour of his will, the Englishman is particularly liable. Here also, from that deficiency which I have noted in the faculty of adapting the outward to the inward, he is apt to blunder into confounding what is appropriate and seemly with what partakes of excess or invidious meaning. At the same time, an important connection between high doctrine and high ritual is to be traced to a considerable extent in the Church of England, and in commenting on over-statement I do not seek to understate. This connection is, however, for the present hopelessly mixed with polemical considerations, and therefore excluded from the field of these remarks.

But there is a question which it is the special purpose of this paper to suggest for consideration by my fellow-Christians generally, which is more practical and of greater importance, as it seems, to me, and

has far stronger claims on the attention of the nation and of the rulers of the Church, than the question whether a handful of the clergy are or not engaged in an utterly hopeless and visionary effort to Romanise the Church and people of England. At no time since the bloody reign of Mary has such a scheme been possible. But if it had been possible in the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries, it would still have become impossible in the nineteenth; when Rome has substituted for the proud boast of *semper eadem* a policy of violence and change in faith; when she has refurbished and paraded anew every rusty tool she was fondly thought to have disused; when no one can become her convert without renouncing his moral and mental freedom, and placing his civil loyalty and duty at the mercy of another; and when she has equally repudiated modern thought and ancient history. I cannot persuade myself to feel alarm as to the final issue of her crusades in England, and this although I do not undervalue her great powers of mischief. But there are questions of our own religious well-being that lie nearer home. And one of them is whether, as individuals, we can justly and truly say that the present movement in favour of ritual is a healthy movement for each of us; that is whether it gives or does not give us assistance in offering a more collected act of worship, when we enter the temple of the Most High, and think we go there to offer before Him the sacrifice of praise and prayer, and thanksgiving? Of one thing we may be quite certain, and it is this. To accumulate observances of ritual is to accumulate responsibility. It is the adoption of a higher standard of religious profession; and it requires a higher stand of religious practice. If we study, by appropriate or by rich embellishment, to make the Church more like the House of God, and the services in it more impressive by outward signs of His greatness and goodness, and of our littleness and meanness, all these are so many voices, audible and intelligible, though inarticulate, and to let them sound in our ears unheeded, is an offence against His majesty. If we are not the better for more ritual, we are the worse for it. A general augmentation of ritual, such as we see on every side around us, if it be without any corresponding enhancement of devotion, means more light but no more love.

But it is even conceivable, nay far from improbable, that augmentation of ritual may import not increase but even diminution of fervour. Such must be the result in every case where the imagery of the eye and ear, actively multiplied, is allowed to draw off the energy, which ought to have its centre in the heart. There cannot be a doubt that the beauty of the edifice, the furniture, and the service, though their purpose be to carry the mind forward, may induce it to rest upon themselves. Wherever the growth and progress of ritual, though that ritual be in itself suitable and proper; is accepted, whether consciously or unconsciously, and whether in whole or in

part, by the individual, as standing in the stead of his own concentration and travail of spirit in devotion, there the ritual, though good in itself, becomes for him so much formality, that is so much deadness. Now there are multitudes of people who will accede at once to this proposition, who will even hold it to be no more than a truism, but with a complacent conviction, in the background of their minds, that it does not touch their case at all. They may be Presbyterians or Nonconformists; or they may be Churchmen whose clergyman preaches against Popery open or concealed, or who have themselves subscribed liberally to prosecute the Rev. this, or the Rev. that, for Ritualism. No matter. They, and their clergyman too, may nevertheless be flagrant Ritualists. For the barest minimum of ritual may be a screen hiding from the worshipper the Object of his worship: nay, will be such a screen, unless the worshipper bestirs himself to use it as a help, and to see that it is not a snare.

In the class of cases supposed, the ready acquiescence of a few moments back has by this time probably been converted into a wondering scepticism. And there is at first sight something of paradox in the assertion that all ritual, not only elaborate but modest, not only copious but scanty, has its dangers. It seems hard to preach suspicion and misgiving against what is generally approved or accepted by the most undeniable Protestants. But the very same person who errs by making his own conscience in ritual a measure for the consciences of other men, lest they should run to excess, may be himself in surfeit while he dooms them to starve, for what is famine to them may be to him excess: what they can digest may be to him indigestible. It is difficult, I think, to fix a maximum of ritual for all times and persons, and to predicate that all beyond the line must be harmful; but it is impossible to fix a minimum, and say up to that point, we are safe. No ritual is too much, provided it is subsidiary to the inner work of worship: and all ritual is too much, unless it ministers to that purpose.

If there be paradox in this assertion, the explanation of it is not far to seek. It will be found in the removal of a prevailing and dangerous error in kindred subject-matter. It is too commonly assumed that, provided only we repair to our church or our chapel, as the case may be, the performance of the work of adoration is a thing to be taken for granted. And so it is, in the absence of unequivocal signs to the contrary, as between man and man. But not as between the individual man and his own conscience in the hour of self-review. If he knows anything of himself, and unless he be a person of singularly-favoured gifts, he will know that the work of Divine worship, so far from being a thing of course even among those who outwardly address themselves to its performance, is one of the most arduous which the human spirit can possibly set about. The processes of simple self-knowledge are difficult enough. All

these, when a man worships, should be fresh in his consciousness : and this is the first indispensable condition for a right attitude of the soul before the footstool of the Eternal. The next is a frame of the affections adjusted on the one hand to this self-knowledge, and on the other to the attributes, and the more nearly felt presence, of the Being before Whom we stand. And the third is the sustained mental effort necessary to complete the act, wherein every Christian is a Priest ; to carry our whole selves, as it were with our own hands, into that nearer Presence, and, uniting the humble and unworthy *prophora* with the one full perfect and sufficient Sacrifice, to offer it upon the altar of the heart : putting aside every distraction of the outward sense, and endeavouring to complete the individual act as fully, as when in loneliness, after departing out of the flesh, we shall see eternal things no longer through but without a veil. Now, considering how we live, and must live, our common life in and by the senses, how all sustained mental abstraction is an effort, how the exercise of sympathy itself, which is such a power in Christian worship, is also a kind of bond to the visible ; and, then, last of all, with what feebleness and fluctuation, not to say with what duplicity, of intention we undertake the work, is it not too clear that in such a work we shall instinctively be too apt to remit our energies, and to slide unawares into mere perfunctory performance ? And where and in proportion as the service of the body is more careful, and the exterior decency and solemnity of the public assembling more unimpeachable, these things themselves may contribute to form important elements of that inward self-complacency which makes it so easy for us, whenever we ourselves are judge and jury as well as "prisoner at the bar" to obtain a verdict of acquittal. In other words, the very things which find their warrant in their capacity and fitness to assist the work of inward worship, are particularly apt to be accepted by the individual himself as a substitute for inward worship, on account of that very capacity and fitness, of their inherent beauty and solemnity, of their peculiar and unworldly type. So that ritual, because it is full of uses, is also full of dangers. Though men may increase responsibility by augmenting it, they do not escape from danger by its diminution : nothing can make ritual safe except the strict observance of its purpose, namely, that it shall supply wings to the human soul in its callow efforts at upward flight. And such being the meaning of true ritual, the just measure of it is to be found in the degree in which it furnishes that assistance to the individual Christian.

The changes, then, in our modes of performing Divine service ought to be answers to the inward call of minds advancing and working upwards in the great work of inward devotion. But when we see the extraordinary progress of ritual observance during the last generation, who is there that can be so sanguine as to suppose that there

has been a corresponding growth of inward fervour, and of mental intelligence, in our general congregations? There is indeed a rule of simple decency to which, under all circumstances, we should strive to rise—for indecency in public worship is acted profanity, and is grossly irreligious in its effects. But when the standard of decency has once been attained, ought not the further steps to be vigilantly watched, I do not say by law, but by conscience? There are influences at work among us, far from spiritual, which may work in the direction of ritual. The vast amount of new made wealth in the country does not indeed lead to a display as profuse in the embellishment of the house of God, as in our own mansions, equipages, or dresses. Yet the wealthy, as such, have a preference for churches and for services with a certain amount of ornament: and it is quite possible that no small part of what we call the improvements in fabrics and in worship may be due simply to the demand of the richer man for a more costly article, and thus may represent not the spiritual growth but the materializing tendencies of the age. Again, there is a wider diffusion of taste among the many, though the faculty itself may not, with the few, have gained a finer edge; and, with this, the sense of the incongruous, and the grotesque cannot but make some way. Here is another agency, adapted to improving the face and form of our religious services, without that which I would contend is the indispensable condition of all real and durable improvement—namely, a corresponding growth in the appreciation of the inward work of devotion. But a third and very important cause, working in the same direction, has been this. The standard of life and of devotion has risen among the clergy far more generally, and doubtless also more rapidly, than among the laity. It is more than possible that, in many instances, their own enlarged and elevated conception of what Divine service ought to be in order to answer the genuine demands of their own inward life, may have induced them to raise it in their several churches beyond any real capacity of their congregations to appreciate and turn it to account.

Even in the theatres of our day, the spectacle threatens to absorb the drama, and show, which should be the servant, to become the master. Much more is the danger real in the sanctuary, for the function of an audience is mainly passive, but that of a congregation is one of high and arduous, though unseen, activity.

But it is time to draw together the threads of this slight discourse upon a subject very far indeed from slight. Whatever may be said of the merits of authoritative and coercive repression in matters of ritual—and I am not very sanguine as to its effects—assuredly they never can dispense with the necessity, or perform the office, of the moral restraints of an awakened conscience. Some may dispute the proposition that their gripe is hard, where a tender touch is needed; but who can question that they will reach but few, where many

require a lesson? Attendance on religious services is governed among us to a great extent, especially in towns, and most of all in the metropolis, by fashion, taste, and liking: but no preference is really admissible in such a matter, except the strict answer of the conscious mind to the question, What degree and form of ritual is it that helps me, and what is it that hampers and impedes me, in the performance of the work for which all congregations of Christians assemble in their churches?

If we consider the nature of Divine Service altogether at large, the presumption is against alteration as such in the manner of it. For the nature of God and the nature of man, and the relation of the one to the other, are constant; and in their solemn subject-matter, mere fashion, which is a principle of change altogether questionable, and which may be defined as change for its own sake, ought to have no place whatever. The varieties required by local circumstances or temperaments can be no novelties, and will probably in the lapse of time have asserted themselves sufficiently in the subsisting arrangements.

But if we limit and regulate our consideration of the case by a careful reference to our own time and country, the presumption is much weakened, possibly in one sense even reversed. For we have been emerging from a period in which the public worship of God had confessedly been reduced to a state of great external debasement. In this state of things a Reformation was necessary. Happily it came, and it surmounted the breakers and floods of prejudice. There was therefore a presumption not against, but in favour of change of some kind. When, however, the further question was reached of what kind the change ought to be, it remained true that each particular change required to be examined on its own merits, and to make its own case. The tests to be applied would be such as the following questions might supply:—

1. Is it legally binding? an inquiry, in which the element of desuetude can hardly be excluded from the view of a clergyman or of his flock.

2. Is it in its own nature favourable to devout, and intelligent adoration of God in the sanctuary?

3. Will it increase, or will it limit, the active participation of the flock in the service?

4. Is it conformable to the spirit of the Prayer-Book?

5. Is it agreeable to the desires of this particular congregation?

6. Is it adapted to their religious and their mental condition; and likely to bring them nearer to God in the act of worship, or to keep them further from Him; to collect or disperse their thoughts, to warm or freeze their affections?

It seems to me that, as a general rule, an answer to all these questions should be ready before a change in ritual is adopted: and that,

where law interposes no impediment, still, if any of them has to be answered in the negative, such changes can hardly be allowable.

Except in the single case where the standard of decency has not been reached, I am wholly at a loss to conceive any excuse for contravening the general sense of a congregation by changes in ritual. If the clergyman thinks the matter to be one of principle, should he not instruct them? If he sees it to be one of taste and liking, should he not give way to them? Should he not be the first to perceive and hold that unsettlement in matters of religion is in itself no small evil: and to reflect that, by making precipitately some change which he approves, he may prepare the way and establish the precedent for a like precipitancy in other changes which he does not approve? Especially, what case can there be (except that of decency, and such a case can hardly be probable) in which he will be justified in repelling and dispersing his congregation for the sake of his service? Doubtless it is conceivable, that Divine Service may be rendered by careful ritual more suitable to the dignity of its purpose. But let us take, on the other hand, a church where a ritual thus improved has been forced upon a congregation to whom its provisions were like an unknown tongue, and whom it has therefore banished from the walls of the sanctuary. Is it conceivable that such a spectacle can be a pleasing one in the sight of the Most High? Did Christianity itself come down into the world in abstract perfection and in full development? or was it not rather opened on the world with nice regard to the contracted pupil of the human eye which it was gradually to enlarge, unfolding itself from day to day, in successive lessons of doctrine and event, here a little and there a little? The jewels in the crown of the Bride are the flocks within the walls of the temple; and men ever so hard of hearing are better than an empty bench.

I will, however, presume to express a favourable inclination towards one class of usages, with a corresponding aversion to their opposites. I heartily appreciate whatever, within the limits of the Prayer Book, tends to augment the active participation of the laity in the services: as for example their joining audibly in the recital of the General Thanksgiving; or the aid they may give the clergyman (often so valuable even in a physical point of view) by reading the Lessons.

Again, if ritual be on the increase among us, ought it not to receive at once its complement and its balance in a greater care, fervency, and power, of preaching? Nothing, in my opinion, is of more equivocal tendency than high ritual with a low appreciation of Christian doctrine. But if there be high ritual and sound doctrine too, these will not excuse inadequate appreciation or use of the power of the pulpit. If ritual does its work in raising the temper of devotion, it is a preparation for corresponding elevation in the work of the



preacher : and if the preacher is able to warm, to interest, and to edify his hearers, then he improves their means of profiting by ritual, and arms them against its dangers.


But if self-will and want of consideration for others have been, and, in a diminished degree, are still, a snare to the clergy, have not we of the laity the same infirmities with far less excuse? Is it not strange to see with what tenacity many a one of us will, when he casually attends a church other than his usual one, adhere to some usage or non-usage perfectly indifferent, but with the effect either of giving positive scandal or of exciting notice, that is, of distracting those around him from their proper work? How is this like the Apostle's rule, who was all things to all men? Or have we found out that the rules of Scripture were made, as well as the discipline of the Church, for the clergy alone? But even if it be the layman's privilege at once to rule the Church and to disobey it, how is it that he does not respect the feelings of other laymen by decently conforming in all matters indifferent to the usages of the congregation to which he has chosen for the nonce to attach himself? It is much to be feared that when the clergyman has unlearned his own unreasonableness, he may still have to endure much from the unreasonableness of some handful of units among his flock. But if he be indeed worthy of his exalted office, he will see in the first place how little charity to the recalcitrant there will be in forcing on them even improvements which to them can only be stumblingblocks. Next, if he put on the armour of patience and of love, he will soon become aware of its winning efficacy. Lastly, there is an expedient which is in his own hand, and to which he cannot be prevented from resorting. Those defective perceptions of the outward manner of things, which I take to be national, must often make their mark on the clergy as well as on us of the laity. I remember long ago hearing a clergyman (who left the Church of England a few days later) complain of a want of reverence in his choir boys, with a demeanour, though it was in his beautiful church, fit for a tavern. The first, and last, and most effective article of ritual is deep reverence in the clergyman himself. Nothing can supply its place; and it will go far to supply the place of everything. It abhors affectation; and it does not consist in bowings and genuflexions, or in any definite acts: *nequeo monstrare et sentio tantum*. The reason why this reverence is the most precious part of ritual, is because ritual in general consists *ex vi termini* in symbol; but reverence means, together with a sign, a thing signified. It has its being in a profound sense of the Divine presence, expressing itself through a suitable outward demeanour. But if the demeanour be without the sentiment, it is not reverence, it is only the husk and shell of reverence. The clergyman is necessarily the central point of his congregation. Their reverence cannot rise above his; and their reverence will insensibly but continually approach to his. If this be the key-note of the

service, questions of ritual will adjust themselves in harmony with it. And one reason why the point may be more safely pressed is, because reverence need not be the property or characteristic of any school in particular. It distinguished the Margaret Chapel of forty years ago, when the pastors of that church were termed Evangelical. It subsisted in that same chapel thirty years ago, when Mr. Oakeley (now alas! ours no more), and Mr. Upton Richards gave to its very simple services, which would now scarcely satisfy an average congregation, and where the fabric was little less than hideous, that true solemnity which is in perfect concord with simplicity. The Papal Church now enjoys the advantages of the labours of Mr. Oakeley; who united to a fine musical taste, a much finer and much rarer gift, in discerning and expressing the harmony between the inward purposes of Christian worship and its outward investiture, and who then had gathered round him a congregation the most devout and hearty that I (for one) have ever seen in any communion of the Christian world.

And now, for my last word, I will appeal to high authority.

In the fourteenth chapter of Saint Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians may be found, what I would call the code of the New Testament upon ritual. The rules laid down by the Apostle to determine the comparative value of the gifts then so common in the Church will be found to contain the principles applicable to the regulation of Divine service; and it is touching to observe that they are immediately subjoined to that noble and wonderful effusion describing "Charity," with which no ethical eloquence of Greece or Rome can suitably compare. The highest end, in the Apostle's mind, seems to be (v. 5) "that the church may receive edifying." At present there is a disposition to treat a handful of men as scapegoats; and my fear is not only that they may suffer injustice, but lest far wider evils, than any within their power to cause or cure, should creep onwards unobserved. As rank bigotry, and what is far worse, base egotistic selfishness may find their account, at moments like this, in swelling the cry of Protestantism, so much of no less rank worldliness may lurk in the fashionable tendency not only to excessive but even to moderate ritual. The best touchstone for dividing what is wrong and defining what is right in the exterior apparel of Divine service will be found in the holy desire and authoritative demand of the Apostle, "that the Church may receive edifying," rather than in abstract imagery of perfection on the one hand, or narrow traditional prejudice on the other.

W. E. GLADSTONE.



## LAGRANGE AND HEGEL: THE SPECULATIVE METHOD.\*

OUR exposition of the limitations to which Deduction is confined carries with it a condemnation of the Method so dear to Metemprics. To complete the lesson, however, we should disengage the real efficiency of a procedure which, although often a failure, is sometimes a success; and to do this we must find out wherein the failure and the success will lie. Two great thinkers, Lagrange and Hegel, may profitably be contrasted, as examples of the fertile and infertile employment of the Deductive Method.

In that wonderful achievement, the *Mécanique Analytique*, Lagrange proposed to himself the novel aim of "reducing the theory of Mechanics, and the art of resolving its problems, to general formulas, the simple development of which gives all the equations necessary for the solution of each problem." He proposed another aim, which was that of "uniting and presenting *under one point of view the different principles which had been found to facilitate the solutions of the question, showing their connection and mutual dependence*, enabling us to judge of their correctness and their range." The single principle to which all the others were assigned as developments, was the principle of Virtual Velocities. In

\* In a recent number of this REVIEW Lord Arthur Russell upheld the validity and importance of the Speculative Method, as understood by Hegel. The chapter specially devoted to the Speculative Method in the second volume of my *Problems of Life and Mind*, now in the press, although not written with such a view, may be taken as my answer to Lord Arthur's claim for Hegel; and on this account I detach it, and publish it here in advance.

the opinion of Laplace this was to render the science perfect. "Il a réduit la recherche du mouvement d'un système quelconque de corps à l'intégration des équations différentielles. Alors l'objet de la Mécanique est rempli, et c'est à l'analyse pure à achever la solution des problèmes."\*

Hegel's aim was to reduce the theory of the universe, and the solutions of various problems, to a single principle—namely, the dialectical movement of contradiction, in which one idea successively evolved another by union with its opposite. Being and its opposite Non-Being, passed from their abstractness into the concreteness of reality—i.e., the Becoming. Hegel brought the multiplicity of the Universe under this one rubric, as Lagrange had brought the multiplicity of Movement under his one rubric. The evolution was deductively expounded. Nor can it be said that Hegel's principle is more abstract, and his treatment more analytical, than Lagrange's. If his attempt was pure Metaphysics, the attempt of Lagrange was pure Mathematics. If Hegel rejected the complexities of concrete perception and constructed the universe out of conceptions (*Begriffe*), Lagrange expressed the elementary dynamical relation in terms of the corresponding relations of pure quantities, and from the equation thus obtained, deduced his final equations by simple algebra. Thus, although certain quantities which express the physical connections necessarily appear in the equations of motion of the component parts of a system, the method of Lagrange eliminates *these* quantities from the final equations, and retains simply the algebraical quantities. Nay, so resolute is he to keep to this abstraction, that he declines to call in the aid even of diagrams; fixing attention solely on the symbols, he banishes the ideas of velocity, momentum, and energy, *after they have once for all been condensed in the symbols.*

Strange as this procedure may appear to those who have not reflected on the ideal constructions of Science, it is but an extension of the principle of Analysis. Science deals primarily with abstractions. All the complexities of concretes are got rid of (when once their abstract values have been ascertained), and thus, in lieu of a mill-stream with its varied banks, "the dark round of the dripping wheel," and the complicated internal mechanism of the mill, Science substitutes *abstract numbers*—the Reals disappear and give place to *foot-pounds*. So in dealing with the diffusion of gases, instead of attempting to follow the real process, the chemist, knowing that the diffusiveness depends on the relative densities of the gases, takes the square root of the number which represents the specific gravity, divides 1 by this number, and, in the fraction thus obtained, gets the diffusiveness. Hegel saw clearly enough the triviality of the common objection that Philosophy "deals only with abstractions;" and the common fallacy that therefore it deals only with empty generalities.

\* Laplace, *Système du Monde*, i. 348.

Philosophy, as he says, moves only in the region of Thought, and therefore its contents are abstractions; but this is only as respects the form; in its elements Philosophy is concrete.\*. I think he too often failed steadily to keep the concrete reality in view; but he was assuredly correct in defining Philosophy as the thoughtful contemplation of things—*die denkende Betrachtung der Gegenstände*; where he erred was in substituting the movement in thoughts as equivalent to the movement in things,—operating on abstract symbols without regard to their concrete reals; a substitution which is perfectly legitimate when the symbols are the rational equivalents of reals, but wholly deceptive when this equivalence is not demonstrable.

It is because Hegel's Method only involves operation on symbols, and not the verification of their equivalence with reals (in this resembling the procedure of all Metempirics), that it conducts him to results flagrantly at variance with some of the best ascertained truths of Science, and never in any single instance, I believe, conducts him to results which enlarge the store of positive knowledge, out of the purely logical region. Science owes nothing to Hegel's Method, but, on the contrary, has often been seriously retarded by it; whereas Science has been enriched by Lagrange. Hegel has with astonishing ingenuity and consistency ranged the Universe under his one rubric, classifying its phenomena into a system. But the reason why his classification has not the power manifested by Lagrange's, is not that he embraces the Universe—Lagrange only embracing Dynamics—but that his logic is uncontrolled by Verification. The defect is not simply in "constructing the universe out of conceptions," since in Philosophy the universe must take this abstract form; the defect lies elsewhere—in constructing the universe out of conceptions which are not the rational equivalents of perceptions. Every reader who has attentively followed the exposition I have given of the process by which rational equivalents are obtained, will seize my meaning. Let me, however, illustrate it once more. By rigorous reasoning the principles of Imaginary Geometry prove that two parallel lines would finally meet, and that a line produced would return upon itself. But this Geometry has no methods by which to prove that such lines exist, or that a space of constant curvature is sensible in our Cosmos; and in the absence of such proof we naturally rely on the Geometry which assures us that parallel lines do not and cannot meet in our Cosmos. Were the deductions of Hegel equally rigorous, his Method would still be wholly incompetent to prove that they represented the real order of phenomena, as their rational equivalents, in the same sense that true concepts represent perceptions in their real order.

There was a superstition once prevalent that if a sorcerer con-

\* Hegel, *Geschichte der Philos.* i. 37.

structed a waxen image of any man, all the operations he performed on that image would be simultaneously effected on the man; so that pricking a pin in the waxen breast was equivalent to planting a dagger in the man's. It is an analogous superstition that operations performed on thoughts are equivalent to operations performed on things; and that we have only to look inwards to see the process that goes on outwards. The analogy may be carried further. The operation performed on the waxen image does *represent* what would be the result of a similar operation performed on the man, but to what extent? only to the extent in which the image and the man are equivalent—i.e., wherein both are material forms destroyed by the agents. But in all other respects—in those wherein they differ as waxen substance and living organism—the parallelism fails. Thus the logical operations on conceptions may represent similar operations on perceptions—the interpretation of an ideal construction is a valid interpretation of the external order, in so far, and only in so far, as the one can be taken for the rational equivalent of the other. But this is precisely the domain of Verification.

Starting from the admission that Philosophy is ideal construction formed out of symbols which represent, or are intended to represent the real order in Feeling, and can only be true when these symbols are the equivalents of their significates, we must reject Hegel's Method, which proceeds on a reversal of this relation between Thought and Feeling, and declares Thought to be prior in nature, though posterior in time—preceding Feeling, as the abstract precedes the concrete. Analysis having once reached the abstract, and *seen* it everywhere throughout the concretes, Hegel concludes that the abstract was before the concretes, they being simply *its* concretions, and it not being an abstraction of what is common to them. This, as I have said before, is the fallacy of erecting a result into a principle, making the end the origin.\*

We shall have to return to this point presently, but must here

\* "Were not the dicta of Locke and Hegel, though apparently a reversal the one of the other, after all identical? Locke says, Notions are abstractions from Sensations; while for his part Hegel says, Sensations are concretions from Notions: where at bottom is the difference? Yes, but observe, Hegel's series is the organic system of Thought complete—so to speak, *alive* in itself."—*Stirling, Secret of Hegel*, 1865, i. 163. Locke's series is quite as organic as Hegel's; and Mr. Stirling has indicated, in a subsequent passage, where the important difference lies—namely, "that thought never could have been acquired without previous sensuous experience. Yes, but what matters that? We do not wish it to be subjective thought; it is objective thought: it is thought really *out there*, if you will, in that incrustation that is named the world. It, this world, and all outer objects, are but sensuous congeries, sensuous incrustations of these thoughts. Did a human subject not exist, it is conceivable that this congeries and incrustation would still exist, and it would exist still as a congeries and incrustation of objective thought." This transporting of Thought out of the organism into the External Order—this transfiguration of Existence into a transcendent Ego, a thinking universe, which is man "writ large"—is the very fallacy arising from converting resultants into principles.

continue our survey of the two Methods, in their agreements and divergencies. Lagrange admits that the principle of virtual velocities is not sufficiently evident in itself to be erected into a first principle, but urges that, nevertheless, it may be regarded as the general expression of the laws of equilibrium. Hegel would also have admitted that his principle of the dialectic process is not self-evident, but would urge that, when reached by analysis of the movement of Thought, it may be recognized as the most general expression of all logical operations, and (since Nature is but the objective aspect of Thought) of all natural processes. So far the two Methods agree. But our next step confronts an important variation. The principle of virtual velocities is seen, when expounded, to be irresistible; it is reducible to an identical proposition. The principle of the dialectic process is disputable and disputed. The former principle is but an extremely abstract expression of actual observations; and its symbols mean no more than their assigned significates, *connoting* nothing beyond what they *denote*, and never varying in their values. Can this be said of Hegel's principle? If by analysis I arrive at pure Being (*seyn*), the blank form, or the indeterminate formlessness, which is wholly without assignable predicates beyond that asserted in the simple *is*—and if also I arrive by the same process at its correlative Non-Being, equally indeterminate—can I, *must* I, construct out of these two zeros a positive number, out of these blank Noughts a full Reality, out of these subjects without predicates a subject of many predicates? Every student of Hegel knows that his paradox—the identity of Being and Non-Being—is not the sheer absurdity it appears to Common Sense; but one must have given oneself over, bound hand and foot, to the master, before Hegel's deduction can be reconciled with the conclusions of a Method which operates on symbols interpretable in terms of Feeling. Thus, although Being and Non-Being may be correlatives, yet if they are symbols having no qualitative values, neither their antithesis nor their union will by any operation on them bring in qualities. "Their difference, when the two are steadily looked at in thought, is seen," according to Mr. Stirling, "to generate a species of movement in which they alternately mutually interchange their own identity. Being, looked at isolatedly, vanishes of its own accord, and disappears into its opposite; while Nothing, again, similarly looked at, refuses to remain Nothing, and transforms itself into Being." \* All this seems coherent so long as we refrain from affixing definite significations to the terms; but fix these meanings, and then see what results. The two correlatives are of course opposites, and as such have a difference of aspect; this difference generates a species of movement—a generation truly miraculous, and therefore unintelligible—in which the moving abstractions do not simply pass from one position to another, as in.

\* *Op. cit.* i. 49, 50.

all other species of movement, but each throws its nature aside to take up that of its opposite. It may be so—in the world of the Notion constructed out of Hegelian symbols. It has no resemblance to any world constructed out of symbols which condense sensible experiences. When two shadows which have no solidity blend together, they make a deeper shade; they do not make a solid. If to this it be objected that there is no contradiction of opposition between two shadows, so that their coming together should generate a different result, I will ask whether a positive and a negative will yield a new positive by their union? If  $0 + 0 = 0$ , does not  $0 + 1 = 1$ ?

So long as Being and Non-Being are symbols without assigned values, they stand as two sides of an equation of zeros: Being, as zero, and Non-Being as zero. But no sooner do we interpret the symbols than we find one is the abstract of all existences, an expression which condenses all that is known or knowable of things; whereas the other is not the equivalent of this at all, but, instead of condensing experiences of things, is an abstract expression of their negation. Hegel admits that they are pure abstractions, which are only actual in the Becoming (*Werden*); but what I have never been able to learn is how these unrealities acquire reality, how these abstractions acquire Quality by their mutual opposition and interpenetration. The Becoming, as a mere movement of the one abstraction into the other by the dialectic process, can only be the blending of blank forms. We can understand how, starting from Feeling, or its correlative Quality, we analytically reach the two abstractions which as such have let drop any aspects of Quality; for this is but the familiar process by which, starting from a solid, given in Feeling, we reach the abstractions extension without solidity—and surface without depth; and on these abstractions we operate; but we do not suppose that the solid was originally constructed out of these abstractions; nor that the true philosophical conception of genesis is that which presupposes things to have been thus evolved.

Hegel's principle therefore is, to say the very least, eminently disputable. But were it indisputable, the validity of his Method would have to be displayed by its success; and that success must necessarily depend upon the precision and fixity of the symbols operated on. Lagrange confines his principle to the explanation of movement and equilibrium. Dealing throughout with Magnitudes only, he invokes the axioms of Magnitude—that equals are equal, unequals unequal, and that two quantities equal to a third are equal to each other. The physical, chemical, biological, psychological relations of things are not touched; how far these may be ranged under his rubric does not concern him; he deals with statical and dynamical relations only. Had Hegel confined himself to logical relations among symbols, and explained how the categories of Thought arise, and how they symbolize the generalities of things when per-



ceptions are condensed in conceptions, his procedure would have been analogous to that of Lagrange. But his ambition is higher, and his Method has a wider range. He classifies both the logical and the real Universe under one rubric. An attentive study of the *Mécanique Analytique* shows that the various conditions of movement and equilibrium—all the equations of motion there adopted—are not exhibited as deductive discoveries from the principle of virtual velocities, but are merely ranged under that rubric, now they are discovered. In spite of the clearness of his insight and the rigour of his deductions, Lagrange on several occasions falls into the error which haunts Deduction as its evil genius—namely, that of rendering his conclusions too absolute, by extension to cases not identical with the premises.\* How much more restriction Hegel's statements require to make their abstract expressions harmonize with concrete experiences need not here be specified: the steadfast rejection of his generalizations by all men of science in their several departments may not be considered enough by his disciples; but the point on which the surest reliance may be placed is this, that Deduction is in its nature inferential, and therefore always liable to error, always needing verification.

When Hegel is contented to accept the ascertained truths of research, as Lagrange accepts the equations of motion, when his views are but the systematic co-ordination of Experience, we can have nothing further to demand than that his classification shall justify itself by the facilities it affords. It is an ideal construction; and our only attitude towards it should be one of inquiry whether it can assist us in further search. Does it so far harmonize with our experiences as to guide our thoughts and actions towards a fuller knowledge and a completer adjustment to the external order? This is a question each student must answer for himself. I answer by a decided negative; and I think I see the grounds which render Hegel's Method a failure. The Method is but an elaboration of the attempt made by Descartes and Spinoza to apply the Deduction, proved to be so successful in Mathematics, to Physics and Metaphysics. Now, although I have endeavoured to show that the Method really pursued in Mathematics is the only true procedure, I have shown that all attempts to imitate it in application to Physics and Metaphysics have been failures because the imitation has mistaken the Method which is actually pursued in Mathematics, and has pursued a Method which would equally have issued in disastrous failure there—I mean the disregard of sensible Intuition, and of step-by-step Verification. Pure Deduction is helpless in Mathematics as elsewhere. To reach new geometrical truths more is required than axioms and definitions; there must also be intuition of the figures.

\* See the corrections of Poinsoet and others in the edition published by Bertrand. Paris, 1863.

To reach new physical and metaphysical truths, more is needed than general laws and deductive applications; there must also be new sensible experiences. When we have the new intuitions, we can reflectively see them to be exemplifications of the axioms; and when we have the new experiences, we can class them beside the old experiences. But the procedure is not reversible. We can see what is seen; we can reflect back on what was seen before; we can divine nothing. It may be possible some day to reduce all known truths to a general truth; it will never be possible to reach a *new* and *distinct* truth without a new and distinct experience of relations; it will never be possible to reach the Unknown simply by inspection of the Known, without going through the sensible experiences in which all knowledge arises.

This is the empirical standpoint. It is of course disputed by metempiricists. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel were notoriously of a quite different way of thinking. They hoped to replace the empirical procedure by an *à priori* construction. According to Schelling, Philosophy must be regarded in the light of a continuous history of Self-consciousness, for which Experience only furnishes the documents, all the forms of the Ego being represented in Nature, so that it is indifferent whether we refer to the subject or the object. What would Lagrange have said to a mathematician who regarded Dynamics in this light? The fundamental position of this school is that the logical order is the real order; which in a certain sense may be interpreted on experiential principles—namely, that the relations among symbols and the groupings of these relations *represent* the relations and groupings of feelings, which feelings are real presentations, so that ideal constructions formed out of real elements symbolically represent the real world; but *this* interpretation would be rejected with scorn by Schelling and Hegel. The meaning they intend to convey is, that Thought is identical and co-extensive with Being, and the order in thoughts is the only truth of things. "Those who know nothing of philosophy," says Hegel, "throw up their arms in wild astonishment when they hear the proposition *Thought is Being*. Nevertheless the assumption of this unity is the ground of all our action;"\* and Schelling scornfully sets aside the popular notion that Thought gradually conforms itself to Things; reversing it, he declares that Nature only expresses and realizes the laws of Thought, and indeed *is* only Nature in so far as this is effected. "Nature is visible Mind, and Mind is invisible Nature."† The reader who has present to him the detailed exposition I have attempted of Nature as reflected in Sense and Thought (Problem III, ch. I.), will seize at once the confusion between symbols and reals which Schelling here exemplifies. He has not, like Hegel

\* Hegel, *Encyclopædie: Philos. des Geistes*, § 465, p. 354.

† Schelling, *Ideen zu einer philos. der Natur*, 1803, p. 64.

given a systematic statement of the psychological grounds on which he bases his conclusion, but he allows us to see in glimpses the course of his thought. Thus he finds in every organism a necessary reciprocal relation between the parts and the whole, the parts only existing in and for the whole; but this whole is a Notion (*Begriff*), because wherever there is a necessary reciprocal relation between the parts and the whole there is a Notion.\* The subjective nature of this unity Schelling indicates in a subsequent passage: "This unity is a Notion, and only exists in relation to an intuitively reflecting Mind" (p. 45). At the same time he declares all necessary Notions to be objective, and hence the conclusion that the Notion lies at the basis of the objective, as it lies at the basis of the subjective universe. Nature, in fact, is but a development of the Notion; and Mind is but a development of the Notion. Hegel has expanded and systematized this view. On it I remark that, if the term Notion be stripped of all the concrete experiences it abstractly condenses, and be reduced to its merely formal significance as the expression of the subordination of parts to a whole, we may indeed say that it is identical with every other formal expression of such subordination; and the empty symbol will then stand equally well for our conception of an organism, and for the objective organic connexion; and in the same way, this organic connexion, as a group, will be equivalent to any inorganic connexion as an object. But restore the particulars which give this Notion life, assign the values which alone can make the symbol valid, and we see at once the formalism of this identity, we see that the Notion is not simply reciprocity of relations but a reciprocity of relations in a *sensitive* sphere, having feelings and thoughts for its elements; whereas the Organism is not this, but the very different reciprocity of relations in a *vital* sphere, having tissues and functions for its elements; and the Object is still more widely separated as a reciprocity in the *physical* sphere, having masses and forces for its elements. If it shocks all Logic to say the cow is the same as a cabbage because both may be classed under the general head of an Organism, not less must it shock all but transcendental Logic to say that the processes of Nature are the same as the laws of Thought because both may be classed under the head of Grouping. And it is characteristic of Hegel that, having by an absurdly mistaken etymology derived *Urtheil*—Judgment—from *ur-theilen* (primitive separation), he regards the unclosing of the potential parts of a plant in its development from a germ, as the logical operation of judgment; and adds, this example serves to show how neither the Notion nor the Judgment exist in our minds only:—"The Notion dwells in the heart of things—it is that by which they are what they are."† Nothing but a sublime reliance on his Method could have kept him serious when he propounded the theory that

\* *Op. cit.* p. 43.

† *Encyklopädie*, § 166.

the bud is *refuted* by the blossom, and this blossom in turn by the fruit, which proves the blossom to have been a false existence, the truth of the plant being just this fruit.\* If the blossom refutes the bud, death refutes the plant; Death therefore must be the final Notion! Again, when speaking of Zeno's Dialectic, he remarks that the reason why Zeno illustrated it by Motion simply was that *Dialectic is itself Motion*; in other words, Motion is the Dialectic of Being. "The Thing as self-moving has its Dialectic in that, and Motion is the becoming another while preserving itself." Zeno, we are told, never doubted the fact of Motion; he only inquired into its truth; but Motion is untrue, for it is a contradiction.†

It is Hegel's boast that he has transformed Substance into Subject,‡ which is logically acceptable, if we consider attributes as predicates; but the ambiguity of the term subject, in the sense of Mind, leads him to the conclusion that the reality of things lies not in the things themselves, but in their totality, their *universals*, and these are thoughts. All speculation (and nothing else is philosophically to be counted) is the transformation of sensuous opinion into abstract thought;§ which is true enough, but requires fuller specification, both as to how the transformation is effected, and what elements are let drop in the process of feelings being replaced by symbols. When I take the lion as a symbol of kingliness, or a bank-note as a symbol of houses, cattle, corn, &c., I shall be led into sad mistakes if I disregard their symbolical nature, and proceed to draw conclusions respecting kings from qualities observed in lions. "The specific facts of feeling, perception, desire, will, &c., in so far as they are *known*, may on the whole be called Presentation (*Vorstellung*), and we may say in general that Philosophy puts Thoughts, Categories—more accurately Notions—in the place of Presentations;"|| in other words, replaces images of things by generalized symbols of these images. "Presentations in general may be regarded as the *metaphors* of Thoughts and Notions. But to have these Presentations is by no means to know their significance for Thought, nor their Thoughts and Notions. Conversely it is one thing to have Thoughts and Notions, another to know what Presentations, Intuitions, and Feelings correspond with them."

This view of feelings, as the metaphors of Thought, is cardinal, and, I think, a fallacy. It belongs to his groundwork of Thought being the objective truth of Things, their universals, so that Feeling is only one of its manifestations. He remarks that one of the great obscurities in Philosophy is that ordinary minds always want an

\* *Phänomenologie*, p. 4.

† *Geschichte der Phil.* i. 313.

‡ *Phänomenologie*, Vorrede, p. 14.

§ *Gesch. der Phils.* ii. 223, and elsewhere, "Philosophy does nothing but transform perceptions into thoughts."—*Encyklopädie*, § 20.

|| *Encyklop.* § 3.

image to interpret a thought. "They say, 'We don't know what to think,' when a Notion is presented them; but there is nothing more to think in a Notion than just the Notion itself." There is nothing more to be felt in a feeling than just the feeling itself; but in a symbol there is always something more to be understood than the symbol itself—namely, the significates. Hegel's view of Thought, it may be said, is so completely the reverse of mine, that I have no right to criticize him from my point of view. If my criticism were directed against the logical coherence of his deductions, this objection would be valid; but I am here attempting to show why his System is a failure, and why his Method cannot lead to an extension of knowledge; and surely, if his psychological foundation is so completely the reversal of all observation as to make Thought the *prius*, and universals the only reals, we need not wonder if we find it difficult to accept a system which, as he somewhere says, produces the feeling of walking on our hands. Because acrobats succeed in walking on their hands, and because Hegel succeeds in presenting an inverted image of the universe, this is no reason why we should give up the more effective method of Nature, and cease walking on our feet.

In his *Phänomenologie* and in his *Philosophie des Geistes*, Hegel expounds the evolution of Thought through its successive grades of Sensation, Perception, and Conception. There are several propositions which positive Psychology will recognize as its own, notably that accentuated proposition—"The whole of Reason—the whole material of the Spirit—is in Sensation (*Empfindung*);" \* and again, that which rejects the common view of Intellect, as a *tabula rasa*, receiving all its contents from without. But the positive psychologist must be on his guard, and not interpret Hegel's symbols without remembering the Hegelian meanings. All through the exposition runs the fallacy already noted, which makes that which is the *final result* of evolution its *initial principle* and *persistent regulator*; so that the abstract Thought which is found at the end is assumed to have generated the whole process from the beginning. This is the fallacy of an Astronomy expounding that it is the solar system which condenses nebulae into suns and planets, not the nebulae which differentiate into a solar system—of a Biology making organs and tissues the products of an Organism—of a Sociology making the aggregations and consequent politics of families, tribes, and nations the realization of an abstract idea—the State. Hegel thus completely reverses the historical genesis. "What the Mind seems to receive from without is simply that which is rational—i.e., that which is identical with itself, immanent in itself; the only purpose of the Mind is to get rid of the supposed externality (*sich selber-äusserlichkeit*) of the rational object. Thus, whatever is thought, is; and that

\* *Philos. des Geistes*, iii. § 447.

which is, only is in so far as it is thought." \* "The laws of Nature are determined by the indwelling Understanding, and hence intelligent consciousness finds in Nature its own nature reflected, and thus becomes objective to itself." †

Pythagoras, when he argues that Number is the origin and reality of things, seems incomprehensible and absurd to many who find it quite easy and rational to accept *vous*, or Intellect, as the Architect of the Universe. These latter ought to welcome Hegel's principle that Thought is the beginning and the end of things—the circle in which the end is presupposed, yet only *is* when the circle is complete.‡ To the positive psychologist, who has been wont to trace the evolution of Thought, and who finds it to be a process of Grouping—according to one view of it; or, according to another and more special interpretation, a reproduction of experiences under symbolical forms—Hegel's principle will seem quite as irrational as that of Pythagoras. Hegel's procedure is uniformly that of translating experiences into symbols, and then accepting these symbols as the primary and only valid reals. Quoting the Aristotelian aphorism, "*Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu*," he says that when speculative philosophy rejected this aphorism it was a mistake. We must, however, equally assert "*Nihil est in sensu quod non fuerit in intellectu*." And this means that *vous*, or Spirit, is the cause of the world." §

The reader who is prepared to accept Thought as infinite—Thought which *thinks itself*, no less than *Things*—an infinite universality, of which Feeling, Perception, Intuition, Understanding are the finite particulars or grades, and of which Things and Laws of Things are but the objective aspects—may find in this system a fascinating coherence. He may also accept the "plain truths" which, to Hegel's surprise, excited so great an outcry even from philosophers: "Whatever is rational, is actual; and whatever is actual is rational." Any reader indisposed to accept the identity of Thought and Being would see in the first of these "plain truths" the very questionable assertion, that "whatever is active is ratiocinative;" nor would this be effected by Hegel's explanation that from his meaning of actuality all contingency is eliminated, and only *necessary* actions are true, are active. I am not here proposing to criticize this system, only to indicate its spirit and Method. That spirit and that Method are profoundly opposed to the spirit and

\* *Op. cit.* iii. § 465. † *Ibid.* § 422. ‡ *Phänomenologie*, p. 15.

§ *Encyklop.* § 8.

That I am not misrepresenting the procedure will be apparent to any one who studies Hegel; and may be seen also in the luminous and penetrative *Prolegomena* which Mr. Wallace has prefixed to his translation of *The Logic of Hegel*, translated from the *Encyclopædia of the Sciences*. Oxford, 1874. Perhaps this single sentence from Hegel himself will suffice: "The real contents of our consciousness are preserved, and even for the first time put in their proper light when they are translated into the form of thought and the notion of reason." § 5.

Method of positive Science, and it is on this ground that the system is judged. He professes indeed to found his philosophy on Experience. But his views of what constitutes Experience, and, above all, his failure to discriminate between the respective provinces of Feeling and Symbolism, lead him to conclusions which Science peremptorily rejects. In the principle of Experience, he says, "lies the unspeakably important truth that in order to accept and believe any fact we must be in contact with it; or, in more exact terms, that we must find the fact united and combined with the certainty of ourselves. We must be in contact with our subject-matter, whether it be by means of our external senses, or, what is better, by our profounder mind and our innermost self-consciousness." Philosophy "takes its departure from Experience, including under that name our immediate consciousness and the processes of inference from it. Awakened by this stimulus, *Thought* is itself characterized, by *raising itself* above the *natural state of Mind*, above the senses and inferences from the senses." \* Now, if Thought here means the symbols, and the natural state the feelings symbolized, I, for one, have no objection to urge against this passage except its misleading metaphors. What I object to is, that Hegel having got his symbol relies on it, and all that can be got out of it, without reference to the feelings originally symbolized. He sarcastically asks, "Would any one who wished for fruit reject cherries, pears, and grapes, on the ground that they were cherries, pears, and grapes, and not fruit?" This same question may be asked of him: "Will you reject sensations, images, perceptions, on the ground that they are not thought? and will you accept whatever is true of thought in the abstract as true of any particular sensation, image, or perception?"

It might seem unfair to test Hegel's Method by his application of it to the phenomena of Nature because his warmest disciples are ready to admit its failure there, although, if his principles are correct, they ought there to find a perfect application. Nor will I touch on his Psychology, because that science is at present in too unsettled a state for general agreement. I will simply refer to his History of Philosophy, justly regarded as one of his most considerable achievements. Because, on reviewing the various stages through which Speculation has passed, he finds that he can rearrange all opinions under his logical rubric, he insists that this was the necessary order of their evolution—in spite of the historical fact that this order was not followed. One idea is supposed to develop itself by means of its opposition to a second, and thence into a third. Whereas History very plainly shows that this was not the process at all, but that each idea, each system of thought, was developed—as everything else is—out of and by means of its own conditions; and each when evolved took its place beside the others. Philosophy did not start with general scientific truths, and from these gradually descend

\* *Encyklopädie*, § 12.


to particular truths—did not even start with the fundamental truths of Motion, from thence to deduce the equations of Motion. It reached these general truths in a roundabout laborious way; but these truths once reached, were seen to have been all along implied in the experiences from which they were extracted. Thus seen, they presented that Necessity and Universality so dear to metaphysicians.

Hegel recognizes three paths on which Truth may be sought. The first is Experience—which is, however, a mere form, and depends upon the Sense which brings it. The second is Reflection, in which Truth is defined through its thought-relations. But in neither of these is perfect Truth to be found. That is only to be found in the pure form of Thought. Here man's attitude is one of perfect Freedom.\* My answer to this is, that when the pure form of Thought shall have proved its competence by finding the Truth, and gaining the assent of rational minds to the conclusions thus found, there will be justification enough for the Hegelian Method—and not, till then. For the present I am content with the fact that his Method is not the Method of Search which has heretofore discovered such truths as we have. At the best it is but a Method of codification, and its merits must be estimated by its success in codifying the results reached by Science. According to the explicit and implied testimony of all scientific workers, it has *not* hitherto justified itself in this way; and I cannot but express my regret to see that, now Germany has so emphatically pronounced its verdict by neglect, England is, in an increasing body of distinguished men, manifesting a more intelligent and sympathetic attitude towards this illusory system. In Germany the dissatisfaction with Hegel has led to a widespread expression of the necessity of going back to Kant. This is very significant of the futility of the metaphysical Methods. What would a biologist or chemist of our day think of the analogous proposition to give up all the results of research since Bichat and Lavoisier, and return to those teachers as guides? And why would such a proposition at once be seen to be absurd? It is because the positive Method—unlike metaphysical Methods—has its principles of rectification in itself. Experiments which are offered as proofs have to be experimentally tested, so that any error which may unawares have crept in is seized on and thrown out. How far this is from the case of metaphysics I need not specify. Hegel's constant complaint against Kant and Schelling is that their conclusions are *not deduced*; and his own mistake lies precisely in this, that he accepts a deduction as if it were a verification. He relies on his logical abstractions as the ancients relied on their oracles, which were worded so generally as to include any particular result; and although the particular result might seem to verify the truth of the oracle, it usually did so in quite a different sense from that in which, before the event, it was interpreted.

GEORGE HENRY LEWES.

\* *Encyclopædie*, § 24.





## CHARLES I. AND HIS FATHER.

IN TWO CHAPTERS.

THE "fractions" of a book on James I., which Leigh Hunt rescued from Mr. Carlyle's Waste-Paper Bag, are so picturesque in style, and so illuminative as to the history of the period, that one regrets they are fractions only. Carlyle could have given us a rare book on James. In the perplexing and contradictory character of the man, and in the tragi-comic medley of events in his reign, he would have found exercise for dramatic sympathy and sardonic humour, and he would have had ample opportunity, in the course of the work, of indicating the "deep presaging movement" of those forces which were to convulse English society during the Puritan revolution. The reign of James was essentially an historical introduction to the life and times of Charles I., and it is as such that I treat of it in this chapter.

Carlyle evidently demurs to the verdict of mere contemptuous execration which has commonly been pronounced upon James. "His Majesty," he says, "as I perceive, in spite of calumnies, was not a coward." No man detests cowardice more than the biographer of Cromwell, but he will have it that James's discretion was of a kind not incompatible with courage. "He knew the value, to all persons, and to all interests of persons, of a whole skin; how unthrifty everywhere is any solution of continuity, if it can be avoided! He struggled to preside pacifically over an age of some ferocity much given to wrangling." We seem to detect a spark of

positive enthusiasm for James in Mr. Carlyle when he speaks of his good nature and his "shining examples of justice."

And yet the evidence is strong that James was both cowardly and unrighteous. It was not a shining example of justice that he gave in the case of Raleigh. It was still less a shining example of justice that he gave in the case of Somerset. The truth is, he was an aggregate of confusions and incongruities. He was a spoiled child, in a deplorably literal sense, before he was born. Nature's intention with him seems to have been to produce the ablest Stuart that ever graced the line since it sprang from the daughter of Robert Bruce; but what Mr. Carlyle would call "black art" intervened to defeat nature's intention; and the child born three months after the shock received by Mary Stuart from the drawn swords of Rizzio's murderers was physiologically a wreck,—damaged irretrievably in body and mind. To revile James as a coward because he shuddered at the flash of the cold iron is as thoughtless as it would be to scorn him because he could not stand on his legs till he was seven years old. Though damaged, however, in mind and body, he was destroyed in neither. His limbs shook; his nerves were those of a hypochondriac; yet he had physical toughness enough to enjoy field sports. His tongue was too large for his mouth; he stuttered and sputtered; but he was a loud, voluble, vivacious talker. His mind, like his body, had been shaken into grotesque incoherence. Will and intelligence, instead of being in closest conjunction, like good sword in steady hand, had been flung apart. He would see with piercing clearness what it was best to do, and with streaming eyes, stammering and whimpering, would wish to do it; and would not be able. He would negotiate about a matter for years, fail in his object, and then sum up with the adroit shrewdness of his friend Bacon, in form of an apophthegm, the cause of his failure. "The wisest fool in Europe," Sully called him. There is nothing in Shakespeare wiser than the sayings, or foolisher than the doings, of Polonius.

It was one of the fixed ideas of Englishmen in the first half of the seventeenth century that Queen Elizabeth had been a great and glorious sovereign, and that it was well with England in her time. Knowing the Virgin Queen better than the men of that generation knew her, we can keep our admiration for her within bounds; but from the day of her death until the day when Charles II. returned from his travels to ascend the throne, the reign of Elizabeth was looked back to with enthusiasm by the great body of Englishmen. Eliot and Pym attested the fact in their contentings with James; Charles I. knew it, and declared, in opening the Long Parliament, that his wish was to see "all things reduced to the good order and practice of Queen Elizabeth, which, by the people of England, were looked upon with the greatest reverence;" and it was one of the fundamental notions of Oliver Cromwell, who, to his second

Parliament, used these words, "Queen Elizabeth of famous memory, —we need not be ashamed to call her so." Imperious, proud, ambitious to do good to her people and be the crowned servant of England,—with one hand on the money-bag and one on the sword,—persecuting Papists and bidding her own Bishops know their mistress,—she was the kind of queen Englishmen could love. Arbitrary and over-bearing she was; but Poyser could forgive his wife for being a termagant in consideration of her efficiency in minding the house and snubbing Squire Donnithorne. Elizabeth snubbed the Pope, stood forth frankly as the head of the Protestant interest in Europe, fostered the Reformation in Scotland, befriended the Dutch, smashed the Armada, and did it all uncommonly cheap. She was neither too bad, nor what would have been quite as fatal—too good, to be the ideal sovereign of the great body of Englishmen.

James thought far too much of himself to learn anything from Queen Elizabeth. His political notions, even if abstractly wise, were hopelessly irreconcilable with those of Elizabethan Englishmen. Account for the fact as we may—whether it was that he wished to shield himself from assassination, or that he honestly desired to be fair and friendly to all his subjects—he was disposed to tolerate Roman Catholics. The fact is an honour to him in our eyes, but it grieved his own subjects. His foreign policy gave no more satisfaction than his domestic. He was the first advocate of the doctrine of English non-intervention in Continental politics; the head and, so far as appears, the tail and the body, of the Bright and Cobden school of his day. "Let us mind our own business! Why should not the two great maritime powers, England and Spain, having the broad spaces of the sea for roadway, make room for each other? We shall be Protestants; Spaniards will be Papists; but why should we injure each other for that? Why should we not rather be allied in those cases where our interests are identical?" This was the gist of James's non-intervention logic. The present generation, with its insular and pacific maxims, can hardly cast a stone at him. Advice, political or theological, he was ready to give to all lengths and breadths; but whether people would hear, or whether they would forbear, he was not the man to strike. Not Lord Palmerston himself could have had firmer faith in the potency of Great British exhortation than James. Persons have been met with in our own time cynical enough to sneer at the substitution of constitutional syllogisms and well-aimed quotations, even when fired off by Earl Russell in his finest attitude, for cannon batteries and bayonet charges; and a similar scepticism was prevalent in the time of James. Reckoning up the succours forwarded to the distressed Elector Palatine, the wits declared that Denmark had sent a hundred thousand herrings, Holland a hundred thousand

butter-boxes, and the king of England a hundred thousand ambassadors. James's subjects were eminently disqualified to appreciate anything but the eccentricity of his pacific opinions. They were fierce impatient, irascible, and inspired with burning hatred both of Popery and of Spain. It was the avowed belief of the ablest Protestants of the time, of men as statesmanlike as Pym and as ardently progressive as Milton, that peace could not be kept with Rome or toleration granted to Romanists, because the Pope claimed to be above all monarchs and all laws. Jesuitism was in the heyday of its powers, and Jesuitic Popery, which, until Prince Bismarck once more treated it as a reality, had become, for statesmen of our time, a reminiscence or a shadow, was regarded by the great body of intelligent Englishmen as a terrible fact. It had been revealed to them in the massacre of St. Bartholomew and in the Gunpowder Plot. Clad in steel, and commanding the armies of Catholic Europe, it engaged in internecine struggle with Gustavus Adolphus, the champion of Protestantism, who called all true Protestant hearts to his banner, a call heard and obeyed by many a brave youth in England and Scotland. "Those only," says Isaac Disraeli, "who have read the letters of the times can form any adequate notion of the agonizing and universal interest which pervaded the English people at every advance or retreat of the Austrian Tilly, the Danish Christian, and the Swedish Gustavus." It was not long-winded arguments, but steel-clad squadrons, that James's subjects wished him to contribute to the Protestant cause.

He had been ten years on the throne of England before his policy fully evinced its difference from that of Elizabeth. In 1610 the dagger of Ravallac reached the heart of Henry of Navarre. Though he had formally joined the Catholic Church, Henry's schemes were generous towards Protestantism and obnoxious to the Jesuits, and they were commonly believed at the time to have planned the assassination. The general policy of James in relation to Continental Protestantism had been influenced by Henry, and the death of the French king removed one of his leading lights. For about ten years also, he enjoyed the services of Salisbury, the judicious minister of Elizabeth. It was in connection with the troubles of his son-in-law the Elector Palatine, that James's distinctive and unpopular policy became conspicuous. The marriage itself had been enthusiastically approved in England. According to Tillières, the French ambassador, Elizabeth Stuart was "honoured and beloved" by the English people, and they were well pleased when she was given in marriage to a resolutely Protestant prince. The Universities had got out their jingling apparatus, and produced the amount of Latin verse required to celebrate the occasion. Among others chosen at Oxford to do the jingling creditably to the University were two men, one in the prime of manhood, the other in the

bloom of youth, who have become known to history—William Laud and John Hampden. Their epithalamium contained this prayer, with reference to the marriage: "That a progeny might thence arise unequalled by any land or race." Curious! Had Hampden's prayer *not* been granted there would have been no Prince Rupert to lead the Cavaliers on Chalgrove field, where Hampden fell; but there would also have been no female branch from the Stuart stem to ingraft on the Brunswick stock, and to yield an heir to the British throne when the male branch, against which Hampden fought, had been finally cut off. It is, perhaps, worth remembering that Prince Charles of Culloden stood not one whit nearer to James I. than his Brunswick cousins, and that Queen Victoria has in her veins that best stream of the Stuart blood which flowed off with her whom our fathers affectionately called "the Protestant Electress." Her Majesty inherits the throne of Great Britain as a Stuart.

The Elector Palatine was ambitious beyond his strength of wing, and, by hawking at the crown of Bohemia, lost both it and his patrimonial Palatinate. Had James been a man of war, tens of thousands of Englishmen would have gladly followed him to redress in arms the wrongs of Frederick and his wife. But James hated war, and there were other considerations besides his love of peace which might well disincline him to a warlike expedition. The old feudal array of England had fallen to pieces, and could not be pitted against the standing armies which had arisen on the Continent. He believed besides in the divine right of kings; he furiously detested the doctrine of the divine right of peoples. It was by the Bohemian people that Frederick had been called to the throne, and he had stretched out his hand against his liege lord, the German Emperor. James, therefore, was averse to the idea of fighting for his son-in-law; but he would negotiate for him to any extent; and circumstances provided him with a field in which he could prosecute negotiations, as he thought, with a prospect of substantial results. His son Henry had died. His son Charles, whose cast of character suited him better, required a wife. Inasmuch as James was wise, he had discerned before leaving Scotland, and had written down in his Basilicon Doron, that the heir to the English crown ought to marry a Protestant; but inasmuch as he was only a wise fool, he played the traitor both to his own sagacity and to the interests of his country and his race, by making it his grand object to marry Charles into one of the Catholic dynastic houses. It was so much finer to rank with the monarchs of Spain, France, and the empire than to hold out the hand of fellowship to the mob of princelings who headed the mixed multitude of Protestant Germany! The Spanish Infanta was of the age at which those luckless beings, the princesses of old dynastic houses, are chaffered for by kings and ministers. Baby Charles and the Infanta—this was the scheme of

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James—would be married; England and Spain would be cordial allies; and the preponderating influence of the Spanish throne would be used at the Imperial Court for the restoration of the Palatinate to Frederick. Bristol, James's ambassador in Spain, whose talent, experience, and general ability to judge are beyond debate, made up his mind that the project was feasible, and that, in the event of the marriage, Spain would honestly exert herself to replace Frederick in his seat as Elector Palatine. Though they might hate the English and love the Pope, all sensible Spaniards felt that it was of extreme importance to Spain that such Englishmen as Raleigh, Frobisher, and Drake,

Adventurous hearts who bartered bold  
Their English blood for Spanish gold,

should leave Spanish commerce alone. They were willing, therefore, to pay some price for a stable peace with England. Under those circumstances it was natural that Spain, though perhaps insincere in the earlier stage of the negotiations, should become desirous that the Infanta should be married to Charles; and if this is granted, it can hardly be disputed that James, holding a very bad hand, was playing as good a game for the Elector as was on the cards.

The Spanish negotiation reached a crisis in 1623. Prince Charles had lately come of age. Buckingham was assiduous in his worship of the rising sun. Suddenly the Baby and Steenie, as James called Charles and Buckingham, announced that they were going to Spain in person. James expostulated, gesticulated, cried; but he had himself, in his hot youth, crossed the sea to pay court to Anne of Denmark, and as "the sweet lads" insisted, the "dear dad and gossip" of course gave way. Taking the names of Tom and Jack, Charles and Buckingham crossed the Channel, and proceeded *via Paris* to Spain. Of Buckingham, perhaps the most interesting variety of the species royal favourite that ever appeared, it will here be appropriate to say a word or two.

Queen Elizabeth had inherited from her father the inestimable faculty of knowing and valuing a wise man when she saw him. An incurable and offensive flirt, she liked pretty men, but knew that they were good only for playthings, and had strength of will to keep them in their place. James thought no one so wise as himself, and was not without discernment of intellectual defect in fascinating personages; but knowledge, here and elsewhere, was not, in James, synonymous with power. Against Somerset he appears to have fairly maintained his mental independence; but Villiers, far more brilliant, ambitious, and daring than Carr, was resolutely bent on making him a slave in all respects. That Buckingham was a fool is as certain as that his sovereign was; but as James was a wise fool, Buckingham was a fool of genius. Felton's knife put an

end to him before the nature and reach of his capacity could be finally estimated. That his figure was handsome and his face beautiful; that he was splendidly accomplished and that his manners were captivating; that his courage was steady and placid in the moment of general danger, and foolhardy when only his own life was at stake; that he was active, adventurous, and speculative, in the style of the old English voyagers;—all this may be regarded as proved. He entertained schemes of conquest in South America, which he got Gustavus Adolphus to sanction, and on which Cromwell, who became possessed of his papers, is thought to have founded an expedition. Equally certain is it that he was vain, unprincipled, irascible; that his prodigality was outrageous; that his arrogance and audacity verged on lunacy. Writers speak of his white velvet dress, hung with diamonds to the value of eighty thousand pounds, which he shook from him in his path, as a lion shakes the dew-drops from his mane. Such a lion among ladies was likely to be “a most dreadful thing.” Buckingham, the beautiful, madly-arrogant Englishman, when he and Charles, on their way to Spain, mingled in the society of the French Court, dared to throw love-glances at the young French Queen; and thus drew upon himself the dangerous frown of Richelieu. When lion meets lion, then comes the tug of conflict. The Cardinal, whose fine genius seems to have had the advantage (with a view to success) of being as untrammelled by religious scruples as that of Frederick or that of Voltaire, was himself a lover of his Queen. His sacred character as a bishop, his eminence as a theologian, would lend exquisite flavour and piquancy to such forbidden fruit. The Queen is understood to have been not insensible to the charm of having fascinated the two most fascinating and prominent men in France and in England respectively. All things are said to be lawful in love, and Richelieu, who was seven years older than Buckingham, and now no longer that dapper ecclesiastic, that “creature of porcelain,”\* whose ambition had first found wings in the service of the French Queen-mother, absolutely forbade his rival, after the friends had gone on their way, to re-enter France. The destructive wrath of Buckingham, prompting him to make his way into France at the sword-point and force the world to own that he, not Richelieu, was the better man, became an important factor in the political evolution of the time.

Such was the Buckingham with whom, after having seen and remarked at the French Court the vivacious, dark-eyed, captivating Henrietta Maria, Charles pursued his journey to Spain in quest of the Infanta. When Jack and Tom turned up in Madrid, the excitement among the Spaniards was great. Charles had touched the romantic nerve of the people, and it vibrated in vivid response. To a lover so frank and intrepid what could be denied? Philip declared that he would put his daughter into Charles's arms, and that, if the

\* Michelet.

Pope refused his sanction to the match, it should be dispensed with. Bristol was satisfied that the prospect of success was good. Then Buckingham spoiled all. Jealous of Bristol, insolent to the Spaniards, acting as a petulant and capricious fool, he resolved to defeat the projected match. The facile Charles was persuaded that he was being played upon, and that the delay which occurred was due to Spanish treachery. There is no doubt that Philip and his ministers were falsely accused, and that Buckingham frustrated the negotiation from pique and passion ; but when the Duke returned to England, bringing back the Prince, and it became known that he had been chief actor in the business, Buckingham rose to the zenith of popularity. The joy of all classes at receiving back Charles from the perils of the sea and of Popish Spain was unbounded. Such a clamouring and cackling of delight from shore to shore of England, especially in the loyal city of London ! As if the affections and hopes of all the hens in the farmyard had been embarked with one adventurous duckling on the horse-pond, and now the inestimable creature was once more safe on land ! If we were now to receive back the Prince of Wales after having been sealed up for a winter in the Polar ice, we could not make greater fools of ourselves.

Our ancestors called themselves free, and in a deep sense were so. They understood that no king had a right to crumple up the written law in the shut fist of a despotic will. The prerogative of the Crown was, they vaguely conceived, the blazon and the buckler of the people. But an anointed king was for them a sacred personage. There was something supernatural about him. Superstition was still a colossal power, even in Protestant countries ; men believed in witchcraft and astrology as firmly as we believe in dividends ; and royal touch was still held to be potent in the cure of epilepsy. In its noblest form Shakespeare entertained this reverence for kings, and expressed it perfectly and imperishably when he spoke of the "divinity that doth hedge a king." If you would realize the difference between the antique England of the Jacobean period and the England of the Victorian age, read Macaulay's impatiently contemptuous sketch of James, and then turn to the following lines, in which Shakespeare, who was a subject first of Elizabeth and then of James, eulogizes both :—

As when

The bird of wonder dies, the maiden phoenix,  
Her ashes new-create another heir,  
As great in admiration as herself ;  
So shall she leave her blessedness to one  
Who, from the sacred ashes of her honour,  
Shall star-like rise, as great in fame as she was,  
And so stand fixed : Peace, plenty, love, truth, terror,  
That were the servants of this chosen infant,



Shall then be his, and like a vine grow to him.  
 Where'er the bright sun of heaven shall shine,  
 His honour and the greatness of his name  
 Shall be, and make new nations. He shall flourish,  
 And, like a mountain cedar, reach his branches  
 To all the plains about him.

It is not reasonable to say that, in these lines, Shakespeare was a mere court flatterer. The reverence for kings that pervades his historical plays was infinitely deeper than court flattery. What he wrote about James was as natural, becoming, and right, in the eyes of his generation, as what Mr. Tennyson has written about Queen Victoria is in the eyes of ours. If Shakespeare had told James that his throne was "broad-based upon the people's will," he would either have received some serious mark of the royal displeasure, or, if James had happened to be in his best mood, would have been sent for and treated, on his knees, to a sputtering lecture, an hour long, on the sacred and imprescriptible rights of the Lord's anointed, while courtiers stood round in gaping admiration and archbishops declared in lowly accents that the cascade of nonsense was inspired by God.

James welcomed back Charles and Buckingham with transports of delight. "I wear Steenie's picture," wrote the slobbering non-descript, "in a blue ribbon under my waistcoat next my skin." But his days were henceforward to be full of sorrow. It was not possible for him to extinguish his intellect so far as to be, in political matters, Buckingham's unconscious or happy slave. Steenie had made Baby Charles quite his own, and they were in a league to keep James in the dark. Their plan was never to let him be for five minutes out of sight of one or both of them. But every ambassador of that time who understood his trade was a master in the art of intrigue; and Marquis Ynoiosa and Don Carlos Caloma, the King of Spain's head men in England, contrived to reach the ear of James. Three months long they had watched for an opportunity, baffled by the vigilant favourite and the cunning prince. At last Caloma managed to engage the attention of Charles and Buckingham in one part of a room while Ynoiosa slipped a note into James's hand, with a glance doubtless that it was to be put into his pocket. The Prince and Buckingham were told that afternoon that, on account of a bitter cold and rheum, the King would be confined to his chamber, and could not see them. In the evening Carendolet, secretary to the Spanish Legation, was introduced into James's room, and assured him that he, James, was surrounded by spies and informers, that no one dared to do his commands or to tender to him advice, except by the permission of Buckingham; in one word, that Buckingham was king. James promised secrecy, and next day, when Charles and the Duke met him as he drove in his coach, he took in his son but shut the door against the favourite. His majesty

had escaped, then? Not he! The Bishop of Lincoln, shifty, eloquent Welsh Williams,—indefatigable in the pursuit of useful knowledge and alert to make the most of both worlds,—had Carendole's mistress in his pay. The secretary told the mistress, and the mistress told the Bishop, and the Bishop told the Prince, and the Prince told Buckingham, and James was recalled to a sense of the difficulty of emancipating himself from the yoke of his poor slave and dog by an ironically sympathetic question from said slave as to that rheum with which he had been troubled the other evening.

For intrigue was one of the arts carried to a high state of perfection in that religious age. The meshwork in which it encircled personages of importance was complicated in its ramifications and fine in its threads. A clever ambassador, a Bristol for instance, would be better served by the body-guards of the Spanish king than the Spanish king himself, would have keys that could open Philip's most secret cabinets, and would boast that he could furnish James with copies of documents before they were read by Philip in council. The most fervently pious men, the Puritan Cromwell for example, would have no misgiving as to the maxim, *licet uti altero peccato*, would dispense the necessary pieces of silver to the domestic Judas, and would leave the conscientious question to the latter. Under these circumstances, a liberal-minded Charles II., conning the lessons of adversity in threadbare coat in Holland, would testify his filial affection by having Dr. Dorislaus, who had taken part in the trial of his father, assassinated. And so the endless tragi-comedy, act after act, went on, and the whirligig of time kept moving, and at length a free press and Baron Reuter began to manage the intelligence department for irresistible Opinion, without, it may be hoped, much need of liars, assassins, and traitors, and surely, with comparative advantage to all parties.

James had not succeeded in breaking the yoke of Buckingham, but it galled him to the quick. The Earl of Bristol, eclipsed and supplanted by the Duke, had returned from Spain, and a persuasion had gradually diffused itself that the nation had been misled as to the causes of the failure of the Spanish match project. Having nursed that project as a pet lamb in his bosom, James learned with feelings which may be imagined that it had been frustrated in mere capricious wilfulness by Buckingham. Knowing how deeply James had valued the Spanish alliance, Bristol doubtless calculated that Charles and the favourite could not permanently hoodwink him, and hoped that the Duke would fall and that himself would regain power. He knew that James could not dispense with a favourite, but his notion, strange to say, was that Somerset, a convicted murderer, might return to Court in that capacity. James actually had a secret interview with Somerset. It was believed by close observers at the time that Buckingham held his place by an

extremely precarious tenure. The unhappy King was the centre of a coil of inextricable intrigues, Buckingham plotting against Somerset, Bristol plotting against Buckingham, Baby Charles and Steenie plotting against the dear dad and gossip ; Spanish interest, French interest of the Court and Richelieu party, French interest of the Huguenot party, interest of the Elector Palatine, interest of the Puritans and patriots of England, all pulling and wrestling and whirling as in delirious dance round James. It was enough to tease a poor old nondescript wise fool to death. Volumes might be written to trace the conflicting influences and describe the warring passions of the scene ; but the game would not be worth the candle ; and we ought to be thankful that oblivion, which, like death, is often kind, has spread over the whole its pall.

The main historical facts which it is important for us to note are, first, that the Court was steadily growing in unpopularity during the last years of James's reign ; and, secondly, that this unpopularity directed itself more against Buckingham and Charles than against the king. The popularity which the duke had earned by bringing back Charles unmarried from Spain was short-lived. It was whispered that, whatever might be his motives for opposing the Spanish match, they implied no dislike of Popery, inasmuch as he had in Spain declared himself prepared to become, if need were, a Papist. He was soon the best hated man in England, and the prince, intimately associated with him, could not but share his unpopularity. The most important consideration of all, however, to explain the coldness with which the nation regarded Charles's accession to the throne, is that he identified himself more closely than his father with certain theological influences and tendencies, now coming prominently into view, which the majority of the people and of their representatives in Parliament regarded with unmeasured hostility.

We may shut the book of England's history in those years unless we apprehend the interest taken in theological questions. That interest was fervent and universal. Landed proprietors, farmers, shop-keepers, nay, apprentices and farm-labourers cared more about abstract theological propositions than people now care about big loaf or free breakfast table. And, strange as it may seem, it is a fact which will be questioned by no one acquainted with the literature of the period, from the writings of Owen, Baxter, and Milton down to street-broadsides and municipal petitions, that the theology which had been embraced with passionate intensity by the great body of the English people, was that which can be briefly and practically described as absorbing, beyond any other theological scheme, the human into the Divine. The fundamental position of Puritan theology was that defined by St. Paul when he represents God as the potter and man as the clay. This will now strike most readers as a doctrine of utter slavishness ; but all

can understand that, if attainment of infinite benefit and escape from inexpressible calamity were believed to be connected with absolute submission to the Divine will, a resistance proportioned to the strength of this conviction would be presented by those entertaining it to any attempt to prevent them from submitting themselves implicitly to God. It has been demonstrated again and again in history, that under no influence does man become more terrible as a force than when he feels himself a mere instrument in the hand of God. Take three historic names, with all they stand for, to prove this fact,—the Hebrew David, Mahomet, Cromwell. The Puritan, ever in the great Taskmaster's eye, penetrated with the faith that his whole individuality was taken possession of by God, presented a front of fierce opposition to the Papist on the one hand, and to the Arminian on the other. The Papist put the Pope and the Church between the soul and God; the Puritan would hear of no created mediator. The Arminian ventured to assert, from the bosom of the Reformed Church itself, the rights of the human personality; the Puritan recognized essentially but one right, one fate, for the finite being, to be irradiated with God as light, or to be consumed by God as fire. In the history of spiritual civilization and of European progress, Arminius and his followers take an honoured place as daring to stem the current of tendency in their time, and to maintain, with their lives in their hands, that the clay, if it ceases to be clay and becomes human, has a personality not to be extinguished by God himself, a personality involving rights which, if justice admits of any definition whatever, can be pleaded against power even when infinite. But religion, if it has often been expanded and ennobled by an infusion of philosophy, has invariably been thereby weakened as a force; and whatever Arminianism may have done to promote in the largest sense the liberty of the human spirit, it is unquestionable that the cause of practical freedom, as against priest or despot, was in the seventeenth century mainly vindicated by the inexorable determination of the Puritans to be untrammelled in obeying the law of their God. Assailed by the Puritans, the Arminians leant naturally upon the State for protection, and while the historian of philosophy classes them as advocates of freedom, the historian of constitutional liberty must pronounce them politically servile. Moderating their jealousy of the civil power, they moderated also their hatred of the Papacy, and naturally cast in their lot with those Protestants who had least objection to the doctrine, ritual, and episcopal government of the old Church.

If the importance of these statements in relation to the history of England in the first half of the seventeenth century has been appreciated, it will be understood that it was a great point for James, in respect of popularity, that his theology was Puritan, and that it was a

strong point against Charles that he allied himself from the first with the Romanizing and Arminian party. James's brain had been taken possession of in his youth by the Augustinian system of theology as repromulgated by the greater Augustine of Geneva. He came from Scotland sound as a bell on the five points of Calvinism; and so late as 1618 his representatives in the Synod of Dort were instructed to side with the Calvinists. It is indeed true that he much preferred bishops to presbyters, and that the English Puritans gained no favour in his eyes by reminding him of those Caledonian ecclesiastics who, whatever their faults, were never accused of sycophancy. They had told James that he was "Christ's silly vassal," and lectured him and snubbed him without mercy. No doubt they told him also that he was the Lord's anointed, and James had wit enough to extract a good deal out of this. The prophet Samuel, striving to check the monarchical tendencies of the degenerating Jews, warned them that, once their king was anointed, they would be compelled to submit to him however afflictive he might be. James knew he had been anointed, felt that he was afflictive, and asked whether any subject pretending to logic could dispute the duty of submitting to him? The "stubborn kirk" clung to its notions as to the supreme right of the people, and would lend no countenance to despotic theories. It was heaven for James, after having been called a silly vassal by gaunt presbyters in serge, to be told by surpliced prelates that he spake as an angel of God. But so long as his bishops said this, he liked them to be theologically in sympathy with the Reformation, and out of sympathy with the Church of Rome.

While Puritan theology reigned in Court and Church, the Puritan revolution, in so far as it was a religious revolution—and its central force was religious—was impossible. Revolutions are not made by trifles; men do not shed their blood for *tolerabiles ineptiæ*. Neither the bishops nor the ceremonies would have occasioned civil war, if they had continued to stand for that for which they stood in the days of Elizabeth and in the early days of James. At that time there was no irreconcilable breach between the Church of England and the Scottish Kirk. English archbishops could find admiring audiences north of Tweed, and young Mr. Laud, preaching at Oxford, got himself sharply rebuked by his University superiors for his new-fangled high-Anglican notions, so well fitted to sow dissension between the Church of England and the Reformed Churches. John Knox, though he refused a bishoprick, had been prevented by no scruple of conscience from ministering in an Episcopal church. The symbols about which the Puritans fought had been of comparatively small consequence until they became typical, or were believed to have become typical, of the main issue between Rome and the Reformers. The Church seemed to be once more interposing

between God and the soul, and the palladium of Protestantism to be in danger. "Some men," says Hume, "of the greatest parts and most extensive knowledge that the nation at this time produced could not enjoy any peace of mind because obliged to hear prayers offered up to a Divinity by a priest covered with a white linen vestment." As if one should appraise in money worth the thin pole and torn rag around which men bleed in battle, and wonder how they can sell their lives for ninepence!

The man to whom the portentous change which had taken place was chiefly due has been already named. William Laud was about thirty years old when James came to England, but, though he was already possessed with the idea which has given him a place in history, he did not, for many years, occupy a highly important position. His advance was slow but sure. No man ever understood better than he the art of stooping to conquer and cringing to subdue. Bishop Williams, possessed of a random generosity which enabled him to do a kindness to men he despised, held out his hand to Laud and helped the "urchin" to court. Williams had intrigued boldly and shiftily, as we have seen, for the favour of Buckingham, and had probably reckoned on making the haughty Duke his friend; but the brilliant, wily Welshman found himself sharply repelled, while Laud, who seems never to have suggested to Buckingham that he was anything but his, the Duke's, humble slave, "became," says Abbott, "the only inward counsellor with Buckingham, sitting with him sometimes privately for whole hours." Laud stepped as softly as an incarnate idea; which, indeed, he was—the Anglican idea in flesh. Consumed by his one passion, he knew no friendship, no mere mundane fidelity or gratitude. He undermined his benefactor Williams, and sent him first to the seclusion of a country diocese and then to the Tower. Buckingham and Charles never imagined that they were being dominated by Laud, but the influence of the idea stole over them, and for Charles it became an enthusiasm, an inspiration, a doom. Laud, in the cast of his theology, was an Arminian and a Roman. He believed in episcopacy by divine right, in the radical difference between clergy and laity, in the mystic efficacy of sacerdotal functions and sacramental rites. He attached immense importance to the symbolism and ceremonial of worship.

The sagacity which lay, hidden but indestructible, amid heaps of topsy-turvy rubbish behind James's goggle eyes, told him that Laud was dangerous, and Steenie and Baby had a good deal to do before James, the wise man, yielded, and James, the fool, took Laud into comparative favour. It need not be doubted that the ecclesiastic made way considerably with the old king. Buckingham's mother was a Papist; it was arranged that Laud should lay siege to her. He engaged, in her presence, in controversy with Jesuit Fisher, and


had an opportunity to display the exquisite advantages of his system; how it had all the attractions of the Church of Rome and none of the drawbacks of the Reformed Churches; how it disallowed the jurisdiction of a foreign ecclesiastic in England, but exalted the native primate and the native king; how it rejected sundry errors of the Romish theology, and yet afforded the stay of Church authority to diffident souls, and priestly succour and absolution to those who trembled at the thought of immediate intercourse with God. Here was a plan for reconciling discrepancies, for solving problems that seemed insoluble! Could James but accept it, he might smite Jack Presbyter hip and thigh, from the Dan of Church government unto the Beersheba of dogma. The lady declared herself converted. It seems probable that, between the date of the Synod of Dort and his death, James learned to look with much less alarm and repugnance on Laud than he had previously done; but the change would not be observed by the body of the people, whereas the devotion of Charles to Laud and Arminianism was undisguised.

Though Bristol, Somerset, Ynoiosa and company were skilful intriguers, and though James was painfully sensible of his enslavement, Buckingham and Charles prevailed, and he never escaped their tutelage. To the last his subjects tolerated him, or more than tolerated him. He got credit for what was good in him, and Buckingham was debited with the failures of the Government. The national pride was grievously wounded by the disastrous issue of the expedition despatched in 1624 for the recovery of the Palatinate. We may be very sure that both as a man of peace and a wise fool James had in his heart distrusted and disliked the enterprise, and when it failed, this would be remembered. The calamity had been great and ignominious. Twelve thousand foot and two hundred horse, under command of the renowned Count Mansfeldt, had embarked. When they reached the French coast, they were not permitted to land. Sailing for Holland, they were there also bidden to stand off. While they tossed on the grey seas that chafe against the Dutch dykes, their provisions began to fail, and the men sickened and died. The English at home s'uddered at hideous details of corpses washed ashore and eaten by hogs. Half the army having perished, a landing was effected, but the force was now too weak to accomplish anything decisive. In pacific enterprises into which James really threw his heart, he had been successful. His policy in connection with the "plantation" of Ulster was judicious and public-spirited. There was something about him personally which, in spite of his repulsive characteristics, must have been likeable. He was sprightly, fond of anything like a joke, never moody or morose. His verses on the expedition of Buckingham and Charles to Spain are vivacious, and the versifier was fifty-six years old. Far from unintelligently or steadily kind-hearted, he was in

an extreme degree soft-hearted, and a reputation for soft-heartedness goes far with the crowd. Scott's delineation of him in the *Fortunes of Nigel* is as trustworthy as the best history, and when we leave the garrulous matchmaker over his cock-a-leekie, we feel how impossible it would be to get up indignation against so amiably preposterous a tyrant. We must say, however, that, unless his portrait by Vandyke is a mere lie, he could on some occasions look dignified enough. The Londoners called him old Jemmy, laughed at him, grumbled at him, endured him, and when, in 1625, he died, were inclined to be furious with Buckingham for having, as they imagined, murdered him. The idea is not so extravagantly absurd as it may appear to this generation; it was entertained by clever men at the time, for there were shrewd observers who believed that James would by a desperate effort rid himself of the Duke, and Buckingham was not a man to be scrupulous in extremity; but we may safely believe that the king had no fouler play than that of being worried to death by vexation and intrigue.

PETER BAYNE.





## THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE PURE SCIENCES.\*

### I.—STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION.

ON entering this room and looking rapidly round, what do I see ? I see a theatre, with a gallery, and with an arrangement of seats in tiers. I see people sitting upon these seats, people with heads more or less round, with bodies of a certain shape ; sitting in various positions. Above I see a roof with a skylight, and a round disc evidently capable of vertical motion. Below I see the solid floor supporting us all. In front of me I see a table, and my hands resting upon it. In the midst of all these things I see a void space, which I can walk about in if I like. The different things I have mentioned I see at various distances from one another, and from me ; and (now that the door is shut) I see that they completely enclose this void space, and hedge it in. My view is not made of patches here and there, but is a continuous boundary going all round the void space I have mentioned. All this I see to exist at the same time ; but some of you are not sitting quite still, and I see you move ; that is to say, I see you pass from one position into another by going through an infinite series of intermediate positions. Moreover, when I put my hands on the table, I feel a hard flat horizontal surface at rest, covered with cloth.

Have I spoken correctly in making these assertions ? Yes, you will say, this is on the whole just what I ought to have seen and felt under the circumstances. With the exception of one or two points expressed in too technical a form, this is just the sort of language that a witness might use in describing any ordinary event.

\* Lectures delivered at the Royal Institution in March, 1873.

without invalidating his testimony. You would not say at once "this is absurd; the man must not be listened to any longer." And if, having been precisely in my situation, you wished to describe facts with the view of drawing inferences from them—even important inferences—you would make all these statements as matter of your own direct personal experience; and if need were, you would even testify to them in a court of law.

And yet I think we shall find on a little reflection that not one of these statements can by any possibility have been strictly true.

"I see a theatre." I do not; the utmost I can possibly see is two distinct curved pictures of a theatre. Upon the two retinas of my eyes there are made pictures of the scene before me, exactly as pictures are made upon the ground glass in a photographer's camera. The sensation of sight which I get comes to me at any rate through those two pictures; and it cannot tell me any more, or contain in itself any more, than is in those two pictures. Now the pictures are not solid; each of them is simply a curved surface variously illuminated at various parts. Whereas, therefore, I think I see a solid scene, having depth, and relief, and distance in it, reflection tells me that I see nothing of the kind; but only (at the most) two distinct surfaces, having no depth and no relief, and only a kind of distance which is quite different from that of the solid figures before me. You will say, probably, that this is only a quibble on two senses of the word "see." Whether it is so or not makes no difference to our subsequent argument; and yet I think you will admit that the latter sense, in which I do not see the solid things, is the more correct one. For the question is not about what is there, but about what I see. Now exactly the same sensation can be produced in me by two slightly different pictures placed in a stereoscope—I say exactly the same; because if I had sufficiently accurate coloured photographs of this room properly illuminated, the rays of light converging on every part of each of my retinas might be made exactly the same as they are now; and the sensation would therefore not only appear to be the same but would actually be the same. I should think I saw a solid scene; and I should not be seeing one. Now to see, and to see what is actually there, are two different things.

Again, "I see people with heads more or less round."—I can't see your heads; I can only see your faces. I must have imagined the rest. But just consider what it is that I have imagined. Is it merely that besides what I do see I have added something that I might see by going round to the other side? No, there is more than that. The complete sensation which I have of a human head when I look at one is not merely something which I do not see now, but something which I never could see by any possibility. I have the sensation of a solid object, and not of a series of pictures of a

solid object. Although that sensation may be really constructed out of a countless number of possible pictures, yet it is not like any of them. I imagine to myself, and seem to see, the other side of things, not as it would look if viewed from beyond them, but as it would look if viewed from here. I seem to see the back of your head, not as it would look if I got behind you, but as if I saw it through your face from the spot where I am standing; and that, you know, is impossible.

I seem to see all these objects as existing together. But really as a matter of fact I move my eyes about and see a succession of small pictures very rapidly changed. Each of my eyes has six muscles which pull it about, and if I knew which of these muscles were moving, and how fast, at any moment, I should get information about the direction in which my eye was looking at the time. Now it is only a very small part of the scene before me that I can really see distinctly at once; so that I have really seen a panorama, and not the one large picture that I imagined; and yet while looking at the small portion which I can really see distinctly, I think I see distinctly the whole room.

Again, I seem to see that in some directions, at least, this void space in the middle is completely bounded—the surface of the floor, for example, which bounds it, appears to be completely filled up and continuous, to have no breaks in it. And when you move I seem to see you go *continuously* from one position to another through an infinite series of intermediate positions. Now quite apart from the question whether these conclusions are true or not, it can be made out distinctly that I could not possibly see either the surface of a thing, or a motion, as continuous; for the sensitive portion of my retina, which receives impressions, is not itself a continuous surface; but consists of an enormously large but still finite number of nerve filaments distributed in a sort of net-work. And the messages that go along my nerves do not consist in any continuous action, but in a series of distinct waves succeeding one another at very small but still finite intervals. All I can possibly have seen, therefore at any moment is a picture made of a very large number of very small patches, exceedingly near to one another, but not actually touching. And all I can have seen as time passed is a succession of such distinct pictures coming rapidly after one another. You know that precisely as the stereoscope is made to imitate that property of my two eyes out of which I imagine solid things, so another instrument has been constructed to imitate that property of my nerves out of which I imagine continuous motion. The instrument is called the *Zoetrope*, or *Wheel of Life*. It presents to you a succession of distinct pictures coming after one another at small intervals; and the impression produced by that series is precisely the impression of one thing in continuous motion.

Let us now put shortly together what we have said about this sensation of sight. I shall use the word mosaic to represent a few disconnected patches which a painter might put down with a view of remembering a scene he had no time to sketch. Then, I seem to see a large collection of solid objects in continuous motion. The utmost I can really see is a panorama painted in mosaic and shown in a wheel of life. I do not know that my direct perception amounts to so much; but it cannot possibly amount to more. What it really does amount to must be reserved for subsequent discussion. At any rate I must have imagined the rest.

Lastly, when I put my hands on the table, I feel a hard, flat, horizontal surface at rest, covered with cloth. Now there are three things that really happen. First, there is a definite kind of irritation of certain organs of my skin, called papillæ. It is that irritation that makes me say *cloth*. Secondly, certain of my muscles are in a state of compression, and they tell me that. Thirdly, I make a certain muscular effort which is not followed by motion. This is all that I can really feel; but those three things do not constitute a hard, flat, horizontal surface covered with cloth. As before, I must have imagined the rest.

Do not suppose that I am advocating any change in our common language about sensation. I don't want anybody to say, for instance, instead of, "I saw you yesterday on the other side of the street," "I saw a series of panoramic pictures in a sort of mosaic, of such a nature that the imaginations I constructed out of them were not wholly unlike the imaginations I have constructed out of similar series of panoramic pictures seen by me on previous occasions when you were present." This would be clumsy, and it would not be sufficient. And yet I cannot help thinking that in certain assemblies, when some of those who are present are in an exalted state of emotional expectation, and the lights are low, even this roundabout way of putting things might be, to say the least, a salutary exercise.

But the conclusion I want you to draw from all this that we have been saying is that there are really two distinct parts in every sensation that we get. There is a message that comes to us, somehow; but this message is not all that we apparently see and hear and feel. In every sensation there is, besides the actual message, something that we imagine and add to the message. This is sometimes expressed by saying that there is a part which comes from the external world and a part which is supplied by the mind. But however we express it, the fact to be remembered is that not the whole of a sensation is immediate experience (where by immediate experience, I mean the actual message—whatever it is—that comes to us); but that this experience is supplemented by something else which is not in it. And thus you may see that it is a perfectly real question, "Where does this supplement come from?" This question has been

before philosophers for a very long time ; and it is this question that we have to discuss.

But first of all we must inquire a little further into the nature of the supplement by which we fill in our experience. When I fill in my experience of this room in the way that I have described, I do not do so at random, but according to certain rules. And in fact I generally fill it in *right*; that is to say, from the imaginations that I have built up I can deduce by rules certain other experiences which would follow from actions of a definite sort. When I seem to see a solid floor, I conclude that if I went there I could feel it as I do the table. And upon trial these conclusions in general turn out right. I cannot therefore have filled in my experience at random, but according to certain rules. Let us now consider what are a few of these rules.

In the first place, out of pictures I have imagined solid things. Out of space of two dimensions, as we call it, I have made space of three dimensions, and I imagine these solid things as existing in it; that is to say, as having certain relations of distance to one another. Now these relations of distance are always so filled in as to fulfil a code of rules, some called common notions and some called definitions, and some called postulates, and some assumed without warning, but all somehow contained in Euclid's "Elements of Geometry." For example, I sometimes imagine that I see two lines in a position which I call parallel. Parallelism is impossible on the curved pictures of my retina; so this is part of the filling in. Now whenever I imagine that I see a quadrilateral figure whose opposite sides are parallel, I always fill them in so that the opposite sides are also *equal*. Now this equality is also a part of the filling in, and relates to possible perceptions other than the one immediately present. From this example, then, you can see that the fundamental axioms and definitions of geometry are really certain rules according to which we supplement or fill in our experience.

Now here is a rather more complicated example. If I see a train going along and a man moving inside of it, I fill in the motion of the train as continuous out of a series of distinct pictures of it; and so also I fill in the motion of the man relatively to the train as continuous. I imagine all motions, therefore, according to the rule of continuity; that is, between the distinct pictures which I see, I insert an infinite number of intermediate pictures. Moreover, both of these motions are imagined in accordance with the laws of geometry; that is to say, they are imagined so that the relations of distance at any instant obey those laws. But now I may, if I like, consider, besides the motion of the train and the motion of the man relative to it, the motion of the man relative to me, as if there were no train; and this like the other motions is part of the filling in. But I always fill this in in such a way that the three

motions—of the train by itself, of the man by himself, and of the man relatively to the train—satisfy certain rules, by which one can be found when the other two are given. These rules are called the laws of kinematic, or of the pure science of motion.

Then we may say to begin with, that we supplement our experience in accordance with certain rules: and that some of these rules are the foundations of the pure sciences of Space and Motion.

Instead of Space and Motion, many people would like to say Space and Time. But in regard to the special matter that we are considering, it seems to me for reasons which I do not wish to give at present, to be more correct to say that we imagine time by putting together space and motion, than that we imagine motion by putting together space and time.

There are other rules, besides those of space and motion, according to which we fill in our experience. One of these rules I may call the continuity of things. I can see this table, and feel it, and hear a sound when I strike it. The table is an imagination by which I fill in a great variety of different experiences. It is what I call a thing. Now, if I come into this room again, and have any experience of the table, I shall fill it in in such a way as to imply that the same variety of experiences might be combined again; that is, I shall imagine the thing to be persistent. But this rule will not apply universally, and I do not always observe it. Because I have seen a tree without leaves in the winter, I do not in the summer fill in my experience of the trunk with imagination of leafless branches above. But I do fill in the two experiences with an imagination of an infinite series of gradual intermediate changes. Some people divide this rule into two—the persistence of substance and the continuity of qualities. I prefer to make one rule, and to call it the continuity of things. Things—that is to say, combinations of possible experience—are not persistent, but they change continuously in the imagination by which we fill up that experience. Or we may say that experience at any one time is always so filled in as to aggregate together the possible perceptions implied by the result into groups which we call things; and that experience of a period of time is always so filled in that things change only in a continuous manner.

Another rule of the supplement which we imagine is that which provides that these changes of things shall take place according to a certain uniformity. The simplest case of this is when the same experience is repeated, and we fill up the changes subsequent to the second experience, so that they shall be the same as those subsequent to the first. It is not necessary that the experience should be actually repeated; it may only be filled up in the same way. The uniformity, however, which is involved in this law is a much more complicated thing than this simple case. I can only say here that experience is filled up always so as to make the imagined history of things

exhibit *some* uniformity; that the definiteness of this varies in different individuals and at different times. Some people prefer to call this the law of causation, and to say that we always supplement our experiences in such a way that every event has a cause or causes which determine it, and effects which flow from it.

Now all this filling up that we have been considering happens directly in the sensations that I get from day to day, just as I get them. (It is convenient to use the word sensation, as meaning the *whole* phenomenon, not only the immediate experience, but also the supplement.) But if I want to talk to you about them, or if, advancing upon that practice, I talk to myself about them, then I am obliged to use *language*, or to represent them by signs; and this requires me to group them in a new manner. I have to make imaginations not of things, but of whole series of things, of relations of these to one another, and combinations of the relations. I have to construct, in fact, what I shall call for shortness the apparatus of thought—the means by which I talk to myself. For there seems reason to think that the conceptions which correspond to general terms—names of a class, or of an abstract relation—are first rendered necessary by the language which expresses them.\* But however that may be, this new world of conceptions is not made wholly at random, but satisfies certain laws. For example, in order to describe a certain group of things, I introduce the very complicated conception *six*, and say there are six of them. Now, whenever this is done in the case of two groups, giving rise to the conceptions *six* and *three*, it is possible to apply the same process to the group compounded of those two, and it always gives rise to the conception *nine*. Here, then, is a law of combination to which the world of conceptions has to conform. And another is this: If every individual which belongs to the class A belongs also to the class B, and if every individual which belongs to the class B belongs also to the class C, then always every individual which belongs to the class A belongs also to the class C. Rules like these, which regulate the world of conceptions, built out of our sensations, are also said to belong to the pure sciences; and the two examples which I have chosen belong respectively to the sciences of Number and Logic.

There may be other kinds of rules according to which experience is supplemented and sensations are built up into conceptions; but I am not aware of any more kinds, and perhaps those that I have mentioned will be sufficient for our purpose. I will just state again the names of the sciences which consist in these three groups:—

The rules about Space and Motion constitute the pure sciences of Geometry and Kinematic.

The rules about Things and Uniformity have been said to belong to a pure science of Nature.

\* See this view ably defended in Professor Max Müller's Lectures, delivered at the Royal Institution in April, 1873, and since published in *Fraser's Magazine*.

The rules about Numbers and Classes constitute the pure sciences of Arithmetic and Formal Logic.

But for the present let us confine our attention to the first group of rules; those which relate to space and motion. There is one other property of them which we have to consider, besides the fact that our experience is filled up in accordance with them. I have already mentioned this property, but in only passing. It is that in general this filling in of experience is *right*; and that, so far as these rules are concerned, it is not only right in general, but always right. That is to say, if from the sensation which is made by the filled-up experience we predict certain other perceptions as consequent upon our actions, these predictions will actually be fulfilled. To take the example we considered before, I always imagine a parallelogram so that its opposite sides are equal. Now, the conclusion from this is, that if I go to the parallelogram and apply one of the sides to the other, I shall not perceive any difference. The rule by which I supplement my perception is also a true statement about objects; it is capable of a certain kind of verification, and it always stands this test.

Here, however, I could use the word *equal* only in its practical sense, in which two things are equal when I cannot perceive their difference; not in its theoretical sense, in which two things are equal when they have no difference at all. But there has been for ages a conviction in the minds of men that these rules about space are true objectively in the exact or theoretical sense, and under all possible circumstances. If two straight lines are drawn perpendicular to the same plane, geometers would have told you for more than two thousand years that these straight lines may be prolonged for ever and ever without getting the least bit nearer to one another or further away from one another; and that they were perfectly certain of this. They knew for certain that the sum of the angles of a triangle, no matter how big or how small it was, or where it was situated, must always be exactly equal to two right angles, neither more nor less. And those who were philosophers as well as geometers knew more than this. They knew not only that the thing was true, but that it could not possibly have been otherwise; that it was necessarily true. And this means, apparently, not merely that I know that it must be, but that I know that you must know that it must be.

The case of arithmetical propositions is perhaps more easily comprehended in this respect. Everybody knows that six things and three things make nine things at all possible times and places; you cannot help seeing not only that they do always without exception make nine things, but that they must do so; and that the world could not have been constructed otherwise. For to those ingenious speculations which suppose that in some other planet there may always be a tenth thing inevitably suggested upon the union of the six and the three, so that they cannot be added together without



making ten; to these, I say, it may be replied that the words *number* and *thing*, if used at all, must have different meanings in that planet. The reply is important, and I shall return to it in a subsequent lecture.

Now Locke and Hume gave explanations of the existence of two of these general rules which I have put into my second group. Locke explained the notion of substance, the notion that a *thing* means something more than an aggregate of possible perceptions, but the fact that we are accustomed to get these perceptions all together; by this *custom* they are welded or linked together, and our imagination of the thing is then this connected structure of perceptions, which is called up as a whole whenever one or more of the component perceptions is called up. Having thus by custom formed the complete sensation which we have of the thing, we suppose that this is a message, like the actual perceptions, and comes from something outside. That something is the substance. Locke did not admit that this supposition is right, and that the linking together of messages is really itself a message; but still he thought there was something outside to correspond to this linking. Hume explained in the same way the rule of causation. He said we got it from being accustomed to perceive one event following another; so that these two perceptions got linked together, and when one of them occurred alone, we fill it in with the other one. And then, regarding this link, produced only by custom, as if it were a message from somewhere, like the simple perceptions, we give it the name of causation.

These explanations agree in saying that the supplement of experience is made up of past experience, together with links which bind together perceptions that have been accustomed to occur together. This fact, that perceptions and feelings which have frequently occurred together get linked, so that one calls up the other, is called the law of Association, and has been made the basis of scientific Psychology. According to these explanations of Locke and Hume (which extended to the other two groups of rules) all the knowledge we have that the rules are right, or may be objectively verified, is really derived from experience; only it is *past* experience, which we have had so often and got so accustomed to that it is now really a part of ourselves.

But Kant, after being staggered for some time by Hume's explanation, at length said, "It is impossible that all your knowledge can have come from experience. For you know that the axioms of mathematics are absolutely and universally true, and no experience can possibly have told you this. However often you may have found the angles of a triangle amount to two right angles, however accustomed you may have got to this experience, you have no right to know that the angles of every possible triangle are equal to two

right angles, nor indeed that those of any one triangle are absolutely and exactly so equal. Now you do know this, and you can't deny it. You have therefore some knowledge which could not possibly be derived from experience; it must therefore have come in some other way; or, there is some other source of knowledge besides experience."

At that time there was no answer whatever to this. For men did think that they knew at least the absolute universality if not the necessity of the mathematical axioms. To any one who admitted the necessity, the argument was even stronger; for it was clear that no experience could make any approach to supplying knowledge of this quality. But if a man felt absolutely sure that two straight lines perpendicular to the same line would never meet, however far produced, he could not maintain against Kant that all knowledge is derived from experience. He was obliged to admit the existence of knowledge *a priori*, that is, knowledge lying ready in the mind from the first, antecedent to all experience.

But now here is a difficulty to be explained. How is it possible that I can have knowledge about objects which is prior to all experience of objects, and which transcends the bounds of possible experience?

First of all, what do I mean by objects? In the answer to this question lies really Kant's solution of the problem, and I shall endeavour to make this clear by a comparison.

If a man had on a pair of green spectacles, he would see everything green. And if he found out this property of his spectacles, he might say with absolute certainty that while he had those spectacles on everything that he saw without exception would be green.

"Everything that he saw;" that is to say, all objects of sight to him. But here it is clear that the word object is relative; it means a representation that he gets, and has nothing to do with the thing in itself. And the assertion that everything is green, would not be an assertion about the things in themselves, but about the representations of them which came to him. The colour of these representations would depend partly on the things outside and partly on his spectacles. It would vary for different things, but there would always be green in it.

Now let us modify this example a little. I know for certain that the colour of every object in the universe is made up of colours, that lie within the range of the visible spectrum. This is apparently a universal statement, and yet I know it to be true of things which it is impossible that I should ever see. How is this? Why, simply, that my eyes are only affected by light which lies within the range of the visible spectrum. Now I say that this case is only a little modified from the previous one. The green glass lets in a certain range of light; the range is very little increased when you take it

away. Only in this second case it happens that we are all actually wearing very nearly the same spectacles. That universal statement which I made is true not only of objects as they appear to me, but also of objects as they appear to you. It is a statement about objects; that is, about certain representations which we perceive. It may, therefore, so far, have its origin in the things of which these are representations, or it may have its origin in us. And we happen to know that in this case it is not a statement about external things, but about our eyes.

Admitting, then, that the objects of our sensation are representations made to us; that their character must therefore be partly dependent upon our own character; what properties of these objects should we naturally suppose to have this origin, to be derived from the constitution of our minds? Why, clearly, those which are necessary and universal; for only such properties can be so derived, and there is no other way in which they can be known to be universal.

Accordingly, Kant supposes that Space and Time are necessary forms of perception, imposed upon it by the perceiving mind; that things are in space and time as they appear to us, and not in themselves; and that consequently the statement that all things exist in space and time is a statement about the nature of our perception and not about the things perceived.

The word corresponding to experience (*Erfahrung*) is used by Kant nearly in the sense in which I have used *sensation*; to mean the whole phenomenon consisting of the bare message and also of the filling-in, the complete representation which we get of objects. But it is not apparently confined to this; it means not merely the sensations which I get, but the sensations which I talk about. Giving to the word this sense for the present, we may say that in his theory the form, the general character, of experience is imposed upon it by two faculties which we all possess; Intuition and Understanding—Intuition has necessarily the forms of Space and Time; but we are not to say that those properties of space which are expressed in the geometrical axioms are all necessitated by the forms of intuition; for it is the understanding that supplies us with the pure notions of quantity, quality, relation, and modality. It is not always easy to separate the parts played by these two faculties in supplying the general rules to which experience conforms; but it appears, for example, that the three dimensions of space are given by pure intuition itself, while the equality of the opposite sides of a parallelogram is only given by help of the understanding. It is not to our purpose to investigate the difference between these two faculties, or even to remember that Kant made a distinction between them. All that is important for us is the theory that those general statements upon which the pure sciences are founded, although really true of objects, that is of representations made to me, are in fact statements about me and not

about the things in themselves: just as my general statement about the colours of things was really a statement about my own eyes and not about the things. And it is just because these statements are about me that I know them to be not only universally but always necessarily true about the objects I perceive; for it is always the same *me* that perceives them—or at any rate it is a *me* possessing always the same faculties of representation.

Now observe what it is that this theory does with general statements; what is the means by which it gets rid of them—for it does get rid of them. It makes them into particular statements. Instead of being statements about all possible places and times and things, they are made out to be statements about me, and about other men, in so far as they have the same faculties that I have. I want you to notice this transformation particularly, because I shall afterwards endeavour to establish a similar transformation, though in rather a different manner.

In the next place, observe that the question which was proposed by the Critical Philosophy is a perfectly real and important question. It is this:—"Are there any properties of objects in general which are really due to me and to the way in which I perceive them, and which do not belong to the things themselves?" But it seems to me that the method by which Kant attempted to answer this question was not the right method. It consisted in finding what are those characters of experience which we know to be necessary and universal; and concluding that these are characters of me. It requires, therefore, some infallible way of judging what characters are necessary and universal. Now, unfortunately, as I hope to show you, judgments of this kind may very possibly be mistaken. If you went up to our man with the green spectacles, and argued with him that since he knew for certain that everything was green, whereas no experience could tell him so, this greenness must be somewhere in the apparatus by which he perceived things; there would be just one weakness in the argument. He might be mistaken in thinking he knew that everything was green. But the proper thing to do, as it appears to me, would be to take him to a looking-glass and show him that these spectacles were actually upon his nose. And so also in the general question which is proposed by the critical philosophy. The answer to that question must be sought not in the subjective method, in the conviction of universality and necessity, but in the physiological method, in the study of the physical facts that accompany sensation, and of the physical properties of the nervous system. The materials for this valid criticism of knowledge did not exist in Kant's time. I believe that they do exist at present to such an extent at least as to indicate the nature of the results which that criticism is to furnish.

The Kantian theory of universal truths was largely, though not completely, accepted by Whewell, and applied with considerable

detail in his *Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*. It is necessary to mention him here, not on account of any important modification that he introduced into the theory, but because the form into which he put it has had great influence in directing the attention of scientific students to the philosophy of science; and because by intelligent controversy he contributed very much to the clearing up and development of an opinion which we have next to consider—that of Mr. John Stuart Mill. I can best, I think, set this opinion before you, if I have permission to quote a short passage.

“To these arguments (of Dr. Whewell, contending that the axioms could not be known by experience) . . . a satisfactory answer will, I conceive, be found, if we advert to one of the characteristic properties of geometrical forms—their capacity of being painted in the imagination with a distinctness equal to reality: in other words, the exact resemblance of our ideas of form to the sensations which suggest them. This, in the first place, enables us to make (at least with a little practice) mental pictures of all possible combinations of lines and angles, which resemble the realities quite as well as any which we could make on paper; and in the next place, make those pictures just as fit subjects of geometrical experimentation as the realities themselves; inasmuch as pictures, if sufficiently accurate, exhibit of course all the properties which would be manifested by the realities at one given instant, and on simple inspection; and in geometry we are concerned only with such properties, and not with that which pictures could not exhibit, the mutual action of bodies upon one another. The foundations of geometry would therefore be laid in direct experience, even if the experiments (which in this case consist merely in attentive contemplation) were practised solely upon what we call our ideas, that is, upon the diagrams in our minds, and not upon outward objects. For in all systems of experimentation we take some objects to serve as representatives of all which resemble them; and in the present case the conditions which qualify a real object to be the representative of its class, are completely fulfilled by an object existing only in our fancy. Without denying, therefore, the possibility of satisfying ourselves that two straight lines cannot enclose a space, by merely thinking of straight lines without actually looking at them; I contend, that we do not believe this truth on the ground of the imaginary intuition simply, but because we know that the imaginary lines exactly resemble real ones, and that we may conclude from them to real ones with quite as much certainty as we could conclude from one real line to another. The conclusion, therefore, is still an induction from observation. And we should not be authorized to substitute observation of the image in our mind, for observation of the reality, if we had not learnt by long-continued experience that the properties of the reality are faithfully represented in the image; just as we should be scientifically warranted in describing an animal which we had never seen, from a picture made of it with a daguerreotype; but not until we had learnt by ample experience, that observation of such a picture is precisely equivalent to observation of the original.

“These considerations also remove the objection arising from the impossibility of our ocularly following the lines in their prolongation to infinity. For though, in order actually to see that two given lines never meet, it would be necessary to follow them to infinity; yet without doing so we may know that if they ever do meet, or if, after diverging from one another, they begin again to approach, this must take place not at an infinite, but at a finite distance. Supposing, therefore, such to be the case,

we can transport ourselves thither in imagination, and can frame a mental image of the appearance which one or both of the lines must present at that point, which we may rely on as being precisely similar to the reality. Now, whether we fix our contemplation upon this imaginary picture, or call to mind the generalizations we have had occasion to make from former ocular observation, we learn by the evidence of experience, that a line which, after diverging from another straight line, begins to approach to it, produces the impression on our senses, which we describe by the impression 'a bent line,' not by the expression 'a straight line.'"—*Logic*, Book ii., chap. v., s. 5.

Upon this argument I have one very simple remark to make. That "characteristic property of geometrical forms" is derived from experience;—we have "learnt by long-continued experience that the properties of the reality are faithfully represented in the image." Experience could only tell us this, of realities and of images both of which we have experienced. I must know both of two things to know that one faithfully represents the other. Experience then tells me that my mental images of geometrical figures are faithful representations of those realities *which are within the bounds of experience*. But what is to tell me that they are faithful representations of realities that are beyond the bounds of experience? Surely no experience can tell me that.

Again, our notion of *straight* is a combination of several properties, an aggregate of impressions on our senses, which holds together within the limits of experience. But what is to tell us that these impressions hold together beyond the limits of experience?

It seems to me then, that in admitting the universality of certain statements, Mr. Mill knows something which on his own principles he has no right to know.

In the following section, Mr. Mill deals with the supposed *necessity* of these truths. Taking this to mean the inconceivability of the negation of them, he explains it in somewhat the same way as Hume explained the idea of cause, namely, by means of the law of association. But that which in Locke and Hume had been merely a special explanation of particular phenomena, has in the meantime grown into an extensive and most successful science of Psychology. It began, as you remember, in the form of a link between two impressions that occur frequently together. Perhaps the most important step was Hartley's idea of "mental chemistry;" that the result of two linked impressions might not put in evidence either of the components, any more than water exhibits to us the hydrogen and the oxygen which it contains. In the hands of James Mill and Mr. Bain, this mode of explanation has been applied with marked success to a vast number of mental phenomena; so that when Mr. Mill makes use of it to account for the inconceivability of that which has not yet been experienced, he is backed by an enormous mass of similar and most successful explanations.

This view, that the supplementary part of our sensations is an accumulation of past experience, has been further defended by Mr. Bain in many excellent books. But there is one respect in which the doctrine of Mr. Mill and Mr. Bain differs very importantly from the one which we have next to consider—that of Mr. Herbert Spencer. He also believes that the whole of our knowledge comes from experience; but while in the former view this experience is *our own*, and has been acquired during the lifetime of the individual; in the latter it is not the experience of you or me, but of all our ancestors. The perceptions, not only of former generations of men, but of those lower organisms from which they were originally derived, beginning even with the first molecule that was complex enough to preserve records of its own changes; all these have been built into the organism, have determined its character, and have been handed down to us by hereditary descent. The effect of this upon Kant's doctrine may be best displayed by another quotation:—

“The universal law that, other things equal, the cohesion of psychical states is proportionate to the frequency with which they have followed one another in experience, supplies an explanation of the so-called ‘forms of thought,’ as soon as it is supplemented by the law that habitual psychical successions entail some hereditary tendency to such successions, which, under persistent conditions, will become cumulative in generation after generation. We saw that the establishment of those compound reflex actions called instincts is comprehensible on the principle that inner relations are, by perpetual repetition, organized into correspondence with outer relations. We have now to observe that the establishment of those consolidated, those indissoluble, those instinctive mental relations constituting our ideas of Space and Time, is comprehensible on the same principle. . . .


“In the sense, then, that there exist in the nervous system certain pre-established relations answering to relations in the environment, there is a truth in the doctrine of ‘forms of intuition’—not the truth which its defenders suppose, but a parallel truth. Corresponding to absolute external relations, there are established in the structure of the nervous system absolute internal relations—relations that are potentially present before birth in the shape of definite nervous connections; that are antecedent to, and independent of, individual experiences; and that are automatically disclosed along with the first cognitions. And, as here understood, it is not only these fundamental relations which are thus pre-determined; but also hosts of other relations of a more or less constant kind, which are congenitally represented by more or less complete nervous connexions. But these pre-determined internal relations, though independent of the experiences of the individual, are not independent of experiences in general: they have been determined by the experiences of preceding organisms. The corollary here drawn from the general argument is, that the human brain is an organized register of infinitely numerous experiences received during the evolution of life, or rather, during the evolution of that series of organisms through which the human organism has been reached. The effects of the most uniform and frequent of these experiences have been successively bequeathed, principle and interest; and have slowly mounted to that high intelligence which lies latent in the brain of the infant—which the infant in after-life exercises and perhaps strengthens or further complicates—and which, with minute additions, it bequeaths to future generations. And thus

it happens that the European inherits from twenty to thirty cubic inches more brain than the Papuan. Thus it happens that faculties, as of music, which scarcely exist in some inferior human races, become congenital in superior ones. Thus it happens that out of savages unable to count up to the number of their fingers, and speaking a language containing only nouns and verbs, arise at length our Newtons and our Shakespeares."—*Principles of Psychology*, vol. i.

This doctrine of Mr. Spencer's is what I believe to be really the truth about the matter ; and I shall have to return to it again by-and-by. But I have a remark to make here. It seems to me that the Kantian dilemma about universal propositions is just as valid now, in spite of these explanations, as it was in his time. How am I to know that the angles of a triangle are exactly equal to two right angles under all possible circumstances ; not only in those regions of space where the solar system has been, but everywhere else ? The accumulated experience of all my ancestors for a hundred and fifty million years is no more competent to tell me *that* than my own experience of the last five minutes. Either I have some source of knowledge other than experience, and I must admit the existence of *a priori* truths, independent of experience ; or I cannot know that any universal statement is true. Now, the doctrine of evolution itself forbids me to admit any transcendental source of knowledge ; so that I am driven to conclude in regard to every apparently universal statement, either that it is not really universal, but a particular statement about my nervous system, about my apparatus of thought ; or that I do not know that it is true. And to this conclusion, by a detailed examination of various apparently universal statements, I shall in subsequent lectures endeavour to lead you.

W. K. CLIFFORD.





## CAPITAL :

### MR. MILL'S FUNDAMENTAL PROPOSITIONS.

**M**R. MILL is generally regarded as the great apostle of the modern doctrines of political economy, and his work is almost universally accepted as the text-book upon the various subjects which collectively form what is known as this science. He tells us that "besides the primary and universal requisites of production—labour and natural agents—there is another requisite, without which no productive operations beyond the rude and scanty beginnings of primitive industry are possible, namely, a stock previously accumulated of the products of former labour. This accumulated stock of the produce of former labour is termed "capital."

Now, for intelligent appreciation of the facts of economical science, it is necessary for students attentively to consider what are stated by Mr. Mill as fundamental propositions respecting capital, the full comprehension of which, as he says, is already a considerable step out of darkness into light.

I believe that, on careful examination, many persons will, like myself, be surprised to see how exceedingly croneous most of them are.

The first of these propositions he states to be "That industry is limited by capital." The phrase may be objected to for want of precision, as it is susceptible of the construction that capital is antagonistic to industry; but this is clearly not what Mr. Mill intends. He obviously means that without capital there can be no exercise of industry; and he calls it an axiom which he says until lately was almost universally disregarded by legislators and political writers.

This so-called axiom is without foundation in fact. Industry is

only limited by the means of life. If population is starved to death, industry will effectually be limited, but not otherwise. While there is life there is hope; and there may be also industry; otherwise we must suppose that there never could have been any product of industry without pre-existent capital; and as Mr. Mill himself has defined capital to be the accumulated stock of the produce of former labour, we find ourselves involved in an impossible contradiction. Moreover, if the axiom were true, no increase of capital could ever be obtained, supposing it to be pre-existent in certain quantity. That quantity would be necessary for the support of a limited extent of industry, and would maintain no more; and the industry, being so limited and dependent on the pre-existent capital, could not increase the quantity of capital. If it is capable of doing so, then it is obvious that capital proceeds from industry, and that no limitation of industry is caused by capital, which itself is only an effect of industry as a cause. Mr. Mill, in fact, puts the cart before the horse in his first fundamental proposition. He goes on to say, in his explanation of it, that the only productive powers are those of labour and natural agents—that there can be no more industry than is supplied with materials to work up and food to eat—that self-evident as the thing is, it is often forgotten that the people of a country are maintained and have their wants supplied, not by the produce of present labour, but of past—and that, of what has been produced, a part only is allotted to the support of productive labour, and that there will not and cannot be more of that labour than the portion so allotted (which is the capital of the country) can feed and provide with the materials and instruments of production. From these and his subsequent observations it is obvious that he is not alive to the contradictions in which he is involved.

It is true that there can be no more industry than is supplied with materials and food to eat; but he overlooks the fact that all materials are the products of the earth in some form or other, always existing without reference to labour; and that there should be food enough in existence for immediate consumption is an essential condition of any human life at all; no initiatory stage of human transactions is conceivable in which the race as a whole, or any part of it, was without food to support life, even in the shape of wild fowl or animals, or the natural vegetable products of the earth. There was, therefore, no time when the materials and food to eat were not present to support industry; but these, or at least these in this shape, are not what Mr. Mill or any one else means by capital; and it is plain that so far from industry being limited by capital, the industry must precede and produce the capital in any case where it is accumulated. When Mr. Mill, in the next place, says that it is forgotten that the people of a country are maintained, not by the produce of present labour, but of past, he drops out of sight the fact that this is only

true to a very limited extent. If the continuous artificial production of food necessary in present states of society were interrupted for a very short time, we should know that the product of past labour is sufficient only for our support for a limited period, which would soon come to an end. We should find that whatever else may constitute wealth or productive labour in the eyes of the economists, food is the primary necessity of life, which is not and cannot be accumulated for long, nor in large quantity, and never really can form any great portion of the savings known as capital. Yet without the food capital would be valueless; in fact we know that no one practically accounts food as among his savings. Whoever possesses more food than he needs for the consumption of his own household for such a time as it will probably remain undecayed, is only too glad to part with the surplus to others in exchange for some less perishable property; and I suppose that it will be no exaggeration to assume that at no one time is there so much food in actual existence as would support mankind for a single year. And further, when Mr. Mill states that a part only of what is produced by past labour is allotted to the support of productive labour, and there cannot and will not be more of that labour than the portion so allotted (which is the capital of the country) can feed and provide with the materials and instruments of production, he uses language exceedingly sophistical and misleading. He speaks as though any portion of an existing community were likely to remain unfed unless the capital, that is the past savings, is used to feed them; but the major part of past savings consists of substances which cannot be used as food; and food, as I contend, forms in fact little or no portion of capital. Except in very extraordinary circumstances, producing famine, we may suppose that all the community will be fed, no matter upon what occupation they may be employed. They will first and naturally seek the occupation which will ensure them food. It is not capital that feeds them. Capital can only determine the direction in which their labour shall be applied. It is accumulated in substances of exchangeable value—of the least perishable nature, of which gold, from its peculiar properties, has been generally selected as the most eligible for the purpose. The labourer or mechanic gives his labour in exchange for gold, which he can again exchange for food and other necessities; and the person who gives the gold can determine by agreement the purpose to which the labour shall be applied—to this production or employment, or to that; but this is all. No future production can be accomplished without fresh labour; while much may be produced without any capital at all, if the workmen combine, and if only food be procurable, which in many cases it may be, from the natural animal and vegetable products of the earth.

But, it may be urged, when Mr. Mill says that industry is limited by capital, that is, the amount of capital, he means that it is limited

by the amount of machinery or apparatus and raw material which may be applied to the purpose in view. To this I reply that it is not accurate to term this a limitation of industry by capital. Such a state of things is only limitation of a particular kind of production by the lack of the special requisites necessary for that purpose—which may occur, while, at the same time and place, there is abundance of food and of wealth or capital, or the savings from former industry, applicable to other purposes for which both labour and capital may be used. As, for instance, when during the American war the cessation of the usual supply of raw cotton put a stop to the production of the Lancashire looms. No one supposed that this effect was caused by lack of capital, of wealth, or savings to continue the industry. These existed in sufficient abundance, of exchangeable value, whether in money or in goods. But the accumulated savings from former labour were here useless for further production unless they could be exchanged for another thing which could not be obtained at the time from the usual source of supply.

As a broad general principle, then, we see that it is incorrect to say that industry is limited by capital. And, in fact, speculations upon the precedence of capital or industry at this stage of human affairs are scarcely more profound than the wisdom of the owls—those birds being absorbed, according to a fable I have heard, in contemplation of the question whether there was first an owl and then an egg, or first an egg and then an owl. If further illustration were, however, wanted, it might be found abundantly in the history of many Colonies and settlements. The early settlers, of course, needed some food, some clothes, and some shelter; but these were of the simplest, and many privations had to be endured. Little or nothing of previous savings was brought into a country which, when first occupied, was only a savage wilderness, where nothing was to be bought and there were no labourers to employ, and if anything was to be done or procured it had to be done or procured by the settlers themselves. But from very small beginnings property was gradually collected—such of it as was perishable exchanged for what was more useful and durable—and finally the surplus savings exchanged with other communities for gold, until, for instance now, in less than forty years, there is scarcely a more wealthy or prosperous community of the same number in the Queen's Dominions than the Colony in which I write.

That capital is not in all cases indispensable to industry may be seen also in instances where nations have consumed almost all their exchangeable savings, and yet contrive to proceed with further production by the aid of paper currency, which, in fact, is nothing but promissory notes—discounting the produce of labour yet unperformed. It is necessary to remember that very little of what is known as property can be applied to the remuneration of labour. Of

real property none at all can be so applied. It is not divisible, and is not movable. In fact, scarcely any commodity can be used for the purpose except gold and silver, in the certified quantities of certain quality, which we call money or coin.

Now, in the United States of America, to say nothing of European nations, we find such a state of things in actual existence. The exigencies of the civil war caused the portion of their accumulations, possessed in the shape of gold, to be exchanged with other nations for more perishable commodities, which have been consumed, until little has been left of previous savings which is capable of being exchanged for fresh labour. The nation has been obliged, by what may be regarded as a domestic arrangement within itself, to enable the several members of the State to give each other credit, on the security of future production, by the issue of paper notes of nominal value, which do not represent existing property, but are in fact merely promises to pay at an indefinite future time. No doubt a time may arrive, perhaps must arrive, when the foreign trade of the nation will be hampered, at least to the extent of restricting imports to the amount which can be paid for by commodities other than gold; inasmuch as foreigners will not readily take promises to pay which are useless to them out of the United States. But it does not follow that this disappearance of capital, or accumulation of savings, will at all diminish the industry of the nation itself, so long as it is capable of producing food and other necessities of life from time to time, from year to year, as occasion requires. In fact we know that it has not limited industry; and, on the contrary, it may be said that, in the absence of accumulations of food, or commodities which may be exchanged for food, industry is more imperatively enforced to obtain the means of living.

I must not be understood, however, as failing to see that the possession of accumulated savings—of capital—confers great advantage in industrial pursuits, in so far as it enables the possessor to direct masses of labour into particular channels, for special objects very beneficial to himself. But it is out of the question concerning the degree to which this mode of operation benefits *l.m.*, rather than the labourers employed, that the difficulties arise which beset the relations of capital and labour; and this kind of limitation to industry is quite a different thing from that implied by Mr. Mill's generalization.

Mr. Mill proceeds to comment upon what he regarded as the erroneous belief that laws and governments, without creating capital, could create industry; and further on, he states explicitly that they can create capital by laying on taxes and employing the amount productively, and in this way can create additional industry. Here, again, we are called upon to admit that an effect precedes a cause. It is totally incorrect to say that capital can be created by laying on

taxes. Taxes are merely contributions in small quantities of existing savings, to be again distributed among the community; it may be in very different and much more beneficial proportions among the same mass, though this effect will depend upon the character of the taxation and the purposes to which the contributions are applied. The money in which the taxes are paid is never destroyed; but it is wholly impossible for any government, by taxation, to create the slightest addition to any single substance then in existence. If, by the application of the capital so collected, industry is directed into so-called productive employment, any accession to material property previously in existence must be obtained from new labour, which had not been applied at the time of the collection of the taxes; and all that it is possible for the government to have done is to apply that labour to one purpose rather, than another. So, likewise, it is the grossest fallacy to assume, as is done by Mr. Mill, that laying taxes on income or expenditure, and applying the proceeds towards paying off the public debts, would be equivalent to employing the amount productively. If the whole of the public debt were wiped off to-morrow by a stroke of the pen, the nation, as a whole, could be no richer than it is now, except in so far that it got rid of the claims of foreign fundholders. Some individuals would be ruined for the eventual advantage of others. Not one ounce of the precious metals, nor of food, nor one shred of other property would be added to what now exists—no augmentation whatever of available capital would take place. The national debt in one, and to the nation the most important, sense, is no debt at all from the nation, being quite as much a debt to the nation. It is merely a statement of account between members of the same community, recording the obligations of the body as a whole to individual members of the partnership, who have lent money or goods for purposes of common interest; and it can only determine the manner in which existing property shall be distributed. To suppose that capital can be created by extinction of the national debt is to suppose that a man of large business transactions could increase his wealth by debiting in his books an amount against a mining speculation, which he credits to a ship's account. The proceeding may show that the ship was profitable, while the mine caused loss; but it will not add one farthing to the total of his cash account.

It is not necessary here to follow Mr. Mill through the third section of the chapter to which I am referring. His arguments appear to me to be based on a radical misconception of the true character of the national savings which constitute capital, to which I have already adverted in a previous paper,\* and I need not recapitulate my comments upon that misconception. But it is curious to note, in pass-

\* "A Plea for some Facts."

ing on to the consideration of another of his "fundamental propositions," the singular inconsistency of Mr. Mill's statement that every increase of capital gives, or is capable of giving, additional employment to industry without assignable limit, and the fact that all capital is the result of saving from former labour, with his anxiety—so constantly shown throughout his work—with regard to the effect of the increase of population. One would suppose, that, as labour is the source of all wealth, more population would imply more labour, and the greater accumulation of savings; and as the more capital would afford more employment without assignable limit, there need be no fear of the effect of greater population; but for some inscrutable reason, this is not the conclusion at which Mr. Mill arrives by the help of his own arguments, although what the facts of the case are, and the experience of multitudes, may be seen from observing the course of events and the struggles to obtain population in North America and Australasia.

Mr. Mill's second fundamental proposition is that all capital is the result of saving; and his third that, although saved, and the result of saving, it is nevertheless destroyed. With the former of these two we need not quarrel; but with all deference to Mr. Mill's reputation, the two together constitute a silly paradox, and this silly paradox we are called on to accept as science. The statement involves a physical impossibility. It matters not whether a material product be consumed by the producer or some other person—that thing cannot be saved. It is a marvel that the keen and polished intellect attributed to Mr. Mill was not sufficiently penetrating to enable him to perceive the absurdity of the belief which he was inculcating. The confusion arises from the singular determination not to admit—although gold is a commodity—that it can have any substantive value as exchangeable property. It is necessary to remember that all the commercial or economical transactions of mankind consist of nothing more than the exchange of one article of value for another, or of the gift of some article of exchangeable value, more or less necessary, in exchange for labour, or service of some kind. All the products of human manual labour are material substances. It is in the savings of these, at any particular point of time, that the capital at that time will consist. We must remember, too, that these possessions or capital are the product of *past* labour which can never be again applied; and if these products are consumed, the *same* can never be called again into existence, though they may be replaced by like substances produced by new labour. Now, suppose all industry to be arrested on some one day, and to be suspended for an indefinite time, it will soon be found that the greater part of the possessions in existence on that one day are required for more or less immediate consumption, and will be speedily destroyed; and if not so consumed, will decay, until nothing is left of the stock or capital except those things

naturally imperishable. Let A, B, C, and all the alphabet down to X, Y, Z, represent various commodities, from very perishable ones, like bread and meat, represented by A, B, to very durable ones, like gold and silver, which may be Y, Z; it is obvious that the possibility of accumulating and preserving the products of past labour will diminish from Y, Z, up to A, B. It is as though one should every day pour into the same receptacle a portion of sand, of oil, of water, and of ether. It would not surprise him that in a short while he should find little but sand, and no ether at all. It is so in the exchanges of the world of things of value in existence at the same time; and it is utterly misleading to introduce into the computation things which may be produced subsequently to that time by new labour. These latter can never form a portion of the *former capital*, though the new labour may replace for future use necessities of which the supply has been exhausted. But if the consumption or destruction of these amounts to the number or value of ten in a given period, and in that period are replaced only by the same number, accumulation of these cannot occur. My argument upon this point is, that all transactions in the commerce of mankind are only matters of barter or exchange; that gold and silver are part of the movable property of mankind; that of this movable property the most durable will last longest and be most readily accumulated; and that, as every body is anxious to get gold, because it will keep best and is always exchangeable, savings will naturally fall into the form of gold. This being so, and the capital of the world being really the savings of the world, on which point I agree with Mr. Mill, I say that, as a physical fact, capital will consist chiefly of gold. As a matter of fact of another kind, no doubt labour is the source of all wealth; but we are too apt to mix up other questions which are metaphysical with questions of simple physics when we begin to talk of labour and industry. We forget that the property in existence is the result of labour which has been already expended, and which same labour can never be again applied. The question to be answered is, how much and what kind of the produce of past labour retaining exchangeable value remains to mankind after the lapse of a few years, except gold. Land in this question can scarcely be considered, because that has always been in existence and will always remain, although in many instances much impoverished by cultivation. Mr. Mill admits that very little else remains; and he and his disciples are obliged to resort for explanation of the existence of capital to a miraculous annual resurrection of what has been destroyed. This is really untrue. The same old products of former labour are not reproduced. And if gold does not represent the savings of former years, then we, in fact, have no accumulations of circulating capital of any consequence, and Mr. Mill's conception of it is chimerical. His proposition involves a supposition similar to this, that, if I now drop my manuscript into the fire where



it is consumed, I shall also have saved it. It is true I may reproduce my essay by re-writing it; but for this purpose I shall have to use fresh paper, fresh ink, and new labour, and the mental and manual exertion which I may employ to-morrow will not be the same which were expended yesterday. There seems to be a tendency in words to deviate from their original meaning. We lose sight of the fact that capital means things saved; and because the word is sometimes used to signify any advantage, as when we speak of political capital, it has almost become synonymous with some immaterial abstraction. To permit ourselves to be misled by this, is almost as absurd as it would be to suppose that a table really means a dinner, because when it is said that a man keeps a good table, it is meant that he gives good dinners. But confusion as to what he regards as being saved is repeatedly apparent in Mr. Mill's contention. In speaking of what is done with the capital which he represents as being consumed (vol. i. p. 87), he says:—"Part is exchanged for tools and machinery, which are worn out by use; part for seed or materials, which are destroyed as such by being sown, or wrought up and destroyed altogether by the consumption of the ultimate product. The remainder is paid in wages to productive labourers, who consume it for their daily wants; or, if they in their turn save any part, this, also, is not generally hoarded, but (through savings banks, benefit clubs, or some other channel) re-employed as capital and consumed." Now, if labourers save any part of the capital by the aid of savings banks and benefit clubs, that part of the capital must be money, and if re-employed as capital cannot be consumed, but only again exchanged. And, although the machinery and the tools for which the capitalist has exchanged other part of his capital will wear out, the capital which he gave will have been also money, and that will not wear out, but will again be exchanged; and therefore it is absurd to say that the capital has been consumed so far as the community at large is concerned, though the individual who had it has consumed his temporary use of it.

There is something amusing in the simplicity with which Mr. Mill says that "to the vulgar it is not at all apparent that what is saved is consumed." To them, he says, every one who saves appears in the light of one who hoards. He fails to see that no one does, or, in fact, can, hoard to advantage anything but gold; and that, according to his theory, it ought to be totally immaterial whether that is hoarded or not, it being useless for production. In any case it is indestructible. The only evil which can arise to the general public from hoarding gold is from keeping an article of exchangeable value out of the circulation to which every such article contributes. Even to the possessor of the hoard the loss is only of the interest—formerly called the usury—which would be given to him for the temporary use of the gold as an article of exchange; and presumably its services in this capacity must be valuable, or they would not be paid for. But

all Mr. Mill's arguments in favour of saving anything but gold are in direct contradiction to those which he uses in support of the consumption of what he regards as capital; and there is almost a puerile misapprehension of the true state of the case when he says that it is the intervention of money which obscures to an unpractised apprehension the true character of these phenomena. One might almost as well say that it is the intervention of water which prevents a correct understanding of the action of a water-mill; and it would be equally absurd to say that the power of the water is not to be taken into account because the same water can drive several wheels in succession, as to overlook the exchangeable value of gold because it can be exchanged again and again. The gold, in fact, is the power which drives the wheel, but it is not the wheel of circulation itself. Most undoubtedly, all expenditure being carried on by the use of a special, most generally used, article of value, that article comes to be looked upon as the main feature in the transaction—as much so in the case of gold as it would be in the case of wool or wheat, and no more; and since the article gold does not perish, but only changes hands, people *do*, most naturally, fail to see that any destruction of that property takes place in the case of what is called unproductive expenditure. The money being merely transferred, they *do* most truly think that *that* wealth has only been handed over from the spender, whom Mr. Mill calls the spendthrift, to other people who may use it as they choose, for any purpose, productive or otherwise, just as readily as any one previously. This is by no means confounding money with other wealth, but is distinctly recognizing the special character of this form of wealth. The wealth which has been destroyed, as Mr. Mill says, was not the money, but the wines, equipages, and furniture, which the money purchased; and from these no return whatever could have been obtained except by their purchase in this manner for destruction; and therefore society is *not* poorer by the amount so destroyed.

The whole of Mr. Mill's subsequent argument, in the place to which I am referring (vol. i. p. 90), amounts in effect only to this, that society should put an end to the production of all articles of luxury, and that labour should be applied only to the growth and manufacture of necessaries for the majority of the community, in order that all may have enough of these. I have not the slightest objection to offer to this as a matter of morality; but it appears to me that, what we call economical laws, cannot ensure it; and certainly the operation of free trade and modern commercial policy have a directly contrary tendency.

In a recent article in the *Fortnightly Review*, Professor Fawcett discusses the effect of an increased production of wealth upon wages, which it is admitted in many cases have not been advanced at all by the unprecedented growth of the trade of the country. It appears to

be regarded as extraordinary that the working producer should not have been benefited by this remarkable augmentation of national wealth. It does not seem to occur to Mr. Fawcett that there is no reason why the profits on national exchanges should flow into the pockets of the manufacturer or of the labourers whom he employs. In fact the competition to which he is subjected with rival producers in other countries in selling to the exporting merchants may, and does, compel the manufacturer to keep down wages at a point which will enable him to sustain such a competition. The profits which accrue on the successful exchanges of the commodities after they are produced, for other consumable commodities, and finally for gold—into which commodity all profits will eventually gravitate, if I may be allowed the expression—will be found in possession of the mercantile or trading rather than the manufacturing or producing class. The first action of free trade is to produce this result. The subsequent and eventual tendency is to promote the migration of industries to places where they can be conducted most cheaply by cheap labour. From a cosmopolitan point of view this effect need not be deprecated. To the world at large it is immaterial whether cotton manufactures are carried on in India, by British skill and capital and native labour, or in the Southern States of America, by American enterprise and imported Chinese labour, though the Lancashire cotton-spinners will possibly look at the matter in another light.

Mr. Fawcett, adopting the prevalent theory that gold and silver can have no other effect upon the world's exchanges than that of a so-called medium, through which they are transacted, does not recognize the effects which flow naturally from the fact that labourers are paid for their labour in gold, which is never destroyed, and from the character of this first exchange affecting all subsequent transactions; but proceeds to consider the case, as usual, "without the intervention of money." He accounts for the results by assigning three causes—increase of population, the displacement of labour by machinery, and the export of capital. But it may be doubted whether either of these can have any perceptible influence in the matter. The more numerous marriages caused by higher wages, and any real increase of population in consequence, are probably more than counterbalanced by the emigration of adult males in the very flower of manhood during the last twenty-five years; because very few of the children of marriages contracted during that period can yet have arrived at an age when they can render effective assistance in any industry. As to the effect of machinery, Mr. Mill has himself observed, that "hitherto it is questionable if all the mechanical inventions yet made have lightened the day's toil of any human being. They have only enabled a greater population to live the same life of drudgery and imprisonment, and an increased number of.

manufacturers and others to make their fortunes." And it frequently has been urged in defence of machinery, that so far from diminishing the demand for labour it has created new sources of employment and need for labour. If machinery does cheapen labour or throw men out of employment, it must be admitted that improvements in machinery are not beneficial to the labouring classes. With respect to the last cause assigned by Mr. Fawcett—the export of capital—it ought to be almost a sufficient answer to observe that, if capital has been exported to a large extent, then *pro tanto*, the wealth of the country has been so exported, and is no longer in Great Britain. It is again necessary to insist upon it that capital is saving, and saving can only consist of material things. If this material wealth has been exported to other countries, all the advantages connected with it are transferred also, just as much as the material advantage of the possession and use of a carriage and horses will be transferred to another person if I lend him mine, though I may remain the nominal proprietor, and may expect to have my property returned to me at some time, with or without compensation for the use of it. But it may also be noted how inconsistent is this latter suggestion of Professor Fawcett's with the principles laid down by the school to which he belongs. If money is not capital—if capital consists only of the increased value given to farms by the improvements to land and buildings, of development of factories and a greater number of them, of more numerous and better dwellings, and of a diffusion of general prosperity among the mass of the people, so that they who were previously badly housed and fed live in more comfort, and fare more plentifully, if not luxuriously—then in what manner would it be possible to export this kind of capital? But here again we have an instance of the remarkable contradictions apparent in the doctrines of the economists. They are constantly coming into contact with facts, and base arguments upon them which are at variance with the theories they endeavour nevertheless to maintain by an effort to make the facts coincide with them.

Mr. Mill observes that all the ordinary forms of language tend to disguise that everything which is produced is consumed, and that by the language used, the idea suggested is, that the riches transmitted from ancestors and predecessors were produced long ago at the time when they were first acquired, and that no portion of the capital of the country was produced this year, except such as may have been added then to the total amount. He says that the fact is far otherwise. He seems to pay no attention to the probability—to use no stronger term—that this language embodies the common sense; that is the common agreement from experience, of societies; who know that the land, from the products of which the incomes and subsistence of all are in some way derived, was always in existence; and, leaving land as a possession which is peculiar in its character out of the

question, that many products of human industry are more or less durable, and some counted as the most valuable for exchange, are almost imperishable, as are gold and silver; and that these are transmitted from one generation to another. It is idle to pretend that civilized nations do not now possess an enormously greater quantity of gold and other more or less durable property than was accumulated fifty years ago, which will be transmitted to our posterity; and equally delusive to ignore the consequences to industry, production, and commerce, which is only exchange, produced by this possession. This large accession to the quantity of the precious metals, of which the value in exchange is still recognized, has produced a twofold effect, in first augmenting the purchasing power of portions of the human race, and then stimulating the productive industry of other portions, until large additions have been made to other forms of wealth and industry, so that much more of all wealth exists now than formerly. But these causes do not necessarily ensure, and, in fact, have not produced any more equal distribution of goods. On the contrary, the tendency appears to be in the opposite direction.

The perpetual consumption and reproduction of capital, according to his theory, Mr. Mill thinks, is what affords the explanation of what has so often excited wonder, the great rapidity with which countries recover from devastation, caused by war or other calamities; and he says that there is nothing wonderful in the matter. But there would be if we accept his explanation. It is totally fallacious to speak of a *vis medicatrix naturæ* in such a question. Nature will do nothing here; all must be accomplished by human labour. All that his argument shows, if it shows anything, is that there is no such thing as capital, and that there is no necessity for it. If industry were limited by capital, and money, that is, gold and silver, is not capital then the devastation having destroyed the capital, industry must cease, and nothing further could be done. But the fact is that the wealth destroyed would, in any case, have perished sooner or later, and needed to be replaced by other wealth, as Mr. Mill admits; though he forgets that it cannot be the same wealth, and that this must always be done by new labour not before applied; and the real savings of the former labour of the inhabitants embodied by exchange in gold and silver are not destroyed. Where these have been plundered from the inhabitants, their means of procuring in exchange for them the necessaries of life, or the materials for resuming their usual occupations, will have been diminished; but treasure we know, on almost all such occasions as hostile invasion, is immediately and easily removed, or concealed in places of security. And it by no means unfrequently happens that their store of precious metals is added to, at least in modern times, since the harsher modes of warfare have been abandoned, by the expenditure of a foreign army during the time of the hostile occupation. Prince Bismarck practically recognized

this truth, when he insisted upon the indemnity from France of 200,000,000*l.* of gold as compensation for the Prussian war expenses. It really was the only way to recover money which, in fact, had been transferred to France.

But as an instance of warfare on the largest scale, where the evils of such a struggle, prolonged for nearly five years, must have been felt in all their intensity, and yet where there was no introduction of foreign money or foreign supplies, which were not raised as loans, or paid for by the inhabitants of the country which was the seat of war, it will be worth our while to consider the effects produced by the gigantic civil war in the United States.

Let us think of what actually happened. Somewhat more than a million of lives, I believe, are said to have been lost; and expenditure, which was defrayed partly by loans of money and partly by paper issues, was incurred to the extent of more than 500,000,000*l.* sterling. The contest was between people of the same nation, and it may be assumed that no important addition was made from without to the population to be supported during the time of the war. On the contrary, it appears that consumers to the extent of a million, or whatever was the real number, were removed. Of the combatants and others engaged, it may be assumed, I think fairly, that all would have been fed and clothed if there had been no war; and it would probably not be too much to say that their actual consumption of commodities and comforts, not to say luxuries, during the campaigns, was really less than it would have been in time of peace. The consumption of the necessities of life is varied very little by the different occupations in which men are engaged, but the diminution caused in some respects during a state of war would probably nearly counter-balance the destruction from waste which, no doubt, is sometimes unavoidable. The unusual consumption would be almost entirely of things like arms and ammunition, and warlike equipments of various kinds, the destruction of which would scarcely be felt on return of peace. The loss of these, and of the products which it may be supposed the men under arms might during the war have developed from the soil or raw material, if not so engaged, will really constitute the whole diminution of property caused by the war, except in so far as buildings or permanent structures may have been partially injured, or other property vindictively destroyed. Of the accumulated savings of the people existing at the commencement of the war in gold and silver none will have been destroyed. The chief evils of war, apart from loss of life, consist not so much in destruction as in the more or less violent and sudden dislocation and redistribution of capital; and even for this, and for losses of some property, it will be seen further on that the nation is not without compensation. But these masses of men under arms for a national purpose or the common weal are to be paid, fed, and clothed, and furnished with munitions and materials

of war at the common national or public expense, not at their individual or private charges. This expense must be defrayed from the public chest, or what used in the early days of the West Indian colonies, to be there expressively termed "the common stock." The common stock not being sufficient for this sudden emergency, money must be raised by taxes, which are only contributions or subscriptions from *all* the nation to compensate that portion of it which performs a particular service, and to pay for the cost of materials for performing it. These contributions of taxes being in money, would in any case not be destroyed, but only again distributed among the nation as a whole. But for reasons, among which political considerations are not the least, the Government, as agent for the nation, regards it as expedient to meet the exigency by a loan borrowed rather than by present taxation, thus deferring the period at which each individual taxpayer of the nation shall contribute his quota. The necessary amount is, therefore, in the first instance, raised by the nation as a body, borrowing from some of its citizens what is required, and so far nothing is done beyond redistributing the property of the society as a whole. But the accumulations of individual citizens are not sufficient to furnish enough in lump for the purposes immediately in view, and recourse is had to loans of money from members of foreign nations, on the security of bonds bearing interest to be repaid at a future time. Now, the immediate effect of this is really to bring more money, that is more capital of an imperishable character, into the United States; the persons who have lent it having nothing in exchange for it but promises to pay it back at a future time, with interest for the use of it in the meanwhile. The nation is therefore absolutely in possession of more capital than it had before, though under an engagement to return it at a future period. Contractors make fortunes; more money circulates among the money-dealing classes; but the Government, as agent for the nation, soon finds itself again in need of funds for carrying on the war; because the continuously increased outflow from the public chest, or common stock, is not compensated by simultaneous income or contributions—what we call taxes—from the several parts of the whole to that common stock. The nation is really much richer; but with a large public debt. Almost all the advantages which are attributed to an abundance of capital in a country, by any school of economists, existed, and would have remained, but for some collateral circumstances; and, even after making allowance for them, the extraordinary prosperity of the United States since the war has been notorious. More money was wanted, however, by the Government, and the device was resorted to of legal tender notes, or inconvertible paper currency, not bearing interest. When issue of such a currency takes place—which is really nothing but the issue of national I.O.U.s—the real currency or circulating capital of the country will speedily disappear before it, to do elsewhere what cannot be done by the

I.O.U.s. The exports of the country being greatly diminished, and not being sufficient to meet the cost of large importations of expensive materials of war, the difference of value could only be paid in Europe in gold, and great part of the gold accordingly went to Europe for that purpose; while other circumstances connected with the deranged trade led to exportation of other part; until almost the only so-called money left in circulation was an aggregate of small national promissory notes, redeemable at no specified period, amounting even in 1873 to \$356,000,000. These promissory notes, like all others, could not be protected from the usual effect of credit, and had to submit to discount, at one time of as much as sixty per cent. ; for it is necessary to recall to mind that what was termed a rise of prices in the United States was nothing but the low value of this inconvertible paper currency. It really represented, and still represents, nothing but the anticipation of future products of future years, perhaps of future generations. But, as in like cases with individuals, these paper issues do confer a temporary accession to the means of the nation, just as a man will benefit by the property he can get in exchange for a promissory note which will have to be paid after his death by some one else. There is no way, as Mr. Mill has said, in which a general rise in prices, or, in other words, depreciation of money, can benefit anybody, except at the expense of somebody else. And in this case the nation, as a whole, benefited at the expense of individuals. It was an unjust form of taxation. Individuals paid by the State were forced to take these notes at their nominal value; while, so soon as it was sought to exchange them for gold or other commodities, they could only be passed for half that amount. Private creditors suffered heavily. The only mode by which public creditors, contractors, and others could protect themselves was by charging more than double what would have satisfied them if paid in gold. The Government, therefore, as agents for the people in these cases, had to do what was tantamount to the proceeding of the young spendthrift who takes forty pounds and a worthless picture for a *post obit* for one hundred pounds. But, like the young spendthrift, the nation has temporarily benefited by the present accession to its means. Mr. Mill has said that "substitution of paper for metallic currency is a national gain; any further increase of paper beyond this is but a form of robbery." I think him entirely wrong in regarding it as a real—that is, a permanent gain. It is not possible to make real value out of nothing. His mistake arises from regarding money as only a medium of exchange, which it is not—it is a substantive article of exchange. Paper money can no more be a permanent gain to a nation than a promissory note can be so to a merchant who makes it; but, like the promissory note, it may afford immense temporary advantage, as has, in fact, been seen in the United States. It has had the temporary effect of adding circulating



credit to the extent of more than seventy-two millions of pounds sterling to the mercantile resources of the nation, which has used abroad the gold displaced at home.

And this view is not inconsistent with the fact that inconvenience is now felt in the United States from the attempts to contract the currency. The gold and silver which has been superseded by the paper has been exchanged in foreign trade for other forms of wealth, some of which have been destroyed, and the rest cannot answer the purpose of money so well, and especially do not permit accumulations of savings to be made in their form, except to a limited extent. The nation is rich, but not in gold and silver. Savings may be made in the shape of the national paper currency, or promises to pay, so long as it remains in circulation and retains credit; but as it falls in to the public chest for taxes or anything else, and is laid aside without re-issue, unless it is replaced by gold, so much exchangeable credit is removed from circulation, and the lack of the function naturally discharged by gold begins to be felt; and the inconvenience must continue until excess of value of exports over imports and the receipt of the difference in gold again restores as much as is needed of that commodity to embody the savings—the capital of the nation.

Consideration of these circumstances will enable us to understand the effect of government loans for war purposes, or other expenditure which is called unproductive, and why, as Mr. Mill admits was the case, "the years in which expenditure of this sort has been on the greatest scale have often been years of great apparent prosperity; the wealth and resources of the country, instead of diminishing, having given every sign of rapid increase during the process, and of greatly expanded dimensions after its close, as was confessedly the case during the last long continental war." So long as we are misled by such suppositions as that "the whole amount borrowed by the government is destroyed, and was abstracted by the lender from a productive employment in which it had actually been invested," we can never ascertain the true state of the case. The amount borrowed is borrowed in money, which is not destroyed, but put into immediate circulation; and if in the possession of the lender to lend, it could not then have been invested in any productive employment. We talk of "investing" money, and "locking up" capital, as if some such thing was really done as enclosing it in something else, or hoarding it for a time, whereas there is no more certain mode of passing money from hand to hand than by exchanging it for other property, which is what we call investment.

Mr. Mill states that, according to the principles he lays down, these loans must tend to impoverish the country; yet he cannot help the admission contained in the passage quoted above, that they did not in fact do so. It is strange that he should have been so prejudiced by his theories as not to see that the facts must be right and his...

theory wrong. Instead of inquiring why the facts oppose the theory, and where the explanation is to be found for this remarkable discrepancy, he disingenuously endeavours to give reasons for "the causes which operated, and do commonly operate, to prevent these extraordinary drafts on the productive resources of the country from being so much felt as it might seem reasonable to expect." I say, disingenuously, because it is disingenuous to assume that there has been any extraordinary draft on the resources of the country in the face of evidence that "the wealth and resources of the country, instead of diminishing, have given every sign of rapid increase during the process, and of greatly expanded dimensions after its close." If the vast sum of the nominal war debt of the United States really represented the value of property, of capital, of accumulated savings from past labour, absolutely and truly destroyed by the war, then indeed the nation would have been impoverished to prostration. But it does nothing of the kind. A part of that sum merely represents national property re-distributed subject to certain obligations *inter se*; a part represents money borrowed from foreigners, which—or the property which has been bought with it—still exists in the possession of the nation; and the rest is composed of the paper currency or circulating credit by which future contributions from individual citizens to the common stock have been discounted; these latter never having represented any true property either in gold or goods.

We now pass on to Mr. Mill's fourth fundamental proposition—that demand for commodities is not a demand for labour. It is no wonder, as Mr. Mill says, that political economy advances so slowly when such a paradoxical question as this still remains open at its very threshold. The proposition is a sophism, and Mr. Mill's treatment of it is most sophistical. Of course, a commodity is not the same thing as labour. A commodity is the product of labour now expended and dead, and the commodity remains in place of it. Water is not a pump. A demand for water is not, in the first instance, a demand for a pump; if water is to be obtained from a bucket already supplied there is no demand upon the pump; but if none can be obtained but from a pump, then, in fact, a need for water does most emphatically make a demand upon the pump-handle. If we can imagine a suspension of human affairs, in which all production had ceased, then a demand for commodities would certainly not be a demand for labour. But we know that the business and transactions of mankind are in a state of continuous flux, and the consumption of commodities to-day or this year does not create an effective demand for labour to produce more for consumption to-morrow or next year. If this were not so, indeed, the imaginary spendthrift—that *bête noire* of the economists—would, on the ground of their own arguments, have a full and complete answer to all their reproaches. He might logically say—You state that a demand for commodities is not

a demand for labour. I do not want labour ; I want commodities, and give capital in exchange for them. Take your capital and employ the labour to produce anything you please, and leave me unmolested to enjoy the commodities I consume ; I do you no harm. And this answer is, indeed, true as regards any commodities already in existence. The labour which produced them has been used, and can never be again applied to any purpose, and if the commodities which have been the result cannot be profitably exchanged—the labour is for ever lost. No abstinence from consumption of a luxury—be it velvet, lace, or champagne—can enable that thing, velvet, lace, or champagne, to be transmuted into food or clothing, or enable the labour which made it to be used again for the production of any more necessary commodity. The past is irrevocable. All that can be done at any point of time is to determine how labour shall best be applied in the future for the good of the social body. And this is done by demand caused by consumption. It may be safely assumed that there will be no demand for superfluities until the necessity for that which cannot be dispensed with has been satisfied. But it is a childish sophism for Mr. Mill to say that “manufacturers and their labourers do not produce for the pleasure of their customers, but for the supply of their own wants ; and having still the capital and the labour, which are the essentials of production, they can either produce something else which is in demand, or, if there be no other demand, they themselves have one, and can produce the things which they want for their own consumption.” The pleasure of their customers does determine what is produced, and it is simply ridiculous to say that if it were the united pleasure of consumers no longer to wear cotton clothing, that it would be easy for the Lancashire manufacturers to remove their capital into some other manufacture. They could do nothing of the kind. *Their* present capital—the buildings, machinery, and appliances for making cotton goods, for which they had exchanged their former capital in gold and silver—would be totally useless for any other purpose ; and, as the making of cotton goods is supposed to cease, no one would or could have any desire for the possession of this property, and it would not be salable. It is important to remember that, in spite of what Mr. Mill says, it is *not* always the fact “that the capital invested in an employment can be withdrawn from it if sufficient time be allowed.” The outfit and buildings intended for one industry cannot be transferred to another. When a man retires from a business under circumstances such as I have supposed, he retires because he is unable to carry it on ; but he cannot withdraw capital which is lost to *him* for ever. The cotton manufacturers would simply be ruined. They live, and move, and have their being on the breath of the demand for cotton goods—no other demand will suit their purpose ; and the property which they possess in this shape would not render to them—

selves the slightest assistance even in growing a potato or a cabbage for their own sustenance. It is absurd to say that they can now produce the things they want for their own consumption. The economists constantly speak as if "production" were a single substance, applicable to all kinds of consumption—as if a piece of it might be turned into a coat, another portion used to feed a baby, and, if not wanted for these purposes, could be made into a railway bridge. It seems to be forgotten that abstinence of A. from the consumption of velvet will by no means supply B. with bread; the velvet cannot be turned into bread or anything else. The bread can only be obtained, if required in greater quantity, by labour specially applied to land; and it does not at all follow that even by withdrawing the whole of the labour now applied to the production of what are called luxuries, and applying it to the cultivation of the soil, that any considerably greater quantity of food can be produced, except in places where there are large tracts of unoccupied country; and in these the lack is not of food but of luxuries, for which the inhabitants of such places are ready to exchange their surplus food. It is for this reason that I conceive it to be altogether a fallacy to state, as Mr. Mill does, that a person who buys commodities and consumes them himself does no good to the labouring class. What he consumes can never be turned into capital or made use of in any other way if not so taken in exchange for consumption. A piece of velvet cannot itself afford any assistance in making more velvet; just as little can it do in producing cotton goods, or cloth, or butter, bread or cheese. But the purchaser of the velvet exchanges for it gold—a species of possession more readily exchangeable for any of these things, or for the labour necessary to obtain or produce them; and which yet, from its durability, possesses the advantage of never being itself consumed, retaining after each exchange an unimpaired power of purchase.

It is not extraordinary that the proposition for which Mr. Mill contended should appear to so many a paradox, when his illustrations are so untrue and misleading. He says that "if, instead of laying out one hundred pounds in wine or silk, I expend it on wages or in alms, the demand for commodities is precisely equal in both cases; in the one it is a demand for one hundred pounds' worth of wine or silk; in the other for the same value of bread, beer, labourers' clothing, fuel, and indulgences; but the labourers of the community have in the latter case the value of one hundred pounds more of the produce of the community distributed among them. I have consumed that much less, and made over my consuming power to them. If it were not so, my having consumed less would not leave more to be consumed by others, which is a manifest contradiction." The comparison is totally unfair, and the reasoning fallacious in the extreme. Mr. Mill is involved in the contradiction to which he

refers, because it is certain that his not having consumed wine or silk cannot possibly have left more bread and beer, clothing and fuel, which are different substances, for the labouring classes. And his having consumed the wine or silk might possibly have enabled larger quantities to be provided of the necessities named. But, besides this, the demand in the two cases which he compares is not the same for commodities. If the one hundred pounds is laid out for wine or silk this is an exchange for wine or silk ; if laid out in wages or alms, it is exchange for labour, or a gift without an equivalent. But there, in accuracy, the comparison should stop. In both cases, after this first exchange or gift, the one hundred pounds may be laid out in the bread or beer, clothing, fuel, or indulgences, just in the same manner, either for the labourers who made the silk or the wine, or for those who dug the artificial lake, or for the ignoble recipients of alms. But, in fact, the reasoning throughout this portion of Mr. Mill's chapter is based apparently upon the remarkable supposition that all produce is the same kind of thing, of which what is not consumed by one will be equally valuable to others, for whatever purpose needed. Whereas "turning over part of my share of the present produce of the community to the labourers," if that share is silk or velvet, is very much like giving them a stone when they ask for bread. The true necessities of life, simply stated as food, clothing, and shelter, are just those requirements which cannot be altogether relinquished by any one in favour of others, though they may be restricted in quantity and quality.

Mr. Mill closes the chapter upon which I am commenting with some observations respecting many popular arguments and doctrines he regarded as erroneous, more particularly with regard to the incidence of taxation. I do not propose now to analyse this section of the subject. But this is certain, that the effect of taxation can never be accurately traced until its true character—what is really done by the imposition of a tax—is seen and acknowledged. We shall grope in the dark until it is seen and acknowledged that national taxation does not and cannot impoverish the nation as a whole—that it is absurd to talk of "consumption" by a Government which, in the capacity of Government, can consume nothing, and that all that the most grinding taxation can do is to re-distribute the property of the society with more or less violence, or more or less prudence, or more or less inconvenience to the persons from whom the contributions are exacted in the first instance. But no savings of the nation are consumed any more than there is consumption of money among a party of men who sit down to a round game, some of whom win and some lose.


In the foregoing pages I have endeavoured to call attention to what I regard as fundamental errors in the propositions respecting capital, which are accepted as true by the school of economists of

which Mr. Mill was the most distinguished member ; and I have sought to explain in what I think these errors consist. Instead of endeavouring to trace out the physical effects of an endless chain of exchanges, of property for labour, and of property of various degrees of durability for other property likewise of varying perishability, in mercantile transactions, the economists base all their investigations upon a metaphysico-moral proposition that gold is not wealth. And they institute a kind of economical sacrament in which gold—that is, money—is held to be merely the outward and visible sign of an invisible and mysterious gift or benefaction, which is imparted to the true believer by the transfer of the money, but is not perceptible, except in the beneficial effects of future labour. All this may be poetry, but it is not economical science.

It does not follow because I point out what I conceive to be errors—which, if they are such, must fatally affect theories based upon them—that I therefore pretend to furnish an explanation of all perplexing economical and social phenomena. I only say that it appears to me we have not got hold of the right clue by which to thread the labyrinth in our search for the truth. But I may hereafter try to trace the effect of these errors in other branches of inquiry, such, for instance, as international trade, foreign exchanges, and the distribution of the precious metals.

ANTHONY MUSGRAVE.

SOUTH AUSTRALIA, 15th May, 1874.



## ST. PAUL'S CATHEDRAL.

**F**EW questions of an artistic nature have recently excited so much attention or been so warmly discussed as those raised regarding the proposed decoration of St. Paul's Cathedral. Nor ought we to be surprised at this, for of all our modern buildings it is perhaps the one of which Englishmen have most reason to be proud. Though not the largest, it surpasses all the other great Renaissance Cathedrals in beauty of design, and, externally at least, leaves very little to be desired. Internally, however, the arrangements are avowedly by no means so successful. Partly in consequence of the arrangement of the plan, but more, perhaps, owing to the inherent difficulties of applying what was practically an external architecture to internal purposes, defects in design become everywhere apparent. The most striking of these, because the most gratuitous, is the introduction of an Attic over the main Order throughout the building. Had the architect instead of this employed an Order 10 or 12 feet taller his roof would have rested on its proper supports, he would not have been obliged to cut through his entablature to make room for the arches, and the whole proportion of the parts would have been immensely improved. Nowhere is this more evident than under the great dome, where, from this defect and the attempt to make the arches leading to aisles equal to those of the nave and transept, his art broke down altogether, and nothing can well be worse than the arrangement of the alternate arches of the great dome. The sloping inwards of the pilasters of the drum of the dome itself is another defect, arising from a mechanical difficulty, that ought to have been avoided, and so, too, might the twisting of the main vault throughout. If architecture were with us a progressive art and in a

healthful state, it would not be difficult, with our extended knowledge and increased experience, to remove or remedy all these defects. Had we, consequently, the courage to treat Sir Christopher Wren's architecture as William of Wickham treated that of his predecessor, Walkelyn, the interior of St. Paul's might easily be rendered worthy of its exterior, and one hundred thousand pounds spent in improving its details internally, and a like sum expended in its decoration, would, if judiciously applied, make St. Paul's the most beautiful interior of its class in Europe. The spirit of the age would not, however, tolerate the alteration of any detail for mere alteration sake, unless some obvious public benefit was to be obtained by it, and perhaps it is as well it should be so. If this door were once opened, while the present feeling with regard to art still prevails, we do not know how far Gothic details and mediæval barbarisms might creep in. We had better "bear those ills we have, than fly to others that we know not of."

Any structural alteration being, therefore, entirely put on one side as not to be thought of, the problem is reduced to such simple elements that it seems as if it ought to be easy to find an answer to so simple a proposition as to ascertain what amount of decoration is wanted to complete St. Paul's as it stands, and how that should be applied. Simple as it seems at first sight, the matter has somehow or other got into a wrong groove, and unless it can be brought back to the straight path, there is infinite danger that an injury may be done to this noble edifice, that if once attempted will be irreparable. There probably never was a case in which public opinion has been so unanimous or so strongly expressed as in condemnation of Mr. Burges' proposals, but it has not been sufficient to cause their withdrawal. There is a pause, however, in ordering their execution, and if the interval thus allowed for reflection is availed of, the Cathedral may yet be saved. This cannot, however, be done if those who are best qualified to judge on the subject hold back, and will not speak in their own names and say what they think. Of course it is ungracious and troublesome to do so, and exposes anyone who attempts it to an amount of annoyance and unpleasantness from which most men shrink; but the cause is a worthy one, and the danger imminent. Once a single stone pilaster is chipped away, to be replaced by a veneer of cold grey Sicilian marble, the deed is done, and the Dean and Chapter are committed to an outlay of £400,000 on one of the most fantastic proposals that probably ever was submitted in seriousness to any body of men.

If Sir Christopher Wren had been asked in his old age what he believed was wanted to complete his Cathedral, his answer would probably have been an abrupt "Nothing." It is true the great dome was not finished internally as he wished, but it was completed by Sir



James Thornhill's paintings, and he had no thought or idea of undoing what had been then done. It is true also that he had not been able to procure Greek marbles in his altar-piece. But that was a comparatively immaterial piece of furniture, that might be added at any time. It was not a Baldacchino, as is generally supposed, but merely an altar-piece of indifferent design, which his pupil Hawksmoor afterwards copied in the church of St. Mary Woolnoth, Lombard Street, where it may still be seen, but hardly will be admired by anyone. Not being able to obtain this, he—as the next best thing—painted the apse in imitation of marble, and thus finished it, not exactly as he desired, but so as to leave nothing to his mind incomplete. Lastly, he may have intended to do something with the central domes of the main vault and aisles, as these are left in plaster, while the whole of the rest of the interior is a finished work of Portland stone. We have no hint, however, of what he proposed for these parts, if, in fact, he proposed anything at all, which is doubtful.

With these slight exceptions, it appears that Wren died in the firm belief that his great work was complete, and this, too, certainly was the idea of his contemporaries; and though a proposal was afterwards made by the Academy to adorn its walls with paintings, the idea was at once rejected, and the Cathedral, till recently, remained pretty much as its great architect left it.

The taste of the public has, however, made rapid strides in being educated to an appreciation of the value of colour in connexion with architecture during the last fifty years. It has been discovered that the Greeks coloured their temples both internally and externally, and we have also found out that whitewash is not the most appropriate decoration for Gothic interiors; and more than this, foreign travel has familiarized the educated public with Continental examples where colour is sometimes lavishly introduced and dazzles the eye, though its taste is frequently questionable. Be that as it may, however, the result has been that the public have generally become dissatisfied with the effect of the interior of St. Paul's as it stands. Few care to inquire how much of this is owing to defects in the architecture, and how much owing to the absence of colour. It requires both knowledge and skill to ascertain this, but that is not the question now. The public feel that something should be done to remedy the present state of affairs. What that something is they leave to experts to determine.

The first to take action to satisfy this feeling was the late Dean Milman. He appointed a committee and raised a considerable sum of money for the completion of St. Paul's. His efforts, however, were mainly directed to the ritual arrangements. His great idea, and it was a most successful one, was to use the floor space under the great dome for at least occasional services. For this purpose it was necessary to remove the organ from its original position, where it

cut the dome off from the altar, and to provide another organ for the dome services. In decoration little was attempted beyond filling the apse windows with stained glass from Munich, and filling two of the spandrels of the great dome with mosaics.

Though neither of these decorative attempts can be said to have been successful, the ritual arrangements were eminently so, and gave an impulse which could not be stopped for the utilization of the Cathedral for higher purposes than it had hitherto been employed for, and his successor in office consequently determined to carry on the good work, and, if possible, on a more extended scale.

In furtherance of this project, in 1870, a new Committee was organized, and an appeal issued to the public setting forth the scheme on the widest possible basis that had then occurred to any one, and asking for a quarter of a million of money to complete St. Paul's. A public meeting was held at the Mansion House, and the public responded so handsomely to the appeal, that by the end of 1873 £55,000 had been given or promised. Of this sum some £14,000 have been expended in alterations of the choir, of the organs, and in the completion of various works previously undertaken; but there still remained, according to the published accounts, £34,000 invested, and over £8000 arrears of subscriptions not paid and instalments promised—say, altogether, £40,000 now available.

During the first year after this nothing of importance was undertaken. The Committee then thought it was necessary to wait to see how far the public would respond to the appeal, and what funds they could fairly calculate upon, before settling on any scheme for laying them out. Just, however, when things seemed ripe for a commencement, Dean Mansel's death occurred and put a stop for a time to further operations, and his successor reasonably and properly asked for time to familiarize himself with his new position, and master the details of what was admitted to be a complicated question.

At length, in the spring of 1872, a time had arrived when action could no longer be delayed, and it was necessary some course of proceeding should be determined upon. A new question then, however, cropped up for the first time, which has influenced the subsequent proceedings of the Committee in a most unexpected manner. Up to that time it had not been doubted that the Committee was bound to take on themselves the responsibility of selecting the artists who were to execute the work, and to retain the control of them in their own hands. It was then, however, proposed that they should delegate these functions to some architect; and this having been determined on by a majority of those present—by the narrowest of narrow majorities—Mr. Burges was selected to fill the post.\*

\* Ill health had compelled me to go abroad in the early spring of 1872, before the question was mooted; before I returned in May, the final vote was taken, and Mr. Burges appointed.

Had there been in the profession any classical Sir Gilbert Scott, it might certainly have been expedient to appoint him. Any one, in fact, who, from long familiarity with the style, knew exactly how to supply what was missing—who, from long experience, knew within very narrow limits how much money was likely to be raised for any particular object, and knew also how to apply that sum so as to get the greatest amount of effect out of it, and more than even this, a man who from temper and habit could work with other men—if such man exists in the profession, his appointment would have given confidence to the public without entirely abrogating the just responsibility of the Committee, and all might have gone on pleasantly and well. But it is needless now to speculate on the existence of such a man; these qualifications are certain not to be found in the one selected.

No one has yet attempted to explain what Mr. Burges' qualifications are for the work to which he has been appointed. The public can only, of course, judge from what he has done in public, and that certainly does not seem encouraging. His only classical work at all similar to this is the chapel at Worcester College, which he decorated a few years ago. It may be admitted the task was not an easy one. The chapel was merely a large room, but its proportions were good, and there was nothing to interfere with any style of decoration that might be adopted. The result is generally admitted to be a failure. There is, in fact, no design in it at all. The walls and roof are covered with an infinite number of small details, some classical, some mediæval, some modern; but they are covered, and that is all, and the whole is harmonized by darkening the windows so as to produce a dim religious light, supposed to be favourable to devotion, but certainly not to artistic effect.

It is not, however, by such a work as this that Mr. Burges would wish to be judged. From the commencement of his career his predilections have been turned to the arts of the Middle Ages, and being almost unrivalled as a draughtsman, he has been able to reproduce the forms and details of mediæval architecture in a manner that has never been surpassed. What he is doing now at Cardiff Castle is perhaps the most truthful reproduction of mediæval baronial art in modern times. In all the ancient castles fitted up hitherto for modern habitation, the owners have insisted on something like modern feelings and modern refinement being introduced in spite of the archæologists; but at Cardiff nothing of the sort is tolerated. In the drawings of the staircase exhibited at the Royal Academy, and those published in *The Architect* from time to time, we thoroughly realize the art congenial to the tastes of an illiterate baron surrounded by his blood-stained ruffian retainers, who, when not engaged in fighting or plundering, spent their time in drinking and debauchery in their fortified dens. Time and romance have thrown such a halo over these times, and mosses and ivy have so softened the harsher

features of their art, that few can realize the utter barbarism of those ages. Mr. Burges has done so in a manner that no other man has approached, and deserves all possible credit for his achievement; but it is precisely the genius that enables him to realize so perfectly the barbarisms of those ages which unfits him for such a task as the completion of St. Paul's. The vigour of the crude colouring and heraldic architecture of the staircase at Cardiff stands in strange contrast with the feeble prettiness of Worcester Chapel, but are equally an index of the taste of their author. No one, in fact, has described more truly than himself what his feelings were in this respect, when, at a meeting of the British Architects in 1871, he exclaimed: "As one of the Gothic men, I must protest that our quarrel is not with the Greek. Nobody ever heard me, or the school with which I happen to be identified, say one word against Greek architecture; but we have fought, and will fight, against the Sir Christopher Wren abominations. Such work is not Greek, and those who practise it do not follow Greek principles of design!"\*

With such tastes, and professing such principles, the wonder is that Mr. Burges should have sought or accepted such an appointment as that of architect to St. Paul's. The appointment, however, was made, and it was in vain that those who knew all this, and especially those who knew what had happened in the case of the Constantinople Memorial Church, tried to procure its revocation before it was too late. They asked that a meeting of the shareholders or of the General Committee should be convened, and the question submitted to them. Everything was refused; and, finding opposition hopeless, they gave in,—as minorities ought to do,—and from that day forward loyally refrained from doing anything by word or deed that would hamper Mr. Burges in any way, or prevent his having full scope for elaborating his designs in such manner as he thought best.

The next act in the drama was ushered in by a short resolution, passed on the 6th of November, 1872, by the members then present of the Fine Arts Committee, after the conclusion of a meeting of the Executive Committee, at which the terms of Mr. Burges' appointment were finally settled. It was to the effect "That Mr. Burges be now instructed to prepare designs for the completion of St. Paul's."

Of course it was expected that on this being officially communicated to him, Mr. Burges would at once apply to the Fine Arts Committee for instructions, or at all events put himself into communication with them in some way, so as to ascertain their views and wishes. Mr. Burges, however, is evidently of opinion that genius had better not be trammelled with instructions, and those who know him well know that the last thing that would occur to him would be that the

\* Published paper of the Royal Institute of British Architects for 1871; p. 52.

advice or opinion of any man or set of men could be of the smallest possible value or assistance to him in preparing his designs.

The absence of instructions was of comparatively little importance, as this could only have been a repetition of what was printed in the appeal, and a statement of the financial position and prospects of the fund ; but with all this Mr. Burges was as familiar as any of the Committee. In addition to this there was a resolution passed unanimously at the largest meeting ever held of the whole Executive Committee immediately after Mr. Burges' nomination. It was to the effect that when Sir Christopher Wren's wishes or intentions could not be ascertained, it was an instruction to the architect that he shall be guided by the practice and principles of the best architects of the "cinque cento" period. Notwithstanding this it seems only too manifest that he has entirely ignored this instruction, and since this was publicly pointed out neither he nor any of his supporters have been able to produce a single example to exonerate him from the charge of having deliberately disobeyed an instruction which any other architect would have considered as binding. Although, therefore, instructions would in all probability have been useless, a morning spent in discussing this and other matters might have saved much of the subsequent unpleasantness, provided Mr. Burges could be influenced by anything any committee could desire, which, to say the least of it, is more than doubtful.

The consequences of all this, however, was that nothing was heard of or from him till June in the following year, when the Committee were summoned to inspect a model of one half of a bay of the nave, which he submitted as his design for the completion of St. Paul's. This was accompanied by a statement of the reasons which induced him to select a bay of the nave in preference to any other part to explain his views, and by the meagrest possible account of the materials he intended to employ. The main features of the design were that the stone surfaces were everywhere to be hidden ; the lower part chipped away to give place to a veneer of white—as he explained—of grey Sicilian marble ; above this, when not covered with mosaic or gildings, a coating of gesso —*vulgo* plaster—was to be applied ; and the windows were all to be filled with coloured glass. No attempt was made to justify all this by quoting any precedents, nor was it pretended that it was in accordance with anything that was ever done or proposed by Sir Christopher Wren, whose designs and intentions the Committee were solemnly pledged to respect. In vain the Committee asked for information how he proposed to treat the great dome, the choir, and other parts of the church. He had made no design, no drawing, no sketches even ; his whole time had been occupied in trying experiments by pasting little bits of paper on the model to try the effect, and he had not thought of anything beyond. Equally in vain they asked what the

whole would cost. No estimate was submitted with the model, but he read out certain figures he had on scraps of paper, and which the members of the Committee might jot down as they pleased. Added together they showed that one half bay of the nave, with one class of workmanship, would cost £11,780, and a slightly superior class, £12,504; say, £25,000 per bay. Beyond this he could give us no information. "That was his design, and he could make no alteration in it; it must be taken or rejected as a whole."

After infinite wrangling the only concession that could be wrung from him was, that if we would wait six months longer, and pay for it, he would furnish us with a model of the apse and one bay of the choir. In thus having a design of both ends, we might judge of the rest; and with this the Committee were forced to be content, though not without hope that he might in the meanwhile relent, and furnish some drawings and details of how he proposed to treat the rest of the building.

On the 27th March in the present year the second model was ready for inspection, and with the first was exhibited at the Royal Academy in May.

The model retained all the objectionable features of the first with this additional one, that all the colours were deepened and heightened to such an extent that the effect was positively vulgar, which cannot be said of the first, whatever its other defects may be. Besides this there was the same persistent refusal to furnish information regarding the treatment proposed for the rest of the Cathedral, and not a scrap of a drawing or sketch of any kind. This model was accompanied with a still more meagre statement than that furnished with the previous one, of how it was proposed to carry it out; but neither it nor the model showed the smallest tendency toward any concession to the strongly-expressed views of the Committee, or any hint that such concession was possible. The estimate too was furnished in the same unsatisfactory manner, and amounted to £37,000 for the portion of the building shown in the model, if executed by those artists he was accustomed to work with, that is, with those who have perpetrated the horrors of Cardiff Castle. What it may amount to now that public opinion has forced him to apply to a higher class of artists none can tell. But the figures will hardly be disputed, as immediately afterwards he sent in a claim for £900 odd as his commission at  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. on the amount.\* As before, no general estimate was submitted, but it was hinted unofficially that £400,000

\* It is one of the not least curious features of the transaction, that the agreement with Mr. Burges is so framed that before a single working drawing has been made, or a tender submitted from any one who is to take part in the work, on his mere "*ipse dixit*," verbally delivered, he is entitled to claim his commission in a larger sum than the Commissioners possess, or are likely to possess, while he remains their architect.

was the amount; and as that figure was afterwards furnished from his office, and printed with the description of his models when exhibited, it may be taken as what was then assumed to be the cost, though an attempt has been made to explain it away. Indeed, if any one will take the figures above quoted for the spaces represented in the two models, and allowing 10 per cent. for contingencies, multiply them by the area of the spaces not included, they will find the amount barely sufficient, even supposing the estimates are perfectly trustworthy, that no new contingencies arise during the progress of the works, and no rise in the price of materials and labour. Without the least desire to exaggerate, my impression is a considerably larger sum will be required.

The experience of others may be different, but I do not believe that a proposition so utterly beyond their available means was ever seriously submitted to any set of grown-up men on such imperfect data, and with such inadequate reasoning for its adoption. Had any engineer or architect submitted such a proposition to any board of directors of any railway or any company accustomed to treat of such matters, he would simply be told he might retire, and they would not trouble him to return. Men of business do not usually rush into an outlay ten times greater than they can afford, especially when every part of the proposed scheme is [an experiment and a novelty, and opposed to all they had before desired or thought proper to adopt.

Notwithstanding this, had there been any features of a high or noble art about the design, any part that could have been separated from the rest or modified, it might have been worth while trying further; but it was asserted, as indeed was evident, that the whole hung together, and that it must be either accepted or rejected as it stood. This being so, it seemed needless to go further, and the majority of the Fine Arts' Committee declined to recommend it for adoption.

It is not, however, by any means only on the score of expense that Mr. Burgess' proposal to veneer the lower part of the cathedral with marble is objectionable. Its employment there is still more reprehensible, because it is, and must always remain, a manifest sham. Certainly, it seems strange that such a proposal should come from one of the most devoted disciples of a school that, for the last forty years, have been lecturing the world on truth of materials, truth in construction, truth, in fact, before everything—who have lined the interiors of our churches and the passages of our houses with the coarsest brick-work, because it was constructively true, while plaster, though clean and pleasant to look on, was a concealment of construction; yet, here is a proposal to chip away as truthful a piece of construction as exists in any mediæval cathedral, and to replace it

with what is, and must always be perceived to be, a mere surface decoration, and to cover up those parts that are not cut away with tiles, tesserae, and plaster ! There have, of course, been buildings erected in rubble-masonry, or brick-work, which it has been intended from the first should be decorated in this manner, and instances where it has been found necessary to alter the internal architecture, and to hide the wound so made by expedients of this sort ; but it is probably correct to assert that in no country of the world, in any age, was a proposal such as this ever carried into effect. Having a perfectly truthful, honest stone construction, which it was neither intended nor thought desirable to alter or change in any way, it never, I believe, entered into anyone's head to hide the whole construction, by trying to make the lower part appear as if it were of a more precious material, and the upper part as if it were mere plaster and paint.

Almost as great a mistake as its inherent falsehood, is the mode in which Mr. Burges proposes to use the material. What induced the Byzantine and Italian architects to employ marble to the extent they did, was the immense variety of colours it placed at their disposal ; from black to white, every colour and every tint was to be found, and with it they could compose mosaics, which, on flat surfaces, are always brilliant, even if not always in good taste, nor suitable for larger and more monumental buildings. But no architect ever proposed to line the whole of the lower part of his building with one cold, monotonous monochrome of gray—doing so is to ignore the use and properties of the material used, to an extent, I believe, that never was done. What an architect of the best age would probably have done at St. Paul's, if using marble at all, would have been to fill, with richly-toned marbles, the panels on either side of the windows, or of the piers, and wherever a plain surface could be formed, well framed with masonry. By such means great warmth and brilliancy might be attained, at one-tenth of the cost of Mr. Burges' proposal, without interfering in any way with the truthfulness or effect of the church as it stands. The one place where Mr. Burges introduces something of this sort is exactly where it is most objectionable. In the flutings of the great pilasters of the nave he proposes to introduce warmer and richer-coloured marbles. This is, no doubt, sometimes done in Italy ; but only in the worst age and with the worst effect. It shows that what was meant to suggest strength is a mere sham, only a little bit of inlay, which, besides its streakiness, violates every principle of any suggested construction. For chimney pieces or console tables such a mode of treatment may be legitimate ; but, in monumental buildings, it was only adopted in Italy by the worst architects in the worst age.

Another defect is that the grey Sicilian is in the wrong place. One of the first principles for the decoration of an interior is to



begin with the strong and dark colours below, and to use lighter and more airy tints in the upper parts. Here the effect is reversed. All below is light and monochromatic, and the colouring deepens upwards, till the whole proportions of the church are altered, and the roof is actually brought down on our heads.

Another more serious defect in Mr. Burges' scheme of decoration is that it involves painting all the windows of the church. This he does not intend to do so that the colour shall intercept as much light as is done by the Munich glass in the apse, but rather as is done by the windows at Worcester chapel. Perhaps he may even make them lighter than these; but it is a fact that, however low the tone of colour, and however much white glass may be retained, any painting that will give form and substance to human figures, and architectural details, must obstruct a considerable portion of light, how much, as he says, can only be determined by experience; but if we put it at one-fourth, we certainly shall not exaggerate. This, added to the absence of reflection from the roof, in consequence of its being deeply coloured, instead of its present light-reflecting surface, will certainly produce a gloom that is most undesirable, and that certainly will not be remedied by the introduction of grey Sicilian marble. Its surface is not lighter than that of Portland stone, nor its colour so pleasing, and though it does admit of being polished, that adds very little to its lighting qualities, while any reflecting surface is most undesirable in the solid parts of any building, and the utmost shininess that can be got out of it will not replace one-tenth part of the light shut out by painting the windows. One of the great charms of St. Peter's and of most Italian churches arises from the flood of white light that pours through their perfectly colourless windows—at best we can hardly obtain this in London, and Sir Christopher Wren did not foresee to what an extent coal smoke would deprive us of it; but to diminish what little we have to the extent of one-fourth, or one-third, ought to be fatal to any proposal which involves such a necessity.

Again, is it wise or reasonable to apply mosaics as a surface decoration to the extent to which Mr. Burges proposes? Except in and under the dome of St. Peter's, I do not know one example where it has been successful in modern times. In nine cases out of ten, at St. Peter's and elsewhere, the mosaics are framed pictures which have no connection whatever with the structure, and, as such, are perfectly legitimate; but, as an integral part of the architecture, the advantage of their employment is more than doubtful.

However effective the old mosaics may be on the plain surfaces of the churches which were especially erected for their reception, there is nothing done in modern times that at all encourages us to believe that the art can be successfully revived. The two mosaics in the

spandrels of the dome are admitted failures, and the sooner they are removed the better ; and the experiment at the Parliament Houses is not more successful. There are places in the Cathedral—in the great dome for instance—at a great distance from the eye, where mosaics might be successfully introduced ; but in the clerestory, and where they can be at all clearly seen, though their effect may be pleasing to some people, because archaic, their effect would not be artistic unless treated in a very different manner from any produced in modern times.

Gilding and double gilding the capitals of the pillars and other parts of the architecture becomes of course a necessity from the gorgeous key-note of decoration adopted throughout Mr. Burges' design, but is just one of those things that betray its weakness. They are stone, and of a design much more suited, from the largeness and coarseness of its parts, for external than for internal decoration, and gilding them will only bring out this defect with tenfold force. If it was proposed to replace them with bronze of a much more delicate and complicated pattern, gilding would not be so offensive. Even gilt plaster might be tolerated, because it is a material that you know must be covered up, and is only a vehicle for some kind of decoration, but gilt stone-work implies a contrast between the material and its surface which cannot be reconciled.

It is needless to point out the anachronism of the great Byzantine figure of Christ in the semi-dome of the apse, and of many other of the details of the decoration which belong to an age long before the cathedral was erected. It would be a far more agreeable task to point out any happy suggestion that might be useful as hints for further designs. It would be absurd to deny that there are not some very pretty and pleasing bits of detail in the designs, but, except in the pavements, which are generally good and appropriate, the others are so misapplied, and the thing is so radically wrong in principle, that what in itself is good generally loses its value from the mistaken mode in which it is introduced.

The French have recently spent very considerable sums in the decoration of their churches—the Madelaine and St. Vincent de Paul for instance ; but they have never attempted mosaics. Recently a million of francs was voted for the decoration of the interior of the Pantheon ; but they laugh at the idea of employing anything so coarse or inartistic for their interior. What they intend is to paint pictures in encaustic on canvas, and apply them to the plain surfaces of their walls, and to frame them with architectural decoration executed in the same manner. On one other point too they have quite made up their minds, which is not to interfere in any way with the stone architecture of the interior of the church, nor even to gild the capitals ; that is to be left as now in all the purity of its plain stone surfaces.

It would be easy to go on multiplying criticisms; but the real question is, why should we be ashamed of the stone-lined interior of St. Paul's? Except some Jesuit churches in Belgium, it is probably correct to assert that there is not one church on this side of the Alps which is so adorned. Everywhere and in every age, both mediæval and modern, the churches are proud of their stone-faced interiors. If they use marble at all, it is only in decorative shafts, and details much to the same extent and with the same effect as would be obtained by filling the panels in St. Paul's with this material; but beyond this all the interiors of our mediæval churches and cathedrals show internally the stone of which they are constructed, and with the best and most pleasing effect. Marble was only used internally by the Italians, who, though great as painters and sculptors, failed entirely as architects; and even they only used it extensively, in the worst age, and coupled with an architecture so capricious and bad, that we shudder to think of it. Is it really come to that, that we, with all our increased knowledge of classic art and improved taste, are invited to copy the works of Bernini, Borromini, or Ivara? They and their contemporaries were the men that used marble most, and their works are simply frightful.

If we are to carry out this system to its logical sequel, there is a Gothic church at Rome—Sta. Maria Sopra Minerva—which is lined with marble throughout its lower part—why, following this example, should we not so treat the naves at Winchester or Canterbury? Why not get up a subscription to remove the offensive stone surface of the interior of Westminster Abbey, and replace it by marble, gesso, and mosaic? The one would be as reasonable as the other. The architecture as the masonry of St. Paul's is lithic, and suitable to no other material than stone; and, unless the whole is remodelled, nothing that can be done can effectually alter or conceal that fact.

In addition to the above alluded-to financial and artistic difficulties there is another reason which it seems ought to make the Committee pause before attempting to carry Mr. Burges' design into effect. In the appeal which they issued on undertaking their task, and on the strength of which the money now in their hands was subscribed, they distinctly and emphatically pledged themselves that "Sir. C. Wren's intentions, his mode of treatment, and as far as they can be authenticated, his very designs will be scrupulously kept sacred and followed."

Notwithstanding this, Mr. Burges does not even pretend that he ever thought of Sir Christopher, or his intentions, in preparing his models, and no one has or can contend that a jumble of Byzantine mediæval, and modern art ever entered into his head or of that of any of his contemporaries. But, it is contended, Wren left no instructions for the completion of his work, and we do not know what his intentions in that respect really were. Within certain limits this

is true, but only so, because he believed his work, as mentioned above, to be complete, and to require very little if anything to make it all he could have wished. There is a paragraph in a letter written by himself in 1717, and quoted by Elms in his life of the great architect, in which he expresses himself to the following effect: "My opinion therefore is to have statues erected on the four pediments only, which will be a most proper, noble, and sufficient ornament to the whole fabric, and never was omitted in the best ancient Greek and Roman architecture; the principles of which throughout all my schemes of this colossal structure I have religiously endeavoured to follow, and if I glory, it is in the singular mercy of God, who has enabled me to begin and finish my great work so conformable to the ancient model."

It is true this refers more to the exterior than to the interior of the church, but it enunciates his views and principles with a clearness it is impossible to mistake. The foot note in the "*Parentalia*" (page 292), which has been so frequently quoted and insisted upon, is unfortunately only a rhetorical account, in the inflated language of the period, by a grandson, of the wondrous things his great ancestor would have done had he been allowed his own way. After all it only refers to the great dome and the altar-piece, both of which were finished after a fashion, but not as Wren wished. The whole of the stone work of the interior he certainly thought was complete, and the only part, consequently, regarding which his intentions are at all doubtful, are the smaller domes of the main and side aisles. These are left in plaster, and he may have intended to decorate them in some way or other. Possibly with figure subjects, but in that case probably in monochrome, as the great dome was treated by Thornhill. But this point, and this only, remains doubtful.\* Although we cannot, therefore, say distinctly in what exact manner he would have treated this or any other part of the building, if more ornament had then been insisted upon, one thing is perfectly certain, he would have treated it in the manner he thought most classical, as he understood that word, from the study of such ancient examples as were then available, or as they were interpreted by his contemporaries and practised since the revival of classic art by Bramante, Peruzzi, and others of that great age. Whatever question there may consequently be about details, no educated person will, at the present day, I presume, pretend that he does not know what classic art means, either as practised by the Greeks and Romans, or as understood by the architects of the Renaissance between the beginning of the six-

\* In Longman's "*Three Cathedrals of St. Paul*" (p. 149), there is a copy of a contemporary print showing the spandrels of the dome filled with figures. There is nothing, however, to show that the design was made on Wren's suggestion, or had his approval.

teenth and that of the eighteenth century. That was the style in which St. Paul's cathedral was conceived and carried out. No one on the other hand will, I presume, contend that Mr. Burges' designs are classic or have a trace of classic feeling in them. Not only, therefore, because they are out of harmony with the style of the building, but because they are in direct opposition to the ideas or wishes of Sir Christopher Wren, which the Committee have pledged themselves to respect, does it seem that they ought now to hesitate before attempting to carry them into effect.

It may, however, be argued, and with great show of reason, that we now know more of classic art than Wren did. Greek architecture has been practically discovered and described only since his death; the excavations at Pompeii and Herculaneum have added immensely to our knowledge of Roman art and of their modes of applying colours. Besides this, we have found out that their builders did not whitewash mediæval cathedrals, but coloured them, to a certain extent, at least; and we have consequently become so accustomed to colour that we cannot tolerate the plain monotony of a colourless stone interior. This may be quite true and legitimate, though the question has not yet been argued on that ground, and we may—perhaps ought to—proceed on that basis. But, if it is so determined, one thing at least seems certain, that whatever ornament or colour is added, it ought to be classic in design and feeling, in so far as the æsthetic forms of the art are concerned, though the subject may express Christian feeling in the same mode as is done by the ritual arrangements of the church, which are not those of a classic temple.

So obvious does all this appear, that it seems difficult to believe that it will seriously be attempted to carry out Mr. Burges' plans for the so-called adornment of St. Paul's. If it is done, it will be a strange Nemesis for misdeeds, of which Wren certainly was not guiltless. First, Inigo Jones, and then Wren, not only at St. Paul's, but everywhere, ruthlessly hacked away the most beautiful and delicate Gothic details, and added Corinthian porticos and Corinthian altar-pieces in Gothic churches, insensible to their incongruity. In so far as they were allowed, these two great architects strove to purge old St. Paul's of what they considered the barbarous art of the Middle Ages, and strove to substitute for it the purity and elegance of the classic forms of which they were so deeply enamoured. Two centuries have just elapsed since the foundation-stone of the new church was laid, and now the whirligig of fashion has brought round a new state of affairs, and it is seriously proposed, in so far as may be possible, to wash the Paganism out of this too classic temple, and to reproduce the gloom, the mysticism, and crude art and colouring of the style he so much despised. He may have done wrong, but that is hardly a reason why we should do worse.

It is a painful, and would be a profitless task, dwelling on the disagreeables of the past—if they are past—and would not be attempted here, if it were not that it is indispensable it should be done in order to understand the future, or to indicate the course that it now seems most desirable to pursue. Nothing is to be done till the autumn meeting of the Chapter, but then it is understood they will decide—and decide finally—which of the two courses open to them they will adopt. But just because the decision then taken will be final, it is necessary that any one who has anything to say on the subject should say it now,—if he delays, it may be too late.

Of the two courses now open, one would be to persevere in the decision already arrived at, to carry out Mr. Burges' scheme for the apse and one bay of the choir in the manner exhibited in the model No. 2.

The other is, frankly to admit that a mistake had been made, and to start again from the point where we were when Mr. Burges' appointment was first determined upon.

There is no doubt the first proposal can be carried out, if determined upon. The money in the hands of the Committee is sufficient, or nearly so, for the purpose, and if £5 or £10,000 more is required to complete it, it could be obtained during the three or four years the works are in progress. Not from the public,—they ceased to subscribe the moment Mr. Burges was appointed,—but from individuals of ecclesiological tendencies who would willingly see the Paganism of St. Paul's blotted out, and what they consider a more Christian style of decoration introduced in its stead. So far all is easy, but what then? We should have about a tenth part of the cathedral more gorgeously decorated than any other church of its class on the same scale in Europe, but the whole of the rest looking colder and poorer by contrast with its gaudy sacrarium. But it is contended, Do one part well, and money will flow in—London is the richest city of the world, and will subscribe liberally. To some extent this is true; but, even supposing the first experiment is much more successful than there is any reason to expect, £360,000 is a large sum to ask for or expect. No such sum has been raised or asked for for any such purpose. The Committee were blamed, and not without reason, for asking for £250,000. No one ever dreamt of such a sum as £400,000. It is an entirely original conception of Mr. Burges, but one, it is feared, it will be impossible to realize. It was with great difficulty we raised £50,000, and the first £50,000 in such a case is always the easiest to obtain. Though the wealthiest city, London is not exactly that one which takes the deepest interest in church matters, and those of her citizens who do, have either views opposed to the Paganism of St. Paul's or to the attempt to mediævalize it. It is not as in a cathedral town where all unite and feel pride in sustaining and adorning the sacred and historical numen of the place;

fifty discordant elements interfere with any great effort of the sort in London; and, if I am not very much mistaken, he certainly is a sanguine man who would look forward to our doubling our first contribution within the next ten or twelve years. If we are to wait till the full sum now asked for is raised, we must wait for a century at least; but meanwhile the discrepancy between the East end and the rest of the Church will be so painful that something must be done to remedy it. What probably will be done will be that money will be raised to decorate the whole in a temporary manner on the plea that it is only temporary. The lower parts of the walls will be covered with plaster and painted in imitation of marble, and the upper part decorated with paper mosaics, and colour in distemper applied where wanted. This is what has happened at St. Peter's, which is a notable example of a building commenced without counting the cost, but not in this respect at all to compare like beginning an undertaking certain to cost £400,000 with only 10 per cent. of that amount promised or in hand.

Assuming, however, that other counsels should prevail, and the Committee determine on making a fresh start, it does not seem difficult to indicate the principal steps to be taken to carry out the work. The first of these would be the appointment of a new Fine Arts Committee, consisting of amateurs, artists, and architects, or others possessing sufficient knowledge to guide such an enterprize, and sufficiently numerous and influential to command the confidence of the public. Without this, it seems in vain to ask the public for more money. The recent discussions have thoroughly discredited the Committee as at present constituted, and with these internal dissensions they would appeal in vain for further support. One, indeed, of the most unhappy features connected with Mr. Burges' appointment was, as was well known at the time, that it would split the Committee into two hostile camps. Even if he had been all and more than all his supporters allege in his favour, his opinions were so pronounced and so uncompromising that such a division was inevitable, and so were all the consequences that have followed. It will, however, be of no use attempting to constitute such a body, unless it is made sufficiently numerous and sufficiently influential to command respect both out of doors and within. Men of position or of power will not give their time and attention to such a work if they are liable to be "dissolved" the first time they happened to differ from their architect as to the mode in which the work was to be carried out, even when it happens that he is bringing forward schemes so novel and so extravagant that they never entered into the head of any other man living. Their opinion in matters of taste must be considered decisive, and their recommendations carried out, if within the limits of their instructions, which may be easily defined. If it is set about in the right way, there seems little doubt there would

be no difficulty in getting such a committee together, and as little of their working harmoniously for the purposes of their appointment.

When they settle to their task, the question will inevitably again arise whether they should appoint an architect to assist them or not. The expediency of doing so is a perfectly open question, but if decided in the affirmative, one of the first conditions of the appointment ought to be, that he should make no designs himself, beyond general sketches indicating the position and extent of the proposed decoration. What is wanted is not a new design, but merely the completion of one made 200 years ago, and nine-tenths of which are already complete. As no structural alterations are contemplated, there is no opportunity of his exercising his skill as an architect, and as far as that is concerned a non-professional man would do as well. But what the Committee do want is a man so familiar with all the peculiarities of the style in which the church is built that he can detect and prevent anything incongruous that may be suggested. They want, too, a man of business, who can see that contracts are properly framed and knows when they are properly executed, and they also want some one who has passed his life in artistic circles, and knows consequently the men best qualified to execute any particular kind of work, and able consequently to point them out for selection by the Committee, and such a man is only to be found in the ranks of the architectural profession. If, however, he is also to design the works himself, it must eventually result in the Committee being dependent on the assistance of one mind only instead of many, and unless he is a universal genius the result would be a mediocrity, in execution which would probably be fatal. The best artists would hold aloof, for they know it would be of no use attempting to compete against "the man in possession," and the Committee would not have that range of selection among all the best artists in Europe which seems indispensable for the successful carrying out of such an undertaking.

If appointed, the architect ought certainly to be paid by a salary, not a commission. When the necessary amount of money to be expended bears a certain definite relation to the amount of work to be done, and that is also proportioned to the amount of labour, thought, and responsibility to be incurred, a commission is a fair and reasonable mode of remuneration. But when the artist is left to say whether the expenditure shall be £40,000 or £400,000, and his commission consequently either £2,000 or £20,000, it is not in human nature to resist looking complacently on the larger figures. It may or may not lead to large estimates; but it certainly is not a means for promoting economy, and no Committee is wise in laying themselves open to the charge of encouraging extravagance, and no artist ought to be exposed to the possible reproach of having yielded to such temptation.

Having settled these and other questions regarding the *personnel*



of the undertaking, the next point to which the Executive Committee must turn their attention is to determine what amount they are likely to receive, and what, consequently, they ought to allot to the decoration of St. Paul's.

If £400,000 were placed at the disposal of the Committee to-morrow, I maintain, without hesitation, that it would be a wicked piece of foolish extravagance to waste it on the adornment of the interior of St. Paul's. The expenditure would not in any way remedy the inherent faults of arrangement, or details which are the real defects of the design—perhaps rather exaggerate them—while there are fifty ways in which such a sum might be expended which would be more useful for the improvement of the arts, or the promotion of religious sentiment, than this. If the Committee had £200,000 at their disposal, it might—as hinted above—be worth while to throw Sir Christopher overboard as completely as Mr. Burges has done, and face the whole difficulty and alter the internal architecture till it was rendered as beautiful as the exterior. The public, however, have no such confidence in any living architect, or any set of men, that they would listen for one moment to such a proposition. Perhaps they are right, but whether right or wrong, certain it is it would not be tolerated. That being so, there is nothing left for it but to make the best we can of the building as it stands, and for that purpose my conviction is £100,000 would amply suffice. This, too, as a sum the Committee may reasonably hope to raise within the next ten or fifteen years. After such a breakdown as has occurred it will require great influence, great prudence, and harmonious working, to extract the £60,000 necessary to make up this sum from the pockets of the subscribers; but it probably may be done, while the realization of the larger sum seems simply impossible. Another great advantage of starting on this more moderate scale would be, that if that amount cannot be obtained, less would suffice without resorting to any mean or temporary expedients; while the works can easily be so designed that if more money became available, ornament may be added to any extent without undoing anything that has been done.

Assuming such a scale of expenditure, its apportionment would probably be in something like the following proportions:—

Nave and side aisles . . . . .	£15,000 or 20,000
Dome above whispering gallery . . . . .	20,000 „ 25,000
Dome from gallery to floor . . . . .	15,000 „ 10,000
Transept . . . . .	10,000 „ 10,000
Choir and apse . . . . .	30,000 „ 25,000
Contingencies and extras . . . . .	10,000 „ 10,000
	<hr/>
	£100,000 £100,000

Of course these proportions may and must be varied to some extent when drawings are made and estimates obtained, but probably not to

any great extent. In the nave, what is most wanted is a marble pavement of good and rich design, and a certain amount of marbling in plinths and panels. This would contribute more to give a furnished and finished look to the whole than any amount of colour in the roof.\* In addition to this a certain moderate amount of gilding and colour might be applied to the capitals and cornices, and the smaller domes must be finished with figure painting or emblems, but either in monochrome or with the least possible amount of colour. The windows require reglazing, but might be done with ground glass, probably with a cut pattern in it, and set in ornamental frames. If any colours are introduced in them it should only be as jewels, and occupying not more than one-twentieth of the whole surface. If all this were done it would relieve the present cold, unfinished appearance of the nave in a wonderful manner, and to as great an extent as is compatible with the rest of the architecture as it is, and must remain.

In the dome and transept we have the example of St. Peter's, which must to a great extent be followed, and the sum set down will probably be sufficient to reproduce it in all essentials, except that we must be content in the lower part with honest Portland stone instead of the sham plaster marbles, and must omit the picture mosaics of our model.

The key note for the decoration of the choir must be the stall work in oak at present existing. If Mr. Burges' decoration was carried out, this must inevitably be replaced by marble stalls with canopies, either in the same material or in ebony and ivory, or some such material as is generally done in the Italian marble churches we are told to admire. If the present stall work is retained, such a decoration as that suggested for the nave would be in harmony, though it might be made richer, and the sacrarium must of course be enriched to a greater extent than any other part of the church; and all this, it is believed, could be done for the sum set down.

When these preliminaries are settled, the next point would be to determine what part of the work should be first undertaken. I would suggest the great dome. First, because it is the only part that is offensive, except from its plainness, but also because it is the only part regarding which we feel sure we know what the original intentions of the architect were. We also have in St. Peter's a model which, *mutatis mutandis*, we may confidently follow. Nothing of the same sort has been so successful in modern times, and it will be difficult to surpass it. Another reason why the dome should be first

\* If universal experience is any guide in this matter, Mr. Burges' system is hopelessly wrong. We place richly coloured carpets on our floors, we paint our walls in rich bright colours, and we whitewash our ceilings. I do not know one instance of a rich and warmly-coloured roof supported on cold grey walls.

attended to is that being farthest from the eye and less seen in connexion with any other part of the church, any mistake consequently that might be made would be less apparent and interfere less with anything that might be done hereafter.

The spandrels of the great dome and the decorations of the smaller domes of nave and aisles might follow. The last thing that should, I fancy, be undertaken, is the choir and apse—not that these are less important than other parts of the church—on the contrary, it is because they are the most important, and also, unfortunately, the most difficult, that it seems that it would be most unwise to attempt their decoration before we have more knowledge of the materials and processes we are going to employ, and more experience of the comparative skill or ability of the artists who may be selected for the work.

During the three or four years in which the works of the dome would be in progress there would be time to mature the plans for the east end, and during that time a school of artists would be formed who might be capable of carrying it out. To attempt it first would be to risk a failure which might mar the whole project.

Supposing the dome or any other part of the work to be selected for a first experiment, and the amount to be expended upon it determined, there would be no difficulty in obtaining sketches from ten or a dozen architects or artists for its execution, and as little in selecting three or four of these as the most suitable for the purpose. But before going beyond this, the most important step in the whole process would be a resolution on the part of the Committee that no attempt should be made to carry any design permanently into effect before it had been tried; not on a toy mould, but on the walls of the church itself. In the case of marbling a few shillings spent in the purchase of marble papers will suffice to ascertain the effect of introducing that material, at least to the extent above suggested, and when mosaics or other decorations are proposed a few pounds would be sufficient for the preparation of cartoons of the full size, and so coloured as to prevent anyone standing on the floor of the church from ascertaining whether they are real mosaics or not. As already mentioned, a great part of the mosaics of St. Peter's are still in the paper stage, and few are aware of it.\* Soon or later these full-sized cartoons must be prepared, but I do not believe that any artist can judge of their effect at the distance from the eye and under the

\* So convinced was I personally of the importance of this process, that before going to Italy I had contracted with an artist to prepare and fix up a full-sized cartoon for one of the spandrels of the dome under the whispering gallery. I did not expect or intend that the Commissioners should accept my design. All I wished to show was how easy it might be made to judge of the effect of any design before it was too late. Had this process been followed in the case of the two mosaics now there, they probably never would have been executed in a permanent material.


peculiar circumstances of light and air in such a place, for instance, as the great dome without seeing them *in situ*. It must be of immense advantage to the artists to see their own work and those of others *in situ* before being finally called on to execute it. As great an advantage to the Committee, who, besides having this means of judging, would have the benefit of the criticisms of other artists and the public generally before being called on to decide. At the same time, nothing probably would give more confidence in the acts of the Committee than this public appeal to the judgment of all the world before finally deciding on anything.

In a few words, the conclusion I have arrived at from a very careful study of the subject during the last four or five years are, that, when fairly looked at, few problems present a simpler and more certain solution than those involved in the completion of St. Paul's. So much is done, that little remains to be done; what that little should be, is so clearly indicated by the style of the building and that of contemporary examples, that it is difficult to go wrong in matters of taste when the subject is fairly approached. My conviction also is, that £100,000 is amply sufficient, more, indeed, than is necessary, to complete the church, and to bring its decoration up to the highest point compatible with its architecture, provided no radical or structural alteration is contemplated.

Holding these opinions, I cannot but regard Mr. Burges' proposal as absurdly extravagant, and, in fact, impossible, in so far as outlay is concerned, and at total variance with every principle in matters of taste that ought to guide any Committee in completing and adorning this great work of Sir Christopher Wren.\*

JAS. FERGUSON.

\* In order to prevent any misunderstanding, I may state that none of those who have been acting with me on the Committee for the completion of St. Paul's, have anything to do with this article. One of them knows, but only by accident, of my intention to write it. The others do not, and have consequently no responsibility connected with it, either direct or indirect.



## CONTEMPORARY EVOLUTION.

### PART V.

THE attempt was lately made \* to trace the effect on Christianity of a further Evolution of physical knowledge, and the conclusion arrived at was that such Evolution must be itself comparatively uninfluential, inasmuch as it could act only indirectly by stimulating the diffusion of philosophical ideas. Yet earlier † we saw reason to believe that the results of Political Evolution would also depend upon the course hereafter taken by Philosophy. We have here, then, to consider that supreme question concerning the result of the Renaissance Movement—namely, the philosophical direction it is likely to take—with the hope of being able to form a final judgment as to the result of the great conflict between reviving Paganism and the Christian Church.

The prospect that first strikes the eye of one surveying the field of contemporary speculative activity cannot be very encouraging to the lover of Christianity. Strauss, Buchner, Vogt, Haeckel and Hartmann in Germany at present attract the sympathies of multitudes now co-operating, at least in will, with the attack made by Bismarck at the same time on both freedom and Christianity. In France, though the school of Comte is comparatively small, yet English sensationalism—that of Mr. Spencer—is making considerable advances, while the old Voltairian spirit holds its own with a tenacity similar to that possessed by the “principles of 1789.” In Italy the English and German speculative schools are also making inroads, while, if such is not yet the case in the Iberian peninsula, traditional convictions are gradually losing their hold, so that such exemption may

\* See CONTEMPORARY REVIEW for August, 1874, p. 360.

† Ibid., February, 1874, p. 345, and March, 1874, p. 599.

perhaps be mainly assigned to political conditions unfavourable for intellectual activity.

In England a remarkable change has come over the spirit of the nation, and now by a singular coincidence even the liveliest sentiments of pity for the brute creation happen to concur with popular science in tending to obscure the distinction between rational and irrational natures, and in promoting a ready acceptance of the great doctrine concerning the essential Bestiality of Man. This doctrine is here specially referred to because it has in fact become the test doctrine by which the philosophical position of teachers and disciples may best be gauged.\* In the fourth part of this Essay it was stated that a certain Philosophy was much diffused by means of physically scientific teaching, a strongly antichristian Philosophic school, of which Strauss may be taken as a type, having eagerly caught at such physical teaching as a most convenient auxiliary.

The English of the eighteenth century were the leaders in speculative thought, and for all the great praise often bestowed upon German culture, the same may be said of those of our metaphysical writers of to-day who also deal with physical science. Darwin has no where so great a following as in Germany, while Mill has no slight influence in the land where his ashes repose. It will, it is believed, then, be amply sufficient for our purpose if we mainly direct our attention to the English Sensational school which is ousting Hegel in Germany and Cousin in France, and which claims to have done justice to Kant and Reid by harmonising the truths they held with the apparently contradictory, but really complementary, verities put forward by those they refuted. The teaching of the English School as represented, amongst others, by Mill, Bain, Spencer and Lewes, logically culminates in three negations, namely, of God, the Soul, and Virtue. Yet this is the school still honoured by the University of London, with its exclusive patronage, thus imbuing with its doctrines the minds of all our most cultured youth. If such a system can sustain itself, and, still more, if it can propagate itself, its effect on Christianity need not be stated. These terms, which some may be disposed to think too severe as applied to our popular English system, cannot be fully justified here. It must suffice to remind readers that the long dissimulated Atheism of Mill is now avowed, that Spencer declares Theism to be not even thinkable, and that the subordinate systems of all the school necessarily deny virtue in refusing every element of spontaneity to the human will. But this denial is not less evident from yet another point of view. According to the popularly received view of Evolution—the view that is put forward by Spencer, Darwin, Bastian, Vogt, Buchner and Haeckel—

\* Mr. A. J. Mott, in his opening address, October, 1873, to the Literary and Philosophical Society of Liverpool, p. 3, says: "Questions concerning the origin of mankind have become either the radiating or the culminating points in most branches of science."

virtue is absolutely identified with the most brutal selfishness. As Mr. Martineau has tersely put it: \* "Conscience is a hoarded fund of traditionary pressures of utility . . . our highest attributes are only the lower that have lost their memory, and mistake themselves for something else." Two considerations, however, present themselves at once with reassuring aspect to the student of the various systems just now in vogue. These are, first, their discord and the internecine war amongst the Teachers of these various systems, and secondly, the grotesqueness of the idol which each severally offers to the homage of his followers. Thus Messrs. Mill and Spencer diverge respecting even the very foundation of the whole fabric of knowledge, which foundation the second asserts, while the first denies, to be "inconceivability." Messrs. Bain and Spencer also differ on the same question; Mr. Bain asserting "experience," and not "inconceivability," to be the basis of certitude. The "principle of contradiction" presents another point on which they differ. Comte's teaching is repudiated with apparent scorn by Mr. Spencer, while quite lately a wide divergence † from the teaching of the last named writer has been introduced by his brother sensist, Mr. G. H. Lewes, no less than from that of Mr. Mill.‡

In this their mutual destructiveness the negative Philosophers of our day but follow in the footsteps of their predecessors of the last three centuries, and were it not that "while the grass grows the steed starves," and that we need something positive, such systems might be left unassailed to the action of their own mutually disintegrating influences.

The curious objects presented to veneration by these systems may claim a passing notice.

We have first the "Unknowable"§ as an object whereon to expend our religious instincts, an entity without intelligence or volition, without an affection or a purpose, as much the cause of everything vile as of all we most admire—an entity to be saluted only || by exclamations (vocal or mental) of "It is! It is!"

\* CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, April, 1872, p. 610.

† Thus in his "Problems of Life and Mind," Mr. Lewes describes "conceptions" as "symbols," (p. 191), and affirms that the "object felt exists precisely as it is felt" (p. 192). Again (p. 420) he says that what is "unpicturable" may be "conceivable," and he plainly declares his dissent from Mr. Spencer's "transfigured realism."

‡ As when Mr. Lewes asserts (p. 398) that the truths respecting triangles are not generalisations but intuitions, and again (p. 424) when he declares that "much" that Mill includes under Induction is either "Intuition" or "Description."

§ It is rather amusing to find how much is after all "known" about this "unknowable." Thus we learn from Professor Tyndall (Use and Limit of the Imagination in Science) that it is known to have what may be compared with "Shores," and further that these "shores of the unknowable" are known to be "infinite." Further, since what has "infinite shores" must be itself infinite, the Unknowable we must conclude to be "boundless," while at the same time it must be "bounded in that it has 'shores.'"

|| See CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, September 1873, p. 612.

Then we have the "Universum" of Strauss, the contempt of Schopenhauer for which was so great a sin in the eyes of the former, seeing that Strauss demanded for his idol (what from no sane man will he ever get) a devotion such as a good man feels for his God!

A more naturally popular, but really as absurd an idol is that "Humanity" of Mr. Comte, so curtly dismissed by Mr. Spencer\* as a quite inadequate object of reverence, which a little reflection readily enough shows it to be. Small value can ever be widely set on the "immortality" which Positivism promises to its faithful disciples, and for the following reasons: 1. Few persons will care for a popularity which follows upon their utter personal annihilation. 2. Few, again, can hope for such immortality at all, since the immense majority of men must be content to die unknown. 3. Still fewer, it may be affirmed, would really prize posthumous veneration by public opinion, when they consider how many really contemptible and vile characters have been popularly revered. 4. The Positivist heaven is, moreover, necessarily denied to many of the most virtuous, since it is a necessary condition of the virtue of many to live obscure and unknown. 5. Finally, the difficulty which a conscientious man experiences in estimating even *his own* motives and character, shows how simply impossible it is for many men accurately and justly to estimate each other's real merits. But one of the drollest notions of what may fitly inspire reverence is put forth by Mr. Spencer himself; not, indeed, in his own person, but in that of an imaginary disputant, whose discourse he calls "comparatively consistent." This disputant is made to speak† of the oscillations of molecular motion thus: "The activities of this imponderable substance, though far simpler, and in that respect far lower, than the activities we call Mind, are at the same time far *higher* than those we call Mind in respect of their *intensity*, their velocity, their subtlety & . . . thought is quick, light is many millions of times quicker." Thus quick and strong jumpings and very complex antics are relatively "*high*"—using that word in the sense we *apply it to mind*. Exceedingly complex gyrations of atoms are thus higher than "love of God or man." Contemplating in imagination the atomic oscillations which this view of the universe puts before him, the Spencian disciple may be imagined to exclaim: What wonderfully oscillating atoms, how noble! With what energy and rapidity do they not vibrate! they are divine; *Venite adoremus!* As has been said, Mr. Spencer has not adopted this view as his own answer to an imaginary objector; nevertheless he patronises it as a "comparatively consistent" one, and certainly does not condemn it as nonsense; yet it is really wonderful how any one man of intelligence should for a moment imagine that any other could think material particles to

\* CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, June 1873, pp. 15-16.

† "Psychology," vol. i. p. 622.



be one bit more "noble" compared with "mind," let them perform what gyrations they may, or that they were made even a trifle "higher" by such restlessness. This passage reminds us of the Emersonian religion latent in the pious pirouettes of Fanny\* Ellsler. Returning to our main subject, we may note yet another curious phenomenon. We refer to the strange contradiction presented by the Sensist School, which contains Reasoners who ignore Reason, and teachers of others, who, not content with ignoring their own Ego as a substance, fail to appreciate their own passing logical activity. Messrs. Spencer and Lewes, however fundamentally they differ, agree in representing "Inference" as really nothing but "association." No doubt the *sense-judgment*, so to speak, of Brutes is the imagination of unapparent sensibles through association with felt sensibles; but *rational-judgment* is, at the least, the taking up and transformation of this sensible association by the action of a self-conscious intellect. Mr. Lewes † speaks of bees feeling geometry in constructing their cells. They feel, of course; but to imply they have thereby any appreciation of geometry would be hardly less unreasonable than to imply the same of crystallizing salt or sugar. The "Logic" of sense is truly "Logic," but it is the logic of some one else, not of the brute that feels. Mr. Lewes, however, makes a remark of so strange a character, that it is impossible after reading it not to hesitate before accepting any opinion of his respecting intellect. Speaking ‡ of "Instinct" as being, according to his strange notion, "lapsed or indiscursive intelligence;" he says: "The objection will doubtless be raised that Instinct is wholly destitute of the characteristic of Intelligence in that it has no choice: its operation is fixed, fatal. The reply is twofold: in the first place, the objection, so far as it has validity, applies equally to judgment where, given the premisses, the conclusion is fatal, no alternative being open. Axioms, in this sense, are logical instincts. Thus the highest intellectual process is on a level with this process said to be its opposite." "On a level!"—"applies equally!" Why, here the essential distinction between "Instinct" and "Reason" is utterly ignored. "Instinct" is "fatal" but *blind*. Reason is "fatal," but *sees*. Axioms cannot be "Instincts," because they are *seen* to be true, and are not blindly followed.

But is it possible for modern Philosophy to culminate in such unsatisfactory and misleading exhibitions as this? It may be safely affirmed that self-contradiction, confusion, and that speculative annihilation, philosophical scepticism, must be the logical outcome of all such modern philosophy as either ignores the distinctive characters of reason, or denies our certainty of our own continued substantial existence, as does the Philosophy alike of Mill, of Huxley, and of

\* See CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, January 1872, p. 187.

† "Problems of Life and Mind," p. 240.

‡ Op. cit. p. 141.

Spencer. The limits of this article prohibit any attempt to demonstrate the latter operation; and it is the less necessary as the present writer has endeavoured elsewhere \* to make it clear. But it may be here remarked first that it is logically impossible to deny our knowledge of the substantial and persisting Ego without at the same time implying such knowledge, and secondly that uncertainty on the matter can alone be justified by introducing a scepticism so complete that the doubt itself vanishes in the uncertainty which follows as to whether such doubt is not after all certainty ending, in mental paralysis and the breakdown of all possible philosophy. But, once more, is this and such as this the end of modern Philosophic Evolution? As the New Academy has seemed to some to close the cycle of Greek speculative thought, is a hopeless and absolute philosophic scepticism to close that of the modern period? That such is to be the end, Comte, as all know, has broadly proclaimed, and his English disciple, Mr. G. H. Lewes, for all his verbal juggle about "metaphysics" and "metem-pirics," is as persistent as ever in denying the possibility of solving all those problems which have ever occupied the minds of the highest intellects; which problems he collectively stigmatises as "metem-pirical."

So gloomy and despairing a view is by no means shared by the present writer; on the contrary, he looks forward with confident hope to great metaphysical progress at no very distant period, and he sees no cause of discouragement in a certain apparent barrenness of results attending recent speculation. Progress is not uniform, but is effected by successively advancing waves, and even thus very unequally—advance in some directions being generally accompanied by, at least temporary, retrogression in others.

The artistic triumphs of Greece were not attained without an accompanying ethical depression, and when the decaying Greco-Roman civilization became largely replaced by that of hardy Teutons, fresh from the baptismal font, barbarian art accompanied the moral renovation. The literary culture of the Renaissance was synchronous with a wide-spread loss of political liberty, to the profit of centralized despotism, while the gradual growth and consolidation of our parliamentary system marks a period of continued architectural decline. Mr. Lecky † has admirably demonstrated to us how wide-spread sentiments and habits of thought simply drop out of fashion, and how beliefs which have never been disproved, and with their evidence still unrefuted, come gradually to be abandoned and their evidence ignored, till a quite contradictory belief is eventually accepted. A wave of sentiment, far more than any logical process, repelled from men's minds the doctrine of man's ape origin when was first mooted. It is the flow of an opposite wave of sentiment

\* See *Fortnightly Review*, Vol. xiii., 1873, p. 718.

† "History of Rationalism."

which determines its wide-spread acceptance now. Might we not then expect, *à priori*, that the great advance in natural knowledge of the last three centuries—those marvellous discoveries which have more and more directed men's minds to physical observation and experiment—should be accompanied by stagnation or retrogression along some other lines of thought?

Attention cannot fully be directed to two distinct enquiries simultaneously, and an exhausting pursuit of physics must necessarily starve some other intellectual habit. We should then be little surprised to find for a time, a philosophical decline accompanying scientific advance. Moreover, it is ever the wont of men's minds, to depreciate the object of admiration of the period immediately preceding. We can view with more or less admiration the costume of a century past, but the fashion of some five or ten years ago seems to us more or less absurd, as well as distasteful. Thus each past activity has to wait for its due appreciation, until the period of unjust depreciation which has followed it has passed by.

The architectural glories of Northern Europe, those mediæval structures, at once (from their beauty and true principles of construction) poems and scientific treatises in stone, have only of late years ceased to be despised as barbarous. Now, universally appreciated, fragments of ruins which happy accident has saved from destruction, are guarded with jealous care, and thoughtfully studied as revelations of a skill and refinement which have passed from among us.

As it is now with the material constructions of the middle ages, so, we may find reason to think, will it be to a yet greater extent with the far more marvellous intellectual fabrics those ages have bequeathed us. The soaring lightness of such lofty arches as those of the Choir of Le Mans, awake our admiration by reason of their beauty. But our wonder is yet more exercised by the solidity of those slender piers, and towering buttresses, which, arch over arch, hold securely poised so vast a roof of stone at such an airy height. Similarly, the wonderful acuteness, the delicacy and subtlety of distinction to be found in scholastic writers are already exciting the wonder of the few who, following Sir William Hamilton, are beginning to make acquaintance with them. But it may be that wonder will ere long be much more widely excited by the solidity of the reasoning those acute and delicate minds thought out. A foretaste of such appreciation with respect to the philosophy of this period has lately been given us by one of its most distinguished opponents. The Lord Rector of Aberdeen, addressing his subjects, thought it well to tell them :—

“The scholastic Philosophy is a wonderful monument of the patience and ingenuity with which the human mind tried to build up a logically consistent theory of the Universe. . . . And that

\* See CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, March 1874, p. 667.

philosophy is by no means dead and buried, as many vainly suppose. On the contrary, numbers of men of no mean learning and accomplishment, and sometimes of rare power and subtlety of thought, hold by it as the best theory of things which has yet been stated. And, what is more remarkable, men who speak the language of modern Philosophy nevertheless think the thoughts of the schoolmen."

It may be well, perhaps, now to state the reasons which make this increased appreciation probable.

Mr. Spencer has remarked \*: "During all past times mankind have eventually gone right, after trying all possible ways of going wrong." The same course mankind appears also to follow in philosophic speculation. The great process of *reductio ad absurdum* has attended the Evolution of our post-mediæval metaphysics. The logical result is scepticism, the intellectual paralysis (as respects philosophy) attending the modern sensational school, which is essentially the school of Hume, has already been noted; it remains to call attention to the fact that Hume's philosophy is the logical consequence of the metaphysics referred to. That such is the case, indeed, the event has shown. Berkeley's mind was far too acute not to build logically on the premisses he accepted from Locke, and the same may be said of Hume with respect to Berkeley. The refutation which Kant for a time effected has been itself refuted by the aid of that very evolutionary process which Kant himself favoured and foreshadowed. In spite of the efforts of the philosopher of Königsberg, in spite of Reid and his followers in England, and of Royer-Collard, Maine-de-Biron, Jouffroy and Cousin in France, the most extreme sensationalism is once more in possession of the field, ranging from Naples to Aberdeen, and from Bordeaux to St. Petersburg.

Thus the teaching of the whole school of Modern Metaphysics ends in Scepticism, in Nihilism, as the ultimate result of Materialism and Idealism.

It will naturally be asked, then, if such is not to be the end of Philosophic Evolution, what is the remedy, and how is recuperative force to be obtained?

The reply here offered is, that a remedy is to be obtained by digging deeper. No mere return to Kant is adequate to meet a scepticism which so much of Kant's system completely justifies. It is impossible to secure to practical reason its objective validity, if "pure" reason be declared fallacious. If the view here advocated be correct, what is needed, and what evolution will infallibly bring about, is not a return to *a* Philosophy, but a return to *the* Philosophy. For if metaphysics are possible, there is not, and never was or will be, more than one Philosophy which, properly understood, unites all speculative truths and eliminates all errors—the Philosophy of the Philosopher—Aristotle.

But, it will be exclaimed, this is throwing us into confusion; all the speculative discussions of the last two thousand years and more will have to be gone through again! Aristotle is understood in many senses, and has given rise to many schools. It would be hardly less irrational to refer us to the Bible for Theology, than to refer us to Aristotle for Philosophy. And the propriety of the objection would be conceded, did there not exist a continuous traditional line of Philosophic Evolution, bringing down the Peripatetic Philosophy to the present day. Others may exclaim, this is stagnation, or even reaction! But there is of course no real danger of either; the laws of Evolution in general render it absurd to suppose that stagnation, or a really reactionary reversal of development, can ever be possible. All that is possible is that speculation may revert to a temporarily abandoned line of inquiry, experience having demonstrated that all other possible lines end blindly.

Many persons may be surprised to read the assertion that such a continuous and traditional school of Philosophy exists at all; but that it does exist is none the less a truth. The Peripatetic Philosophy simply fell out of fashion at the period of the Renaissance, when in the scientific and literary intoxication of the period, with its reviving Platonism, Pantheism, and Paganism, men left traditional lines of speculative thought to fall into bondage to the Philosophical empiric Descartes and the wonderfully overestimated Bacon. The French philosophical heresiarch—the logical father both of our modern materialists and idealists—never understood—he had never even learned—the Philosophy he ignorantly opposed. That Philosophy, ridiculed and overborne, but never refuted, was pushed aside by the force of the popular current, and became, after a time, like the architecture of the colleges it had illustrated—a byword of reproach and contempt; till, ignored and forgotten, the world is astonished to learn that it has never ceased to have both teachers and disciples. It is even amusing to observe how pointless are many of the arguments of moderns such as Messrs. Spencer, Lewes, &c., from their want of acquaintance with the Scholastics, and the simple way\* in which they think that all is done, when Kant has been replied to, and that it is quite needless to go further back.

Some readers may be disposed to ask, where has this philosophy been preserved, and who are its teachers now?

At the epoch of that flood of barbarian invasion which overspread a world deemed by so many to be approaching its end, the treasures of classic literature found fortunate shelter within the libraries of

\* Thus Mr. Spencer ignores all philosophy anterior to Descartes, and contents himself with Berkeley, Hume and Kant, as examples of the moderns. Mr. Lewes (*"Problems,"* vol. i., p. 437) actually affirms "All modern metemprics are either Kantian or founded upon Kantian principles." For examples of complete misapprehension of the only philosophy worthy the name, and consequently futile argumentation, see pp. 152, 212, 214, 245, 249, 265, 271, 278, 363, 368, 437, and 447.

Benedictine monasteries scattered far and wide in dense forests, savage, rocky solitudes, or dismal swamps. Those black-robed monks, whose manual labour spread agriculture over Northern Europe, not content with ministering to the people's bodily and spiritual needs, paved the way for refined mental culture by their preservation of so many writings which, but for them, would have been finally lost to us. For these deeds the gratitude of all enlightened men of all creeds or of none, has been, and is, theirs; and thus, when modern Vandalism recently threatened with destruction the venerable Abbey of Monte Cassino, some of our noblest fellow-countrymen allowed no difference of belief to hinder their energetic protest against so cruel a blow to history, to literature, and to the glory of the Italian nation itself.

At the epoch of that flood of Pagan intoxication which overspread Europe at the Renaissance, as the culture of the traditional philosophy passed from disesteem to abandonment, it found a fortunate shelter also within religious houses, and especially (as was most natural) with the Dominicans. The mission of the friars preachers was, however (for some centuries to come at least), mainly accomplished, and thus we have to look elsewhere for its most efficient support. Just at the critical moment there appeared in the arena of speculative conflict those ever-fresh spiritual athletes, the sons of St. Ignatius of Loyola. In their colleges the traditional philosophy has been scrupulously preserved, and from Suarez and Lugo to Kleutgen (now living in exile) an uninterrupted body of teachers has carried on its cultivation and development, applying its principles again and again in opposition to the various errors as they have arisen, from the time of the Society's foundation to the present day. As gratitude is now due, and widely acknowledged, to the Benedictines, for their preservation during the illiterate ages of our choicest literary treasures, so gratitude is now due, and will one day be even more widely acknowledged, to the Jesuits for their preservation during the whole Renaissance movement of our choicest philosophic treasures, as main guardians of the Peripatetic tradition.

The Fathers of the Society enjoy the glory of perennial persecution and hostility; and, whatever may be the view taken of their merits, and whatever good men may oppose them, all must admit that they at least possess the distinction conferred on them by the special hostility of all the vilest of mankind. Nevertheless it is not impossible that their careful preservation for us of the traditional philosophy may one day be reckoned a yet greater distinction.

This Philosophy then lives, and is taught amongst us here in England now, and it is to be regretted that some prominent English Sensists do not profit by such teaching. Were one of the leaders of the modern school to cease altogether to write or teach for a period

of some three years, and to endeavour to obtain for that period the hospitality of a Jesuit Seminary, and there devote himself (merely *at first* as a learner, and not as a critic) to the acquisition of the Peripatetic Philosophy, his labour would not be lost. The present writer has too strong a belief in human free will to be confident that the supposed student's views would be thereby, as a matter of course, fundamentally modified, but is quite certain that his power and depth as a philosopher would be very greatly augmented, and, irrelevant matters being removed, controversy would be brought more aptly to an issue.

It may be asked, however, wherein do you see actual signs of such a revival of Philosophy? It may be answered that amongst other indications the writer has positive information of the advance of the Peripatetic Philosophy in Germany; that Professor Uberweg himself bore witness to such a movement; that Mr. Spencer's own writings tend to force it on; that Mr. Lewes's last book \* is calculated to drive it forward at an accelerated rate; that its course is facilitated by the philosophy of Hartmann; and that the testimony of no less an opponent than Professor Huxley himself, has borne witness to its vitality. Moreover, as will be almost immediately urged, recently discovered scientific facts and the direction of modern biological thought favour philosophical conceptions universally prevalent amongst men of culture four centuries ago, but which have since been generally neglected and ignored.

If, then, such a revival as is here indicated is indeed to be looked for—if that philosophy, in the terms of which the various Christian doctrines have been defined is likely once more to play a prominent and dominant part in the intellectual world, it is almost needless to point out that there can be no fear for Christianity. That Evolution is taking such a course the present writer believes, and he consequently also believes that scientific and political Evolution can but favour Christianity, in the modes predicted in former parts of this Essay, on the condition that philosophic Evolution should be found to take no hostile direction. But if Postcartesian philosophy has been so wanting in positive results, even from its own point of view, as is

\* See his "Problems of Life and Mind;" we find there good Peripateticism as to the soul and body unconsciously set forth at pp. 112, 156, 160 and 161; as to the distinction between men and brutes, at pp. 124, 153-155, 157, 160, 169, 250 and 296; as to universals, at p. 136; as to the existence of "potential" knowledge, at p. 243; as to the sort of existence possessed by "co-ordination," "life," and "mind," at p. 281; as to terminology, at p. 336; as to the relation of the ideal to the real order, at p. 342; as to mathematical intuitions, at p. 398; as to the relations between imagination and conception, at p. 420. Even as to Logic, as an art, he goes wrong rightly. Thus he says (p. 77), "There is no more an art of Reasoning than there is an art of Breathing or Digesting." But peripatetic logic is an art in so far as it is Cathartic, and that as we may improve our actual breathing or digestion through a knowledge of physiology, so we may practically improve our actual reasoning through a knowledge of the laws of thought.

here maintained, are the gyrations it has gone through useless, and will the world be none the better for the expenditure of so much effort and so much skill? Instead of such being the case, it seems probable that the Postcartesian philosophy, of which Spencerism may be taken as the culmination, will have performed a most useful part. Indeed, considering how through it and its alliance with physical science, philosophy has penetrated where, but for these conditions, it might never have effected an entrance, it would be difficult to estimate its value and importance too highly. The main reason why the wide diffusion of Spencerism seems so advantageous, is its bearing upon four fundamental objects:—I. The Ego. II. The Will. III. Nature. IV. God.

1. As regards the Ego, the persistence with which our knowledge of it has been denied, and the arguments by which such denial has been supported, serve to bring out the supreme importance of our recognition of our own self-consciousness and all that our knowledge of the Ego implies and contains. Each man who for the first time has his eyes thus opened to the marvellous nature of his present knowledge of his own past existence, will see in the necessarily postulated "veracity of memory" the evidence of his possession of real objective truth and of knowledge other than phenomenal. In recognizing his own self-consciousness he must also recognize that his mind declares certain truths (*e. g.*, that what thinks, exists) to be absolutely and universally true. He must, on introspection, further see that such truths are not passively apprehended by him, through his impotence to think the contrary, but are actively apprehended and seen to be truths positively necessary and universal, and in this way his mind will again be carried by its own force from subjectivity to objectivity. The validity of the declarations of his intellect, and consequently of its logical processes, being thus rendered unassailable except at the price of absolute intellectual paralysis, its declarations as to "causation" and "morality" gain at once a recognized validity. That phenomenal conditional changes, even if ranging in cycles through a past eternity, must require a real, absolute eternal, Cause, will be apparent to him, while the absolute declarations of the intellect in the sphere of morality will necessarily lead to the attribution to that cause of "a goodness" harmonizing with, however immeasurably exceeding, his own. In other words, the widespread propagation of the absurd denial of our own self-knowledge is an antecedent condition to a more thorough and complete appreciation of that self-knowledge and of all that is made known to us thereby, than any other cause (save such denial) could well be conceived as producing. The supreme importance of the Delphic inscription acquires a fresh significance. In knowing "ourselves" we come to know, with a supreme degree of certainty, a whole sphere of objective truths which the intellect is seen to have the



wonderful faculty of perceiving together with the very light by which those truths manifest themselves to it—namely, their objective, necessary, and universal truth.

The facts here referred to may be summed up, in other words, as follows:—

The consideration of our own continued existence reveals to us objective truth and our possession of it.

Our self-consciousness also reveals to us that similarly there are universal, objectively necessary truths (as *e. g.* "what thinks exists"), and that we can know them.

Similarly our intellect shows us the validity of our own reason and the objective validity of the syllogism which renders implicit truth explicit to us.

Hence we learn the validity of our inference as to the existence of a First Cause of the universe known to us, and of a possible indefinitely vast universe beyond our knowledge.

From this Cause, which our reason tells us must be greater and higher than we can conceive, we rationally infer "order." Therefore there must be a purpose in all that such Cause produces, since "order" and "purpose" exist in human actions and are recognized by the human intellect, which is one amongst the effects of such First Cause.

II. With respect to "Will," the passionate obstinacy with which the declarations of the common sense of mankind are contested and every fragment of free self-determining power denied, serves to bring out more emphatically than before the marvellous and isolated character of that power of choice which all unprejudiced men know that they possess. When it comes to be fully appreciated, amongst the many, how rigid law rules not only all living as well as inanimate irrational creatures, but how even the immense majority of our own actions are simply automatic—the wonderful character of our power of (in certain cases) voluntarily choosing the less attractive of two competing objects—will be less inadequately estimated. Moreover, the recognition in our own being of this power, beyond anything else in nature, renders supernatural action external to us not only credible but to be anticipated *à priori*. Creative action and absolute annihilation, miracle, response to prayer, and the apportionment in another world of rewards and chastisements according to the exercise in this of meritorious volitions, or of the reverse, harmonize thoroughly with that philosophy which asserts the freedom of the will. That they do so harmonize, the very objections of our modern Determinists serve to demonstrate; and it is daily becoming more apparent that to deny these is by implication to deny the existence of virtue, to uproot every possible basis of morality, and to eliminate from the social organism those legal sanctions, and even those modes of speech, which are bound up with the very existence of "rights"

and "duties" practically as well as logically. The bitter hostility which exists to the doctrine of man's free will is not difficult to understand. It is impossible to assert it without implicitly asserting religion; and it is, in one aspect at least, a trial to pride. It is indeed no small trial to the pride of a highly-cultured man of powerful intellect to feel that the poorest peasant is fully as capable as himself of performing the highest actions—those which are the special prerogative of man—namely, the exercise of rational meritorious volition and choice. If there is such a thing as morality, it is beyond comparison as to value with mere intellectual culture or capacity, and it necessarily follows that a poor paralyzed old woman sitting in a chimney-corner may, by her good aspirations and volitions, be repeatedly performing mental acts compared with which the discovery by Newton of the law of Gravitation is as nothing.

Again, in Free Will and Morality, we have that which cannot be the result of mere brute inheritance. Conceptions of Time and Space, may be plausibly represented as structural results of a practically infinite brute ancestry which has been submitted to conditions of time and space, but, at any rate such ancestry was never submitted to conditions of moral responsibility. Thus the recognition of the human will renders absurd the conception that man can have developed from a brute.

III. With respect to "Nature," the modern conception of it is in many respects, as has been lately said, a return to older views, or at least harmonizes with such. The prevailing views are indeed simply Pantheistic, but all that is positive in such views may be easily assimilated with Philosophic Theism. Indeed, it may be affirmed that much in Modern Physiology demands Scholasticism as its logical complement, and the doctrine of Biological Evolution needs pre-eminently the aid of the peripatetic doctrine of "Matter" and "Form."

Mr. Spencer's view of Evolution itself may be taken up and included within a larger one, which will then assume the part of "form" to the "matter" provided for us by Mr. Spencer.

Mr. Spencer's law is, that everything in the Material Universe is proceeding from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity. But he supplies us with no explanatory basis for this law. We can see, by his system, neither its origin, its ultimate future, nor the principle of its continuity. Our Philosophy, however, shows us (by means of our self-conscious substantial Ego, endowed with the power of knowing objective truth) a necessary First Cause—which amongst its attributes must have an intelligence and a will, such as find their faint and inadequate type in the corresponding faculties of the human soul. Such a cause, as Intelligent, cannot be self-contradictory, and hence necessarily follows the con-

*tinuity* of Cosmical Evolution. It must, as Will, have such an intensity of "purpose," that no human purpose can be comparable with it. Hence necessarily follows "*final causality*"—the enchainment of all phenomena and their adaptation to ends in a hierarchy of augmenting activities, from molar cohesions and celestial revolutions through vegetative life and animal sentiency up to self-consciousness and free volition, so that, from kingdom to kingdom, the creation may rise towards an ideal—by successively higher degrees of participation in the perfection of the First Cause itself. By the union of these two laws of (1) continuity and (2) final causality, the whole phenomena of the universe—physical, biological, political, moral, and religious—may be really explained and understood, and Mr. Spencer's law may be accepted as conveniently expressing its material aspect and mode of action. Whether or not the teleological part of this conception can be gathered from mere irrational nature directly, it can most certainly be obtained from a consideration of what is involved in our own self-consciousness. When such implication is brought thence and applied to the universe, Nature, on a large scale and when broadly read, loudly confirms it though, as might be expected, the application of the human mind to the task of thoroughly comprehending the purposes of God in any given phenomenon has led, as it must necessarily always lead, to delusion and disappointment.

The phenomena of Cosmical Evolution are presented by the sensist school in terms of matter and force, and Mr. Spencer presents us with matter also reduced to conceptions of force. But that the universe can be explained by the conceptions of one sole force by itself, without any other force or any matter upon which such solitary force may act, is an evident absurdity. We must therefore conceive at least two forces, or force and matter. But for a solitary force to act upon matter, that matter, even if consisting of but a single element, must have certain qualities and powers of response to incident forces—*i. e.*, we must conceive latent potentialities which incident forces may render actualities. Hence we get the formal law of Cosmical Evolution—whereof Mr. Spencer's law is the material expression. This formal law may be defined as the continuous progress of the material universe by the unfolding of latent potentialities through the action of incident forces in harmony with a preordained end, such unfolding, exhibiting a change from indefinite incoherent homogeneity to definite coherent heterogeneity.

It was before observed, that reason shows us that phenomenal changes, even if eternal, require an eternal absolute cause. It shows it us thus: The principle of causality teaches us that everything must be absolute or caused. Science reveals to us an indefinite series of passed phenomenal changes, but points to no beginning. Reason

does not affirm that such changes may not have proceeded in cycles from all eternity, owing to an eternal collocation of causal factors. If such collocation and factors be the Absolute, we have Pantheism; which is to be refuted by *a priori* demonstrations of reason as well as by the positive dicta of our intellect in the sphere of morality, revealing to us an absolute distinction between good and evil, which Pantheism necessarily denies. If such collocation and factors be not the Absolute, they are caused; (that they are really fortuitous would probably be asserted by none of our modern school of philosophy, and this alternative may be neglected as absurd and obsolete). If such collocation and factors be caused, they cannot be caused by the whole sum of the phenomenal series, since this is the effect; still less by any part of it. They must, then, be caused by something external to the series and to the collocation of causal factors. But if the phenomenal universe be eternal, this cause must be eternal. It must be absolute, as the cause of everything phenomenal and relative. It must be orderly and intelligent, as the cause of an orderly series of phenomena which reveals to us an objective intelligence in the bee and ant, not that of such animals themselves, but which harmonizes with, and is recognized by, our own intellect. It must be adequate to produce all the phenomena which have been produced—amongst them power, intelligence, morality, and will; in other words, it must be God.

This Divine First Cause thus recognized by our intellect as necessarily existing, is more or less qualitatively revealed to us in the material universe according as we extend the sphere of our observations. It is concealed most completely when the inanimate creation is alone considered. It seems to assume a Pantheistic form when we rise no higher than the brute creation. If man alone occupies our attention, a narrow anthropomorphic Deism may be the result; but from a sympathetic study of the whole universe—the mineral, vegetable, animal, and human creations, including intellect, morality, and will,—the conception of Almighty God becomes fully revealed to the human intellect.

The process of Evolution, as carried through the material world, shows us the evolution from potentiality into actuality of successively new forms. We cannot imagine how they are produced; we simply recognize that they are. In passing to the vegetable world from the mineral kingdom, we behold, for the first time manifested, a vital form. In passing to the animal world from the vegetable kingdom, we behold, for the first time manifested, a sentient form. In passing to the human world from the kingdom of brute animals, we behold, for the first time manifested, a rational form.

With our entrance on the world of self-conscious reason and free volition we impinge upon another order of being from that revealed to us by all below it—an order of being which the cosinical universe,

as it were, intersects, as the different lines of cleavage and stratification may intersect in the same rock.

The mingling of the hyper-physical world of rationality with the irrational creation is paralleled by the existence of crystals in plants, and by the action of the vegetable kingdom in modifying the results of merely physical and chemical laws.

Such mingling is again paralleled by the action of plants on animals and of animals on plants (as *e. g.*, the necessity of insect-life for the fertilization of many, and even for the nutrition of some plants), such fertilizing action, perhaps, even occasioning important variations.

Modern science convincingly shows us that truth which St. Thomas taught centuries ago—that a successively increasing purpose runs through the irrational creation up to man. Cosmical entities and their laws do serve organic being more than inorganic, sentient being more than insentient, rational being more than sentient. Therefore, if the First Cause wills at all, he must have willed most service to man of all known creatures.

This increase of service (and consequent dependence) becomes manifest when we consider the following truths:

The inorganic world can do without the organic, but not *vice versâ*. The vegetable world can exist without the animal, but not *vice versâ*. The animal world can do without the rational world as experienced by us, but not *vice versâ*. Therefore, if there is *intention* at all, all things are for man in the chief degree, and not *vice versâ*.

The same law of progress extends through the evolution of human society. In politics, in law, in science, in art, and in religion\* we find the same law of evolution—continuity and final causality resulting in the manifestation of increasingly stable and definite varieties of being.

IV. We come now to the last and supremely important result of Modern Metaphysics—the vividness with which it forces on the many a recognition of the awful, the unapproachable majesty of Almighty God under the foolish term of “the Unknowable.” Of course there is nothing said upon this subject by Mr. Spencer, or any other writer, which has not been said scores of times by mediæval and other theologians. It is somewhat amusing to read Mr. Spencer’s objection to the term “personality,” as applied to God, because “inadequate and *below*, rather than above, the unspeakable reality—as if every tyro in theology did not know that not even “being” could be predicated univocally of God and of any creature, and as if the term *hyperhypothesis* was not a familiar one to denote the absolute personality as distinguished from every dependent one. Yet it is none the less true that grossly inadequate and absurdly anthropomorphic conceptions of God are widely spread, and that the incautious and

\* See Dr. Newman’s great work, “An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine.”

inaccurate language of popular pious writers is likely to spread further and deeper such grossness and absurdity. Of course, after all, the difference between our highest attainable conception of God and that of the rudest boor is as nothing compared with the difference between that highest conception and the Divine reality. Nevertheless, *quoad nos*, it is a great gain to have a somewhat higher notion more widely spread, and the general dissemination of controversy respecting "the Unknowable" cannot fail to spread wider, conceptions of a higher character. Not but that "the Unknowable," as represented by Mr. Spencer, devoid of personality, is, in reality, *lower* instead of, *higher* than the popular conception of God; but at the same time, while those who are indisposed to Theism may thus be confirmed in their negations, those who are Theists cannot but have their Theism improved and their conceptions raised by a careful and detailed consideration of the hopeless inadequacy of all symbols to convey to us a knowledge of our Creator as He is.

From the foregoing considerations, minds tolerably free from prejudice can hardly fail to deduce certain practical conclusions.

1. Worshippers of God are often reproached with seeking to influence their Deity to unduly favour them by the use of flattery, and it is urged that no good man would allow himself to be influenced by praises or abject entreaties, or by expressions of reverence and self-abasement whether by word or gesture. But anyone who has gone through the modern controversy as to "the Unknowable" must logically admit that this reproach and this argument are nothing less than absurd. He must recognize that there is no parity whatever between praise, entreaty and reverence as addressed to man, and praise, entreaty and reverence as addressed to God. It is contemptible to flatter men, because it is wrong, and contemptible to say that which we know not to be true; but to flatter God is simply *impossible*. Reverence of an extreme kind paid to man is contemptible because it is a mode of lying, of asserting a disparity and a superiority which in truth do not exist, but with God it is quite otherwise. No Oriental prostrations can even approximatively express the awful reverence with which *reason* declares it fitting for a creature to approach his Creator, regard being had to that Creator's majesty alone. A worship which by every outward expression should denote a reverence and adoration such as no words could express would, from this point of view, surely be that which could alone deserve the epithet of *Rational*.

2. The recognition of God's inconceivable greatness, joined with our clear perception of all that is implied in our own free-will, must force on the student of this modern controversy a special apprehension of the nature of "sin." If "the Unknowable" be all that we are told it is, there cannot possibly be any evil comparable with that of a voluntary denial of worship, or of any other conscious rebellion

against God. It becomes manifest at once that if there be a personal embodiment of evil, the one motto of such a being must be the proud one "*non serviam*," and the worst men the world contains must be those who commit this act of pride, and who, however unconsciously following such a leader, adopt his motto avowedly or practically. Moreover, not only the supreme vice but the unspeakable folly of such a line of conduct must become plain, and the truth of the dictum "*initium sapientie timor Domini*," must shine out with a distinctness not before perceived. It thus appears that the true line to be drawn as regards men is between those who have and those who have not a will to adore, love and serve God. This is taught by the Church in allowing a possibility of salvation to all who, being through no fault of theirs ignorant of Revelation, simply worship a *Deus unus et remunerator*, and in affirming that one pure mental act of love of God alone, or with contrition if needed, suffices for justification. Tender consideration and loving sympathy are due to all who reject revealed religion, because they cannot see how it accords with their notions of God's perfections. But, unhappily, we have only too much evidence that there are those who reject all Divine worship because they will submit to no being whatever, and who even pass on to "hate God" with all their heart, with all their soul, with all their mind, and with all their strength, thus beginning in this world that hatred of their Creator which exists eternally in hell.

3. Once more, the same considerations cannot but bring home to the student how evidently true is the saying that God's ways cannot be as our ways, and how, therefore, the action which we discover immanent in the material universe may be rationally taken to be from God. In that universe we find an action the results of which harmonize with man's reason, which is orderly, which disaccords with the action of blind chance and with the "fortuitous concourse of atoms" of Democritus; but, at the same time, an action which ever, in part and in ultimate analysis, eludes our grasp, and the modes of which are different from those by which we should have attempted to accomplish such ends. The inconsistency is surely very great of those who assert that all our knowledge comes from experience, and at the same time that "creative action" is incredible because nature affords no evidence of it. Since of creative action we have and can have no experience whatever, that action, if it takes place, must necessarily be unperceived and uncomprehended by us. The action of God must necessarily be unimaginable by us in its fulness, but its reality and efficiency can be very clearly conceived as incessant and universal in every form of being known to us, and in the far greater number of entirely unknown forms. God is thus neither withdrawn from nor identified with his material creation, and no part of it is left devoid of meaning or of purpose. The poet's plaint as to the flower

'born to blush unseen and waste its sweetness on the desert air' is thus seen to be quite uncalled for—every creature of every order of existence, being ever, while its existence is sustained, so complacently contemplated by God that the intense and concentrated attention of all men of science together upon it could but form an utterly inadequate symbol of such divine contemplation.

4. There is yet one more practical consideration which this controversy seems well fitted to bring home vividly to the student of it—namely, the question of "worship." The consistent evolutionist who fully apprehends the great principle of continuity must recognize the utter hopelessness of anyone inventing *de novo* a form of worship of "the Unknowable" capable of satisfying the intellectual, moral and esthetic tendencies of men of culture. Recognizing the fact that the ascensive process of evolution is "integrating" and not "disintegrating;" that what has once become disintegrated can never really be restored, and that, speaking broadly and on the whole, the later developments are superior to the earlier, it seems inevitable that the rational and consistent Evolutionist should go to Mass.

Recognizing "the Unknowable" as everywhere present in nature, the Evolutionist must recognize that a fitting worship should embrace as wide a field of existences and activities as is compatible with historical evolution. He will not affect to despise the senses and emotions any more than the intellect as involved in such worship, rather, being impressed (as a follower of Herbert Spencer) with the vivid permeability of those channels which lead to irreligious emotions, he will see the reasonableness of facilitating religious emotion by supplying it with easily permeable channels, and of bringing in as much as possible instead of excluding vivid sensations.

In the various fragmentary relics of the Church's worship which have been adopted by the sects, the reason of the Evolutionist can hardly fail to be tried and irritated by a service (a product of mere disintegrating action) in which worship consists of sentences distinctly uttered in the vernacular tongue, followed by a sermon with which it is very likely he will have but little sympathy. At Mass his intellect, though amply exercised should he so will it, yet need not be tried by the hearing of a single word from beginning to end. His esthetical instincts may be gratified by treasures of the organic and inorganic worlds; by products of human skill whether of the artizan or the musician, and by the solemn motions and stately rhythms of, as it were, a sacred dance. His historical sentiments will be gratified by contemplating a worship essentially the same as that spread over our land before these last three centuries of repression; a worship the same as that which aided to weld together Normans and Saxons into our English race; the same as that which has afforded spiritual support to all those the world has deemed most holy—to Fénelon, Vincent of Paul, Aquinas, Francis and Augus-



time. Even dimly, as in a glimmering twilight, he may see in the sacred offerings and the accompaniments of flowers, of tapers, and of perfumes, suggestions of a past, remote indeed, even of the early worship of his primitive Aryan forefathers in their eastern home. The "reasonable service" of Him who is at once the Source and Maintainer of all Evolution from the merely physical to that of human society, should surely have this harmonious universality of character. If "the Unknowable," if Almighty God is to be worshipped at all, the consistent Evolutionist must surely deem that worship to be most fitting which has thus from century to century grown on and on in one progressive process of increasing integration. The Evolutionist recognizing the First Cause everywhere, and also (if a consistent follower of Mr. Spencer) recognizing the need of Religion, must require a real worship of profound, at least mentally prostrate, adoration of that Cause as actually present here and now. Such a one could not surely find a more fitting mode of worship than the one suggested. Being himself a creature under conditions of space and time, and necessitated to frame his thoughts according to such conditions, he must worship, if he worship at all, the First Cause under those limitations. In joining in worship at the Elevation of the Host he cannot err, since, as he admits his Deity everywhere, he must surely be also THERE. Nay, he must needs admit that He is emphatically and supereminently there in that which is the centre of devotion to those present, and which has been the centre of devotion and worship of all the holiest souls the world has seen for many centuries past.

But if the Spencerite, convinced of the existence of an inconceivably high First Cause, which, from reverence alone, he refrains from calling personal, should so assist at the Church's highest act of worship, *even a doubter as to Theism* may rationally also so assist. In offering a hypothetical worship such doubter palter with no truth, but only manifests his good will to perform a duty, should the existence of such duty be a reality—as to which, by the hypothesis, he is in a state of uncertainty. If he is sincerely desirous of having his doubts resolved, surely he must feel convinced that such a manifestation of good-will can have no other than a beneficial effect (supposing a Personal First Cause exists) while in no case can it harm or degrade him, since he is not supposed to give any assent to that which he does not really accept, but, being confessedly in a state of doubt, he offers only a hypothetical worship such as should rationally accompany the existence of such doubt, though not, of course, the existence of a state of positive and absolute negation, such as no modern English philosopher openly avows.

Glancing backwards over the course we have traversed, it seems borne in upon us that the logical development of that process which Philip the Handsome began, is probably advancing, however slowly,


to a result very generally unforeseen. But if such result as that here indicated be the probable outcome of Philosophical Evolution, Christianity has once more evidently nothing whatever to fear from it. "A Philosophy which as a complement unites in one all other systems, will harmonize with a Religion which as a complement synthesises all other Religions, and not only Religions properly so called but Atheism also.

Atheism, Pantheism, and Pure Deism running their logical course and mutually refuting each other find an ultimate synthesis in Christianity, as we have before found them to do in Nature. Christianity affirms the truth latent in Atheism, namely that God, as He is, is unimaginable and inscrutable by us; in other words, that no God such as we can imagine, exists. It also affirms the truth of Pantheism, that God acts in every action of every created thing, and that in him we live and move and are. Finally, it also asserts the truth of Deism, but by its other assertions escapes the objections to which Deism by itself is liable from opposing systems. Similarly Christianity also effects a synthesis between Theism and the worship of Humanity, and that by the path not of destruction, but through the nobler conception of "taking the Manhood into God."

It may be well to conclude this Essay by a retrospect.

Our investigations concerning Social, Political, Scientific, and Philosophic Evolution, have but led us to what we might have *a priori* anticipated—the conclusion that the highest intellectual power is that which must ultimately dominate inferior forces. Neither political nor scientific developments can avail against the necessary consequences of Philosophical Evolution. No mistake can be greater than that of supposing that philosophy is but a mental luxury for the few. An implicit, unconscious philosophy possesses the mind and influences the conduct of every peasant. Metaphysical doctrines, sooner or later, filter down from the cultured few to the lowest social strata, and become, for good or ill, the very marrow of the bones, first of a school, then of a society, ultimately of a nation. The course of general Philosophy, it is here contended, is now returning to its legitimate channel after a divergence of some three centuries' duration. That return cannot affect prejudicially the Christian Church, but must strengthen and aid it, and thus that beneficial action upon it of Political and Scientific Evolution, before represented as probable, will be greatly intensified, and the great movement of the RENAISSANCE hereafter take its place as the manifestly efficient promoter of a new development of the Christian Organism such as the first twenty centuries of its life afforded it no opportunity to manifest.

ST. GEORGE MIVART.



## REVIEW OF OBJECTIONS TO LITERATURE AND DOGMA.

### I.

**M**ODERN scepticism will not allow us to rely either on the Epistle of Polycarp, or on the narrative of his martyrdom, as certainly authentic; nevertheless a saying from the latter we will venture to use. As Polycarp stood in the amphitheatre at Smyrna before his martyrdom, with the heathen multitude around crying out against him as an atheistical innovator, the Roman proconsul, pitying his great age, begged him to pronounce the formulas which expressed adherence to the popular religion and abhorrence of Christianity. 'Swear,' said he, 'by the fortune of Cæsar; cry: *Away with the atheists.*' Whereupon Polycarp, says the letter of the Church of Smyrna which relates his martyrdom, looking round with a severe countenance upon the heathen multitudes that filled the amphitheatre, pointed to these with his hand, and, with a groan and casting up his eyes to heaven, cried: 'Away with the atheists!' This did not give satisfaction, and Polycarp was burnt.

Yet so completely has the so-called atheism of Polycarp prevailed, that we are almost puzzled at finding it called atheism by the popular religion of its own day, by the worshippers of Jupiter and Cybele, of Rome and the fortune of Cæsar. On the other hand, Polycarp's retort upon these worshippers, his flinging back upon their religion the name of atheism, seems to us the most natural thing in the world. And so most certainly will it be with the popular religion of our own day. Confident in its traditions and imaginations it now cries out against those who pronounce them vain: *Away with the atheists,*

just as the heathen populace of Asia cried out against Polycarp. With a groan, and casting up his eyes to heaven, the critic execrated by our popular religion and by its votaries might well, like Polycarp, point to his execrators and retort: *Away with the atheists!* So deeply unsound is the mass of traditions and imaginations of which this religion consists, so gross a distortion and caricature of the true religion does it present, that future times will hardly comprehend its audacity in calling those who abjure it atheists; while its being stigmatized itself with this hard name will astonish no one.

Let us who criticize the popular religion, however, show a moderation of which our adversaries do not set us the example. We may not indeed, like the *Times* newspaper, call this current theology 'an English, a Protestant, and a reasonable religion.' But let us never forget that it professes, as we ourselves have again and again repeated, along with all its pseudo-science and all its popular legend, the main doctrine of the Bible, the pre-eminence of righteousness and the method and secret of Jesus,—professes it and in some degrees uses it. Let us never forget that our quarrel with its pseudo-science and its popular legend is because they endanger this main doctrine, this saving truth, on which our popular religion has in some degree hold. Let us gladly admit that the advance of time and of knowledge has even begun to shake the overweening confidence of our official theology in its own pseudo-science and popular legend, and that its replies to the impugner of them, if still too apt to be intemperate, are yet fast freeing themselves from the insolence and invective of thirty years ago. The strictures of official theology on 'Literature and Dogma' have certainly not been mild; yet, on the whole, their moderation has surprised me. An exception must be made, perhaps, for the *Dublin Review*. But an Englishman should always ask himself with shame: If Irish Catholicism is provincial in its violence and virulence, whose fault is it?

To retort therefore upon those who have attacked 'Literature and Dogma' as anti-Christian and anti-religious, to re-capitulate their hard words and to give them hard words in return, is not our intention. It is necessary, indeed, to mark firmly and clearly that from our criticism of their theology,—that grotesque mixture, as we have called it, of learned pseudo-science with popular legend,—their outcry does not make us go back one inch; that it is they who in our judgment owe an apology to Christianity and to religion, not we. But when this has once been clearly marked, our business with our assailants is over. Our business is henceforth not with them, but with those for whose sake 'Literature and Dogma' was written.

These alone we have in view in noticing criticisms of that book, whatever may be their nature. And there have appeared criticisms of it very different from those blind and angry denunciations of which we have spoken, those denunciations from the point of view of official

theology; there have been criticisms deserving, some of them, our high respect, others, not our high respect only but our warm gratitude also; all of them, our careful attention. Eminently of this sort were the criticisms by Mr. Llewellyn Davies in this REVIEW, by Professor Rauwenhoff in the *Theological Review* of Leyden, by M. Albert Réville in the *Academy*, by M. Charles Secrétan in the *Revue Suisse*. But nothing is more tiresome to the public than an author's set vindication of his work and reply to his critics, however worthy they may be of attention; and certainly nothing of this kind should we think of proposing to ourselves. To weigh what his critics say, to profit by it to the best of his judgment, and either to amend or to maintain his work according to his final conviction, is the right course for a criticized author to follow. It is all that the public want him to do, and all that we should in general wish to do ourselves.

But let me recall the object for which 'Literature and Dogma' was written. It was written in order to win access for the Bible and its religion to many of those who now neglect them. It was written to restore the use of the Bible to those (and they are an increasing number) whom the popular theology with its proof from miracles, and the learned theology with its proof from metaphysics, so dissatisfy and repel that they are tempted to throw aside the Bible altogether. It was written to convince such persons that they cannot do without the Bible, that the popular theology and the learned theology are alike formed upon a profound misapprehension of the Bible; but that, when the Bible is read aright, it will be found to deal, in a way incomparable for its effectiveness, with facts of experience most pressing, momentous, and real.

This conviction of the indispensableness of the Bible, which in 'Literature and Dogma' I sought to impart to others, I myself had and have. In England the conviction has long prevailed and been nearly universal, but there are now signs of its being shaken. To maintain it, to make it continue to prevail, to hinder its giving way and dying out, is my object. It seemed to me that the great danger to the Bible at present arises from the assumption that whoever receives the Bible must set out with admitting certain propositions, such as the existence of a personal God, the consubstantiality of Jesus Christ with this personal God who is his father, the miraculous birth, resurrection, and ascension of Jesus; now the nature of these propositions is such that we cannot possibly verify them. It seemed to me that with the uninstructed or ill-instructed masses of our people this obstacle to the Bible's reception, which for a long time was an obstacle not existent for them at all, is, as things now stand, an obstacle almost insuperable. Therefore I sought and seek to show that the Bible is really based upon propositions which all can verify.

It is true, some deny that there exists the danger which I apprehend for the Bible. The masses, say they, the working men, are

not hard-headed, reasoning people at all; they are eminently people led by their feelings and passions. Yes, led by their feelings and passions towards what flatters their feelings and passions; but religion and the Bible do not flatter their feelings and passions. Towards religion and the Bible, which fill them with superstitious awe no longer, but which claim to check and control their feelings and passions, they have plenty of suspiciousness, incredulity, hard-headed common-sense to oppose. At most, they will make religion into something which flatters their feelings and passions; as one hears from those who know them, and one can see from their newspapers, that many of them have embraced a kind of revolutionary Deism, hostile to all which is old, traditional, established, and secure, and favourable to a clean sweep and a new stage, with the classes now in the background for chief actors. There is much to make the political Dissenters, on their part, fall in with this sort of religion, for many of its ends are theirs too; and we see that they do incline to fall in with it and to try to use it. And a revolutionary Deism of this kind will grow not improbably into a considerable power amongst us; so habituated are the people of this country to religion, and so strongly does their being vibrate to its language and excitements. The God of this religion of the future will be still a magnified and non-natural man, indeed, but by no means the magnified and non-natural man of our religion as now current. He may be best conceived, perhaps, as a kind of tribal God of the Birmingham League; not by any means a *Dieu des Bonnes Gens*, like the God of Béranger, a God who favours garrets, grisettes, gaiety, and champagne, but a *Dieu des Quatre Libertés*, the God of Free Trade, Free Church, Free Labour, and Free Land; with a new programme, therefore, and with Birmingham for his earthly head-quarters instead of Shiloh or Jerusalem, but with the old turn preserved for commanding to hew Agag in pieces, and with much even of the Biblical worship and language still retained; Mr. Jesse Collings and Mr. Chamberlain dancing before the ark, and Mr. Dale and Mr. George Dawson, in the Birmingham Town-Hall, offering up prayer and sacrifice. All this is possible, and perhaps not improbable. But a revolutionary Deism, based on the supposed rights of man and ardently destructive, is not the real religion of the Bible. It will fail; and its failure, the failure of that attempted application of the Bible which made the Bible flatter their feelings and passions, will discredit the Bible with the masses more than ever, will make them more than ever confront it with a suspiciousness, a hard incredulity, which take nothing upon trust. And fail the application must, for it is just one of those attempts at religion, at setting up something as righteousness which is not, that inevitably as often as we try them break down, and that by breaking down prove the grandeur and necessity of true religion, and testify to what it is. Nothing but righteousness will succeed, and nothing is righteousness but the method

and secret and sweet reasonableness of Jesus Christ. But these have nothing to do with the gospel of the rights of man, of the natural claim of every man to a certain share of enjoyment. Political science may create rights for a man and maintain them, may seek to apportion the means of enjoyment; but such is not the function of the Christian religion. Man sincere, man before conscience, man as Jesus put him, finds laid down for himself no rights; nothing but an infinite dying, and in that dying is life.

We persevere therefore in thinking, that danger, whether from active hostility or from passive indifference, to the continued prevalence and almost universal use of the Bible in this country there is; and that the only safe way of meeting this danger is to find, as grounds for men's continued acceptance and use of the Bible, propositions which can be verified and which are unassailable. This then has been our object: to find sure and safe grounds for the continued use and authority of the Bible.

It will at once be evident how different a design is this, and how much humbler and more limited, from that of those Liberal philosophers whose design is in general to discover and to lay down *the truth* as it is called. For we start with admitting that the truth, so far at least as religion is concerned, is to be found in the Bible, and what we seek is, that the Bible may be used and enjoyed. All disquisitions about the Bible seem to us to be faulty and even ridiculous which have for their result that the Bible is less felt, followed, and enjoyed after them than it was before them. The Bible is in our hands to be felt, followed, and enjoyed; this conviction we set out with. Men's instinct for self-preservation and happiness guided them to the Bible; now it is of the essence of what gives safety and happiness to exercise influence, to excite emotion and joy. And the Bible has long been enjoyed and enjoyed deeply; its summons to *lay hold of eternal life, to seek the kingdom of God*, has been a trumpet-call bringing life and joy to thousands. They regarded the Bible as a source of life and joy, and they were right in so regarding it; we wish them to be able so to regard it still. All that we may say about the Bible we confess to be a failure, if it does not lead people to find the Bible a source of life and joy still.

Liberal philosophers reproach us with treating the Bible like an advocate; with assuming that Israel had a revelation of extraordinary grandeur, that Jesus Christ said wonderful things far over the heads of his hearers, and that the records of all this are something incomparably delightful and precious; now we say that no inquiries about the Bible can be fruitful that are not filled with a sense of all this, which Christendom has always felt and rightly felt, only it has justified its feelings on wrong grounds. But Liberal investigators of truth, think, some of them, that as the Bible often offends against

morality, and at its best only utters, in an old-fashioned and ineffective way the commonplaces of morality which belong to all ethical systems, therefore the Bible had better be dropped and we should try to enounce in modern congenial language the new doctrines which will satisfy at once our reason and our imagination. Other investigators of truth destroy to the best of their ability all the grounds on which people have accustomed themselves to receive the Bible as something divine and precious : and then they think to save everything by a few words of general respect and esteem for the Bible, or for religion in the abstract. Their negative criticism has great fulness, ardour, and effect ; their positive commendation of the Bible or religion is such as to have no effect at all. It was this which we blamed in Dr. Colenso's treatment of the Bible, now several years ago. We have no wish to revive a past controversy ; but we thought then, and we think still, that it was a signal fault in Dr. Colenso's book that it cut away men's usual ground for their religion and supplied really no other in its place ; for his prayer of Ram, and his passage from Tully's Offices, and his own sermon, we must be permitted to regard as being, under the circumstances, a ground quite comically insufficient. Mr. Greg, who took up arms for Dr. Colenso, did not understand this ; he does not understand it now. And no wonder ; for his own original book on the Creed of Christendom, acute and eloquent as his writing often is, had on the whole the same fault as Dr. Colenso's work. The upshot of the matter, after reading him, seemed to be that the Bible was a document hopelessly damaged, and that the new doctrines which are to satisfy our reason and our imagination must be sought elsewhere.

The same is to be said of a very learned and exact book which has appeared lately, having for its title *Supernatural Religion*. Hereafter we shall have occasion to speak of this work at more length, but we now will remark of it only that it has the fault of leaving the reader, when he closes it, with the feeling that the Bible stands before him like a fair tree all stripped, torn, and defaced, not at all like a tree whose leaves are for the healing of the nations. No doubt this is not the author's design, and no doubt the current notions assailed by him, the popular view of the Bible-books and of their composition, are full of error. But attacking these throughout two thick volumes with untiring vigour and industry, and doing nothing more, he simply leaves the ordinary reader, to whom the Bible has been the great, often the only, inspirer of his conduct, his imagination, his feelings,—he leaves him with the sense that he sees his Bible with a thousand holes picked in it and fatally discredited as an authority.

These investigators go upon the supposition that a man's first concern is to know the truth, and that to know the truth about the Bible is to know that much of it is legendary and much of it of uncertain authorship. We say, on the other hand, that no one knows



the truth about the Bible who does not know how to enjoy the Bible; and he who takes legend for history and who imagines Moses or Isaiah or David or Paul or Peter or John to have written Bible-books which they did not write, but who knows how to enjoy the Bible deeply, is nearer the truth about the Bible than the man who can pick it all to pieces but who cannot enjoy it.

Perhaps, however, we ought to say that the author of *Supernatural Religion*, like Dr. Colenso, tries to provide a substitute for what he destroys. After declaring that 'there is little indeed in the history and actual achievements of Christianity to support the claim made on its behalf to the character of a scheme divinely revealed for the salvation of the human race,' he tells us that after getting rid of Jewish mythology 'we rise to higher conceptions of an infinitely wise and beneficent Being,' that 'all that we do know of the regulation of the universe being so perfect and wise, all that we do not know must be equally so,' and that 'here enters the true and noble faith which is the child of Reason.' Alas! for our part we should say rather: 'Here enter the poor old dead horses of so-called natural theology, with their galvanic movements!' But this is our author's prayer of Ram, his passage from Tully's Offices, his sermon; and he promises us, so far as we understand him, much more in the same style. We say that it is ludicrously insufficient, all of it, to fill the place of that old belief in Christianity's claim to the character of a scheme divinely revealed for the salvation of the human race which he seeks to expel. We say it is a string of platitudes, without the power of awakening religious emotion and joy, and not a whit more proveable, moreover, as scientific fact, than the miracle of the resurrection or the Johannine authorship of the Fourth Gospel.

We, on the other hand, think that there is everything in the history and actual achievements of Christianity to support its claim to the character of a religion divinely revealed for the salvation of the human race. We look with apprehension on all that diminishes men's attachment to the Bible. But that the Bible is not what we have fancied it, and that to be divinely revealed is not what we have supposed, time and experience are beginning to bear in upon the human mind. Many resist vehemently these intimations from time and experience. This resistance we believe to be utterly vain; we counsel men to accept them, but we seek to show that the Bible and the Christian religion subsist, all the while, as salutary, as necessary, as they ever were supposed to be; and that they now come out far more real, and therefore far more truly grand, than before. Our adversaries will say, perhaps, that this attempted demonstration is our prayer of Ram. And the test of our work does really lie here: if the positive side in 'Literature and Dogma,' if its attempt to recommend the Bible, to awaken enthusiasm for the Bible, on new grounds, proves ludicrously insufficient, weak and vain; if its negative

side, its attempt to apply to popular religion the confutations and denials which time and experience suggest, proves the more prominent, the only operative one,—if this is so, then our work is, by our own confession and with our own consent, judged; it is valueless, perhaps mischievous. We can scarcely, however, be expected ourselves to admit that this is already proved. The time for the book's wide working, as we said at first in publishing it, has hardly yet fully come. On its first appearance it was sure to be laid hold of by those for whom it was not written, the religious world as it is called, the unhesitating recipients of the Christianity popularly current, and to occasion scandal. It was not written for those who at present receive the Bible on the grounds supplied either by popular or by metaphysical theology; it was written for those who from dissatisfaction with such grounds for the Bible are inclined to throw the Bible aside. Into the hands of not a few readers of this sort the book has fallen, both here and abroad, and they have found it of service to them. They have been enabled by it to use and enjoy the Bible, when the current theology, popular or learned, had almost estranged them from it. But many and grave objections have been alleged against the book which has done them this service. What are they to think of these objections, or at least of the more important among them? what weight are they to attach to them? Are they to go back from the way of reading and interpreting the Bible which we had counselled them to follow, and which they had begun to find profit in, or are they to pursue it steadfastly? Puzzled and shaken by some of the objections we may suppose them; and yet if they give ear to them, if they do not get the better of them and put them aside, they will lose, we believe, all sure hold on the Bible, they will be more and more baffled, distressed and bewildered in their dealings with religion. To the extent, therefore, necessary for enabling such readers to surmount their difficulties, I propose to deal with the reproaches and objections brought against 'Literature and Dogma.'

But first there is one reproach to be noticed, not so much for the reader's sake as for our own;—the reproach of irreverent language, of improper and offensive personalities. The parable of the three Lord Shaftesburys, the incessant use of the names of the Bishops of Winchester and Gloucester to point a moral,—every one will remember to have heard of these as serious blemishes in 'Literature and Dogma.' To have wounded the feelings of the religious community by turning into ridicule an august doctrine, the object of their solemn faith; to have wounded the feelings of individuals either by the wanton introduction of their names in a connexion sure to be displeasing to them, or else by offensive ridicule and persistent personal attack, is a crime of which the majority of my English reviewers have found me plainly guilty, and for which they have indignantly censured me. The *Guardian* has even been led by my mention of the Archbishop of

York, and by my remarks on the Bishops of Winchester and Gloucester, to conclude that the order of bishops has upon me the effect of a red rag upon a bull, and that I cannot contemplate it without becoming infuriated. A word of notice these censures seem to demand.

As regards the three Lord Shaftesburys, we say boldly that our use of that parable shows our indulgence to popular Christianity. Polycarp sternly called the disfigured religion he saw prevalent around him, *atheism*. We have said, and it is important to maintain it, that popular Christianity at present is so wide of the truth, is such a disfigurement of the truth, that it fairly deserves, if it presumes to charge others with atheism, to have that charge retorted upon itself; and future ages will perhaps not scruple to condemn it almost as mercilessly as Polycarp condemned the religion of heathen antiquity. For us, the God of popular religion is a legend, a fairy-tale; learned theology has simply taken this fairy-tale and dressed it metaphysically. Clearly it is impossible for us to treat this fairy-tale with solemnity, as a real and august object, in the manner which might be most acceptable to its believers. But for the sake of the happiness it has given, of its beauty and pathos, and of the portions of truth mixed up with it, it deserves, we have said, and from us it has received and always will receive, a nearly inexhaustible indulgence. Not only have we not called it atheism; we have entirely refused to join our Liberal friends in calling it a degrading superstition. Describing it under the parable of the three Lord Shaftesburys, we have pointed out that it has in it, as thus represented, nothing which can be called a degrading superstition; that it contains, on the contrary, like other genuine products of the popular imagination, elements of admirable pathos and power. More we could not say of it without admitting that it was not a legend or fairy-tale at all, and that its personages were not magnified and non-natural men. But this we cannot admit, although of course its adherents will be satisfied with nothing less. It was our object to carry well home to the reader's mind what a fairy-tale popular Christianity really is, what a trio of magnified and non-natural men is its Trinity. The indulgence due, however, from us to popular Christianity has been shown, if we have admitted that its fairy-tale, far from being a degraded superstition, is full of beauty and power, and that its divinities are magnifications of nothing unworthy, but of a sort of character of which we have an eminent example amongst us, in a man widely beloved and respected, and whom no one respects more than I do.

As to the bishops, whose sacred order is supposed to fill me with rage and hatred, it must be modern bishops that have this effect, for several bishops of past times are mentioned in 'Literature and Dogma' with veneration. Of three modern bishops, however, the deliverances are criticized;—of the Archbishop of York, the late Bishop of Win-

chester, and the Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol. But the deliverances of all the three are by no means criticized in the same manner. Private considerations are not, in general, matter with which to trouble the public, but where they come in to fix a rule for literary conduct they may be mentioned. Personal acquaintance, if it is at all friendly or intimate, excludes in my opinion the right of public ridicule and attack. For many years I have been on terms of at least friendly acquaintance with the Archbishop of York; to say in print what was offensive to him I should think as inexcusable as to say it in his company. I believe that I have in my book said nothing of him that can be offensive. Logical and metaphysical reasonings about essence, existence, identity, cause, design, have from all time been freely used to establish truths in theology. The Archbishop of York early acquired distinction in the study of logic; that he should follow in theological discussion a line of which St. Anselm, Descartes, Leibnitz and Locke have set him the example, is a matter neither for surprise nor for ridicule. Certainly I believe that this line can lead in theology to nothing but perplexity and disappointment. I believe that religion could never have been originated by it, can never be confirmed by it. I say this freely when I see the Archbishop of York adopting it. But I say it without a thought of ridicule or disrespect towards the Archbishop of York, either for his adoption of such a line of argument, or for his management of the line of argument which he has chosen to employ.

The case is different with regard to that brilliant and well-known personage, who since the publication of 'Literature and Dogma' has passed away from amongst us. My personal acquaintance with the late Bishop of Winchester was of that very slight kind which imposes no restraint upon public criticism. I feel more restraint in speaking of him now that he is dead than I should have felt in speaking of him in his lifetime. He was a man with the temperament of genius; and to his energy, his presence, his speech, this temperament could often lend charm and power. But those words of his which I quoted, and his public deliverances far too frequently, had a fault which in men of station and authority who address a society like ours, deserve at all times as severe a check as either blame or ridicule can inflict upon them. To a society like ours, a society self-regulating, which reads little that is serious and reflects hardly at all, but which desires to pursue its way comfortably, and to think that it has in its customary notions and beliefs about religion, whenever it may be driven to fall back upon them, an impregnable stronghold to which it can always resort; to such a society men of eminence cannot do a worse service than to confirm and encourage it, with airs of superior knowledge, profound certainty, and oracular assurance, in its illusion. A man of Bishop Wilberforce's power of mind must know, if he is sincere with himself, that when he talks of 'doing something for the

honour of Our Lord's Godhead,' or of 'that infinite separation for time and for eternity which is involved in rejecting the Godhead of the Eternal Son,'—he must know that by this singular sort of mixture of unction and metaphysics he is solemnly giving a semblance of conceivability, fixity, and certainty to objects which do not possibly admit of them. He must know this, and yet he gives it, because it suits his purpose, or because the public, or a large body of the public, desire it; and this is claptrap. The *Times*, it is true, speaks of the popular Christianity of this country as 'an English, a Protestant, and a reasonable religion.' The *Times*, however, is a popular newspaper; and the public, when it reads there things which suit its wishes, is always half-conscious, at least, that to suit its wishes they are written. But the late Bishop of Winchester was a man in high office and dignity, a man at the same time of great gifts; he spoke to the English public with authority and with responsibility proportionate to that authority; yet he freely permitted himself the use of claptrap. The use of claptrap to such a public by such a man ought at least to be always severely treated at the tribunal of letters and science, for it will be treated severely nowhere else. The late Bishop of Winchester was a man of a sympathetic temper, a dash of genius, a gift of speech, and ardent energy, professing to be a guide in a time, a society, a sphere of thought, where the first requisite for a guide is perfect sincerity,—and he was signally addicted to claptrap. If by ridicule or by blame I have done anything to discredit a position such as that which he assumed, I cannot regret it. Those who use claptrap as the late Bishop of Winchester used it, those who can enthusiastically extol him as an ideal bishop, only prove their valuelessness for the religious crisis upon which we are now entering. No talents and acquirements can serve in this crisis without an absolute renunciation of claptrap. Those who cannot attain to this have no part in the future which is before us; real insight and real progress are impossible for them; Jesus would have said of them: *They cannot enter into the kingdom of God.*

With the Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol I had, when 'Literature and Dogma' was published, no personal acquaintance whatever. I respect him as one of the very few public men who in any degree carry on serious studies after having left the University. But he certainly joined himself with the Bishop of Winchester in holding the language on which I have animadverted above, and he laid himself open, therefore, to the same criticism.

Perhaps I ought, finally, to say a word of a remark concerning the late Mr. Maurice, which has given great umbrage to some of his friends. I cannot say that anything Mr. Maurice touched seems to me to have been grasped and presented by him with enough distinctness to give it a permanent value. But his was a pure and fine spirit, perpetually in

a state of ferment and agitation; on many young men of ability, agitated by the unsettled mental atmosphere in which we live, he exercised a great attraction. Some of them have cleared themselves; and as they cleared themselves they have come to regard Mr. Maurice as the author of all the convictions in which after their ferment and struggle they have found rest. This is generous in them, and to Mr. Maurice it does honour to have had such disciples.

And now I have done with these personal matters and can address myself to my main purpose.

To people disposed to throw the Bible aside 'Literature and Dogma' sought to restore the use of it by two considerations: one, that the Bible requires for its basis nothing but what they can verify; the other, that the language of the Bible is not scientific, but *literary*,—that is, the language of poetry and emotion, approximate language thrown out, as it were, at certain great objects which the human mind augurs and feels after, and thrown out by men very liable, many of them, to delusion and error. Those who could follow us would have, we said, for their reward, this: they would feel once more, or they would feel for the first time, what it was the object of our book to inspire,—an enthusiasm for the Bible. They would be able to use it, enjoy it, live by it. But much to which we were led by those two considerations with which we set out has been violently impugned; what we have now to do is to ask whoever thought he found profit from those considerations to examine with us whether it has been impugned successfully; whether we ought to give it up, or whether we ought to hold by it firmly and hopefully still.

First and foremost has been impugned our definition of God. And of this we certainly cannot complain; for we have ourselves said, that without a clear understanding in what sense this important but ambiguous term *God* is used, all fruitful discussion in theology is impossible; and yet in theological discussion, this clear understanding is hardly ever regarded, but people assume that the sense of the term is something perfectly well known. 'A personal First Cause, that thinks and loves, the moral and intelligent governor of the universe,' is the sense which theologians in general assume to be the meaning, properly drawn out and strictly worded, of the term God. We say that by this assumption a great deal which cannot possibly be verified is put into the word God; and we propose, for the God of the Bible and of Christianity, a much less pretentious definition, but which has the advantage of containing nothing that cannot be verified. The God of the Bible and of Christianity is, we say: *The Eternal not ourselves that makes for righteousness*. Almost with one voice our critics have expostulated with us for refusing to admit what they call a personal God. Nothing would be easier for us than, by availing

ourselves of the ambiguity natural to the use of the term God, to give such a turn to our expressions as might satisfy some of our critics, or might enable our language to pass muster with the common religious world as permissible. But this would be clean contrary to our design. For we want to recommend the Bible and its religion by showing that they rest on something which can be verified. Now, in the Bible God is everything; unless therefore we ascertain what it is which we mean by God, and that what we mean we can verify, we cannot recommend the Bible as we desire. So against all ambiguity in the use of this term we wage war. Mr. Llewellyn Davies says that I admit that the most proper language to use about God is the approximative language of poetry and eloquence, language thrown out at an object which it does not profess to define scientifically, language which cannot, therefore, be adequate and accurate. If Israel, then, might with propriety call God 'the high and holy one that inhabiteth eternity,' why, he asks, may not the Bishop of Gloucester with propriety talk of 'the blessed truth that the God of the universe is a person?' Neither the one expression nor the other is adequate; both are approximative. I answer: Let it be understood, then, that when the Bishop of Gloucester, or others, talk of the blessed truth that the God of the universe is a person, they mean to talk, not science, but rhetoric and poetry. In that case our only criticism on their language will be that it is bad rhetoric and poetry, whereas the rhetoric and poetry of Israel is good. But the truth is they mean it for science; they mean it for a more close and precise account of what Israel called poetically 'the high and holy one that inhabiteth eternity;' and it is false science because it assumes what it cannot verify. However, if it is not meant for science, but for poetry, let us treat it as poetry; and then it is language not professing to be exact at all, and we are free to use it or not to use it as our sense of poetic propriety may dictate. But at all events let us be clear about one thing: Is it meant for poetry, or is it meant for science?

If we were asked what in our own opinion we had by 'Literature and Dogma' effected for the benefit of readers of the Bible, we should answer that we had effected two things above all: first, that we had led the reader to face that primary question, so habitually slurred over, what 'God' means in the Bible, and to see that it means the Eternal not ourselves that makes for righteousness; secondly that we had made him ask himself what is meant by winning Christ, knowing Christ, the excellency of the knowledge of Christ, and find that it means laying hold of the method and secret of Jesus. And of these two things achieved by us, as we think, for the Bible-reader's benefit, the first seems to us the more important. Sooner or later he will find the Bible fail him, unless he is provided with a sure meaning for the word 'God.' Until this is done, and to keep steadily before his mind how loosely he and others at present employ the word, we

even recommend him to allow to the word no more contents than by its etymology it has, and to render it 'The Shining.' Archbishop Whately blames those who define words by their etymology, and ridicules them as people who should insist upon it that sycophant shall mean 'fig-shewer' and nothing else. But etymological definition, trifling and absurd when a word's imported meaning is sure, becomes valuable when the imported meaning is unfixed. There was at Athens a practice, says Festus, of robbing the fig-orchards; a law was passed to check it; under this law vexatious informations were laid, and those who laid them were called *sycophants*, fig-informers, or, if Archbishop Whately pleases, fig-shewers. Then the name was transferred to vexatious informers or to calumniators generally, and at last to a cheating impostor of any sort. The wider new meaning thus imported into the word was something quite clear, something on which all were agreed; and thenceforward to insist on limiting *sycophant* to its old etymological sense of fig-informer would have been ridiculous. But the case is different when the fuller meaning imported into a word is something vague and loose, something on which people are by no means agreed. It is then often an excellent discipline to revert to the etymology, and to insist on confining ourselves to the sense given by this until we get for our word a larger sense clear and certain. 'In thee, O Shining, have I put my trust! O Shining, thou art my Shining, early will I seek thee! My soul, wait thou only upon The Shining, for my expectation is from him! The fool hath said in his heart: There is no Shining!' This will not give us satisfaction; but it will thereby stimulate us all the more to find a meaning to the word 'God' that does give us satisfaction, and it will keep vivid in our minds the thought how little we ourselves or others have such a meaning for the word at present.

Lord Lyttelton lately published in this REVIEW a disquisition on 'Undogmatic and Unsectarian Teaching' which signally illustrates the utility of this etymological discipline. Lord Lyttelton is very severe upon those whom he calls 'the shallow sciolists and apostles of modern Unsectarianism;' and very favourable to dogma, or the determined, decreed and received doctrine of so-called orthodox theology. He draws out a formal list of propositions beginning with: God is, God made the world, God cares for men, God is the Father of Men, and ending with: The Deity of God is in one sense One in another Threefold, God is One in Three Persons. He defies any one to show where in this list that which is universal ends and that which is dogmatic begins. And his inference apparently is, that therefore the last propositions in the series may be freely taught. But if he examines his thoughts with attention he will find that he cannot tell where the character of his propositions changes because he has been using the word 'God' in the same sense all through the series; now, the sense given to this word governs the sense of each and all of



his propositions, but this sense he omits to furnish us with. Until we have it, we may agree that his latter propositions are dogmatic, but we cannot possibly concede to him that his earlier propositions have universal acceptance. Yet the whole force of his series of propositions, and of the argument which he founds upon it, depends on this: whether his definition of God, which he does not produce, is unchallengeable or no. Till he produces it, his readers will really best enable themselves to feel the true force of Lord Lyttelton's propositions by substituting for the word God its strict etymological equivalent *Shining*,—the only definition to which, until the fuller definition is produced and made good, we have any right. The propositions will then run: The *Shining* is, The *Shining* made the world, The *Shining* cares for men, The *Shining* is the Father of men, and so on to the final proposition: The *Shining* is One in Three Persons. That inconclusiveness, of which we are by these means made fully aware, exists just as much in Lord Lyttelton's original propositions, but without being noticed by himself or by most of his readers.

Resolutely clear with himself, then, in using this word 'God,' we urge our reader to be, whatever offence he may give by it. When he is asked in a tone of horrified remonstrance whether he refuses to believe in a personal God, let him steadily examine what it is that people say about a personal God, and what grounds he has for receiving it. People say that there is a personal God, and that a personal God is a God who thinks and loves. That there is an Eternal not ourselves which makes for righteousness and is called God, they admit; and indeed so much as this to them and to us experience proves. For the constitution and history of things shows us that happiness, at which we all aim, is dependent on righteousness; yet certainly we did not make this to be so, and it did not begin when we began, nor does it end when we end, but is, so far as we can see, an eternal tendency outside us, prevailing whether we will or no, whether we are here or not. There is no difficulty, therefore, about an Eternal not ourselves that makes for righteousness, and to which men have transferred that ancient high name, *God*, the Brilliant or *Shining*, by which they once adored a mighty object outside themselves, the sun, which from the first took their notice as powerful for their weal or woe. So that God is, is admitted; but people maintain, besides, that he is personal and thinks and loves. 'The Divine Being cannot,' they say, 'be without the perfection which manifests itself in the human personality as the highest of which we have any knowledge.' Now, 'the deeper elements of personality are,' they add, 'existence, consciousness of this existence and control over it.' These therefore, they say, God must have. And that the Eternal that makes for righteousness has these, they account (though their language is not always quite consistent on this point) a fact of the same order and of as much certainty as that there is an

Eternal that makes for righteousness at all. 'It is this power itself,' says M. Albert, Réville, 'this not ourselves which makes for righteousness, that constantly reveals to us the fact that it is a Spirit, that is to say, not merely an influence, but life, consciousness, and love.' Religion, it is affirmed, religion, which is morality touched with emotion, is impossible unless we know of God that he is a person who thinks and loves. 'If the not ourselves which makes for righteousness,' says M. Réville, 'is an unconscious force, I cannot feel for it that sacred emotion which raises morality to the rank of religion. Man no longer worships powers of which he has discovered the action to be impersonal.' All this sort of argumentation, which M. Réville manages with great delicacy and literary skill, is summed up in popular language plainly and well by a writer in the *Edinburgh Review*. 'Is the Power around us not a Person; is what you would have us worship a thing? All existing beings must be either persons or things; and no sophistries can deter us from the invincible persuasion which all human creatures possess, that *persons* are superior to *things*.'

Now before going further we have one important remark to make upon all this. M. Réville talks of those who *have discovered* the action of God to be impersonal. In another place he talks of *denying* conscious intelligence to God. The *Edinburgh Reviewer* talks of those who would have us worship a *thing*. We assure M. Réville that we do not profess to have discovered the nature of God to be impersonal, nor do we deny to God conscious intelligence. We assure the *Edinburgh Reviewer* that we do not assert God to be a *thing*. All we say is that men do not know enough about the Eternal not ourselves that makes for righteousness to warrant their pronouncing this either a person or a thing. We say that no one has discovered the nature of God to be personal, or is entitled to assert that God has conscious intelligence. Theologians assert this and make it the basis of religion; it is they who assert and profess to know, not we; we object to their professing to know more than can be known, to their insisting we shall receive it, to their resting religion upon it. We want to rest religion on what can be verified, not on what cannot; and M. Réville himself seems, when he lets us see the bottom of his thoughts, to allow that a personal God who thinks and loves cannot really be verified, for he says: 'It is in vain to ask how we can verify the fact that God possesses consciousness and intelligence.' But we are for resting religion upon some fact of which it shall not be in vain to ask whether we can verify it. However, the theologians' conception of God is represented as a far more satisfying one in itself than ours, and as having, besides, much to make its truth highly probable, at any rate, if not demonstrable. And the reader of 'Literature and Dogma' may think, perhaps, that we have been over-cautious, over-negative; that we are really, as M. Réville says of us 'decidedly too much afraid of the idea of the personality of God.'

He may think, that though we have given him as his foundation something verifiable and sure, yet that what we have given him is a great deal less than what the theologians offer to give, and offer with such strong and good reasons for its truth, that it becomes almost certain if not quite, and a man is captious who will not accept it.

Descartes, as is well known, had a famous philosophical method for discovering truths of all kinds ; and people heard of his method and used to press him to give them the results which this wonderful organ had enabled him to ascertain. Quite in a contrary fashion, we sometimes flatter ourselves with the hope that we may be of use by the very absence of all scientific pretension, by our very want of 'a philosophy based on principles interdependent, subordinate and coherent' ; because we are thus obliged to treat great questions in such a simple way that any one can follow us, while the way, at the same time, may possibly be quite right after all, only overlooked by more ingenious people because it was so very simple. Now proceeding in this manner we venture to ask the plain reader whether it does not strike him as an objection to our making God a person who thinks and loves, that we have really no experience whatever, not the very slightest, of persons who think and love, except in man and the inferior animals. We for our part are by no means disposed to deny that the inferior animals, as they are called, may have consciousness, that they may be said to think and love, in however low a degree. At any rate we can see them before us doing certain things which are like what we do ourselves when we think and love, and which may be attributed to them also, without our failing to understand what is meant by thinking and loving ; and they may conceivably be called persons who think and love. But really this is all the experience of any sort that we have of persons who think and love,—the experience afforded by ourselves and the lower animals. True, we easily and naturally attribute all operations that engage our notice to authors that live and think like ourselves ; we make persons out of sun, wind, love, envy, war, fortune ; in some languages every noun is male or female. But this, we know, is figure and personification ; being ourselves alive and thinking, we naturally invest things with these our attributes, and imagine all action and operation to proceed as our own proceeds. This is a tendency which in common speech and in poetry, where we do not profess to speak exactly, we cannot well help following, and which we follow lawfully. In the language of common speech and of poetry, we speak of the Eternal not ourselves that makes for righteousness, as if he were a person who thinks and loves ; naturally we speak of him so, and there is no objection at all to our so doing.

But it is different when we profess to speak exactly, and yet make God a person who thinks and loves. We then find what difficulty our being actually acquainted with no persons superior to ourselves

who think and love brings us into. Some, we know, have made their God in the image of the inferior animals: we have had the God Apis and the God Anubis; but these are extravagances. In general, as God is said to have made man in his own image, the image of God, man has returned the compliment, and outwardly or inwardly has made God in the image of man. All we can then do is to take the best thinking and loving of the best man, to better this best, to call it *perfect*, and to say that this is God. So we construct a magnified and non-natural man, by dropping out all that in man seems a source of weakness and inserting its contrary, and by heightening to the very utmost all that in man seems a source of strength, such as his thought and his love. Take the account of God which begins the Thirty-nine Articles or the account of God in any confession of faith we may choose. The same endeavour shows itself in all of them: to construct a man who thinks and loves, but so immensely bettered that he is a man no longer. Then between this magnified man and ourselves we put, if we please, angels, who are men etherialized. The objection to the magnified man and to the men etherialized is one and the same: we have absolutely no experience whatever of either the one or the other. Support, however, is obtained for them from two grounds:—from metaphysical grounds, of which we will speak presently and from the ground of miracles. Interferences and communications of such a kind as to be explainable on no other supposition than that of a magnified and non-natural man, with etherialized men ministering to him, are alleged to have actually happened and to be warranted by sure testimony. And there is something in this. If the progress of the natural day was really stopped to enable the chosen people to win a great victory over its enemies, if a voice out of the sky really said when Jesus was baptized: *This is my beloved Son*,—then the magnified and non-natural man of popular religion, either by himself or with angels, etherialized men, for his ministers, is a supposition made credible, probable, and even almost necessary, by those incidents.

Thus we are thrown back on miracles; and the question is, are we to affirm that God is a person who thinks and loves because miracles compel us. Now, the reader of 'Literature and Dogma' will recollect that half a dozen pages of that book, and not more, were taken up with discussing miracles. The *Guardian* thinks this insufficient. It says that solid replies are demanded to solid treatises, and that I ought to have taken Mr. Mozley's Bampton Lectures on Miracles, and given, if I could, a refutation to them. It tartly adds, however, that to expect this of me 'would be to expect something entirely at variance with Mr. Arnold's antecedents and with his whole nature.' Well, the author of *Supernatural Religion* has occupied half a thick volume in refuting Mr. Mozley's Bampton Lectures; he has written a solid reply to that solid treatise. I am sure he has not convinced the

*Guardian*, but it ought at least to be pleased with him for having so far done his duty. For my part, although I do justice to Mr. Mozley's ability, yet to write a refutation of his Bampton Lectures is precisely, in my opinion, to do what Strauss has well called 'going out of one's way to assail the paper fortifications which theologians choose to set up.' To engage in an *à priori* argument to prove that miracles are impossible, against an adversary who argues *à priori* that they are possible, is the vainest labour in the world. So long as the discussion was of this character, miracles were in no danger. The time for it is now past, because the human mind, whatever may be said for or against miracles *à priori*, is now in fact losing its reliance upon them. And it is losing it for this reason: as its experience widens, it gets acquainted with the natural history of miracles, it sees how they arise, and it slowly but inevitably puts them aside.

If I were to claim commendation for anything in 'Literature and Dogma,' I should be disposed to claim it, above all, for the brevity and moderation with which the subject of miracles is treated. It is possible to spend far too much time and mental energy over the thesis that miracles cannot be relied on; for the thesis, though true, is merely negative, and therefore of secondary importance. The important question is, what becomes of religion, so precious, as we believe, to the human race, if miracles cannot be relied on. We ought never so to immerse ourselves in the argument against miracles as to forget that the main question lies beyond, and that we must press forward to it. As soon as we satisfy ourselves that on miracles we cannot build, let us have done with questions about them and begin to build on something surer. Now, it is in a much more simple and unpretending way than controversialists commonly employ that we satisfy ourselves that we cannot build upon miracles.

For it is possible, again, to exaggerate vainly the demonstrative force of the case against miracles. The logical completeness of the case for miracles has been vaunted, and vaunted falsely; some people are now disposed to vaunt falsely the logical completeness of the case against miracles. Poor human nature loves the pre'ntious forms of exact knowledge, though with the real condition of our thoughts they often ill correspond. The author of *Supernatural Religion* asserts again and again that miracles are contradictory to a complete induction. He quotes Mr. Mill's rule: 'Whatever is contradictory to a complete induction is incredible,' and he quotes Mr. Mill's account of a complete induction: 'When observations or experiments have been repeated so often and by so many persons as to exclude all supposition of error in the observer, a law of nature is established,' and he asserts that a law of nature of this kind has been established against miracles. He brings forward that famous test by which Paley seeks to establish the Christian miracles, his 'twelve men of known probity and good sense relating a miracle wrought before their eyes, and consenting to be racked and burned sooner than acknowledge that there existed any

falsehood or imposture in the case,' and he asserts that no affirmation of any twelve men would be sufficient to overthrow a law of nature, or to save, therefore, the Christian miracles.

Now, these assertions are exaggerated and will not serve. No such law of nature as Mr. Mill describes has been or can be established against the Christian miracles; a complete induction against them, therefore, there is not. Nor does the evidence of their reporters fail because the evidence of no men can make miracles credible. The case against the Christian miracles is that we have an induction, not complete, indeed, but enough more and more to satisfy the mind, and to satisfy it in an ever increasing number of men, that miracles are untrustworthy. The case against their reporters is, that more and more of us see, and see ever more clearly, that they were not and could not be the sort of picked jury that Paley's argument requires, but that with all the good faith in the world they were men likely to fall into error about miracles, to make a miracle where there was none, and that they did fall into error and legend accordingly.

This being so, we have no inclination either to dwell at excessive length on the subject of miracles, or to make a grand show of victoriously demonstrating their impossibility. But we have to ask ourselves over again, whenever anything is made to depend upon them, how their case really and truly stands, whether there can be any prospect, either for ourselves or for those in whose interest '*Literature and Dogma*' was written, of returning to a reliance upon them. And the more we consider it the more we are convinced there is none; and that the cause assigned in '*Literature and Dogma*' as fatal to miracles,—that the more our experience widens, the more we see and understand the process by which they arose, and their want of solidity,—is fatal to them indeed. The time has come when the minds of men no longer put as a matter of course the Bible-miracles in a class by themselves; and from the moment this time commences, from the moment that the comparative history of all miracles is a conception entertained and a study admitted, the conclusion is certain, the reign of the Bible-miracles is doomed.

Let us see how this is so. Herodotus relates, that when the Persian invaders came to Delphi, the arms dedicated in the temple miraculously went forth of themselves, and two local heroes buried near the place, Phylacus and Autonous, arose and were seen, of more than mortal stature, fighting against the Persians. He relates, that before the onset at Salamis the vision of a woman appeared over an *Æginetan* ship, and cried in a voice which all the Grecian fleet heard: 'Good souls, how long will ye keep backing?' He relates, that at Pedasus, in the neighbourhood of his own city *Halicarnassus*, the priestess of Athene had a miraculous sprouting of beard whenever any grievous calamity was about to befall the people around; he says in one place that twice this miraculous growth had happened, in another, that it had happened thrice. Herodotus writes here of times

when he was himself alive, not of a fabulous antiquity. He and his countrymen were not less acute, arguing, critical people than the Jews of Palestine, but much more. Herodotus himself, finally, is a man of a beautiful character and of pure good-faith.

But we do not believe that Phylacus and Autonous arose out of their graves and were seen fighting with the Persians; we know, we say, by experience, how this sort of story grows up. And that at the Crucifixion, then, many dead saints arose and came out of the graves and went into the holy city and appeared unto many, is not this too a story of which we must say, the moment we put it side by side with the other, that it is of the same kind with it, and that we know how the sort of story grows up? That the phantom-woman called to the *Æginetan* crew at Salamis: *How long will ye keep backing!* we do not believe any the more because we are told that all the Grecian fleet heard it. We know, we say, by experience that this is just the sort of corroboration naturally added to such a story. But we are asked to believe that Jesus after his death actually cried to Paul on his way to Damascus: *It is hard for thee to kick against the pricks*, because the bystanders are said to have heard it, although to be sure in another place, with the looseness natural to such a story, the bystanders are said *not* to have heard this voice. That the Salamis story and the Damascus story are of one kind, and of what kind, strikes us the moment that we put the two stories together. The miraculous beard of the priestess of Pedasus is really just like the miraculous blindness of Zacharias, the father of John the Baptist. The priestess of Pedasus, however, is said by Herodotus in one place to have twice had her marvellous beard, in another to have had it thrice; the discrepancy proves, we say, how loose and unhistorical this kind of story is. But yet when Jesus is in the Second Gospel said to have healed as he departed from Jericho one blind man who sate by the wayside, and in the First Gospel to have healed as he departed from Jericho two blind men who sate by the wayside, there is here, we are asked to believe, no discrepancy really at all. Two different healings are meant, which were performed at two different visits to Jericho; or perhaps they were performed at one and the same visit, but one was performed as Jesus entered the city, and the other as he left it; and the words of St. Mark: 'And he came to Jericho; and as he went out of Jericho blind Bartimæus sate by the wayside,' really mean that Bartimæus sate there as Jesus went *in* to Jericho, and two other blind men sate by the wayside as he went *out*. How arbitrary, unnatural and vain such an explanation is, what a mere device of our own to make a solid history out of a legend, we never feel so irresistibly as when we put the Jericho story by the side of others like it.

Yet still, in new and popular books, this precious device for reconciling inconsistent accounts of the same thing, the hypothesis that the incident did really happen more than once, is furbished up and brought out afresh. So strong, so persistent, so desperate is the

endeavour to make that wonderful mixture of truth and fiction, which the four gospels give us, into one uniform strain of solid history. The attempt must fail ; it will impair the understanding of all who make it, it will mar the reputation of every critic who makes it, and yet will disappoint them after all. The kindest thing one can do to an intelligent reader of the Bible is to convince him of the utter hopelessness of any such attempt, to bring him speedily and once for all to a state of settled clearness on the subject. And this will be done, not so well directly, by arguing how improbable such an hypothesis as that incidents should exactly repeat themselves in itself is, as indirectly, by showing from examples how very prone is the human imagination to reproduce striking incidents a second time, although the incidents have in truth occurred once only.

To save the exactness of the Gospel narratives, the stories of the healing of the blind men at Jericho are made to pass, we have seen, for the stories of two separate miracles. But a more remarkable instance still of the actual production of an incident twice is alleged in regard to Christ clearing the Temple of buyers and sellers. The Fourth Gospel, as is well known, puts the clearance at the beginning of Christ's career, the synoptics put it at the end shortly before his arrest. Probably the synoptics are right ; for the act was one which coming from an unknown man would have merely seemed extravagant and exasperating, whereas, coming from Jesus after his line of teaching and reforming had become familiar, it would have had significance and use. But be this as it may ; at any rate, if the act came at the outset of the career of Jesus, then the synoptics, one would say, must have made a mistake ; if at the close, then the author of the Fourth Gospel. Not at all ; the same striking incident with all its circumstances really happened, we are told, twice : first at the outset of Christ's career and then again at its close. Neither the synoptics, therefore, nor the author of the Fourth Gospel are in error.

Now, this seems surprising ; but some who are lovers of the Bible may be inclined to try and believe it, may seek to cling to such an explanation, may argue for its possibility *à priori*. Crumble with them sooner or later it will ; what may convince them, at once and for ever, of its hollowness, and save them much loss of time and distress of mind ? The application of such a piece of experience as the following.

Some years ago a newly married couple were during their honeymoon travelling in the Alps, they made an excursion on Mont Blanc, the bride met with an accident there, and perished before her husband's eyes. The other day we had, strange to relate, just this touching story over again. Again a newly married couple were in the Alps during their honeymoon, again Mont Blanc was the scene of an excursion, again the bride met with an accident, again she perished in her husband's sight. Surprising, but there was the fact ! people talked of it, the telegraph spread it abroad. But ours is a time of



broad daylight and searching inquiry. The matter drew attention, and in a few days the telegraph announced that the second accident had never really happened at all, that it was a mere doubling and reflexion of the first. Men's imagination reiterates in this way things which strike it, and loose relation narrates the doubled fact seriously. As our experience widens, it brings us more and more proof that this is so, and one day a signal example is decisive with us. The Mont Blanc story, or some story of the kind, comes with a sort of magic to make scales fall from our eyes. It is still possible *à priori* that the Temple may have been cleared twice, and that there is no mistake in the Gospel reports; the induction against it is not a complete induction, but it is henceforth complete enough to serve, it convinces us. In spite of the *à priori* possibility, we cannot any longer believe in the double clearance of the Temple and in the exactitude of both the accounts in the Gospels, even though we would.

It is this impossibility of resting religion any more on grounds once supposed to be safe, such as that the Gospel narratives are free from mistake and that the Gospel miracles are trustworthy, which compels us to look for new grounds upon which we may build firmly. They do us an ill turn and we owe them no thanks for it, who compel us to keep going back to examine the old grounds, and declaring their want of solidity. What we need is to have done with all this negative, unfruitful business, and to get to religion again;—to the use of the Bible upon new grounds which shall be secure. The old grounds *cannot* be used safely any more, and if one opens one's eyes one must see it. Those who inveigh against us could see it, if they chose, as plainly as we do; and they ought to open their eyes and see it, but they will not. And they want us to go on trusting foolishly to the old grounds as they do, until all tumbles in and there is a great ruin and confusion. Let us not do so. Let those who have read 'Literature and Dogma' with satisfaction be sure that what is in that book said against miracles, kept though it be within the narrowest limits possible, is indispensable, and requires so little space just because it is so very certain. Let him accustom himself to treat with steadiness, with rigorous simplicity, all the devices to save those unsavable things, the Bible-miracles.

To reduce the miraculous in them to what are thought reasonable dimensions is now a favourite attempt. But if anything miraculous is left, the whole miracle might as well have been left; if nothing, how has the incident any longer the proving force of a miracle? Let us treat so absurd an attempt as it deserves. Neander supposes that the water at the marriage-feast at Cana was not changed by Jesus into wine, but was only endued by him with wine's brisk taste and exhilarating effects. This has all the difficulties of the miracle and only gets rid of the poetry. It is as if we were startled by the extravagance of supposing Cinderella's fairy godmother to have

actually changed the pumpkin into a coach and six, but suggested that she did really change it into a one-horse brougham. Many persons, again, feel now an insurmountable suspicion (and no wonder) of Peter's fish with the tribute-money in its mouth, and they suggest that what really happened was that Petër caught a fish, sold it, and paid the tribute with the money he thus got. This is like saying that all Cinderella's godmother really did was to pay a cab for her godchild by selling her vegetables. But then what becomes of the wonder, the miracle? Were there ever such apologists as these? They impair the credit of the evangelists as much as we do, for they make them transform facts to an extent wholly incompatible with trustworthy reporting. They impair it more; for they make them transform facts with a method incompatible with honest simplicity.

Simple, flexible common-sense is what we most want, in order to be able to follow truly the dealings of that spontaneous, irregular, wonderful power which gives birth to tales of miracle,—the imagination. It is easy to be too systematic. Strauss had the idea, acute and ingenious, of explaining the miracles of the New Testament as a reiteration of the miracles of the Old. Of some miracles this supplies a good explanation; it plausibly explains the story of the Transfiguration, for instance. The story of the illumined face of Jesus,—Jesus the prophet like unto Moses whom Moses foretold,—might naturally owe its origin to the story of the illumined face of Moses himself. But of other miracles, such as the walking on the Lake of Gennesaret or the cursing of the barren fig-tree, Strauss's idea affords no admissible explanation whatever. To employ it for these cases can only show the imperturbable resolution of a German professor in making all the facts suit a theory which he has once adopted. But every miracle has its own mode of growth and its own history, and the key to one is not the key to others. Such a rationalizing explanation as that of Peter's fish is ridiculous; yet a clue, a suggestion, however slight, of fact, there probably was to every miracle; and sometimes, not by any means always, this clue may be traced with likelihood.

The story of the feeding of the thousands may well have had its rise in the suspension, the comparative extinction, of hunger and thirst during hours of rapt interest and intense mental excitement. In such hours a trifling sustenance which would commonly serve for but one or two, will suffice for many. Rumour and imagination make and add details, and swell the thing into a miracle. This sort of incident, again, it is as natural to conceive repeating itself, as it is unnatural to conceive an incident like the clearance of the Temple repeating itself. Or to take the walking on the sea of Galilee; here, too, the sort of hint of fact which started the miracle will readily occur to every one. Sometimes the hint of fact, lost in our Bibles, is preserved elsewhere. The Gospel of the Hebrews,—an old Gospel outside the canon of Scripture, but which Jerome quotes and of which

we have fragments,—this Gospel, and other records of like character, mention what our four Gospels do not: a wonderful light at the moment when Jesus was baptized. No one, so far as I know, has yet remarked, that in this small and dropped circumstance, a weird light on Jordan seen while Jesus was being baptized, we not improbably have the little original nucleus of solid fact round which the whole miraculous story of his baptism gathered.

He does well, who, steadily using his own eyes in this manner, and escaping from the barren routine whether of the assailants of the Bible or of its apologists, acquires the serene and imperturbable conviction, indispensable for all fruitful use of the Bible in future, that in travelling through its reports of miracles he moves in a world, not of solid history, but of illusion, rumour, and fairy-tale. Only, when he has acquired this, let him say to himself that he has by this achieved nothing, except to get rid of an insecure reliance which inevitably some day or other would cost him dear, of a staff in religion which must sooner or later have pierced his hand.

One other thing, however, he has done besides this. He has discovered the hollowness of the main ground for making God a person who thinks and loves, a magnified and non-natural man. Only a kind of man magnified could so make man the centre of all things, and interrupt the settled order of nature in his behalf, as miracles imply. But in miracles we are dealing, we find, with the unreal world of fairy-tale. Having no reality of their own, they cannot lend it as foundation for the reality of anything else.

There remain the grounds for asserting God to be a person who thinks and loves which are supplied by metaphysics.

“*Continuo auditæ voces, vagitus et ingens.*”


At the mention of that name, *metaphysics*, essence, existence, substance, finite and infinite, cause and succession, something and nothing, begin to weave their eternal dance before us; with the confused murmur of their combinations filling all the region governed by *her*, who, far more indisputably than her late-born rival political economy, has earned the title of the Dismal Science. Yet even here we will ask the reader of ‘Literature and Dogma,’ if he does not disdain so unsophisticated a companion, to enter with us. And here, possibly, we may after all find reason to retract, and to own that the theologians are right. For metaphysics we know from the very name to be the science of things which come after natural things; now the things which come after natural things are things not natural. Clearly, therefore, if any science is likely to be able to demonstrate to us the magnified and non-natural man, it must be the science of non-naturals.

MATTHEW ARNOLD.

(*To be continued.*)

# THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW





## ON THE ATMOSPHERE IN RELATION · TO FOG-SIGNALLING.

### *Introduction.*

THE cloud produced by the puff of a locomotive can quench the rays of the noonday sun ; it is not therefore surprising that in dense fogs our most powerful coast-lights, including even the electric light, should become useless to the mariner.

Disastrous shipwrecks are the consequence. During the last ten years no less than two hundred and seventy-three vessels have been reported as totally lost on our own coasts in fog or thick weather. The loss, I believe, has been far greater on the American seaboard, where trade is more eager and fogs more frequent than they are here. No wonder, then, that earnest efforts should be made to find a substitute for light in sound-signals, powerful enough to give warning and guidance to mariners while still at a safe distance from the shore.

Such signals have been established to some extent upon our own coasts, and to a still greater extent along the coasts of Canada and the United States. But the evidence as to their value and performance is of the most conflicting character, and no investigation sufficiently thorough to clear up the uncertainty has hitherto been made. In fact, while the *velocity* of sound has formed the subject of refined and repeated experiment by the ablest philosophers, the publication of Dr. Derham's celebrated paper in the "Philosophical Transactions" for 1708 marks the latest systematic inquiry into the causes which affect the *intensity* of sound in the atmosphere.

Jointly with the Elder Brethren of the Trinity House, and as their  
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scientific adviser, I have recently had the honour of conducting an inquiry designed to fill the blank here indicated.

One or two brief references will suffice to show the state of the question when this investigation began. "Derham," says Sir John Herschel, "found that fogs and falling rain, but more especially snow, tend powerfully to obstruct the propagation of sound, and that the same effect was produced by a coating of fresh-fallen snow on the ground, though when glazed and hardened at the surface by freezing it had no such influence." \*

In a very clear and able letter addressed to the President of the Board of Trade in 1863,† Dr. Robinson, of Armagh, thus summarises our knowledge of fog-signals :—"Nearly all that is known about fog-signals is to be found in the Report on Lights and Beacons; and of it much is little better than conjecture. Its substance is as follows :—

"Light is scarcely available for this purpose. Blue lights are used in the Hooghly; but it is not stated at what distance they are visible in fog; their glare may be seen further than their flame.‡ It might, however, be desirable to ascertain how far the electric light ~~its flash~~ can be traced.§

"Sound is the only known means really effective; but about it testimonies are conflicting, and there is scarcely one fact relating to its use as a signal which can be considered as established. Even the most important of all, the distance at which it ceases to be heard, is undecided.

"Up to the present time all signal-sounds have been made in air, though this medium has grave disadvantages: its own currents interfere with the sound-waves, so that a gun or bell which is heard several miles down the wind is inaudible more than a few furlongs up it. A still greater evil is that it is least effective when most needed; for fog is a powerful damper of sound.'"

Dr. Robinson here expresses the universally prevalent opinion, and he then assigns the theoretic cause. Fog, he says, "is a mixture of air and globules of water, and at each of the innumerable surfaces where these two touch, a portion of the vibration is reflected and lost.|| . . . . Snow produces a similar effect, and one still more injurious."

Reflection being thus considered to take place at the surfaces of the suspended particles, it followed that the greater the number of particles, or, in other words, the denser the fog, the more injurious would be its action upon sound. Hence optic transparency came

\* Essay on Sound, par. 21.

† Report of the British Association for 1863, p. 105.

‡ A very sagacious remark, as observation proves.

§ Powerful electric lights have been since established and found ineffectual.

|| This is also Sir John Herschel's way of regarding the subject. Essay on Sound, par. 38.

to be considered a measure of acoustic transparency. On this point Dr. Robinson, in the letter referred to, expresses himself thus :—"At the outset, it is obvious that, to make experiments *comparable*, we must have some measure of the fog's power of stopping sound, without attending to which the most anomalous results may be expected. It seems probable that this will bear some simple relation to its opacity to light, and that the distance at which a given object, as a flag or pole, disappears may be taken as the measure." "Still clear air" was regarded in this letter as the best vehicle of sound, the alleged action of fogs, rain, and snow being ascribed to their rendering the atmosphere "a discontinuous medium."

Prior to this investigation the views here enunciated were those universally entertained. That sound is unable to penetrate fogs was taken to be "a matter of common observation." The bells and horns of ships were affirmed "not to be heard so far in fogs as in clear weather." In the fogs of London the noise of the carriage wheels was reported to be so much diminished that "they seem to be at a distance where really close by." My knowledge does not inform me of the existence of any other source for these opinions regarding the deadening power of fog than the paper of Derham published one hundred and sixty-seven years ago. In consequence of their *à priori* probability, his conclusions seem to have been transmitted unquestioned from generation to generation of scientific men.

### *Instruments and Observations*

On the 19th of May, 1873, this inquiry began. The South Foreland, near Dover, was chosen as the signal station, steam-power having been already established there to work two powerful magneto-electric lights. The observations for the most part were made afloat, one of the yachts of the Trinity Corporation being usually employed for this purpose. Two stations had been established, the one at the top, the other at the bottom of the South-Foreland Cliff; and at each of them trumpets, air-whistles, and steam-whistles of great size were mounted. The whistles first employed were of English manufacture. To these were afterwards added a large United States whistle, and also a Canadian whistle, of great reputed power.

On the 8th of October another instrument, which has played a specially important part in these observations, was introduced. This was a steam siren, constructed and patented by Mr. Brown, of New York, and introduced by Professor Henry into the lighthouse system of the United States. As an example of international courtesy worthy of imitation, I refer with pleasure to the fact that when informed by Major Elliott, of the United States Army, that our experiments had begun, the Lighthouse Board at Washington, of their own spontaneous



kindness, forwarded to us for trial a very noble instrument of this description, which was immediately mounted at the South Foreland.

The principle of the siren is easily understood. A musical sound is produced when the tympanic membrane is struck periodically with sufficient rapidity. The production of these tympanic shocks by puffs of air was first realized by Dr. Robison, and his device was the first and simplest form of the siren. A stopcock was so constructed that it opened and shut the passage of a pipe 720 times in a second. Air from the wind-chest of an organ being allowed to pass along the pipe during the rotation of the cock, a musical sound was most smoothly uttered. A great step was made in the construction of the instrument by Cagniard de la Tour, who gave it its present name. He employed a box with a perforated lid, and above the lid a similarly perforated disk capable of rotation. The perforations were oblique, so that when wind was driven through the lid, it so impinged upon the apertures of the disk as to set it in motion. No separate mechanism was therefore required to turn the disk. When the perforations of lid and disk coincided a puff escaped; when they did not coincide the current of air was cut off. In this way impulses were imparted to the air, and sound-waves generated. The siren has been greatly improved by Dove, and specially so by Helmholtz. Even in its small form, it can produce sounds of great intensity.

In the steam siren, as in the ordinary one, a fixed disk and a rotating disk are employed, but radial slits are used instead of circular apertures. One disk is fixed vertically across the throat of a conical trumpet 16½ feet long, 5 inches in diameter where the disk crosses it, and gradually opening out till at the other extremity it reaches a diameter of two feet three inches. Behind the fixed disk is the rotating one, which is driven by separate mechanism. The trumpet is mounted on a boiler. In our experiments steam of 70lbs. pressure was for the most part employed. Just as in the ordinary siren, when the radial slits of the two disks coincide, and then only, a strong puff of steam escapes. Sound-waves of great intensity are thus sent through the air, the pitch of the note depending on the velocity of rotation.

To the siren, trumpets, and whistles, were added three guns—an 18-pounder, a 5½-inch howitzer, and a 13-inch mortar. In our summer experiments all three were fired; but the howitzer having shown itself superior to the other guns, it was chosen in our autumn experiments as not only a fair but a favourable representative of this form of signal. The charges fired were for the most part those now employed at Holyhead, Lundy Island, and the Kish light-vessel—namely, 3 lbs. of powder. Gongs and bells were not included in this inquiry, because previous observations had clearly proved their inferiority to the trumpets and whistles.

On the 19th of May the instruments tested were :—

On the top of the cliff:

*a.* Two brass trumpets or horns, 11 feet 2 inches long, 2 inches in diameter at the mouthpiece, and opening out at the other end to a diameter of  $22\frac{1}{2}$  inches. They were provided with vibrating steel reeds 9 inches long, 2 inches wide, and  $\frac{1}{4}$  inch thick, and were sounded by air of 18 lbs. pressure.

*b.* A whistle, shaped like that of a locomotive, 6 inches in diameter, also sounded by air of 18 lbs. pressure.

*c.* A steam-whistle, 12 inches in diameter, attached to a boiler, and sounded by steam of 64 lbs. pressure.

At the bottom of the cliff:

*d.* Two trumpets or horns, of the same size and arrangement as those above, and sounded by air of the same pressure. They were mounted vertically on the reservoir of compressed air; but within about two feet of their extremities they were bent at a right angle, so as to present their mouths to the sea.

*e.* A 6-inch air-whistle, similar to the one above, and sounded by the same means.

The upper instruments were 235 feet above high water mark, the lower ones 40 feet. A vertical distance of 195 feet, therefore, separated the instruments. A shaft, provided with a series of twelve ladders, led from the one to the other.

Comparative experiments made at the outset gave a slight advantage to the upper instruments. They, therefore, were for the most part employed throughout the subsequent inquiry.

Our first experiments were a preliminary discipline rather than an organized effort at discovery. On May 19 the maximum distance reached by the sound was about  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles.\* The wind, however, was high and the sea rough, so that local noises interfered to some extent with our appreciation of the sound.

Mariners express the strength of the wind by a series of numbers extending from 0 = calm to 12 = a hurricane, a little practice in common producing a remarkable unanimity between different observers as regards the force of the wind. Its force on May 19 was 6, and it blew at right angles to the direction of the sound.

The same instruments on May 20 covered a greater range of sound; but not much greater, though the disturbance due to local noises was absent. At four miles' distance in the axes of the horns they were barely heard, the air at the time being calm, the sea smooth, and all other circumstances exactly those which have been hitherto regarded as most favourable to the transmission of sound. We crept a little further away, and by stretched attention managed to hear at intervals, at a distance of six miles, the faintest hum of the horns. A little

\* In all cases nautical miles are meant.

further out we again halted ; but though local noises were absent, and though we listened intently, we heard nothing.

This position, clearly beyond the range of whistles and trumpets, was expressly chosen with the view of making what might be considered a decisive comparative experiment between horns and guns as instruments for fog-signalling. The distinct report of the twelve o'clock gun fired at Dover on the 19th suggested this comparison, and through the prompt courtesy of General Sir A. Horsford we were enabled to carry it out. At half-past twelve precisely the puff of an 18-pounder, with a three-lb. charge, was seen at Dover Castle, which was about a mile further off than the South Foreland. Thirty-six seconds afterwards the loud report of the gun was heard, its complete superiority over the trumpets being thus, to all appearance, demonstrated.

We clinched this observation by steaming out to a distance of eight and half miles, where the report of a second gun was well heard by all of us. At a distance of ten miles the report of a third gun was heard by some, and at 9·7 miles the report of a fourth gun was heard by all.

The result seemed perfectly decisive. Applying the law of inverse squares, the sound of the gun at a distance of six miles from the Foreland must have had more than two-and-a-half times the intensity of the sound of the trumpets. It would not have been rash under the circumstances to have reported without qualification the superiority of the gun as a fog-signal. No single experiment is, to my knowledge on record to prove that a sound once predominant would not be always predominant, or that the atmosphere, on different days would show preferences to different sounds. On many subsequent occasions, however, the sound of the horns proved distinctly superior to that of the gun. This *selective* power of the atmosphere revealed itself more strikingly in our autumn experiments than in our summer ones ; and it was sometimes illustrated within a few hours of the same day : of two sounds, for example, one might have the greatest range at ten A.M., and the other the greatest range at two P.M.

In the experiments on May 19 and 20 the superiority of the trumpets over the whistles was decided ; and indeed, with few exceptions, this superiority was maintained throughout the inquiry. But there were exceptions. On June 2, for example, the whistles rose in several instances to full equality with, and on rare occasions subsequently even surpassed, the horns. The sounds were varied from day to day, and various shiftings of the horns and reeds were resorted to, with a view of bringing out their maximum power. On the date last mentioned a single horn was sounded, two were sounded, and three were sounded together ; but the utmost range of the loudest sound, even with the paddles stopped, did not exceed six miles. With the view of concentrating their power, the axes of the horns had been

pointed in the same direction; and, unless stated to the contrary, this in all subsequent experiments was the case.

On June 3 the three guns already referred to were permanently mounted at the South Foreland. They were ably served by gunners from Dover Castle.

On the same day dense clouds quite covered the firmament, some of them particularly black and threatening, but a marked advance was observed in the transmissive power of the air. At a distance of six miles the horn-sounds were not quite quenched by the paddle-noises; at eight miles the whistles were heard, and the horns better heard; while at nine miles, with the paddles stopped, the horn-sounds alone were fairly audible. During the day's observations a remarkable and instructive phenomenon was observed. Over us rapidly passed a torrential shower of rain, which, according to Derham, is a potent damper of sound. We could, however, notice no subsidence of intensity as the shower passed. It is even probable that, had our minds been free from bias, we should have noticed an augmentation of the sound, such as occurred with the greatest distinctness on various subsequent occasions during violent rain.

The influence of "beats" was tried on June 3, by throwing the horns slightly out of unison; but though the beats rendered the sound characteristic, they did not seem to augment the range. At a distance from the station curious fluctuations of intensity were noticed. Not only did the different blasts vary in strength, but sudden swellings and fallings off, even of the same blast, were observed. This was not due to any variation on the part of the instruments, but purely to the changes of the medium traversed by the sound. What these changes were shall be indicated subsequently.

The range of our best horns on June 10 was eight and three-quarters miles. The guns at this distance were very feeble. That the loudness of the sound depends on the shape of the gun was proved by the fact that thus far the howitzer, with a three-lb. charge, proved more effective than the other guns.

On June 25th a gradual improvement in the transmissive power of the air was observed from morning to evening; but at the last the maximum range was only moderate. The fluctuations in the strength of the sound were remarkable, sometimes sinking to inaudibility and then rising to loudness. A similar effect, due to a similar cause, is often noticed with church bells. The acoustic transparency of the air was still further augmented on the 26th: at a distance of nine and a quarter miles from the station the whistles and horns were plainly heard against a wind with a force of four; while on the 25th, with a favouring wind, the maximum range was only six-and-a-half miles. Plainly, therefore, something else than the wind must be influential in determining the range of the sound.

On Tuesday, July 1, observations were made on the decay of the sound at various angular distances from the axis of the horn. As might be expected the sound in the axis was loudest, the decay being gradual on both sides. In the case of the gun, however, the direction of pointing has very little influence.

The day was acoustically clear; at a distance of 10 miles the horn yielded a plain sound, while the American whistle seemed to surpass the horn. Dense haze at this time quite hid the Forceland. At  $10\frac{1}{2}$  miles occasional blasts of the horn came to us, but after a time all sound ceased to be audible; it seemed as if the air, after having been exceedingly transparent, had become gradually more opaque to the sound.

At 4.45 P.M. we took the master of the Varne light-ship on board the *Irene*. He and his company had heard the sound at intervals during the day, although he was dead to windward and distant  $12\frac{3}{4}$  miles from the source of sound.

Here a word of reflection on our observations may be fitly introduced. It is, as already shown, an opinion entertained in high quarters that the waves of sound are reflected at the limiting surfaces of the minute particles which constitute haze and fog, the alleged waste of sound in fog being thus explained. If, however, this be an efficient practical cause of the stoppage of sound, and if clear calm air be, as alleged, the best vehicle, it would be impossible to understand how to-day, in a thick haze, the sound reached a distance of  $12\frac{3}{4}$  miles, while on May 20, in a calm and hazeless atmosphere, the maximum range was only from 5 to 6 miles. Such facts foreshadow a revolution in our notions regarding the action of haze and fogs upon sound.

An interval of 12 hours sufficed to change in a surprising degree the acoustic transparency of the air. On the 1st of July the sound had a range of nearly 13 miles; on the 2nd the range did not exceed 4 miles.

### *Contradictory Results.*

Thus far the investigation proceeded with hardly a gleam of a principle to connect the inconstant results. The distance reached by the sound on the 19th of May was  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles; on the 20th it was  $5\frac{1}{2}$  miles; on the 2nd of June 6 miles; on the 3rd more than 9 miles; on the 10th it was also 9 miles; on the 25th it fell to  $6\frac{1}{2}$  miles; on the 26th it rose again to more than  $9\frac{1}{4}$  miles; on the 1st of July, as we have just seen, it reached  $12\frac{3}{4}$ , whereas on the 2nd the range shrunk to 4 miles. None of the meteorological agents observed could be singled out as the cause of these fluctuations. The wind exerts an acknowledged power over sound, but it could not account for these phenomena. On the 25th of June, for example, when the range was only  $6\frac{1}{2}$  miles, the wind was favourable; on the 26th,

when the range exceeded  $9\frac{1}{2}$  miles, it was opposed to the sound. Nor could the varying optical clearness of the atmosphere be invoked as an explanation; for on July 1, when the range was  $12\frac{1}{2}$  miles, a thick haze hid the white cliffs of the Foreland, while on many other days, when the acoustic range was not half so great, the atmosphere was optically clear. Up to July 3 all remained enigmatical; but on this date observations were made which seemed to me to displace surmise and perplexity by the clearer light of physical demonstration.

### *Solution of Contradictions.*

On July 3, we first steamed to a point 2.9 miles S.W. by W. of the signal station. No sounds, not even the guns, were heard at this distance. At two miles they were equally inaudible. But this being a position at which the sounds, though strong in the axis of the horn, invariably subsided, we steamed to the exact bearing from which our observations had been made on July 1. At 2.15 P.M., and at a distance of  $3\frac{1}{4}$  miles from the station, with calm, clear air and a smooth sea, the horns and whistle (American) were sounded, but they were inaudible. Surprised at this result, I signalled for the guns. They were all fired, but, though the smoke seemed at hand, no sound whatever reached us. On July 1, in this bearing, the observed range of both horns and guns was  $10\frac{1}{2}$  miles, while on the bearing of the Varne light-vessel, it was nearly 13 miles. We steamed in to 3 miles, paused, and listened with all attention; but neither horn nor whistle was heard. The guns were again signalled for; five of them were fired in succession, but not one of them was heard. We steamed on in the same bearing to 2 miles, and had the guns fired point blank at us. The howitzer and the mortar, with 3 lb. charges, yielded a feeble thud, while the 18-pounder was wholly unheard. Applying the law of inverse squares, it follows that, with the air and sea, according to accepted notions, in a far worse condition, the sound at 2 miles distance on July 1 must have had more than forty times the intensity which it possessed at the same distance at 3 P.M. on the 3rd.

'On smooth water,' says Sir John Herschel, 'sound is propagated with remarkable clearness and strength.' Here was the condition; still with the Foreland so close to us, the sea so smooth, and the air so transparent, it was difficult to realize that the guns had been fired or the trumpets blown at all. What could be the reason? Had the sound been converted by internal friction into heat, or had it been wasted in partial reflections at the limiting surfaces of non-homogeneous masses of air? I ventured, two or three years ago, to say something regarding the function of the Imagination in Science, and notwithstanding the care then taken, to define and illustrate its real province; some persons, amongst whom were one or two able men, deemed me loose and illogical. They misunderstood me. The faculty to which I

referred was that power of visualising processes in space, and the relations of space itself, which must be possessed by all great physicists and geometers. Looking, for example, at two pieces of polished steel, we have not a sense, or the rudiment of a sense, to distinguish the inner condition of the one from that of the other. And yet they may differ materially, for one may be a magnet, the other not. What enabled Ampère to surround the atoms of such a magnet with channels in which electric currents ceaselessly run, and to deduce from these pictured currents all the phenomena of ordinary magnetism? What enabled Faraday to visualise his lines of force, and make his mental picture a guide to discoveries which have rendered his name immortal? Assuredly it was the disciplined imagination. Figure the observers on the deck of the *Irene*, with the invisible air stretching between them and the South Foreland, knowing that it contained something which stifled the sound, but not knowing what that something is. Their senses are not of the least use to them; nor could all the philosophical instruments in the world render them any assistance. They could not, in fact, take a single step towards the solution without the formation of a mental image, in other words, without the exercise of the imagination.

Sulphur in homogeneous crystals is exceedingly transparent to radiant heat, whereas the ordinary brimstone of commerce is highly impervious to it—the reason being that the brimstone does not possess the molecular continuity of the crystal, but is a more aggregate of minute grains not in perfect optical contact with each other. Where this is the case a portion of the heat is always reflected on entering and on quitting a grain; hence when the grains are minute and numerous this reflection is so often repeated that the heat is entirely wasted before it can plunge to any depth into the substance. The same remark applies to snow, foam, clouds, and common salt, indeed to all transparent substances in powder; they are all impervious to light, not through the immediate absorption or extinction of the light, but through repeated internal reflection.

Humboldt, in his observations at the Falls of the Orinoco, is known to have applied these principles to sound. He found the noise of the falls far louder by night than by day, though in that region the night is far noisier than the day. The plain between him and the falls consisted of spaces of grass and rock intermingled. In the heat of the day he found the temperature of the rock to be considerably higher than that of the grass. Over every heated rock, he concluded, rose a column of air rarefied by the heat; its place being supplied by the descent of heavier air. He ascribed the deadening of the sound to the reflections which it endured at the limiting surfaces of the rarer and denser air. This philosophical explanation made it generally known that a non-homogeneous atmosphere is unfavourable to the transmission of sound.

But what, on July 3, not with the variously heated plain of Antures, but with a calm sea as a basis for the atmosphere, could so destroy its homogeneity as to enable it to quench in so short a distance so vast a body of sound? My course of thought at the time was thus determined. As I stood upon the deck of the *Irené* pondering the question, I became conscious of the exceeding power of the sun beating against my back and heating the objects near me. Beams of equal power were falling on the sea, and must have produced copious evaporation. That the vapour generated should so rise and mingle with the air as to form an absolutely homogeneous medium was in the highest degree improbable. It would be sure, I thought, to rise in invisible streams, breaking through the superincumbent air, now at one point, now at another, thus rendering the air *flocculent* with wreaths and stræ, charged in different degrees with the buoyant vapour. At the limiting surfaces of these spaces, though invisible, we should have the conditions necessary to the production of partial echoes and the consequent waste of sound. Ascending and descending air-currents, of different temperatures, as far as they existed, would also contribute to the effect.

Curiously enough, the conditions necessary for the testing of this explanation immediately set in. At 3.15 P.M., a solitary cloud threw itself athwart the sun, and shaded the entire space between us and the South Foreland. The heating of the water, and the production of vapour were suddenly checked by the interposition of this screen; hence the probability of suddenly improved transmission. To test this inference, the steamer was immediately turned and urged back to our last position of inaudibility. The sounds, as I expected, were distinctly though faintly heard. This was at 3 miles distance. At  $3\frac{3}{4}$  miles the guns were fired, both point blank and elevated. The faintest pop was all that we heard; but we did hear a pop, whereas we had previously heard nothing, either here or three-quarters of a mile nearer. We steamed out to  $4\frac{1}{4}$  miles, where the sounds were for a moment faintly heard; but they fell away as we waited, and though the greatest quietness reigned on board, and though the sea was without a ripple, we could hear nothing. We could plainly see the steam-puffs which announced the beginning and the end of a series of trumpet-blasts, but the blasts themselves were quite inaudible.

It was now 4 P.M., and my intention at first was to halt at this distance, which was beyond the sound-range, but not far beyond it, and see whether the lowering of the sun would not restore the power of the atmosphere to transmit the sound. But after waiting a little, the anchoring of a boat was suggested, so as to liberate the steamer for other work; and though loth to lose the anticipated revival of the sounds myself, I agreed to this arrangement. Two men were placed in the boat and requested to give all attention, so as to hear the sound if possible. With perfect stillness around them,



they heard nothing. They were then instructed to hoist a signal if they should hear the sounds, and to keep it hoisted as long as the sounds continued.

At 4.45, we quitted them and steamed towards the South Sand Head light-ship. Precisely fifteen minutes after we had separated from them the flag was hoisted: the sound had at length succeeded in piercing the body of air between the boat and the shore.

We continued our journey to the light-ship, went on board, heard the report of the lightsmen, and returned to our anchored boat. We then learned that when the flag was hoisted, the horn-sounds were heard, that they were succeeded after a little time by the whistle-sounds, and that both increased in intensity as the evening advanced. On our arrival, of course we heard the sounds ourselves.

We pushed the test further by steaming further out. At  $5\frac{1}{4}$  miles, we halted and heard the sounds; at 6 miles we heard them distinctly, but so feebly that we thought we had reached the limit of the sound-range; but while we waited the sounds rose in power. We steamed to the Varne buoy, which is  $7\frac{3}{4}$  miles from the signal-station, and heard the sounds there better than at 6 miles distance. We continued our course outwards to 10 miles, halted there for a brief interval, but heard nothing.

Steaming, however, on to the Varne light-ship, which is situated at the other end of the Varne shoal, we hailed the master, and were informed by him that up to 5 P.M. nothing had been heard, but that at that hour the sounds began to be audible. He described one of them as "very gross, resembling the bellowing of a bull," which very accurately characterizes the sound of the large American steam-whistle. At the Varne light-ship, therefore, the sounds had been heard towards the close of the day, though it is  $12\frac{1}{4}$  miles from the signal-station. I think it probable that, at a point 2 miles from the Foreland, the sound at 5 P.M. possessed fifty times the intensity which it possessed at 2 P.M. To such undreamt-of fluctuations is the atmosphere liable. On our return to Dover Bay, at 10 P.M., we heard the sounds, not only distinct but loud, where nothing could be heard in the morning.

#### *Remarkable Instances of Acoustic Opacity.*

In his excellent lecture entitled "*Wirkungen aus der Ferne*," Dove has collected some striking cases of the interception of sound. The Duke of Argyll has also favoured me with some highly interesting illustrations. But nothing of this description that I have read equals in point of interest the following account of the battle of Gain's Farm, for which I am indebted to the Rector of the University of Virginia:—

" Lynchburgh, Virginia, March 19, 1874.

" SIR,—I have just read with great interest your lecture of January 16, on the acoustic transparency and opacity of the atmosphere. The remarkable observations you mention induce me to state to you a fact which I have occasionally mentioned, but always where I am not well known, with the apprehension that my veracity would be questioned. It made a strong impression on me at the time, but was an insoluble mystery until your discourse gave me a possible solution.

" On the afternoon of June 28, 1862, I rode, in company with General G. W. Randolph, then Secretary of War, of the Confederate States, to Price's house, about nine miles from Richmond; the evening before General Lee had begun his attack on McClellan's army, by crossing the Chickahominy about four miles above Price's, and driving in McClellan's right wing. The battle of Gain's Farm was fought the afternoon to which I refer. The valley of the Chickahominy is about one and a half mile wide from hill-top to hill-top. Price's is on one hill-top, that nearest to Richmond; Gain's Farm, just opposite, is on the other, reaching back in a plateau to Cold Harbour.

" Looking across the valley I saw a good deal of the battle, Lee's right resting in the valley, the Federal left wing the same. My line of vision was nearly in the line of the lines of battle. I saw the advance of the Confederates, their repulse two or three times, and in the grey of the evening the final retreat of the Federal forces.

" I distinctly saw the musket-fire of both lines, the smoke, individual discharges, the flash of the guns. I saw batteries of artillery on both sides come into action and fire rapidly. Several field-batteries on each side were plainly in sight. Many more were hid by the timber which bounded the range of vision.

" Yet looking for nearly two hours, from about 5 to 7 P.M. on a mid-summer afternoon, at a battle in which at least 50,000 men were actually engaged, and doubtless at least 100 pieces of field-artillery, through an atmosphere optically as limpid as possible, *not a single sound of the battle* was audible to General Randolph and my myself. I remarked it to him at the time as astonishing.

" Between me and the battle was the deep broad valley of the Chickahominy, partly a swamp shaded from the declining sun by the hills and forest in the west (my side). Part of the valley on each side of the swamp was cleared; some in cultivation, some not. Here were conditions capable of providing several belts of air, varying in the amount of watery vapour (and probably in temperature), arranged

like laminæ at right angles to the acoustic waves as they came from the battle-field to me.

"Respectfully,

"Your obedient servant,

"R. G. H. KEAN.

"Professor John Tyndall."

I learn from a subsequent letter that during the battle the air was still.—J. T.

*Echoes from invisible Acoustic Clouds.*

But both the argument and the phenomena have a complementary side, which we have now to consider. A stratum of air less than three miles thick on a calm day has been proved competent to stifle both the cannonade and the horn-sounds employed at the South Foreland; while, according to the foregoing explanation, this result was due to the reflection of the sound from invisible *acoustic clouds* which filled the atmosphere on a day of perfect *optical* transparency. But, granting this, it is incredible that so great a body of sound could utterly disappear in so short a distance without rendering some account of itself. Supposing, then, instead of placing ourselves behind the acoustic cloud we were to place ourselves in front of it, might we not, in accordance with the law of conservation, expect to receive by reflection the sound which had failed to reach us by transmission? The case would then be strictly analogous to the reflection of light from an ordinary cloud to an observer between it and the sun.

My first care in the early part of the day in question was to assure myself that our inability to hear the sound did not arise from any derangement of the instruments on shore. Accompanied by the private secretary of the Deputy Master of the Trinity House, at 1 P.M. I was rowed to the shore, and landed at the base of the South Foreland Cliff. The body of air which had already shown such extraordinary power to intercept the sound, and which manifested this power still more impressively later in the day, was now in front of us. On it the sonorous waves impinged, and from it they were sent back with astonishing intensity. The instruments, hidden from view, were on the summit of a cliff 235 feet above us, the sea was smooth and clear of ships, the atmosphere was without a cloud, and there was no object in sight which could possibly produce the observed effect. From the perfectly transparent air the echoes came, at first with a strength apparently little less than that of the direct sound, and then dying gradually and continuously away. A remark made by my talented companion in his note-book at the time shows how the phenomenon affected him:—"Beyond saying that the echoes seemed to come from the expanse of ocean, it did not appear possible to indicate any

more definite point of reflection." Indeed no such point was to be seen; the echoes reached us, as if by magic, from the invisible acoustic clouds with which the optically transparent atmosphere was filled. The existence of such clouds in all weathers, whether optically cloudy or serene, is one of the most important points established by this inquiry.

Here, in my opinion, we have the key to many of the mysteries and discrepancies of evidence which beset this question. The foregoing observations show that there is no need to doubt either the veracity or the capability of the conflicting witnesses, for the variations of the atmosphere are more than sufficient to account for theirs. The mistake indeed hitherto has been, not in reporting incorrectly, but in neglecting the monotonous operation of repeating the observations during a sufficient time. I shall have occasion to remark subsequently on the mischief likely to arise from giving instruction to mariners founded on observations of this incomplete character.

It required, however, long pondering and repeated observation before this conclusion took firm root in my mind; for it was opposed to the results of great observers, and to the statements of celebrated writers. In science, as elsewhere, a mind of any depth, which accepts a doctrine undoubtingly, discards it unwillingly. The question of aerial echoes has an historic interest. While cloud-echoes have been accepted as demonstrated by observation, it has been hitherto held as established that audible echoes never occur in optically clear air. We owe this opinion to the admirable report of Arago on the experiments made to determine the velocity of sound at Montlhéry and Villejuif in 1822.\* Arago's account of the phenomenon observed by him and his colleagues is as follows:—"Before ending this note we will only add that the shots fired at Montlhéry were accompanied by a rumbling like that of thunder, which lasted from 20 to 25 seconds. Nothing of this kind occurred at Villejuif. Once we heard two distinct reports, a second apart, of the Montlhéry cannon. In two other cases the report of the same gun was followed by a prolonged rumbling, These phenomena never occurred without

\* Sir John Herschel gives the following account of Arago's observation:—"The rolling of thunder has been attributed to echoes among the clouds; and if it is considered that a cloud is a collection of particles of water, however minute, in a liquid state, and therefore each individually capable of reflecting sound, there is no reason why very loud sounds should not be reverberated confusedly (like bright lights) from a cloud. And that such is the case has been ascertained by direct observation on the sound of cannon. Messrs. Arago, Matthieu, and Prony, in their experiments on the velocity of sound, observed that under a perfectly clear sky the explosions of their guns were always single and sharp; whereas when the sky was overcast, and even when a cloud came in sight over any considerable part of the horizon, they were frequently accompanied by a long-continued roll like thunder."—"Essay on Sound," par. 38. The distant clouds would imply a long interval between sound and echo, but nothing of the kind is reported.

clouds. Under a clear sky the sounds were single and instantaneous. May we not, therefore, conclude that the multiple reports of the Monthery gun heard at Villejuif were echoes from the clouds, and may we not accept this fact as favourable to the explanation given by certain physicists of the rolling of thunder?"

I think both the fact and the inference need re-consideration. For our observations prove to demonstration that air of perfect visual transparency is competent to produce echoes of great intensity and long duration. The subject is worthy of additional illustration. On the 8th of October, as already stated, the siren was established at the South Foreland. I visited the station on that day, and listened to its echoes. They were far more powerful than those of the horn. Like the others, they were perfectly continuous, and faded, as if into distance, gradually away. The direct sound seemed rendered complex and multitudinous by its echoes, which resembled a band of trumpeters first responding close at hand, and then retreating rapidly towards the coast of France. The siren echoes on that day had 11 seconds' duration, those of the horn 8 seconds' duration.

In the case of the siren, moreover, the reinforcement of the direct sound by its echo was distinct. About a second after the commencement of the siren blast the echo struck in as a new sound. This first echo, therefore, must have been flung back by a body of air not more than 600 or 700 feet in thickness. The few detached clouds visible at the time were many miles away, and could clearly have had nothing to do with the effect.

On the 10th of October, I was again at the Foreland listening to the echoes, with results similar to those just described. On the 15th I had an opportunity of remarking something new concerning them at Dungeness, where a horn similar to, though not so powerful as, those at the South Foreland, has been mounted. It rotates automatically through an arc of  $210^{\circ}$ , halting at four different points on the arc and emitting a blast of 6 seconds duration, these blasts being separated from each other by intervals of silence of 20 seconds.

The new point observed was this:—As the horn rotated the echoes were always returned along the line in which the axis of the horn pointed. Standing either behind or in front of the lighthouse tower, or closing the eyes so as to exclude all knowledge of the position of the horn, the direction of its axis when it sounded could always be inferred from the direction in which the aerial echoes reached the shore. Not only, therefore, is knowledge of *direction* given by a sound, but it may also be given by the aerial echoes of the sound.

On the 17th of October, at about 5 P.M., the air being perfectly free from clouds, we rowed towards the Foreland, landed, and passed over the seaweed to the base of the cliff. As I reached the base, the position of the *Galatea* was such that an echo of astonishing intensity was sent back from her side; it came as if

from an independent source of sound established on board the steamer. This echo ceased suddenly, leaving the aerial echoes to die gradually into silence.

At the base of the cliff a series of concurrent observations made the duration of the aerial siren-echoes from 13 to 14 seconds.

Lying on the shingle under a projecting roof of chalk, the somewhat enfeebled diffracted sound reached me, and I was able to hear with great distinctness, about a second after the starting of the siren blast, the echoes striking in and reinforcing the direct sound. The first rush of echoed sound was very powerful, and it came, as usual, from a stratum of air 600 or 700 feet in thickness. On again testing the duration of the echoes, it was found to be from 14 to 15 seconds. The perfect clearness of the afternoon caused me to choose it for the examination of the echoes. It is worth remarking that this was our day of longest echoes, and it was also our day of greatest acoustic transparency, this association suggesting that the duration of the echo is a measure of the atmospheric *depths* from which it comes. On no day, it is to be remembered, was the atmosphere free from invisible acoustic clouds; and on this day, and when their presence did not prevent the direct sound from reaching to a distance of 15 or 16 nautical miles, they were able to send us echoes of 15 seconds' duration.

On various occasions, when fully three miles from the shore, the Foreland bearing north, we have had the distinct echoes of the siren sent back to us from the cloudless *southern* air.

To sum up this question of aerial echoes. The siren sounded three blasts a minute, each of 5 seconds' duration. From the number of days and the number of hours per day during which the instrument was in action we can infer the number of blasts. They reached nearly twenty thousand. The blasts of the horns exceeded this number, while hundreds of shots were fired from the guns. Whatever might be the state of the weather, cloudy or serene, stormy or calm, the aerial echoes, though varying in strength and duration from day to day, were never absent; and on many days, "under a perfectly clear sky," they reached, in the case of the siren, an astonishing intensity. It is, doubtless, to these air-echoes, and not to cloud-echoes, that the rolling of thunder is to be ascribed.

### *Experimental Demonstration of Aërial Reflection.*

Thus far we have dealt in inference merely, for the interception of sound through aerial reflection has never been experimentally demonstrated; and, indeed, according to Arago's observation, which has hitherto held undisputed possession of the scientific field, it does not sensibly exist. But the strength of science consists in verification, and I was anxious to submit the question of aerial reflection to an

experimental test. As in most similar cases, it was not the simplest combinations that were first adopted. Two gases of different densities were to be chosen, and I chose carbonic acid and coal gas. With the aid of my skilful assistant, Mr. John Cottrell, a tunnel was formed, across which five-and-twenty layers of carbonic acid were permitted to fall, and five-and-twenty alternate layers of coal gas to rise. Sound was sent through this tunnel, making fifty passages from medium to medium in its course. These, I thought, would waste in aerial echoes a sensible portion of sound.\*

To indicate this waste an objective test was found in a gas-flame brought to the verge of flaring. The action of sonorous vibrations on such a flame was discovered by Professor Leconte in the United States, who had the sagacity to seize upon the most essential features of the phenomenon. A similar observation was subsequently made by Professor Barrett, while assistant in the physical laboratory of the Royal Institution; and both he and myself, my present assistant Mr. Cottrell, and Mr. Philip Barry, have succeeded in pushing such flames to an extraordinary degree of sensitiveness. The following brief description of a sensitive flame 24 inches high, issuing from the single orifice of a steatite burner, is taken from my Lectures on Sound. "The slightest tap on a distant anvil causes it to fall to 7 inches. When a bunch of keys is shaken the flame is violently agitated, and emits a loud roar. The dropping of a sixpence into a hand already containing coin, knocks the flame down. The creaking of boots sets it in violent commotion. The crumpling or tearing of a bit of paper, or the rustle of a silk dress, does the same. Responsive to every tick of a watch held near it, it falls and explodes. The winding up of the watch produces tumult. From a distance of 30 yards we may chirrup to this flame, and cause it to fall and roar. Repeating a passage from the 'Faery Queen;' the flame sifts and selects the manifold sounds of my voice, noticing some by a slight nod, others by a deeper bow, while to others it responds by violent agitation."

We are now prepared to understand a drawing and description of the apparatus first employed in the demonstration of aerial reflection. I take both drawing and description substantially from an account of the apparatus given by a writer in "*Nature*," Feb. 5, 1874.

"A tunnel *t t'* (Fig. 1), 2 inches square, 4 feet 8 inches long, open at both ends, and having a glass front, runs through the box, *a b c d*. The spaces above and below are divided into cells opening into the tunnel by transverse orifices exactly corresponding vertically. Each alternate cell of the upper series—the 1st, 3rd, 5th, &c.—communicates by a bent tube (*e e e*) with a common upper reservoir (*g*), its counterpart cell in the lower series having a free outlet into the air. In like manner the 2nd, 4th, 6th, &c., of the lower series of cells are

connected by bent tubes (*n n n*) with the lower reservoir (*i*), each having its direct passage into the air through the cell immediately above it. The gas distributors (*g* and *i*) are filled from both ends




FIG. 1.

at the same time, the upper with carbonic acid gas, the lower with coal-gas, by branches from their respective supply pipes (*f* and *h*). A well-padded box (*P*) open to the end of the tunnel forms a little cavern, whence the sound-waves are sent forth by an electric bell



(dotted in the figure). A few feet from the other end of the tunnel, and in a direct line with it, is a sensitive flame (*k*), provided with a funnel as sound-collector, and guarded from chance currents by a shade.

"The bell was set ringing. The flame, with quick response to each blow of the hammer, emitted a sort of musical roar, shortening and lengthening as the successive sound-pulses reached it. The gases were then admitted. Twenty-five flat jets of coal-gas ascended from the tubes below, and twenty-five cascades of carbonic acid fell from the tubes above. That which was a homogenous medium, had now fifty limiting surfaces, from each of which a portion of the sound was thrown back. In a few moments these successive reflections became so effective that no sound having sufficient power to affect the flame could pierce the clear, optically-transparent, but acoustically-opaque atmosphere in the tunnel. So long as the gases continued to flow the flame remained perfectly tranquil. When the supply was cut off, the gases rapidly diffused into the air. The atmosphere of the tunnel became again homogeneous, and therefore acoustically transparent, and the flame responded to each sound-pulse as before."

Not only do gases of different densities act thus upon sound, but atmospheric air in layers of different temperatures does the same. Across a tunnel resembling *t t'* fig. 1, sixty-six platinum wires were stretched, all of them being in metallic connection. The bell, in its padded box, was placed at one end of the tunnel, and the sensitive flame *k*, near its flaring point, at the other. When the bell rang the flame flared. A current from a strong voltaic battery, being sent through the platinum wires, they became heated: layers of warm air rose from them through the tunnel, and immediately the agitation of the flame was stilled. On stopping the current the agitation recommenced. In this experiment the platinum wires had not reached a red heat. Employing half the number and the same battery, they were raised to a red heat, the action in this case upon the sound-waves being also energetic. Employing one-third of the number of wires, and the same strength of battery, the wires were raised to a white heat. Here also the flame was immediately rendered tranquil by the stoppage of the sound.

But not only do gases of different densities, and air of different temperatures, act thus upon sound, but air saturated in different degrees, with the vapours of volatile liquids can be shown by experiment to produce the same effect. Into the path pursued by the carbonic acid in our first experiment a flask, which I have frequently employed to charge air with vapour, was introduced. Through a volatile liquid, partially filling the flask, air was forced into the tunnel *t t'*, which was thus divided into spaces of air saturated with the vapour, and other spaces in their ordinary condition. The action

of such a medium upon the sound-waves issuing from the bell is very energetic, instantly reducing the violently agitated flame to stillness and steadiness. The removal of the heterogeneous medium restores the noisy flaring of the flame.

A few illustrations of the action of non-homogeneous atmospheres produced by the saturation of layers of air with the vapours of volatile liquids may follow here.

*Bisulphide of Carbon*.—Flame very sensitive, and noisily responsive to the sound. The action of the non-homogeneous atmosphere was prompt and strong, stilling the agitated flame.

*Chloroform*.—Flame still very sensitive; action similar to the last.

*Iodide of Methyl*.—Action prompt and energetic.

*Amylene*.—Very fine action; a short and violently agitated flame was immediately rendered tall and quiescent.

*Sulphuric Ether*.—Action prompt and energetic.

The vapour of water at ordinary temperatures is so small in quantity, and so attenuated, that it requires special precautions to bring out its action. But with such precautions it was found competent to reduce to quiescence the sensitive flame.

As the skill and knowledge of the experimenter augment he is often able to simplify his experimental combinations. Thus, in the present instance, by the suitable arrangement of the source of sound and the sensitive flame, it was found that not only twenty-five layers, but three or four layers of coal-gas and carbonic acid sufficed to still the agitated flame. Nay, with improved manipulation the action of a single layer of either gas was rendered perfectly sensible. So also as regards heated layers of air, not only were sixty-six or twenty-two heated platinum wires found sufficient, but the heated air from two or three candle flames, or even from a single flame, or a heated poker, was found perfectly competent to stop the flame's agitation. The same remark applies to vapours. Three or four layers of air saturated with the vapour of a volatile liquid stilled the flame; and, by improved manipulation, the action of a single saturated layer could be rendered sensible. In all these cases, moreover, a small high-pitched reed might be substituted for the bell.

In the experiments at the South Foreland, not only was it proved that the acoustic clouds stopped the sound; but in the proper position the sounds which had been refused transmission were received by reflexion. I wished very much to render this echoed sound evident experimentally; and stated to my assistant that we ought to be able to accomplish this. Mr. Cottrell met my desire by the following beautiful experiment, which has been thus described before the Royal Society:—

"A vibrating reed B (Fig. 2) was placed so as to send sound-waves through a tin tube, 38 inches long, and  $1\frac{1}{4}$  inch diameter,

in the direction B A, the action of the sound being rendered manifest by its causing a sensitive flame placed at F' to become violently agitated.




FIG. 2.

"The invisible heated layer immediately above the luminous portion of an ignited coal-gas flame issuing from an ordinary bat's-wing burner was allowed to stream upwards across the end A of the tin tube. A portion of the sound issuing from the tube was reflected at the limiting surfaces of the heated layer; the part transmitted being now only competent to slightly agitate the sensitive flame at F'.

"The heated layer was then placed at such an angle that the reflected portion of the sound was sent through a second tin tube, A F (of the same dimensions as B A). Its action was rendered visible by causing a second sensitive flame placed at the end of the tube at F to become violently affected. This *echo* continued active so long as the heated layer intervened; but upon its withdrawal the sensitive flame placed at F', receiving the whole of the direct pulse, became again violently agitated, and at the same moment the sensitive flame at F, ceasing to be affected by the echo, resumed its former tranquillity.

"Exactly the same action takes place when the luminous portion of a gas flame is made the reflecting layer; but in the experiments above described the invisible layer above the flame only was used. By proper adjustment of the pressure of the gas, the flame at F' can be rendered so moderately sensitive to the direct sound-wave that the portion transmitted through the reflecting layer shall be incompetent to affect the flame. Then by the introduction and withdrawal of the bat's-wing flame the two sensitive flames can be rendered alternately quiescent and strongly agitated.


"An illustration is here afforded of the perfect analogy between

light and sound; for if a beam of light be projected from B to F, and a plate of glass be introduced at A in the exact position of the reflecting layer of gas, the beam will be divided, one portion being reflected in the direction A F, and the other portion transmitted through the glass towards F', exactly as the sound-wave is divided into a reflected and transmitted portion by the layer of heated gas or flame."

Thus far, therefore, we have placed our subject in the firm grasp of experiment; nor shall we find this test failing us further on.

JOHN TYNDALL.

*(To be continued.)*



## THE CHRISTIAN PATRIARCHATE,

IN ITS INFLUENCE ON DOCTRINE AND RITE.

**T**HE influence which was exercised upon the Church Universal by those great ruling churches which formed the recognised centres of authority and sources of doctrinal teaching from the earliest period, has been hitherto singularly disregarded, or at least very incidentally and unsystematically considered. Yet, as it became developed in the institution of the Patriarchate, it forms a factor (so to speak) in the history of the Church, of the highest value and importance; and one which cannot but be taken into account in solving the difficult problems which that long and perplexing history presents to the mind of the student. While it remains unsolved, we can neither be able to estimate the forces which a central and authoritative teaching have brought to bear upon the doctrines of the Church, nor to adjust the conflicts between critical and dogmatic teaching which recur at every period of early Christianity.

The incidents of the external life of the Church and of its internal and dogmatic structure have for the most part been treated as absolutely separate, or else they have been huddled promiscuously together, as though they had only a chronological or accidental connection. Few have endeavoured to account for the fact that the advancing organisation of the whole body was the motive power which brought its doctrines into a systematic form, or to mark the Providences which carried on in the Church this twofold development. Yet the most superficial observer of the features of the history of Church doctrine and government cannot fail to be struck with the sudden and almost spontaneous growth of the Patriarchal

system, which established in the great centres of the ancient world an authority so singular and paramount, as to be wholly inexplicable on merely outward and temporal grounds. The long and wearying controversy on the Supremacy of Rome,—which seems likely to last as long as the religion it has so fatally divided,—has so distorted the whole subject as to render it impossible for those on the one side to recognise the co-ordinate authority of the early Patriarchs (insisted upon and confirmed even in the transient union of the Churches at Florence), while it has made it difficult for the disputers of the Roman autocracy to admit any authority whatever in that single Church which advances in regard to every other so exorbitant and injurious a claim. But a more impartial examination of the pre-dominating influence of the great Patriarchal sees of Antioch, Alexandria, and Rome—to which Constantinople and Jerusalem were subsequently added, the one as having succeeded to the rank of an Imperial Capital, the other as having an acknowledged primacy of honour—must lead to the conclusion that the institution of the Patriarchate in favour of these great central Churches, has more than any other circumstance in the history of Christianity, contributed to mould its doctrines and to create that framework of systematic divinity which has so long survived the destruction of the Patriarchal fabric. I venture to affirm that the history of the gospels, of the creeds, of the liturgies, and of the synodical decisions of the Church is to be read in the combined or conflicting influences of these great sees which from the very first, and even before the purely diocesan system had arisen, exercised, as great schools of religious thought and scriptural interpretation, an almost irresistible power over the vast body of Christian believers scattered through the more distant provinces of the then known world. In illustrating this view I propose briefly to indicate the influence of these great central powers in the formation of the gospels, the creeds, and the liturgies of the Church—upon its methods of interpretation and teaching—and finally, on its legislation both in regard to doctrine and discipline.

Our first inquiry points to the origin of the four great narratives of the life and doctrine of our Lord, which have formed the basis of the teaching of the Christian Church in every age. These, as the traditions which accompany, and are inseparable from their history, clearly show, represent not only the personal teaching of the Evangelists, but their teaching in connection with those great ruling centres which so early became identified with their names. They exhibit to us the forms which the teaching of Christianity assumed in these great central communities in which the Apostles had established schools and systems of doctrinal instruction. It has been too much the fashion of later critics to accept just as much of the traditional history of the gospels as suits the mere purpose of their

authentication, and to reject or discredit every statement however reasonable which passes this arbitrary line.

But if (for instance) St. Irenæus is to be believed, when he affirms St. Matthew's Gospel to be authentic, why should we refuse to accept his testimony when he proceeds to affirm that it was written when he was among the Jews and in their own language?

And if Origen, Eusebius, Athanasius, Cyril of Jerusalem, Epiphanius, Gregory Nazianzene, and every subsequent authority confirm this evidence, it is surely unreasonable to reject one member of the tradition because we care only for the other—to deny that the shell which has preserved it is as genuine as the kernel, because the latter is all that we care to preserve. It is the invariable testimony of the ancients that St. Matthew's Gospel was written for the Church of Jerusalem and in Hebrew, and that it was the first of those we have. Nor is the universally received tradition respecting St. Mark's Gospel less precise or less worthy of credit. From St. Irenæus, Clement of Alexandria, Eusebius, Tertullian, Origen, and others, we gather the fact that St. Mark's Gospel was written at Rome, that it represented the teaching of St. Peter in that city and had his sanction; that it was preached also in Alexandria, where St. Mark is believed to have closed his life; and was written, moreover (as the Fathers generally affirm) for the Italians and in Latin. From the same original sources we learn that St. Luke's Gospel was universally held to embody the teaching of St. Paul; that he himself was a native of Antioch, and a member of that great and primitive church; that he wrote in Greek and for Greeks, and compiled his narrative in Achaia. The traditions of the fourth Gospel are given us with still greater fulness and precision. We gather from them the facts that it was written later than, and as supplementary to, the rest; that it had a more controversial object than that of the simple narratives which preceded it, being written either in foresight, or in the presence, of those errors concerning the nature of our Lord which so early appeared in the Church; and that the scene of its publication was Ephesus. Now the evidences for the authenticity of the Gospels and of the circumstances which attended their publication, must stand or fall together. They form two indivisible links in the chain of facts which connects us with this distant past, and we cannot arbitrarily separate them. If, however, we accept them together, and in their integrity, we arrive at several very suggestive conclusions illustrating the connection of the history of the Gospels with that of the great central Churches of Christianity whose influence predominated throughout the entire period of united Christian legislation. For the traditions respecting the Evangelists and their labours bring five Churches prominently before us, Jerusalem, Antioch, Alexandria, Ephesus, and Rome. And as Ephesus fell so shortly under the influence and within the Patriarchate of Con-

stantinople, and its authority and traditions devolved to that Church, which soon became the head of the Eastern Empire, as Rome had been of the Western, we may substitute that Patriarchate for the See of Ephesus, and number the five great ruling centres as—Jerusalem (whose primacy was rather of honour than of power)—Antioch, which at an early period acquired a predominant power in the great Oriental Diocese—Alexandria, the head of all the African Churches, whose power over Western Africa devolved at a later period to Carthage—and Rome, the great and sole centre of the Western World.

These Sees had acquired even before the establishment of Christianity in the Empire so extraordinary a power and weight, that the Nicene Council, in organising the Patriarchate, only added the element of jurisdiction to that consultative authority over rite and doctrine, which so early gave to the Sees of Antioch, Alexandria, and Rome an overwhelming influence in the Christian body.

These circumstances present a strong *prima facie* evidence that the Synoptical Gospels exhibit not only the names and teachings of the Evangelists, but also the form and character which the doctrines and facts of our religion had acquired in the three great ruling cities, whose history was then, and has ever since been, most closely connected with that of the doctrine, the ritual, and the legislation of Christianity. As the civil government was absorbed into these important centres, so the suffrages of the more distant and dependent Churches were gathered up into these great schools of public teaching. "Rome, the mistress of the world—Alexandria, the head of the Egyptian kingdom, and Antioch, the Queen of the East, were conspicuous among the cities of the Empire—and the Bishops of these Sees enjoyed singular privileges—which, first established by custom and prescription, were afterwards sanctioned by the decree of the Nicene Council." \*

These great Churches, as they absorbed into themselves the learning, the influence, and the traditions of the Asiatic, the African, and the Western world, became the recognized depositories of the doctrinal records and decisions of the Christian body—the scenes in which the great schools of Scriptural interpretation originated, and in which the most illustrious of the martyrs for our faith closed their testimony to its truth. We cannot, therefore, wonder that recourse was had to them from all parts of the Christian world; and that, when an external jurisdiction was added to the Church by the establishment of Christianity in the Empire, what was at first a consultative appeal passed by degrees into a judicial one, and that the primacy of honour and deference developed itself

\* Petrus de Marca de Concordantiâ Sacerdotii et Imperii, l. i. c. v. s. 5.



naturally into a primacy of order and jurisdiction, the first phase of the change being presented by the Nicene decree which traces the first lines of the ancient Patriarchate. The great Bishop Scipio Ricci, in his *Memoir on the rights of Bishops*, presented to the Assembly of Bishops at Florence in 1787, observes that the appellate jurisdiction of the Church of Rome grew up entirely from the many consultations and references made to that Church as the most eminent of the Sees of the West. He observes, further, that the replies of the Popes up to the period of Innocent III. were in the form of consultations and advices, resolutions of canonical doubts, and the prescription and enforcement of the laws of the General Councils. The legislative tone was never assumed until long after the forging of the Decretal Epistles, and even then it met with serious opposition. From the admitted fact that the great Patriarchates were the sources of Christian tradition and counsel from the earliest period, Anastasius Bibliothecarius compares them to the five senses of the Church Universal; and affirms that, in their unity on any particular truth, the unity of the whole body is completed. "*Profecto nihil generalitatis deest ecclesiæ, si omnes illæ sedes unius fuerint voluntatis, sicut nihil generalitatis deest motui corporis, si omnes quinque sensus integræ communisque fuerint sanitatis.*" The breaking up of the influence of the Sees of Antioch and Alexandria by the Jacobite schism, left Rome and Constantinople to pursue their course of aggrandisement in the East and West, without any check from their ancient equals, while the separation of the Empires had prepared the way for the ecclesiastical autocracy of the two capitals.

But a new light is thrown upon the theory we have here advanced, by the Creeds of the ancient Church, those monuments of the most venerable antiquity which are probably as old as the Gospels themselves, and represent the earliest typical forms of our faith. They constitute the foundation of that catechetical teaching which is foreshadowed by St. Paul in the Epistle to the Hebrews, where the Apostle lays down the first principles of the systematic teaching of Christianity, and charges his converts, "leaving these to go on unto perfection."

It cannot but appear to every critical eye, that the distinctions and affinities which subsist between these primitive documents, must throw a peculiar light on the doctrinal history of the Church.

Now, if we examine the many Creeds which have been preserved to our day from the traditions of the oldest Churches, we shall find that they generally fall into three distinct families—the Oriental, the Alexandrine, and the Western, or Roman—the first of these being subdivided into the Creeds of the proper Diocese of the Orient, and those of the Syrian and more distant Churches of Asia. We shall be led to observe, further, that the Alexandrian and Roman formulæ bear a much closer resemblance to one another than

either of them do to the Oriental—a circumstance which recalls the historical affinities of the two former Churches in the earliest period. At the same time the greater brevity of their forms of Creed corresponds well with the peculiar characteristics of that Gospel which was specially set forth for the teaching of the Western world. Even the article of the “descent into hell,” which is peculiar to the Western Creeds, is indicative of the teaching of St. Peter, from whose Epistle it is so clearly derived. Nor is it only in what may be termed their “crude forms” that the Creeds bear witness to the influence of those great Churches with which the personal labours of the Apostles were so closely connected. Even the additions and accretions of a later day testify the same influence. For while the additions at Nice proved the early power of the Alexandrian Church and its illustrious representative, the additions at Constantinople proved the overwhelming influence of the Oriental Diocese and its great chief, St. Basil, to whose teaching and treatise on the Holy Ghost, supported and enforced by his devoted friend, St. Gregory Nazianzene, and his brother, St. Gregory of Nyssa, the additions of that Council are attributed.

The influence of Alexandria was again felt in the prohibitory law of the Council of Ephesus against any innovation, even under the pretext of explanation or illustration, upon the terms of the Nicene Creed—while at Chalcedon the influence of the Oriental Diocese transferred the prohibitory law from the Nicene to the Constantinopolitan formulary, and re-established the reign of the literal school of Antioch in the person of the great Theodoret, as against the mystical school of Alexandria. It was the concurrence of the greater Sees in these changes—the general belief that they were in agreement with the traditional methods of teaching which prevailed at these recognized centres, which more than any external circumstance led to their unanimous reception by the whole Church. This accounts for the singular unanimity with which the Constantinopolitan additions were received by the Church, though the Western Churches were hardly represented in the Council; which yet added more words to the Creed than there are letters in the much-disputed *Homoousios*. The letter of Pope Damasus conveyed to the Synod the concurrence of the Western Patriarch—and the union of the Eastern and Western Churches was held to be complete. In like manner, the famous definition of Pope Leo the Great, read and examined, and finally adopted by the Council of Chalcedon, fixed the doctrine of the whole Church, and settled one of its deepest controversies. But for this theory, the perfect acquiescence of the whole Church in the Constantinopolitan additions would remain for ever one of the most insoluble problems of Church history. And scarcely less inexplicable would be the fact that the decisions of the African Councils against Pelagianism were accepted and incorporated in the

Code of the Universal Church, though the Eastern and Roman Churches were not represented in these Councils, and the recognition of them by the three great Patriarchal Sees was all that gave them universal sanction and authority. No General Council ever mentioned them, yet they stand side by side with the Nicene decrees themselves, as representing the traditions and decisions of the great Patriarchal Churches. On the other hand, the addition of the "*Filioque*" to the Creed by the Western Church, without the sanction or concurrence of the Eastern Patriarchs, led to that great schism which has broken up so fatally the testimony of the Patriarchal Churches to the truths of Christianity and their united government of the Church of Christ. In the ordinary course of events, and as the centres of population and of government became changed, this revolution would almost inevitably have taken place. But Rome precipitated the fatal disintegration of this ancient system which constituted the last link between Oriental and Western Christianity, and the increasing alienation between the rival Churches is one of the saddest results of the rupture of the Patriarchal tie. An irresponsible monarchical system of government both in doctrine and discipline superseded this oligarchic plan of the Patriarchate, and the rights of the Metropolitan order were almost immediately absorbed and lost. Had the change been gradual and natural, time would have been given for the powers which were thus violently broken up to gravitate towards the newer centres of power, and the great divisions of Europe would have probably carried on the Patriarchal tradition and presented a firm barrier against the encroachments of Rome, and a guarantee against sudden and extreme changes like those which a Reformation carried on from without the Church rendered almost inevitable.

From the view of the influence of the Patriarchate, as illustrated in the Christian Creeds, we are led to consider its influence on the Liturgies of the Christian Church, which fall into classes and divisions having a still clearer and deeper demarcation. We have here again three distinct families—the Asiatic (again sub-divided), the Alexandrian, and the Roman.

The liturgies of St. Basil and St. Chrysostom are the reformed representatives of the first—while the Mozarabic liturgy of Spain, whose distinctive features are Oriental, represents another branch of the same family. The Alexandrine and African liturgies, and their corrupted type, the so-called Liturgy of St. Mark, represent the second of these great divisions; while the Roman Liturgy, as reformed by Gelasius and Gregory the Great, and receiving many modifications in the Gallic, Frankish, and other ritual uses, represents the third great class of this group of ancient Christian offices. Here then we have a ritual system which corresponds with that of the Patriarchate, and again suggests to us the influence of the great ruling Sees, not only

upon the symbolical, but also upon the liturgical documents of the Church universal. Here also we find again that the Alexandrine and Roman forms approach one another more closely than either of them approaches the third—and the historian Socrates notes the agreement even in the fifth century between the Churches of Rome and Alexandria in matters of ritual observance. Thus the abstaining from celebrating on the Saturday is said to be a peculiar tradition of the Roman and Alexandrian Churches; while the presbyterial college or community in Alexandria and its authority in the election of the Patriarch (which St. Jerome records) bears a singular resemblance to the Roman Cardinalate in its earliest form,\* and supplies another link in the chain which connects Rome with Alexandria in the persons of St. Peter and St. Mark.

The pursuit of these affinities would lead us into a wider field than we proposed to enter upon in these few observations. It is enough for us here to indicate the fact that the divisions of creeds, liturgies, and other distinctive features in the history of the doctrine and ritual of the Church, correspond remarkably with its great ecclesiastical divisions, and point to the predominant influence of those ruling Sees which constitute the Patriarchal system. Let us now proceed to the consideration of these central schools as the depositaries of the traditional rules and methods by which the interpretation of the Scriptures was conducted from the beginning, and the body of orthodox systematic divinity constructed. The truth that the Scriptures were not delivered by the Apostles and Evangelists in the mere letter, but that (as the judicious Chemnitz observes, and as Calixtus and the reformed school of Helmstadt affirmed) "their genuine and native sense was delivered with them," † must appear to be no less a conclusion of common sense than it is of historical examination. While the Ancient Fathers are unanimous in their belief and assertion that all necessary truths bearing upon the life and practice of the Christian lie on the surface of the Scriptures, and are gathered up in the very creeds of the Church; while the very existence of these creeds and the jealousy with which they were guarded from any innovation, or even explanation (except in extraordinary emergencies) vindicates the same great rule of Christian liberty, and test of Christian discipleship—neither have the great teachers of the Church as individuals, nor the whole Church in its collective capacity, admitted for a moment the wild schemes of those who would submit the Scriptures to the rules of ordinary criticism, or entrust their interpretation to the capricious and conflicting rule of the "private spirit." Whether this spirit is claimed as the property of every member of the Church,

\* See Tamagna "*Origine e Prerogative dei Cardinali*," who quotes an important treatise on this subject by Mario Lupi, Archpresbyter of Bergamo.

† Friderici Ulrich. Calixti, "*de Universalis Primæ Ecclesiæ Auctoritate*,"

or restrained to a single individual (as in the doctrine of the Papal Infallibility), it is equally such a "private spirit" as is condemned by St. Peter (2 Ep. I. 20), though asserted in his name. "To say that the Pope is the only infallible interpreter of tradition," writes Bishop Pannilini (in the Acts of the Assembly of Bishops at Florence in 1787)

"Is to make an assertion which either destroys itself or destroys the idea which is essential to the very nature of tradition. . . . The universality of its testimony is the essential characteristic of tradition, and where there is no such testimony we can no longer recognize true tradition. To restrict it therefore to a single individual would be against its very definition. If the Pope were the sole judge and sole interpreter of it he would be the only witness, and would alone constitute tradition.\* If he alone constituted it, it would cease any longer to be tradition, inasmuch as it would fail in the essential characteristic of tradition. . . . But the certainty of tradition consists essentially and by its very definition, not in the sole testimony of the Roman Pontiff, but rather in that of the Fathers, councils, pastors, and Church of every age. Accordingly to limit the final decision of controversies to Pontifical decrees would be either to destroy the nature of tradition or to assert an absurdity."†

The traditional interpretation of the ancient Scriptures was delivered to the Apostles and disciples by Christ Himself, and became a common inheritance vested in the whole Church, long before any special gift or privilege was bestowed upon any particular member of it. We trace it in every illustration of ancient Prophecy in the Gospels and in the Epistles. In these a mystical interpretation appealing to a conventional and popular knowledge recurs frequently. Historical facts are referred to as having secondary and allegorical meanings. We recognize systems and schools of prophetic interpretation, as in the process of formation even in the primitive Church, whose laws and principles were laid down long before the first teachers of Christianity had passed away. Although (as Cardinal Cajetan observed) "God hath not tied up the exposition of Scripture to the interpretation of the holy fathers, but has constituted the entire Scripture the rule of interpretation of its separate parts."—he adds properly "*sub Catholice ecclesie censurâ*,"‡ by which he reserves to the ancient methods and laws of the Church universal their proper force and influence, while vindicating to all alike that interpretive right without which "nothing" (as he says) "would be left to the Christian of a later age than to transfer the matter from book to transcript" (*de libro in quinternum*).

Now the great central schools in which the rules and principles of scriptural interpretation were handed down would necessarily be those ancient and Apostolic Churches which gathered into one and

\* It is said that the present Pope, conscious perhaps of the necessity of escaping this dilemma, has boldly accepted the contradiction by identifying himself with what he has destroyed, in that famous solécisme "*Tradizione son' io*."

† *Atti dell' Assemblée*, tom. IV., pp. 687-9.

‡ *Præf. in Pentateuch*.

harmonized the teaching of the inferior Churches, and to which recourse was had on every occasion of doubt or difficulty. The Acts of the Apostles most clearly indicate to us the truth that at Jerusalem, at Antioch, and at the other great centres of Apostolic teaching (in which Rome, as the scene of St. Paul's long and systematic instruction, must have held a distinguished place) there existed prophets or interpreters, we might almost say "schools of prophets" and "schools of interpretation," fulfilling to the faithful the promise of St. Peter himself, "Moreover, I will endeavour that ye may be able after my decease to have these things always in remembrance." The Thirteenth Chapter of the Acts opens with the description of the Church of Antioch as containing one of the greatest and earliest of these schools of Christian doctrine and interpretation. The Eleventh Chapter (v. 27) had already indicated Jerusalem as also a centre of this exegetical system. Of the earliest history of the Church of Alexandria we know less than of the Oriental Churches. Nor is it clear in what manner the Churches of Cyrene, Carthage, and North-Western Africa generally acquired the knowledge of Christianity, though their recognition of the guidance of Alexandria in the period of keeping Easter, and the correspondence which passed between the Churches of Africa and Alexandria in regard to the Nicene Canons, prove that they recognized the authority of that See in its Patriarchal aspect, and had probably derived their earlier traditions from the same source. But though Alexandria does not take so early a place as a school of divinity as Antioch and Rome, it fills by far the most conspicuous rank in the period immediately succeeding. For the great catechetical school of Alexandria far eclipsed in the brilliancy of its results, and in the permanence of its influence, every other school of interpretation—carrying up its traditions through Origen, Clement, and Pantænus to the days of St. Mark himself. To this school, eminently and distinctively the *mystical*, as opposed to the *literal* school, we owe many of those traditional applications of the early prophecies, which arose out of the Septuagint version of them, and are so difficult to trace to any but a traditional origin—as that of Deuteronomy XXVIII., 66—applied to our Lord's Crucifixion by St. Athanasius and others—of Isaiah LIII., 8, as applied to his divine generation, and others which those acquainted with the writings of Origen and his many followers will readily recall. Passing on to Rome, though the evidences of a distinct school, like that of Antioch (which culminated in the person of Theodorit) or of Alexandria (which was so faithfully represented by his antagonist St. Cyril) are less precise and characteristic, we yet find that it took a clear and original position between both; producing that system of mixed interpretation which has more than any other prevailed in the Western Church, and moderated the excesses of the Oriental system. To whatever cause we may attribute the fact, it is certain that the

great literal school of interpretation, of which Antioch was the recognized centre, and the mystical school of Alexandria, blended together and reconciled by what we might call the eclectic schools of Rome and Carthage, have produced that body of systematic divinity which is even now, in spite of our manifold divisions, the undivided inheritance of the whole Church of Christ, and of which it might be said, as of the Episcopate, "*Est unus, cujus a singulis in solidum pars tenetur.*" The general rules of interpretation given us by St. Irenæus, St. Hilary, St. Jerome, St. Augustine, and others, have fixed the limits and adjusted the claims of literal and allegorical interpretation. Thus the exaggerated use of the latter by Origen and his disciples, and of the former by Diodorus of Tarsus, Theodore of Mopsuestia, and the school of Antioch, has been precluded, and that union and harmony of the two systems carried out which St. Jerome illustrates from Amos IX. 6. "He buildeth his stories in the heaven and hath founded his troop on the earth. *Cum historia, habuerint fundamenta, tunc spiritualis intelligentiæ culmina accipiunt.*"

The entire history of the earlier Councils is a narrative of the conflict and reconciliation of these schools of scriptural interpretation carried on under the influence of the three great Patriarchal Thrones which so faithfully represented them. The judgment against Arius at Nicæa, was the triumph of the Alexandrian school against an excessive development of the literal school of Antioch. The condemnation of Macedonius at Constantinople exhibited a further development of this great influence modified by that of Antioch as represented by the doctrine of St. Basil. At Ephesus the school of Alexandria again triumphed, while at Chalcedon the literal school of Antioch, supported by the influence of the Roman Patriarchate, again reasserted its supremacy. The fifth general Council shows the reaction which set in in the East against the predominant influence of Antioch, while the sixth, which condemned Monothelitism, was equally a violent revulsion against the excesses of the mystical school of Alexandria. Thus, mainly to the influence of the three great ruling Sees, moderated and adjusted by the simpler divinity of the western churches of Rome and Carthage, we are indebted for the formation and consolidation of that system of orthodox divinity which reigns even yet throughout Christendom, surviving by so many centuries the breaking up of the ancient Patriarchate. But the churches of Rome and Carthage (which had attained to a Patriarchal rank in Western Africa, the provincial synods of Africa suffering no appeal to any higher tribunal, as the learned Justellus clearly shows\*) did not merely exercise a moderating and adjusting power in this great constructive work, but entered upon an active and original part in it, though in another field. While the

\* Justell in *Codice Canonum Ecclesie Africane*. (Not. p. 35).

mysterious doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation were chiefly defined and settled in the East, and in the more accurate terms of that language in which they were first embodied, the African Church was summoned to a task equal in dignity and difficulty—the definition and protection of the great doctrines of grace against Pelagius and his followers, but feebly and incidentally touched by the council of Constantinople. It is a most impressive and suggestive thought, that this purest and most devoted branch of the Universal Church survived only just long enough to complete this great work, and having established the principles of the doctrine of grace for every age and every church, sank under the persecutions of the Vandals. Nor was the mission of the Church of Rome less important though much later in time. For the condemnation of Abailard, and the vindication of the supreme doctrine of the Atonement, in which St. Bernard took so distinguished a part, gave to the Roman Church a co-ordinate influence with the Eastern Patriarchates in the completion of the body of Christian doctrine.

The framework of Christian theology thus perfected in all its essential parts, passed from the united influence of the Patriarchate into the hands of the schoolmen, or systematic teachers of divinity, both in the east and in the west. St. John Damascene in the east, and Aquinas, Scotus, and the other great teachers in the west, taking as their text-books the one, the Catenae of the Eastern Fathers, the other the “Book of Sentences,” of Lombard (a kind of systematized catena of the Fathers of the Western Church) elaborated upon these foundations a still more compact and connected fabric of doctrine, which even the shock of the Reformation did not materially disturb. If we take up the writings of Aquinas on the Creed, the Lord’s Prayer, and the Commandments—and especially his “*Compendium Theologiae*”—we shall see how completely the platform of this ancient teaching has withstood the storms of the sixteenth century. The period of this great convulsion witnessed a phenomenon which has been far too little regarded by the student of ecclesiastical history. While the Reformers and their adversaries were engaged in minute and often merely verbal controversies on questions which had never been even opened at an earlier period, the great school of systematic divinity, in which the Reformers had themselves been trained, remained harmless and intact. Daillé has well observed that the “Fathers of the first centuries treat on matters very far different from the present controversies on religion,” and it is obvious that the system of divinity to which they so largely contributed could not be materially affected by the controversies that were opened at the Reformation—important though they undoubtedly were. But whatever the cause may have been, the result remains indisputable.

If we compare the great commentators of the Roman and Re-




formed Churches—Aquinas, Cajetan, Erasmus, Arias Montanus, Estius, Maldonatus—with Brentius, Vitringa, Bengel, Schmidt, Marckius, and even Calvin and Luther themselves, we shall find them presenting the most singular agreement in their exegetical principles, and shall be constrained to recognise the wonderful Providence which has overruled the interpretation as carefully as it has guarded the text of Scripture. But not only did the great fabric of systematic divinity endure the shock of the greatest change which the mind of man has ever experienced, and survive it unhurt. Every subsequent convulsion has only proved still more remarkably its solidity and permanence. Tested as it has been in every succeeding inquiry by innumerable criteria of truth, it remained inviolate even in the day when the Reformed communions were again divided and subdivided. Even the orthodox Dissenters from our church have consciously or unconsciously accepted the exegetical laws of the ancient church universal, and the headings of our authorized Bible, which represent this primitive teaching, are received and propagated with the Bible itself by those who would be least disposed to recognize directly the authority by which it was established. Whence (we might ask) have the divided members of the Christian family derived their agreement in the interpretation of the Song of Solomon, of the obscurer prophecies, of the parables of Christ in their moral and spiritual aspect, or their practical rules in regard to the limits of the general precepts of Christ, and a hundred other points of agreement, if it be not from that traditional interpretation of Scripture, which, however, its authoritative basis may be repudiated, has retained its real influence over every communion of Christians however distant or divided from the ancient centres of Christian teaching and influence? And whither ought we to seek for the reunion of the Christian world in its outward form as well as in its inner life, but in the gradual concurrence of all alike in the interpretation of the written word of God—the hallowing and often unconscious meeting of the most distant members of the family of Christ in the page of his recorded truth? The great Bishop Wessenberg has well observed that the critical study of the Scriptures, both by the members of the Roman and the Reformed Churches, brought them continually nearer to one another, and promoted more than any other means the reunion of the Christian world.\* The hopes of the future unity of the Church are less involved in the chances of artificial and conventional agreements on matters of controversy, than they are in the truth that the vital points of Christian teaching are the same in every communion which has preserved the traditions of the undivided church, and the principles of interpretation which were formed under the Patriarchal system.

\* "Die Grossen Kirchenversammlungen des 15ten und 16ten Jahrhunderts," tom. IV., p. 29.

Consciously or unconsciously the same systematic theology has been adopted by all alike. "The dogmas of the heavenly philosophy" (as Vincent of Lerins has termed it) have clustered around the central truths so invariably and so fruitfully that we cannot fail to trace the hand of God in the history of Christian dogma as clearly as we trace it in the external history of the church itself. To one signal instance of this external providence in its bearing upon the development of the internal structure of the Christian body, we have specially directed the attention of the reader in these few lines, in the hope that this mere skeleton of an argument may sometime derive form and life from an abler hand; and that many may be led to study a page of the book of God in Providence which throws so singular a light on the page of his revealed word. It were ill to resign to mere human philosophy or scientific inquiry the investigation of "God in History," or as we might well amplify the term, "God in the History of his Church and people—God in his providential direction of the Kingdom and family of Christ."

ROBERT C. JENKINS.



## THE FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY OF 1830 :

AN ENQUIRY INTO THE CAUSES OF ITS FAILURE.

[“ I may not live to see it, but I cherish the conviction that Constitutional Monarchy (the cause to which my political life has been devoted) will be permanently re-established in France.”—These words were written by M. Guizot, after the fall of King Louis Philippe, to a friend of the present writer. These words were the burden of all the letters to his English correspondents in which M. Guizot then alluded to the events of 1848. M. Guizot did not live to see constitutional monarchy re-established in France, but he lived to see France miss the opportunity of re-establishing it ; and he closed his eyes upon a political situation apparently destitute of all encouragement to that faith in constitutional monarchy which he cherished to the last.

The immensity of the change effected, during the lifetime of the present generation, in the international condition of Europe is marked by the effort it now costs us to recall from the oblivion of a very recent past those incidents of M. Guizot's foreign policy which were the cause of such strong emotion among the contemporaries of his political career. But the name of this illustrious man is associated with a great political experiment, which is still universally interesting, notwithstanding the failure of it. For the maintenance of a monarchy, exclusively by the support of the middle class, is an experiment of which the result cannot be unimportant to any modern state whercin the preponderating political power is possessed by its middle class. That the experiment failed in France we know. But

that fact is not, in itself, conclusive ; for the question remains, whether the failure be attributable to exceptional circumstances, or to the universal conditions of the problem.

It is this question which suggested the following reflections. They were written many years ago, as part of a work never published or even finished. Nor, indeed, were they then written with a view to publication ; but, rather, as private records of an endeavour to ascertain what organic elements of durability have been either preserved or produced by the chief European communities (and more especially our own) in the present stage of their social development.]

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IT would perhaps be easy to prove that the great things achieved by some nations have often been due to their faults, and that the sufferings of other nations have as often been caused by their virtues. There is, in any case, much to moderate self-satisfaction, and mitigate self-reproach, in the praise and blame which History distributes. Neither individuals nor nations can unite in themselves all the virtues. Some virtues are incompatible with each other ; some are the beneficent accompaniments of inevitable defects. The best instruction, therefore, which can be offered to a nation, in the choice of its intellectual attitude towards other nations, is that which enables it to recognize the good qualities not natural to its own character ; and to utilise, for its own preservation or improvement, those nations in which such qualities are found. Hence, in our study of political problems at home, there is always something to be learned from the experience of our neighbours, however greatly it may differ from our own. It is, at least, under this impression that I now propose to examine the practical conditions of Constitutional Government in continental communities ; and, of those communities, the first to claim attention is the French.

In surveying the condition of Europe, the eye first fastens upon France, just as, in examining the mechanism of a watch, the first object of inspection would be the mainspring. It is not only the geographical position of that country which gives to the phenomena of its social and political life an exceptionally cosmopolitan importance. Nor is it exclusively, or even mainly, owing to any peculiarity in the temperament of the French People, that modern France has become the busiest and most conspicuous theatre for the performance of these audacious political experiments which Europe contemplates, sometimes as an admiring, always as an interested, spectator. For the rapid and popular diffusion of political ideas, the French nation has, no doubt, peculiar qualifications, intellectual, social, and geographical ; and, perhaps, the assertion may be as true, as it is certainly common, that, of all European communities, the French is the most susceptible to the reception of new ideas, and the most impulsive in the practical

prosecution of them. But it must be evident, even to the most superficial observation, that the phenomena of French politics are in nowise explained by this statement of French character, even if the statement be accepted as indisputable. Why is it that we now hear so much about the political restlessness, the fickleness, the turbulent inconsequence, of the French? Why is it that, in the past history of this people, we find nothing to justify such a description of their characteristic qualities? Whatever was specially political in its most brilliant epochs, that history identifies with a man, rather than with a party, and ascribes, less to the political activity of the people, than to the personal energy of the monarch or the minister. However great may have been, at all times, the social vivacity of Frenchmen, it is certain that, down to a comparatively late period, their history is a record of political patience; and, if their social revolution was disastrously premature, was not their political revolution as disastrously tardy?

No; it is not in the political temperament, it is in the political condition, of France that we must seek the explanation of these phenomena. Nor need we go far to find it, amongst the powerful and promiscuous solvents of 1793. It is not the character of a patient, it is the character of a disease, which we have here to study; and every wise physician knows that sensuous excesses are oftener the consequence, than the cause, of disordered health. A state in which all the organic elements of political durability have been dissolved is, necessarily, driven fast along the path of political experiment. There is no help for it. It is not a matter of popular preference or national temperament; it is a stern political necessity. Organs are developed; they cannot be created. Institutions may be *thrown up*, they cannot be *kept up*, in a vacuum; and, when thus thrown up, they often fall, like bread and butter, on their best side. The future is the correlative of the past: faith in the former is paralysed by infidelity to the latter. The idea of duration cannot be expressed if either of these terms be excluded; yet both of them are wanting to the political condition of France; and, in such a condition, the most ingenious legislation, the most powerful executive machinery, are like the levers of Archimedes without a *Pou sto*.

But every European state is interested in the political experiments of its neighbours; and more especially is this the case as regards the political experiments of France. For the changes which have been violently and prematurely effected in the body politic of this country differ rather in degree than in kind from those which naturally belong to the phase of political development common to modern societies in all old communities. Life has been said to be an incurable disease. Every organism carries in itself the germs of its own dissolution. History forbids belief in the immortality of nations; and Europe is growing old in all her members. France, indeed, has

used up in fifty years the life of five centuries ; but the astonishing vitality which enables her, not only to survive the decomposition of her chief political organs, but to make way, from generation to generation, upon a succession of splendid makeshifts, with so much pomp, power, and material prosperity, is a phenomenon which should command our admiration, and certainly does not deserve our disparagement.

It may be thought, however, that in the theory of constitutional government, English statesmanship can have nothing to learn from the results of French empirics. This would be true if, in England, the history of constitutional government had not now reached that chapter with which it commonly opens in continental communities ; a chapter in which we find it identified with the preponderating power of the middle class, and specially distinguished from all other forms of government as the one most congenial to middle class interests, and best calculated to carry a nation safely along the path of material progress, unretarded by the reactionary prejudices of an aristocracy, unconvulsed by the revolutionary impulses of a demos. This connection between the monarchy and the middle class was effected, in England, by the great Whig Reform Bill of 1832 ; and in France, much about the same time, by the Constitution which accompanied the establishment of the Orleans dynasty in 1830.

The reign of Louis Philippe was characterised by a remarkable display of intellectual activity and splendour. Every department of human genius was represented in France with a vigour amply justifying the boast of that generation which called itself *la jeune*. For the first time, since the revolution of 1798, a literature and an eloquence, born out of that revolution, flourished under the most favourable conditions, and with the most brilliant effect. In the French Chambers, so newly trained to the liberty of speech, Europe admired an assemblage of orators unsurpassed in debating power even by the ancient Parliament of England. And what animation their eloquence imparted to the whole social life of the nation ! The public interest in a fine speech was passionate and universal. It was the fine speech itself which then absorbed the public interest, whether the subject of discourse were law or liberty, peace or war, the guilt of a criminal, the character of a minister, the career of an academician. It was all one to the public. Eloquence was the text, fact only the pretext. Words became things. Lamartine, after minutely describing to us the process of concocting that phrase, *Plutôt que de cesser d'être Français je cesserai de vivre*, suggested by Berryer to Ney, when the latter, on his trial, *se retira avec son avocat ; pour concerter son attitude*, exclaims with great gravity, and in perfect good faith, *ce mot fut sublime !* Society itself had become a brilliant debating club. Round every dinner table, in every salon, conversation was indirectly animated by the eloquence of the tribune or

the bar; and the gossip of the evening revived the emotions of the day.

It was the same passion for duelling which had pervaded the age of Louis XIII. But small swords had gone out of fashion. The duellists no longer belonged to the noblesse; they were the sons of the bourgeoisie; and their weapons were not rapiers but phrases. The artistic side of the French bourgeoisie, or at least of that period which we identify with the reign of the bourgeoisie in France, expressed itself in rhetoric. It is easy to laugh at this exaggerated love of phraseology; but let us remember that the middle class of most countries is absolutely impenetrable, by any means, to the ideas and sentiments of which phraseology is, at least, one vehicle. This æsthetic susceptibility of the French middle class to the influence of oratory, and the charm of finished expression, was perhaps derived from the fact that, in the France of the old régime, wit had been the one only possible means of introduction to the Court, at the command of those members of the bourgeoisie who were so fortunate as to possess it. It was, in fact, the fine sharp needle through which was passed the thread of intelligence that served to connect the tiers état with the noblesse.

In the French Chambers, during the reign of Louis Philippe, every political party found a voice which vibrated throughout Europe. The Legitimists obtained in Berryer the *verba togata* which gave stately utterance to all noble sentiments lingering among the traditions of the past. In the speech of Odillon Barrot, so grave and masculine, the opinion of the more ardent Liberals found expression, not only forcible, but dignified. The principles of that revolution which had placed the House of Orleans upon the throne had their luminous expositor in Guizot; and by the oratory of Thiers the art of reply was carried to a consummate finish, uniting the readiness in argument of a Fox with the verbal liveliness and sparkle of a Shiel. Later in the same reign, Alphonse de Lamartine enthralled the audience he had begun by disappointing, and became the most persuasive orator, not only of his country, but of his age. M. Thiers was the lively and impressionable, M. Guizot the austere and dignified, representative of the French bourgeoisie. The one was not more vivacious, supple, swift, ardent, full of enthusiasm, youthful-minded, and even boyish, in his passionate patriotism and love of national glory, than the other was stately, decorous, formal, inflexible, frigidly intellectual. "*Montez, montez, Messieurs! Jamais vous n'arriverez à la hauteur de mon dédain.*" These words are eminently characteristic of the man who uttered them.\* Between Thiers and Guizot,

\* M. Guizot, however, was not deficient in wit. What Frenchman is? But his wit was, like all his other gifts, stately and cold, even when scathing. Judge ex ungue leonem. An Orleanist nobleman, who had accepted from the Empire a high post abroad, returning to Paris, called on M. Guizot, who received him in solemn

however, a more attractive and interesting position belongs to Berryer, in the parliamentary portrait gallery of the reign of Louis Philippe.

"*Victrix causa Diis placuit sed victa, Catoni.*"

The cause which found in Berryer so eloquent a champion, was perhaps not particularly beautiful; and, had it been a successful cause, it would have lost the poetry with which he invested both it and himself. But how that cause became him, and he it! Berryer was a consummate artist; and the beauty of his art was irresistible. The image of this delightful orator is the last, and loveliest, that lingers in the recollection of that great age of parliamentary eloquence which was outlived by so many of its most brilliant representatives.

In 1852 the Constitution of France was again, as usual, under revision. The majority of the Chamber, which had voted the law of May, was anxious, from fear of the Red Spectre, to prolong the powers of the President of the Republic, Prince Louis Napoleon. Throughout the provinces, the Councils General had pronounced in favour of the prolongation; and there can be no doubt that it was generally desired by the country. But the Mountain did not desire, and was resolved to oppose, it. The measure could not constitutionally be carried without a majority of two-thirds of the Chamber; and, as the Mountain disposed of more than one-third of the total number of votes, it was well known that the measure would be outvoted. This debate on the Revision of the Constitution was, therefore, nothing more than a great parliamentary display, a magnificent political sham fight. It was not on that account, however, any the less interesting to the public; and the triumph of the day was certainly reserved for Berryer. When he rose, the deputies on all sides of the House quitted their benches, and grouped themselves around the Tribune. The Mountain was as attentive and respectful as the rest of the Chamber. M. Berryer spoke of 1789; of the Tennis Court at Versailles; of the noble ardours, the generous aspirations, of the young generation of that day; when he, Berryer, and his contemporaries still dreamed that the reign of universal liberty had begun, and still filled the future with their golden visions. He described

silence; replying only by a bow, as significant as Lord Burleigh's, and as stately, to all he said. M. Guizot's visitor, disconcerted, and at last indignant, took his leave, exclaiming, "Fortunately I have many other old friends in the Orleanist party, *qui me recevront d'une bien autre façon.*" Then Guizot, speaking for the first time, replied, "*Vous vous trompez, Monsieur, ils seront plus cruels, ceux-là; car ils parleront.*" Again: Guizot and Thiers happened to be travelling together on board the same steamboat. The night was fine. All the passengers remained upon deck. Guizot, wrapped up in his cloak, on a bench, was half asleep; Thiers in his most talkative humour. Some one said to Guizot, "Thiers, who has been explaining the science of navigation, is now telling us how the ship's course ought to be steered."—"Comment?" murmured Guizot, drowsily, "*n'est-il pas encore sur le midi?*"



the enthusiasm and assiduity with which he, and his young companions, used to attend the debates in the assembly for the purpose of writing down the speeches as they were spoken, before the days of shorthand reporters; he painted the rapture of civic and patriotic purpose with which all those young hearts and heads were filled by the contemplation of the great events passing around them; and, whilst the speaker thus gave utterance to his own recollections, tears were literally streaming from the eyes of the old Marquis de Grandvilliers, who was amongst the deputies gathered around the steps of the Tribune.

Those who were then present still recall with emotion their sensations when Berryer, suddenly pausing and stretching out his arm to the old man, dropped his voice into the accents of an affectionate familiarity, and exclaimed, "T'en souviens tu Grandvilliers?" The old Legitimist rose to his feet, and answered "Oui, oui, je m'en souviens!" The effect of this scene is indescribable. There was no applause; but a nameless sound, a sound between a sigh and a sob, went round the whole House. It was a fitting echo to the last accents of the oratory of an age which had already passed away.\*

It has been often said that the House of Orleans was kept upon the throne of France by the cohesive force of parliamentary corruption. But, admitting, to a certain extent, the truth of this assertion, we can find in it no adequate explanation of the fall of Louis Philippe.

Under the auspices of an energetic, patriotic, and unscrupulous minister, the House of Hanover was kept upon the throne of England by means of parliamentary corruption. But the House of Hanover remains upon the throne of England; identified by the grateful loyalty of the English nation with that period of its history in which liberty and order have been most harmoniously combined. In a country harassed, as England once was, and as France still is, by incompatible dynastic pretensions, and irreconcilable dynastic parties, it is extremely doubtful whether parliamentary government (a government involving considerable relaxation of executive force) can be carried on without corruption. History, at any rate, furnishes no example of the successful maintenance of parliamentary govern-

\* Two very opposite appreciations of Berryer's speaking have quite recently been recorded by Mr. Evelyn Ashley, in his interesting continuation of the *Life of Lord Palmerston*. General Jacqueminot told Lord Palmerston that Berryer had nothing but a good voice, and that his speeches contained little matter; adding, "If any man had Berryer's voice and manner, with the matter of Thiers or Guizot, he would be irresistible." Lord Palmerston, however, says, "This account of Berryer does not tally with what Peel told me. . . . Peel says he once asked Talleyrand who was the best French speaker he had ever heard. Talleyrand said the best, decidedly, was Mirabeau, and the next best, Berryer."—*Life of Lord Palmerston*, vol. iii., pp. 151-152.

ment by other means under such conditions. It is doubtless true that, during the reign of Louis Philippe, the management of parliament was practically the management of the personal interests of its members. If we take the average of the parliamentary majorities of that time, we find that from eight to twelve votes were generally sufficient to turn the scale. The deputies were, nominally, unpaid, and most of them were provincial lawyers or metropolitan journalists. Tobacco monopolies, local post offices, decorations, commercial concessions, and official employments, constituted the convertible currency in which they transacted their dealings with the Cabinet, giving it credit for "value received." But whose the fault? The government was committed by its constitution to exclusive reliance upon the support of the bourgeoisie; and the bourgeoisie set a commercial value upon its political support of the government with which all its political interests were identified! A foreign diplomatist, calling on M. Guizot after a lengthened debate in the chamber, found that minister in a condition of extreme physical exhaustion. "I am grieved," said the courteous envoy, "to be obliged to trouble you after a day of such fatiguing parliamentary labour."—"Ah," groaned M. Guizot, "it is not the parliamentary nor the diplomatic business that fatigues me; but—" (pointing to a long list of applications for posts, pensions, promotions, orders, offices) "*c'est le personnel qui m'achève!*"

Yet, when all has been said, that fairly can be said, against the French Parliament under Louis Philippe, its impartial historian must affirm that the character of this illustrious assembly was not unworthy of the genius it displayed. Like all chambers popularly elected, it had its alloy; its political adventurers, its intriguing jobbers, its extravagant fanatics, its selfish schemers. But, on the whole, it was an assembly eminently creditable to the enlightened age and great people, which had called it into being. It was patriotic and intelligent.

And here it is worth while to notice a curious, and somewhat paradoxical, phenomenon in parliamentary history. The character of a popular assembly is generally patriotic, and the pervading sentiment of it national, in the inverse ratio of the extension of the suffrage from which it is elected. I know of no instance to the contrary. But, without searching for examples so remote as the ancient parliaments of Castile, we may find one to the point in the English Parliament previous to 1832, as compared with the same Parliament subsequent to that date. And, indeed, there is an obvious reason why this should be the case. A legislative assembly elected by a restricted suffrage instinctively regards itself as the specially responsible representative of the national interests in their *ensemble*. And justly so. Because, if the paramount object of its existence were the representation of local interests in their separate groups, such an

assembly would be differently constituted. If its debates be adequately reported by a tolerably free press, or otherwise amenable to public comment, the contact thus maintained between the whole of its members and the collective sentiment and opinion of the whole nation, must necessarily be closer, stronger, and more constant, than the contact between each of its members and each of the small groups of local interests which they separately represent. But, when the magnitude and importance of the constituency has been greatly increased, its claims upon the sympathy and attention of its representative are proportionately increased. Not so, however, his capacity of sympathy and attention : and thus, in his mind, the image of the nation would inevitably be displaced by that of the constituency, even if it did not commonly happen that the representatives of large and important constituencies are selected, rather on account of their local sympathies and experience, than for any general knowledge of imperial affairs, or proved capacity to deal with such affairs in an imperial spirit.

What is needed, therefore, to maintain the salutary current of instinctive sympathy between the nation as a whole, and its parliament as the articulate expression of the nation's imperial unity, is not so much a wide suffrage as a wide publicity, and unrestricted freedom of debate.

The suffrage represented by the French Chamber during the reign of [Louis Philippe was, no doubt, a very restricted one. But the patriotism and the ability of the Chamber itself were not thereby restricted. What the result did prove to be too restricted, was the political intelligence of the bourgeoisie, who failed to perceive that this restricted suffrage was essential to their retention of that political monopoly which they eventually surrendered without even the merit of a conscious sacrifice of self-interests.

But this is a point to which I shall presently have occasion to recur. It is enough to indicate it here.

If we turn from the oratory to the literature of the reign of Louis Philippe, still more brilliant and imposing is the aspect of the age. In the graver schools of literary thought we recognize a vigorous activity, and high level of attainment. The philosophy of Idealism obtains in Maine de Biran no mean convert from the sensationalism of Condillac ; and the barren field of metaphysics is adorned by the literary culture and talent of a Jouffroy and a Victor Cousin. History receives from the intellect and erudition of Guizot a scientific method and direction, steadied by the writer's great experience of practical politics. From the genius of Thiers it takes a rare beauty of style, and a narrative charm which gives the glow of romance to the exposition of fact. Elsewhere, this province of research is illuminated, from the most opposite points of view, by such illustrious writers as Barante and Thierry, who paint the feudal past in its own gothic

colours,—or Mignet, Michelet, Quinet, and others, who philosophise or poeticise facts into illustrations of systems. Everywhere thought abounds, and rushes, exulting, into new-found channels.

I know of no literary epoch in which so many writers of popular fiction have simultaneously attained to so high a degree of literary excellence, and so wide a range of literary influence, whilst preserving, each of them, from the conventionalities of a school, the individuality of their own genius. A complete list of all the eminent poets, novelists, and dramatists, who flourished during the reign of Louis Philippe would be almost interminable; and any criticism of their works from a literary point of view would carry us beyond the scope of the present enquiry, which is only concerned with literature in its direct relations to politics.

A common fallacy is, perhaps, involved in the assumption that literature is the expression of a contemporary public opinion. The literature of the day is the last word of yesterday, and the first word of to-morrow. That is to say, it is the expression of the opinion which has been public, and of the opinion which is about to become public. But it does not directly express contemporary opinion, which is silent. The public mind, formed by the opinions and sentiments of the majority of the nation, is in constant conflict with the private mind, formed by the sentiments and opinions of the minority of the nation. The majority is always triumphant in the present. It is already in possession; and, being under no obligation to prove its title to the ground it holds, it has no inducement to break silence. The minority, differently situated, is not a proprietor but a claimant; and it is compelled to plead its cause at the bar of opinion. On the one side is power; on the other, force. The power of the majority is mute. It has no occasion to speak. The force of the minority is in its expression. When the necessity of self-defence obliges the majority to break silence, the majority is already half defeated, and must soon become a minority. The literature of such a minority, however young, is the literature of the past. The writers of the majority rarely, if ever, constitute the literature of a nation. They are, so to speak, executive, not legislative, writers. They may govern, but they do not teach. They may impose laws, they cannot make them. Still, I think we are justified in seeking from the popular literature of any particular period important indications of its intellectual and political tendencies. For the life of an age is made up of its relations to the past and the future. Each has its party in the present. And, indeed, what makes so often sanguinary the passage over from the old to the new time, is the extreme narrowness of the way. Between the past and the future flows a broad stream of time; but over it is thrown only a single bridge, a narrow one, the present. Those who move, and those who stand still, the going and the coming, the men who rush forward and the men who fly back, all jostle each other.

midway. Each hinders his fellow; and a thousand combatants fall momentarily under the feet of their comrades, without helping the battle.

Now, in the popular literature of the reign of Louis Philippe, we find, no doubt, a tendency to agitate practically insoluble questions, and to riot in the indulgence of morbid sentiments; we find this tendency, moreover, carried to an excess which is incompatible with the serenity of elevated art, and antagonistic to that critical *beau idéal* wherein poetry seeks images of grace and beauty. Some of the most powerful writers of this period strove, with a vain expenditure of prodigious effort, to dignify what is intrinsically mean, to adorn what is ugly, sentimentalise what is cynical, and extract a sort of romantic ethics from social theories which all sober understanding perceives to be baneful to domestic morality. Still, in this imaginative literature, all wrong in its conceptions of art, all false in its philosophy of life, there was a force, a hardihood, a zest of animal spirits, a fulness and freshness of power, out of which it seemed impossible but what something lovely and noble, as well as strong and salient, must eventually issue, if only the genius of the age were permitted to filter itself by the mere process of flowing on. And, after all, it is not for long that what is pernicious in the influence of imaginative writers can endure. There is sure to come a reaction from the blind admiration of their faults which, for a while, obliterates even their merits. We had a literature, on the whole, far more coarsely adapted to demoralize society, under Charles II. But it passed away, innocuous to the succeeding generation; and, instead of a Congreve, an Addison became the fashionable model of taste, and arbiter of letters. Lord Byron, a genius immeasurably more potent in his intellectual and personal influence than all the imaginative writers of young France put together, could not long charm youth

"To make frowns in the glass, and write odes to despair."

Even before his untimely death, the eyes of the young generation turned, in dislike of his defects, from the study of those superlative beauties in his work, which a distant posterity will assuredly appreciate. And, if ever the influence of Byron again dominates a school or an age, it will be an influence purified, like that of an ancient classic, from all that can alloy delight in the critical study of an irregular but splendid genius.

The real question for the political enquirer, however, is not the literary sins or merits of the imaginative writers of the age of Louis Philippe. It is the cause, and character, of their influence upon the political temperament of their time. Never, I think, was there a time when purely imaginative writers exercised so immediate, and powerful, an influence over the thoughts and feelings of their contemporaries. The battle of æsthetic principles, waged between the classic

and romantic schools of French literature, agitated the whole of France as deeply as if it involved the most momentous political issues. A new play by Victor Hugo was an event that convulsed a generation. Even the venerable and stately repose of the Academy was invaded, and violently shaken, by the tumultuous wave of passionate personal emotion which followed, and marked, the literary movement of the time. Nor was this all. Literature was not only in itself a political power, it was the means of placing political power in the hands of literary men. In the politics of countries where government has gradually become representative from the growing claims of great properties or great industries, the purely literary intellect is at a discount. In the political history of our own country there are, no doubt, instances, from Burke to the present day, of men famous in letters who have also occupied a conspicuous position in public life. But they have not attained to this position by means of their literary fame, or their literary turn of mind. They have attained to it in spite of both, and by means of other qualifications. Moreover, both the political and literary world in England have practically (and I cannot but think justly, if rules be not invalidated by their rare exceptions) assumed that the intellectual qualities necessary for the highest success in purely imaginative literature, are incompatible with those which are requisite for active public life. If we admit that the political novelist or essayist is not disqualified, by his literary habits of thought, for the labours of practical politics, we are certainly not predisposed to believe that, because a man is a great poet, he must have it in him to be a good politician. In France it was otherwise.

The periodical press enlisted some of the profoundest, and some of the most brilliant, writers of this remarkable epoch. Unquestionably it erred in its redundant vitality. It was defiant, petulant, provocative. It was also too much inclined to that most unsatisfactory and pernicious of all processes in political reasoning, the research into eternally just principles of social government, and deduction therefrom of abstract speculations on ultimate conclusions. Sound political sense shuns the indefinite; and to no political society is there any definite commencement remounting beyond its acknowledged history, or any definite prospect extending beyond the sequences which can be logically deduced from the actual condition of the day. Politics admit of no myths in the past like the Social Contract of Rousseau, and no star-reading in the future like the Human Perfectibility of Condorcet. No doubt, the French Press under Louis Philippe had its grave defects. But they were the defects of youth; defects which time and experience suffice to reform, when youth has, on the whole, cultured intelligence and noble aspiration. And in that press each opinion had, at least, its champion as well as its destroyer. The press did but share the general free-

dom accorded, in all other fields of argument, to disputants for truth. Its soldiers fought without mask, mantle, or secret dagger. They gave to their cause the responsibility of their names, and defended it at the hazard of their lives. The power which the press thus acquired might be too great, its influence too inflammatory; but it could only be the legitimate power of talent, backed by the influence of whatever authority the name of the writer carried with it. In a press so singularly open, the rulers could at least see the full front of every opinion, and calculate the worth of every foe.

And certainly, for the writers of the periodical press itself, the reign of Louis Philippe was the Golden Age. To achieve a reputation in the leading article of a journal was the readiest means to fortune and to power. The journal was a career. It led to the chamber, to the senate, to the administration. It certainly seems to us, looking back upon it, that the system of constitutional monarchy, under Louis Philippe, was precisely the political system which a periodical press would have felt a common interest in defending against all combinations for its overthrow. But it is the condition of a periodical press to have no instinct of a common interest; and the journalism of the day was, itself, employed in loosening all the grounds in which its own roots were interwoven with those of the monarchy. The same remark applies to the imaginative literature of the time. Never again, in all probability, will imaginative writers, nor yet the literary class as a whole, enjoy so large a share of political power as that to which they were admitted by the character of the monarchy whose foundations they did their best to undermine. But, as I have said, it is not with the literary sins of these writers that we are here concerned. The question before us is this. How far does the imaginative literature of the reign of Louis Philippe really represent the political spirit of that time, and thus furnish some evidence of the latent causes of a revolution that paralyzed the literature and swallowed up the reign?

Now, I think it must be allowed that nothing could be more antagonistic to the principles of monarchy represented by Louis Philippe than the whole tone and spirit of the popular poetry and fiction which had full career during his reign. For the French monarchy of 1830 was essentially, and avowedly, THE CORONATION OF THE MIDDLE CLASS. Its most lucid and competent expositor proclaims, and advocates, it as such. "On l'appelle," says M. Guizot, "le parti de la bourgeoisie, des classes moyennes. C'est, en effet, ce qu'il était, et ce qu'il est aujourd'hui." (*Guizot, De la Démocratie en France*, p. 94.) But, according to the same champion of that monarchy, and according to the logic of every disciplined political reasoner, a political system based on the ascendancy of the middle classes must rest on the popular respect shown to those principles with which a bourgeoisie, or middle class, most identifies its social

interests and moral sentiments. The recognized sanctity of property, the sober regard for practical business, and for the regulated duties of life,—that which M. Guizot calls “l’esprit de famille, l’empire des sentiments et des mœurs domestiques,”—in short, practically, a quick but steady progress which does not shake the funds or drain the tills; and, theoretically, a decorous homage to the stability of those bulwarks of social order, the altar and the hearth: such, if a middle class is to be the governing power of the country, must be the permanent character of its policy and the persuasive tendency of its social example.

From the moment in which a middle class welcomes, as liberal and enlightened, notions that assail the established rights of property, or the received code of domestic morals, its political ascendancy is doomed. Not more surely was it among the signs of coming destruction to the peerages of the French nobles, when their favourite authors were Rousseau, Diderot, and Voltaire, than it became a sign that the bourgeoisie of France were about to resign their sway, when their favourite writers were Balzac, Georges Sand, Victor Hugo, Eugène Sue.

The common characteristic, not of these writers alone, but of the great majority of their less renowned contemporaries, is a defiance of all the principles upon which the moral power of a middle class can rest. In their works, sober probity is made to look mean by the side of some fantastic paradox of honour; the sanctity of marriage is ridiculed and denied; the wronged husband represented as a brute or a fool, the faithless wife as an *ange déchû*; the convict is portrayed as a prodigy of natural goodness made bad by artificial laws; the trader as a knave; the priest as a hypocrite or a dullard; the noble as a blackleg; the *ouvrier* as a hero.

Now, whatever the influence which such literature may have had on the reading public, it is quite clear that it could have had none at all, if the reading public had not felt a sympathetic gratification in conceding it. The cultivators of that literature cultivated it as a profession. Their object was to please and to sell. If the reading public had recoiled from the subjects they selected and the sentiments they uttered, those writers would have struck into other subjects and expressed other sentiments. Romance writers are not, like saints and martyrs, willing to die for the holiness of their doctrines. The most impressionable of human beings are the children of Fancy; and they only give back to their age and country, in imaginative forms, what their age and country have instilled into them. That the writers of a Middle Class Monarchy should attack the received interests and morals of the middle class, would prove nothing politically. But that such writers should be popular, admired, and famous with the middle class itself, is a grave political symptom. Against death by suicide, the gods themselves cannot defend their favourites; and political power soon abandons a class that betrays its own cause.



Such was the romantic literature of the monarchy of the middle classes in France. But, behind this light though formidable artillery were ranged heavier forces against the sway of the bourgeoisie. The working class was not only idealized and poeticized by wayward genius, it was invoked by the eloquence of a false philosophy as the founder of a new, and more perfect, organization of the social world. The dreamers of the first revolution revived in visionaries more plausible, and far more seductive to the honest poor. It was no longer now the vague cry of the Rights of Man, but the distinct, intelligible appeal to the man who works for wages—the special proclamation of the Rights of Labour. The enemy of the working class was not now the aristocracy. Aristocracy was no more. It was the Bourgeoisie. It was the employer by whom the employed was being wronged and robbed; it was the shopkeeper who ground down the journeyman, the manufacturer who oppressed the artisan. It was the original sin of Capital *versus* the redemption of Bone and Sinew.

The main cause of the revolution which annulled the Orleans dynasty is here; or, at least, the immediate determining cause of it. Substantially, that revolution was a revolt of the working class against the middle class; but be it always remembered that *the revolt was fostered and encouraged by the middle class itself*. Thinking to increase its power, the bourgeoisie arrayed itself against the monarchy which represented, and protected, it; pressed for that extension of the electoral suffrage by which the acute old king saw that it would be admitting the agencies bent on its destruction; and, disappointed of the reform that would have slowly undermined, joined in the revolution that immediately engulfed, its ascendancy.

Undoubtedly there were many other causes of discontent with the latter portion of the reign of Louis Philippe. But these were not among the primary causes of its overthrow. The king's foreign policy was extremely unpopular; and the French care much about their foreign policy. In the intrigues of the Spanish marriages they beheld the nepotism of a royal egotist, rather than the policy of a patriot king. France had not been as glorious as Frenchmen wished to see her, during the pacific reign of that humane monarch. The national pride was mortified, the military ambition damped and thwarted. The revolution which had placed Louis Philippe on the throne had excited, as all such revolutions must, hopes of some impossible progress to some indefinite end. The unhappy death of the king's eldest son, and his own advanced years, presented to the popular mind those images of feebleness and insecurity in dynasties yet unconsolidated by time—a regency and an infant. Corruption had been one of the engines of power by which necessity endeavoured to replace institutions; corruption through numberless *employés* in all the provinces. Reforms were, doubtless, needed. But when all

the worst that can be said of his character and his reign has been freed from exaggeration, and is calmly summed up against all that can be said, not only in defence, but in praise, of both, the retrospective thinker, contemplating the reign of Louis Philippe, still murmurs, "Yes, reforms were necessary, but not a revolution; and, if a revolution, certainly not the rash surrender, to mob rule, of so grand an experiment as Constitutional Monarchy with a free Chamber and a free Press."

In England—let us hope also in the younger constitutional systems of Belgium and Italy—had the offences of the reign been twofold what they were, there would have been a change of ministers, but not of dynasties.

It must, however, be acknowledged that Louis Philippe, himself, had thrown away the great personal safeguard of Constitutional Monarchy, when he excluded from it the salutary principle of ministerial responsibility.

A constitutional throne is an armchair; an absolute one is a stool with no back to it. Princes are, by temperament and position, liable to giddiness; and a constitution is even more helpful to their own security than to that of their subjects. Could the first Napoleon have afforded to accord to France the constitution she obtained from Louis XVIII., perhaps he would not have fallen from his throne when the giddy fit was on him. But the main defect of the position occupied by a popular despot, or democratic dictator, is that his only intelligible title to it lies in his supposed exceptional fitness for governing. Every system of government rests upon some necessary fiction. Constitutional government reposes upon many. The fundamental fiction of Cæsarism is infallibility, just as that of Constitutionalism is impeccability. Hereditary sovereignty is strengthened by the surrender of personal power and responsibility; because, the less important the part personally taken by the sovereign in the making of the laws, and the practical ordering of the public interests, the less excuse there is for periodically agitating the country for the choice of a sovereign, and the more obvious becomes the convenience of the hereditary principle. A Hapsburg, or a Bourbon, can afford to adopt the principle of ministerial responsibility; a Napoleon, or a Cromwell, cannot. Louis Philippe, however, neglected the advantage offered him by the constitutional character of his crown. Representative states must not expect to enjoy a perpetual spring-time. The advantage they do enjoy, is that, in the open plain of popular government, the snow melts every year and soon disperses; whereas, under the cold shade of a personal throne, it accumulates in glaciers which continually threaten, and sometimes crush, the people who live under them. And, although it may take ages to collect the materials of an avalanche, the tinkle of a mule bell, or the bray of an ass, is often sufficient to bring one down.

Louis Philippe did not govern solely through his ministers; he governed too much himself, and this was known. So that, in assuming the functions of a minister, he lost the immunity which constitutional theories accord to a monarch. Thus, instead of a change of government, when the government became unpopular, the king himself was swept away; because, in the king, was the government.

Thus passed from the throne of France the dynasty of Orleans; and, with it, the monarchy of the middle classes.

That monarchy, however, was expelled by the mob of Paris, not by the nation. The nation did not expel, it abandoned, it. The National Guard, the Chamber, the Army, abandoned the choice of the Bourgeoisie, because the Bourgeoisie had already abandoned its own cause. The monarchy had based itself exclusively on the middle class. It had no props in institutions congenial to monarchy; the loyalty of nobles, the sympathy of masses, the interest of armies. To reign by, and through, the middle class, it had neglected all other aids. Its ostensible and immediate offence, the refusal of electoral reform, was in reality a proof of its care for the middle class, with which it had identified its cause, and by which it was betrayed in the hour of danger.

Thus, the fall of the House of Orleans was virtually the abdication by the middle class of its own sovereignty. And, therefore, was the revolution of 1848 a great blow to the principle of Constitutional Monarchy; or, at least, to all the popular theories about Constitutional Monarchy. For it proved that a Constitutional Monarchy cannot safely depend on the exclusive support of that class with which Constitutional Monarchy is inevitably most connected by the circumstances, as well as by the sentiments, of modern society. It cannot rest on the middle class alone. For its duration it must have with it classes that will brave a mob in support of the principle of monarchy, even though they may not approve of the monarch actually on the throne. There is no life in institutions longer than the life of a single man, if they depend, not on the value at which the community assesses the institutions themselves, but on the personal popularity of an individual.

It is commonly believed that a more timely and energetic employment of military force would have saved the monarchy. So far as it is possible for a distant and retrospective inquirer to form any opinion on such a point, I share this belief. But it is wholly immaterial to the subject and object of my present inquiry. Had the monarchy been so saved, its salvation would have been due to the energy of a man, not to the soundness of a system. And it is only with political systems that we are here concerned; not forgetting, of course, how greatly the natural effects of any political system are susceptible of modification by the influence of personal character.

Regarded intellectually and socially, that monarchy of Orleans was

not a failure. Far from it. Never has France enjoyed a longer lease of that rational liberty, which consists in the management of public interests and affairs by the active co-operation of the nation with its government, and the general diffusion of political vitality. The reign, as we have seen, was characterized by an extraordinary display of intellectual vigour. Voice and thought were free. It was the fault of the time, not of the monarchy, if freedom ran into licence. Religion was respected, whilst science was encouraged, by the attitude of the government and the example of the Court. The members of the royal family were blameless in their lives, and rarely in any single family has so much intellect and intellectual culture been as felicitously united with so high a sense of civic duty.\* Years of peace had been bestowed upon Europe, adding largely to the national prosperity of France. The wealth and industry of the nation had made great and steady progress, without so absorbing the national spirit in the prosecution of purely material interests, as to lower the intellectual tone of it. The administration of justice was pure; and tempered by the known humanity of the sovereign.

Yet through the whole political tissue of the time there ran a thread of unreality, which snapped, at last, under the first strain of revolutionary pressure. This thread was woven, neither by the monarchy, nor yet by the bourgeoisie, considered as apart from each other. It was woven by the union of them both in the *monarchy of the bourgeoisie*, a fiction! For a middle class has not in itself the necessary elements of sovereignty. It is born satisfied, and can never attain to anything; not even to a starting-point. Its proper place in the community is that which its name implies, a middle one. Louis Philippe virtually said to the Bourgeoisie of France, "I am not a king: I am a *paterfamilias*, a man of business,—like yourselves." His monarchy, therefore, was like an arch without a keystone. The keystone need not be of a different material from the other stones, but it must always be of a different shape; and, without it, no arch can stand.

Far back in the past, however, lie the inexorable first causes of this, as of all the other political failures of modern France. For the past may be good or bad; but, for well or ill, it will always be the fatal master of the future. The People and the Aristocracy are the two first conditions of any great and durable political structure. The third is the Dynasty, in which their traditions and interests are united. The dynasty may be extinguished by the sterility of a race, or the accidents of civil war; but it will always revive again in some

\* This was written many years ago. The conduct of the Princes of the House of Orleans, under many trying circumstances, has since then been such as to entitle them to the sincere respect of every impartial critic and every honourable gentleman.—L.


form or other, either by importation or production, so long as the two primary conditions of national life are left. For they engender their complement. The people will always remain: but a people which cannot produce an aristocracy is a plant without sap, a field without seed, an image of sterility.

In France, Richelieu decapitated half the aristocracy, and Louis XIV. degraded the remainder into courtiers. Then, the people decapitated the dynasty, and remained alone—alone and infructuous. Having left itself nothing to unite with, it can engender nothing but the germs of its own gradual exhaustion by barren emotions and abortive effort.

There are some causes which, in their overthrow, overwhelm their representatives. In a great earthquake, the first things to disappear are the lofty things—temples and palaces. It was not accorded to the Revolution of 1848 to overthrow one of those causes.

Charles X. embarked at Cherbourg, surrounded by all the grandeurs of royalty. Louis Philippe fled from Paris in disguise. 1830 impeached the members of the 'Ordonnances.' 1848 did not deign to notice the king's subservient advisers. The bourgeoisie is never heroic: and in the fall of the bourgeois monarchy there was no tragic incident. But it has left behind it some lessons still worth studying; and, if ever constitutional monarchy be again established in France, it must be upon some broader, and safer, foundation than the exclusive satisfaction of a middle class.

LYTTON.



## THE RE-UNION OF THE CHURCHES, AND THE BONN CONFERENCE.

AS a general statement, it will scarcely be denied by any one that in the present day throughout Europe the two great contending forces in the sphere of religion are unbelief and superstition. All the different churches and sects of Christendom stand between these two forces, as between two poles—some with their faces towards the one and some with their faces towards the other. There is a general desire to avoid both, and to find a resting-place in rational faith ; but how to reach this is the subject of contention, and in the warfare there is much misunderstanding and recrimination, many being unable to discern friend from foe. Theology has come into confusion. Religion with many sincere persons is merely superstition, and the intellectual presentations of Christianity made by its chief defenders are such as to leave no alternative but that recently announced by one of our most gifted, as well as, I may say, religious of our men of science, that if the choice lay between Atheistic materialism and the doctrines of some Christians, his decision must be for the former.

It is when surrounded by such questions as have recently come in upon us from many different regions of inquiry, both in nature and in history, that Christian men have been compelled to a re-examination of the contents and the meaning of Christianity. The Roman Catholic Church, as represented by the Vatican Council, has dealt with the problem in its own way. It has put an end to all perplexity for those who can receive its authority as divine, by vesting infallibility in the Roman Pontiff. This has satisfied the body of the Roman Catholic

clergy, and the unthinking millions who are enrolled as Catholic Christians, to whom all doctrines are nearly alike. But so far as the problem itself is concerned, nothing is really determined.

The Ultramontane Church having wrapped itself closer in its mantle, the work has devolved with increased intensity on the other sections of Christendom. What answer can they give? In what light do they regard Christianity? This, I apprehend, was the ultimate question at the Bonn Conference, though it presented itself under the aspect of the Re-union of the Churches.

For some time in England we have been familiar with the words, "The Re-union of Christendom." Some of the English journals that have been hostile in their criticisms of the Bonn Conference, must have been under the impression that it was but a movement of the same party, and to be carried on in their spirit. It is pleasant to be able to deliver them from this illusion. Whatever similarity there might be in their objects, and notwithstanding the presence of some English re-unionists, the aim, as well as the whole tone of the promoters of the Bonn Conference, was entirely different. The English re-unionists proposed a conspiracy of episcopal churches to crush the non-episcopal. This was openly avowed in Dr. Pusey's "Eirenicon," where the Greek and Roman Churches, with all their corruptions, were to be united with the Anglican, as forming "Christendom;" while the non-episcopal communities of the Reformation were treated as *extra ecclesiam*, without the pale of the true Church. The same thing was expressed in its most offensive form by some of Dr. Pusey's humbler disciples, who did not scruple to put "infidelity" and "dissent" in the same category, declaring that the Greek, Latin, and Anglican communions were the broken mirror of the Church, while other religious bodies were but "the shivers and atoms around."\* "The first great hindrance," said another writer, who is rector of a parish in Dorsetshire, "that lies before us arises from the *Protestantism of England*. Till this is removed the re-union of our Church, as the Church of England, with either the Greek or the Latin Churches, is absolutely hopeless."† Nothing of this spirit is found in Dr. von Döllinger. Though educated a Romanist, and though still desiring to follow traditionalism in religion, yet

"His delights are dolphin-like,  
Above the element he moves in."

He is conscious of the vast services which Protestantism has rendered to Christianity and to the progress of European science and civilization. He invites representatives of the non-episcopal communities to come and confer with him on the same equal terms as the Greeks and the Anglicans.

\* See "Essays on the Re-union of Christendom," with a preface by Dr. Pusey. J. T. Hayes, 1867, pp. 73, 74.

† Ibid. p. 89.

It is scarcely possible for any one who knows the history of the English Church, to read such passages as I have quoted from the writings of English clergymen, and refrain from an outpouring of righteous indignation. In the days of Cranmer, a scheme was originated at Lambeth Palace for the union of all the Reformed communities. The English Church, which had owed so much to the foreign Reformers, seemed destined from its position to take the lead in so noble an enterprise, but it has sadly failed in its great vocation. True, it has never wanted men who have maintained the principles on which it was established at the Reformation, but they have been thwarted by another party, whose history declares them the real authors of all the divisions and schisms that have troubled England for three centuries; and this party is now developing into those who wish to annihilate Protestantism, that they may become one with the enemies of the Reformation.

The English re-unionists had a final and a fatal blow when the Vatican Council declared the Pope infallible. They were told in plain words that they were not Catholics; that they misunderstood Catholicism, which meant not receiving certain doctrines called Catholic, but obedience to the authority of the Catholic Church. Henceforth their hopes were for ever shattered. But there still remained the Greek Church, and the secession of the Old Catholics left the possibility of union with them. The movement towards either the Greek or the Roman Church was certainly alarming, but the society of the Old Catholics is likely to be wholesome in its influence on the body of the English clergy.

At the Cologne Congress of 1872, I formed a judgment of the Old Catholic movement, which I expressed in an article in this REVIEW. I have attended both the subsequent Congresses, I have had a good deal of correspondence with several of the leaders, and I have conversed freely with many of the laymen who are its most ardent supporters. Since the Cologne Congress to this hour, it has always been a matter of wonder to me that any one could take a different view of the movement from what I then put forward. It is essentially a revolt against mechanical religion, and a desire to bring men into that liberty wherewith Christ has made them free. It is in its entire substance and spirit the opposite of that movement which is leading many English clergymen to desire the abandonment of both the name and the doctrines of Protestantism. Of course, any judgment on a movement, the principles of which have not been formulated, can only rest on the expressed opinions of individuals, or be gathered from the tone of the speeches and sermons of the leaders. Moreover, it would not be fair to attribute to the movement the opinions of all who go with it. Many of the laymen, judging from intelligent persons with whom I have conversed, are men who have long since broken with the Church of Rome, and have renounced all dogmas, making Christianity



to consist only of love to God and man. The movement, so far as the people are concerned, is manifestly stronger in the intellectual than in the religious element. This is also probably true as regards the leaders. Bishop Reinkens, who seems to breathe as much as any of them the atmosphere of earnest piety, may be fairly taken as the exponent of their theological position. In 1872, while the Bishop of Lincoln was ringing in our ears the necessity of "Bishops, Priests, and Deacons," I noticed the entire absence of any response to the bishop's sentiments in the bishop's sense. During the preliminary meetings at Professor Knoodt's house, which I had the privilege of attending, I asked Professor Reinkens if I rightly understood the meaning of a passage in one of his lectures which I had in my hand. The passage contained a denial that there was any gift of grace connected with the office of a bishop, and defined the Church as "the assembly of those who are called to the life of love and faith in Christ." I was assured that I understood it rightly as meaning that the Church was constituted by the believing community, and not by a hierarchy of bishops, priests, and deacons. Bishop Reinkens has since expressed his views on this subject with more explicitness, even maintaining that there can be no bishop without a community of believers, and that the Church does not save, but is saved.

The *Guardian*, the organ of the High Anglican party, noticing the bishop's speech at Freiburg, hopes that he was not expressing his sentiments with sufficient deliberation; but I am certain that Bishop Reinkens has more in common with the Evangelical and Liberal parties in the Church of England than with the party which hangs its Christianity on "bishops, priests, and deacons." His last words to me this year at Bonn were a regret that at the Conference there were no Presbyterians from Scotland, nor any representatives of the English Nonconformists.

Dr. Döllinger is, without doubt, the most Conservative of the old Catholic leaders; but the progress he has made is very marked. On every point of difference between the Church of England and the Roman Catholics he is on the side of the Church of England. He declared expressly that he did not regard the Old Catholics as bound by the Decrees of Trent. Three years ago it was not possible to extort from him such a confession. The grand *crux* of Old Catholicism then was, how to reject the Vatican and hold by Trent. The difficulty is got over by the rejection of both, so that the Old Catholics are much older than at first they supposed themselves to be. Dr. Döllinger's declaration on the subject was naturally a great joy to the members of the Bonn Conference. It was a step which vastly facilitated their proceedings, and gave them a straightforward character. The Anglicans were asked for the time not to consider themselves bound by the Thirty-nine Articles. It was plainly intimated that these Articles did not in every point agree with the doctrines of the

Catholic Church in the first six centuries. This was something which we did not care to be told ; but if the Articles must go, it is better that we should give them up frankly than follow the disingenuous, not to say dishonest conduct of Dr. Newman and Dr. Pusey, who put upon the Articles a meaning which was plainly not that of the compilers. The sentiments of our Reformers are well known ; if in anything we differ from them, it is competent for us to say so openly. But to pervert their language is an immorality which cannot be too severely reprobated, and which deserved all the indignation it created, when on the publication of Tract 90 it outraged the conscience as well as the consensus of the whole English Church. It was one of the evil works condemned by St. Paul, as doing evil that good may come.

The method of procedure at the Bonn Conference was the Historical. The primary inquiry was to discover the doctrines of the Primitive Church before the great divisions of East and West. To the fairness of this proceeding there could not only be no objection, but, considering the three Churches chiefly represented, there was, as a beginning, no alternative. The advancing Old Catholics had met the retrogressive Anglicans in presence of the petrified Greeks, and a proper inquiry for them, at least as a preliminary, was to find the ground on which they stood before the first separation. Whether that ground be really discoverable, or tenable when discovered, are subsequent questions. I attended the Conference rather to watch the proceedings than to take a part in them. The criticisms which I am now to make would have raised discussions for which those present were not prepared, and for which there was insufficient time. They may, however, be useful in future deliberations, and of this there is the greater hope that they are made in the spirit of one who is friendly to all schemes for the entire Re-union of Christendom.

The first discussion did not promise much harmony, and might have damped the ardour of the greatest re-union enthusiast. It was altogether a pitiful spectacle to see men fighting about a word in the Nicene Creed, which, by their own confession, added nothing to its original meaning. From the Greeks no concession was to be expected. They were on the negative side, and had nothing to yield. The Old Catholics were ready at once to exclude the words as an unauthorized addition, and as the chief disturber of the peace between East and West. No one can tell how the *Filioque* got into the Nicene Creed. It was the work of some surreptitious hand eager for the furtherance of some metaphysical point, which was regarded as part of the Catholic faith. In the ninth century the word was expressly rejected by Pope Leo III. ; but in the eleventh century, through the negligence, Dr. Döllinger said, of the Roman Church, it had been inserted in the creed without authority, and adopted by the whole of Western Christendom. But how could the Anglicans, whose appeal is to that which has been received *always, everywhere, and by all*, give up a word that had so

long been a part of their creed? Age makes all things hallowed. Antiquity gives sacredness, even to a forgery. The word had been in the creed for a thousand years, and who knows what principle may be sacrificed if it is excluded now? No principle at all, said Dr. Döllinger. The faith of the Church, for eight hundred years, was perfect without it. But the Anglicans would not yield. The *Filioque*, however it got there, was in the dear Creed.

The subsequent discussion on this subject was still more humiliating than the first. Instead of the Article drawn up by Dr. Döllinger declaring that the insertion of the *Filioque* was illegal, and ought to be removed, the Anglicans had an amendment, which recommended serious consideration how the Creed might be restored to its original form, "without sacrifice of the truth which is expressed in the present Western form." But we deny, said the Easterns, that there is any truth expressed in the Western form. The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father as a principle, but not from the Son as a principle. Bishop Reinkens expressed his opinion that it would be better if the mode of the procession of the Holy Ghost were not defined at all, not even as "from the Father." It was the contending for definitions of this kind that caused men to forget the greatest of all dogmās, which is love. This was a ray of sweetness amid the arid discussion, and evoked from the Easterns the orthodox retort that love itself must be grounded on truth. It was proposed to alter the words into "the truth which may be expressed." By this the Greeks were appeased; but the Anglicans then began to renew the contest. *May be*, said the Bishop of Pittsburgh, includes *may not be*, and so casts doubt upon the doctrine of the Western Church. The arch-priest Janyschew answered, that there was no hope for the future if the Anglicans imagined that there was any doctrine in the *Filioque*. Dr. Döllinger managed to satisfy both parties by telling them that their present object was to construct a bridge to bear them over the gulf, but that the large house to hold them all was to be built on the other side. To the acceptance of the provisional Article, both the Greeks and the Anglicans seemed disposed; but the depths of Anglican acuteness were not yet explored. In translating the Article into English, Dr. Döllinger used the word "contained" instead of "expressed." The Orientals wanted to retain the first word; but the Anglicans were resolute for the second. Dr. Döllinger declared that it utterly surpassed his mental vision to see any difference between the two words. In the German language they were perfectly identical. Canon Liddon then explained, that to orthodox Anglicans the word "contained" was as impure as the bath in which the heretic Cerinthus had performed his ablutions. It was a word positively contaminated by the Rationalists of the English Church, who had adopted the scandalous language of one of the Homilies, that "the Scripture *contains* the Word of God." When Canon Liddon preaches in St. Paul's it will

henceforth be wrong to say that the pulpit *contains* him, for it may also *contain* something besides him, as, for instance, his cassock and his surplice. The Greeks at last yielded, and took the word *expressed* instead of *contained*.

This *Filioque* was a great point settled, but I fear the Re-union of Christendom is far off if the Anglicans are to fight so hard for every word of their creed. The rest of the voyage, however, was over a smoother sea. The other Articles were mostly of the character of concessions to Protestantism, and were so moderately expressed as generally to commend themselves to all parties, at least provisionally, as articles of peace. The first that provoked anything like discussion, was the one on faith and works, when, in express contradiction to the English Articles, justification was declared not to be by faith alone. The thing intended was right enough, but faith is one of those unfortunate words in theology that has as many meanings as any number of men choose to put upon it. At the Reformation, in face of the prescriptions of the Romish Church, which were called good works, it had an important meaning, and became the battle-cry of the Reformers. It meant that divine forgiveness was free to all who looked to Christ as the Author of Redemption. Examined in other lights and with other references, the expression "faith alone" was not strictly accurate, nor has it always furnished a sufficient guard against substituting a notion or an emotion in the place of a moral life. The Article was doubtless aimed at faith alone in an evil sense, and not as the doctrine stands in the Reformed Confessions. The amendment of "faith without love" for "faith alone" was at once accepted by all, so that the faith which justifies is a faith which produces good works. Dr. Döllinger found less objection than he anticipated to the doctrine of seven sacraments, but a distinction was made between the two instituted by Christ and the other five. The Sacraments of the Gospel are Baptism and the Lord's Supper. These were the only two permanent ceremonies or visible acts which Christ established in His Church, and the Reformers called them specially by the name of Sacraments. This Dr. Döllinger said was a limitation of the word for which they had no authority. The Roman Church, since the twelfth century, had applied the word "sacrament" to five other religious ceremonies besides Baptism and the Lord's Supper. The Greeks held the same number under the name of mysteries, which is the word the Latins translate as sacraments. The Bishop of Winchester said that there might be any number of sacraments, but there were two in the Gospel with which grace was bound up, and which were generally, that is, said the bishop, *universally* necessary to salvation. The Romish Church and some of its imitators among the Anglicans, find grace in all the seven. Dr. Pusey \* makes seven channels. This number seven is more sacred,

\* See Dr. Pusey's *Eirenicon*, p. 20.

and it is probable that the more channels the more grace. A Lutheran minister at the Conference made everything depend on baptism. This was the grand prescription for the regeneration of the race. Christianity itself, he said, began with the baptism of Christ. The Bishop of Winchester added the Eucharist as also necessary to salvation, and Dr. Döllinger said that on that principle he might add Ordination, for without it there could be neither Baptism nor the Lord's Supper. The discussion was not pressed further, for it was rather doubtful where it would end. A return to this subject at some future time may result in general education.

The first Article which seemed likely to carry in its bosom elements hostile to progress was the Ninth, which runs thus:—

"We agree, that the genuine tradition—i.e., the unbroken transmission, partly oral, partly in writing—of the doctrine delivered by Christ and the Apostles, is an authoritative source of teaching for all successive generations of Christians. This tradition is partly to be found in the *consensus* of the great ecclesiastical bodies standing in historical continuity with the primitive Church, partly to be gathered by scientific method from the written documents of all centuries. 2. We acknowledge that the Church of England, and the Churches derived through her, have maintained unbroken the Episcopal succession."

The first exception that might be made to this Article is from the word "authoritative." The great Bangorian controversy, which filled many volumes, turned on the word "authority." Bishop Hoadly said that Christ had left no living authority in the Church—by which he meant no one that could decide absolutely—from whose decision there was no appeal. But there is a secondary sense of authority, which as a Bishop of the Church he never thought of denying. We speak of Cranmer, Hooker, Jeremy Taylor as authorities when there is any question of what the Church of England teaches. We give a certain amount of deference to their opinions, yet we do not regard them as absolute or ultimate authorities.\* They may have been wrong on some points, and so we are free to differ from them. It is, I suppose, in the latter sense that we are to take the word "authoritative," as applied to tradition. It means that to the Catholic or general opinion of the early Church writers, we are to give a certain or rather an uncertain amount of deference. But another question arises. Where are we to find the genuine tradition? The Article answers, from the *consensus* of the great ecclesiastical bodies, &c. Which are these bodies? The Orientals say that none but they have any historical continuity. If we take in the Latin Church we reduce

\* Since this was written the Bishop of Winchester has said, in a letter to the Bishop of Melbourne, that he takes "tradition" in the sense of "primitive testimony," and "authority" as meaning "great value." This seems to agree with what I have tried to say. See *Guardian*, Oct. 14.

he number of Articles on which there is a *consensus*. If we take in the Anglican as represented by the Thirty-nine Articles, we reduce it further. But if the Anglican is taken in, why not other great bodies, as for instance the Wesleyan, which throughout the world has probably as many adherents as the Anglican? What is to be the definition of "historical continuity?" Is it to be a succession of bishops? In that case the historical continuity has no value, for it has suffered the Church of England to embody in its standard the same doctrines as are found in other Protestant Confessions. Perhaps the *consensus* is to consist only of the points on which Greeks, Romanists, Anglicans, and Non-episcopal Protestants are agreed. The idea is not a bad one, for it would leave but few Articles necessary to be believed, and these would all be of a very simple character. But this is only one "partly." There is another which speaks of gathering a *consensus* from the written documents of all centuries by a scientific method. This method has yet to be discovered. The impossibility of discovering it has driven the Romish Church from trusting in either written or oral tradition, to the living infallible voice. Before Dr. Döllinger can get his "authoritative" tradition he must discover his method of discovering it. The early centuries, which are the most important, will present the greatest difficulties. Even on a question so important as Christ's Divinity there is no agreement among patristic scholars as to what was taught by the Nicene Fathers. Petavius and Huetius, Sandius and Episcopius, Daniel Whitby and William Whiston, have all testified as the result of their studies that the Ante-Nicene Fathers were Arian. Bishop Bull has maintained the contrary, but whoever is convinced by Bishop Bull will be convinced when on scientific principles he ought to remain in suspense. I defy any man who reads, for instance, Tertullian, to determine whether he is Arian or Athanasian. Canon Liddon's judgment on the Ante-Nicene Fathers is that their writings "admit a Catholic interpretation but do not invite one." Taking even this as a true statement of the case, what hope can we have of getting any "authoritative" teaching from a comparison of the documents of all centuries? If we take the decisions of Councils, there is the same difficulty in finding a *consensus* of faith. Every reader of ecclesiastical history feels but too keenly the truth of Dr. Jortin's words, that the Council of Jerusalem was the first and the last council at which "the Spirit of God presided." The Christian world, in the first centuries, says the same writer, used to have such frequent councils that they might have been called Quarter Sessions. Gregory Nazianzen tells us that he used to avoid all such, for they never did any good but only increased dissensions and quarrels.

The Anglicans were not quite sure if this Article should be allowed to stand as it had been drawn up. They afterwards, to prevent any misunderstanding, agreed to prefix a clause to the effect that Holy

Scripture was the primary rule of faith. This reduced the "authoritative" tradition to be found in the *consensus* to the subsidiary office of the interpreter of Scripture. It is, however, doubtful if even with this prefix the Article is free from danger. If authority is taken in the secondary sense which I have already mentioned, the reasonableness of the rule is as obvious as to take the *consensus* of some of our great English divines as authority for the meaning of our Articles. But if this ecclesiastical *consensus* is to be an absolute authority while holding the place of interpreter, it may usurp the authority of the primary rule of faith. Such an authoritative interpreter of a law would become the law-maker. It is certain, I think, that the compilers of Article IV. never intended any such interference as this when they said that nothing was to be believed as necessary to salvation but what could be proved by Holy Scripture. Their intention, I apprehend, rather was to exclude any such "authoritative" interpretation.

The second clause of this Article was intended to satisfy the Anglicans that they had "historical continuity," and the evidence of this was the episcopal succession. It was impossible that the Old Catholics could claim historical continuity for themselves and not grant the same to the English Church. The validity of both successions must stand or fall together. There can be no dispute that the succession was preserved in England at the Reformation. The only question is its worth, after being separated from the rest of the Catholic Church throughout the world. If, as some Anglicans say, the Articles are full of Protestant errors and opposed to Catholic truth, it will follow that the succession has not been effectual to preserve the truth. It will also follow, as I have already intimated, that a great "ecclesiastical body," non-episcopal, will be as likely to have preserved Catholic truth, as one with a succession of bishops. There are dilemmas on every side, unless we take the old High Church position, that the Protestant doctrines taught in the Articles are also Catholic and primitive truth; but this is a "stand-point overcome," if that primitive truth is to be identified with the very doctrines which the Articles expressly condemn.

The grandly Protestant Article rejecting "the new doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin" again summoned the bravest of the Anglicans to the front of the battle. On the ground of liberty, Canon Liddon proposed that it should only be condemned as "a dogma of faith," and not as a pious opinion. The Article as it stood was limiting the freedom of the Church. The learned Canon was proceeding to show that it was an opinion not unknown by that wonderful guardian of truth, Catholic antiquity. There were, he said, at least intimations of it in the early centuries. "No," said Dr. Döllinger peremptorily, "there are no intimations of it till the thirteenth century." Open questions are excellent things, but

there must be some questions closed, and closed on the negative side. Papal Infallibility might also be left open as a *pious* opinion. But some opinions, as Dr. Döllinger said, are not *pious*, but *impious*. The Old Catholic movement would have no reason to give for its existence if such doctrines as the Immaculate Conception and Papal Infallibility were now to be regarded as *pious* opinions. On this subject the Old Catholics were as firm as the Rock of Peter. Dr. Döllinger said that he and his colleagues knew that the dogma of the Immaculate Conception was "prepared by a long chain of forgeries before it was fastened on the Church by the Pope. It was well understood that it was to pave the way for the newer doctrine of Infallibility. It was intended to create a precedent for the imposition by the Pope alone of a new Article of Faith on the whole Catholic world. Old Catholics, therefore, had most weighty reasons for a stringent declaration on this doctrine, it being to them the *fons et origo malorum*." No unexpected eruption of the most terrible elements in nature could have struck the Old Catholics with such utter astonishment as the amendment of the Anglicans and their speeches on this subject. "They are nearer Rome than we are," exclaimed a Professor who was sitting next to me and appealing with an eye of pity for some explanation of the phenomenon. "Did you never know that before?" I answered; "the Anglicans have long had their faces as though they would go to Rome, while you are coming from it; you met and spent a night together somewhere, at, I suppose, 'The Three Taverns,' but you have long since passed each other." Bewilderment covered his face as he exclaimed "Is it possible?"

The Article on Confession was as moderate as any Protestant could wish. Such a thing as confession, either to the congregation or to the minister, has probably existed from the Apostles' times. The power of the keys is but the exercise of discipline. There need be nothing wrong in either. They both exist in many churches that have no traces of the sacerdotal principle. The Article on the commemoration of the faithful departed was like casting fire among the inflammable materials of Anglicanism. At the Reformation we ceased to pray for the dead because of the Romish abuses of Purgatory. But if prayer is only a pious wish, why should we not pray for the dead as well as for the living? Their state, even in the "rest of Paradise," may be one of progression. But why limit our prayers to the "faithful departed?" Do not the unfaithful departed require them more? And why limit them to men? The Church in heaven is one with angels and archangels, cherubim and seraphim; why not include these in our prayers? and why refuse a pious wish for the restoration of those exalted spirits that kept not their first estate? Do we not mean the whole of this when we say, "Thy kingdom come?"



The Article on the Eucharist, at first sight the most satisfactory, was in reality the most unsatisfactory business transacted by the Bonn Conference. It is always possible for errors to lie concealed under general statements or words that may have different meanings; but this Article might have been written by Calvin or Zwingli.

It reads thus :—

"The Eucharistic celebration in the Church is not a continuous repetition or renewal of the propitiatory sacrifice offered once for ever by Christ upon the cross; but its sacrificial character consists in this—that it is the permanent memorial of it, and representation and presentation (*Vergegenwärtigung*) on earth of the one oblation of Christ for the salvation (*Heil*) of redeemed mankind, which, according to the Epistle to the Hebrews (ix. 11, 12), is continuously presented in heaven by Christ, Who now appears in the presence of God for us (ix. 24).

"While this is the character of the Eucharist in reference to the sacrifice of Christ, it is also a sacred feast, wherein the faithful, receiving the Body and Blood of our Lord, have communion one with another (1 Cor. x. 17)."

Here is first a distinct denial that the Lord's Supper is a repetition of Christ's propitiatory sacrifice, and an express affirmation that its sacrificial character consists in its being a permanent memorial of that sacrifice. I was unable to follow the objections of the Orientals, but as reported in the *Guardian*, they are made to say that the Eastern Church regarded the Eucharist as the offering of that perfect sacrifice which Christ made on the cross, and that it was offered for the quick and the dead. The answer was that the Article did not contradict this. I certainly understand the first clause of the Article to be an express contradiction of the doctrine that the Eucharist is the offering of Christ's perfect sacrifice. Another question was, if it was intended to make a distinction between the presentation on earth, and the permanent offering in heaven in its nature. The answer to this was "certainly not." But the meaning of this answer depends on the answer to the previous question. If Christ is continually repeating His propitiatory sacrifice in heaven; and if the Eucharist is an offering of the same nature, it follows that the Eucharist is a renewal of Christ's propitiatory sacrifice, which is the thing condemned by the Article. The speakers must either have misunderstood each other, or there is some error in the report as given in the *Guardian*.\*

\* Since the above was written I have communicated with Professor Reusch, the official stenographer of the Conference. His account makes Dr. Döllinger to admit that the Eucharistic sacrifice is *propitiatory*, which is in express words a contradiction of the Article. According to Professor Reusch's notes, a Russian priest said, "I accept the Article because it does not contradict this doctrine of our Church, viz., that the Eucharistic sacrifice is essentially the same as the sacrifice on the cross, because in the Eucharist is offered the same Lamb of God as on the Cross, only that then the Lord

The only occasion on which I thought it necessary for me to speak was concerning the meaning of the latter clause, which says that in the Eucharist we receive Christ's body and blood. The multiplication of "celebrations," and the superstitious washing of cups, gathering of crumbs, altar bowings, kissings, and crossings which of late years have made the worship in some English churches offensive to reasonable worshippers, demand some care in defining the sense in which we receive Christ's body and blood in the Eucharist. The language on this subject is very unguarded even with theologians whose views are perfectly rational. A Nonconformist, for instance, like Dr. Doddridge in the well-known hymn, speaks of the Communion as a "rich banquet of Christ's flesh and blood." Miles Coverdale, speaking of the Eucharist, says that in it "our souls by faith receive Christ's broken body and His blood shed; yea, even whole Christ." John Calvin says that "an inward substance is annexed to the visible sign; and as the bread is distributed in the hand, so is the body of Christ communicated to us to the intent we should be partakers thereof. It is not a sacrifice which the priest is to offer for the remission of sins, but a sacrifice on which the people are to feed." Archbishop Cranmer says, "We receive the self-same body of Christ that was born of the Virgin Mary, that was crucified and buried, that rose again and ascended into heaven, and sitteth on the right hand of God the Father Almighty." Similar language was used by the ancient Fathers, and Cranmer said that he wished "to set his hands to all the singular speeches, phrases, ways and forms of speech which they do use in their treatises upon this sacrament."

I wished to point out to the Bonn Conference, and especially to the English Clergy, that notwithstanding all this extravagant language found in Fathers and Reformers about receiving Christ's body and blood in the Eucharist, yet no such thing was intended as the words seem to intimate. The Reformers had no sooner used these words than, in order to be understood, they were obliged to give an explanation of what they meant. Melancthon once made the remark

Himself offered the sacrifice visibly in His own person, while He now in the Eucharist offers the sacrifice invisibly in the form (*Gestalt*) of bread and wine, and then by actually effusing the blood, now sacramentally, as an unbloody sacrifice. This sacrifice is not only a sacrifice of thanksgiving, but also a propitiatory sacrifice for living and dead."

Döllinger—"I do not see that the teaching of the Greek Church is not in harmony with the Article."

Professor Rhossis from Athens—"The Article is not in contradiction with the teaching of our Church, if by *Vergegenwärtigung* (presentation) is not meant a *Veranschaulichung* but has an interior-connexion with the heavenly sacrifice, and is near relation to it."

Döllinger—"It is meant in this sense."

I cannot suppose that the English clergy had any idea of any such meaning as that which according to these reports the Orientals put upon the Eucharistic Article.

that if the old Fathers had ever dreamed of their words being taken literally, they would not have spoken with such extravagant metaphors. And I am certain that Cranmer, and our Reformers with him, if they had known the use that was to be made of the language, which is in the Prayer-book, would never have allowed it to remain there. Notwithstanding Cranmer's *caveat*, his language has been taken literally, and, as in the case of the Fathers, doctrines have been built upon metaphors. I do not say that we are bound to Cranmer's view, but I do think that Cranmer ought to be taken as fairly representing the mind of the Church of England after the Reformation; and he has told us plainly that though he used all these metaphorical speeches about the sacrament, yet he intended them only as metaphorical speeches. He quoted rules given by the old Fathers themselves, how such figurative language was to be understood. "In plain speech," he says, "it is not true that we eat Christ's body, and drink His blood." Christ is in heaven, and is only present on earth as the sun is present by light and heat. To receive Christ's body and blood is to receive the truth. It is to believe in Christ, and this eating and drinking is not confined to the Eucharist, for the faithful feed upon Christ in their daily lives. "If," Cranmer says, "Christ had never ordained the sacrament, yet should we have eaten His flesh and drunken His blood, as all the faithful did before the sacrament was ordained, and do daily when they receive not the sacrament. The doctrine of the "real presence" is founded mainly on the application of John vi. to the Eucharist, a discourse which was uttered at least a year before the supper was instituted, and as far as fair exegesis can carry us, had really no reference to it at all. I abstained from voting on the Eucharistic Article, because I was not allowed to take it in Archbishop Cranmer's sense, which I believe to be that of the Church of England, of many of the Fathers, and moreover of Jesus Christ Himself as He has explained His own words in the discourse in which He spoke of eating His flesh and drinking His blood.

Before any real progress can be made towards the re-union of the divided Churches, the first question to be settled is the character of the Church which Christ founded: Is it constituted by a hierarchy, or is the ministry merely one of its accidents? In other words, does Christ's Church depend on the external official form, or does it consist of those who are united by the same spirit? If it is constituted by the official hierarchy, there can be but one visible Church. Division in a Church so constituted is impossible. One of the parties is schismatic and no longer a part of the Church. The Romish Church carries out this principle consistently, denying to all outsiders any claim to be any part of the Catholic Church. It is the simple principle that Christ's Church is one society, and the official hierarchy is the permanent bond of its unity. Now if

this hierarchy be the essential constitution of the Church, and Christ promised that against His Church so constituted the gates of hell should not prevail, either one of the hierarchical churches is alone Christ's Church, or His promise has failed. We acknowledge that Christendom is divided into hostile communities, and yet we repeat the old creed which says, "I believe in *one* Catholic Apostolic Church." Where is its unity? It exists and yet it does not exist, is the burden of the confession of many who yet believe that the Church depends for its existence on the official life. I take up the "Correspondence between Members of the Anglo-continental Society" with old Catholics and Orientals, and I find in the first letter a request for prayers in furtherance of the "unity of the one Holy Catholic Church," which is further called "the undivided body of Christ." Why pray for its *unity* if it is already *one* and *undivided*? On the next page is a letter from the Bishop of Winchester, who says that the Church of England earnestly seeks "the *unity* of the Catholic Church," that is the unity of the one Church which is universal. On another page the editor says that the members of the one, though divided Church, are grouped under the headings of (1), Oriental Christians; (2) Roman Catholics; (3) Old Catholics; (4) Anglicans; (5) Protestants. This Church which consists of these differing communities is one. But this unity is invisible. It is not that unity which is implied in the very principle of an official hierarchy constituting the Church.

I turn to Dr. Pusey's *Eirenicon* to discover, if possible, his view of ecclesiastical unity. I find an effort to answer the charge of Dr. Manning, that the Church of England "formally denies the indissoluble unity of the Church." Of course Dr. Manning means the visible unity, which from his stand-point of a Church constituted by a hierarchy as a kind of medium of communication between God and man, is a unity necessary to existence. Dr. Pusey's idea of the Church is fundamentally the same in kind as Dr. Manning's; but he has to contend with the troublesome fact that the Church, as he regards it, is not one; that is, has no visible unity. He makes the Church to consist of three distinct communities, each with their distinct hierarchies. His answer to Dr. Manning is, that the Church of England prays for "all bishops," and not merely for her own; that the Church has a spiritual unity from Christ as the Head of His Body; that all are united to Him who receive the Sacraments as administered by the *organization* which Christ appointed. Arguments are also brought forward from cases of the suspension of intercommunion in former times not destroying the unity of the Church. Though non-episcopal communities are excluded, Dr. Pusey can still find no unity but the invisible. Instead of one society with an organization for the transmission of grace, he believes in at least three societies with one organization for the transmission of grace,

and between these three there has been no intercommunion for centuries.

If the hierarchy be the Church, and Christ promised to be with it always to the end of the world, it certainly is incredible that He should ever allow that hierarchy to be divided. The continuance of a succession by a branch cut off from this hierarchal organization, which on the theory in question is the bond of the unity of "the Body of Christ," can be no more than the continuance of a branch cut off. An organization cannot be divided into contending parts, and yet remain one.

The first obvious inference from this is, that the re-unionists must not lay their foundation in the theory of a mechanical Church. If they do, the Romanists will beat them with their own weapons. The Orientals may indeed contend with the Romish community for precedence and for being *the* society which Christ established; but the Old Catholics and the Anglicans must turn their backs in the day of battle. It matters nothing that the Jansenist bishops of Holland, by whom Bishop Reinkens was consecrated, can trace their succession through bishops that were once in communion with all the Catholic bishops of the Western Church. The succession was continued by a deposed Bishop *in partibus* who had become a Jansenist, and this cannot in any sense be said to have been a consecration authorized by the Catholic Church. The Anglican consecrations in the time of Queen Elizabeth stand on better grounds. Archbishop Parker was consecrated by four bishops, and not by one as in the Jansenist Church in Holland. The See of Canterbury was vacant not by deprivation, but by the death of Cardinal Pole. The consecrators, though not themselves believers in the necessity of Episcopal succession, followed as far as practicable the usual canons of consecration. But what was it all worth when tried by the theory of a mechanical Church as set forth by Dr. Pusey and Dr. Manning? The consecration of Archbishop Parker was not the work of the *Church*. The bishops who were in possession of the sees when Elizabeth came to the throne were still by ecclesiastical law the possessors of these sees. They could not be deprived by a secular power. With one exception, they all declared themselves against the changer, which Elizabeth introduced, but still, like Wordsworth's "little maid," Elizabeth "would have her will," and commanded four Protestant bishops who had no sees, to perform a consecration. The succession was continued, but, on the theory of a visible authoritative Church, the act was the creation of a schism.

If I have made no mistake in the interpretation of Bishop Reinkens' views, as expressed in the speeches and sermons to which I have already referred, we may fairly conclude that the Old Catholics make nothing of this episcopal succession, but take the more certain ground of resting on the personal life of the Church. They

acknowledge the invisible and spiritual union of all Christians in the Body of Christ, which is not an external, mechanical Church, but a body animated by one Spirit, though divided externally into many parts, with different Church politics and different intellectual apprehensions of the meaning of Christian doctrine. It is on this ground that they are able to propose more intercommunion between different Christian communities, and this they are not to confine merely to those that are Episcopal, but in the words of the President of the Central Committee for Rhineland, they are to stretch out a "brotherly hand to the members of the Reformed Churches of their Fatherland," as well as to "the Anglican Church."

When the idea of a mechanical Church is set aside, there will follow as a corollary the setting aside of all mechanical religion. The material transmission of grace through sacraments, and other acts performed by the clergy, is the fountain of nearly all superstition in the Christian Church. It is totally opposed to the whole spirit of Christ's religion. The doctrine is built entirely on misunderstood metaphors and Oriental forms of speech. We of the Church of England had it torn up by the roots at the Reformation, but some of the old language was allowed to remain. On that language it took root again, and now the Upas tree is threatening destruction to all healthy development. It has been since the time of Laud the great incubus on the bosom of the Church of England, and it is chargeable with the guilt of many schisms, from the expulsion of the Puritans to the Wesleyan exodus of later times. It is against this mechanical religion of the Romish communion, that the Old Catholics have made the loudest protests. They demand a spiritual worship. They have declared themselves free from the tyranny of the hierarchical system of Rome, which professes in itself to constitute the Church of Christ. Being once made free, let them not bring themselves into bondage by the claims of any other hierarchy. Let them for ever bid farewell to mechanism and materialism in religion.

It may be said, further, that the union of the Churches can never be accomplished on a purely dogmatic basis. This is what Dr. Bluntschli told the Old Catholics at the Cologne Congress, and there are many indications that they are now tolerably clear as to the truth of it. The idea of uniting all Churches on the basis of an agreement in opinion, is as absurd as that of the Roman magistrate of whom Cicero speaks who, being sent to Greece as pro-consul, expected to unite the different philosophers into one sect. On his arrival he assembled them together and offered his authority and assistance for their reconciliation. His reward was that the philosophers laughed at him.

Some general doctrines or principles the re-unionists must of course have, but their chief dogma must be love or charity—that charity which suffereth long and is kind. The forbearance with each

other which, on what are reckoned non-essentials, is now practised in every Christian community, must also be practised as to many things reckoned essentials. To accomplish this is, and will be, the grand difficulty to be overcome. The duty which men feel of contending for the truth will conflict with the duty of showing charity to those who widely differ from them. The most sincere and upright men are often the men who will fight to the last for a pin of the tabernacle or the contour of a surplice. Men will have strong convictions. It is right that they should, and it is right that they should fight to the death for every tittle of what they believe to be truth. But this should be tempered by charity, for however great faith may be, charity is greater.

The articles of dogmatic or doctrinal belief that are to be regarded as fundamental, must be few and simple. They must not be too minutely defined, for it is definition that makes division, and all subjects that are defined must be regarded as not having received the last possible expression of accuracy, but as capable of being reset in other forms suitable to other times. We must not attempt to bind the Church by stereotyped creeds as the final expression of truth. The same freedom now accorded in subscription to the Articles must be extended to all the symbols that have come down from the ancient Church. All such confessions are stamped with the spirit and bare traces of the theological strifes in which they had their origin. The Christianity of the fifth century will no more suit the centuries that are to come, than that of the tenth or the sixteenth. A place must ever be left in all our definitions for the admission of any truth which may be discovered in the future concerning God and His relations with man. Whatever Christianity revealed, it is certain that it left much unrevealed. It is certain, too, that it is by a slow process that the world learns the full meaning of all that the New Testament contains. An astronomer once said that though the stars do not develop, astronomy does. Christianity itself may not change, but man's understanding of it may. That which seemed final to the Nicene Fathers, to the Council of Trent, or to the compilers of the XXXIX Articles, cannot be final to us and to our children.


Lastly. If the only union we can expect is a union in which we are to tolerate each other's differences, let us begin now, and let us begin where all true charity begins—at home. One half of the worshipping people of England are outside the Episcopal Church. Why do we not hold communion with them, and let our differences stand as they are? Would it not, for instance, be far more Christian for the well-meaning Bishop of Lincoln to hold fellowship with the Wesleyans, who for a century have kept religion alive in his diocese, than to heap contumely upon them by calling them schismatics. Granting that they are wrong in some points, yet on the main questions of Christian doctrine they are nearer to the Church of

England than the Church of England is to the Greek Church. The same is true of all the other influential non-episcopal churches both in England and Scotland ; and what is more, those in England are our own children who, by the confession of all parties, have been driven away by the negligence and unwisdom of their mother. If we could present a united National Christianity at home, we could with a better grace seek communion with Churches in other lands. By admission of the Anglican writers in the Anglo-Continental correspondence they are all members of the "One Undivided Body of Christ." They have the invisible unity with the Head which is of infinitely greater importance than any visible unity can be. We acknowledge them to be Christ's members, and yet repudiate them as schismatics. Let us hope that the intercourse of Anglicans with the Greek and Continental Churches may be the means of giving them wider views both of the Church and of the world, and be the beginning of a new era of charity and forbearance towards those who differ from them at their own doors.

JOHN HUNT.

*Postscript.*—Since this article was written, Professor Reusch has sent me a copy of the complete Report of the proceedings of the Conference. It is published at Bonn.





## PROFESSOR WHITNEY ON THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE.

IT is remarkable that in the same month of July 1874 we find an anonymous writer in England saying :

"Few recent intellectual phenomena are more astounding than the ignorance of these elementary yet fundamental distinctions and principles (*i.e.*, as to the essence of language) exhibited by conspicuous advocates of the monistic hypothesis. Mr. Darwin, for example, does not exhibit the faintest indication of having grasped them." \*

Whilst in the United States the distinguished philologist, Professor W. D. Whitney, observes that :

"Mr. Darwin himself shows a remarkable moderation and soundness of judgment in his treatment of the element of language. . . . Very little exception is to be taken by a linguistic scholar to any of his statements. Though no master, such as Müller is, of the facts of many languages, his general view of speech in its anthropological relations, his sense of what it is to man, and how, is far truer than that of the scholar who has attempted by the evidence of language to overthrow his whole theory." †

Truly no man is a prophet in his own country !

Professor Whitney is the first philologist of note, who has professedly taken on himself to combat the views of Professor Max Müller ; and as the opinions of the latter most properly command a vast deal of respect in England, we think it will be a good service to direct the attention of English readers to this powerful attack, and, as we think, successful refutation of the somewhat dogmatic views of our Oxford linguist.

\* *Quarterly Review*. "Primitive Man : Tylor and Lubbock," p. 45.

† *North American Review*. "Darwinism and Language."

The Professor's article is a review of Schleicher's book, "Über die Bedeutung der Sprache für die Naturgeschichte des Menschen," \* and of Max Müller's well-known lectures on "Mr. Darwin's Philosophy of Language"; but in fact the article deals almost entirely with the latter, Schleicher being dismissed with a single paragraph.

Turning to Müller the Professor happily observes:—"It is never entirely easy to reduce to a skeleton of logical statement a discussion as carried on by Müller, because he is careless of logical sequence and connection, preferring to pour himself out, as it were, over his subject, in a gush of genial assertion and interesting illustration." In taking up the cudgels, Müller is clearly impelled "by an overmastering fear lest man should lose" "his proud position in the creation," if his animal descent is proved. He maintains the extraordinary position that if an insensible gradation could be established between ape and man, their minds would be *identical*, and that by a similar argument the distinction between black and white, hot and cold, a high and low note might be eliminated: he overlooks, too, "the undoubted and undisputed fact that species do actually vary in nature." The same line of proof would show that the stature of a man and boy were *identical*, because the boy passes through every gradation in attaining the one stature from the other. No one could maintain such a position, who grasped the doctrines of continuity, and of the differential calculus. Professor Whitney justly points out, that in biology the gradations are not infinitesimal, but are such as are observed in nature to exist between parent and offspring. According to what is called the "Darwinian theory," organisms are in fact *precisely* the result of a multiple integration of a complex function of a very great number of variables; many of such variables being bound together by relationships amongst themselves: an example of one such relationship being afforded by the law, which has been called "correlation of growth."

Professor Whitney says:

"As a linguist he (Professor Müller) claims to have found in language an endowment which has no analogies, and no preparations in even the beings nearest to man, and of which, therefore, no process of transmutation could furnish an explanation. Here is the pivot on which his whole argument rests and revolves."

And he urges that Müller does not argue his "case with moderation and acuteness, on strict scientific grounds and by scientific methods," in setting up language as *the* specific difference between man and animals. Many other writers in fact have adduced other differences as *the* correct ones; thus, that he

"Alone is capable of progressive improvement; that he alone makes use of tools or fire, domesticates other animals, possesses property, or employs

\* Translated into English by Dr. Bikkens, under the title "Darwinism tested by the Science of Language."

language; that no other animal is self-conscious, comprehends itself, has the power of abstraction, or possesses general ideas; that man alone has a sense of beauty, is liable to caprice, has the feeling of gratitude, mystery, &c., believes on God, or is endowed with a conscience."\*

Many of these asserted distinctions are successfully combated in "The Descent of Man."

Although Müller asserts that animals receive their knowledge through the senses only, and that no animal possesses "the faintest germs of the faculty, of abstracting and generalising," he elsewhere says that "if there is a *terra incognita* which excludes all positive knowledge, it is the mind of animals;" the whole subject is transcendent. It seems strange that the same person should be involved in such profound ignorance, and yet have so complete a knowledge of the limits of the animal mind. Professor Whitney, however, justly points out that the minds of our fellow-men are a *terra incognita*, in exactly the same sense as are those of animals:

"Who, for example, can be sure that, if he had a friend's sensorium in his brain instead of his own, he would get precisely the same sensation of colour as at present from the green grass and the blue sky?" . . .  
 "We believe that the horse sees green, and tastes water, and feels pain, as confidently, and on nearly the same grounds, as we believe that our neighbour does the same."

It is true that with man we have an additional source of evidence in language, but it can hardly be asserted that this is the only one.

With reference to the denial of conceptual knowledge to animals Mr. Darwin says:†—

"But when a dog sees another dog at a distance it is often clear that he perceives that it is a dog in the abstract; for when he gets nearer, his whole manner suddenly changes, if the other dog be a friend. A recent writer remarks that in all such cases it is a pure assumption to assert, that the mental act is not essentially of the same nature in the animal as in the man. If either refers what he perceives with his senses to a mental concept, then so do both. Vide Mr. Hookham, letter to Professor M. Müller, 'Birmingham News,' May, 1873."

To most persons it will be sufficient to know, with Prof. Whitney that—

"An animal like a dog perfectly knows what a man is, never confounds it with any other creature, knows what to fear and hope from it, in order to hold, with a confidence that is proof against all authority, the doctrine that an animal lower than myself possesses such germs of the faculty of generalizing as are distinct only in degree from those which I possess."

The allusion to authority in this passage refers to the attempt of Müller to crush his adversaries, by a reference to Kant, Hume, Berkeley, and Locke. But fortunately we live in an age, which

\* "Descent of Man." Vol. i. p. 49.

† "Descent of Man." (New edition to be published shortly, p. 83.)

(except for temporary relapses) does not pay any very great attention to the pious founder, and which tries to judge for itself.

On examining the extract from Locke made by Müller, Prof. Whitney finds that the power of forming general ideas is denied to animals, simply on the ground that they do not talk, and observes that, "The fallacy lurking here is the assumption that, if general ideas were formed, they could not help finding expression in words; and that I can see no good ground for." Prof. Müller, however, adheres to and restates Locke's position in his own words; and reason is defined by him, as the *power* of forming and handling general concepts.

Prof. Whitney then says; .

Reason "is that power over general concepts which we possess, and which is so much higher than anything possessed by brutes, that it is properly called by a different name. Again, 'handling' general concepts is an ambiguous and unscientific phrase, and involves, perhaps, more power than 'forming' them; we might fairly enough say that the effective management of ideas is possible only by means of a system of signs, which the brute confessedly has not. But to put the formation of general concepts at the very top, and the power of weighing probabilities and calculating results, even genius itself, far below, is to turn the natural order of things topsy-turvy. . . . Nor, once more, is articulate language, or language of any kind, the only intelligible manifestation of reason. There is rational conduct as well as rational speech, and it is quite as effective as speech. . . . Müller himself acknowledges . . . that, 'though the faculty of language may be congenital, all languages are traditional.' Unless, then, reason is a matter of tradition rather than of natural gift, a man may fail to have had any language handed down to him, and so may fail to give what Müller regards as the only possible evidence of reason, and yet may be rational."

In thorough consistency with himself, Müller would appear to hold that the born deaf and dumb have no concepts, "except such as can be expressed by less perfect symbols." If, however, they can form *any* concepts, they can, as Prof. Whitney urges, reason.

It is curious to observe that the Quarterly Reviewer, who is just as much bent as Prof. Max Müller on the dualistic hypothesis of man's origin, takes up the deaf and dumb man also.\* He however, maintains that—

"The intellectual activity of their minds is indeed evidenced by the peculiar construction of their sentences. Mr. Tylor tells us (p. 25), 'Their usual construction is not "black horse" but "horse black;" not "bring a black hat," but "hat black bring." . . . There can be no doubt that a society of dumb men would soon elaborate a gesture language of great complexity."

It seems, then, that the Reviewer is as much opposed to Müller as are the evolutionists; and on this point at least he seems to have sound sense on his side.

Müller asks, "Are concepts possible, or, at least, are concepts ever

\* "Primitive Man," July, 1874, p. 46.

realised, without some form or outward body?" and answers the query by saying that "if the science of language has proved anything, it has proved that conceptual or discursive thought can be carried on in words only." He maintains that thought and language are as necessary to the existence of each other, as the peel to an orange. To this Prof. Whitney observes, that concepts may be formed and yet not put before the consciousness of the conceiver, so that he "realises" what he is doing; complex thoughts are doubtless impossible without symbols, just as are the higher mathematics. Yet we know that dogs doubt and hesitate, and finally determine to act without any external determining circumstance.

Whitney very happily illustrates the independence of thought from language, by calling up our state of mind when casting about, "often in the most open manner, for new designations," for new forms of knowledge, or when "drawing distinctions, and pointing conclusions which words are then stretched or narrowed to cover." "If Müller had brought before him some wholly new animal he would find that he could shut his eyes and call up the image of it readily enough without any accompanying name."

It is a proof that we realised and conceived the idea of the texture and nature of a musical sound before we had a word for it, that we have had to borrow the expressive word "timbre" from the French.

Prof. Whitney says, however, that he is convinced that Müller does not quite understand "the theory of the antecedeny of the idea to the word, in the minds of those who hold that theory." He cannot bear anything which seems to derogate from the dignity of language. Whitney fancies that Müller may only mean to deny "that men elaborate a great store of ideas, and then, by an after-thought, proceed to invent names" for them; and that he may mean that when a sign has been sought and found for a concept, it is used "as a necessary standing-ground from which to rise another step." And he illustrates this possible interpretation, by showing how much Müller has of late changed his position with respect to the "bow-wow" and "pooh-poo" theories of language; for even he now says, "interjections and imitations are the only possible materials out of which human language could be formed." Although he still guards himself from being confused with the ordinary pooh-pooists, by holding that words come from roots, and roots from interjections and imitations, whilst *they* do not interpose the roots on the evolutionary road!

Professor Whitney says that human nature is the sum of certain endowments above and beyond those of animals. To human nature concrete speech does not belong, but only the capacities and tendencies for its development. Its development has been slow, as in other branches of human activity; but every race has worked out some system of verbal signs, just as every race uses some tools.

These results constitute the civilization of the race. The name of "reason" is due to the capacities, and not to the results themselves. The most important capacities for language have been memory, distinct conception, abstraction, reflection, and the review of our own mental processes; and, of not less importance, the power of adapting means to ends. The end of language is intercommunication.

"It is where speech cuts loose from its narrow and inextensible instinctive basis, and becomes, instead of a cry to relieve the speaker's own feelings, an utterance to bring a thought before another that its unlimited growth becomes possible and that its history begins; here it makes that transition from emotional to rational, upon which Müller with good reason lays so much stress."

The capacities, he continues, are not wanting in some of the lower animals, though their degree is so much lower than ours. Animals understand much that we try to signify to them; and it is in the largeness of our "power of connecting definite sounds with definite ideas,"\* that lies our pre-eminence.

Professor Whitney thinks that we shall never discover the steps between "the wholly instinctive expression of the animals" and "the wholly conventional expression of man."

"The wishes and expectations of those (for there are such) who still look to find a connecting series are founded on a misapprehension, and are futile; their fear to find that nature has made a *saltus* in passing from the one to the other is equally in vain. There is neither *saltus* nor gradual transition in the case; no transition, because the two are essentially different; no *saltus*, because human speech is an historical development out of infinitesimal beginnings, which may have been of less extent even than the instinctive speech of many a brute. If we had the missing links supplied we should not find the more and more anthropoid beings possessing a larger and larger stock of definite articulations to which they by instinct attached definite ideas; there are no such elements in human language, present or traceable in the past; and as we approach man, the detailed instincts leading to definite acts or products diminish rather than increase; we should find those beings showing more and more plainly the essentially human power of adapting means to ends, both by reflection and unconscious action, in communication and expression, as in other departments of activity."

Professor Whitney agrees with Mr. Darwin in thinking that man does not owe his existence, *as man*, to language, but that language has enabled him to reach a higher level of manhood. And à propos to Mr. Darwin's opinion on this point, the *Quarterly Reviewer*, before alluded to, charges him† with contradicting himself in the *Descent of Man*, thus:—

"In one place (vol. i., p. 54) he attributes the faculty of speech in man to his having acquired a higher intellectual nature, while in another place (vol. ii., p. 391) he ascribes man's intellectual nature to his having acquired the faculty of speech."

\* "Descent of Man."

† P. 45.

In all justice, however, the latter reference should have been given to pp. 390 and 391, and then we find as follows :—

Vol. i. p. 54—

“It is not the mere power of articulation that distinguishes man from other animals, for as every one knows parrots can talk ; but it is his large power of connecting definite sounds with definite ideas ; and this obviously depends on the development of the mental faculties.”

And Vol. ii. p. 390—

“A great stride in the development of the intellect will have followed as soon as, through a previous considerable advance, the half-art and half-instinct of language came into use ; for the continued use of language will have reacted on the brain, and produced an inherited effect ; and this again will have reacted on the improvement of language. P. 391—The large size of the brain in man . . . may be attributed in chief part . . . to the early use of some simple form of language . . .”

The asserted contradiction then lies in a skilful reading of the sentence on p. 391 *apart* from its context on p. 390.

With all deference to the great weight of Professor Whitney's opinion, I venture to think that he makes a dangerous assertion when he says that we shall never know anything of the transitional forms through which language has passed. It is ever a doubtful policy to assert that science is incapable of anything. Does Professor Whitney mean that it is impossible to track the Aryan languages higher than their roots, or to discover the imitational and interjectional sources of those roots ? The attempt to do so has already been made, but with what degree of success I must leave professed philologists to judge. Count Liancourt and Mr. Pincott have just published a work on the “Primitive Laws of Language.”\*

I will give a short sketch of their method, in the hope that competent judges may be induced to consider their views.

Our authors state their objections to the “bow-wow,” “pooh-pooh,” and “ding-dong” theories of language, but then proceed to expound their own theory of its origin ; their views, however, *exactly* accord with what I, at least, have always thought I understood by the ordinarily received onomatopœic theory. The idea which, I believe, is new in their work is the reduction of the received roots of language (of which they state there are 1800 in Sanskrit) down to a very small number of still more primitive roots, and of these they give the onomatopœic origin. Whether or not they push this analysis to a fanciful extent, I will not pretend to say. The method will be best illustrated by some of their examples. They trace the words “and,” “other,” “or,” “either,” down to the Sanskrit “antara” and

\* “Primitive and Universal Laws of Language.” By Count G. A. de Goddesand Liancourt and F. Pincott. London : W. H. Allen. 1874. These authors, by the bye, seem to agree with Müller in the point attacked by Whitney, for they say that “man spoke before he reasoned.”

"itara." The latter consists of two parts, "i" and "tara"; "i" is the root "to go," and "tara" is derived from the verbal base "trî," "to cross over." We meet "tara" again in the comparative "better," but it generally dwindles down to the mere letter r in comparatives. We meet trî again in trans:—

"The primitive meaning of trî is, however, 'cross over'; it is a compound formed of t., the remote definite = 'there' + ri = 'go,' and is, therefore, equivalent to 'go there,' i.e., 'motion to that place.'"

Similarly "pri" is the origin of "pra," "pro," "forth," &c., and is derived from "pā" the sound "produced by a puff of breath," which "would aptly convey an idea like 'forth,' and "ri," to "go." "Ri" they consider as a sort of intensified form of "i"; the letter r being one natural way of reduplicating and intensifying a sound. By methods such as above indicated, they reduce all the roots down to a few "onomatops,"—G the onomatop of "throat," "swallow," "seize," &c.,—I="here," denoting "self," "unity," "motion towards the speaker" and "motion in general"—L the onomatop of "tongue," "lick," "smear," "bright," &c.—P that of "puff," "forward," &c.—another P that of "suck," "drink," "nourish"—T the onomatop of definition, that which is exterior to self, "other," "there," "beyond," &c. This indication suffices to sketch the method pursued, and it will be interesting if some competent judge will criticize it.

Professor Whitney notwithstanding, I cannot see that it is wholly useless to speculate on some of the influences, which must have had their bearings on the formation of language,—whether or not we fancy that we can still trace the remains of such influences in languages, as they exist at present.

According to Mr. Darwin's views, man owes his extraordinary power of modulating the voice, and producing diversity of sounds, in general, not to sexual selection. Doubtless in very early times his ape-like ancestors possessed vocal organs, with which they gave forth a limited number of significant cries, serving to convey various signals and emotions to their brethren; but Mr. Darwin's view is that the voice attained its present perfection by its constant use as a sexual charm (as in the case of the singing gibbons), and by the selection consequent on such use in courting. It is curious if man is indebted for language, not entirely to the vast utility of so perfect a means of intercommunication, but partly to the philoprogenitive nature of his ancestors!

Again, if this view is correct, music is antecedent to language. Mr. Spencer's view is exactly the other way, for he thinks that music owes its origin to the imitation of the various intonations, made use of in the verbal expression of the emotions; and these varied intonations he ascribes to purely physiological causes. Influenced by what



Mr. Spencer would call the "family bias," I cannot but think that my father's view is the more probable, since it serves far better to explain the strong emotional effect of music, and since the voice is so largely used in many other departments of the animal kingdom as a love-charm.

I have heard it suggested that though animals give significant cries, yet that as they are never known to approach conventionality, but continue stereotyped, we do not here see any real approach to language; for that the whole essence of language lies in its conventionality. But I think that this objection can be scarcely justified, for when one holds a stick, and gives it to a dog to worry, he growls—but yet in a way so very distinct from that of real anger, that one can only interpret the growl as a sort of conventional mark of his anger. Again, it has been asserted that all the cries of animals are purely emotional; yet I know a terrier, who has, untaught, invented a peculiar low bark, like "wuff!" which is never used except to mean "open the door." And the domestic cock has a well-known peculiar cry, only used to summon his wives to any food which he has found. The ease with which a conventionalised cry might be adopted by animals, is illustrated by the undoubted fact that the barking of dogs is a mode of giving tongue only learnt under domestication; for the dogs, which ran wild on the island of Juan Fernandez, had, after thirty-three years, quite lost the art, and some which were recaptured re-acquired it; and, further, individual wolves and jackals, kept in confinement, have learnt to bark like dogs.\*

An animal giving various significant cries, and also practising singing, would hardly fail to make his cries yet more significant by imparting to them some of the intonations of his song, and this might easily give to such cries a much wider significance. It is said that savages when excited naturally speak in a sort of song, which would accord well with this view, though in no way contradictory of Mr. Spencer's.

It is clear, too, that in a much later stage of the development of language, when the metaphorical power, of which language exhibits such extraordinary diversity, had become somewhat developed, that the same quasi-word, or conventionalised cry or exclamation, might come to bear very widely different meanings according to its intonation; when however there came to be synonyms for the same object or idea, that word would be likely to survive the best, which differed from others, not merely in intonation, but in its consonants. This would at least be likely to hold good of languages still in a progressive condition. May not this possibly serve as an explanation of the fact that in such a fossilised language as Chinese, we find so great a variety of tones? Mr. Swinhoe told me that the same monosyllable

\* Darwin: "Animal and Plants under Domestication," vol. i., p. 27.

had eight different meanings according to its intonation ! How great is the weakness to a tongue springing from this source, may be realized by what Mr. Swinhoe also told me, viz. : that a Chinaman barely understands another, when spoken to unexpectedly, so that it is usual to preface any remark by "look here," or "I wish to speak."

To return to Professor Whitney,—I do not understand the grounds on which he denies that any transitional stage is possible in the formation of language. He does not imagine that a language, however incomplete, sprang forth fully caparisoned from a single generation of anthropoid apes. It is surely probable that many generations of quasi-men passed away, who used a small vocabulary of conventionalised cries ; that these cries became more and more conventionalised, by departing more and more from the sounds or exclamations, from which they took their origin. Many roots would probably propagate themselves by fission, and give rise to new roots, gradually to become entirely separate from their onomatopœic originals. I should imagine that the imitative origin of quasi-words (serving alike as verbs, adjectives, and nouns) would in early times have served as a kind of *memoria technica* of their meanings. It is obvious that any system of verbal signs would have a much more retentive hold on the memory, when such signs had a relationship however feeble with the objects represented. An English child learns and remembers the word "baa-lamb," and calls a cow a "moo-cow," for long before he can keep the mere signs "lamb" and "cow" in his memory ; and he frequently begins by calling dogs and cows "bow-wows" and "moos," and continues to use these words, even after he pronounces these syllables in a quite conventionalised manner. And will not something of the same kind surely have taken place in the infancy of the human race ?

If the complete conventionalism and fossilisation of onomatopœic roots did not take place in a single generation,—and to me it seems impossible that it should have done so—then surely it is erroneous to say that there is no transitional stage of language possible ; and it is not absolutely chimerical to hope that *some* of the steps in such transitions may yet be discoverable, though such speculations must necessarily remain highly doubtful, and the results can never be tabulated along with those more certain results, to which we are led in other branches of science.

Again, Professor Whitney says that—

"Hovel, cottage, and palace do not grow by insensible gradation out of bees' cells, or birds' nests, or beavers' huts, or any other animal structures; they began when man; a shelterless creature, with no building instincts, felt the discomforting influences of external nature, and saw how, by the appropriate use of materials lying within his reach, they could be avoided."

But we know now that some of the anthropoid apes build themselves a platform to rest on, a hardly ruder piece of architecture, than the

shelter erected by the Fuegians; such building is probably instinctive. Now, how can Professor Whitney know that an animal, endowed with high mental power, would not consciously extend such instinctive habits, and that the instinctiveness of the action would not gradually dwindle, and become displaced by a complete rationality? When the orang, mentioned by Mr. Darwin, used a mat to shelter his back from the sun, he probably did it rationally, while he would also probably build his platform instinctively. May we not look at the conscious use of the mat, as a proof that instinct and rationality blend into one another? It is true that we have but little evidence that an action performed wholly instinctively by one generation of animals, is ever performed partly rationally by the next, or that an act done instinctively in youth, is done rationally in later years, but we have no reason to deny its possibility, and it is even *à priori* probable. Although it has been asserted that instinct and reason vary inversely as one another, yet the best observers agree in maintaining that the very reverse is true, and that the more closely any supposed instinctive action of animals is watched, the more it is found blended with reason. Mr. L. H. Morgan, who has observed the habits of beavers probably more closely than any man alive, goes so far as to believe that their wonderful constructions are built entirely under the guidance of reason. And by experiments, Huber showed how immediately bees called in reason to help their cell-making instinct, when he placed them under new and anomalous conditions.

In conclusion, we recommend all who feel an interest in the subject to read Professor Whitney in the original, as his matter is already so much condensed, that any abstract, such as I have endeavoured to give, must do but feeble justice to it.

GEORGE H. DARWIN.



## CHARLES I. AND HIS FATHER.

IN TWO CHAPTERS.

### II.

CHARLES STUART, who ascended the throne of England in the spring of 1625, inherited peculiarities both physical and mental from his father. He was an ailing child, and exhibited indelible traces of James's tottering gait and stuttering articulation. If Lilly can be trusted, "the old Scottish lady, his nurse, used to affirm that he was of a very evil nature even in his infancy," and his own mother predicted harm from his wilfulness. If he was his father's superior in dignity, he ran into the opposite extreme of punctiliousness. If James was offensively familiar, he surrounded himself with elaborate frost-work barriers of etiquette, and ticketed the rooms in Whitehall in the ratio of their accessibility to courtiers of this rank and of that. Of the sagacity which lay beneath all his father's absurdities he had not a trace.

Everything except the vague sentiment of favour which attends incipient royalty was against Charles. In the beginning of his reign he went to meet his bride, Henrietta Maria of France, and spent his first few days of wedded life at Canterbury. It was distressing to the English people that their king should marry a Papist. Henrietta, it is true, was French, and this, in the popular apprehension, was better than if she had been Spanish; but in connection with the marriage negotiations, occasion had been found to offend and alarm the Protestant feeling of the nation. The English Court had engaged to furnish eight ships to the French king, and it was whispered that

they were to be employed against Rochelle. Admiral Pennington declared that he would be hanged rather than serve against the Huguenots, and every man in the ships, with the exception of one gunner, made off. Those ingenious gentlemen who discourse on the continuity of the Church of England, and ask you to name a date for the English Reformation, might be assisted by these circumstances. When, in a fleet fitted out by Charles I., exactly one man could be found, from admiral to powder-monkey, who did not prefer the risks of disobedience and mutiny to fighting against French Protestants, the historical continuity of the old Popish Church of England may be said to have been broken.

The presence of Henrietta at his side put the final touch to that distrust with which Charles was regarded by his subjects when he began to rule over them. The French princess played an important part in the eventful drama of the time. She was devoted to her Church, and the harshness of English Protestantism was not likely to soften her Popery. By her marriage treaty she was empowered to bring up her children in her own religion until they were thirteen years old; and though historians say that this was but a formal concession on the part of the English negotiators, we can judge whether the conscience, the confessor, or the womanly pride of Henrietta was likely to treat it as such. It is certain that her sons Charles II. and James II. were Papists. She was naturally regarded by the English and Irish Catholics as the head of their party, and her daring intrigues in the Popish interest brought her life into extreme danger. She won her husband's affections, and attained great influence over him. At first, indeed, he tried to assert his mastership, and soon after his marriage turned the whole bevy of the Queen's attendant Frenchwomen out of England. Charles was always apt to fly out into impotencies of sudden rage. "Force them away," he wrote to Buckingham, "driving them away like so many wild beasts until ye have shipped them; and so the devil go with them." But, though wilful, Charles had no strength of will, and as his troubles thickened, and the soft brilliancy of Henrietta's youth deepened into the gracious sadness of her matron beauty, she attained an ascendancy over him which at last became supreme.

Intense interest was at this time excited in England by the siege of Rochelle. Richelieu had in youth aspired to be a soldier, and although the patrimonial bishopric drew him into the Church, he gave proof that, under his Cardinal's hat, worked the genius of a great commander. Having shut up the Huguenots in their last city, he proceeded to reduce the town with the calculated energy of one who, from the beginning, sees the end. A sea-wall of his devising strode gradually across the mouth of the harbour to intercept approaching succours. A cry rose from the Protestants of England as if Richelieu were at their own gates. Buckingham

heard the appeal and answered it ; but he did so, not as the sure and patient chief who is as careful in preparation as prompt and bold in fight, but as the spoiled child of royal favour. Unwarned by the failure of Count Mansfeldt's expedition, he sailed for Rochelle without securing an understanding with the besieged. The Rochellers could not forget the episode of the ships. When Buckingham appeared with his squadron in the offing, they refused to admit him. He determined to attempt the Isle of Rhè. At first, because he encountered no force capable of meeting him in the field, he fancied he was carrying everything before him ; but he had no conception of the art of war, and threw away time and men in attacking without the requisite ordnance the principal fort in the island. The French then came upon him in overwhelming numbers, and though he and his men fought bravely, two-thirds of the army of 7,000 perished, and he returned with the wreck of the expedition to England.

Amid the storm of indignation which greeted the Duke on his return, Charles stood by him faithfully. This might have been to the credit of the king if he had first inquired, with a due sense of responsibility for the blood and substance of his people, into the causes of the failure. But he liked Buckingham, and had no idea of the process by which defeat is converted into victory. Charles always acted as if he believed that success or failure is a prize or a blank drawn in a lottery—that a mere favourite is as likely to succeed as a man of ability ; and that, when one expedition collapses, the thing to be done is just to fit out another in the old way of routine. Buckingham has failed ; well, let Denbigh, Buckingham's brother-in-law, try it. Denbigh fails, bringing back the fleet with the imputation of having flinched from the enemy ; let it be Buckingham once more, then. A new expedition was accordingly fitted out, and Buckingham was appointed to the command. The popular party distrusted this expedition as they had distrusted the other, and the land rang with execrations of the Duke. These, acting upon a sore point of personal grudge in a weak and fanatical brain, inflamed John Felton into a monomaniac ; and as Buckingham was about to embark at Portsmouth in August, 1628, he stabbed him to the heart. It remains, therefore, a matter of speculation whether the favourite had it in him to retrieve, by some splendid feat of genius, his own fame and the fortunes of his master.

The expedition sailed under command of the Earl of Lindsay, but effected nothing. After one of the most heroic defences recorded in history, Rochelle surrendered. The embrace of Richelieu had closed round 15,000 Rochellers, the last and bravest of the Huguenots of France ; 4,000 living skeletons confessed that they could do no more.

During the three years of the new reign over which we have been glancing, the Parliament of England had played no unim-

portant part on the stage of affairs. The historical describer has always to regret that he must treat events, not simultaneously and in vital connection with each other, as they occurred, but in succession. That old Mexican, or old Egyptian and Assyrian, method of writing history, in which it was painted on broad walls, was the right one. Here army meets army in shock of conflict; there the assailants enter the breach in a city wall; on the one hand the king and his councillors meet in palaver; on the other the queen and her ladies look on with interest while lions crunch the heads of captives. It is impossible to transfer the panorama of events to the printed page; otherwise we might have shown how, while English seamen were rushing from their ships *en masse* rather than serve against Huguenots, while English armies were sinking in French swamps, while the banner of Protestantism, once proudly upheld by the arm of Elizabeth, was being struck down from Bohemia to Rochelle, the Commons of England looked on in the background, their brows clouded with shame and grief, their eyes sparkling with fiercest anger. Blind to the state of the nation he undertook to govern, Charles was surprised, when he met his first Parliament in 1625, to find that the Houses were indisposed to put confidence in his administration, and that supplies were stingily dealt out. Hume thinks it sufficient to convict the Commons of unreasonableness to say that they forced James and Charles into a war with Spain, and withheld the supplies required for its vigorous prosecution. The explanation is that, though favouring the war with Spain, they distrusted Buckingham, and were bent upon expelling him from the royal councils. Charles dissolved them. In 1626 he called a second Parliament, but the cry of the Commons still was for the dismissal of Buckingham—that is to say, for a complete change of administration; and in six months they had shared the fate of their predecessors. His third Parliament met in 1628; and for the third time, as by a spectre which he could not lay, he was confronted by the patriot party. The philosophic sympathy of Hume for the afflicted monarch is fine. His Parliaments, instead of pouring the contents of England's purse into his lap, would only carp and grumble; and yet they had nothing to complain of except that the religious bent of the Court was dead against that of a passionately religious people, and that the general administration was perhaps the most beggarly tale of disgrace and disaster to be found in the whole annals of England!

Hume, however, is right when he says that "it is ridiculous to consider the English constitution before that period as a regular plan of liberty." It was still possible for the sovereign of England to feel that his kingly honour and his duty to God and his country required him to maintain his own will and judgment against Parliament. The Puritan leaders, on the other hand, Eliot, Pym,

Hampden, and their fellows, though they revered *Magna Charta*, and were all that Mr. Carlyle means by "constitutional pedants"—that is to say, they attached infinite importance to the collective reason and will of nations, and would not have been loyal to the angel Gabriel, as king in England, if he had superseded law and Parliament—had no parchment programme of constitutional freedom. They had an indestructible sense of what English liberty had been in the past. Through the presaging instinct of greatness they were aware of "the spirit of the future time, yearning to mix itself with life," and were resolute that English freedom should be transmitted unimpaired to their posterity. They knew that the political institutions of Europe were in a state of transition, and that the liberties of England must be carried over into the new time or lost for ever. They understood what Richelieu was doing in France, and were aware that Philip II., by dint of ruthless patience, had strangled the spiritual and the civil freedom of old Spain; and that, even in Arragon, where the black-business had been most difficult of execution, "the grinning skulls of the Chief Justice of the kingdom and of the boldest and noblest advocates and defenders of the national liberties, exposed for years in the market-place with the record of their death-sentence attached, informed the Spaniards, in language which the most ignorant could read, that the crime of defending a remnant of human freedom and constitutional law was sure to draw down condign punishment."\*

The patriot or country party of the Parliament which framed the Petition of Right represented, first of all, the material wealth of England. The Commons, who, as a body, were patriots, were computed to have among them three times as much riches as the Lords. With the fact that they were men of substance may fitly be taken the fact of their ingrained conservatism. Engaged in transacting a revolution, they deprecated change: their whole revolution was formulized as opposition to change. They revered the monarch and the monarchy, but detested the slavish teachings of the Laudian school, by which the king was made a despot. Among those who, in tones of clear and fervid eloquence, enforced the principle and policy of realizing the new by preserving and adapting the old, was Sir Thomas Wentworth, a dark, sharp man, of good Yorkshire blood, whose massive head, strong brows and keen lips could not escape observation as he sat in the front rank of the patriots. "We must vindicate—what?" asked the future Strafford. "New things? No: our ancient, legal, and vital liberties; by reinforcing the laws enacted by our ancestors; by setting such a stamp upon them that no licentious spirit shall dare henceforth to invade them." Bent upon vindicating the law, the party was appropriately strong in legal

\* Motley's "United Netherlands."



talent, counting as its own Selden and Coke, each with extensive cellarage of brain, in which lay stowed away enormous treasure of law learning.

Such were the Puritan patriots of Charles's third Parliament; men of substance, men of thought and energy; great in discernment, in civic courage, in patience; in conservatism that revered even the husk of the old, and yet would, by invincible instinct, make way for the green living bud of the new as it inexorably superseded the old. They desired to bring the Crown into harmony with the deliberate intelligence of the country, to secure that the national policy should be worthy of England and the administration in the hands of trusted and able men; that the Court should be frankly Protestant, and that the laws for repressing Popery should be enforced; that the liberty of the subject should be inviolable except by legal process; and that property should be exempt from seizure except to the extent permitted by Parliament. As we read over the few unadorned clauses of the Petition of Right, we are disposed to wonder that words so measured and claims so mild should involve issues so momentous and interests so vast.

It was in the first summer months of 1628 that the Commons, having voted five subsidies but not yet actually handed them over to the Court, pressed the king to accept the Petition of Right. He had recourse to shuffling and evasion, trying to over-reach the patriots by assenting in words framed for the occasion, not in those used by kings of England since the Conquest. His artifices were penetrated and baffled, and he then accepted the Petition of Right in regular form. But he accepted it ungraciously, grudgingly, as one that gnawed his tongue for pain. The patriots received the concession with gratitude too deep for words, but their joy was of short duration. Charles had no sooner pocketed his subsidies and prorogued Parliament than he contemptuously broke his promise. In the following August Buckingham was slain; Charles tried to persuade the judges to let him put Felton to the torture with a view to the discovery of accomplices. The judges declined, but the Royal attempt would not escape the notice of the patriots. Before the Houses re-assembled, Rochelle had fallen. Charles had been drawing closer to Laud, and had ostentatiously favoured the clergymen whom, on account of their servility and Arminianism, the Commons had punished. The death of Buckingham had plainly brought no new era. The session, therefore, which commenced in January, 1629, was stormy. The House resolved itself into a committee of religion, determined to grapple once for all with Laud's counter-reformation, which seemed to them palpably a conspiracy in the interest of the Pope. A grand remonstrance was on the way, a remonstrance in which Laud was to be named, and in which the claims and principles of the Petition of Right were to be re-affirmed. Charles hurried to dissolve the Par-

liament, and after a scene of excitement unprecedented in English Parliamentary history, during which, while Hollis and others held down Speaker Finch by main force in the chair, resolutions against Popery, Arminianism, and illegal exactions were passed by acclamation, the session abruptly closed. This was in March, 1629. Charles breathed freely as one who, to use his own word, had succeeded in trampling down a brood of "vipers," and determined that he would govern henceforth without Parliaments.

It was about the time of Buckingham's death that Sir Thomas Wentworth deserted the popular party and joined the Court. The opinion of Pym and the patriots was that his desertion was an act of deliberate apostacy; and the candid historian is constrained to admit that no other decision would be just. The best that can be said in mitigation of his guilt is that the maudlin romance of personal devotion to Charles may have sentimentalized and softened into vice the robust virtue of his devotion to England.

The policy of *Thorough*—a word adopted from the correspondence of Laud and Strafford to denote the system of administration during those years when Parliaments were suspended in England—was no special device of any man's. It was naturally suggested by Charles's situation, and was the embodiment of his arbitrary disposition, his wilfulness, his detestation of Parliaments, his belief in his divine right to be an autocrat. During those years he was a resolute and unrelenting despot. Men who had irritated him by their Parliamentary opposition were imprisoned. Monopolies of soap, salt, wine, leather, seacoal hampered industry. The king's forests were arbitrarily extended in disregard of private rights; and it is notable that whereas James, with a genuine kingliness of satisfaction in increasing the resources of his country and the prosperity of his subjects, had interested himself in planting Ulster with men, Charles was perpetually bent upon extending the breadth of his acreage under trees and game.

Where Strafford was present, whether in Yorkshire or in Ireland, there was energetic civil administration, and Laud ruled the Church with a rod of iron; but the impotence which had characterized Charles's general administration from the first continued to prevail. Though he devoted much attention to the fleet and was fond of building large ships, the narrow seas were not safe for English vessels or the English coasts for English subjects. "The merchants," said the Commons, describing this period in the Remonstrance of 1641, "have been left so naked to the violence of the Turkish pirates, that many great ships of value, and thousands of his Majesty's subjects, have been taken by them and do still remain in miserable slavery." As if he had not his hands full enough at home, Charles meddled in foreign politics, and meddled not as an able or high-minded statesman but as a mean and incompetent intriguer. He intrigued

with Spain against Holland, and with the Netherlands against Spain, not reaping a shred of advantage in either case but incensing both parties against him. These negotiations are painfully detective in the light they cast upon Charles's character. For the promise of the isles of Zealand, he was ready to assist Spain to subjugate Holland; and in the idea that the Netherlands might accept him for sovereign, he was willing to help them to throw off the Spanish yoke.\* It is difficult to imagine any motive for these proceedings except personal ambition. Charles alienated the sympathy of every foreign power, and in his misfortunes had no friend either among Catholics or Protestants.

Strafford discerned that the thing essentially necessary, if Charles was to reign despotically over England, Scotland, and Ireland, was a drilled and disciplined army. Laud pointedly agreed with Strafford as to the absolute necessity of a military force that could be relied on. These two singled out each other, and were singled out by their contemporaries, as the pillars of the new despotism. It was reserved for Lord Macaulay to discover that the man in whom Strafford absolutely confided, and whom the Long Parliament struck down as well as Strafford, was an imbecile. What is still more surprising, his lordship's estimate is based almost exclusively on the fact that Laud jotted down his dreams, and that his dreams were as foolish as other people's. Not one of Laud's contemporaries would have found the slightest trace of superstition in his diary. Strafford himself did not feel the need of strenuously drilling troops more acutely than Laud. Strafford himself could not have regarded with more contempt and distress the administrative imbecility which reigned in London than Laud. The intellectual range of the Archbishop was narrow; his temper was morose and fanatical; he was an ecclesiastic, and not more than an ecclesiastic; he committed almost incredible mistakes; but in the sincerity of his belief, in the concentration of his energy, in his complete and disinterested devotion to his Anglican idea, he was great. In his main aim of securing the priesthood and the episcopate for the Crown, he succeeded; and the Church of England wears his image and superscription to this hour. No sooner was the gripe of Pym on the throat of Strafford, than the Irish Parliament turned on him like Actæon's hounds on their master; but when the Short Parliament of 1640 refused to grant supplies, Laud's clergy in convocation tabled their money.

After Buckingham's assassination, Laud's sway over Charles became absolute. It was a strange relation in which the ecclesiastic stood to his sovereign; a relation in which every word of the priest was a word of reverent assent, every look a look of abject submission, nay, every thought the thought of a willing and grateful minion,

\* Clarendon and Hardwicke State Papers, quoted by Hallam.

but in which nevertheless the intellect, conscience, and will of the sovereign were mastered by the priest. Charles was one of the few men who perfectly understood Laud, and was an Anglican of Laud's type. An Anglican king and an Anglican high priest, each supreme in his own sphere, each divinely commissioned to rule over England, each encompassed with a mystic sacredness and inviolability; the high priest enjoining the people to submit in all things to the king, the king putting all the civil authority of the State at the service of the Church: this was the vision that enthralled the imagination of Charles. There was an irresistible charm for a man of intense wilfulness, and whose intellectual strength was not in proportion to his religious sensibility, in a theory which made self-assertion a duty, and enabled him to believe those who resisted him to be damnable sinners. It was the illusion in which he was wrapped by Laud that gave a martyr serenity to his sad and weary face, a fortitude not less than heroic to his bearing in many an hour of tribulation; but if it supported him, and promoted the purposes of Vandyke, it was infinitely baneful to England. The vices of weak men become subtly and powerfully noxious only when they are consecrated, for themselves and others, into virtues.

The Anglicanism of Laud, so different from the nobly comprehensive and philosophical Anglicanism of Hooker, was at first misapprehended by almost all his contemporaries. "This," said both Puritan and Papist when the scheme of Laud began to unfold itself, "is Popery." Hallam quotes from one of Henrietta Maria's letters to Madame de Motteville some expressions which enable us to realize with precision the idea formed of Laud's position by a clever, observant, clear-minded Papist who was constantly in converse with him. The Archbishop seemed to Henrietta "*dans son cœur très-bon Catholique*." She took his preparation of a liturgy with "*peu de différence de la foi orthodoxe*," for introduction into the Church of Scotland, to be the commencement of an attempt to assimilate worship, throughout the three kingdoms, to that of the Church of Rome. The Pope shared the expectations of the Queen. Panzani, the Papal emissary, opened a secret negotiation for the reunion of the Churches. The offer of a Cardinal's hat was made to the Archbishop. Anglo-Catholicism has suggested the same hopes and inferences in our own time. Dr. Newman tells us that, when he joined the Church of Rome, his Popish friends asked him when Dr. Pusey was to follow. They thought him uncharitable when he expressed no hope that Dr. Pusey would submit himself to the Pope. The genuine Anglican is not a man of strong logical instincts, and can remain for an indefinite period in a position logically untenable. Anglicanism is to Popery what a fine copy in water-colours is to a great original picture in oils. The Pope and

the Jesuits at last found Laud out ; and when they caught a glimpse of his true meaning, which indeed he had made no conscious efforts to hide, the recoil with which they started back from him was sharp. It was the keen antagonism of one who suddenly detects, in the soft accents and deferential manner and obliging concessions of an acquaintance, what Balzac calls *la tendresse commerciale*. This is a different thing from the tenderness of sympathy. "Oh, I see;" this was the feeling of the Pope on having his eyes opened ; "you would borrow for your Church of England all the attractiveness and power of the Papacy—apostolic descent, time-honoured ceremony, solemn pageantry, melting music, sacramental salvation—and yet rebel against the Church's head, and erect your own Canterbury Popedom. Thank you for your civility, and for snivelling so sweetly about 'a sister's fall;' but we shall spoil that little game. You are not one whit nearer the true Church than the Puritans." When swords were drawn in the quarrel, the word from Rome to the English Papists was to make no distinction between the heresy of Charles and that of his foes. Henrietta Maria, having learned the secret of Anglicanism, gave up Laud and Strafford without a pang, and it was with no immedicable anguish that she saw the grave close on Charles. The Papist pours upon the Anglican the concentrated venom of several fine essential hatreds—the hatred of the struggling author for the paid and applauded plagiarist, the hatred of the wife for the fascinating beauty of the *demi-monde*, the hatred felt by all men for the sly foe, the simpering rival, the traitor friend. Since the seventeenth century Rome has met every Anglican advance with a spurn of contempt ; and the Anglican who has become a Papist is uncompromising and incisive in his Popery. Dr. Newman has said piercingly bitter things about the hybrid entity which he once lovingly "imagined to be a portion of the Catholic Church," which he left as a "mere national institution," and which he finally perceived to be "the veriest of nonentities."\*

The sum total extracted by the Court from the pockets of Englishmen during the eleven years when the constitution was in abeyance, was not large in proportion to the wealth of the country ; and we need not scruple to concede to Clarendon that, in the absence of war and the general quickening of intelligence, the country enjoyed material prosperity. Nor can we dispute Hume's statement, that, when spread over so many years, the number of mutilations, whippings, and gags administered to the Puritans, under the auspices of Laud and the Star Chamber, was not extremely great. But all the more on these accounts ought we to admire the conduct of those English patriots who fretted under the yoke of Charles. Few nobler spectacles are presented by history than that of the English people in those

\* All three expressions are gleaned from one page of the "Apologia."

years when, from the nobles in their castles to the yeomen in their cottages, all classes were agitated by poignant distress at the thought of law insulted and Parliament suppressed. There is more of the secret of England's ordered liberty and rooted greatness in the gratitude and admiration with which Hampden's countrymen looked upon his conduct in the ship-money case than in ten such fields as Agincourt or Cressy. At the Court, though there must have been misgivings, the prevailing mood was one of cynical complacency. The witty privy councillor "would ordinarily laugh," says May, "when the words *liberty of the subject* were named." Those enamoured of political servitude were, however, "but a small part of the nation." The great majority; including "the common people and the country freeholders," "were sensible of their birth-rights and the true interest of the kingdom," and "would rationally argue of their own rights, and those oppressions that were laid upon them."

How long the profound and practically universal disaffection might have smouldered without insurrectionary conflagration, if no spark had fallen to kindle it from without, no man can tell. Laud, it is commonly said, committed an imbecile mistake in trying to force his Anglicanism on the Scotch. But Strafford as well as Laud, thought that the Scotch could offer no formidable resistance. The Irish deputy said, in so many words, that five months would suffice to reduce Scotland to obedience. In England the extent and fervour of sympathy with the Scotch were in proportion to the resentment felt against the Court on account of English wrongs. Charles led an army towards the Scottish border in 1639, but no fighting ensued, and a pacification was effected. The truce was short-lived. In the beginning of 1640 he resolved to attempt a second time to coërcé the Scots by force of arms, and called a Parliament in the hope that it might grant him supplies. It met in April, and is admitted to have been, when the events of the preceding years are taken into account, conspicuously moderate and loyal. But, though not refusing money, it proposed to inquire into grievances, and Charles dissolved it.

Having relieved himself of the presence of Parliament, he marched to encounter the Scots, who had this time crossed the Tweed. If readers would understand the state of affairs which fifteen years of misgovernment had produced in long-suffering England, they have but to realize a few of the facts relating to the levy of Charles's army in 1640, collected by Mr. J. Bruce in his careful and lucid "Notes on the Treaty of Ripon."

The people, as represented by the yeomen, farmers, and train bands who came together in arms, were possessed with two ideas which agitated them almost to frenzy—the idea that money ought not to be illegally raised, and the idea that England was being betrayed to the Pope. Instead of shouting for the

king and backing the constable, Charles's soldiers rent open prison-doors and set free those immured for refusing to pay the taxes. Bailiffs attempting to raise ship-money were "grievously beaten." It was of no use to distrain—people would not make a bid for the goods brought to the hammer. The Sheriff of Oxfordshire, collecting ship-money, finds, wherever he comes, that the constables have disappeared, and that gates are "chained, locked, and barricaded." Mutiny pervades the troops, and the officers are in danger of their lives. In Norfolk, there are "murmurs, discontents, and outrages," and the recruits "utterly refuse to be disciplined." At Warminster, the soldiers get hold of the notion that their commander is a Papist. They propose to him that they shall all receive the sacrament. He declines; in that case, they say, they cannot march with him; and so they "cashier their captain." At Farringdon, the men murder Lieutenant Mohun, threaten their other officers with death, and put them all to flight. At another place the officers require to kill some of the men in self-defence. At Wellington, Lieutenant Compton Evers does not go to church. The troops take it into their heads that he is a Papist, and murder him "with circumstances of frightful atrocity." An attempt is made to arrest four. Twenty start from the ranks exclaiming that they all did it. Beating, cashiering, murdering their officers, opening prisons, wasting the country, incensed to madness against Laud and the Pope, believing that the Scots are their brothers in religion and in hatred of despotism, this promising army welters on towards York. Of only one officer do we hear who managed to secure the goodwill of his men. Young Frank Windebank, son of the Secretary, finding himself suspected of Popery, and in danger of being murdered, bent to circumstances, read prayers and sang psalms at the head of his regiment, and backed up these edifying exercises with a drop of drink and largesse of tobacco. The men perceived that there was nothing wrong with Frank's theology, and while less shifty officers trembled for their lives, he became immensely popular.

In the midst of an armed mob, greatly more inclined to coalesce with the Scots in a campaign against himself and his bishops than to fight on his behalf, Charles could not but perceive that, at York, in the summer of 1640, that a crisis had arrived. Strafford was at his side, but the Earl, who had recently, after long begging, obtained his title, was racked with a painful malady, and found the occasion too much for him. There is some evidence of his having made an attempt to kindle the martial ardour of the English, but beyond this we fail to discover one spark of genius or of inventive statesmanship, in the proceedings of Strafford at this juncture. He evinced as complete an ignorance of the state of public feeling in England as Laud, and he had not Laud's excuse of being an ecclesiastic,

and of *not* having been a patriot. Strafford found that the king had really no party. The one rational advice that reached Charles came from the Archbishop. It was to hold out the hand to several of the leading patriots, and, in particular, to offer the command of the army to Essex. To such an offer the earl, ambitious of distinction, "seemed not averse;" and if Essex had been placed at the head of the army, and reasonable concessions made to the popular party, it is in the highest degree probable that the spirit of the troops might have been successfully appealed to on the score of the insult to England which a Scottish invasion seemed to involve. The Queen approved of Laud's project, and wrote to the king in its favour. It was, in fact, the best that could be suggested in the desperate circumstances to which Charles was reduced. His thorough incapacity rendered him blind even to the meaning and point of the advice, and he made to the Queen and Laud the pompously imbecile reply that he had already invited Essex "to come along with the forces of his county." They knew that as well as he, but something more than the invitation addressed to every leading man in England was required to act upon the vanity and ambition of the earl. Having no policy of his own, Charles yielded to the representations of his nobility assembled at York, and agreed to summon Parliament. On the 3rd of November, 1640, a day memorable in the annals of England, the Long Parliament met.

The cardinal fact to be apprehended in connection with the Long Parliament at the time of its meeting is, that it was substantially unanimous, and represented a substantially unanimous nation. Lords and Commons pronounced condemnation upon the political and ecclesiastical government to which England had been subjected. Frightful as the misgovernment had been, the reverent affection with which his people regarded Charles was not, so far as can be gathered from the speeches of the leading patriots at the opening of the Parliament, destroyed. It was not in hypocrisy, it was in simple subjugation of heart and intellect (in a manner inconceivable to this generation) by the illusive spell of anointed sovereignty, that Pym spoke of Charles as "a pious and virtuous king, who loved his people and was a great lover of justice." If it is impossible to believe that Pym thought these words literally true, it is certain that the Commons of England heard them without imputing a shadow of duplicity to the speaker. They attest for us the marvellous potency of an illusion which not only assigned to the king a constitutional incapacity to be called to account, but credited him, to a very considerable extent, with divine immunity from wrong-doing. Rudyard, a sturdy Puritan, told the House that evil counsellors had not "suffered his Majesty to appear unto his people in his own native goodness." "They had eclipsed him by their in-



terpositions. Although gross, condensed bodies may obscure and hinder the sun from shining out, yet he is still the same in his own splendour. And when those bodies are removed, all creatures under him are directed by his light and comforted by his beams."

Ought we to admire, or at least to respect, this disposition of the Commons as the childlike simplicity of noble natures? Hardly. The illusion was, after all, a lie, and few lies have been so pernicious. It lured Charles to his doom; smiling him on by the falsehood that he possessed a charmed life. It threw an element of perplexity and quasi-insincerity into the speeches, remonstrances, proclamations of the Parliament, every musket fired against the king being fired in his name and professedly for his sake. One cannot help entering into the feeling of Charles when, in answer to a Parliamentary declaration, punctiliously respectful to himself and fiercely condemnatory of all he did, he exclaimed, "We could wish that our own immediate actions, which we avow, and our own honour, might not be so roughly censured and wounded, under that common style of *evil councillors*."

The first object of Lords and Commons at the meeting of the Long Parliament was to strike down the most prominent councillors or instruments of the king. Seven of the Commons, Pym at their head, Hampden bringing up the rear, impeached Strafford of high treason before the Lords. About the same time Laud was sent to the Tower. The Archbishop's unpopularity had reached a climax, and shortly before his arrest a mob had come swarming and vociferating about Lambeth, with supposed intent to sack the palace. The rioters did not effect an entrance, and in fact did nothing more than raise a noise. In making the noise, however, they used a drum. It was beaten by a poor creature called Archer. He was seized and tried for high treason. The beating of the drum had, it seems, technically amounted to this crime; but it is monstrous to imagine that Archer had levied war against his sovereign. He was, however, hanged, drawn, and quartered; and unless we are to suppose that a warrant in Charles's hand, printed by Professor Masson, remained a dead letter, he was first put to the torture. In the interval, therefore, between the death of Felton and the death of Archer Charles's tyrannical power had increased.

Strafford's friends and his own judgment warned him that he ought to avoid London, but Charles told him to come. Henrietta Maria disliked him, and he was too strong a man to be quite after Charles's heart. There were sycophant bishops enough at hand to supply the king with casuistical reasons for breaking his promise and abandoning his devoted servant; but it is pleasant to find that Juxon, the creature of Laud, acting doubtless under the inspiration of his patron, told him that he was bound by his word. Charles felt that to sacrifice the Earl was a black and cowardly sin, and he was ever after haunted with remorse for it. Strafford went to the

block ; Laud's ecclesiastical policy was reversed ; Windebank and Finch fled the kingdom ; the Courts of Star-Chamber, High-Commission, and of the North were abolished ; and the sudden dissolution of Parliament was obviated by a bill forbidding the step, except with its own consent. The nightmare rose from England's heart, and the nation breathed freely. Such may be considered the position of affairs when the Parliament was prorogued in the summer of 1641.

The brightness passed away with the noontide of the year. When the Houses met again in autumn the unanimity which had reigned at the opening of the Long Parliament had disappeared for ever. Causes of alarm and foreboding had startled the leaders of the patriot party. Laud was in the Tower, and Strafford in the grave, but Charles had fallen under the influence of Henrietta Maria. It became indubitable, soon after the death of his great minister, that he was involved in a new reticulation of intrigue. After adjourning Parliament, he proceeded to Scotland, Hampden and one or two other trusty and sagacious patriots accompanying him ; and the dark plottings in which he there engaged with Montrose, of which the aim seemed to be to put him in possession of a military force, were not calculated to promote confidence. In his absence, discoveries had been made among the papers which Secretary Windebank left behind him when he fled, by which Henrietta and Charles were implicated in dark schemes for bringing a foreign army into the island. The Irish rebellion had broken out, agitating men's minds with its inexpressible horrors ; and the rebels declared themselves to be the Queen's soldiers and loyal to the King.

The fears of the patriots were increased by their perceiving that an undiscerning public had already forgotten Thorough. Charles had been welcomed back from Scotland with effusion, and feasted in Guildhall. Hampden, Pym, and the leading patriots apprehended a strong reaction, and made up their minds that it was absolutely necessary that a patriot ministry should be at the helm of affairs. This was the object of the great Remonstrance. But the Commons, instead of being united in presenting it to the Crown, as they had been united against Strafford, were divided into two fiercely hostile parties, in numbers not very unequal. The Remonstrants carried their measure, but it was by the narrow majority of eleven. The document which they presented to Charles is an eloquent summary of the oppressions and calamities of the fifteen years of maladministration which preceded the impeachment of Strafford, with a representation that the pernicious system must not only be put an end to, but replaced by entirely different counsels. Had Charles received it with meekness, referred, in proof of his sincerity, to the death of Strafford and the imprisonment of Laud, and appealed to the representatives of the people to trust him, it can hardly be doubted,

that in a few weeks he would have possessed a majority in the House of Commons.

By what words, then, shall we measure the folly of Charles when we say that his practical answer to the Great Remonstrance was an attempt to effect in person the arrest of Pym, Hampden, and three other leading patriots, on a charge of high treason? Lord Macaulay holds that the criminality of this famous proceeding was great, but that it was not particularly foolish. The ordinary opinion has been that the criminality was less than the folly; and this opinion seems to be correct. Those men had opposed Charles since his accession to the throne. He looked on them as the murderers of Strafford. He believed them to have been guilty of treason. He expressly said in the House that, in connection with a charge of treason, all privilege was suspended. Where, in this, do we detect atrocious criminality? The immeasurable folly of the attempt is proved by the consideration that, whatever had been the immediate issue, Charles could not possibly have reaped from it anything but calamity. The treason of which he accused the five members was connivance at the Scotch invasion of England. But in the Remonstrance the warmest approval is expressed of the policy pursued by the Scotch; and whatever might be the relings of the popular heart towards Charles, the great body of the English people felt that the advance of the Scottish army had been the immediate cause of the deliverance of England. Can it be doubted that, if he had succeeded in dragging five of the boldest and best-esteemed patriots from the House, or if, in obedience to his orders, their blood had been shed by the ruffians who attended him to its door, the severed parties would have rushed together, like elements chemically combined by an electric spark, and presented a front of uncompromising opposition? The Scottish army was still in England; and if Charles had succeeded in his attempt on the five members, it would, within ten days, have been marching on London, amid the acclamations of Englishmen. Charles's failure ruined him; but it ruined him slowly, by opening the way to other blunders and mishaps; had he succeeded, his ruin would have been sudden as well as complete.

His bran-new London popularity vanished in a moment. Thousands of swords were immediately drawn in defence of the Parliament. From Buckinghamshire 4,000 riders poured in to protect their beloved Hampden; and the Commons, who sat for some days after the attempt in committee of the whole House in the City, returned to Westminster amid the triumphant shouts of the Londoners.

Seeing these things, Charles retired to Hampton Court, telling the Parliament, who adjured him to return, that he did not consider his person safe in the vicinity of Westminster. Thence he took the road for Canterbury, and so on to Dover, with Henrietta Maria, who, under show of accompanying the Princess Mary to her affianced husband, William, son of the Prince of Orange, sailed for Holland. Charles

doubtless felt that the Queen's life was in danger on account of her intrigues. She carried with her the Crown jewels of England, which were pawned to buy arms.

Up to the day when Charles attempted to arrest the five members, the patriot party had confined itself to the demand that the king should prove his *ex animo*-adoption of a liberal policy by taking into his councils such men as the nation could trust. When he showed his hand by striking a direct blow at the life of the leading patriots, they named a new condition of reconciliation as essential,—that he should put the militia under command of Parliament by accepting a list of Lord-Lieutenants of counties framed by the Houses. Their general scheme of settlement they embodied in nineteen propositions. In June, 1642, these were presented to Charles, and decisively rejected. In July the royal standard was unfurled at Nottingham.

The effect of the acceptance of the nineteen propositions would have been to transform the regal authority of the Plantagenets and Tudors into that now possessed by the sovereign of England. Charles declared that, if he accepted the propositions, he would be a king only in name. It was natural that he should think so; it was pardonable that he should consider such a surrender to be humiliating. Constitutional sovereignty of our modern type had not at that time been seen in the world. William III. chafed so furiously under the attempt of Parliament to dictate his policy, that he told Somers he would rather abdicate than bear the intolerable yoke. In the seventeenth century the English nation groped blindly and instinctively after constitutional sovereignty; but the thing could be realized only through a gradual process of evolution occupying centuries. The process was incomplete even in the days of George III.; for that monarch fretted himself mad in his long endeavour to combine an element of personal autocracy with representative kingship. Logically and formally it has not been developed at this hour; for the sovereign of Great Britain swears in the coronation oath to obey not Parliament, but God; and the royal veto is still theoretically valid against Acts sanctioned by Lords and Commons. The thing has been perfectly realized, not as a logical theorem, but as a fact, in the reign of Queen Victoria. And it has been found that a representative sovereign is not by any means a sovereign only in name. In the affection of a nation, transmitted from father to son, and hallowed by reverent associations, there is real power. Nor can it be said that the representative sovereign lacks, either distinctive functions or princely honour. To discern what the will of the nation is, and to give effect to it with rigorous suppression of all personal bias, is no easy task; and may we not add that a monarch to whom a great people has "lent its terror," and whom it has "dressed in its love," occupies a position of as high honour as is good for mortal?

It is a deep saying of Tennyson's, that

All the past of time reveals  
 A bridal-dawn of thunder-peals  
 Whenever thought hath wedded fact.

But still more terrible is the truth that there have been ages when the wedding of thought and fact, attempted before the destined years had run, proved impossible, and generations of brave and true men wrestled to the death with insoluble problems. In such ages ideas which, if they had been clearly apprehended and resolutely accepted, would have brought reconciliation and prosperity to the contending parties, loom or gleam here and there in the social atmosphere but never attain to steady shining; as white sunlight may be seen breaking out here and there in bursts of splendour through misty clouds in mountain scenery, but never dissipating the storm-twilight and unveiling the day. The ideas which thus loomed and gleamed in the storm of the Puritan revolution were those of representative sovereignty and of intellectual and religious freedom; the clouds and darkness with which they strove were the illusion of divine-right kingship and the still more maddening illusions of conscientious intolerance. It was not Charles alone who believed in the mystic and inviolable rights of an anointed king. The very soldiers who fought against him believed in them, and Englishmen and Scotchmen, intensely Puritan and patriotic, went to death rather than submit to a solution of the problem which did not accord those rights what they considered a due recognition. The conscientious intolerance of the time obscured for all but a select company of the "highest-mounted minds,"—and even to these the "distant morning" shot but wavering and partial rays—the ideas of intellectual and religious toleration. Believing that God punished with eternal pain all who deviated from some one scheme of Christian faith and practice, the men of that generation naturally concluded, in honour to God, that it must be from insincerity, from malignant wickedness, that such deviation arose. Having rebelled against an infallible Church, Protestants turned to an infallible Book, and persuaded themselves with an agony of intense belief that there could be no honest difference of opinion as to the meaning of this Book. If God punished men eternally for finding in it any sense but one, would it not be damnable sin in them to tolerate the finding in it of another? It is pathetically instructive to note that Charles could not believe the Covenanters sincere about religion, and that Baillie and his brethren were convinced it was not really a matter of conscience with Charles to stand by the Church of England. Both the king and his opponents were, of course, as sincere in their religious convictions as it is possible for men to be. So much more easy is it for man to be zealous for God than to be just to his brother and himself.

We cannot enter into debate with Lord Macaulay when he says

that Charles was not conscientious in his obstinate adherence to the Anglican Church. There is nothing in the king's personality more substantial than his conscientious devotion to his Church. If he was not sincere in that, he eludes us as a shadow. Lord Macaulay forgot that there is such an art as casuistry, and that its purpose is to ~~neutralize the~~ scruples of *sincere* consciences by a series of ingenious artifices. Charles was as inconsistent as Lord Macaulay says he was. He established Presbyterianism in Scotland; for a certain price, in the form of military assistance, he would have established Popery in Ireland; he assented to the provisional establishment of Presbyterianism in England. Could he, then, asks the sharp and logical essayist, have any conscientious objections to set aside Anglicanism in England? The answer is that the very office of the casuist is to find minute distinctions between cases which seem to be in principle identical, and thus to reconcile conscience to the one while not reconciling it to the other. It may seem incredible that Charles should succeed in lulling his conscience asleep by the most trivial sophistries; but that it was an object dearer than life with him to quiet his conscience points to the essential and differentiating fact in his moral constitution. He protected his conscience by elaborate entrenchments of school-girl fibs. His letters to Henrietta Maria, who possessed his entire confidence, have a curious interest for those who, like Bishop Butler, love to analyse the subtleties and follow the windings of human motive. He parades his evasions before his wife as if he expected to be praised for his ingenuity. I "call" them a Parliament, you perceive, but I do not "acknowledge" them to be such! "Though I have stretched my wits to persuade them to accept of my personal treaty, yet examine my words well, and thou wilt find that I have not engaged myself in anything against my grounds." "It is true that it may be I give them leave to hope for more than I intended." It was, perhaps, the bitterest drop in poor Charles's cup that Henrietta Maria treated his conscientious scruples with contempt. His letters addressed to her from the Scotch camp in 1646, which have recently come to light, and have been edited with shrewd commentary by Mr. John Bruce, depict him at perhaps the saddest point in his whole sad history. He loves the Queen with all his heart; yet she has no patience with him, no mercy for him. She mocks at his zeal "in the affair of the bishops." After enormous pressure, and without any concession in return, he had consented to the establishment of Presbyterianism in England for three years. Henrietta, caring only that no such cession of the military power of the kingdom should be made as would prejudice his son, vehemently but quite wrongly believed that, if he threw up the Church altogether, he would be allowed to retain the militia. So she pricked into him thus: "*Permettes moy*"—her impatient, misspelled French is better than an English translation—"de vous dire, que je crois, si je

me pouvois dispenser d'une chose que je croiois contre ma conscience pour 3 ans, et pour rien, j'irois plus loin pour sauver mon royaume." With exquisite feminine cruelty she tells him that he has himself to blame for his misfortunes, and that if he had listened to her, he would have been in a different position. "J'oserais dire que si vous eussiez suivi nos avis, que vos affaires seroient dans un autre estat qu'ils ne sont." This was too bad, for Charles could rejoin that it was to save her life that he sacrificed Strafford. But he never blamed her. He pleaded with her like a broken-hearted lover, imploring her not to drive him from his last earthly asylum—her approbation. He explicitly did her bidding in the matter of the militia. The Commons of course stood fast on that point, for to do otherwise would have been to put a knife into Charles's hand with the moral certainty that, in the event of a strong revulsion of popular feeling in his favour, it would be used to cut their own throats. He wrote upon one of the Queen's letters, "The reason why the Parliament answer went not;" and when the answer, with the expected surrender of the militia, came not, he was declared a prisoner.

A touching phase of the casuistical reasoning wherewith Charles sheltered his conscience is revealed in his self-communings on the death of Strafford, as poured into the ear of his wife. It was his fixed idea that God was angry with him for sacrificing the Earl, and that, if he sinned again in the matter of the Church, there could be no pardon for him. "I must confess," he writes, "that heretofore I have for public respects (yet I believe if thy personal safety had not been at stake I might have hazarded the rest) yielded unto those things that were no less against my conscience than this, for which I have been so deservedly punished, that a relapse now would be insufferable, and I am most confident that God hath so favoured my hearty (though weak) repentance, that He will be glorified either by relieving me out of these distresses (which I may humbly hope for, though not presume upon), or in my gallant sufferings for so good a cause, which to eschew by any mean submission cannot but draw God's further justice upon me, both in this and the next world." These may be the words of a weak and a superstitious, but they are those of a sincerely religious man. Charles's casuistical ingenuity might have reconciled him to large concessions of a nature unfavourable to the Church; but death was easier for him than its unreserved abandonment. And let it be deliberately said that, the mere fact of its being a necessity of life for Charles to preserve the citadel of his soul inviolate, reveals a moral quality which places him in a different class from certain historical personages who, in intellectual strength, were immeasurably his superiors. He never, like Napoleon the First in his period of spiritual decadence, or like Frederick of Prussia all through, took evil into his service, and resolved to succeed at *whatever* moral cost. Charles died clinging to the hem of

Christ's garment, and this separates him spiritually by the deepest of all chasms from the men whose god is success.

Casuistry can do much, but it can neither fight battles nor beguile nations out of the fruits of victory. Charles was a bad soldier. There was, in fact, no limit to his practical incapacity. He missed the mark at every critical juncture. When decision and promptitude were required, as in his early advance upon London and again after the capture of Bristol, he was lagging and dilatory; when defeat was sure to be fatal, as at Naseby, he was precipitate. Experience could not teach him. When one instrument was broken he took up another, without any stringency of requirement that the second should be better than the first. The English cavaliers are beaten; perhaps the Irish Papists will pull us through: that hope vanishes; but the English Presbyterians are rising in our behalf: they are put down, but here come Hamilton and his Scots, and all may still be well. Sanguine yet *not* sure, ever learning but never coming to the knowledge either of the truth of facts or the principles of action, Charles was made for failure. His patient perseverance in blundering, his perpetual activity without progress, were deeper signs of practical incapacity, and infinitely more productive of calamity to himself and others, than mere indolence or impatience would have been.

There is immense beneficence in a clear, bold word, yea or nay. Could Charles have done as Count Chambord did last year—said, once for all, that he would reign as a divinely appointed autocrat or not at all—he would have saved himself years of misery and his country rivers of blood. But never in his life was he anything except by halves, and to no party did he ever give complete satisfaction. He could neither serve God nor see the devil; and all men were disappointed in him. Lilly, who was familiar with the gossip of both camps, says that even the Cavaliers only half trusted him, and did not dare to realize the thought of his being completely victorious. Again and again he had excellent cards in hand, but he never could make up his mind to play them rationally. It was a sound scheme "to work the Scots to his design" in 1646; but in order to do so, it was necessary to agree with the Scots, and Charles could not persuade himself to that. When the Scots marched out of England, having found it impossible to take him with them as a friend, and not choosing to take him as a prisoner, he still had good cards if he would have adopted the tone of the Independents, avowed himself the champion of toleration, and made terms with the army. But Cromwell and Ireton found that he was trifling with them. Charles had been bred in an element of intrigue, and was an intriguer all his life; yet he could no more keep a secret than a net can hold water. It looks like insanity to have put into black and white and committed to a messenger a statement that he intended to hang Cromwell and Ireton at a convenient season; but it was scarcely more foolhardy in



Charles to speak of Cromwell and Ireton as he is said to have spoken in the letter intercepted in the Holborn Tavern, than it was to speak of Argyle and the other Scotch leaders as it is absolutely certain he spoke of them in letters despatched by him from the Scotch camp. Charles never perceived that, if he was to have the services of any party, he must adopt, honestly or dishonestly, that party's side. No man but he could have imagined that it was possible to bring the Scots under Lesley and the Parliament to mutual extermination, or again, the Parliamentary Presbyterians and the Independents to mutual extermination, by shilly-shallying between the two, his own conscience being kept quiet, and both parties being hood-winked, by preternatural subtlety in the art of diplomatic evasion. Even Clarendon found that Charles was with him only by halves, and emits a lamentable wail on the king's plots within plots.

It has often been pleaded in favour of Charles that he tried hard to make terms for his friends; but the grievous fact is that he displayed little depth of feeling on behalf of the brave and devoted men who lost life or fortune for his sake. "He was seldom," says Lilly, "in the times of war, seen to be sorrowful for the slaughter of his people or soldiers, or indeed anything else." A chill-blooded man, of low though tough vitality and lethargic feelings, he was capable of much languid wretchedness but not of acute suffering. The state of his body after death showed that the organs had not been wasted or worn; it was physically probable that he would have lived long; and it is doubtful whether the loss of a friend or even of a battle ever cost him a night's sleep. Though he was a bad disciplinarian, and the riot in his camp and the rapine of his soldiers did him infinite harm, he could not do a daringly generous thing to the most willing of friends. Might he not, for example, have spared the life of poor young Colonel Windebank, even although a court-martial had consigned him to death? Colonel Windebank held Bletchington House for the king. The place was strong and well-manned; but the colonel had lately been married, and his young wife and a bevy of her lady friends were with him; and Cromwell, who, with his Ironsides, had been shattering every force that looked him in the face, came fiercely demanding surrender. Cromwell had not a breaching gun, not even foot-soldiers, only a "few dragoons," and as he was a cavalry officer, besieging was, he said, "not his business," but the name of him already (April, 1645) made both the ears of every one of the king's people hearing it to tingle. Agonized by the thought of what might overtake his bride and the other ladies in the event of a storm, Windebanke lost his head and took down the royal standard. The court-martial was bound to condemn him to die; but the circumstances were inexpressibly touching, and were not likely to recur; Charles might

surely have granted himself the luxury of remitting the sentence. He made no sign, and the poor young colonel had to bid his wife adieu and take the death-shot to his breast. "Never was so cold a heart!" The words are spoken of Charles by Mr. Browning's *Strafford*; and well spoken.

It is important to discern the exact reason why Charles died, as there has been much mistaken writing upon the subject. Hallam and Macaulay argue that neither by national nor by municipal law could he be put to death; but neither Hallam nor Macaulay precisely considers for what or by whom he was slain. It was not the Long Parliament that brought him to trial. The Commons of England were faithful to their professions of holding the king incapable of wrong. The Parliamentary majority was cut down by military force into a minority, for the express purpose of making it a possible instrument to take the king's life. In the second place, it is to be recollected, in justice to those who *did* bring Charles to the block, that he was not even made the subject of judicial accusation for his share in the first war. At Hampton Court, many months after his last fortress had been surrendered, he was treated with lenity and consideration. It was because he plotted war within the walls of gentle and honourable imprisonment, because he called an invading army into England, that he was adjudged to die. The men who tried him tore the figment of his personal irresponsibility to shreds. "The king can do no wrong! This man, king or no king, was conquered in battle. In the dark, in easy confinement, he felt for a dagger, and came behind England and did his best to stab her to the heart. For this he deserves to die; and if Parliament cannot say so, we can and do." Such was their plea.

Charles possessed some talents. He had a true taste in art. His gallery of pictures was rich in the productions of Titian, Tintoret, Giorgione, and Velasquez. Every one who engaged with him in discussion was struck with his power of following the clue through labyrinthine mazes of argument. His most remarkable faculty, however, was that of detecting, by some curious instinctive sympathy, the kind of men whom he could make his own—men of splendid parts, but with a certain moral flaw or sickliness in them. This last was the *nidus*, as the naturalists say, which prepared them for Charles's fascination; and once he had exercised it upon them, he bound them to him by indissoluble ties. It would have been a priceless talent if he could have stood by the men he got and had known how to use them; but he did not.

It is interesting to observe how, to the last, he continued plotting and blundering. He was conducted, in the close of 1648, by Colonel Harrison, from Hurst Castle, opposite the Isle of Wight, to London. The route lay by Bagshot, where he formerly had "a little park,"

and where now lived Lord and Lady Newburgh, vehement Royalists. His lordship possessed the fleetest horse in England, and it was arranged that Charles, as he rode through the glades of the forest, should complain of his horse and should be remounted on Lord Newburgh's. The king was then to give his escort the slip, and availing himself of his perfect knowledge of the wood, to make his way to an appointed rendezvous, where other swift horses were to be in attendance. The scheme, as Charles was concerned in it, got wind, and at the critical moment, when he had been long grumbling about the discomfort of his seat and was urgent for a new mount, the fleetest horse in England was found to be lame in stall. He thought it useless to try another, as he rode in the midst of a hundred picked men, well horsed, every man, soldier and officer, "having a pistol ready spanned in one hand." He was quite in the dark as to the true state of affairs. He feared assassination, and lectured Harrison upon the odiousness of the crime. Harrison told him he might keep his mind easy on that point; what was in store for him, "would be very public, and in a way of justice to which the world should be witness." His Majesty could not see it; now, as always, he missed the mark.

Whatever his failings or his faults, he had not "signed against light;" at lowest he had not taken darkness for light, and said to evil "be thou my good." Therefore it was with placid dignity that he laid his head on the block.

PETER BAYNE.



## SAXON STUDIES.

### I.—DRESDEN ENVIRONS.

#### I.

THE capital of Saxony, although not devoid of some pleasant interior features, improves, like the Past, as we walk away from it; until, seen from a certain distance, it acquires a smack of Florence. But cross this line in either direction, and the charm begins to wane. Here erects itself a moral barrier, which the temperate traveller should not transgress. A like mystic circle of greatest enjoyment surrounds all delights; though, unfortunately, we are aware of it only after it has been overpassed. The right perception of mutual distances is a Philosopher's Stone, for which the wise, from Solomon down, have been experimenting.

The true end of travel is, to reconcile us to our homes. We study foreign countries and customs, not for their intrinsic sake, but in order to compare them disadvantageously with our own: and thus the mere cosmopolitan misses more than he gains. But man's eyesight sharpens as his intellect expands, and he begins to hold aloof from his surroundings. The tendency is not an unhealthy one, and, had Paradise never been lost, we should scarce have heard so much about its attractions. Lovers, it is true, appear to prefer contact to vision; but hearts—and sweet-hearts—see with some faculty transcending ordinary eyesight, and unattainable by common-place travellers. Nevertheless, we shall do wisely, on starting out into the

world, not quite to disencumber ourselves of our affectional luggage. It restrains too extended wanderings, and tempers glances else too keen for perfect truth.

As for Dresden, I think its main charm lurks in the towers of its churches and palaces. They elevate the city's outline and make it seductive: albeit thereby somewhat falsifying its true character. Dresden is less romantic than the promise of its spires: for that matter, it is doubtful whether any city could maintain the standard of a cluster of minarets. Surely, the veriest atheist—if there stir within him any vestige of what less rational beings call a soul—must bless Eternal Nothingness that superstition still puts steeples on her churches. Religion may be folly, but all creeds admit the beauty of a dome. It gives unlimited enjoyment, and covers a multitude of sins. What is there, in this upward-tapering, slender-pointing, worse than practically useless structure, that so ensnares the fancy? Certainly, a spire is an outrage to logic and to common sense. Yet has the practice of building them outlived many a seeming-wiser custom, and will, I trust, be one of the latest-cured follies of mankind. The idea was first, perhaps, suggested by an aspiring lamp-flame; and it may continue in vogue so long as fire—and that finer fire we call soul—tends heavenward.

At all events, had I a grudge against Dresden, with power to back it, I would overthrow her towers. Had they never been erected, the city would to-day have been unknown. The traveller, downward-gazing from yonder long-backed hill, and beholding a flattened swarm of mean-featured houses spreading dingily on both sides of a muddy river, would have hastened on, to carry fame and fortune elsewhere. Not here had the Sistine Madonna chosen her abode.

But, as it is, these dusky minarets are loadstones whose attraction it is not easy to resist. In absence, they rise in memory and woo us back. Nevertheless, if we have once escaped, we shall do wisely to revisit them no more. The tall pinnacles lose nothing in the light of recollection; rather, a second look would find them less lofty and refined than at first. Beautiful were they as we gazed upon them; but perfect, only when we have turned away.

## II

From the summit of this grassy upland we may see the city lie below us in the broad and shallow valley through which the Elbe prolongs a lazy S. Under the influence of the early sunbeams, a thin brown mist rises above the red-tiled roofs, and is trailed away by the indolent breeze. This valley is a notable wind-conductor, and many an epidemic has been put to flight by the sturdy northern gales—fortunate medicine for a most constipated system of drainage.

We turn our backs on the city, and ramble countrywards for to-

day. We may walk as leisurely as we like, pausing whenever the humour takes us. For my own part, I refuse at the outset to be hurried, or to stick to the main road when the bye-path looks more inviting. The day is before us : and it is better to acquire something of country lore before attempting the city.

As the sun of planets, so is Dresden centre of a spattering of villages. It is observable, that, although the central body is greatly larger, and presumably older than its satellites, yet the latter are more antique in aspect and conservative in character. Like the smallest babies, they have the oldest faces, and are furthest behind the age. Their limited constitutions do not easily assimilate new food : the short-paced intelligence of the offspring fails to keep pace with the parent's far-striding civilization. Dresden is, at present, not very far behind the age in some respects : it knows something about velocipedes, tramways, and expensive living. But the villages are still early in their eighteenth century. The ignorance of the average Saxon peasant is petrifying—all the more in view of the fact that, of late years, he has begun to learn reading and writing. Such acquirements appear to be a poor gauge of intelligence. Of the march of events—the news of the day—of all such knowledges as the American infant sucks in with the milk from his feeding-bottle—your Saxon peasant has no inkling. Often, he cannot tell you the name of the king beneath whose palace walls he lives. A tradition is current that the last king, but one (who was safely buried about thirty years ago) still survives in a neighbouring castle, a captive to the ambition of his relatives.

In short, like better men than they, when truth is not readily to be had, they swallow lies with at least equal relish. The Saxon mind is capacious of an indefinite amount of information ; but its digestion is out of proportion weak. There is not power to work up the meal of knowledge into the flesh and blood of wisdom. I have observed in the faces of the learned an expression of mental dyspepsia,—bulbous foreheads and dull pale eyes. As for Schiller, Goethe, Heine, and the rest of that giant conclave, they are either not German, or else they are the only true Germans ever born. Immense, truly, seems to be their popularity among their later countrymen : but is the sympathy so officiously asserted, genuine stuff ? It sometimes puts me in mind of the reflection of sublimity in mud puddles.

There is, or used to be, a symmetricalness and consistency about these peasants, unattainable by the more enlightened. They lived near the earth, like plantains ; but their humbleness was compensated by some wholesome qualities. It is uncomfortable to reflect that cultivation will vitiate them—has already begun to do so. Such manure as they are treated to will cause them either to grow rank and monstrous, or to rot away. Broad-based scepticism is sometimes

maintained to be better than deep-rooted prejudice ; but it does not seem to withstand storms so well.

If progress must progress with these people, why not a little modify the method ? The heart of the peasant is, perhaps, as valid as other men's : but his brain is notably weak. Yet reformers address themselves solely to the latter, and force it to an empty activity. The cone is thus inverted, and the learned peasant topples over. In the best of men, the brain, however large, has always been outweighed by the heart. Were education filtered into the peasant through the latter channel, it could never hurt him. It might work in more slowly, but would always remain pure and sweet, and never overfill the vessel.

### III.

Barriers against civilisation are rather physical than moral,—a matter of good or bad roads. We need not consult books for the history of past times ; all ages since the Deluge live to-day, if the traveller direct his steps aright. How old is the world ? Shall we measure its antiquity by Babylon or Boston ? Time sleeps beneath immemorial ruins at one spot, while he mounts the telegraph pole at another.

The Nineteenth Century, accordingly, while it ambles easily down the current of the Elbe, and along the high-roads and railways, seldom exerts itself to climb a hill or wind its way into a sequestered valley. There are retreats but a few miles from Dresden, where still lingers the light of centuries sunk beneath the general horizon. The "Guttentag" affords a ready test of the matter: the distribution of this flower of courtesy marks the boundaries of progress. Try yonder peasant, for instance, as he passes us on the road.—Did he stare stolidly at us ? or go by, awkwardly unconscious, with averted gaze ?—We are at an easy distance from Dresden, and the roads are good. But, did he touch his cap, meet our glance with humble frankness, and speak the "Good-day" with a pleasant gruffness of cordiality ?—Alas, poor fellow ! he lives in a savage gorge, accessible only by an uneasy footpath. Though he appear scarce thirty, he was born at least one hundred and fifty years ago. He knows nothing about the *Neue-Continental-Pferd-Eisenbahn-Actien-Gesellschaft* lately started in Dresden. May we not almost say, seeing that he has never breathed our Nineteenth Century air, that he has no real existence at all ?

This same flower of courtesy depends for its growth not solely on the locality, however, but somewhat also on the individual. In one and the same household we may meet with it under all conditions of luxuriance or starvation. As a rule, it flourishes best with the very old and with the very young—those who have either lived too long

to be affected by modern gospels, or have not yet grown tall enough to reach up to them. It is in the hands of the well-grown youth that the flower is most apt to droop, or wither quite away : they it is who dream most of emigrating to America, and who meantime practise some American virtues in their native cottages. Much unhappiness is no doubt in store for them : but posterity may glorify their stripes with stars.

Their newly gained culture has not yet sunk so deeply into these peasants, however, as to be incapable of occasional disconcertment. If we first salute them, they will almost invariably return our greeting : or the magnet of an overbearing or calmly superior glance will often draw the words from our man, or startle them out of him. For no Saxon, of whatever degree, understands the maintenance of self-respect in the presence of what he fancies a superior power.

In treating of Saxon manners, it might be supposed that the illustrations should be drawn elsewhere than from the peasantry. But I find among them the original forms of many social peculiarities, which, on higher planes, are almost unnoticeable by reason of their conventional dress : conventionalism being the true cloak of invisibility. Superficially, a best-society drawing-room in Germany and in England appear much alike ; but go to the corresponding villages, and we see plainly points of difference, which exist no less—although imperceptibly—higher up. The thin, satiny skin of the polished man-of-the-world is a better veil of his soul, than is the canvas-like hide of the coarse-grained labourer.

But, indeed, all Saxons know how to be polite, and often seem to take pleasure in elaborate exhibitions of civility. Few things do they enjoy more than to take off their hats, smile, nod, and exclaim "Ja ! Ja ! Ja !" It is curious and strange to watch the antics of a group of acquaintances who have by chance encountered one another in the street. After a brief but highly animated conversation, they proceed to make their adieux. It is on his powers in this respect that the Saxon chiefly prides himself. Behold, therefore, our friends who stand waving their hats, smiling, nodding, gesticulating, peppering one another with broadsides of Ja's. They become every moment more and more wound-up. Their excitement permeates every part of their bodies, and approaches ecstacy. It resembles the frenzy of Dancing Dervishes, or the more familiar madness of our own Shakers. This is the Saxon's mystic religious dance. To this height of fervour rises the warm-heartedness for which he is noted. Politeness is common in Saxony—provided only that it cost no more than in the proverb.

## IV.

American Emerson says, "I have thought a sufficient measure of civilisation is the influence of good women." He is said to be the



most popular foreign essayist in Germany; and it is certain that these people are most fond of such literature as is furthest beyond their comprehension. Nevertheless, no true Saxon would subscribe to this particular dogma. For, yonder market-waggon, high-piled with country-produce, and drawn by a woman and a dog tugging on either side the shaft, while the husband driver walks unencumbered alongside,—is so far from being a singular spectacle that, after now some six years daily familiarity with it, I confess to a difficulty in quite sympathising with the indignation of a new-comer. But, indeed, this is nothing: only, at nightfall, we shall meet the same waggon homeward-drawn by the same team: and lo! seated upon the empty hampers, smokes serene the man and master of all. Let us be rational: why walk home when our woman and dog are at hand to carry us?

Why do not the woman-emancipationists come to Saxony, and see with their own eyes what the capacities of the sex actually are? Here women show more strength and endurance than many of their husbands and brothers do. They carry on their broad backs, for miles, heavier weights than I should care to lend my shoulders to. Massive are their legs as the banyan-root; their hips are as the bows of a three-decker. Backs have they like derricks; rough hands like pile-drivers. They wear knee-short skirts, sleeves at elbows, head-kerchiefs. As a rule they possess animal good nature and vacant amiability. But at twenty or twenty-five they are already growing old.—

Growing old, with them, is a painful process, not a graceful one. The reserves of vitality are dry, and the woman's face becomes furrowed, even as the fields she cultivates. Her eyes fade into stolidity and unintelligence. Her mouth seldom smiles. Thirty finds her hollow-cheeked, withered, bony. At fifty—should she live so long—she is in extreme old age. Meanwhile she has been bearing children as plentifully as though that were her sole employment. But such labours secure her scarce a temporary immunity from other toil. I have seen her straining up a long hill, weighted with more burdens than one.—

Pleasanter is it to consider her in the 'hayfield, before youth has dried up in her. Her plain costume follows her figure closely enough to show to the best advantage its heavy but not unhandsome contours. Seen from a distance, her motions and postures have often an admirable grace. Her limbs observe harmonious lines. In raking, stooping, tossing the hay, her action is supple and easy. As she labours in the sun, she keeps up a continuous good-humoured chatter with her companions. Her bare arms and legs are bronzed by summer exposure to heat—and dirt; and her visage is of a colour almost Ethiopian. But an American Southerner might see in her more than the dark complexion, to put him in mind of former days and institutions.

The Greeks had slaves who took the edge off the work, but were not intended to bear Grecian children. Saxon slaves are not let off so easily. A nation, whose women keep their houses, saw their wood, cultivate their crops and carry them to market on their backs, and bear children in season and out of season, may indeed go to war with full ranks, for a time. But what use to conquer the world, if our sons and daughters are to grow up cripples and idiots? For, does that pregnant woman whom we saw straining uphill with her heavy basket injure only herself?

I have already remarked that the ground-plan of high society may best be studied in the nearest village; and so the best way to become acquainted with a Saxon lady is to observe her peasant-sister who sweats and tugs in fields and on country roads. The spirit of chivalry never throve among these people, high or low; what is more serious (and, perhaps, too much so for context so light-toned, as this), the bulwarks of female chastity, where they exist, are rather mechanical than moral. In Saxony, therefore, suspicion justly has the weight of conviction. The best result of this system is an insecure and exaggerated innocence: the rest needs not further to be enlarged upon.

Women are what men make them; and thus we come back to our Emersonian text. The nation that degrades its women, cuts off the wings and darkens the light which should lift and guide it to an enduring standpoint. I cannot but feel a misgiving about these German triumphs in field and cabinet, when I see men helping themselves before women at table—and elsewhere.

How many of us have dreamt romantically about the ideal German peasant-girl? She appeared to us pretty to the edge of beauty—perhaps a step beyond. She was blue-eyed, and flaxen braids fell over shapely shoulders. Her gown was charmingly caught up at one side; she was often seen with a distaff, and was apt to break out in sunny smiles or pathetic little songs. Goethe and Kaulbach have much to answer for! And yet, among many imperfect Gretchens, I have sometimes fancied that I caught a glimpse of the real, traditional heroine.

Handsome and pretty women are certainly no rarity in Saxony, although few of them can lay claim to an unadulterated Saxon pedigree. We see lovely Austrians, and fascinating Poles and Russians, who delicately smoke cigars in the concert-gardens. But it is hard for the peasant type to rise higher than comeliness; and it is distressingly apt to be coarse of feature as well as of hand, clumsy of ankle, and more or less wedded to grease and dirt. Good blood shows in the profile; and these young girls, whose full faces are often pleasant and even attractive, have seldom an eloquent contour of nose and mouth. There is sometimes great softness and sweetness of eye; a clear complexion; a pretty roundness of chin and throat.

Indeed, I have found scattered through half-a dozen different villages all the features of the true Gretchen ; and once, in an obscure hamlet, whose name I have forgotten, I came unexpectedly upon what seemed a near approach to the mythic being. She was at work on the village pump-handle, and her management of it was full of grace and vigour. She bade me good-morning in a round, melodious voice, and looked healthy, fresh, bright, and almost clean. I gave but one glance, and then a subtle inward monition impelled me to hurry away. For, although a second look might have recognized her as the long-sought one, yet it might have brought disappointment, and, therefore, was too much to risk. Meanwhile, so much was gained—I cannot say that I have failed to find her.

But this is sentimental nonsense. English, French, Italians, Spaniards, Russians—each and all surpass their German sister in some particular of beauty ; and the American, in all combined. Gretchen will always have unlovely hands and shapeless feet ; her flaxen braids will be dull and lustreless, and her head will be planed off behind on a line with her ears. This is no anti-climax ; for most of the qualities which make a human being humanly interesting, are dependent upon a goodly development of the cerebellum.

# V.

We sallied forth this morning in quest of a representative Saxon village ; but, save as regards situation, one is as representative as another. The same people inhabit all, and follow the same customs, submit to the same inconveniences, partake of the same ignorance, and are wedded to the same prejudices and superstitions. Moreover, the names of fifteen out of twenty of these villages end in the same three mystic letters—"itz." What "itz" signifies I know not ; but I should fancy that whoever lives in a community whose name terminates differently would feel like a kind of outlaw or alien. Loschwitz, Blasewitz, Pillnitz, Pulsnitz, Sedlitz, Gorbitz,—all are members of one family, and look, speak, and think in the family way. It is admirable the care they take to post up their names on a signboard at each entrance of the village, doubtless a safeguard against the serious danger of forgetting their own first syllables. Were some mischievous person, while the honest villagers slept, to interchange all their signboards, there would be no hope of their ever identifying themselves again. Perhaps, indeed, they might fail to perceive the alteration. Pillnitz or Pulsnitz—what odds ? It can matter little to a pebble what position on the beach it occupies ; and I dare say the members of various families might be substituted one for another, and nothing be noticed much out of the way on either side.

Many of these little flocks of houses have settled down from their flight in the realm of thought along the banks of a stream which

trickles through a narrow gorgo, between low hills. The brook is an important element in the village economy, fulfilling the rather discordant offices of public drain, swill-pail, and wash-tub; and moreover serving as a perennial plaything for quantities of white-headed children and geese. It is walled in with stone; narrow flights of steps lead down at intervals to the water's edge, and here and there miniature bridges span the flood. The water babbles over a pebbly bottom, varied with bits of broken pottery and cast-away odds-and-ends of the household; once in a while the stream gathers up its strength to turn a saw-mill, and anon spreads out to form a shallow basin. Stiff-necked, plaster-faced, the cottages stand in lines on either bank, winking lazily at one another with their old glass eyes, across the narrow intervening space. Above their red-tiled roofs rise the steep hill-ridges, built up in irregular terraces, overgrown with vines or fruit trees. Nobody seems to stay at home except the geese and the babies.

Such little settlements hide in country depths, whither only grassy lanes and footpaths find their way. Others there are, mere episodes of the high road, dusty, bare, and exposed, with flat views over surrounding plains; with a naked inn—"Gasthaus"—in their midst, where thirsty teamsters halt for beer, and to stare with slow-moving eyes at the pigmy common with its muddy goose-pond, and to pump up unintelligible gutturals at one another. Others, again, are ranged abreast beneath the bluffs on the river bank; a straggling footpath lodges crookedly through them, scrambling here over a front doorstep, there crossing a backyard. Women, bare of foot and head, peer curiously forth from low doorways and cramped windows; soiled children stare, a-suck at muddy fingers; there are glimpses of internal economics, rustic meals, withered grandparents who seldom get further than the doorstep; visions of infants nursed and spanked. A strip of grass intervenes between the houses and the Elbe river; through trees we see the downslipping current, bearing with it interminable rafts and ponderous canal-boats, and sometimes a puffing steamer, with noisy paddle-wheels. At times we skirt long stretches of blind walls, from the chinks of which sprout grass and flowers; and which convey to us an obscure impression of there being grape-vines on the other side of them.

Or, once more, and not least picturesquely, our village alights on a low hill-top, where trees and houses crowd one another in agreeable contention. The main approach winds snake-like upwards from the grass and brush of the valley, but on reaching the summit splits into hydra heads, each one of which pokes itself into somebody's barnyard or garden, leaving a stranger in some embarrassment as to how to get through the town without unauthorised intrusion on its inhabitants. Besides the main approach, there are clever short-cut down steep places, sometimes forming into a rude flight of stone steps,

anon taking a sudden leap down a high terrace, and finally creeping out through a hole in the hedge, at the bottom. The houses look pretty from below; but after climbing the hill their best charm vanishes, like that of clouds seen at too close quarters. In Saxony, as well as elsewhere, there is a penalty for opening Pandora's box.

## VI.

As for the cottages themselves, they are for the most part two-storied boxes, smeared with stucco and gabled with red tiles: thatch being as rare here as it is common in England. In fact, these dwellings are not real cottages, but only small inconvenient houses. They are never allied to their natural surroundings—never look as though they had grown leisurely up from some seed planted æons ago. They never permit us to mistake them for an immemorial tree-stump or mossy rock, which rustic men have hollowed out, and improved into a home. The oldest of them have a temporary, artificial look, conveying the idea that they have been made somewhere else, and been set down in their present situation quite by accident, to be tried in a new place to-morrow. A Saxon never sees the spot he builds in, but only the thing he builds. German toy-villages, which charmed our childhood, are more accurate copies of the reality than our years of discretion would have supposed. Magnify the toy, or view the reality from a distance, and the two are one and the same.

This unstable impression results from the fact that Saxon souls have no home-instinct. The peasant thinks of his house as a place to sleep in—and to eat in, before and after sleep. He knows no hearth, around which he and his family may sit and chat; instead, there stands a tall glazed earthenware stove, which suggests the idea rather of a refrigerator than of a fire; until we burn our fingers on it; a hypocritical, repellent thing, which would sooner burst than look comfortable. And how can a man converse rationally or affectionately over night, with the woman whom he means to harness to his cart in the morning? His only resource is to go to the inn, and drink flatulent beer in company with a knot of smoky beings like himself. He seldom gets drunk; indeed, I doubt whether the "Einfaches" beer which he affects is capable of producing anything worse than stolid torpidity—which is perhaps not a wholly undesirable condition for a homeless man to be in. On gala days he drinks and eats more than usual, and sometimes put on a suit of remarkable black broadcloth—with the comfortless grandeur thereto appertaining. He plods on foot to the next village, and sits in the "Restauration," or bowls in the alley, or talks crops and prices with his peers. Be that how it may, the gala ends, for him, so soon as he turns his face homewards.

Partly answerable for this barrenness of soul is, no doubt, the form of government, which pokes its clammy, rigid finger into each man's private concerns, till he loses all spirit to be interested in them himself. But yet more, must it be said, is it traceable to that cold, profound selfishness which forms the foundation and framework of the national and individual character, in every walk of life: the wretched chill of which must ultimately annul the warmth of the most fervent German eulogist, provided he be bold enough to bring his theoretical enthusiasm to the decisive test of a few year's personal intercourse and conversation with the people.

At this early hour of the day, however, our peasant is off to his work, and we may examine his abode without calling into question the qualities of the owner. It is by no means devoid of ornamentation, both natural and artificial: which, if in harmony with the temporary character of the house itself, is, not the less, often tasteful and pretty. Whenever possible, the house is made the nucleus of a bunch of flowers and verdure. Brightly coloured blossoms crowd the narrow windows, winter and summer; and the greater number of the cottages have attached to them tiny gardens—some hardly bigger than large flower-pots—where grow pansies, pinks, marigolds, and roses, in gaudy profusion. Flower cultivation is a national trait; and I have seen very unæsthetic-looking people plucking wild-flowers in the fields. Wild-flowers are easily obtainable, it is true, but the spirit that uses them is less common. Here seems to be a contradiction, and a pleasant one, in the Saxon peasant's character. We look in vain from his house-windows to those of his face; there are no traces of flowers there; albeit plenty of soil in which to plant them. Nevertheless, were there not germs of grace and beauty somewhere hidden in him, such blossoms would scarcely adorn his outward life.

For my part, I like to believe that the women thus make amends to themselves, a little, for the moral sterility of their earthly existence. The flowers that we see in their windows may bloom there to a better purpose than elsewhere. Perhaps, too, they may be prophetic as well as emblematic of good.

Besides his flowers, the peasant often drapes the front of his house with a thick green apron of woodbine or grape. The latter is never out of place: but woodbine impresses me as being insincere and artificial—the antipodes of the strong and faithful ivy. It does not cling to its support of itself, but must be fastened up; and a mischievous wind-gust may snatch it from its moorings. It grows rapidly; but its tendrils do not twine round the heart; nor does it endure long enough for the eye to become lovingly familiar with its twists of stem and massings of foliage. Compared with ivy, it is meretricious; flourishes with superficial luxuriance, but has no real pith; makes a gaudy show in autumn; but in winter its splendours fall away, and leave a straggling nakedness. It does not uphold, but is

upheld, and must fall when the support is withdrawn. It endures but a few years at best, and dies unlamented, for another may readily be had to fill its place. It has no modesty, but obtrudes itself officiously, flaunting its glossy, fragile leaves with an unbecoming freedom. It lacks the tender traditions which the ivy has. Seen from a distance, an incautious eye might mistake the one for the other; but when I find my ivy turn out woodbine, I feel the same kind of disappointment which follows upon addressing, to a stranger, the sentimental remark intended for a friend.

The grape is, on the whole, perhaps the most suitable vine for cottage purposes, because it has to do with the life of the present; whereas the ivy more resembles a pall than a wedding garment, and is chiefly associated with ruins and crumbling traditions. The grape-vine hangs its shaggy green beard from eaves and window-sills; and, when the fruit is ripe, the cottage seems the realization of an Arcadian dream of luxury. Howbeit, if we attempt still further to realize our dream by putting forth our hand to pluck and eat,—the awakening comes; for every cluster has a market as well as an æsthetic value. It is well to be pastoral and romantic, but I must first pay so many groschen for the grapes. Thus is sentiment made ridiculous now-a-days; all the fine pictures have a reverse side, whereon is daubed a grinning caricature, named Common Sense, or Practical Experience. Some clever person is almost always at hand to spring this reverse upon us; but not the less, in solitude, or in rare companionship, we will sometimes forget the parody in musing on the poem.

## VII.

As at present used in reference to the works of man, picturesque is rather a vague term. If it may not be directly defined as ignorance, it is at least opposed to what is understood as classic beauty. A picturesque house or street is one which, though meant for use, is practically inconvenient to the verge of uselessness. From this point of view, it will be doing no violence to polite usage to describe these Saxon villages as eminently picturesque. The dwellings are seldom so comfortable as a right economy of materials would have allowed; they huddle together irregularly, drawing in their toes, as it were, and ducking their heads between their shoulders. Some few are built of hewn logs, the second story projecting like a ponderous eyebrow; and these have I know not what quaint charm, which distinguishes them from others in the memory. They are more primitive. It is the yoking of poverty with some so-called modern improvements that makes true, unlovable ugliness. Justly to harmonize itself, poverty should wear a garment of antiquity, proportioned to its degree.

The front door is not always the mouth through which proceeds the

true utterance of the house ; in many it is uniformly closed, and wears an aspect of wooden formality. We behold, on jambs and lintel, an uncouth display of architectural ornamentation ; and here are inscribed the date of erection, the name or initials of the founder, and some baldly pious motto—a scriptural proverb, or other scrap of religious truism. “*Im Gottes Segen ist Alles gelegen*,” “*Wer Gott vertraut hat wohl gebaut*,” and so on indefinitely. These may be, and I suppose they generally are, taken as evidences of a childlike simplicity and faith. But I would rather they had been written on the inner side of the lintel. The introduction of God’s name to every base occasion is a trait of this people, and crops out in their daily conversation to a degree quite astonishing. It is not a sincere or wholesome practice, rather a kind of religious snobbishness.

Although the front door has not always this pharisaical character, but is sometimes made genial by an ample porch, and worn steps and balusters—yet as a general thing the back-door manifests more vitality and frankness. It opens on an unevenly paved court ; above, the tiled roof stoops affectionately ; here sits the old man with his porcelain pipe, and watches the old woman peeling potatoes ; while the baby at their feet is happy with the potatoe-skins. Here we see the earthen pots and copper-kettles of Dutch painters ; here detect make-shifts and undress rehearsals. Here is a fine irregularity of light and shade ; and, in the heat of summer, a grateful gloom and dampness. That man must be puritanically upright and above-board who never cherished a secret partiality for back-doors. There are easy back-door ways of doing and saying things, such as can never make their appearance on the front doorstep.

The curiosity which may have prompted me to peep into a Saxon farm-yard was never justified by what I saw there. Two sides of the enclosure are bounded by a high blind wall, rough with dirty plaster ; the other two, by barns and outhouses. There is always a melancholy excess of space : objects which should be grouped together, languish apart. Here is a pump ; in that corner huddles a cart ; yonder is a heap of straw. Lonely hens straggle here and there, presided over by an abstracted cock, who never crows. An ill-humoured dog barks at me from a distant kennel, and rattles his rusty chain. It is vain to look for the warmly-hospitable atmosphere, for the bustle, the sound, the busy repose that should belong to farm-yards. The ground is roughly paved with cobble stones ; infrequent men and women shuffle, wooden-shod, across and along, but I see no one who looks a farmer. The Saxons do not appreciate the earth ; they sow without affection, and reap without thankfulness. Their selfish stolidity cannot sympathize with warm-hearted, generous, slow, majestic nature ; they grudge the labour of co-operating with her, and would rather steal the milk from her breast, than claim it by the sacred right of children. But though they be sulky, nature never is ; she yields nourishment



to them as to others ; and there is gracious humour in the smile wherewith she hears them grumble at the pain of suckling her.

Hard by the farm-yard are the hillocks and head-stones of the village cemetery. Were there any warmth in the dead, they lie close enough here to create a very genial temperature. The monumental devices stand shoulder to shoulder, each striving to outdo its neighbour, either in stylishness or in extravagance of eulogistic inscription. There can be no safer gauge of culture in a people than the aspect of their graves. They bury their bodies out of sight ; but their superstition, their vanity, their truth or falsehood,—these nowhere declare themselves so undisguisedly as on the tombstone. We must read the carven inscription, like some kinds of secret writing, between the lines ; and how different is the hidden from the ostensible meaning ! What traits of character and condition are portrayed in the design, ornament, and material of this last milestone of earthly life ! In what a solemn light they stand ; and with what eyes must the soul regard them, which looks from beyond the grave ! Pitifully awry must the least pretentious appear, from that stand-point ; but what of these gilt, gingerbread affairs, with their record of titles and virtues ? Green grass is the tombstone which best stands all tests. It tells only of the life which springs from decay.

From of old humourists have made capital of the follies of head-stones ; but there is something ghastly in the smile which such jests create. I prefer to let the poor, fantastic records remain in peace, to crumble or endure, as sun and rain may choose. Most of these Saxon memorials are made of wood, garnished with more or less of symbolic atrocity. The graveyard, as a whole, wears an aspect of grisly gaiety, impressing the beholder as a subtle stroke of malignant satire. In the silent sunshine of a summer day, or beneath the yet more voiceless moonlight, the strained discord of the spectacle is protest sufficient against itself.

#### VIII.

I have already made passing mention of the geese ; but they are entitled to more than a brief notice. They constitute a goodly proportion of the village population, and they are invariably at home. When not paddling and gobbling in their mud-puddle, they dawdle in lines along the streets, or anent the back-yards, where may perchance be found some kind of food dear to the goosey heart. There is admirable unanimity in a flock of geese, as though each were magnetically conscious of all his companions' sentiments and emotions. All wish to do the same thing at the same time ; and fortunately the conditions of their life permit the indulgence of this desire. Yet is each goose a kingdom to himself ; pride waddles in his gait, and unbounded self-complacency wallows with him in the dirt. You may

easily put him to flight; but out of countenance—never! So soon as his pursuer's back is turned, the fugitive hisses as briskly as though he had been heroic from the beginning.

There is something very human in their hiss, and in their expression while giving vent to it. I have never heard precisely such a sound from a human being, or seen a human neck stretched in just such a way. But I fancy that many souls, were they visible, would appear not otherwise than as hissing geese; and that the spirit of their speech is a similar sibilation.

Though intolerant of strangers, geese fraternize with their fellow-villagers, albeit never on terms of such familiar confidence as hens maintain. The character of the goose, with its fine distinctions from those of other domestic fowls, has never been sufficiently set forth. The goose should not be made typical of stupidity, save as it may be the essence of stupidity to see all things through the medium of one's self. He is the symbol of the lowest form of egotism: barring that, he is as astute as any animal of his order. I never heard of a pet goose: there seems to be no way of caressing him, except to feed him; for though egotists are not as a rule averse to being made much of—as witness cats—yet the goose is too full of himself to care for endearments. Furthermore, his self-conceit is not of a wholesome external character, like that of the turkey or peacock: it subsists but little on the consciousness of outward attractions, but seems to build upon a supposititious mental or moral worth,—with an assurance, ludicrous, yet too human to be agreeable. What causes the goose to bend his head in passing beneath the farm-yard gate, except the persuasion that his towering spirit overtops the world? Unlike that of the eagle, however, the goose's self-esteem has nothing lofty or noble in it: it is the conceit of vulgarity—pride inverted, because based on petty self.

It is agreeable to harmony to observe how constantly the goose affects muddy water. They are the pigs of the bird race. They prefer muddy water, and glory in it. If muddy water be not a good emblem of spiritual uncleanness and perverted truth, I know not where to find a better. The proud severity of swans leads them to pure lakes and streams, and the naïve innocence of the duck attaches him to ponds whose faults are mitigated by duckweed and minnows. But nothing suits the goose so well as a barren mud-puddle. The sleekness of his coat presents a sinister-contrast to the undisguised grossness of his interior. He is an epitome of certain human vices; and even when prepared for the table, a slice too much of him fills the soul with heavy disgust.

I once met with a quaint theory, according to which the dumb companions of man were held to be the reflection of his own ruling thoughts and affections. Thus, the character of the savage is revealed in the wild beasts he hunts; that of pastoral nations, in

their peaceful flocks ; of the chivalrous and warlike races, in their thorough-bred and fiery steeds. As the man's nature changes, so do the animals around him die out or multiply. For every wild beast that becomes extinct, there expires some fierce passion of a human soul. For every dove that coos on the roof, there dwells in some heart a thought of innocence and gentleness:—a pretty fancy, arbitrary at first sight, perhaps, but to a deeper consideration revealing glimpses of a profound inward significance.

How happens it, now, that there should be so many geese in Saxon villages ? Geese will grow as readily in one place as another ; yet here are twice as many geese, in proportion to the human population, as elsewhere. I fear there must be an occult vein of sympathy between them and their owners, reaching deeper than the flavour of roast goose, or money value, can justify: some mutual consciousness of similar dispositions. Geese, I say, are symbolic of self-seeking, self-glorifying, short-sighted human vanity: and where geese abound, such vices are rife. If this be not the true solution of the mystery, the sole alternative lies in the fact that, at Strasbourg, they make *pate-de-fois-gras*. In justice to the theory, I must admit that there are at least half as many pigeons as geese in Saxony. These I take pleasure in construing as representative of the love of mothers for their babies, and the innocent thoughts of the babies themselves. If we must have pies, let us fatten pigeons rather than geese.

## IX.

A noticeable quietness pervades these villages ; as though they had dropt asleep ages ago, not to awaken in this century at any rate. The houses stand voiceless like empty shells, and the narrow road wanders lonely between them. The inhabitants are abroad—in Dresden, in the fields, wherever their work may have taken them. Within the village limits remain only those who are either too old or too young to be away: these, with the proprietor of the *Gasthaus*, and a shopkeeper or two, are all.

But even were every one at home, we should never see anything resembling the omnipresent activity of a New England or Western village. They are born quiet—these people:—a Saxon baby has but little cry in him, and no persistent noisiness. In infancy he is stiffened out in swaddling-clothes, and lives between two feather pillows, like an oyster in his shell: moving only his pale blueish eyes and pasty little fingers. A greasy nursing-bottle is poking itself into his mouth all day long. He has a great, hairless, swelled head, like an inflated bladder. His first appearance out-doors is made in a basket-waggon, planted neck-deep amidst his pillows; the hood of the waggon being up and closely blue-curtained. Sometimes he rides double, his brother's or sister's head emerging at the opposite

end of the little vehicle. They seldom die under this treatment : indeed, even a soul would find difficulty in escaping from beneath those feather pillows, and through the crevices of those close-drawn blue curtains. When they have colic (but they seldom muster energy sufficient), they uplift a meagre cry, as though aware that something of the sort would be expected of them. But it often happens, as I am credibly informed, that they must be dashed with cold water in order to bring their lungs into action. A dash of cold water would be apt to produce a spasm in a Saxon of whatever age.

Thus early begins the subjection to law and custom. When the child gets to be thirty inches high, or thereabouts, it is sent to school ; whither it paces temperately, with little noise ; racing, horse-laughing and all disorder are tacitly discouraged. The little girls link arms and gossip as they go ; while the boys march soldier-like with their small knapsacks, precocious in discipline and conservatism. When the play hour comes, they engage in a mutually suspicious manner, as though self-conscious of hypocrisy and make-believe.

By and by they grow up,—more of them than would be supposed. But the habit of following authority and precedent in all concerns of life grows with them. They will never feel quite safe about blowing their noses, until they have seen the written law concerning that ceremony, signed and sealed by the king, and countersigned by Prince Bismarck. They swim everywhere in the cork-jacket of Law ; and, should it fail them, flounder and sink : or even lose their heads and are betrayed into some folly which helps them to the bottom.

It is that early experience of swaddling and feather-pillowing, I suppose, which implants in all Saxons their sleepless dread of a draught. I fancy their very coffins must be made more air-tight than other people's, and that the sod must be pressed down more closely over their graves. Summer or winter, nothing will hire a Saxon to sit beneath an open window, to stay in the same room with an open window, or to sleep with an open window in the house. Why windows in Saxony were made to open, is a mystery. The Saxon turns up his coat-collar and glares intolerant at the mere rattling of a window sash. He will risk a broken head in the cause of bad air. The atmosphere of the lecture-rooms in schools and universities, lies thick and foul as stagnant water. Those rooms are atmospheric sewers, with no outlet. If you become giddy and nauseated with this breathing-material, you must seek relief out of doors : no fresh air may trespass on the hallowed impurity of the interior.

As might be imagined, such lung-food as this gets the native complexion into no enviable state : in fact, until I had examined for myself the mixture of paste and blotches which here passes for faces, I had not conceived what were the capacities for evil of the human skin. I have heard it said—inconsiderately—that the best side of a Saxon was his outside : that the more deeply one penetrated into

him, the more offensive he became. But I think the worst damnation that the owner of one of these complexions could be afflicted with, would be the correspondence of his interior with his exterior man.

The Saxon can no more be influenced to moderation in this matter, than the wind can be persuaded not to blow. His argument declares that a cold is more to be dreaded than poison, and influenza than a two-edged sword. Whereas, at worst, an influenza can but kill; but foul air means diseased life. It is surely better to die in the freedom of the mountains, than to exist in however luxurious a polluted room. Nevertheless, the Saxon does not merely endure pollution,—he likes it—and it likes him.

It is an ill-built, ill-favoured race, and of an unhealthy constitution. As for the soldiers, they are in all respects a forced product: compelled to exertion and hardship so long as their term of service lasts, they make up for it by dying early. They are machines, working marvellously while the driver's hand is over them; then coming to a rusty standstill for ever.

Despite their closeness within doors, in summer the Saxons much affect the open air. They will sit all day beneath the beer-garden trees. Yet do they return, without sigh or shudder, to their atmospheric styes at night. And they seem to carry their atmosphere about with them. Meeting a party of them on the breeziest summit of the Saxon Switzerland, anon we have a subtile reminiscence of stale tobacco and beer. Is there nothing in the souls of this people congenial to the fair and pure influences of nature? They admire—who more vociferously?—a fine view or picturesque vista. Howbeit, the very fact of their being able glibly to utter profundities, casts a sinister suspicion upon the genuineness of their title-deeds to them. What true lover of nature, should she in a fortunate hour reveal her beauty to him, would not blush and stammer in the attempt to compliment her to her face? She abashes his praise to silence. That eloquent stanza which, as he sat at home, seemed to him the full utterance of the best his eyes could discover, shrinks now from his lips, and shows pale and vulgar. He must turn his back upon living nature, and forget the better part of her, before he can remember her eulogies aright.

Not so the Saxon, who not only delights to wear his heart upon her sleeve, but is himself the daw that pecks at it. He loudly approves that which transcends approval. The pure and chaste loveliness of nature, which should be viewed only reverently and in silence, he levels with the meretricious allurements of a harlot, which every charlatan may canvass with praise or blame. And, such is the bad power of this low spirit, the true lover's reverence is disturbed, and he is vexed with a miserable suspicion of that sanctity which he had fancied secure from all base approach. But in truth it is no

mysticism to say that the essential Nature is in each man's soul ; it is the soul, and the soul's mood, which quickens and colours her; and womanlike, she changes with our change.

The Saxon's sentimentalism is vitiated by his moral and physical ill-health. He is continually doing things false in harmony, and incomprehensible, as all discord is. Who but he can sit through a symphony of Beethoven's, applauding its majestic movements with the hand which has just carried to his lips a mug of beer, and anon returns thither with a slice of sausage ? It seems as if no length of practice could marry this gross, everlasting feeding, to any profound appreciation of music. He frowns down the laughter of a child, the whispering of a pair of lovers, as disturbing the performance : but the clatter of knife and fork, the champing of jaws—offends him not. He seems to recognise the noble beauty of the theme ; he nods and rolls his eyes at the sublimer strains. Does he comprehend them ? He reminds me of the Jews, who, indeed, possess the Bible ; written, moreover, in their native Hobrew ; who peruse it daily, and can repeat much of it by heart ; and who yet have never read so much as a single line of the word of God.

## X.

We have wandered through the village, its extreme outpost is behind us, and we tread once more upon the smooth white highway. The road is lined on both sides by interminable rows of trees, defining its course when itself is out of sight. There are cherry, apple, and, less often, poplar trees. On the whole, the effect is tiresome. I do not like to see my path marked out before me. Moreover, I am kept perpetually in mind of the nearness of mankind. Each tree was planted by a man ; and, if it happen to be a fruit-tree, men must often visit it. The road itself, to be sure, is also man's handiwork. But it does not obtrude itself ; at most it is but the amplification of a natural pathway, and so falls quietly in with the order of nature—provided only it be not too immitigably straight.

It is a noticeable trait of this country—the impossibility of getting beyond every-day limits. There is no seclusion, whereof we may feign ourselves the first invaders, and, as such, secure from pursuit or encounter. There is no profound wildness, even where the surroundings seem least tame. The woods are supervised by foresters, in green uniforms and glazed caps, who take care that the trees shall be planted in straight lines, and affix its label to every tenth trunk. Who but a hypocrite would pretend to lose himself in a forest, all whose trees were numbered ? Nay, in some places (the royal park for instance) are certain respectable-looking old vegetables, which no one would suspect of such enormity, which are provided with names and titles into the bargain. We may find them set forth in the

Forester's book thus: "No. 27. Oak. Heinrich the Stout." "No. 28. Elm. Karl the Long-legged." What is to happen to a people who can do such things as this?

We cannot fly beyond the possibility of a Saxon, so long as we remain in Saxony. No matter where we are, he has been there just before us; and hark! his step approaches from behind. But see yonder thickly-wooded dell, abode of nymphs and hamadryads, surely unprofaned as yet by any human presence: let us plunge into it, and woo its sweetly shy inhabitants. Quickly we pass its limits, and are engaged in pleasing conflict with reluctant branches. Virgin moss yields beneath our feet, we hear Arcadian twitterings of birds. The bare exterior world is shut out and forgotten. We listen for the light step of the wild nymph amidst the bushes, and scan closely the rough bark which seems ready to start asunder at the magic pressure of the hamadryad's finger.

Look! what flutters on the turf of yonder fairy glade? Is it the rosy girdle of some woodland being, who, frightened at our approach, has left it behind her in her too hasty flight? We draw near with reverent feet, and stand beside it. . . . Pick it up if you will: a small paper bag of a raw pink colour, bearing on one side the legend, "Rudolph Kretzchmar, Cigarren-Handlung, Georg Platz, Dresden." Ay, he and his customers are here, all about us. We strike a path leading to the nymph's grot—'tis a smartly painted beer-cabin, with square, yellow, wooden chairs and tables. The nymph and the hamadryad, in soiled petticoats and rolled up sleeves, are scrubbing the floor and window; while Pan stands yonder in a swallow-tailed coat, with a napkin under his arm, and answers to the title of Kellner. Bring your best beer, waiter, and draw it cool. We need refreshment!

I know few spots more beautifully unkempt than is a certain rocky pass in the Saxon Switzerland. The steep sides are rank with mossy verdure—cool and moist with trickling springs. Tender ferns bend greenly athwart dark backgrounds of stony clefts. Beside the rugged pathway bubbles over rocks the glancing soul of a cold brook. High up, the slope whispers with thick-growing pines, mingled with trees of less austere foliage. Highest of all, grey crags crowd abrupt and angular against the sky, and cast jagged shadows on the opposite steep. Listening closely, we hear only the brook, and the pines, and a dapper bird or two, and a torrid hum of invisible insects. "Here, at last," we murmur, "is the unprofaned retreat so long desired in vain!"

But, looking again at that immemorial battlement which the siege of centuries has so grandly scarred, we see painted, just at its base, a spruce white square, on which is recorded in accurately formed letters and numerals, white and red, the position of this point relatively to the Government Survey Base Line, and its elevation in metres

above the mean level of the North Sea. Immediately the secluded pass seems peopled with the shapes of Saxon engineers, uniformed and equipped. Those pines were set out, at so much per dozen, by the King's landscape gardeners, who, likewise, grouped the rocks by aid of a steam derrick. The brook was a happy after-thought; but owing to the scarcity of water, it runs only during the season. There is a model in plaster of our entire surroundings in the Engineers' Bureau, with a pin sticking in the very spot where we now stand. I repeat there is no escape. The presence of man journeys with us like the horizon, go we never so fast or far.

Indeed, there are the stone-breakers, who take up their abode along our whole line of march. They are a class by themselves; I cannot imagine their following any other profession. They are mostly time-gnawed old fellows, whose bones seem to have been cracked long ago by their own hammers. They wear great goggles of wire-gauze, which give them an impressive air of gloomy cadaverousness. A huge wooden-soled shoe protects their foot from stray knocks. On frequented roads a canvas screen is set up, to protect the passer by from flying stone-sparks. We hear the dull intermittent beat and crack, but see only the head of the hammer as it rises occasionally above the screen for a harder stroke.

The men seem to take an interest even in such work as this. An extra hard bit of stone arouses their combative instinct; and they have a sensation of pleasure when a fragment divides into pieces of the proper size and shape; while, if it weakly crumble, they damn it with contempt. Thus with their hammers do they sound the whole gamut of the emotions. Occasionally they pause from labour, straighten their stiff old backs, and glance at the sun, to see how far he is from dinner time. Before falling to work again, they look critically at their next neighbour's stone pile, and exchange a grunt or two with him. Like other world-toilers, they sometimes think themselves hardly used—the sport of fortune, and grumble that they would have done better as watchmakers, or painters on porcelain. In point of fact, however, stone-breaking is all they care about on earth, and, were they compelled to forego it, they would break their old hearts in default. Even and regular stand their stone-heaps, end to end, and each is provided with its number, painted on a larger piece of flat rock. Labelling and classification is carried thus far, in Saxony; and I cannot kick a pebble from my path without more or less disorganizing the schemes of the Government at Berlin.

## XI.

I am continually oppressed with the idea that immeasurable possibilities for fine scenery are wasted in Saxony. The Saxon Switzerland is to be sure as picturesque as could be desired. But it is an



abrupt topographical anomaly, uprearing itself in a reactionary manner out of a tedious extent of plain. From a great distance we see the vast square-built rocks lifting their shoulders a thousand or twelve hundred feet skyward; they seem to own no relationship to the silly fields that smile at their feet—no sympathy either of form or substance. I find a shrewd correspondence between this topographical anomaly, and that mental one which uplifts, above the low level of ordinary German intelligence, the enduring group of cloud-capped giants which has given the land its reputation.

Why so flat and tedious, O Saxony? as though some enormous incubus had for ages been rolling its heavy length across your unfortunate face, till every feature was obliterated. Is there any remedy? I see none, short of a general eruption, whereby the whole surface might be broken up in volcanoes, and become a Switzerland indeed. And may the physical upheaval be prophetic of a moral one. It is of significance that mountainous tracts are ever inclined to freedom.

However, the country is not flat in the prairie fashion. It appears so only as the eye sweeps it from a distance. But, traversing the seeming plain, we find it everywhere seamed by narrow gullies, in which the villages lie; so that it were better described as an agglomeration of low table-lands. Beautifully verdant they are in spring and in summer, and pleasingly variegated with squares of many-tinted grain and produce. Moreover, there is an extraordinary abundance of wild flowers—rather an abundance than a variety. I have seen tracts of seven acres actually carpeted with pansies, whose myriad little faces show at a distance like a purple haze. Amidst the green young wheat grow deep azure corn-flowers and scarlet poppies: an armful might be gathered in a few minutes. The banks of country lanes are often blue with harebells; and anon we pass great clover-meadows, humming with bees. This commonness of beauty perhaps mars that finer enjoyment which needs rarity as the finishing flavour. Nevertheless it affords a broad, triumphant satisfaction.

A more concrete taste may be gratified by the cherries—a staple produce of Dresden neighbourhoods. In spring, so thick are the blossoms, the trees resemble white branching coral; but the perfume is faint, as is likewise the flavour of the fruit itself. Flavour or not, they are agreeable eating in warm weather, and cheap enough to tempt to imprudence. We may sit on the bench beside the cherry-booth, and see our plateful gathered from the tree over our heads: or, for a consideration, mount the tree ourselves, and work our will upon it. The cherries are of all kinds and colours, from black to white, and are recommended by the vendor as good for the blood. We devour them, therefore, with the self-complacency of a health-seeker added to the palatal enjoyment; and were it not that they are dismally apt to be wormy, our pleasure would be without alloy.

Agreeably suggestive are the booths themselves—little board huts,

planted in the green midst of the cherry country. The season lasts from the end of June on into August—the mellowest slice of the year; and if enjoyment of nature be ever unconsciously possible, the cherry-people must be happy. Material cares they have none, for their business can lose them nothing, and is apt to pay them well. Each merchant hires a number of trees for the season, paying a percentage—not on what they bear, but on what he sells. The only danger for him is a total failure of the cherry yield, in which case he would be liable for ground-rent; but this occurs only thrice a lifetime.

The booth contains a single room, in which sleep the merchant and his family, like caterpillars in a web. The cooking-stove is wisely put outside on the grass, and the interior thus kept free from smoke and heat. The wife sits in the doorway nursing the baby, while the other children, who are incredibly dirty, but all the happier therefor, play together in a desultory way, or tease a cross-grained cur, who is always an outspoken foe of intending customers. At noon, when the baby goes to sleep, mamma gets dinner: the family gather together: in the afternoon the man smokes his pipe: and so the day passes on.

Delightful—all this: the leisure; the trees, beneath whose shade we sit, all the time working for us and supporting us; the amusement of watching our guests—their various fashions of eating, their remarks and questions, their discontent or satisfaction, their manner of payment and of departure. With what independence would we prepare our noonday meal, and how appetising a fragrance would go up from our fried trout and our bacon and greens. Then light we the after-dinner pipe, whose blue smoke ascends skywards through the green leaves of the tree beneath which we recline. At night, how comfortable to lie on our matting, amidst the country hush, hearing the summer winds come soft-footed up the valley and pause at our window; occasional cherries dropping, over-ripe, with a gentle pat on the roof above; half-conscious, during the night, of the whispering passage of a shower; to fall asleep, secure in the watchfulness of the dog on the threshold; to dream of Arcadian shepherdesses; to awake, fresh, in the early morning, gather betimes our basket of fruit, and sit down to await our first customer. But I suppose the real life, especially when there are babies, does not run on quite so unexceptionably. A prolonged rain, or a wind perverse enough to blow the smoke in at the hut door, would impair our ideal humour.

## XII.

We must turn our steps homeward: at yonder crossing is a guide-post, which should tell us our way, and the distance. Small risk of getting lost in Saxony, if guide-posts can prevent it: though their usefulness is sometimes impaired by the illegibility of the names inscribed upon them: the “nach” is the only part of the direction

which is always distinct. Nor are the estimates of distances often of much service, especially when couched in terms of "Stunde." Theoretically, two Stunde go to a German mile; but, in practice, they vary as the length of various men's legs. What is an hour's walk for one, another may accomplish in half the time; and a dim recognition of some such fact has led the people to qualify their Stunde by an array of adjectives, which complicate if they do not relieve the difficulty. The government milestones, however, are distinct from the guide-posts,—are a newer institution, and as rigidly accurate as their elder brethren are lax. Solid and orderly are they, arched over the top, and consecrated with the government monogram. They look like gravestones, beneath which we may fancy the particular mile recorded on them to be interred. German miles are so long, that we never get on such familiar terms with these milestones as we do with English ones; and the decimal fractions are a sore trial of friendly forbearance.

As we descend the slope towards Dresden, the long panorama is rich with peaceful beauty. There rise the spires and domes, mellowed by the western sun; the white-gleaming river; the further shore dotted with white villas; the pine-shaded horizon; and, wide and high above all, the grand phantasmagory of cloudland. It is in this point of cloud-scenery that Dresden surpasses all places I have seen. The time will some day come, after we have learnt to travel by telegraph, and have become familiar to satiety with terrestrial beauty, that there will be pilgrimages, not to the Alps and to Niagara, but to the land of superbest clouds. Clouds never can become hackneyed, for their forms and tints are infinite, and no Murray or Baedekker can lay down rules and usages about the seeing them. In any true sense of the word, they are indescribable—save by lady-novelists, new to their profession, whose ideas are apt to be cloudy. In every way they are the most elevating part of nature—entrapping our eyes at the horizon, and leading them zenith-ward. Without clouds, the bare, blue, unchanging sky would become intolerable. Man cannot bear unmitigated heaven, any more than he can do without clothes. Clouds are the garments of the sky, and each new costume seems fittest of all. Throughout the world it is the garment that is beautiful. Trees have their leaves, rocks their moss, soil its grass, the earth its blue atmosphere, the atmosphere its clouds.

These vapoury mountains quite outdo their solid rivals; but inspire the imagination with promise of celestial prototypes yet fairer than they. With their unlimited range of form and shade, they may arouse all sentiments from grotesque to sublime. And they prepare the untravelled mind for all the best that earth can show. No alps, no castles by the sea, no palaces in Spain, can surprise him who from his own house door has seen the sun set.

And not the traveller only, but the wit, the humorist, the student of character, may find stimulant for thought and food for reflection in the clouds—find his noblest fancies outdone, his completest theories proved inadequate.—But how is this? Yonder celestial cloud-pinnacle, up whose steep acclivity our high-flown thought was clambering, has subtly sculptured from its facile substance a set of demoniac features, which twist themselves into a sardonic grimace of mockery at our enthusiasm. Our parting digression has carried us too far : we must get back once more to the sober highway. But we return, also, to the opinion which has accompanied us throughout our day's ramble—that the solidest attractions of Dresden and its suburbs are the impalpablest ones, and the least describable. If so it be, the Saxons need not repine. Only the baser part of things is communicable ; and doubtless the pleasanter features of the Garden of Eden are those, whereof no tradition has come down to us.

JULIAN HAWTHORNE.



## LITTLE PAUPERS.

*' Ragged children—with bare feet,  
Whom the angels in white raiment  
Know the names of—to repeat  
When they come to you for payment.'*

**T**HERE are three classes of children who, from no fault or merit of their own, are adopted by the State.

It is not here proposed to speak of those young people who by pocket-picking, unruly conduct, &c., have qualified themselves to be well lodged, boarded, and educated at the country's expense. This article is an attempt to estimate the results of the chief methods adopted of dealing with children who, from the faults or misfortunes of their parents, are entirely maintained by the ratepayers. The information obtainable by the writer being chiefly about girls, this paper will refer entirely to them, and the Metropolitan district will be spoken of exclusively.

Our pauper children may be divided into three classes :—

1. Orphans.
2. Deserted.
3. Casuals.

Under the first heading are included the children of parents who, although living, are permanently unable to support their families, *e.g.*, the paralyzed, incurable, insane.

The second term explains itself.

The third refers to the children of paupers who are constantly in and out of the workhouse. It is perhaps not generally known—it is certainly not generally realised—that numbers of pauper families enter and leave the workhouse several times in the year. Such paupers are usually of the lowest class.

They discharge themselves in fine weather, employing the children of the family in begging, selling fuses in the streets, and so forth. It is common for a family to leave the workhouse just for the hopping season.

It is not necessary to draw attention to the fact that the casual pauper children must be in many ways different from those who come under the heading of orphan or deserted. The casuals must know more of the charms of the street life of liberty, and infinitely more of evil.

In the metropolitan district three systems of dealing with the pauper children are adopted.

"Of course!" says an ignorant, but ordinary-minded reader, "orphans, real children of the State, may be treated somewhat differently from the deserted, whose parents may turn up and claim them; and as for the casuals, they require such different handling that they cannot be classed as either orphans or deserted."

But no, the three systems do not refer, as might be ignorantly and reasonably supposed, to the three different classes of children. In fact, although it is necessary for the sake of accuracy to say that there are three systems, the first, *i. e.*, boarding out, is adopted in the metropolitan district to such a limited extent that it is hardly worth considering here.

What, then, becomes of the eight thousand eight hundred little London paupers whose names the angels know? Or rather it more immediately concerns us now to enquire, what becomes of the three thousand eight hundred and forty-four girls among them?

The answer is short. They are in separate or district schools, *i. e.*, they are either in a large school, or in a very large one.

The district schools which receive the children from several unions contain collectively two thousand one hundred and seventy-one girls. The separate schools, which are for the little paupers of one parish only, have at present only sixteen hundred and seventy-two.

The largest school is the South Metropolitan, at Sutton, a palatial residence familiar to all frequenters of the Derby. This school can accommodate sixteen hundred children, and has about fifteen hundred and seventy under a large staff of officers and servants. The smallest school is that of St. James, Westminster, on Wandsworth Common, containing one hundred and seventy-eight children.

It is desirable now, before making any attempt to describe the schools, to draw attention to the results of the training given as far as it has been ascertained, asking the reader to keep before his mind that the avowed object of the school education is to fit girls for service.

In order to arrive at the results, we will consult the Appendix to

the Third Annual Report of the Local Government Board, containing the Inspectors' Reports on the Metropolitan Schools. Two of these accounts stand out in strongly contrasted colours. The first is by Mr. Tufnell, who may be called the creator of the District School system. The second is by Mrs. Nassau Senior, a lady appointed by Mr. Stansfeld to report on the results of the training given to the girls in these schools. Even though I may remind my readers of the immortal Mr. Woodhouse, who quoted the beginning and end of a letter, but forgot the middle, I cannot resist copying verbatim the opening and closing sentences in these Reports; promising that, unlike Mr. Woodhouse, I will presently revert to the middle.

MR. TUFNELL.

"The surest criticism of the utility of any course of action is the final outcome of it. Now this is a test to which I have always been desirous of submitting our present system of pauper education, by discovering what has been the success in after life of children so reared, in what I have always held to be the only sound way, viz., in district or separate schools." . . . "I come unhesitatingly to the conclusion that nothing can equal or can approach the success of the plan of uniting the children in large schools arranged on the district system."

MRS. N. SENIOR TO MR. STANSFELD.

"In January, 1873, you told me that you wished to have the *women's views* as to the effect on girls of the system of education at pauper schools. You asked me if I would undertake to visit the workhouse schools, and report to you the conclusions at which I arrived. . . . At the outset of my work I fully expected that the result of my inquiries would show in favour of the girls educated in the splendid district schools, where no expense is spared, as compared with girls sent out from the separate schools, which are often very incomplete in their arrangements. To my astonishment the contrary appears to be the case; see Appendix. This fact seems to me to show that, however carefully elaborated a system may be under which girls are brought together in large numbers, it will issue in failure."\*

Now such different conclusions can only be accounted for by different premisses, and it remains next for us to ascertain what are the premisses from which the conclusions are drawn. Mrs. Senior tells us that she divided her inquiry into two parts.

First, as to the present working of the system in the schools. To form an opinion on this point Mrs. Senior proceeded on the following plan: She visited the seventeen metropolitan schools once, postponing the more particular investigation of each school to a later period. When this round of visits was completed, she went to see some

\* There is a decision about Mr. Tufnell's opinions, which contrasts somewhat curiously with the modesty of Mrs. Senior's. Mr. Tufnell does not tell us why he has always held that education in district or separate schools is the only sound way of rearing pauper children.

country districts in England and Scotland in order to compare the physical condition of little London paupers boarded out in private families with that of children placed in metropolitan schools. She also (for the same purpose of comparison) visited orphanages, industrial schools, kinder gartens, reformatories, &c., in England and Scotland, and in Paris went over some of the most important *salles d'asile* and orphanages.

Mrs. Senior's next inquiry was as to the after career of the girls who had been placed out in the world. The results of this inquiry are given, first from the records of the various institutions into which, in case of failure, they might have drifted, viz., a return from one of the metropolitan prisons, showing the number of female prisoners under 40 years of age in custody on the 9th April, 1873, and the number who were educated in pauper schools. This table gives the number of prisoners in custody educated at pauper schools, 13, out of a total of 685 in custody.

The second table refers to female prisoners charged at metropolitan police stations during six months of the year 1873. The total number charged was 12,998, of whom 78 were educated in a workhouse school, 309 refused to give information, 4,414 were in no school at all.

The third table gives the number of pauper women between the ages of 16 and 40 who entered 47 metropolitan workhouses during four months of the year 1873. Of these, 182 out of a total of 1,490 had been in workhouse schools. Of these 182, 24 entered the lying-in, 9 the lock wards.

These three tables give a certain amount of negative evidence. To the first, giving as it does a return from one prison only, and on one day only, I do not attach much weight. The second must, I think, be received with caution, for those well acquainted with the class of women charged at police stations, have told me that people of this stamp have little idea of truth, and will say what is untrue with no apparent motive. The third table gives a certain amount of probably reliable evidence. But I would note that a girl's returning to the workhouse may only mean that she is poor and friendless; and that another may lead an unsatisfactory life, and yet never re-enter the workhouse walls. On the one hand it may be urged that pauper girls, who are consequently friendless, are more likely than others to take refuge in a workhouse, should they fail in service. On the other side it is likely that girls who have been subjected to strict discipline during their school life, are the very last willingly to enter a workhouse or institution.\*

But I will turn to the next, and as it seems to me more reliable,

\* I do not think that we have sufficient evidence to enable us to form any conclusion as to the number of fallen pauper girls; although Mrs. Senior tells me that she has in a non-official capacity found in the lying-in ward of one workhouse four girls from the same district school in the course of one year.



and therefore more important, evidence collected by Mrs. Senior. In order to ascertain how far the girls sent to service from the metropolitan schools during the years 1871 and 1872 were well conducted, and efficiently trained, the following method was adopted: Mrs. Senior obtained from the schools the names and addresses, more or less correct, of all girls sent to service during the years before mentioned, and inquiries were made of the mistresses with whom the girls were placed. The results are thus tabulated:—

## DISTRICT SCHOOLS.

No information owing to incorrect addresses,	} About 74 girls.
families removed, letters unanswered.	
Information refused in one case.	
Information received . . . . .	about 245 girls.

	Per Centage.
Class 1, or good . . . .	28 = 11·42
„ 2, fair . . . .	64 = 26·12
„ 3, unsatisfactory . . .	106 = 43·26
„ 4, bad . . . .	47 = 19·02
	<hr/> 245 = 99·82

The results of the separate or smaller schools stand thus: information received about 245 girls, of whom 51, or 20·81 per cent. are in Class 1; 81, or 33·06, in Class 2; 82, or 33·46, in Class 3; and 31, or 12·65, in Class 4. Having assisted Mrs. Senior in this part of the enquiry, I here speak from experience.

There is a strange similarity in the reports.

First, as regards appearance and health: A very large proportion of the girls were short and stunted. Many suffered from weak eyes or deafness. Secondly, concerning disposition: A large number are reported to be sullen and ill-tempered. One girl was described as at times rather violent, on one occasion breaking a plate on the head of her fellow servant. Another tried to stab the nurse. A third threw herself on the ground when it was attempted to teach her anything. A fourth, on being refused leave to go out on Sunday howled till a mob collected. A fifth set her mistress at defiance by all sorts of extraordinary freaks and whims, insisting upon sitting up all night, refusing to do anything she was told. When she heard that her mistress could keep her no longer she declared that she was perfectly happy, and refused to go. Said that she would cry till she could cry no longer, and then scream. Finally she laid fast hold of the edge of the sink, and was at last removed by force. The mistress of a sixth was so alarmed by her violence that she thought the girl was going to have a fit, and sent for the doctor. The girls were constantly described as seeming like people possessed. Others were sullen, refusing to move or to do anything they were told. The mistress of one, who seemed to have

some sense of humour, used to order a thing to be done in one way, if she wished it done in another, as the best means of securing what she wanted.

Nearly all were indifferent to praise or blame; heavy, dull, apathetic.

Thirdly, as regards capabilities: By far the larger proportion were like machines, able to do work that required hands, but no head. Good needlewomen, when their work was cut out, basted, and prepared, but unable to mend their own clothes. Supposed to be efficient as regards work on a large scale, but certainly very inefficient in the kind of work which they have to do. Excellent scrubbers, but unable to dust a room, or peel a potato.

In most cases the mistresses to whom the girls were sent seemed kind women, who were, to use their own expression, "domesticated," *i.e.*, did good part of the work themselves, and seemed to take real interest in the girls.

One bright-faced, merry little woman said: "Oh! I have many a laugh over Katharine: she seems surprised that the fire burns, and if I ask her to wash out a handkerchief quickly, says it makes her arms ache to move them fast." Happy the woman who could be amused by such a servant! Many mistresses would prefer dulness to such cause for mirth.

One employer wrote, that "Lucy would have been a better servant if she had learned more housework while at school, and had spent less time in doing fractions by mental arithmetic."

Another lady stated, that "Ellen was six years at school, but her principal aptitude being for study and the use of her needle, she was only instructed in household duties during the last six months of her stay."

One old gentleman (whose wife was out) said, in answer to a question, "I should not ask the girl to work, if only she could keep the fire in."

One mistress described "Sarah as the sort of girl who, if told to go half a mile up the road, would, from sheer stupidity, go a mile down it."

Of course there were exceptions—cases where the little maids were highly praised; but these were few and far between. And we nearly always found that the girls who did well had waited on the matron or some other school officer.

Although, as we have said, the large majority of the mistresses seemed kind women, and the places for the most part fair ones, there were exceptions, and these occurred in cases where the choice of situations was made by the relieving officer, instead of by some woman sent from the school.

In some cases, not many, it was found that the girls had been sent to bad neighbourhoods, or to very hard places.

There were also some few evidently hard mistresses, who seemed,

to think that the pauper girls were of different flesh and blood from themselves. These ladies had probably applied to one of the Pauper Schools for a servant, either because the rate of wages was low, or because being rigid believers in the creed that servants should have no followers (*i.e.*, no friends or natural affections), they rightly concluded that a workhouse girl would be more apathetic than one with happier antecedents.

One lady much amused the visitor by her complaints of both girl and school. She said that Mary did not like to be called a pauper, and was so vain that she refused to wear the school bonnet and bought herself another. The visitor suggested that the school bonnet savoured much of the workhouse, and was specially ugly. "Whatever it was," replied the mistress, "it should have been worn in a spirit of thankfulness to the rate-payers who provided it." This lady might surely have sat for the portrait of Mrs. Chick in "*Dombey and Son*," who said, *a propos* of the dress of the Charitable Grinders, "One might wear the articles oneself, and be thankful." The interview was closed by a long and eloquent speech, in the course of which the lady bitterly lamented that her sex precluded her "raising her voice in the House;" and complained that revolutionary principles and political economy were taught in the school. Certainly but for this objection so Conservative a candidate would have been at the head of the poll.

The girl had absconded in the night. It did not transpire that any special efforts had been made to find her.

Many pauper girls run away from their places. It is a serious question, of course, what becomes of them, and I cannot but think that the number who drop out of sight might be much diminished if some home other than the workhouse were open to receive them.\*

I have myself heard of a girl, dismissed from her place late at night for no grave fault, found by a master with whom she had formerly lived, crouching outside his garden railings at 11.30 p.m.; and of another girl who, running away from her place in a fit of temper, was found by a policeman sitting on her box in the road late at night.

It needs no conjuror to tell what must have become of these girls had not the master in one case happened to be returning late from a dinner-party, and thus to have seen the one, and the policeman chanced to light upon the other. I do not think that a Cottage Home, where girls are received on a very small payment, would increase the number of runaways, and I am sure that it might be of material service to many friendless young servants.

Another inquiry (see Appendix G) made by Mrs. Senior concerning girls who left the schools five years ago, after having been in them

\* Such a Home is now open at 33, Robertson-street, Queen's Road, Battersea Park, and seems likely to be well appreciated by the class for whom it is intended.

not less than five years, gives much the same results as the other inquiry, to which reference has been made.

Perhaps the latter leaves in some ways a more painful impression on the mind, for so many of the best girls seem in delicate health, and as regards capabilities for service, it is impossible not to feel that five years' training, representing as it does an expenditure of more than a hundred pounds, ought to have produced more satisfactory results.

It is asserted by those who approve of the present system of educating our pauper children, that we have no right to assume that a pauper child turns out ill unless she returns to the workhouse. But I have before noted that many girls may be leading very unsatisfactory lives, and yet not enter the workhouse. Going to the workhouse may simply mean that the girl is poor and friendless. The pauper spirit may be more developed in a street beggar than a workhouse inmate. But it seems, if the evidence received by Mrs. Senior is to be believed, that a very large proportion of the girls fail in the first instance as servants. It is, of course, true that her information may be called hearsay. But I would urge in what other way can we obtain reports of these girls as servants, than by going to their employers. If it is represented that the class of mistresses to whom they are sent are likely to invent faults which did not exist, I can only say that the situations should be selected with more care, and I do heartily wish that all girls were placed out in the first instance by the Lady Inspector. But it hardly appears likely that more than five hundred women should give so nearly the same report of their workhouse servants, and that that report should be invariably untrustworthy.

If it is allowed that the evidence of 500 people may be taken to be of some value, the next question that arises is whether Mrs. Senior's assistants made the inquiries fairly, or whether they were previously biased against the school, and allowed such bias to colour their reports.

One of us had a strong preconceived idea that a school education was the right one for poor children. The results of the inquiry caused her entirely to change her opinion. Another was so fascinated by the appearance of some of the large schools, that she expected to find the results of the training all but perfection.

It may next be hinted that we had bad memories and were inaccurate. To this I would reply that in nearly all cases the same questions were asked, and the answers were invariably written down at once. Nothing short of truth, or powers of invention equal to those of the writers of fiction in the *Family Herald* could account for the reports we reported. I would add that in many cases our inquiries were made by letter.

I will now revert to Mr. Tufnell's Report, and endeavour to ascertain, as far as may be, the grounds on which he concludes that not

more than four per cent. of the children educated in these schools are known to fail in gaining an honest and independent livelihood, and that "not one per cent. of the orphan class, for whom alone the schools can be deemed responsible, ever come to grief when placed in situations."\*

Mr. Tufnell gives three grounds for this opinion :—First, that he has never been able to discern from the numerous returns he collected and printed in past reports that more than four per cent. fail to get an honest and independent livelihood. Secondly, that the chaplains speak unanimously in the highest terms of the conduct of these children. Thirdly, the evidence of the children themselves—after they leave school.

I will examine these three different grounds for Mr. Tufnell's results separately.

First I will turn to Mr. Tufnell's report for the year 1872. He there states :—

"Statistical calculations are often so confusing owing to the numerous ways in which figures may be manipulated, and the explanations and corrections which must be applied to them, in order to arrive at a true conclusion, that it is much easier and many may think more satisfactory to reason from the broad theoretical conditions of the question." . . . "I have purposely avoided all reference to statistics." . . . "A return was made to Parliament in 1861 purporting to give the number of children who, in the ten years ending 1860, having been at least two consecutive years in school, and had left to take employment, had returned to the workhouse, and comparing the results in workhouses and district schools. . . . As for the Parliamentary return I will venture to say that there is not a chaplain or superintendent or manager of any of these schools who would not denounce the return as utterly unsatisfactory. All the district schools in the list, except one very small one in Shropshire, were under my inspection, and it is simply impossible that 11 per cent. of the boys, and more than a quarter of the girls trained in them, should have turned out failures, unknown to me, the managers, or the chaplains."

I forbear comment on this first ground for Mr. Tufnell's opinion, and turn to the second, *i.e.*, the evidence of the chaplains.

Now I would ask my readers to note that it is the chaplain's duty in some schools (not in all) to visit the children sent to service, and to report on their conduct. These visits are to be paid once every six months until the child reaches the age of sixteen, when it is no longer under the protection of the Poor Law.

But the visits are in some cases restricted in the following way :—

• The chaplains do not visit the children if they go to a distance, or on an inconvenient line of railway, or (and this is the most important point) if they leave the situations procured for them by the school authorities, and obtain for themselves others.

\*. Appendices F. and G. of Mrs. Senior's Report do not bear out this account of the orphans; some of the girls who have turned out ill, having been orphans entirely brought up at the schools.

So without the slightest wish to depreciate the value of the testimony as far as it goes (and some of the accounts which I received were confirmed or supplied by one of the chaplains), I yet say that it is within very narrow limits, for it is to be remembered that the chaplains and school officers are far more likely to hear incidentally of the children who do well than of those who fail in life.

Mr. Tufnell's third ground of evidence is that of the children themselves. And here again I copy verbatim :—

"The following is a letter from a band boy in a regiment now in India, which incidentally mentions the well-doing of several other boys from the same establishment, the Forest Gate District School. It is addressed to the superintendent of that school ; and I ask whether it is possible that such a letter could be written unless the school to which it refers fully carried out what all must allow to be the object of those institutions :—

"RESPECTED SIR,—I am sure you will be pleased to learn that I am happy and doing well in my position as a bandsman in the —th Regiment. Thanks to the care, kindness, and education I received at your noble school, Forest Gate.

If it had not been for the kind, friendly hand that led my childhood's erring heart in that straightforward path, in your orphan home, I almost dread to think what, without friends or home, I might have been at this hour. May the Almighty Father bless and prosper the kind masters, teachers, and patrons of loved old Forest Gate.

I was reading the papers yesterday in our regimental library, the mail had just arrived ; and what heart-sickening sights I read of as daily occurring in the streets of London—crimes of the darkest dye committed by youths younger than me ! Oh ! how many of those poor waifs, Arabs of the nightly streets, would have blessed the day that found them in a school like ours ! I hope some day, please God, it will be in my power to aid the good cause.

I frequently receive letters from dear schoolmates belonging to different regiments. They all speak well of Forest Gate, and bless the day they first entered those walls.

C. K., A. P., W. M. W. C., T. L., W. D., are all doing well.

"Now the above must not be taken as singular. It is in fact typical of innumerable letters written by former occupants of this and other similar schools, whence they are always encouraged to write describing their respective conditions, and I have perused hundreds of letters written in the same style and similar purport to the foregoing."

In the report for 1871, we find a letter addressed by a district school-boy to the chaplain :—

DEAR SIR,— . . . I would be very glad if you would try to get me back to school, for I am now in C. Workhouse. . . . I had rather be at the school with you. I learn no anthems now, and I feel quite miserable ; but I hope I shall learn some more soon. I hear nothing but ill-language here, so I wish you would try to get me back to the school. You know I have not been baptized yet. . . . I have dreamed of the school every night, and I think I am there ; but when I wake up I find that I am in the workhouse, and it makes me quite unhappy. I do not forget to say my prayers, dear sir, though none of the others say their prayers.

Mr. Tufnell says :—

"Here is a boy who, owing to a disreputable father, gets incidentally into a workhouse. He is miserable at the degradation, is disgusted at the language of the inmates, and has the courage to say his prayers amid the

jeers of those around him. I cannot imagine a completer testimony to the excellence of his training, a clearer proof that the boy was thoroughly dispauperised in spirit, and yet this is a case which, according to the doctrine I have been impugning,\* must be counted a failure. . . . I inquired personally into this case, and saw the boy."

If the object of the school is universally acknowledged to be that of training the scholars to write such letters as the above—and Mr. Tufnell assures us they are struck off by hundreds—undoubtedly the results of the school training are most satisfactory. Some sceptical minds will think there is a certain infusion of unreality in hundreds of letters all alike, and in the foregoing style.

But from a good deal of experience of half-educated minds, I should say that the poor very readily adopt this style of composition, and are not therefore insincere. It is more than doubtful, however, whether it is wholesome to encourage such a phase of letter-writing.

Another letter in the last report is from a youth who stole, but who writes to say he has repented. Then follows an autobiography of a pauper boy, which, as it occupies more than ten pages out of the seventeen containing Mr. Tufnell's Report, I cannot quote at length. But the writer describes his suffering under almost incredible cruelties at an old-fashioned workhouse, whence he was removed to Sutton, where, being a clever boy, he speedily became the favourite of the master, and lived, as the fairy tales say, happily ever after. He is now in a high position. As regards this autobiography, I would only point out that the boy in question did get the individual training (as school-master's boy) which all children, to my thinking, require, but which the majority out of a thousand or more collected in one institution cannot receive.

Towards the close of the autobiography are these words,—

" . . . I have also another wish which I continually cherish. It is this—that should I ever grow old and have the means to spend the last few years of my life free from work, that those years may be spent at Sutton, as near the school as possible, so that I may pass away to a far better country, where there are no gutter children, with the dear old building as plainly visible as possible from the window of the sick room where I hope to die."

Mr. Tufnell gives two other letters from lads who have risen in the world, assures us that the girls do equally well; reiterates there is no singularity in the accounts he has quoted, and closes his report in the words already quoted on p. 956.

I think that some at least of my readers will feel with me that Mr. Tufnell's evidence does not entirely outweigh Mrs. Senior's, and it remains for me, as far as possible, to point out the conditions in the schools which produce the results given in the Appendices P and G.

But before going farther, I wish to say that every lover of children

\* That children who return to the workhouse are necessarily failures.

must have the strongest sympathy with the motives of those who were instrumental in the establishment of the present system of dealing with our little paupers.

It must be an immense advantage to the children to be out of London, and it cannot be doubted that the creators of separate and district schools thought, and think, that they had hit upon the best possible means of training the children to be useful citizens. And I would also add my belief that the chief officials employed have, for the most part, the children's welfare near their hearts, and are doing their best for the benefit of those entrusted to their care.

But to continue. First, then, whatever may be thought of the system of teaching large numbers of children together, one fact is indisputable—it is artificial; and I would further urge that if Nature had intended people of one age exclusively to live together, family life would not have existed. It is only those who are wiser than Nature, who put the aged together in alms-houses, and the young in orphanages; and try, as far as possible, to treat all of the same age in the same manner.

I am aware that there are many difficulties in the way of boarding out all our pauper children, and in fact, as regards the casuals, the system is hardly practicable. But I believe family life to be the only real remedy for much of the evil consequent upon a state of orphanage.

Granted for a moment, for the sake of argument, that boarding out is not to be, there comes the great evil of the intermixture of casual and permanent inmates, to which reference was made at the beginning of this paper.

And here it must be marked that the strongest advocates of the present system only maintain that it is good for the casuals and for their managers, *i.e.*, they say that casuals without the permanent element would be more difficult to control. It cannot be denied that the permanent inmates of a school soon bring the casuals into order. Any one who knows much of children, and anything of schools, is aware that a great deal of most satisfactory drill order may exist, and yet that the school may be in a thoroughly unhealthy state morally!

Nothing is easier to get than machine-like regularity and outside obedience. It is easy in an ordinary day school. How much easier where the children are entirely under the control of their teachers all day long, and every day, no mother to whom to complain, no interest, help, or hope apart from their school life?

Surely, as far as the children know, no autocrat was ever more powerful than the Superintendent or schoolmaster of a district school. It may be urged that the officials are under the Local Government Board. Theoretically they are, but practically they are not, and cannot be. One instance will suffice. Though corporal punishment for girls is now forbidden in Workhouse Schools (see



Glen's Poor Law Order), except when ordered by the Superintendent, it has been used in nearly every school by the school teachers and officials, and has only lately been in one school the occasion of grave abuse. In another, the teacher told me that on an average he caned a girl every day. Granted for a moment that such an inconsistency as I have quoted did not exist, and that the officials were not supreme, still they would appear so to the little street arab who comes from her gutter life into this new and strange world. It would be far more startling to learn that such a child did rebel than that she did not.

I do not infer that the children are unkindly treated, merely that they are so absolutely under the control of the officials that discipline is not difficult to attain. But I ask any one who knows much of children, what are the probable results of the intermixture of the casual child just returned from a hop-picking season, with the little orphan who has been within the school walls all her life?

Besides the fact of the schools being artificial in their very existence, they are made doubly so by their machinery. No blame attaches to the officials who do their best to manage a large overgrown institution, which could not exist without an amount of machinery which is unlike any private family. Some of the girls are taught to cook small dinners for the officials, to dust the matron's rooms, etc., and these children turn out better servants. But they do not all have these advantages.

How, for instance, can a girl learn to cook a small dinner, to lay a cloth, and to wait at table properly, whose experience has for years been of the following sort? A description of a school dinner may serve as a specimen of the system throughout:—

*Scene.* A large hall capable of containing fifteen hundred children. A smell as of laundry and kitchen combined, and a good deal of steam. Enter four men bearing two enormous wooden washing-tubs, containing a stew or soup of Australian meat. This is ladled out into small basins, and placed by boys on the tables. The sound of martial music is heard in the distance, and presently more than a thousand little paupers, headed by their brass band, file in and take their places. After singing a grace, they fall to.

The food is good, and on an average sufficient, but it is highly probable that the delicate child cannot eat her portion, and that the strong one could consume more. What is left is in some cases thrown away.

When the girl who has assisted at this meal goes to service, she has not, as far as I know, to serve out soup from a washing-tub, or to sing a grace, or to throw away what is left on the plates.

These comments may seem absurd, but it cannot be too forcibly realized that nearly everything which a girl sees and does at school is absolutely opposed to what she will see and do at service.

The fact that the children are stunted and "inconveniently" small is partly explained by their low class. But it is to be noted that little London paupers when boarded out in the country grow strong and healthy.

The sanitary arrangements of the best of the schools are imperfect. Ophthalmia prevails in nearly all. On this point Dr. E. Smith, the Inspector and Assistant Medical Officer for Poor Law Purposes of the Local Government Board, says in his book entitled "Health":—

#### OPHTHALMIA IN SCHOOLS.

"Inflammatory diseases of the eye are very common among the children of the poor. This is partly due to disease in infancy, partly to a diseased constitution, and partly to the habit of rubbing the eyes with dirty hands when there is an itching sensation. Parents may not be able to remedy the first two without the aid of the surgeon, but the third may be prevented by constant watchfulness and cleanliness, and by attention to the directions which will now be given for children living in schools.

"The fact that ophthalmia prevails in our large schools cannot be denied, and the injury which it inflicts upon the children in their prospects in life can scarcely be overstated; but the causes are more numerous and deeper seated than is generally supposed, and the disease itself, when established, is very intractable. Many of the causes, however, are preventible, and the authorities are not always without blame in reference to them.

"The first and most important cause is not within the control of the authorities, viz., the constitutional state of the children on admission. Disease of a scrofulous character is very common amongst the poor of our agricultural districts, and that of the eyes not less frequent than of the joints; but it is not simply a local disease, since it is due primarily to a defect in the general health; such children, moreover, have been underfed and exposed to many unsanitary conditions, whilst at the same time the treatment of their disease has been neglected.

"These children when admitted into the schools suffer, or have suffered, from this diseased state of the system, if not of the eyes, and however treated will be liable to a recurrence throughout youth, as many years probably as they will remain in the school. The next series of causes are however preventible, and demand much more attention than they have received. Take the following:—

"The school-room is almost always ill-ventilated, often over-crowded, with the temperature higher than that of other rooms, whilst the air is close, stagnant, and irritating from the exhalations of the bodies of the children. This renders every part of the body, and particularly the eyes, which are uncovered, unduly sensitive, whilst the children have their tone of health lowered still further, and are thereby more likely to fall into disease. When the school tasks are over the children rush into and about the play-ground, which is probably exposed to every point of the compass, and to a cold north-easterly as readily as to a warm southerly wind, by which the sensitive eye becomes congested or inflamed. In numerous instances the surface of the play-ground is covered with sand or gravel, and the feet and wind together throw volumes of gritty dust into the air which lodges in the eyes, and further inflames them.

"Play over, the children go into the lavatory, which is very cold and damp, and there wash in cold water, with the aid of common acrid soap, which gets under the lids, and further irritates the eyes. When the child, with smarting eyes, wishes to dry the soap and water away, he uses a towel which is already wet, and unable to absorb water, and therefore rubs away at his

face and eyes in the vain hope of ridding himself of the nuisance. Probably the towel has been used by others having the disease, and is soiled with the diseased secretions, and may actually communicate the disease to a healthy child.

—“Further, the dining-room is generally overcrowded and hot, and full of the fumes of dinner, which may produce some degree of irritation in the eyes, and after staying there for twenty minutes the children rush into the play-ground as they did from the school-room.

“The bed-rooms in all the modern pauper schools are large, airy, and very cold, both by reason of the amount of space which is now demanded for each child, and the absence of any method of warming them. Nothing is more common than to hear the officials in charge complain of this, as it respects the young children in the cold weather. Lofty, long, and wide rooms, with a separate bed for each child, and no distribution of heat can have no other effect in the winter; and when the children leave their beds in the morning and dress and go into the cold lavatory they are the very imper-sonation of cold.

“Moreover, whilst the dietary, taken as a whole, may be sufficient, it is ill-distributed, since there are but three meals a day allowed; and if the meat which is given at one meal were distributed over several it would nourish the children better. A child does not need four ounces or five ounces of cooked meat at a meal, but it requires four meals a day, which, instead of being cold or lukewarm should be hot. Gruel and pea soup are also as much too freely as milk is stintingly supplied.

“What, then, is necessary in reference to preventible causes?

“1. To prevent an undue elevation of temperature in some of the rooms, and thereby the sudden changes from heat to cold;

“2. To warm in a moderate degree the lavatories and bed-rooms;

“3. To prevent gritty dust in the playgrounds, and to provide play-sheds not exposed to the north and east winds;

“4. To supply good white curd soap and chilled water, and a larger quantity of towels, taking care to dry the wet towels if not sufficiently dirty to be removed;

“5. To regulate the dietary more in accordance with home feeding.

“In addition, there should be a system of special supervision of those children who are of a scrofulous habit and peculiarly liable to ophthalmia.

“In reference to treatment, it is clear that the first duty is to separate the diseased from the healthy, and to supply to each individual that warmth and food, soap, water, and towels which his case requires, and to add the treatment of the general health and of the eyes, which every medical man knows how to apply to such cases. Needless spreading of the disease will be prevented by such means, although the constitution and local conditions may not be very amenable to treatment, and the case may linger long in hospital.

“It is also clear that the medical officer should pass before him all the children in the school in single file at least once a week, and carefully notice the state of the eyes and the general health; whilst if there were medical inspectors of the central authority they would be able to confer with the local medical officer, to the advantage of the school.

“We again say that more injury is caused by bad soap and wet towels than is generally believed. All these evils may not exist in every school, or in an equal degree, but they do exist, and are nearly universal.”—*Health: a Handbook for Households and Schools.* By EDWARD SMITH, M.D. 1874.

In most of the school-rooms the air is close. In some of the dormitories it is enough to knock you down. The outside of the

cup and platter is highly polished. The little paupers have clean white pinafores constantly, but their underlinen is dirty, and the same stuff frocks are in many schools worn alike in winter and summer. Rows of white counterpanes on the little beds charm the visitor's sight; but if he were in the dormitories at night, another sense would be tried by the odours arising from boots and clothes worn all day being left in the rooms.

I should like to say a few words on the education which is given to these little paupers. And here I use the word in its common sense, for there really seem still to be many excellent people who think that education means reading, or rather, as it has been aptly termed, the "mechanical application of print to the eye," writing copies, and arithmetic, or rather, making sums according to approved receipts, the result being, as a child of my acquaintance remarked, a mixture of chance and skill.

Though in some of the schools the instruction given is excellent, when we take into consideration the extreme difficulty of explaining many things to children who have no experience of the outside world; in others the standard of education, using the word in the sense which I have previously defined, is very high; indeed, to the three "r's" thus understood, are added various stray bits of information of which it is difficult to imagine the use.

But let us not be ungrateful for small mercies. Let us reflect with joy that although a girl may leave school "totally unfit for housework and unable to use a needle" (see Report) she will probably have an accurate knowledge of the height of the mountain peaks of India, and will be able to recite long pieces of poetry.

Considering that Government deems it allowable for the child whose education is defrayed by the parish to leave school as soon as he can read and write fairly, and work the first four rules of arithmetic (*i. e.*, pass Standard 3, Code 71), it would seem not unreasonable that children supported entirely by ratepayers should be allowed to do something towards earning their own living, when they have had as much book-learning as is thought sufficient for the child of a person receiving outdoor relief.

I am most anxious not to be misunderstood here, as undervaluing education in the real sense of the word. It is because I believe the cultivation of the intellect to be of great importance, that I long for our little paupers to be taught early how to rise from a state of pauperdom by such cultivation; and I am sure that this would be effected by giving them more industrial training, and of a more intelligent kind.

I would now remark that those of us who have ever for any reason made a special effort to recall the events and impressions of childhood, will have been struck by the fact that we remember what

we saw far more vividly and accurately that what we heard. We were more impressed when young, by pictures than by music. We recollect the looks and manner of those familiar to us in infancy, while we forget, or but dimly remember, their words.

Children have a keen enjoyment of the beauties of nature, to a degree, and after a fashion, never experienced in after life. I do not now speak of beautiful scenery exactly, but of green grass, and blue sky, and bright flowers. The suns and moons of childhood were very superior to our modern ones.

Now, if we grant the immense importance to a child of such outside impressions, it follows, as a matter of course, that they should be chosen with great care, and varied as much as possible.

But in orphanages and pauper schools, there is the most absolute monotony, both of sight and sound,—only it is called order and regularity,—and there is intense dullness under the name of method and discipline. White walls, dull rooms, the same dinner to eat on given days of the week; nay, even as far as possible the same quantity to be consumed.

I know one orphanage where the children who cannot eat their dinner are punished by not being allowed any tea.

I knew another where the dormitory window commanded a view of fireworks sent up from a public garden; but on these occasions the blinds were drawn down for fear the children should be disturbed. Anything sooner than disturb the monotony of the school arrangements. All possible precautions are taken to prevent the schools from resembling the world outside.

Life in one of these institutions would be like a piece of music of endless length, from which all accidentals, or changes of time or key, were rigidly excluded. The effect would certainly be to send the hearers into a lunatic asylum or to sleep.

There are, it is true, in such schools, the annual treats. But think what a long time in a child's life a year is. And the very fact that such treats are arranged for large numbers must prevent the children from having any sense of natural free enjoyment.

In pauper schools, order and discipline are not only important, they are all supreme. The strongest advocates of the system of mixing casual and permanent children in one institution defend it on this plea only—viz., that the permanent children soon bring the casuals into order. I have before noted the fact of the fearful knowledge of evil possessed by the casual children. They are not to blame for this; but what can be said for those who are contaminating innocent children by such association—doing the devil's work under the fair name of getting the schools into good order?

There was a time once familiar to most of us, when the mere fact of existence caused an almost overwhelming flow of happiness. Perhaps we can now only recall such a time with an effort. We

may fail to "see it clearly, for the graves that lie between;" but we know that there was such a time, we see it reflected on young children's faces. It is of course easy to call this sort of pleasure in mere existence only an animal pleasure, shared by all young creatures; but as it cannot be found except in those who are innocent, there seems in it something divine. It seems to come straight from above, it is so bright, so pure: the only sort of gaiety which can never jar us even now. We have never in the time of deepest sorrow felt a very young child's spirits too much. And perhaps the friend who is most to us in after life, is the one who retains most of a child's nature. Childhood colours all the rest of life. The gleams of happiness which come from the background of a happy childhood are always the treasures one can never lose.

But as childhood's joys are keen and intense, so are its sorrows. A child's grief is, in many cases, more intense than a grown-up person's. We are apt now to ignore this on the ground that "children soon forget." But this is not accurate. Children's minds may be easily diverted from grief for the time, but the wound is always there, always ready to smart again, and the child is conscious of the fact.

We must remember also that a child's grief is intensified by perplexity. Life, it is true, is in one sense full of mysteries to a child; but there is no mystery like the first personal acquaintance with sorrow, and if that first sorrow consists in the loss of the person to whom the child has hitherto turned for the solution of perplexities and mysteries, the pain and bewilderment combined are almost maddening.

A rich orphan, although with inevitable pain and solitude to bear, has not also the perplexity of an entire change of outside surroundings. But our little pauper orphans have. The tiny cottage is exchanged for the enormous halls and passages of a monster school; the individual care of a mother for the inspection of a matron, who, however tender she may be, cannot care for a thousand children.\*

I said that we see reflected on young children's faces our own recollection of the fact of mere existence being happiness. But I was wrong. There are young children who are really old men and women. We may find them by hundreds in our monster schools. Finally, I would ask any one who has considered the subject of education at all carefully, first, whether the convent system has generally been held good for developing the intellectual powers? secondly, whether there is not great similarity between that system and the one adopted in our pauper schools?

Our little paupers surely, but for the intervention of the casuists,

\* It is true that some of our pauper orphans have the remembrance of a home of hard blows and rough words, but still the most passionate people seem to have a sort of love for their children. I have often been struck by the way in which children who have been undoubtedly roughly used still cling to their parents.

would have a very nun-like education. They learn passive obedience and non-resistance ; and from want of perspective, small events must appear large. But the children's state is one of involuntary imprisonment, while the nuns may be also learning the beauty of self-sacrifice, however mistaken in its form.

At the close of the last century when during the Revolution convents were thrown open, and the inmates invited to go free, we read that some hesitated on the threshold, trembling and bewildered at the sight of the world.

We send our little nuns out with a shove, to begin an entirely new existence, to sink or to swim. We have given very little assistance by previous teaching. We have trained them somewhat after this fashion. They have been accustomed to a smooth pond and the use of corks. We turn them out on a rough sea with little assistance. And the results? Let those who are interested get the Local Government Board Report, and judge for themselves.

HENRIETTA L. SYNNOT.



## CASSANDRA'S REJOINDER.

I HAVE read the various comments and criticisms which have appeared on "Rocks Ahead" with much care and with a sincere desire to find that I had omitted or under-estimated some considerations which might throw doubt on the conclusions I put forward, or at least mitigate their gloomy character. I have profited by some of the suggestions offered to modify, in the collected and amplified form which the Papers in the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW subsequently assumed,\* a few of the expressions originally used, and to develop a few points more fully and more clearly, as well as to discuss one or two objections which appeared to me more valid than the rest. But I cannot say that I find any one of my conclusions to have been materially shaken, nor any of my statements or arguments successfully impugned. I should have been glad if it were otherwise; for the subject is far too grave for egotism, and the picture I drew of the probable future of my country too sad, both in colouring and outline, to be dwelt upon by any patriot without pain. But most of my critics have either been contented to represent my views as the morbid exaggerations of a writer notorious for the consistent lugubriousness of his temperament, and habitually a *laudator temporis acti, se puero, castigatortorque minorum*—which may be very true, but is surely somewhat irrelevant;—or to assert in jaunty confidence that with a people so energetic and full of solid good sense as we are, "something is sure to turn up" to avert the prognosticated evil,—which is possible of course, but which one would fancy could comfort those only who really believe that we *are* so exceptionally sound, sensible, cautious, and forecasting, or who are content to trust to the

\* "Rocks Ahead, or The Warnings of Cassandra." Trubner and Co.



chapter of accidents to prevent active causes issuing in natural results.

Here and there, however, an antagonist has taken up a more distinct and hostile position, and has professed to show that my premises are inaccurate and incomplete, my arguments invalid, and my philosophy and economy essentially and flagrantly unsound as well as shallow. One writer in particular, in the September number of this REVIEW, has attempted so elaborate a refutation of all my positions as to call for a somewhat more detailed reply. Not that I propose to drag my readers through a prolonged controversy which would be an abuse of their patience, and unnecessary for my purpose: much of Mr. Arthur Arnold's paper consisting of such slight misrepresentation or misplacement of my views as was needed to bring them within the range of his guns—a very common but not a very profitable tactical proceeding. I will only comment on a few of the more essential points where we seem to be utterly at variance.

But, first, there are some expressions and more implications in Mr. Arnold's attack of which I think I have just reason to complain. It is of course too much to expect that a critic should be acquainted with the antecedents and general views of the man against whom his criticisms are directed, but in the absence of that acquaintance he should surely abstain from language at once incriminating and curiously inappropriate. He not only in two or three passages uses expressions implying ignorance on my part of the working classes, and his own superior information, but he charges me with "looking at the working man *de haut en bas*," of "writing of them with superb patronage," considering them "stupid," and of speaking of them "in a manner most odiously pharisaical." Now, I do not know what may have been the temporary opportunities of intimacy with the artisan class which Mr. Arnold's experience may have given him, but I shall be surprised to learn that it can equal those of one who for twenty-five of the best years of his life was closely bound up with that class, not only as a large employer of labour and a large owner of cottage dwellings, but as an earnest and industrious, though perhaps not very efficient, labourer for their improvement, elevation, and comfort; and who for another twenty-five years has made their interests his ceaseless study, and the main object of continuous political and literary efforts. Mr. Arnold may have looked at them, visited them, inspected them, "superintended" them—I may fairly claim to have lived among them, toiled for them, sympathised with them, spoken the truth to them as well as of them, served them, but never flattered them. I do not, indeed, like Lord Shaftesbury, profess to "revere" them. I cannot, like Mr. Arnold (p. 637), regard them as pure incarnations of political wisdom, who, in the pursuit of their own interests, are sure to go just as far as they ought to do, and no further,—because I do not see that they have usually done this, or are doing it now;—but I respect them, value them, am hopeful about

them, on account of their sterling and manly qualities, and their frequent shrewd sense when not misguided and demoralised by those who seek their suffrages or would gain the use of their strength. And what, I may ask, is there so "odiously pharisaical"—so redolent of "the sublime height of a morganatic alliance with the Gods" (whatever that may mean) in saying that the English working men, "properly trained, properly led, properly dealt with, would make out and out the best Proletariat in the world," or that they are (apart from their drinking propensities) "more intelligent, more fair, and more sober-minded than those of other lands"? Does Mr. Arnold, who professes himself so disgusted with my phrase, mean that they need no training and no guidance,—and that while "inferior in his opinion in the points I mention to the working classes of most other countries," they are still—and now—fit to govern their own country, and to out-vote all other classes? Several passages in his paper appear to indicate that he is prepared to defend this advanced thesis, and to maintain that the great body of the labouring class may not only be safely intrusted with the ruling power, but are more likely, better qualified, to exercise it honestly and sagaciously than those above them in the social scale. If so the difference in our views is no doubt considerable and fundamental; and we may leave the decision to our readers. Mr. Arnold deems it "the first, indeed the whole, duty of a Statesman to learn the will of the people, and to follow that"—the people here meaning, as the context shows, the majority, the masses. I should call such a man a tool, a slave, a minister perhaps—certainly not a Statesman. I need not point out that the classes whom he thinks it desirable thus to endow with paramount political influence in the State are, in his view, and according to his wide acquaintance with the Proletariat of Europe, "in the matters of wisdom, self-respect, and self-control, behind all other nations" (p. 633). Mr. Arnold says I call them "stupid": I took pains to say just the reverse.

In one point my assailant and I agree; and that point is so important that it might, I should have hoped, have led Mr. Arnold to regard me as rather an ally than an antagonist. We are both earnest advocates of the diffusion of property—especially property in land—among the labouring poor;—only that he considers it as the great object for which their political supremacy is to be desired, while I look to it as the chief safeguard against the possible dangers growing out of that political supremacy. Here, too, however, I note a certain inconsistency among his statements and his aspirations, arising apparently from irrepressible democratic animosities. He more than once refers to Lord Derby's assertion that "the produce of the English soil might be doubled" as conclusive proof that "the interest of the masses has been habitually disregarded by the upper classes," and that this deficient productiveness is due to the non-ownership of land by the peasant order, and would be cured by a change in the proprietary body. He can scarcely be conversant with the careful

investigations of M. Léonce de Lavergne, who shows that of every article of agricultural produce the average yield in England, where the soil is held in few hands, is *double* that in France, the land *par excellence* of peasant proprietorship, wide subdivision, and garden culture. Probably, too, notwithstanding "his personal acquaintance with the people of every European State," he would be surprised to find that the average annual produce of wheat in Belgium (which seems to be his land of promise) is 20 per cent. below that of England.\* He mentions *five or even eight hundred millions* sterling as the amount of capital which must be applied to agriculture in our country in order to bring up its productiveness to a proper standard, and declares that capital will not be thus liberally lavished on the soil till "a vast diffusion of property in land shall have taken place." He overlooks the fact that the free application of capital and above all of machinery to agriculture takes place where large properties and not peasant properties prevail;—and that one of the great drawbacks upon small holdings is that capital is rarely forthcoming and that machinery is scarcely applicable. In a word, my critic is so little careful either of his logic or his facts that, while clamouring for the application of capital to land on a portentous scale, he is equally eager for a subdivision of the land among the class which is peculiarly short of capital; and then selects for animadversion the special set of landowners who have sunk more capital in their land than those of any other country, and *have got*—climate considered—a *larger produce out of their land*; and then represents them as proving by the scantiness of that produce their habitual disregard of the interest of the consuming class! And this is the critic who so "complains of Mr. Greg's three papers, on account of their fallacious parade of care, with a show of calculation which is not borne out upon anything like critical examination."

It is much to be wished that so ardent an advocate as Mr. Arnold of the diffusion of property in the soil among the peasant and artisan classes, would have addressed himself to the problem I propounded in a note (p. 45, or p. 878 in the *Review*), in the first "Rock Ahead"—a problem of which I have as yet seen no attempt at solution. How—in a country like England, where every rich man is eager to buy land, and willing to give far more for it than it is economically worth—is the peasant proprietor to be *secured* in the possession of his holding?

\* The following comparative yield is given on the authority of two passages by different authors in the "Colden Club Essays"—a work which Mr. Arnold will, I apprehend, admit to be reliable—I. p. 431, II. p. 166 :—

#### AVERAGE PRODUCTION OF WHEAT.

	Bushels per Acre.	Hectolitres per Hectare.
Great Britain . . . . .	28	40
Holland . . . . .	...	28
Prussia . . . . .	17	19½
Belgium . . . . .	21	19½
Italy . . . . .	...	16
France . . . . .	14	14½

that is, to be restrained from selling it on the very advantageous terms which are certain to be offered him? Still more, how, when his small property is made still smaller by subdivision among his children, is each one of them to be withheld from parting with his field for five or ten times its value? This has always appeared to me the greatest practical difficulty which we, who desire the wider distribution of landed property among the masses, have to meet.

I will not follow Mr. Arnold in his comments on my second "Rock Ahead." He simply "pooh-poohs" from the height of his superior knowledge or keener insight, all the dangers which I gave grounds for believing were real and visible, however distant. The idea of our cheap coal being worked out, he scouts, as in his judgment mere nonsense. Coal is not getting dearer or scantier, nor will it do so. "Coal is relatively as cheap now as it was in 1834, and there is no reason to suppose that it will not be relatively as cheap in 1900 as it is at present." This is random talk, calling for no reply. I need only say that his dictum will not be endorsed by men far better qualified than either he or I to form an opinion. Again: he considers my notion that where machinery is largely involved, or is the real productive agency, a reduction of the hours of labour means an *approximate* reduction in the produce of that labour, to be mere moonshine; and he undertakes to contradict it on his own authority. I spoke with *connaissance de cause*; I gave fully the grounds and reasons for my conclusion; I have nothing to add to them; and I am no way shaken in my estimate of their validity. Mr. Arnold treats my apprehension of the future probability and gradual approach of serious foreign competition in several departments of our industry, with the usual airy disdain of the ordinary British Philistine. I did not speak without book; and (stated with the guarded moderation with which I stated it) my position, I am satisfied, is unassailable. Mr. Hugh Mason's opinion is no doubt a weighty one; but his confidence is not shared by others equally qualified to judge. And, observe, I did not speak of the danger to our trade and industry from foreign competition as a thing that now is, but as a thing that, if not averted, must come from causes ahead imminent or in operation,\*—and I should be grieved indeed to regard the insane armaments of continental Europe (which Mr. Mason very justly considers as one of our present most efficient safeguards against the danger in question) as permanent facts of modern history.

Mr. Arnold attributes to me (as the *Spectator* had done before him) an ignorance or oversight of one of the clearest principles of political economy, which he specifies as the foundation of most of my blunders. "Mr. Greg is really the victim of one of the most hoary

\* It is only two or three weeks since a very impressive and well-informed paper, maintaining in detail those facts and menaces of which Mr. A.'s omniscience makes so light, was read at the Social Science Meeting at Glasgow by Mr. Matheson.

and inveterate of economic fallacies." . . . . "He has incautiously fallen headlong into the fallacy that the increase of our neighbours must be our undoing." . . . . "Mr. Greg's fundamental error lies in confounding our relative position, which of course declines as other countries approach a higher level of industrial and mechanical industry, with our actual position as regards wealth and comfort in the future." I am supposed not to perceive that "it must be a benefit to us, as it is to individual tradesmen, to live among wealthy neighbours:" and my "error is so patent, so curious, and in so able a man so startling," that Mr. Arnold is "almost inclined to apologize for setting forth such elementary facts in commercial science by way of refutation." The *Spectator* puts the matter still more strongly: "Mr. Greg's error is really closely allied to that old Protectionist fancy, that our nation suffers by the development of the resources of other nations, instead of gaining by it. Nothing is more certain, we take it, than that it is for England's *advantage*, to put it plainly, *that she should lose her commercial supremacy*, if she loses it by no wasteful blunder of her own, but solely by the legitimate development of such of the resources of other nations as were hitherto unknown or unused."

Now, much of this I have already answered in the second edition of my papers, to which I may refer Mr. Arnold and his readers; the rest, whether consisting of confusion or truism, seems to me simply irrelevant. I am not such a tyro in economic science as to be unaware that the increasing wealth of the world at large must be an indirect benefit to every country in the world; nor am I so devoid of ordinary perception as not to recognise that it is far better for a trading country, as for an individual tradesman, to live among wealthy neighbours, *so long as those neighbours are customers*. But what bearing have all these platitudes upon my position? I simply pointed out that hitherto England's exceptional advantages had given her an exceptional position, and had made a very small nation into a very great one; that, being in certain specified particulars so far ahead of other countries, she had manufactured for them and supplied their wants, that to this was owing her rapid and continued progress in prosperity—a prosperity increasing just as the wealth and wants of her neighbours increased; that this rate of progress could not go on, and would probably in time decline, as those neighbours began to supply their own wants, and ceased to come to us for various articles as of yore; and that, just in proportion as the cost of production in this country augmented, would the rival and superseding production of other countries be stimulated. Is there any one of these propositions that Mr. Arnold seriously fancies he has overthrown, or even that he can contest? "We cannot," he admits, "be spinners and weavers for all the world." Very true; we cannot continue to be so; that is just what I allege: but the point is that *we have been*

so and are beginning to cease to be so ; and that as our customers fall off or go elsewhere we shall have to curtail our production, or cease to extend it ; that such curtailment or non-extension implies a check to our progress and our population ; and that such check, if not foreseen and provided for, will involve much distress and suffering. Is any one of these allegations impugnable ? Mr. Arnold and the *Spectator* seem to find consolation in the jaunty assumption that even if we cease to provide the textile fabrics and the coal and iron of the world, there will always be something else which the world will want and which we shall be preferentially applied to to provide. But the very same causes which make our coal and iron and woollens and calicos dearer than those of other lands, will affect more or less all our productions. " But all your customers are getting richer," argues Mr. Arnold, " and can afford therefore to purchase more and to give higher prices." *What is that to me if they cease to come to my shop ?* Will America buy her iron rails from England merely because she is wealthy, while by reason of excellent coal and ore in Pennsylvania in proximity to the surface and to each other, she can manufacture them *more cheaply* for herself ? Will Japan, or Russia, or Italy, or renovated Asia, however rich they may grow, come to us for their metals or their woven goods when the United States, or Belgium, or Switzerland, can supply them at a lower cost, and make a profit by doing so ? I say that *if* our coal and iron fail us, *when* they fail us, and *in proportion as* they fail us, the productions we supply to other countries, and which we have prospered and grown affluent by supplying, will become more costly and more scarce, and that we shall be less and less resorted to for them ; and that thus a great source of our hitherto income will be cut off. Is Mr. Arnold prepared to dispute the proposition ? " Oh," but he says, " that is all gloomy nonsense ; iron and coal won't fail us ; and if our wares do get dearer, what will that matter so long as our customers grow richer, and are all able and willing to pay us more ! " This seems to be pretty much the state of the controversy between us, and I may leave it here. Only I cannot exactly comprehend the logical process of a mind which does not perceive that a nation which has grown rich by the possession and use of a vast treasure hidden in its soil, must grow poorer, positively as well as relatively, by the exhaustion of that treasure. Mr. Arnold may have intended to argue—I believe the *Spectator* did—that *England must pay for her imports*, and that the countries with which she trades, rather than not deal with her, will take her iron and textile fabrics in payment, even though *these* are dearer than their own, or than those of other lands. Doubtless to some extent this may be the case ; but a far surer operation and consequence will be that as England loses her productive advantages, and thereby reduces her productiveness, *she will have to restrict her imports*—an idea which my critics do not seem to have taken in. Nations, like individuals, when they lose a large source of their


wealth by the exhaustion of the balance at their bankers (whether that balance be gold in the coffers or iron or coal beneath the soil), must reduce their purchases, or become bankrupt. As to the dictum of the *Spectator* that "it will be for England's national *advantage* to lose her commercial supremacy"—if "economical" advantage be meant, as by the context I suppose it must be—I can only class it among the daring paradoxes with which that very clever but sensational journal delights to startle or tickle its readers. England's "commercial supremacy" signifies only her power of supplying an inordinate proportion of the wants of the world by underselling all competitors. How it can be for the advantage of her wealth to lose this power, needs, I think, a little explanation.

In conclusion, I would wish to remind my readers that I have been no prophet in the ordinary sense of that word. I have not predicted that the evils treated of *will* come upon us. I have merely pointed out certain agencies in operation, or visibly approaching, which must bring about those evils, unless counteracted in time by other agencies not yet efficient or in sight. I hope the mischiefs I signalised may be averted: I have endeavoured to show how they may be averted; but I am sure that those who deny their imminence or their likelihood are not taking the wisest means to avert them.—Meanwhile my opponents, be their arguments good or bad, are sure to have the best of it before the public. The world, which turns with disgust from my grave forebodings, will hail their delusive comfortings with a shout of welcome or a sigh of relief. The prophets who cry "Peace; peace," when there is no peace have a pleasant time of it—till war comes. No nation will prepare for the evil day, so long as there are seers in abundance who assure them *ex cathedra* that the evil day is very distant or very problematic, or (better still) that it exists only in the morbid imagination of a pessimist by temperament. They will be listened to and caressed, while I shall be laughed at; and the nation, soothed by their opiates into fatal slumbers, will turn on its pillow and address itself, as before, to dreams of endless luxury and sunshine.

"Cassandra's fate reversed is theirs;—  
She, true, no faith could gain;  
They every passing hour deceive,  
Yet are believed again."

On Lord Lyttleton's commentary I have no remarks to make, beyond thanking him for the courtesy and kindly appreciative tone of his language towards myself—a tone so unhappily rare among controversialists. I am too well aware that the Christianity which I would fain see taught, as the only form likely in the end to hold its ground in this country, must appear to Lord Lyttleton a creed shorn of all its more specifically valuable and essential elements.

W. R. GREG.



## REVIEW OF OBJECTIONS TO 'LITERATURE AND DOGMA.'

### II.

PROFESSOR HUXLEY'S interesting discourse the other day at

Belfast drew attention to a personage who once was in the thoughts of everybody who tried to think,—René Descartes. But in this great man there were, in truth, two men. One was the anatomist, the physicist, the mechanical philosopher who exclaimed : "Give me matter and motion, and I will make the world !" and of whom Pascal said that the only God he admitted was a God who was useless. This is the Descartes on whom Professor Huxley has asked us to turn once more our eyes ; and no man could ask it better or more persuasively.

But there is another Descartes who had of late years been much more known, both in his own country and out of it, than Descartes the mechanical philosopher, and that is the Descartes who is said to have founded the independence of modern philosophy and to have founded its spiritualism. He began with universal doubt, with the rejection of all authority, with the resolve to admit nothing to be true which he could not clearly see to be true ; he ended with declaring that the demonstration of God and the soul was more completely made out than that of any other truth whatever, nay, that the certitude and truth of every science depended solely on our knowledge of the true God.

Here we have the Descartes who is commonly said to have founded



modern philosophy. And who, in this our day of unsettlement, of impatience with authority, convention, and routine, who, in this our day of new departures, can fail to be attracted by the author of the "*Méthode*," and by his premises? *Je n'admets rien qui ne soit nécessairement vrai*, I admit nothing which is not necessarily true; *Je m'éloigne de tout ce en quoi je pourrais imaginer le moindre doute*, I put aside everything about which I can imagine there being the smallest doubt;—what could we, who demand that the propositions we accept shall be propositions we can verify, ask more? *Il n'y a que les choses que je conçois clairement et distinctement qui aient la force de me persuader entièrement*; *Je ne puis me tromper dans les jugements dont je connais clairement les raisons*: Only those things which I conceive thoroughly and distinctly have the power thoroughly to persuade me; I cannot be mistaken in those judgments of which I clearly know the reasons;—what can be better? We have really no other ground for the certainty of our convictions than this clearness. Will it be said that here is an opening, at any rate, for unsoundness, and that in the following sentence, for example, we can plainly see how? *Toutes les choses que nous concevons clairement et distinctement sont vraies de la façon dont nous les concevons*, All things that we conceive clearly and distinctly are true as we conceive them. There is an ambiguity, is there not, about "clearly and distinctly;" a man may say or fancy he sees a thing clearly and distinctly, when he does nothing of the kind? True, this is so; a man may deceive himself as to what constitutes clearness and distinctness. Still, the test is good; we can only be sure of our judgments from their clearness and distinctness, though we may sometimes fancy that this clearness and distinctness is present when it is not.

At any rate, that first and greatest rule of Descartes, never to receive anything as true without having clearly known it for such, is for us unchallengeable. How vain and dangerous did we find Butler's proposal that we should take as the foundation of our religion something for which we had a low degree of probability! In this direction, assuredly, Descartes does not err. "Inasmuch as my reason convinces me," says he, "that I ought to be as careful to withhold my belief from things not quite certain and indubitable as from those which I plainly see to be false, it will be a sufficient ground to me for rejecting all my old opinions if I find in them all some opening for doubt." Certainly this is caution enough, to many it will seem excess of caution.

It is true, the doubts which troubled Descartes and which have troubled so many philosophers, doubts whether this world in which we live, the objects which strike our senses, the things which we see and handle, have any real existence, are not exactly the doubts by which we ourselves have been most plagued; indeed, to speak quite

frankly, they are doubts by which we have never been tormented at all. Our trouble has rather been with doubts whether things which people assured us really existed or had really happened, but of which we had no experience ourselves and could not satisfy ourselves that any one else had had experience either, were really as people told us. But probably this was from our want of philosophy and philosophical principles, which is so notorious, and which is so often and so uncharitably cast in our teeth. Descartes could look out of his window at Amsterdam, and see a public place filled with men and women, and say to himself that he had yet no right to be certain they were men and women, because they might, after all, be mere lay figures dressed up in hats and cloaks. This would never have occurred, perhaps, to the generality of mankind; to us, at any rate, it never would have occurred. But if this sort of scrupulosity led Descartes to establish his admirable rules: "I admit nothing which is not necessarily true," "Only those things which I conceive clearly and distinctly have the power to convince me," we cannot regret that he was thus scrupulous. For we all of us, as many as have doubts of any kind and want certainty, find our need served when a great man sets out with these stringent rules to discover what is really certain and verifiable. And we ourselves accordingly, plain unphilosophical people as we are, did betake ourselves once to Descartes with great zeal, and we were thus led to an experience which we have never forgotten. And perhaps it may be of use to other plain people, for the purpose of the enquiry which at present occupies us,—the enquiry whether the solid and necessary ground of religion is the assurance that God is a person who thinks and loves,—to follow over again in our company the experience which then befell us.

Every one knows that Descartes, looking about him, like Archimedes, for a firm ground whereon he might take his stand and begin to operate, for one single thing which was clearly certain and indubitable, found it in the famous *Cogito, ergo sum*, "I think, therefore I am." If I think, said he, I am, I exist; my very doubting proves that I, who doubt, am. "After thinking it well over and examining it on all sides, to this conclusion I cannot but come, I cannot but consider it settled that this proposition, *I am, I exist*, is necessarily true every time that I pronounce it or that I conceive it in my mind." The discovery of this axiom appears to have filled Descartes with a profound sense of certitude and of satisfaction. And the axiom has been hailed with general approval and adopted with general consent. Locke repeats it as self-evident, without taking the trouble to assign to Descartes the authorship of it: "If I doubt of all other things, that very doubt makes me perceive my own existence and will not suffer me to doubt of that." Thinker after thinker has paid his tribute of admiration to it, and it is called the foundation of modern philosophy.

Now we shall confess without shame,—for to the prick of shame in these matters, after all the tauntings and mockings we have had to undergo, we are by this time quite dead,—we shall confess that from this fundamental maxim of Descartes we were never able to derive that light and satisfaction which others seem to derive from it. And for this reason, the philosopher omits to tell us what he exactly means by *to be*, *to exist*. These terms stand for the most plain, positive, fundamental of certainties, which is established for us by the fact that we think. Now what *to think* means we all know, but even if we did not, Descartes tells us: “A thing which thinks,” says he, “is a thing which doubts, which understands, which conceives, which affirms, which denies, which wishes, which does not wish, which imagines also and which feels.” So far so good; but he does not tell us what those other terms *be* and *exist* mean, which convey the fundamental certainty established for us by the fact of our thinking; and this we do not so clearly know of ourselves without being told. Philosophers know, of course, for they are always using the terms; and perhaps this is why Descartes does not trouble himself to explain his terms, *I am*, *I exist*, because to him they carry an even more clear and well-defined sense than the term, *I think*. But to us they do not; and we suspect that the majority of plain people, if they consented to examine their minds, would find themselves to be in like case with us.

To get a clear and well-defined sense for the terms, *I am*, *I exist*, in the connection where Descartes uses them, we are obliged to translate them at a venture into something of this kind: “I feel that I am alive.” And then we get the proposition: I think, therefore, I feel that I am alive. This asserts our consciousness to depend upon our thinking rather than upon anything else which we do. The assertion is clear, it is intelligible, it seems true, and perhaps it is what Descartes meant to convey. Still, it is disappointing to a plain man, who has been attracted to Descartes by his promises of perfect clearness and distinctness, to find that his fundamental proposition, his first great certainty, is something which we cannot grasp as it stands, but that we have to translate it in order to be able to grasp it.

Perhaps, too, this translation of ours does not, after all, represent what Descartes himself meant by: *I am*, *I exist*. Perhaps he really did mean something more by the words, something that we fail to grasp. We say so, because we find him, like philosophers in general, often speaking of essence, existence, and substance, and in speaking of them he lays down as certain and evident many propositions which we cannot follow. For instance, he says: “The ideas which represent substances to us are undoubtedly something more, and contain in themselves, so to speak, more objective reality, that is to say, they partake by representation in more degrees of being or per-

fection, than those which represent to us modes or accidents only." "Undoubtedly," says he, this is so ; he introduces it, too, with saying : "It is evident." So our guide, who admits nothing which is not necessarily true, and puts aside everything about which he can imagine there being the smallest doubt, lays down that of *substances* we have ideas distinguished from ideas of modes or accidents by their possessing more *being*, and this is equivalent to possessing more perfection. For when we assert that one thing is more *perfect* than another, this means, Descartes informs us, that it has more reality, more *being*.

All this, I say, our guide finds certain and not admitting of the least doubt ; it is part of the things which we conceive with clearness and distinctness, and of which, therefore, we can be persuaded thoroughly. Man is a finite substance, that is, he has but a limited degree of being, or perfection. God is an infinite substance, that is, he has an unlimited degree of being, or perfection. Existence is a perfection, therefore God exists ; thinking and loving are perfections, therefore God thinks and loves. In short, we have an Infinite Being, eternal, immutable, all-knowing, all-powerful, and having every perfection we can think of for him. And all this turns upon the words *is, being*. Infinite being, necessary being, being in itself, as opposed to our own finite, contingent, dependent being, is something that we clearly conceive. Now something cannot come from nothing, and from us this infinite being could never have come ; therefore it exists in itself, and is what is meant by God.

Not Descartes only, but every philosopher who attempts a metaphysical demonstration of God, will be found to proceed in this fashion, and to appeal at last to our conception of *being, existing*. Clarke starts with the proposition that something must have existed from eternity, and so arrives at a self-existent cause, which must be an intelligent *Being* ; in other words, at God as a person who thinks and loves. Locke lays it down that "we know there is some real being, and that non-entity cannot produce any real being," and so brings us to an eternal, powerful, knowing *Being* ; in other words, God as a person who thinks and loves. Of the God thus arrived at, Locke, like Descartes, says that, "the evidence is, if I mistake not, equal to mathematical certainty." St. Anselm begins with an essential substantial good and great, "whereby," he says, "it is absolutely certain, and whoever likes can perceive it," that all the multifarious great and good things in the world get their goodness and greatness ; and thus again we come to a One *Being* essentially great and good, or Divine Person who thinks and loves.

Now here it is, we suppose, that one's want of talent for abstract reasoning makes itself so lamentably felt. For to us these propositions, which we are told are so perfectly certain, and he who will may perceive their truth, - the propositions that there is an essential sub-

stantial good and great, that there is some real being, that a self-existent cause must have been from eternity, that substances are distinguished in themselves and in our ideas of them from modes or accidents by their possessing more being,—have absolutely no force at all, we simply cannot follow their meaning. And so far as Descartes is concerned, this, when we first became aware of it, was a bitter disappointment to us; for he had seemed to promise us something which even *we* could understand, when he said that he put aside everything about which he could imagine there being the smallest doubt, and that the proof of things to us was in the perfect clearness and distinctness with which we conceived them.

However, men of philosophical talents will remind us of the truths of mathematics, and tell us that the three angles of a triangle are undoubtedly equal to two right angles, yet very likely from want of skill or practice in abstract reasoning we cannot see the force of *that* proposition, and it may simply have no meaning for us. And perhaps this may be so; but then the proposition in question is a deduction from certain elementary truths, and the deduction is too long or too hard for us to follow, or, at any rate, we may have not followed it or we may have forgotten it, and therefore we do not feel the force of the proposition. But the elementary assertions in geometry even we can apprehend; such as the assertion that two straight lines cannot enclose a space, or that things which are equal to the same are equal to each other. And we had hoped that Descartes, after his grand promises of clearness and certainty, would at least set out with assertions of this kind, or else with facts of the plainest experience; that he would start with something we might apprehend as we apprehend that three and two make five, or that fire burns. Instead of this, he starts with propositions about *being*, and does not tell us what *being* is. At one time he gives us hopes we may get to know it, for he says that to possess more being is to possess more perfection, and what men commonly mean when they talk of perfection, we think we can discover; but then we find that with Descartes to possess more perfection means to possess, not what men commonly call by that name, but to possess more being. And this seems to be merely going round in a circle, and we have to confess ourselves fairly puzzled and beaten.

So that when even Fénelon says, that most attractive of theologians: "It is certain that I conceive a Being, infinite and infinitely perfect," that is to say, infinitely *being*, we have to own with sorrow and shame that we cannot conceive this at all, for want of knowing what *being* is. Yet it is, we repeat, on the clearness and certainty of our conceptions of being, that the demonstration of God,—the most sure, as philosophers say, of all demonstrations, and on which all others depend,—is founded. The truth of all that people tell us about God turns upon this question what being is. Philosophy is full of the word, and some

philosophies are concerned with hardly anything else ; the scholastic philosophy, for instance, was one long debate about being and its conditions. Great philosophers, again, have established certain heads or "categories" as they call them, which are the final constitutive conditions of things into which all things may at last be run up ; and at the very top of these categories stands *essence* or *being*.

Other metaphysical terms do not give us the same difficulty. Substance, for example, which is the Latin translation of *essence* or *being*, merely means *being* in so far as *being* is taken to be the subject of all modes and accidents, that which stands under them and supplies the basis for them. Perhaps being does really do this, but we want first to know what being is. Spirit, which they oppose to matter, means literally, we know, only breath, but we use it for a *being* which is impalpable to touch as breath is. Perhaps this may be right, but we want first to know what being is. Existence, again, means a stepping forth, and we are told that God's *essence* involves *existence*, that is, that God's being necessarily steps forth, comes forth. Perhaps it does, but we require first to know what being is.

Till we know this, we know neither what to affirm nor what to refuse to affirm. We refused to affirm that God is a person who thinks and loves, because we had no experience at all of thinking and loving except as attached to a certain bodily organization ; but perhaps they are not attached to this, but to being, and we ourselves have them, not because we have a bodily organization, but because we partake of being. Supreme being, therefore, being in itself, which is God, must think and love more than any of us. Angels, too, there may be, whole hierarchies of them, thinking and loving, and having their basis in *being*. In the same way, again, our difficulties about the Real Presence may vanish ; in bread there is an *essence* or substance separable from what the theologians call "that group of visible and tangible phenomena which suggest the presence of bread," in other words, from that assemblage of certain atoms in a certain combination which we think is the bread ; and in the Sacred Host this *essence* or substance is not substance of bread but divine substance. All this may be so ; only we cannot possibly verify any of it until we know what *being* is ; and we want to rest religion upon something which we can verify. And we thought that Descartes, with his splendid promises, was going to help us here ; but just at the very pinch of the matter he fails us.

After all, plain, simple people are the great majority of the human race ; and we are sure, as we have said, that hundreds and thousands of people, if their attention were drawn to the matter, would acknowledge that they shared our slowness to see at once what being is, and, when they found how much depended on seeing it, would gladly accompany us, in the search for some one who could give us help. For on this we ourselves, at any rate, were bent :—to discover some

one who could tell us what being is. Such a kind soul we did at last find; and in these days we need hardly add, that he was a German professor.

But not a professor of logic and metaphysics. No, not Hegel, not one of those great men, those masters of abstruse reasoning, who discourse of being and non-being, essence and existence, subject and object, in a style to which that of Descartes is merely child's play. These sages only bewildered us more than we were bewildered already. For they were so far advanced in their speculations about being, that they were altogether above entertaining such a tyro's question as what being really was.

No, our professor was a mere professor of words, not of ontology. We bethought ourselves of our old resource, following the history of the human spirit, tracking its course, trying to make out how men have used words and what they meant by them. Perhaps in the word *being* itself, said we to ourselves, there may be something to tell us what it at first meant and how men came to use it as they do. *Abstracta ex concretis*, say the etymologists; the abstract has been formed out of the concrete. Perhaps this abstract *being*, also, has been formed out of some concrete, and if we knew out of what, we might possibly trace how it has come to be used as it has. Or has indeed the mystic vocable no natural history of this sort, but has dropped out of heaven, and all one can say of it is that it means *being*, something which the philosophers understand but we never shall, and which explains and demonstrates all sorts of hard problems, but to philosophers only and not to the common herd of mankind?

So, then, the natural history of the word was what we wanted. With a proper respect for our Aryan forefathers, first we looked in Sanscrit Dictionaries for information; but here, probably from our own ignorance and inexperience in the Sanscrit language, we failed to find what we sought. By a happy chance, however, it one day occurred to us to turn for aid to a book about the Greek language, a language where we were not quite so helpless as in Sanscrit, to the "Principles of Greek Etymology," by Dr. George Curtius, of Leipsic.\* He it was who succoured a poor soul whom the philosophers had driven well-nigh to despair, and he deserves, and shall have, our everlasting gratitude.

In the book of Dr. Curtius we looked out the Greek verb *eimi*, *eis* or *ei*, *esti*, the verb which has the same source as the English verb *is*. Shall we ever forget the emotion with which we read what follows:— "That the meaning, addressed to the senses, of this very old verb substantive was *breathe*, is made all but certain by the Sanscrit *as-u-s*, life-breath, *asu-ra-s*, living, and the Sanscrit *ds*, mouth, parallel with the Latin *os*. The Hebrew verb substantive *haja* or *hawa*, has, according

\* "Grundzüge der Griechischen Etymologie," von Georg Curtius; 3rd. edit., Leipzig, 1869.

to Renan ('De l'Origine du Langage,' 4th edit., p. 129) the same original signification. The three main meanings succeed one another in the following order: *breathe, live, be.*" We get, then, for the English *is*, the French and Latin *est*, the Greek *estin* or *esti*, an Indo-European root *as*, breathe.

To get thus much was delightful, but what was our joy to find ourselves put by Dr. Curtius, in some words following those we have quoted, on the trace of a meaning for the mysterious term *being* itself? Dr. Curtius spoke of a root synonymous with *as*, the root *bhu*, in Greek *φύ*, and referred his readers to No. 417. To No. 417 we impatiently turned. We found there the account of the Greek verb *φύω, φύομαι*, I beget, I grow. This word is familiar to us all in our own words *future* and *physics*, in the French *fus*, in the Latin *fui*. All these are from an Indo-European root *bhu*, be, which had primarily that sense of "grow" which its Greek derivative has kept. "The notion *be* attaches to this root," says Dr. Curtius, "evidently on the foundation only of the more primitive *grow*." If the root *as*, breathe, gives us, then, our *is*, *essence*, the root *bhu*, grow, gives us our *be*, *being*. *Is*, *essence* and *entity*, *am*, *be* and *being*, here we have the source of them all; as in another Indo-European root, *sta*, stand, we have, as everybody knows, the source of our words *existence*, *substance*. Our composite verb substantive in English, like the verb substantive in Latin, employs both the root *as* and the root *bhu*; we have *is* and *be*, as the Latin has *est* and *fui*. The French verb substantive manages to employ—so Mr. Littré in his admirable new dictionary points out—the roots *as*, *bhu*, and *sta*, all three.

Now, then, it remained for us to ask, how these harmless concretes, breathe, grow, and stand, could ever have risen into those terrible abstracts, *is*, *be*, and *exist*, which had given us so much torment. And really, by attending to the natural course followed by the human mind, to men's way of using words and arriving at thoughts, this was not so very hard to make out. Only, when once it was made out, it proved fatal to the wonderful performances of the metaphysicians upon their theme of *being*. But we must not anticipate.

Men took these three simple names of the foremost and most elementary activities in that which they knew best and were chiefly concerned with,—in themselves; they took breathing, growing, standing forth, to describe all activities which were remarked by their senses or by their minds. So arose the verb substantive. Children, we can observe, do not connect their notions at all by the verb, the word expressing activity. They say, "horse, black," and there they leave it. When man's mind advanced beyond this simple stage, and he wanted to connect his notions by representing one notion as affecting him through its appearing or operating in conjunction with another notion, then he took a figure from the activity that lay nearest to him and said: The horse breathes (*is*) black.



When he got to the use of abstract nouns his verb still remained the same ; he said : Virtue breathes (is) fair ; Valour growing (being) praiseworthy. Soon the sense of the old concrete meaning faded away in the new employment of the word. That slight parcel of significance which was required had been taken, and now it alone remained, and the rest was left unregarded and died out of men's thoughts.

We may make this clearer to ourselves by observing what has happened in the French and Dutch words for our common word *but*. *But* is in French *mais*, the Latin *magis*, our word *more* ; in Dutch it is *maar*, our word *more* itself. *Mais* and *maar* were originally used, no doubt, with the sense of their being a check, or stop, given to something that had been said before, by the *addition* to it of something fresh. The primitive sense of addition faded away, the sense of check remained alone. And so it was with *as* and *blu*, the primitive *breathe* and *grow*. Whatever affected us by appearing to us or by acting on us was at first said by a figure to breathe and grow ; the figure was forgotten, and now *as* and *blu* no longer raised the idea of breathing and growing, but merely of that appearance or operation, a kind of shadow of breathing and growing, which these words *as* and *blu* had at first been employed to convey. And for breathing and growing other words than *as* and *blu* were now found, just as, in French, *mais* now no longer means *more*, but for *more* another word has been found. Sometimes, however, as in the case of the Greek verb γίγνομαι, ἐγενόμην, we see the same word continuing to be used both in its old full sense and in its new shrunk sense ; γένεσθαι may mean both *to be born* and *to be*. But the user employed it, probably, in the two different acceptations, as if he had been employing two different words, nor did its use as hardly more than a copula necessarily raise in his mind the thought of its originally fuller significance.

Nor were these primitive verbs, *as* and *blu*, used only as a copula, to connect, in the manner we have described, the attribute with its subject. They were also used as themselves expressing an attribute of the subject. For when men wanted strongly to affirm that action or operation of things, that image of their own life and activity, which impressed itself upon their mind and affected them, they took these same primitive verbs and used them emphatically. Virtue *is*, they said ; Truth does not cease to *be* ; literally, virtue *breathes* ; truth does not cease to *grow*. A yet more emphatic affirmation of this kind was supplied by the word *exist*. For to exist is literally to step forth, and he who steps forth gives a notable proof of his life and activity. Men said therefore : Duty *exists* ; that is, according to the original figure : Duty steps forth, stands forth.

And the *not ourselves*, mighty for our weal or woe, which so soon by some one or other of its sides attracted the notice of man, this also man connected with whatever attributes he might be led

to assign to it by his universal connective, his now established verbs *as* and *bhu*, his breathe and grow with their blunted and shadowy sense of breathing and growing. He said: God *breathes* angry; our God *breathes* a jealous God. When he wanted to affirm emphatically that this power acts, makes itself felt, lasts, he said: God *is*, God *exists*, or in other words, God *breathes*, God *steps forth*. Israel conceived God with a solemnity and a seriousness unknown to other nations, as the not ourselves that makes for righteousness. "When I speak of this unique God of Israel," asked Moses, "how shall I name him?" And the answer came (I will give it in the words of the literal Latin version, printed under the Hebrew in Walton's noble Polyglott Bible): "Dixit Deus ad Mosen: *Ero qui ero*. Et dixit: Sic dices filiis Israel: *Ero* misit me ad vos." '*I will breathe* hath sent me unto you;' or, as the Arabic version well renders this mystic name: *The Eternal, that passeth not*. For that this is the true meaning of the name there can be no doubt:—the *I will go on living, operating, enduring*. "God here signifies of himself," says Gesenius, "not simply that he is he who is, for of this everyone must perceive the frigidity, but he signifies emphatically that he is *he who is always the same*, that is, the Immutable, the Eternal." To the same effect Dr. Kalisch, in his valuable commentary, after reciting the series of more fanciful and metaphysical interpretations, rests finally in this the simple and the undoubtedly true one: He that changeth not and that faileth not. "*I will breathe* hath sent me unto you!" Still the old sensuous image from the chief and most striking function of human life, transferred to God, taken to describe, in the height and permanency of its beneficent operation, this mighty *not ourselves*, which in its operation we are aware of, but in its nature, no.

And here is indeed the grand conclusion to be drawn from this long philological disquisition, from our persistent scrutiny of the primitives *as* and *bhu*, breathe and grow: that by a simple figure they declare a perceived energy and operation, nothing more. Of a *subject*, as we call him, that performs this operation, of the nature of things outside the range of plants and of animals which do indeed grow and breathe, and from which the figure in *as* and *bhu* is borrowed, they tell us nothing. But they have been falsely supposed to tell us something about the nature of things, to declare a subject in which inhered the energy and the operation we noticed, to indicate a fontal category or supreme constitutive condition, into which the nature of all things whatsoever might be finally run up.

For the original figure, as we have said, was soon forgotten; and *is* and *be*, mysterious petrifications, remained in language as if they were autochthons there, and as if no one could go beyond or behind them. Without father, without mother, without descent, as it seemed, they yet were omnipresent in our speech, and indispensable. Allied

words in which the figure was manifest, such as existence and substance, were thought to be figures from the world of sense pressed into the service of a metaphysical reality enshrined in *is* and *be*. That imposing phrase of the metaphysicians for summing up the whole system of things, *substance and accident*,—phenomena and that which stands under phenomena and in which they inhere,—must surely, one would think, have provoked question, have aroused misgivings, people must surely have asked themselves what the *that* which stands under phenomena was, if the answer had not been ready: *being*. And being was supposed to be something absolute, which stood under all things. Yet being was itself all the while but a sensuous figure, *growing*, and did not of necessity express anything of a thing's nature, expressed only man's sense of a thing's operation.

But philosophers, ignorant of this, and imagining that they had in *being* a term which expressed the highest and simplest nature of things, stripped off, to use a phrase of Descartes, when they wanted to reach the naked truth of a thing, one of the thing's garments after another, they stripped away this and that figure and size for bodies, this and that thought and desire for mind, and so they arrived at the final substance of bodies and of mind, their being or essence, which for bodies was a substantial essence capable of infinite diversities of figure and size, for mind a substantial essence capable of infinite diversities of thought and desire. And that for bodies and for mind they thus got a highest reality merely negative, a reality in which there was less of reality than in any single body or mind they knew, this they did not heed, because in being or essence they supposed they had the supreme reality.

Finally, in considering God they were obliged, if they wanted to escape from difficulties, to drop even the one characteristic they had assigned to their substance, that of admitting modes and accidents, and thus to reduce, in fact, their idea of God to nothing at all. And this they themselves were much too acute, many of them, not to perceive; as Erigena, for instance, says: "*Deus non immerito nihilum vocatur*, God may be not improperly called nothing." But this did not make them hesitate, because they thought they had in pure being, or essence, the supreme reality, and that this being in itself, this essence not even serving as substance, was God.\* And therefore Erigena adds that it is *per excellentium*, by reason of excellency, that God is not improperly called nothing: "*Deus per excellentiam non immerito nihilum vocatur*."

To such a degree do words make man, who invents them, their sport. The moment we have an abstract word, a word where we do not apprehend both the concrete sense and the manner of this sense's application, there is danger. The whole value of an abstract term depends on our true and clear conception of that which we have abstracted and now convey by means of this term. *Animal*

is a valuable term because we know what breathing, *anima*, is, and we use animal to denote all who have this in common. But the *être* of Descartes is an unprofitable term, because we do not clearly conceive what the term means; and it is, moreover, a dangerous term, because without clearly conceiving what it means, we nevertheless use it freely. When we at last come to examine the term, we find that *être* and *animal* really mean just the same thing: *breather*, that which has vital breath.

How astounding are the consequences if we give to *être* and its cognates this their original sense which we have discovered! *Cogito ergo sum* will then be: "I think, therefore I breathe;" a true deduction, certainly, but *comedo ergo sum*, "I eat, therefore I breathe," would be nearly as much to the purpose. Metaphysics, the science treating of *être* and its conditions, will be the science treating of breathing and its conditions; but surely the right science to treat of breathing and its conditions is not metaphysics but physiology. "God *is*," will be, God *breathes*; exactly that old anthropomorphic account of him which our dogmatic theology, by declaring him to be without body, parts, or passions, has sought to banish. And even to adore,—like those men of new lights, the French revolutionists, haters of our dogmatic theology,—even to adore, like Robespierre, the *Être Suprême*, will be only, after all, to adore the Supreme Animal! So perfidiously do these words *is* and *be*, on which we embarked our hopes because we fancied they would bring us to a thinking and loving independent of all material organization, so perfidiously do they land us in mere creature-worship of the grossest kind. Nay, and perhaps the one man who uses that wonderful abstract word, *essence*, with propriety, will turn out to be not the metaphysician or the theologian, but the perfumer; for while nothing but perplexity can come from speaking of the breathing of the Divine Nature, there is really much felicity in speaking of the breathing of roses.

Dismayed, then, at the consequences of a rash use of *being* and *essence*, we determined henceforth always to subject these vocables, when we found them used in a way which caused us any doubt, to a strict examination. Far from remaining, as formerly, in helpless admiration of the philosophers, when upon the foundation of these words they built their wonderful cloud-houses and then laughed at us for not being able to find our way about them, we set ourselves to discover what meaning the words, in men's use of them, really did and could contain. And we found that the great thing to keep steadily in mind is that the words are, as we have shown, figure. Man applied this image of breathing and growing, taken from his own life, to all which he perceived, all from which he felt an effect, and pronounced it all to be living too. The words, therefore, which appear to tell us something about the life and nature of all things,

do in fact tell us nothing about any life and nature except that which breathing and growing go in some degree to constitute; the life and nature, let us say, of men, of the lower animals, and of plants. Of life or nature in other things the words tell us nothing, but figuratively invest these things with the characters of animal and vegetable life. But what do they really tell us of these things? Simply that they have an effect upon us, that they operate.

The names themselves, then, *being* and *essence*, tell us something of the real constitution of animals and plants, but of nothing else. However, the real constitution of a thing it may happen that we know, although these names convey nothing of it and help us to it not at all. For instance, a chemist knows the constitution, say, of common ether; that common ether is an assemblage of molecules, each containing four atoms of carbon, ten of hydrogen, and one of oxygen, arranged in a certain order. This we may call the being or essence, the *growing* or *breath*, of common ether; that is to say, to the real constitution of a thing, when we know it, we often apply a figurative name originally suggested by the principal and prominent phenomena of our own constitution.

This in the case of bodies. When we speak of the being or essence of bodies, it may be that we know their real constitution and give these names to it. But far oftener men say that bodies have *being*, assert that bodies *are*, without any knowledge, either actual or implied, of the real constitution of the bodies, but merely meaning that the bodies are seen, heard, touched, tasted, or smelt by us, affect our senses in some way or other. And to bodies, thus acting upon us and affecting us, we attribute *being* or *growing*, we say that they are or *breathe*, although we may know nothing of their constitution; but we apply to their action a figurative name originally suggested by the principal and prominent activities of our own constitution.

And we proceed just in the same way with what are not bodies. Men abstract, say, from a number of brave and self-denying actions which have come within their experience, the quality which in these actions strikes them; some abstract inexactly and ill what they thus perceive, others exactly and well. But whether they abstract it exactly or inexactly, alike they talk of the *being* of what they have thus abstracted; alike they say that virtue and duty have *growing* or being, alike they assert that virtue and duty *breathe* or are. They apply to the working of their abstraction figurative names drawn originally from the principal and prominent workings of their own constitution.

Or, again, they become aware of a law of nature, as it is called, of a certain regular order in which it is proved, or thought to be proved, that certain things happen. To this law, to the law, let us suppose, of gravitation, they attribute *being*, they say that the law of gravitation is, exists, *breathe*s, ~~steps~~ forth; that is, they give to the regularly

ordered operation which they perceive, figurative names borrowed from the principal and prominent functions of their own life.

Or, finally, they become aware of a law of nature which concerns their own life and conduct in the highest degree : of an eternal *not ourselves* that makes for righteousness. For this is really a law of nature, collected from experience, just as much as the law of gravitation is ; only it is a law of nature which is conceived, however confusedly, by very many more of mankind as affecting them, and much more nearly. But it has its origin in experience, it appeals to experience, and by experience it is, as we believe, verified. Mr. Dunn,—whom we name with esteem because he has so firmly grasped the truth, that what Jesus Christ cared for was to change the inner man of each individual, not to establish organizations of any sort,—Mr. Dunn says that the God of popular religion, the personal God who thinks and loves, is as much verifiable by experience as our Eternal Power that makes for righteousness. Possibly he imagines us to mean by *power* some material agent, some body, some gas ; and such a divine agent making for righteousness is no more verifiable by experience, we confess, than a divine person who thinks and loves, making for it. We no more pretend to know the origin and composition of the power that makes for righteousness than of the power that makes for gravitation. All we profess to have ascertained about it is, that it has effect on us, that it operates. Some deny that it operates : *The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God.* But we maintain that experience is against the fool, that righteousness is salvation. As far as man's experience reaches, it comes out, and comes out ever more clearly, both by the operation of the law itself and by man's inward sense of affinity and response to it, that our welfare, which we cannot but pursue, is inextricably and unalterably, and by no procuring of ours but whether we will or no, dependent on conduct. Mr. Dunn does not surely think that we have the same experience of God as a person who thinks and loves, which we have of this ? He says that a great many people have believed that God is a person who thinks and loves. Undoubtedly they have ; just as a great many people have believed this or that hypothesis about the system of nature. But the question is, whether they had any such good grounds from experience for accepting these things as true, as there are for accepting as true the law of gravitation and the law of righteousness, the Eternal that makes for righteousness. It is said, again, that *eternal*,—that which never had a beginning, and can never have an end,—is a metaphysical conception not given by experience. Yes indeed, *eternal*, as that which never had a beginning and can never have an end, is, like the final substance or subject wherein all qualities inhere, a metaphysical conception to which experience has nothing to say. But eternal, *ævi-ternus*, the age or life-long, as men applied it to the Eternal that makes for righteousness, was no metaphysical conception. From all they could

themselves make out, and from all that their fathers had told them, they believed that righteousness was salvation, and that it would go on being salvation from one generation of men to another. And this is the only sound sense in which we can call the law of righteousness, or the law of gravitation, or any other law which we may perceive, eternal. From all that we hear or can make out it holds good, and we believe, therefore, that it will go on holding good.

Well, then, men become aware from experience, that source of all our knowledge, they become aware of a law of righteousness. And to this law they attribute *being*, they say that the law of conduct, the Eternal not ourselves which makes for righteousness, is, exists, *breathes, steps forth*. That is to say, they give to the steadfast, unchanging, widely and deeply working operation which they perceive, figurative names borrowed from the principal and prominent operations of their own life.

Being and essence men in this way attribute to what they perceive, or think they perceive, to be a law of nature. But, long before they perceive it as a law of nature, they dimly and obscurely are conscious of its working; they feel its power by many a sharp lesson. And imagination coming in to help, they make it, as they make everything of which they powerfully feel the effect, into a human agent, at bottom like themselves, however much mightier,—a human agent that feels, thinks, loves, hates. So they made the sun into a human being, and even the operation of chance, Fortune. And what should sooner or more certainly be thus made into a human being, but far mightier and more lasting than common man, than the operation which affects men so widely and deeply, for it is engaged with conduct, with at least three-fourths of human life, the not ourselves that makes for righteousness? Made into a human being this was sure to be, from its immense importance, its perpetual intervention. But this does not make the personifying, anthropomorphic process the less the explanation of the attributed human qualities in this case, than it is the explanation of them in others. Yet we will have it, very many of us, that the human qualities are in the one case really there and inherent, but in all the other cases they are the mere work of man's plastic personifying power. What was the Apollo of the religion of the Greeks? The law of intellectual beauty, the Eternal that makes for intellectual beauty. By a natural and quite explicable working of the human spirit, a heightened, glorified human being, thinking and loving, came to stand for the operation of this power. Who doubts this? But the thinking and loving Apollo of the Greeks, and every other example of the like kind except one, this natural working of the human spirit is supposed to explain; only the thinking and loving Jehovah of the Hebrews shall not be explained by this working, but a person who thinks and loves he really is!

To return, then, to our much abused primitives. What is the

conclusion of the whole matter with them? It is this. They were supposed to give us for conscious intelligence, for thinking and loving, a basis or subject independent of bodily constitution. They do in fact give us nothing beyond bodily constitution, but they transfer by a figure our own bodily life to all law and operation. On a fine and subtle scale they still carry on that personifying, anthropomorphic process, native in man and ineradicable, which in all the early religions of the world we can see going forward on a scale gross and palpable.

So it appears, that when we talk of the *being* of things we use a fluid and literary expression, not a rigid and scientific one. And in every case where anything is made to depend upon the use of the words *is* and *be*, we ought to examine what is said, and see what sense they can really, in that particular case, bear. For instance: Descartes says, that what makes him certain of the truth of his fundamental proposition, "I think, therefore I am," *Je pense, donc je suis*, is that he sees quite clearly that in order to think one must be; *pour penser, il faut être*. And *être* really means to breathe, and we do, indeed, see quite clearly that, in order to think, we must breathe, and this is the clearest sense the words can have; but it is not the sense Descartes meant to give them. Well then, they can also bear the sense that because we think we feel ourselves to be alive, and probably this is what Descartes alleges that he and all of us can see quite clearly. So when philosophers tell us, in their grand language, that "from our actual thought we affirm our actual existence," let us simple people interpret, and say that this means that because we think we feel ourselves to be alive; and let us concede, with due admiration for those who clothe the thing in such imposing language, that we can clearly see this also to be true. Only let us remember exactly what it is that we have seen to be true; and when the philosophers go on to tell us, further, that "as we affirm our actual existence from our actual thought, similarly, the idea we have of the infinite and infinitely perfect Being, that is, of God, clearly involves his actual existence;" let us again put the thing into easier language, and propound it to ourselves that as, because we think, we feel ourselves to be alive, similarly, because we think of God, God feels himself to be alive. Probably we shall not be disposed to concede that we can clearly see this to be true; nor, perhaps, would the philosophers allege it as certain, if they had accustomed themselves to inquire in all cases what *being*, *existing*, really mean.

Armed with this key of the real signification of our two poor little words, *is* and *be*, let us next boldly carry the war into the enemy's country and see how many strong fortresses of the metaphysicians, which frown upon us from their heights so defiantly, we can enter and rife. For *is* and *be*, we have learnt, either mean breathe and grow, or else they mean operate. But when the metaphysicians start with their at least certainly knowing that *something is*, they



always have in their minds : Something thinks which neither breathes nor grows, and we know of a subject for thinking which neither breathes nor grows, and that subject is being, *être*. But being, *être*, are breathing and growing. And then, with their two supposed data of a cogitative substance and an incogitative substance, the metaphysicians argue away about the necessary mutual relations of these two in the production of things, and form all manner of fine conclusions. But all the knowledge they do really set out with in their *something* is amounts to this : We are aware of operation ; and this neither tells them anything about the origin and production of things, nor enables them to conclude anything. Now the *Edinburgh Review* says : "All existing things must be persons or things ; persons are superior to things ; do you mean to call God a thing ?" The ambiguity is in *things*. He who asserts this or that to be a person or a thing, endued, that is, with what we call life or not endued with it, pronounces something concerning its constitution. And when we pronounce that God has being, that God is, we may mean by this that God has growth, that God breathes ; and then we do assert something concerning God's constitution, and affirm God to be a person not a thing. But we may also mean, when we pronounce that God has being, that God is, simply that God operates, that the Eternal which makes for righteousness has operation ; and then we assert nothing about God's constitution whatever, we neither affirm God to be a person nor to be a thing. And, indeed, we are not at all in a position to affirm God to be either the one or the other ; and he who pronounces that God must be a person or a thing, and that he must be a person because persons are superior to things, talks as idly as one who should insist upon it that the law of gravitation must be either a person or a thing, and should lay down which of the two it must be. Because it is a law, is it to be pronounced a thing and not a person, and therefore inferior to persons ? and are we quite sure that a bad critic, suppose, is superior to the law of gravitation ? The truth is, we are attempting an exhaustive division into things and persons, and attempting to affirm that the object of our thought is one or the other, when we have no means for doing anything of the kind, when all we can really say of our object of thought is, that it operates.

And that favourite and famous demonstration of Anselm and Descartes, that if we have the idea of a perfect being, or God,—that is to say, of an infinite substance, eternal, all-knowing, all-powerful, the creator of all things, and with every possible perfection,—then this perfect being must exist, for existence is a perfection, and besides, our imperfect finite being could never have given to itself the idea of a perfect infinite being ; but we have this idea quite clearly and distinctly, and therefore there must exist some other being besides ourselves from whom we must have received it ; all this, again, tumbles to pieces like a house of cards the moment we regard it

steadily and with an exact remembrance of what our words mean. The deception comes from the words *perfect being, infinite substance*. Of a *not ourselves* we are aware;—but a clear idea of an infinite substance, a perfect being, knowing and thinking and yet not breathing and growing? And this idea we could not have given to ourselves, because it is a clear idea of an infinite substance, full of perfection, and we are a finite substance, full of imperfection? But after examining *is* and *be*, we are sure that no man has a clear idea of an infinite substance, knowing and thinking, and the idea which he thus describes is an idea which, in the only state wherein he really has it, he may perfectly well have given to himself. For it is an idea of a man immensely magnified and improved. The less and more in ourselves of whatever we account good, gives us a notion of what we call perfection in it. We have degrees of pleasure and we talk of perfect, infinite pleasure; we have some rest, and we talk of perfect, infinite rest; we have some knowledge, and we talk of perfect, infinite knowledge; we have some power, and we talk of perfect, infinite power. What we mean is, a great deal of pleasure, rest, knowledge, power,—all that we can imagine, and without the many lets and hindrances to them which we now experience. Our idea of a perfect being, all-knowing, all-powerful, is just like that idea of a myriagon, of which Descartes himself speaks somewhere. Of a pentagon, or five-sided figure, we have a distinct idea, and we talk of our idea of a myriagon, or ten-thousand-sided figure, too; but it is not a clear idea, it is an idea of something very big, but confused. Such is our idea of an infinite substance, all-knowing, all-powerful. Of a bounded man, with some knowledge and power, we have a distinct idea; of an unbounded man, with all knowledge and all power, our idea is not clear; we have an idea of something very wise and great, but confused. And granting that clear ideas prove themselves, this alleged clear and distinct idea of an infinite substance, all-knowing and all-powerful, is one of those cases where an idea is fancied to be clear and distinct when it is not.

Or let us take the grand argument from design. Design, people say, implies a designer. The fallacy lies in the little termination *er*. We talk of a being, an *être*, and we imagine that the word gives us conscious intelligence, thinking and loving, without bodily organization; but it does not. It gives us one of two things only; either it gives us breathing and growing, or it gives us effect and operation. Design implies a designer? Human design does; it implies the presence of a being who breathes and thinks. So does that of the lower animals, who, like man himself, breathe, and may be said to think. A very numerous class of works we know, which man and the lower animals make for their own purposes. When we see a watch or a honeycomb we say: It works harmoniously and well, and a man or a bee made it. But a yet more numerous class of works we know, which neither man

nor the lower animals have made for their own purposes. When we see the ear, or see a bud, do we say: It works harmoniously and well, and a man or one of the lower animals made it? No; but we say: It works harmoniously and well, and an infinite eternal substance, an all-thinking and all-powerful Being, the Creator of all things, made it. Why? Because it works harmoniously and well. But its working harmoniously and well does not prove all this; it only proves that it works harmoniously and well. The well and harmonious working of the watch or the honeycomb is not what proves to us that a man or a bee made them; what proves this to us is that we know from experience that men make watches and bees make honeycombs. But we do not know from experience that an infinite eternal substance, all-thinking and all-powerful, the Creator of all things, makes ears and buds. We know nothing about the matter, it is altogether beyond us. When, therefore, we are speaking exactly, and not poetically and figuratively, of the ear or of a bud, all we have a right to say is: It works harmoniously and well.

We besought those who could receive neither the miracles of popular theology nor the metaphysics of learned theology, not to fling away the Bible on that account, but to try how the Bible went if they took it without either the one or the other, and studied it without taking anything for granted but what they could verify. But such indignant and strenuous objection was made in the religious world to this proposal, and in particular it was so emphatically asserted that the only possible basis for religion is to believe that God is a person who thinks and loves, that the readers of "Literature and Dogma" who had taken our advice and had begun to find profit from it, might well be supposed to feel alarm and to hesitate, and to ask whether, after all, they were doing well in following our recommendation. So we had to look again at the reasons for laying down as the foundation of religion the belief that God is a person who thinks and loves; and we found reasons of two kinds alleged:—reasons drawn from miracles and reasons drawn from metaphysics. But the reasons from miracles we found, after looking at miracles again, that we could not rely on, that fail us sooner, or later they surely must. And now we find the same thing with the reasons drawn from metaphysics.

The reasons drawn from miracles one cannot but dismiss with tenderness, for they belong to a great and splendid whole,—a beautiful and powerful fairy tale, which was long believed without question, and which has given comfort and joy to thousands; and one abandons them with a kind of unwilling disenchantment and only because one must. The reasons drawn from metaphysics one dismisses, on the other hand, with sheer satisfaction. They have convinced no one, they have given rest to no one, they have given

joy to no one; people have swallowed them, people have fought over them, people have shown their ingenuity over them; but no one has ever enjoyed them. Nay, no one has ever really understood them; no one has ever fairly grasped the meaning of what he was saying when he laid down propositions about finite and infinite substance, and about God's essence involving existence. Yet men of splendid ability have dealt in them; but the truth is, the reasons from metaphysics for the Divine Personality got their real nourishment and support out of the reasons from miracles. Through long ages the inexperience, the helplessness, and the agitation of man made the belief in a magnified and non-natural man or men, in etherialized men, in short in preternatural beings of some sort or other, inevitable; and the preternatural being supposed to be certainly there, the metaphysics or science of things coming after natural things and no longer natural, had to come in to account for it. But the miracles proving to be an unsubstantial ground of reliance, the metaphysics will certainly not stand long. And an unsubstantial ground of reliance men more and more perceive miracles to be; and the sooner they quite make up their mind about it, the better for them. If it is vain to tamper with one's understanding, to resist one's widening experience, and to try to think that from miracles one can get ground for asserting God to be a person who thinks and loves, still more vain is it to try to think one can get ground for this from metaphysics.

And perhaps we may have been enabled to make this clear to ourselves and others, because we, having no talent for abstruse reasoning and being known to have none, were not ashamed, when we were confronted by propositions about essence and existence, and about infinite substance having undoubtedly more objective reality than finite substance, we were not ashamed, I say, instead of assenting with a solemn face to what we did not understand, to say that we did not understand it, and to seek humbly for the meaning of the little words at the bottom of it all; and so the futility of all the grand superstructure was revealed to us. If the German philosopher, who writes to us from Texas reproaching us with wasting our time over the Bible and Christianity, "which are certainly," says he, "disappearing from heart and mind of the cultured world," and calling us to the study of the great Hartmann, will allow us to quote the Bible once more, we should be disposed to say, that here is a good exemplification of that text: *Mansueti delectabuntur*, "The meek-spirited shall be refreshed."

But to our reader and to ourselves we say again as to the metaphysics of current theology what we said as to its miracles:—When we have made out their untrustworthiness, we have as yet achieved nothing, except to get rid of an unsafe stay which would inevitably have sooner or later broken down with us. But to use the Bible, to enjoy the Bible, remains. We cannot use it, we cannot enjoy it, many of us,


if its use and enjoyment require us first to take for granted something which cannot possibly be verified. Whether we will or no, this is so; and more and more will mankind, the religious among them as well as the hard, find themselves in this case. "In good truth," said Pascal to the Jesuits, "the world is getting mistrustful, and no longer believes things unless they are evident to it." In the seventeenth century, when Pascal said this, it had already begun to be true; it is getting more widely true every day. Therefore we urge all whom the current theology, both popular and learned, repels (for with those whom it does not repel we do not meddle), we urge them to take as their foundation in reading the Bible this account of God, which can be verified: "God is the Eternal power, not ourselves, which makes for righteousness," instead of this other: "God is a person who thinks and loves," which cannot. We advise them to eschew as much as possible, in speaking about God, the use of the word *Being*, which even strict thinkers are so apt to use continually without asking themselves what it really means. The word is bad, because it has a false air of conveying some real but abstruse knowledge about God's nature, while it does not, but is merely a figure. *Power* is a better word, because it pretends to assert of God nothing more than effect on us, operation. With much of the current theology our unpretending account of God will indeed make havoc; but it will enable a man, we believe, to use and enjoy the Bible in security. Only he must remember that the language of the Bible is to be treated as the language of letters, not science, language approximative and full of figure, not language exact.

Many excellent people are crying out every day that all is lost in religion unless we can affirm that God is a person who thinks and loves. We say that unless we can verify this it is impossible to build religion upon it; and it cannot be verified. Even if it could be shown that there is a low degree of probability for it, we say that it is a grave and fatal error to imagine that religion can be built upon what has a low degree of probability. However, we do not think it can be said that there is even a low degree of probability for the assertion that God is a person who thinks and loves, properly and naturally though we may make him such in the language of feeling; the assertion deals with what is so utterly beyond us. But we maintain, that, starting from what may be verified about God, that he is the Eternal which makes for righteousness, and reading the Bible with this idea to govern us, we have here the elements for a religion more serious, potent, awe-inspiring, and profound, than any which the world has yet seen. True, it will not be the same religion which prevails now; but who supposes that the religion now current can go on always, or ought to go on? Nay and even of that much decried idea of God as the stream of tendency by which all things fulfil the law of their being, it may be said with confidence that it has in it

new elements of a religion hopeful, solemn, and profound. But our present business is not with this. Our present business is with the religion of the Bible, to show a new aspect of this wherein it shall appear true, winning, and commanding. This was what we attempted in "Literature and Dogma," and the whole value of that book depends, we repeat, on whether we attempted it successfully.

And if the reader of "Literature and Dogma" has for a time to lose sight of this aspect amid negations and conflicts,—necessary negations, conflicts, without which the ground for a better religion cannot be won,—still, by these waters of Babylon, let him remember Sion! After a course of Liberal philosophers proposing to replace the obsolete Bible by the enunciation in modern and congenial language of new doctrines which will satisfy at once our reason and imagination; after reading their grand conclusion that there is little indeed in the history and achievements of Christianity to support the claim made on its behalf to the character of a scheme divinely revealed for the salvation of the human race, let him say: *My soul hath long dwelt among them that are enemies unto peace!* and let him remember Sion. But we will not quarrel with him if he says and does the same thing after reading us, too, when we have kept him so long at the joyless task of learning what *not* to believe. But happily this part of our business is now over. In what remains, we have to defend ourselves, and secure him, against the Liberal philosophers who accuse us of teaching him to believe too much.

MATTHEW ARNOLD.



## LETTER TO THE EDITOR.

SIR,—I was somewhat surprised to read the following passage in an article by Mr. St. George Mivart in the *CONTEMPORARY REVIEW* for March :—“The complete abandonment of the Christian standpoint by those who advocate new State religions even when such advocates are disguised as ecclesiastics, is curiously illustrated by the declaration of Dr. Reinkens (when taking his oath to the State). He then declared that if the State should hereafter require of him acts inconsistent with his duty as a Christian bishop, *he would resign his office rather than oppose it.* . . . Thus, according to him, the duty of bishops in the presence of a Government which has become hostile to Christianity is to *desert their charges* and to leave their starving flocks to the mercy of the wolves, as this eminent pastor professes beforehand his readiness to do.”

Mr. Mivart is surely aware that all bishoprics in the Roman Catholic Church in Prussia, so far as the circumscription of the diocese is concerned, have been constituted by the sanction of the Government ; that the Government has a voice in the election of bishops by eliminating from a list proposed to it by the chapter those whom it disapproves ; that it gives them large dotations, and invests them with civil rank ; further that it concedes them important rights of jurisdiction over their clergy, the control of large funds belonging to the Church, and therefore to its membership in the several local communities, and the right of interference in matters which belong to the State as well as to the Church, *e.g.* marriage, education, divorce, &c. &c. Consequently, ere any bishop enter on his office and exercise in any particular diocese any episcopal functions, he must have been not only approved by the State, but he must take an oath of loyalty to the State. In that oath he swears that his oath to the Pope does not hinder him in keeping his oath of fealty to the State. If, on the ground of his oath to the State, he has been allowed to enter upon his diocese—(1) what should he do if he cannot keep that oath ? (2) what will the State compel him to do if he breaks it ? In the first case, surely he should at once give up his office, so far as it is determined and upheld by the State, or leans on State sanction and authority in the fulfilment of its duties. In the second case, most certainly if he does not, the State will compel him. The Roman Catholic bishop should resign that office to which the oath gave him legal title if his oath to the Pope forbids his perfect loyalty. Bishop Reinkens promises voluntarily to resign his office rather than violate his conscience ! In doing so, he does not desert his flock, but sets it an example of Christian probity.

That the clergy, and especially the bishops, of the endowed historical Churches of Prussia are regarded as holding an office in connection with the State will appear from two quotations which I make. (1) The *Allgemeines Landrecht*, § 96, thus at once defines and privileges the clergy :—“The clergy, as officers of the State, are ordinarily free from the personal taxes and obligations of citizens.” In many other sections it speaks of their “removal from their office,” which Mr. Mivart conceives to be an impossibility. (2) The Commission which examined the Bill carried last May for the “Training of the Clergy” thus speak in their report :—“The pastoral office in the privileged Christian Churches has, by reason of its privileges and the special legal protection it enjoys, the character of a public office. The clergy enjoy the rights of State officers ; the *publica fides* of the church registers, which they keep, and of the certificates copied from them, continues ; their official duties enjoy special legal protection, and suits can only be instituted against them as against State officials. They possess, further, a number of personal privileges in respect to taxation and military service, and the recovery of their ministerial income is secured by either the administration or an abridged procedure in law [Mandatsprozess]. Indeed, the State extends its care for the clerical office so far that it, even without legal obli-

tion, assists with its own resources where the communities are themselves not able to provide an adequate income [the 'Congrua']."

I thought it right to bring the passage which I have controverted before the notice of Bishop Reinkens, and I have pleasure in appending his own explanation and defence of the declaration which he made. It will interest your readers, and may serve to enlighten Mr. Mivart.

I am your obedient servant,

J. B. PATON.

"Dass in England so wenig Kenntniss und Verständniss unserer Sache ist, wie wir das aus Artikeln in den bedeutendsten Englischen Zeitungen, z. B. in der *Times*, ersehen, thut meinen Freunden und mir sehr leid, um so mehr, da wir der Meinung waren und immer noch sein möchten, das edle Englische Volk sei berufen, in dem grossen Culturkampfe der Gegenwart mit an der Spitze zu schreiten. Ein Unglück ist es auch, dass die alten katholischen Familien Englands sich indolent erweisen, unempfindlich für die Sittenverderbniss der Römischen Curie. . . . Die Convertiten, voran Manning, führen allein das Wort im Namen der Römisch-katholischen Kirche, und die alten Familien schweigen oder lassen sich von jenen bevormunden, sie kennen meist nicht einmal den Gegenstand, um den wir kämpfen, und doch haben wir, während der letzten vier Jahre, in Deutschland eine grosse Litteratur darüber geschaffen, die in jenen Kreisen nicht unbekannt sein dürfte, wenn es mit der Religion Ernst genommen würde. Doch meine Arbeit, meine nächste Pflicht, gestattet mir nicht, näher hierauf einzugehen.

"Sie wünschen, von mir eine Aufklärung über ein Wort, welches ich am 7ten October 1873, bei meiner Vereidigung in Berlin, gesprochen habe, dass ich nämlich bei einem Conflicte meines Gewissens mit den Staatsgesetzen nicht meinen Eid brechen, sondern mein Amt niederlegen würde. Nur so hat der Eid auf die Staatsgesetze einen Sinn; der Schwur der ultramontanen Bischöfe richtet sich in der Intention nach einer *Reservatio mentalis*, durch welche derselbe nur zu einem jesuitischen Mittel wird, die Staatsregierung zu täuschen und zu betrügen, um Rechte zu erlangen, welche der Staat ohne die Leistung des Eides nicht gewährt.

"Die Sache verhält sich also. Durch die landesherrliche Anerkennung eines Bischofs erhält dieser staatsbürgerliche Privilegien und Rechte, eine Autorität zur Mitbegründung civilrechtlicher Zustände, grossen Einfluss und selbst eine gewisse Gewalt über die materielle Existenz einer oft bedeutenden Zahl von Staatsbürgern. Alles dieses erhält er niemals und in keiner Weise durch die Bestätigung oder Praeconisation von Seiten des Papstes, und selbst nicht durch die Wahl und Weihe. Auch verleiht der Staat jene Privilegien und Rechte nur und einzig und allein unter der Bedingung der ehrlichen und rückhaltslosen Eidesleistung auf die ganz getreue Befolgung der Gesetze. Nun sage ich: es ist für den vereidigten Bischof unerlaubt und unehrenhaft, bei einem späterhin eintretenden Conflict zwischen neuen Staatsgesetzen und seinem Gewissen jene vom Staate auf Grunde seines Eides erlangten Privilegien und Rechte, Autorität und Einfluss, nun gegen den Staat in feindlicher Untergrabung des Gehorsams gegen die Gesetze überhaupt zu gebrauchen. Er muss dann vielmehr jene Privilegien und Rechte staatsbürgerlicher Natur dem Staate zurückgeben, d. h. das Amt, insoweit es vom Staate anerkannt ist, niederlegen. Ich würde in einem solchen Falle weder dem Staate mein Gewissen opfern noch meinen Eid brechen. Ein solcher Fall wäre aber nicht gegeben durch antirömische, sondern nur durch antichristliche Gesetze, zu deren Befolgung man mich zwingen wollte. Dazu ist nun, Gott sei Dank, in Preussen keine Gefahr vorhanden, auch nicht im Deutschen Reiche. Auch bleibe ich in einem solchen Falle ja immer noch ein katholischer Bischof dem Stande nach, und ich würde den Gläubigen, was mein Gewissen geböte, laut und offen verkünden, ohne jedoch die vom Staate empfangenen Rechte weiter auszuüben.

"Ich verwerfe das Staatskirchentum ebenso entschieden wie den theokratischen Staat. Die Religion ist keine Function des Staates. Ich würde niemals dulden, dass die Regierung in die Lehre, Liturgie und innere Disciplin Eingriffe thäte. Aber eben so sehr hat der Staat auch das souveräne Recht, überall da, wo eine Religionsgesellschaft in die äussere Rechtssphäre hereinragt, das kirchenpolitische Verhältniss selbstständig durch Gesetze zu ordnen, und sich in seine eigene Gesetzgebung nicht hereinreden zu lassen.

"JOSEPH H. REINKENS."

#### [TRANSLATION.]

"My friends and myself are sorry that there should be in England so little acquaintance with and understanding of our movement, as we infer from articles in the most influential journals, e.g. the *Times*; for we were of the opinion, and would yet willingly cherish it, that the noble English nation is called to advance at the head of those engaged in the great intellectual and spiritual conflict of the present time. It



is also a misfortune that the old Catholic families in England have shown themselves indolent and insensible to the moral perversity of the Roman Curia. . . . The converts alone, Manning at their head, speak in the name of the Roman Catholic Church, and the old families either are silent or let themselves be taken under the tutelage of these converts. For the most part they do not even know the object for which we contend; and yet during the last four years we have created a great literature concerning it in Germany, which ought not to be unknown amongst them, if they were in earnest about religion. My work, my present duty, does not, however, permit me to enter more fully into this matter.

"You wish an explanation from me of a sentence which I spoke when I took my oath of loyalty on 7th October, 1873, viz. that in any conflict of my conscience with the laws of the State I would not break my oath, but would lay down my office. Thus alone can an oath to keep the laws of the State have any meaning. With the Ultramontane bishops the taking of this oath is accepted in their minds according to a *reservatio mentalis* through which their acceptance of the oath becomes a Jesuitical means of deceiving and betraying the Government, so as to obtain rights which the State does not grant without the taking of the oath.

"The matter stands thus. Through the Sovereign's recognition of a bishop, the bishop receives privileges and rights that belong to the State, an authority in determining the civil status and condition of its citizens, a great influence and even a certain power over the material means of subsistence of a not inconsiderable number of its citizens. He receives all this, in no conceivable manner, through the confirmation or proclamation of the Pope, nor even through his election and consecration. Further, the State confers those privileges and rights solely and only on the condition of the honourable and unreserved acceptance of an oath to observe the laws with perfect fidelity. Now, I say, for a bishop thus bound by oath it is dishonourable and unlawful, if any conflict afterwards arises between new laws of the State and his conscience, to use those privileges and rights—together with that authority and influence which have been obtained from the State on the ground of his oath—against the State, and in hostile efforts to awaken contumacy against its laws. He ought rather to surrender these privileges and rights that belong to the State, *i.e.* lay down the office so far as it is recognised by the State. In such a case I would neither sacrifice my conscience nor break my oath. I should not, indeed, be placed in this dilemma by the passing of anti-Roman laws; only by the passing of the anti-Christian laws, which I might be required to observe. Thank God, there is no danger at present of such a dilemma in Prussia or in the German Empire. Even however in such a case I would still remain a Catholic bishop in my spiritual prerogative and authority. And I would proclaim openly and clearly to the faithful what my conscience commanded, without, however, exercising any longer the rights which I have received from the State.

"I repudiate the doctrine of a State Church as resolutely as that of a theocratic State. Religion is no function of the State. I would never tolerate any interference of the Government in the doctrine, liturgy, and internal discipline of the Church. But with equal right has the State the sovereign right, wherever a religious society enters the external domain of the law, to determine independently this external relation of the Church and State, and to allow no interference with its own legislative authority.

"JOSEPH H. REINKENS."

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